Inter-Coast International Training, Inc.(doing business as "Intercoast Colleges")

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2018

366 NLRB No. 176 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 176
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Inter-Coast International Training, Inc., d/b/a “Inter-
coast Colleges” and Irma Maldonado. Case 31–
CA–131805
August 27, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS PEARCE AND
MCFERRAN
On April 7, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Lisa D.
Thompson issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The judge found, applying the Board’s decisions in D.
R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in
relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy
Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied in rel-
evant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement in a
manner that requires employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive their rights to pursue class or collec-
tive actions involving employment-related claims in all
forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612
(2018), a consolidated proceeding including review of
court decisions below in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.,
823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), Morris v. Ernst & Young,
LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), and Murphy Oil USA,
Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). Epic Sys-
tems concerned the issue, common to all three cases,
whether employer-employee agreements that contain
class- and collective-action waivers and stipulate that
employment disputes are to be resolved by individual-
ized arbitration violate the National Labor Relations Act.
Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1619–1621, 1632. The Supreme
Court held that such employment agreements do not vio-
late this Act and that the agreements must be enforced as
written pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at __,
138 S. Ct. at 1619, 1632.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief. In light of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, which overrules
the Board’s holding in Murphy Oil, we conclude that the
complaint must be dismissed.1
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 27, 2018
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Yaneth Palencia, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Neil C. Evans, Esq. (Law Offices of Neil C. Evans), for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA D. THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This is an-
other case involving issues raised in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357
NLRB 2277 (2012).1 Pursuant to a charge and amended charge
filed by Irma Maldonado (Charging Party or Maldonado) on
June 30 and September 5, 2014, respectively, the General
Counsel alleges that Inter-coast International Training, Inc.,
d/b/a Intercoast Colleges (Intercoast or Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by: (1)
maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires
employees to resolve all employment-related disputes solely
through individual arbitration, and (2) seeking to enforce that
agreement since January 29, 2014, when it filed a motion to
strike a class action lawsuit in state court.2

1 We therefore find no need to address other issues presented in the
case or raised by the Respondent’s exceptions.
1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Jt. Mot. Stip.
Facts” for the parties’ Joint Motion to Transfer Proceedings to Division
of Judges and Joint Stipulation of Facts, “Jt. Exh.” for the Joint Exhib-
its, “GC Exh.” for the General Counsel’s exhibits, “R Exh.” for Re-
spondent’s Exhibits, “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief, and “R
Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
2 The original complaint was issued on November 28, 2014, and
was subsequently amended on June 26, 2015. The amended complaint
appears to allege that certain earlier motions or pleadings that Respond-
ent filed in 2012 and 2013 in response to the class action lawsuit also
constituted unlawful enforcement of the arbitration agreement, notwith-
standing that they occurred more than six months prior to the charge
and amended charge in this proceeding. However, the parties’ stipula-
tion of facts indicates that only the Respondent’s state court motions
and pleadings that were filed since January 29, 2014, are at issue.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
On November 5, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion to
Transfer the Case to the Division of Judges and Joint Stipula-
tion of Facts, requesting that the foregoing allegations be de-
cided without a hearing based on the stipulated record. I grant-
ed the parties’ motion and directed them to submit briefs by
December 10, 2015. However, counsel for Respondent re-
quested several extensions of time to file its brief, all of which
were granted. Ultimately, the posthearing brief deadline was
extended to February 16, 2016.
After carefully considering the stipulated record, the parties’
statements of position and their briefs, for the reasons set forth
below, I find that Respondent violated the Act as alleged.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The parties stipulated to, and I make, the following findings
of fact as to the nature of Respondents’ business and jurisdic-
tion:
1. At all material times, Intercoast has been a private voca-
tional educational institution with an office and place of busi-
ness in Northridge, California.
2. In conducting its operations during the 12-month period
ending October 31, 2014, Respondent derived gross revenues in
excess of $1 million and purchased and received at its
Northridge, California facility goods valued in excess of $5000
directly from points outside the State of California.
3. Accordingly, at all material times, Respondent has been
an employer within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Background Facts
1. Since at least March 14, 2012, Respondent's Employee
Manual contained an addendum titled, "Employee Acknowl-
edgment and Agreement" (the Agreement). The Agreement
included an arbitration provision which, if signed by employ-
ees, required them to submit all employment related claims to
binding arbitration.3
2. With respect to the arbitration provision, the Agreement
reads, in pertinent part:
I also acknowledge that the Company utilizes a system of al-
ternative dispute resolution which involves binding arbitration
to resolve all disputes which may arise out of the employ-
ment context. Because of the mutual benefit . . .which private
binding arbitration can provide both the Company and my-
self, I and the Company both agree that any claim, dispute,
and/or controversy that either party may have against one
another . . .which would otherwise require or allow resort to
any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum be-
tween myself and the Company . . . arising from, related to,
or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my
seeking employment with, employment by, or other associa-
tion with the Company . . . (with the sole exception of claims
arising under the National Labor Relations Act which are

3 Jt. Mot. ¶12a.
brought before the National Labor Relations Board . . .) shall
be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbi-
tration. I understand and agree that nothing in this agreement
shall be construed so as to preclude me from filing any ad-
ministrative charge with, or from participating in any inves-
tigation of a charge conducted by, any government agency
. . . however, after I exhaust such administrative pro-
cess/investigation, I understand and agree that I must pursue
any such claims through this binding arbitration procedure
. . .4
3. The Agreement represents Respondent’s current policies,
regulations, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.5
4. Between March 14, 2012, and January 15, 2013, Re-
spondent presented the Agreement to its employees, including
Charging Party Maldonado. Maldonado and some of the em-
ployees signed the Agreement and returned it to Respondent.
5. Since about March 14, 2012, employees who signed the
Agreement were bound by the aforementioned arbitration pro-
vision.
6. Previously, in or around May 2011, Anthony Nguyen
(Nguyen), a non-exempt, former employee of Respondent, filed
a complaint in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Cen-
tral District on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
former non-exempt employees of Respondent.6
7. The complaint alleged numerous California Labor Code
and the California Business and Professions Code violations for
earned, unpaid wages.
8. On May 31, 2012, Respondent filed with the court a Peti-
tion to Compel Arbitration, Stay Proceedings and Stay Discov-
ery. In its petition, Respondent sought an order staying the
complaint and compelling individual arbitration of all claims
against Respondent by all class members who signed arbitra-
tion agreements with Respondent, including Charging Party.7
In a sworn declaration in support of the petition, Geeta Brown,
Respondent’s president, stated, “all personnel who commence
or continue employment [at Intercoast] are required to comply
with the company’s alternative dispute resolution policy, which
include the mandatory arbitration of employment related
claims.”8
9. On June 7, 2012, Nyugen opposed Intercoast’s petition to
compel arbitration. Shortly thereafter, on June 14 2012, the
court denied Respondent's petition, essentially on the ground
that it was premature in the absence of a determination regard-
ing the putative class.9
10. On January 3, 2013, Respondent appealed the State
court’s Order denying its petition to compel arbitration. In its
brief, Respondent argued that its Employee Acknowledgement
and Agreement required all members of the class who signed
the Agreement, including the Charging Party, to individually
arbitrate their claims.10

4 GC Exh. 1(o) at Appendix A.
5 Id.
6 GC Exh. 9.
7 GC Exh. 10.
8 GC Exh. 10, p. 6.
9 GC Exh. 13.
10 GC Exh. 14.
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING, INC., D/B/A “INTERCOAST COLLEGES” 3
11. On August 21, 2013, the California Court of Appeals,
Second Appellate District affirmed the State court’s Order
denying Respondent's petition to compel arbitration.11
12. On January 29, 2014, Respondent filed a Notice of Mo-
tion and Motion to Strike Class Action Allegations from the
Class Action Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior
Court.12
13. On September 21, 2015, Superior Court Judge Michelle
Rosenblatt granted Nguyen’s Motion for Class Certification.13
14. On October 23, 2015, Respondent filed its Notice of
Hearing on its initial Petition to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings.14
15. At present, Respondent maintains the arbitration provi-
sion contained in the Agreement as described in paragraph 2
above.
III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Allegations are Barred by Section 10(b)
Before addressing the merits of the arbitration provision in
Respondent’s Agreement, I must determine whether the
amended complaint allegations are time barred under Section
10(b) of the Act. Respondent contends that this case should be
dismissed as time barred because the underlying charges were
filed more than 6 months after: (1) March 14, 2012, the alleged
date the arbitration provision contained in the Agreement was
promulgated, (2) May 31, 2012, the date Respondent filed its
petition to compel arbitration in state court, and (3) January
2013, when Respondent presented the Agreement to its em-
ployee (including Charging Party) and appealed the state
court’s denial of its petition to compel arbitration.
Respondent’s argument is without merit. The Board has long
held that an employer commits a continuing violation of the
Act throughout the period that an unlawful rule or policy is
maintained.15 It is also well established that an agreement en-
tered into outside the 10(b) period may still be found unlawful
where it is enforced inside the 10(b) period.116
In this case, there is no dispute that the mandatory individual
arbitration provision was maintained during the 10(b) period.
As for enforcement, Respondent’s January 29, 2014 Motion to
Strike was filed well within 6 months prior to the initial June
30, 2014 charge. Although it was not the first attempt to en-
force the provision in the class action suit (or the last), the
Board has held that an employer’s continued attempts to en-
force an unlawful provision within the 10(b) period constitute
independent violations.17 Further, while the motion to strike

11 GC Exh. 16.
12 GC Exh. 18.
13 GC Exh. 20.
14 GC Exh. 21.
15 See, e.g., Cowabunga, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 133, slip op. at 2
(2016), and cases cited there. See also Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
NLRB 824, 825 (1998).
16 See, e.g., Cowabunga, above. See also Teamsters Local 293 (R.
L. Lipton Distributing), 311 NLRB 538, 539 (1993); Whiting Milk
Corp., 145 NLRB 1035, 1037–1038 (1964), enf. denied on other
grounds 342 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1965).
17 See CPS Secuirity (USA), Inc., 363 NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 1 fn.
2 (2015) (holding that the fact that the employer initially sought to
did not itself mention anything about the arbitration provision,
Respondent’s purpose for filing the motion was in essence to
strike the class complaint from going forward and compel em-
ployees to comply with its mandatory arbitration agreement. In
fact, the only reason Respondent filed the motion to strike was
because its 2012 petition to compel was rejected by the superior
court as premature. Respondent’s motion to strike was con-
sistent with, and must be considered in light of, its May 2012
petition to compel arbitration and January 2013 appeal of the
superior court order, which specifically argued that the arbitra-
tion provision in Respondent’s Agreement precludes employees
from filing a class action in court and requires them to individ-
ually arbitrate their claims.18 As such, I conclude that the
amended complaint allegations are timely.
B. Whether Respondent Violated the Act as Alleged
As indicated above, the issue in this case is whether Re-
spondent violated the Act by maintaining and enforcing its
mandatory arbitration provision requiring employees to submit
all employment-related disputes solely to individual arbitration.
In D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), the Board held that
the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it re-
quired its employees, as a condition of employment, to sign an
agreement which mandated that all future employment related
claims against the company be determined individually by final
and binding arbitration.219 The Board held that the company’s
mandatory arbitration agreement was unlawful because, inter
alia, it required employees to waive their substantive right un-
der the NLRA to pursue concerted (i.e., classwide or collective)
legal action in any forum, arbitral or judicial. The Board
stopped short of requiring employers to permit both classwide
arbitration and classwide suits in a court or administrative fo-
rum, finding that “[s]o long as the employer leaves open a judi-
cial forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA
rights are preserved without requiring the availability of class-
wide arbitration.”20
The Board reaffirmed the relevant holdings and reasoning of
D.R. Horton in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72
(2014), enf denied in relevant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015). The Board in that case found that the employer likewise
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining mandatory
individual arbitration agreements. The Board also found that
the employer violated 8(a)(1) by seeking to enforce the unlaw-
ful agreements by filing a motion in court to dismiss a pending
FLSA collective action and compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate
their claims individually.

enforce its unlawful arbitration policy outside the 10(b) period did not
bar the General Counsel’s allegation that the employer had unlawfully
continued to seek enforcement of the policy inside the 10(b) period).
18 It is well established that events preceding the 10(b) period are
properly considered to lend context to events occurring within the 10(b)
period. See Machinists Lodge 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362
U.S. 411, 414–429 (1960).
19 D.R. Horton, supra, enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344, 362
(5th Cir. 2013), petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031
(5th Cir. 2014).
20 D.R. Horton, supra at 16.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
Respondent argues that the Board’s foregoing decisions
should not be followed as Federal and State courts have rou-
tinely rejected them and allow for class action/arbitration waiv-
ers. However, D. R. Horton/Murphy Oil represent current
Board precedent that I must follow unless and until it is over-
ruled by the Supreme Court.21 While the Supreme Court has
increasingly shown great deference to enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, and has upheld the enforcement of individual
arbitration agreement in employment related matters,322 the
Court has not expressly overruled D. R. Horton/Murphy Oil.
The Board’s decisions in D. R. Horton/Murphy Oil are there-
fore controlling. Further, as discussed below, on the facts pre-
sented, they compel a finding that Respondent violated the Act
as alleged.
1. Unlawful maintenance of the arbitration agreement
The parties dispute whether the arbitration provision within
Respondent’s Agreement is a mandatory term and condition of
employment. The General Counsel argues that the Agreement
is a mandatory term and condition of employment because: (1)
the Agreement is silent regarding whether employees may opt
in or out, and (2) other record evidence demonstrates that em-
ployees were required to comply with the Agreement; specifi-
cally, the 2012 sworn declaration by Geeta Brown, Respond-
ent’s president, that “all personnel who commence or continue
employment [at Intercoast] are required to comply with the
company’s alternative dispute resolution policy, which include
the mandatory arbitration of employment related claims.”
However, Respondent argues that the Agreement is voluntary
because nothing in the Agreement mandates participation in the
arbitration policy and only some employees signed the agree-
ment.
I find, for the reasons stated by the General Counsel, that the
arbitration provision in Respondent’s agreement is a mandatory
term and condition of employment. The unexplained fact that
only some employees signed the agreement containing the pro-
vision means little in light of President Brown’s declaration that
all employees were required to comply with the provision.
In any event, whether the agreement is mandatory is not dis-
positive of whether the Agreement violates the Act. As indi-
cated by the General Counsel, following D. R. Horton and
Murphy Oil, the Board addressed this issue in On Assignment
Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No. 189 (2015). In that case, the

21 See Manor West, Inc., 311 NLRB 655, 667 fn. 43 (1993); see also
Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746, 749 fn. 14 (1984) (“We emphasize that it is
a judge’s duty to apply established Board precedent which the Supreme
Court has not reversed. It is for the Board, not the judge, to determine
whether precedent should be varied”) (citation omitted).
22 See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749
(2011). In Concepcion, the Court emphasized that its cases “place it
beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”
The Court explained that the purpose of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to its terms.” See
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989). Indeed, the Board also acknowl-
edges that the provisions of the FAA evince a “liberal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.” See D. R. Horton, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8, so
long as the agreements do not preclude employees from exercising their
substantive rights under Section 7 of the Act. Id. at 9.
Board found the employer’s arbitration policy violated the Act
regardless that it allowed employees to opt out of the agree-
ment. Specifically, the Board made clear that individual arbitra-
tion agreements that prevent an employee from engaging in
concerted legal activities (i.e., filing class or collective actions
in court) must yield to the Act, whether or not they were a con-
dition of employment.23 Of particular import, the Board noted
that, “whether. . . [arbitration agreements] are imposed on em-
ployees by employers or whether employees are free to reject
them, makes no difference . . . to the legality of such agree-
ments under the NLRA. . .”24
Accordingly, I find that Respondent unlawfully maintained
the mandatory individual arbitration provision as alleged.
2. Unlawful enforcement of the arbitration agreement
As indicated above, Respondent sought to enforce the provi-
sion by filing its motion to strike. Respondent avers that its
motion to strike the class allegations is not the same as its peti-
tion to compel arbitration, primarily because it never mentioned
the arbitration agreement in its motion to strike as it did in the
petition to compel arbitration. As such, Respondent claims that
the General Counsel is improperly interpreting its motion to
strike as a petition to compel arbitration in an effort to support
her untimely complaint allegations. However, as discussed
above, the motion to strike is properly considered in light of the
previous motions and pleadings, which specifically argued that
the class allegations were barred by the arbitration agreement.
Moreover, Respondent clearly again sought to enforce its un-
lawful mandatory arbitration provision when, on October 23,
2015, it requested a rehearing on its original petition to compel
arbitration. In so doing, Respondent admits that its petition
directly challenges the class members’ right to proceed with
their class/collective action in state court.
Accordingly, I find that, by filing both the June 30, 2014 mo-
tion and the October 23, 2015 notice, Respondent unlawfully
enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Intercoast Colleges is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by main-
taining a mandatory arbitration provision in its Employee Man-
ual which required employees to resolve all employment-
related disputes exclusively through individual arbitration and,
both expressly and in practice, required them to relinquish any
right they have to resolve such disputes through joint, collec-
tive, or class legal action.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by seeking
to enforce its unlawful arbitration provision by filing a January
30, 2014 motion to strike the class allegations and an October
23, 2015 notice of hearing in California Superior Court which
had the effect of compelling arbitration and dismissing all col-
lective and class claims.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair la-

23 On Assignment Staffing, 362 NLRB slip op. at 7.
24 Id.
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING, INC., D/B/A “INTERCOAST COLLEGES” 5
bor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
The General Counsel seeks reimbursement of Charging Par-
ty’s litigation expenses within the 10(b) period, including, but
not limited to, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses resulting
from opposing Respondent’s efforts to enforce the arbitration
provision in state court since January 30, 2014, including the
Respondent’s motion to strike. Respondent argues that the rem-
edies sought by the General Counsel are inappropriate and be-
yond the Board’s jurisdiction. However, the Board has rejected
such arguments and upheld awards of litigation expenses result-
ing from an employer’s unlawful enforcement actions in State
and/or Federal courts.25 Accordingly, I find the General Coun-
sel’s request for litigation expenses an appropriate make whole
remedy and fully effectuate the purposes of Act. Interest on the
amounts due shall be computed in the manner prescribed in
New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010).
The General Counsel also requests an unconditional notice-
mailing remedy, i.e., that Respondents be required to mail the
notice to their employees regardless of whether Respondents
have gone out of business or have closed or ceased providing
services at a particular facility. However, the Board considers
this to be an extraordinary remedy, and the General Counsel
cites no extraordinary circumstances justifying it here.26 The
Board has not routinely included this remedy in other cases
under D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil (notwithstanding that it
would be a relatively simple matter for respondents to include a
copy of the Board’s notice when they notify their employees
that the unlawful arbitration provision has been rescinded or
revised). Accordingly, I decline to order an additional notice-
mailing remedy here.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended.27
ORDER
The Respondent, Intercoast Colleges of Northridge, Califor-
nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

25 See Ralphs Grocery, 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 3 n. 9 (in
finding Respondent’s arbitration policy together with its action in filing
a motion to compel arbitration in California Superior Court, unlawful,
the Board held, “Consistent with our opinion in Murphy Oil, we. . .
shall order the Respondent to reimburse Charging Party. . . and any
other plaintiffs for all reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest,
incurred in opposing the Respondent’s unlawful motion to compel
individual arbitration in the collective wage-and-hour litigation.”). See
also Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) (“If
a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the
employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys’ fees and
other expenses” as well as “any other proper relief that would effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.”).
26 See J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 14 (2010).
27 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitration
provision that, either expressly or impliedly, requires employ-
ees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to main-
tain joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, whether
arbitral or judicial.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise the arbitration provision in all of its
forms to make it clear to employees that the arbitration provi-
sion does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain em-
ployment related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were re-
quired to sign acknowledgements regarding the mandatory
arbitration provision in any form that it has been rescinded or
revised, and if revised, provide them a copy of the revised pro-
vision.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of the State of California, Los
Angeles County, Central District in Case BC461585, that it has
rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration provision, and
inform the court that it no longer opposes the action on the
basis of the arbitration provision.
(d) Reimburse Charging Party Irma Maldonado and any
other employees who joined in the state court litigation in Case
BC461585 for any attorneys’ fees, costs and litigation expenses
that they may have incurred in opposing Respondent’s efforts
to enforce the arbitration provision in that case since January
30, 2014, with interest compounded daily.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all
facilities where the arbitration agreement applied, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix”28 in both English and
Spanish. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees and former employees by such means. Re-
spondent also shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all former employees who were required
to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement during their em-
ployment with Respondent. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-

28 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
ings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since December
30, 2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 7, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a mandatory arbitration
agreement that, expressly or impliedly, requires employees, as a
condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain joint,
class, or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or
judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind or revise the arbitration agreement to
make it clear to employees that the agreement does not consti-
tute a waiver of their right to maintain joint, class, or collective
actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify employees of the rescinded or revised
agreement, including providing them with a copy of the revised
agreement or specific notification that the agreement has been
rescinded.
WE WILL notify the Superior Court of the State of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles County, Central District in Case BC461585,
that we have rescinded or revised the unlawful mandatory arbi-
tration provision, and inform the court that we no longer oppose
the action on the basis of the arbitration provision.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Party and any other employ-
ees who joined in the state court collective litigation in Case
BC461585 for attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses they in-
curred which were directly related to opposing our efforts in
that case to enforce the arbitration agreement since January 30,
2014, including our Motion to Strike Class Allegations and/or
Deem the Case a Non-Class Complaint, with interest.
INTER-COAST INTERNATIONAL TRAINING, INC., D/B/A
“INTERCOAST COLLEGES”
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-131805 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-
1940.