Hyster Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 14, 1972

198 N.L.R.B. 192 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hyster Company and United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-9160
July 14, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On February 25, 1972, Trial Examiner Josephine
H. Klein issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt her
recommended Order.1
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, and as noted
more fully by the Trial Examiner, we find that the
record discloses with respect to the issue of agency,
that Maddox, chairman of the Town Council, was
more than merely a prominent citizen who served as
a reference for some of the Respondent's employees.
Maddox testified that he discussed job applicants 75
to 100 times with Paul, the Respondent's personnel
manager, that he referred 25 to 35 employees to the
Respondent and that he spoke to Respondent's
employees about their jobs on 10 to 15 occasions.
Applicants Stanford and Carruth were advised to see
Maddox by the Respondent's personnel manager,
Paul. Applicant Taylor was advised by the Respon-
dent's employees to talk with Maddox, and the same
advice was given to applicant Smith by "people
talking." The Respondent made no effort to discour-
age the apparent impression of job applicants, its
employees, and people in the community that
Maddox was its apparent agent. Applicants Taylor;
Smith, Stanford, and Carruth were 'each hired after
individual conversations with Maddox. During these
conversations, Maddox interrogated the applicants
concerning their union activity and sympathy,
threatened the discharge of employees who signed
union authorization cards, and threatened that the
Respondent would move away if the employees
chose to be represented by the Union. Maddox also
made appearances at the plant and discussed with
the employees the problems a union might create.
Based on the foregoing, we find, contrary to our
dissenting colleague, that Maddox's conversations
with Smith, Stanford, and Carruth warrant the Trial
Examiner's 8(a)(1) findings and remedy.
Concerning Stanford's discharge, the facts of which
are more fully set out by the Trial Examiner, the
record shows that Maddox, as a result of his
interrogation of Stanford, became aware in early
August that Stanford had signed an authorization
card and that Stanford thought that a Union "would
help things out." Before this conversation, Stanford
had received a merit increase and had been offered
the opportunity to transfer to a job in which he could
make more money. About 2 weeks after the conver-
sation, a few days after the Respondent's personnel
manager and Maddox returned from a 10-day
vacation together, Stanford was discharged without
any advance notice. Stanford's foreman was called
back into the plant from the first day of his vacation
to prepare Stanford's termination report and to
advise Stanford of his discharge. Stanford's job
continued to be performed after his discharge.
Concerning the Respondent's retention of union
adherents who were more active than Stanford, we
agree with the Trial Examiner that a violation of the
Act does not have to be wholesale to be a violation.
The record shows that Stanford is the only employee
whose union sympathies were shown to have been
known to Respondent, and the only employee
discharged. With respect to Stanford's alleged
warnings as to his job performance, we note, as did
the Trial Examiner, that Stanford was never told that
his performance was so poor as to place him in
jeopardy of discharge or disciplinary action. To the
contrary, employees Carruth and Smith, whom
Stanford supplied with parts, testified that Stanford
adequately performed his work. The record shows
that Stanford was unaware of two adverse informa-
tion reports which were a part of his personnel file
and further indicates that, in any event, the dates on
which the reports were written are doubtful. In the
foregoing circumstances, we agree with the Trial
Examiner (1) that the Respondent had knowledge of
Stanford's union sympathy and activity, and (2) that
Stanford's discharge was discriminatorily motivated,
so as to be violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188
the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a F 2d 362 (C A 3). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear for reversing her findings.
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions
198 NLRB No. 11
HYSTER COMPANY
that the Respondent, Hyster Company, Sulligent,
Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
recommended Order.
CHAIRMAN MILLER, dissenting in part:
I would affirm the Trial Examiner only with
respect to the 8(a)(1) findings based on the state-
ments and conduct of Respondent's personnel
manager, Billy Paul, and would dismiss all other
allegations of the complaint.
I find the record evidence far too slim to support a
finding that Mr. Maddox, chairman of the Town
Council, was an agent of Respondent. The Industrial
Development Board, of which Maddox had previ-
ously been chairman, engaged in a practice common
to many communities which attempt to attract
industry-i.e., that of purchasing land, erecting a
plant, and leasing it to an industrial concern on a
nonprofit arrangement, financing the promotional
venture through a bond issue. Clearly such arrange-
ments create no agency relationship.
The only other evidence tending to support an
agency relationship is the Trial Examiner's findings
that Maddox played a role in the employment of
certain individuals by Respondent. The record does
show that Maddox, a prominent local citizen, was
frequently listed as a reference by employees, and
that Respondent checked out such references. Be-
yond that, which would, of course, have no probative
value in establishing agency, the Trial Examiner's
findings are supported by very little solid evidence.
While she found that Smith, for example, had been
advised to consult Maddox, the record shows that
Smith on his own initiative had gone to Maddox,
Maddox had suggested Smith apply at Respondent's
plant, and Smith then listed Maddox as a reference.
She also found that Carruth was told to see Maddox
before reporting to work, but the record of Carruth's
testimony on this point is so confused as to be almost
unintelligible. Taylor was not advised by anyone on
Respondent's behalf to see Maddox.
Thus, the record would much more securely
support a finding that local people seeking ajob with
Respondent found it to be to their advantage to have
the support of a prominent local citizen, and that a
number of them believed Maddox to be such a
person, and also one whose recommendations were
valued by Respondent.
Such facts do not establish a preponderance of
evidence-nor indeed even a prima facie case-of
agency, either as a matter of general law or on the
basis of any existing Board precedent.
Thus, I find no grounds for holding Respondent
liable for any improper statements made by Maddox
and would impute no knowledge to Respondent of
events known only to Maddox.
193
As to the 8(a)(3) finding, there is both a paucity of
evidence of knowledge by Respondent of Stanford's
union activity, no proof of any animus toward
Stanford because of his limited union activity, no
evidence that any other employee (many of whom
were far more active union supporters than Stanford)
suffered any kind of discrimination at the hands of
Respondent, and ample proof that Stanford had
been warned many times during his probationary
period of the inadequacies of his performance. In
that state of the record, I cannot agree that the Trial
Examiner's finding of an 8(a)(3) violation should be
allowed to stand.
The above reasons underlie my partial dissent, the
scope of which is set forth in the first paragraph of
this opinion.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPHINE H. KLEIN, Trial Examiner: This case was tried
in Vernon, Alabama, on November 22 and 23, 19711 on a
complaint issued on October 1 against Hyster Company
pursuant to a charge filed on August 23 by United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, alleging various acts
of interference with employees' rights in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act2 and the discriminatory
discharge of an employee in contravention of Section
8(a)(1).
All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
present oral and written evidence, and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses . The parties waived oral argument
and after the hearing the General Counsel and Respondent
filed briefs. Upon the entire record, observation of the
witnesses , and consideration of the briefs, the Trial
Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
A. Respondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, a Nevada corporation, with an office, plant, and
place of business in Sulligent , Alabama , where it is engaged
in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of lift truck parts
and material-handling equipment. During the past calen-
dar year, a representative period, Respondent sold and
;shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000
'directly from its Sulligent plant to customers outside
Alabama. Respondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
B. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is, and
has been at all times material herein, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 Except where otherwise indicated , all dates herein are in 1971
2 National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat 136, 73 Stat 519,
IU.S C. Sec 151, et seq )
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The complaint alleges that on several occasions in June,
July, and August Respondent, through William Paul,3 its
personnel manager at Sulligent, and its agent, James H.
Maddox, chairman of the Sulligent Town Council, inter-
fered with employees' rights guaranteed by Section 7. In
addition, it is alleged that on August 18 Respondent
discharged employees Willis Stanford because of his union
activities. In addition to the usual factual and credibility
questions, the issue of Maddox's role as an agent of
Respondent is raised.
B. The Setting
Lamar County is essentially rural but has some relatively
small industry. At least as recently as 1969 it was a
nonunion island surrounded by areas in Alabama and
Mississippi with unionized plants. According to Respon-
dent's personnel manager, there are now two unionized
plants, of unspecified size, in Lamar County.4 The
evidence establishes that the union or nonunion status of
all businesses within the area is generally well known in the
community.
Respondent, with its principal office in Portland,
Oregon, is a large company with facilities in various
locations in the United States and in several foreign
countries. In 1969 Respondent decided to build a new
plant. Before choosing a site it investigated several
locations, including Sulhgent, Alabama. Commencing in
April 1969, Respondent's representatives conferred with
members of the Sulligent Industrial Development Board, a
public corporation created in 1961 for the purpose of
promoting industry within the town. Its members are
elected by the Town Council. The board obtains any
needed funds from the Town Council. James H. Maddox
was chairman of the board from its creation until 1964,
when he became chairman of the Town Council, in which
capacity he now serves. He operates a Ford sales and
service agency and an American Oil Company dealership
in Sulligent. Among the town's most eminent native sons,
Maddox has been a guiding light and dominant force in
the activities of the Industrial Board, including its
relationship with Respondent. Also intimately involved in
the board's activities is Frank Buckley, a local businessman
and mayor of Sulligent.
Respondent's representatives initially inquired about
such social matters as housing, schools, churches, transpor-
tation, etc., and such industrial facts as the availability of
suitable land, power, trainable labor, etc. A. A. Mann, who
was to be the plant manager, asked if there were any
unionized plants in Lamar County and received a negative
reply. In October 1969 Respondent chose Sulligent as the
site for its plant and a tentative agreement was executed by
Respondent and the board around February 1970. Respon-
3 At the hearing , Mr Paul identified himself as Billy Paul, which is the
name by which he is known and which he apparently uses for all purposes
A Stanford , however, quoted Maddox as having said in August 1971 that
there are no unionized plants It is possible that Maddox made that
statement about the town of Sulligent, as distinguished from the entire
county of Lamar.
dent commenced some operations in an existing building
in the nearby town of Beaverton.
On June 1, 1970, a formal agreement was executed,
under which the board was to purchase the necessary land,
build the plant according to Respondent's specifications,
and supply specific equipment. The board, as "lessor," was
to finance the entire project by issuance and sale of $2.5
million in tax-free mortgage bonds, amortizable over 19
years, ending in June 1989. The project and any income
and profits therefrom were also to be taxfree. As "rent,"
Respondent is to pay the amounts of the principal and
interest on the bonds as they become due plus expenses of
the trustee. The "lease" runs until 1995, with options in the
Company to renew until 2010 at an annual "rent" of
$2,000. Respondent has the option to terminate the lease
and/or purchase the project for $1,000 upon payment of
the amounts due on the bonds.
While the board is formally designated as a "lessor," it is
the sole source of financing, with the town's credit pledged
in the substantial amount of $2.5 million .5 Manifestly, the
town's financial involvement alone makes it, in practical
effect, if not technically, a joint venturer critically
concerned with the successful operation of the plant.
Respondent introduced into evidence an article from the
editorial page of the page of the Danville, Illinois,
Commercial-News of September 1, 1971. The article,
entitled "Hyster's Newest Plant Vital in Sulligent, Ala."
resulted from a visit paid by representatives of the
newspaper, when they were graciously entertained by
company officials with local dignitaries, including Maddox
and Mayor Buckley. The newspaper item says, inter alia:
One is struck with the youthful work force, both office
and manufacturing . . . . Each new employee, un-
spoiled in thought or work habits, is trained on the job.
s s a r s
Sulligent as a location was no accident. Twenty
communities were studied by experts. Sulligent won
over a Mississippi town because of such matters as
better schools, sewers, water supply, town attitudes, etc.
Maddox and Buckley, apparently major spokesmen for the
"town attitudes," are both outspokenly opposed to labor
unions, having expressed the opinion that unionization
would hamper the growth of Sulligent and damage the
local economy by strikes. Personnel Manager Paul, the
top-ranking Sulligent native at the plant, shares Maddox's
and Buckley's opinions on unionization.
The Sulligent plant began operations around the end of
February or early in March, with the Beaverton plant
continuing to perform certain auxiliary operations. By
April, total employment reached 70, where it stayed until
August 18, the date of the discharge here involved. At the
time of the hearing, there were 100 employees. The
physical plant was so designed and constructed as to allow
for great expansion.
5 Maddox testified that the board was originally organized to refinance
McCoy Manufacturing Company, a local garment plant. According to
Maddox, in that connection the board issued $100 ,000 of bonds in 1961 and
$150,000 in 1965. In November 1971, with around 375 employees, McCoy
had closed (hopefully not a permanent closure).
HYSTER COMPANY
Respondent has held several ceremonial and social
functions attended by company officials and the town's
officials and eminent citizens. There also has been at least
one major event, dedication of plant, with general
community attendance. At all such functions great
emphasis has been placed on the Company's hopes and
plans for expansion. The eventual goal is a work force of
500 to 600 (or even possibly 800) employees. Respondent
has pledged to make the plant a truly local, community
project, eventually to be managed by local citizens.
C. The Events Here Involved
1. The alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1)
a. Billy Paul
Mr. Jack Bradley, a Sulligent native, now lives in
Birmingham , Alabama. He appeared at the hearing as a
"Union Representative" on behalf of the Charging Party
but did not testify. Paul, also a native of Sulligent, had also
lived in Birmingham for an unspecified period preceding
March 1970, when he had returned to Sulligent to work for
Respondent. Paul testified that he had seen Bradley
infrequently in Birmingham. On cross-examination Paul
conceded that he was aware of Bradley's identification
with the Union .6
Bradley initiated a campaign to organize Respondent's
Sulligent employees, but it is not clear when such activity
began. Paul testified that he had seen Bradley in Sulligent
as early as August 1970 but the two men had not spoken
until sometime around April or May 1971, at which time
Bradley said he was working, not vacationing. Other than
Paul's testimony, there is no affirmative evidence of
Bradley's presence or organizational activity in Sulligent at
any time before the middle of July 1971.
Employees Freddy Carruth, Joe Wayne Smith, and
Willis Stanford (the alleged discriminatee herein) testified
that they signed union authorization cards on July 14, 16,
and 19, respectively. They became the employee organizing
committee and solicited cards from other employees.
Respondent contends that the testimony concerning the
signing and solicitation of cards, and the dates thereof,
should be discredited because no cards were offered in
evidence and, apparently, because Bradley was not called
to corroborate the employees' testimony. The acts of
signing and the dates thereof were relevant, but these facts
could be established by oral testimony. The testimony of
the employees was undisputed and Respondent has
adduced neither evidence nor argument which would tend
to provide any basis for disbelief. Under such circum-
stances, corroboration was unnecessary and not in the
interest of expeditious hearing.
Carruth testified that he signed a union card, upon
Bradley's solicitation, at his home on July 14. Shortly
6 "Q You knew Jack Bradley was employed by United Steelworkers,
didn 't you'' A. Yes sir, I knew he was employed by TCI, Tennessee Coal and
Iron in Birmingham I knew he was a-I knew he was a steward-is that
what you call it?"
7 According to Carruth , the Union was discussed at virtually all the
"gnpe sessions" that Paul periodically held with groups of employees
Carruth maintained that Paul somehow caused employees to raise the
subject Although there was considerable testimony concerning the "gnpe
195
thereafter, in Paul's office, Paul asked Carruth if he knew
"Jack Bradley was around." When Carruth said he knew
"nothing about it," Paul said, "Well, you'd better watch
out because we'll be down' for us to watch our step."
Carruth testified that, although he has known Paul a long
time and frequently drops by Paul's office to chat, July 15
was the only time Carruth specifically recalled their
speaking of the Union.7
Paul, on the other hand, testified concerning three
occasions on which he and Carruth talked about the
Union. Paul testified that in March, while they were still
working at the Beaverton plant, Carruth came into Paul's
office-
... he was awfully upset. He just said, Billy, I
understand I've been linked with the Union, there's a
rumor going around in the shop." And I said, "Freddy,
don't worry about rumors, just do your job." And he
said, "Well, I just wanted you to know I haven't been.8
Paul further testified that on July 1 Carruth reported that
Bradley and another man had visited Carruth's home and
spent a great deal of time trying to persuade Carruth to
sign a union card. And then, according to Paul, Carruth
visited Paul's office on July 15 and volunteered the
information that "Jack's back in town" and Carruth
understood that Bradley was "seeing some of our people."
Paul replied that he knew Bradley was in town but had not
heard anything about Bradley's visiting employees at their
homes. Paul maintained that Carruth had taken the
initiative in each conversation and that Paul had not asked
him any questions.
Respondent contends that Carruth "lied unabashedly
about the timing of [his] conversation with Paul" because
he said that Paul called him into the office "right after [he]
signed the card" and "right there," while also testifying
that he had signed the card at home. However, immediate-
ly before using the quoted words, Carruth had dated the
conversation as "right after July the 14th or the 15th."
Nothing in Carruth's demeanor or in his occasionally
imprecise choice of words suggests to the Trial Examiner
that the witness was fabricating or attempting to give the
impression this his conversation with Paul occurred within
minutes after the card was signed. On the other hand,
Paul's testimony is confused . If, as Paul maintained,
Carruth had reported on July 1 concerning a home visit by
Bradley, Paul could not have disclaimed knowledge of
such home visits when talking to Carruth on July 15. It is
most unlikely that Carruth, who, as one of three employee
organizers, had solicited 15 or 20 union cards, would have
voluntarily mentioned Bradley's activity to Paul. Respon-
dent has suggested no explanation for such apparently self-
defeating conduct by Carruth. On the basis of the
probabilities, together with careful observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner credits
sessions," the complaint does not allege any violations based on these
meetings
8 Foreman Kenneth Hierman testified that Carruth made a similar
statement on August 2. The complaint does not allege any conduct of
Hierman as violative of the Act, and Carruth was not examined concerning
any such conversation with Hierman . Maddox's testimony concerning
statements by Carruth is discussed below
196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Carruth as to his conversation with Paul on or about July
15.
Paul's statements, as quoted by Carruth, amount to a
question designed to elicit information concerning organi-
zational activities among the employees and a threat of
unfavorable, though unspecified, consequences to the
employees if they dealt with Bradley, a union organizer. As
such the statements were violative of Section 8(a)(1).
Employee Johnny Lynn Taylor testified that in March,
while still at school, he applied to Paul for employment
with Respondent. In June he spoke to Maddox about the
matter. Three weeks later he saw Paul again and was hired.
Taylor testified as follows concerning the final interview:
... [Paul] started, he wanted to tell me about the
plant, how young it was and how it was growing, and
he asked me did I know anything about the Union and
I told him no, I hadn't worked under a union plant.
And he told me if any of the union people came around
and seen me not to sign a card, to come back and tell
him what we talked about.
Taylor said that the interview lasted about 20 minutes, a
substantial part of which was devoted to the Union, but
Paul "just talked mostly about how the plant was going to
grow," and "said if the Union come in it wouldn't grow."
Taylor said very little-"mostly listened." Taylor was sure
that it was not he who had raised the subject of the Union.
According to Paul, the hiring interview was a fairly long
one, in which Paul emphasized the plant's rosy prospects
and Taylor's opportunities for a great future if he worked
hard. Paul testified that he also outlined the Company's
work rules and similar matters. Paul denied that a union or
unions had been mentioned at any time during the
interview.
The Trial Examiner credits Taylor and, on the basis of
his testimony, finds that Paul unlawfully interrogated
Taylor concerning union activities and solicited him to
report on future activities.
Stanford testified that in his final employment interview,
on June 1, he told Paul that Mayor Buckley has advised
Stanford to tell Paul that "I didn't care anything about the
union, that the work was the only thing I was after."9 Paul
then said that he understood that Stanford worked under a
union at the Walker Manufacturing Company, whereupon
Stanford said that he had done so "only for about two
months." According to Stanford, Paul then said "that they
didn't want a union up there at the plant, that if everybody
could work together, they wouldn't care anything about a
union." Stanford was thereupon hired and reported to
work the next day. Despite Paul's denial, the Trial
Examiner credits Stanford.
Respondent argues that Paul's statements, as quoted by
Stanford, do not establish unlawful interrogation, since
Paul was at most making an observation which called for
no reply. The fact that Stanford had previously worked for
Walker was stated on his employment application and it
was a matter of common knowledge that Walker was a
unionized plant. In the Trial Examiner's opinion, Paul's
reference to Stanford's prior employment at a unionized
plant could have had no purpose other than to elicit some
indication of Stanford' s feelings or opinions about unions
at the time of the interview. Stanford's reply that he had
worked in a union shop for only a short time was a natural
reaction of a job applicant to Paul's statement. According-
ly, the Trial Examiner finds that Paul unlawfully interro-
gated Stanford. Paul's additional statements concerning
the undesirability of a union appear to have been
permissible expressions of opinion. Their context, being an
employment interview, is insufficient to convert them to
violative statements.
b. James H. Maddox
(1) Agency
The great community of interest between Respondent
and the town of Sulligent (through the Town Council and
the Industrial Development Board) is manifest . Theirs was
not a common commercial lease arrangement but rather a
situation in which the community has staked its credit in
the amount of $2.5 million and Respondent has been
afforded tax-free operations financed by tax-exempt bonds
issued by a public body. There is a continuing interdepen-
dence of town and company.
As chairman of the Town Council (and previously
chairman of the Industrial Development Board), Maddox
is vitally concerned for the success of the venture. And, as
would be expected, he has considerable influence with both
the Company and the local citizens.
On direct examination , employee Taylor testified that,
on the advice of some Hyster employees, he had spoken to
Maddox when seeking a job with Respondent. On cross-
examination by Respondent's counsel , Taylor testified as
follows:
Q. Did you hear of anybody else getting a job by
talking to Mr. Maddox?
A. I've heard about some going to see him.
Q. He's a pretty influential guy, isn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. He can get a guy around town, can't he?
A. From what I hear he could.
Maddox testified that he has discussed job applicants
with Paul 75 to 100 times and has referred from 25 to 35
employees to Respondent. "Probably 10 or 15 times"
Maddox has spoken to preser t employees of Respondent
about their jobs. It was stipulated that, of Respondent's
current employees, 24 listed Mayor Buckley and 15 listed
Maddox as references on their employment applications.
There is considerable evidence of the role played by
Maddox and Buckley in relation to the employment of
specific individuals. For example, Carruth's application,
filed on October 13, 1970, listed Maddox as a reference. In
an interview, Paul told Carruth to talk to Maddox. About 2
weeks later Carruth, without having seen Maddox, re-
turned to speak to Paul. Paul told Carruth to report to
work the next Sunday evening, but to see Maddox before
then. When he arrived at the plant at the designated time,
Carruth met Maddox just outside the door. Maddox spoke
of the great future of the plant and its virtues for a young
employee. According to Carruth, Maddox "said if we ever
went union and we go out on strike and all that, that
9 Stanford's prior contact with Buckley is discussed below.
HYSTER COMPANY 197
Hyster would move out on us. Said it just won't be the
same , if it stayed it wouldn't ever grow no more." 10
Employees Taylor and Smith both testified that after
they had filed applications for employment with Respon-
dent but had not been hired, they were advised to consult
Maddox. Taylor's advice came from Hyster employees,
and Smith's came from his father, a former employee of
Maddox, and from "people talking." Each of them was
hired shortly after having spoken to Maddox.
Stanford filed an employment application with Respon-
dent in April 1970, but was not hired at that time. In May
1971 some of his friends who worked for Respondent told
him that if he wanted a job he should see Maddox.
Thereupon Claudeus J. Collins, a district commissioner of
Lamar County, under whom Stanford was then working,
spoke to Maddox and thereafter reported to Stanford that
he should see Paul. Stanford did so and for the next few
days tried unsuccessfully to reach Paul by telephone. On
Tuesday, June 1, Stanford telephoned Paul's office again
and was told that Paul was busy but would return the call.
Stanford left his present telephone number, which was in a
service station where Stanford had stopped in the course of
his work. It was not a station he regularly frequented.
Shortly thereafter Mayor Buckley telephoned Stanford.
According to Stanford, Buckley said that he understood
from Paul that Stanford wanted to work for Hyster.
Buckley then said that "they tried hard up there to get the
plant, that they didn't want no union." When Stanford
replied that he did not care about the Union and his only
concern was to get a job, Buckley said it would be a good
idea for Stanford to repeat that to Paul when he went to
see him . Stanford went to see Paul the next day and was
hired. Buckley conceded that he telephoned Stanford. He
maintained that he called only to say that he heard
Stanford was in line for a job and that Hyster was a fine
company to work for. Buckley said that he normally makes
such calls, since, as the mayor and a concerned citizen, he
engages in such social niceties. He did not explain why
such a gracious gesture could not have awaited a more
propitious time, when Stanford was at home, not on his
job. Buckley denied that Paul had asked him to call or that
he had told Paul he would call Stanford. However, Buckley
was unable to explain precisely how he had learned where
Stanford could be reached at that time. He conjectured
that he had probably got the number from Stanford's
parents, who had visited Buckley's hardware shop, but he
conceded that he might have got it from Respondent.
There is no explanation of how Stanford's parents might
have known Stanford's whereabouts at that time. And
there is no evidence that Paul himself ever did return
Stanford's call. The only reasonable inference, therefore, is
that Buckley called Stanford at the request and/or on
behalf of Paul, and the Trial Examiner so finds. Buckley
conceded that in his telephone conversation he "got
around to telling [Stanford] how [Buckley] felt about
unions," which was decidedly negative.
Stanford further testified that around the end of July he
was told by Paul to go to see Maddox. Stanford did not see
Maddox until August 9. At that time Maddox and
Stanford talked about ordering some parts for repair of
Stanford's car. According to Stanford, with the automobile
business concluded, Maddox turned to the subject of the
Union. Maddox asked if he had ever spoken about the
Union to Stanford and Stanford said "No." Maddox then
asked how Stanford felt about a union, and Stanford
replied that it would help. Maddox then asked if Stanford
had signed a union card, to which Stanford answered in
the affirmative. Stanford's testimony continued:
[Maddox] said, "Well, let me tell you some things
then," he said that no other companies was organized
and that the plant would pick its things up and move
away. And he said if anyone was caught, you know,
talking about union or anything like that, the company
would fire them... .
Paul denied having told Stanford to see Maddox.
Maddox and Paul both testified that they had been out of
town together on a vacation on August 9. Maddox,
however, testified that about a week or 10 days before that
he had talked to Stanford about ordering parts for
Stanford's car and had also spoken about the Hyster plant.
But he denied that the subject of the Union was
mentioned. Maddox testified that he had said he hoped
things were going well at the plant and "That thing means
a lot to me and I'd hate to have any trouble up there and
things don't go as planned .... I'm looking forward to
the day they are working five or six hundred people up
there."
Stanford testified that he established the date of this
conversation because he had gone downtown to get some
medicine for his baby and the date on the medicine bottle
was August 9. He did not produce the bottle. Paul and
Maddox testified that they and their families had been on
vacation, in a hotel, at the time. They did not produce any
receipts.
In its brief, Respondent says that the date of this
conversation was an "unimportant detail." The Trial
Examiner believes that the participants considered the date
"unimportant" and thus had no motive for falsifying. The
Trial Examiner believes that in this instance Maddox's
recollection is the more accurate and thus finds that
conversation between Maddox and Stanford occurred
around August 1 rather than August 9, as Stanford
recalled. Despite Stanford's error as to the date, the Trial
Examiner credits his testimony that Paul told him to see
Maddox and also credits Stanford's version of the
conversation with Maddox.
The General Counsel contends that the foregoing
evidence establishes that Maddox, as chairman of the city
council, was an agent of Respondent. I I Respondent, on the
other hand maintains that the evidence establishes only
that Maddox , as an eminent, influential member of the
community, assisted local citizens in securing employment
by serving as reference for them.
The close relationship between Respondent and the
10 This conversation, occurring more than 6 months before the charge Such an allegation would have been surplusage because there is no
was filed, is not alleged or found to be violative of the Act It is referred to allegation that Buckley engaged in any conduct violative of the Act. The
only as part of a pattern in determining the relationship between Maddox evidence concerning Buckley is relevant , however, since his position vis-a-
and Respondent. vis Respondent and the town is similar to Maddox 's and tends to show a
11 There is no allegation that Mayor Buckley was Respondent's agent pattern of relationship between the town officials and Respondent
198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
board, was, of course, a matter of general public knowl-
edge. Not only had the plant been financed by bonds
issued by the board, but the town officials were prominent-
ly included in all publicized ceremonial events conducted
by Respondent.
The evidence establishes that, before Hyster chose
Sulligent as the site for its plant, it sought and secured
information that there were no unions in Lamar County.
There is no evidence that thereafter Company and town
representatives "officially" discussed the union situation.
But there was no evidence denying the reasonable
assumption that on a private or unofficial basis the matter
was discussed. Paul testified that he and Maddox had
discussed unions "in general" but had not discussed the
possibility of one coming into the Hyster plant or the
means of keeping unions out of the plant. This testimony,
however, is inherently incredible. There would be nothing
unlawful or sinister in their conferring on the most
effective means for countering a union organizational
campaign. So long as there was no coercion or unlawful
interference with employee rights, there is no reason why
the Company could not enlist the persuasive powers and
advice of the citizenry. The Trial Examiner discredits
Respondent's contention that a virtual wall was erected
between the Company and the town so far as unionization
was concerned. Even in the absence of specific credited
evidence that Respondent had individual employees speak
to Buckley or Maddox, the evidence as a whole would
establish that Respondent's representatives and the mem-
bers of the Industrial Board and the Town Council so
acted as to hold Maddox out as an agent of the Company.
While no two cases ever present identical facts, the Trial
Examiner believes that the present case falls within the
precedent of Colson Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 128, 137
(C.A. 8), cert. denied 382 U.S. 904, enfg. 148 NLRB 827;
N.L.R.B. v. Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d 76 (C.A. 5),
enfg. in pertinent part 158 NLRB 863, 873-874; Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers [Hamburg Shirt Corp.] v.
N.LR.B., 371 F.2d 740, 744 (C.A.D.C.), enfg. 156 NLRB
511; Henry I. Siegel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 417 F.2d 1206 (C.A.
6), enfg. in pertinent part 182 NLRB No. 88. In the words
of Judge Leventhal in the Hamburg Shirt case, the Trial
Examiner here finds that Respondent's conduct was such
as to lead to "the employees' reasonable and predictable
conclusion that the business leaders in inveighing against
the Union were serving in effect as organs of communica-
tion from management." In the main, Respondent appears
to have used the community leaders as prestigious
spokesmen so that company officials could personally
avoid violative statements.
Respondent cites Ottenheimer and Company, 144 NLRB
38, 39, fn. 1, and Sparton Manufacturing Co., 150 NLRB
948. In Ottenheimer there appears to have been no "joint
venture" between the employer and the community. A
12 Respondent quotes the following sentence from Ottenheimer "Even if
we were to assume that Respondent 's failure to disavow the action of [the
lessor] constituted an affirmance thereof, there is still lacking an essential
element for the creation of an agency relationship in that there is no proof
that [the lessor] purported to act as the agent of the Respondent . That
statement should be contrasted with the later pronouncement by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Hamburg Shirt v N.LR B, 371 F.2d at 744
"Clasped together under the stimulus of small town economics, the
group of businessmen had formed a corporation which
leased the premises to the respondent, but, so far as
appears, it was a straight commercial lease transaction, as
distinguished from the present case , where the local
government's credit was pledged through tax-free bonds
and without profit. Additionally, there was no evidence
that Ottenheimer had initiated or participated in the
lessor's antiunion activities, whereas in the present case the
Trial Examiner has found that Paul on occasions caused
Maddox or Buckley to speak to employees. Further, in
Ottenheimer there is no indication that employees or others
had any reasonable basis for believing that the employer
and the lessor corporation were acting in concert. The
holding was simply that the lessor "did not become the
agent of Respondent merely because Respondent re-
mained silent after it learned that [the lessor] had repeated
its own threat that unionization of the plant would cause it
to move." In Sparton, while the land on which the plant
was built had been virtually donated, there was no
continuing financial relationship between the company
and the community. There was no evidence that the
company had either instigated or ratified any action by the
two local citizens who had made the invidious statements
in issue . Finally, it should be observed that, except for
Sparton, no later case has cited Ottenheimer as authority on
the point here in issue . The more recent judicial and Board
cases cited above represent the current trend.i2
(2) Statements to employees
Employee Smith had sought Maddox's assistance in
obtaining employment with Respondent sometime in
February.13 He signed a union card on July 16, thereafter
solicited cards from other employees, and served as one of
three employees composing the organizing committee.
Sometime around the end of July he visited Maddox's
place of business to obtain some parts for his car. Smith
testified that he was called into Maddox's office. Accord-
ing to Smith, Maddox asked if Smith had seen Bradley,
who Maddox understood was "down here trying to
organize Hyster." When Smith said he had not seen
Bradley, Maddox said, "We don 't want a union in Hyster,
not right now. . . . Maybe about five or six years."
Maddox asked Smith to tell any union supporters "to put it
off for five or six years." Despite Maddox's denial, the
Trial Examiner credits Smith and finds that Maddox's
question concerning Bradley was unlawful interrogation
designed to elicit information concerning the employees'
union activities.
Employee Carruth testified that around the middle of
July he was at Maddox's place of business to make a
downpayment on a tractor he was buying. Carruth testified
that he was called into Maddox's office, where Maddox
spoke approvingly of the Hyster plant. Carruth's testimony
continued: ". . . then he brought up he heard I had been
Company and the community were linked in a kind of point venture , rooted
in an overlap of financial interest. In this context the Company's silence is
expressive The Company made no effort to dissipate the impression that
the local entrepreneurs spoke with its authority , nor did the Company
repudiate their grim forebodings of the consequence of Union victory."
13 Statements made by Maddox at that time are not alleged as violative
of the Act The evidence leaves in doubt whether such statements were
made within the 6-month period allowed under Sec. 10(b).
HYSTER COMPANY 199
pushing the union, for me to go and get my name cleared
up with Billy Paul. When I was going out the door, he told
me that they had 50 men to every one man working there
watching out for the union." Maddox conceded that he
had had a conversation with Carruth on or about July 14.
According to Maddox, Carruth was executing a contract in
the bookkeeper's office, beside Maddox's private office.
Maddox testified that Carruth volunteered the information
that the "union people" had been to his house and stayed a
long time, despite Carruth's desire to go to bed. According
to Maddox, Carruth asked what Maddox would have done
and Maddox replied that he "would have turned [his] back
on them and went to bed." Maddox also testified that Carl
Reeves, his bookkeeper, was present during the conversa-
tion. Reeves was not called to testify.
Carruth signed his union card on July 14 and, as a
member of the organizing committee, solicited 15 to 20
other cards. Under the circumstances, it is most unlikely
that he would complain to Maddox about the Union's
activities. On the other hand, it would be natural for
Maddox to express his opinion as to the disadvantages of
unionization. On all the evidence, including careful
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, the Trial
Examiner credits Carruth.14 Maddox's telling Carruth to
get his "name cleared up with Billy Paul" amounts to a
potent, if indirect or veiled, threat of adverse treatment for
adhering to the Union.
The statement that "they had 50 men to every one man
working there watching out for the union," which Carruth
attributed to Maddox, is, standing alone, somewhat
ambiguous. However, when coupled with the further
statement that Maddox had heard that Carruth "had been
pushing for the union," it can readily be understood as a
statement creating the impression that the union activities
of Respondent's employees were being kept under surveil-
lance.
Accordingly, the Trial Examiner finds that Respondent,
through Maddox as its agent, violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act on or about July 15 by creating the impression of
surveillance and by threatening adverse treatment for
supporting the Union.
As found above, around the beginning of August,
following a direction by Paul, Stanford spoke to Maddox.
Stanford's and Maddox's contradictory versions of the
substance of the conversation are set forth above. Summa-
rized, Stanford testified that Maddox said that Respondent
would move away if a union came in and threatened that
anyone caught talking about the Union would be dis-
charged. Maddox maintained that he simply asked "How
everything was getting along at the plant" and said he
hoped things were all right because he would "hate to have
any trouble up there and things don't go as planned."
Maddox did not indicate what kind of "trouble" he had in
mind which would cause things not to "go as planned."
On all the evidence, including careful observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner credits
Stanford. On the basis of his testimony, it is found that
14 In the Trial Examiner 's opinion , contrary to Respondent's, Carruth's
possible failure to distinguish between Maddox's pnvate office and the
bookkeeping office at his place of business is no reason for doubting
Carruth's veracity or accuracy Since the bookkeeper did not testify, the
Trial Examiner is inclined to credit Carruth's testimony that the conversa-
Respondent, through Maddox as its agent, unlawfully
interrogated Stanford concerning his union activities, and
threatened discharge for union activity and plant removal
if the employees chose to be represented by a union.
2. The discharge of Willis Stanford
a. The basic contentions
Stanford signed a union card on July 19 and then
solicited cards from other employees. As previously found,
around the beginning of August, in answer to questions by
Maddox, Stanford said he thought the Union would help
at the plant and disclosed that he had signed a card. About
2 weeks later, a few days after Paul and Maddox returned
from a 10-day vacation together, Stanford was discharged,
without any advance notice. Based on all the circum-
stances, the Trial Examiner specifically finds that Maddox
passed on to Paul the information he had obtained about
Stanford.
In addition, even absent such specific evidence of
company knowledge, because of the smallness of the plant
and the general nature of this closely knit small communi-
ty, it would be reasonably inferred that the progress of the
Union's organizational activities and the identity of the
active employee solicitors were known to Respondent.
N. L. R. B. v. Pembeck Oil Corp., 404 F.2d 105, 110 (C.A. 2),
remanded 395 U.S. 828.
The abruptness and timing of Stanford's discharge
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory action
violative of Section 8(a)(3). N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 355 U.S.
829; N.L.R.B. v. Mid State Sportswear, Inc., 412 F.2d 537,
539 (C.A. 5). "The Company had the burden to come
forward with an adequate explanation for discharging
[Stanford] once a prima facie case of possible discrimina-
tion had been established by the General Counsel."
N.L.R.B. v. Standard Container Co., 426 F.2d 793, 794
(C.A. 5).
Respondent maintains that the primary reasons for
Stanford's discharge was that he was an unsatisfactory
employee. The timing and abruptness of the discharge were
allegedly dictated by Respondent's desire to terminate the
employee before the end of his 90-day "probationary
period." Contributing to the discharge, though of second-
ary importance,15 according to Respondent, were Respon-
dent's decision to change its method of handling materials
and its being overstaffed.
b. The chronology
Stanford commenced working for Respondent on June 2
as a "material moveman." Using a gasoline powered
forklift truck, he brought materials from the storage area
outside the production area to the various machines and
removed finished products from the machines. In general,
he learned what materials were needed by watching the
machines, by having machine operators tell him when they
tion took place in Maddox's pnvate office.
15 In its brief Respondent says. "Like the elimination of the moveman
job, the inflated employment level would not, without more , have brought
about Stanford's discharge .. "
200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
needed materials, and by receiving material slips from the
machine operators. He also was responsible for providing
the machine operators with empty chip barrels for scrap
and for removing full chip barrels. He also was charged
with keeping tote boxes in place, with the aisles between
rows of machines clear.
His first supervisor was Larry Butler. On June 21 Butler
recommended Stanford for a merit increase of from $2.16
to $2.27 per hour. The recommendation, approved by P.
Carter, Paul, and Plant Manager A. A. Mann, read:
Willie seems to be learning how to carry out his duties
well and is open to any suggestions that would improve
these duties. He has also made some suggestions on
how to speed up the operation of his duties.
Butler testified that he recommended the increase
because Stanford had suggested that the material move-
man be supplied with a schedule of production for the next
3 to 4 days so he could better anticipate the men's needs.16
Butler did not inform Stanford of the merit increase before
its effective date, July 5.
As of June 28 Butler was transferred to the second shift.
He testified that, during the short time between his
recommending the raise and his transfer, he noticed
Stanford's work "gradually starting" to deteriorate. How-
ever, Butler filed no "information reports," did not
mention the matter to his superiors, and did not say
anything to Stanford, even, apparently, when he informed
Stanford of the merit increase.
Kenneth W. Hierman took over as first-shift foreman,
supervising Stanford, as of June 28. He testified that
practically from the beginning he found Stanford's work
deficient. Sometime after becoming first-shift foreman,
Hierman gave Stanford an undated, handwritten list of the
specific duties of the material handler's job. He discussed
this list, item by item, with Stanford. Hierman testified that
on the same day he prepared a formal "information
report" concerning Stanford's performance. Respondent
introduced the report, with the handwritten list of the
duties of the job attached. The text of that report reads:
I don't feel that Willie is doing his job properly. He
does not keep material supplied to the various work
stations until it is too late and the operators have to
either stand and wait on him or do their own moving.
Assuming that Willie didn't understand his duties, I
ask him to come into the meeting room and we sat
down and talked about his job and I outlined his duties
and told him what we expected of him. We also talked
about his standing around and talking too much when
there was lots of work to be done.
The report bears the date July 15 and is signed by
Hierman, Paul, and Robert Guengerich, who arrived in
Sulligent as the new plant manager on July 14, Hierman
testified that he discussed the report with Paul, "[a]t the
time [he] made it out." Guengerich testified that he saw the
report the week following July 16 and 17. The printed
report form has a line for the employee's signature. Paul
testified that such reports are "always" shown to the
employees and Hierman testified that foremen are suppos-
ed to show them to the employees concerned but he does
not always do so. It is undisputed that this report was not
shown to Stanford. As hereafter set forth, the accuracy of
the date on this report is doubtful.
Guengerich, accompanied by Ned Snow, Respondent's
director of management action staff, had amved to take
over as plant manager in Sulligent on July 14. They spent
the first few days observing the operations. According to
Guengerich, his first negative "observations" concerned
"the lack of work . . . the general disorder in the new
factory, and . . . [the] material handling procedure... .
He and Snow discussed the matter on July 16 and again on
July 17, when they called Paul in to join the discussion.
Guengerich testified that Respondent's "production
inventory records indicated" that there were about 15
excess employees. Learning that six additional employees
were scheduled to report for work on Monday, July 19,
Guengerich and Snow asked Paul to cancel those hirings.
Paul did stop three of the prospective employees from
reporting. According to Paul, the other two had already
served their termination notice periods at their former jobs.
Guengerich testified that on July 17 they reviewed a "list of
employees and probationary employees" and finally
agreed to permit the two employees to report on Monday
because they "agreed there was some uncertainty in the
work loads." According to Paul, at the July 17 meeting
Snow complained that no probationary employees had
been discharged within the past 90 days. Thereupon a list
of employees was produced and they "discussed all the
entire group of employees" and thejobs, including material
moving. Guengerich said that that job could be eliminated
because the material-handling system was to be changed
and "the job hasn't been performed as it should be." There
is no suggestion that any reference was made to any
"information report" on Stanford.
Stanford testified, without contradiction, that he signed a
union card, on Bradley's solicitation, on Monday, July 19.
As previously found, around the beginning of August
Stanford revealed this fact to Maddox.
Respondent introduced into evidence an "information
report" dated August 5 concerning Stanford. It is signed by
Hierman as the supervisor and countersigned by Guenge-
rich and Paul. The text reads:
Willie seems to know what his job is but he would
rather visit, than try to keep his work up. We have to
ask him to straighten areas that he is supposed to keep
straight. And hunt him when we need things moved.
Hierman testified that this report was occasioned by his
having seen Stanford, without his forktruck, standing
watching some steel being unloaded on the loading
platform. Hierman rebuked Stanford, who returned to his
work forthwith. Stanford testified that at the time in
question he was taking a permissible break. There are no
set times for breaks at the plant, employees being at liberty
to take short breaks for drinking soft drinks or using the
restroom at their convenience.
As was true with the one dated July 15, this report was
not shown to or discussed with Stanford and the line for
the employee's signature is blank. Again Hierman ex-
plained his failure to show the report to Stanford by stating
16 This suggestion was apparently implemented in substance when the
method of handling materials was revised around October 1, some 6 weeks
after Stanford's discharge.
HYSTER COMPANY
that it had been made out after Stanford had left for the
day. But Hierman conceded that supervisors are not
required to submit such reports to the personnel office the
day they are prepared. Guengerich testified that he saw
and read that report on August 6. The accuracy of this date
on this second report is also questionable.
According to Respondent, Snow, having left the Sulli-
gent plant around July 23, returned on August 16.
Guengench testified that around 1 p.m. on August 17, as
he and Snow were returning to the plant from lunch, they
saw Stanford standing around on the shipping dock,
outside the plant. Nothing was said to Stanford at that
time. Guengerich and Snow proceeded into the office,
where Snow proceeded to berate Guengerich. According to
Guengench, Snow was particularly irate because nobody
had been discharged since his prior visit. Snow said, as he
had in July, that his extensive experience taught that it was
impossible for any management to hire as probationary
employees only workers who eventually proved satisfacto-
ry. Snow was especially disturbed that no probationary
employees had been terminated, while, as previously noted,
two new employees had been taken on as of July 19. Paul
was summoned to join the discussion and he also was
criticized. Then, concluding this conference, Snow asked
Guengench "when [he] was going to do something about
this material handling situation." However, according to
Guengerich, a change in the system had been decided on in
July and its effectuation had to await receipt of a second
walkie handtruck, which had been ordered.
According to Guengerich, the discussion between him
and Snow resumed on August 18. In this connection,
Guengerich testified:
[Snow] and [I] entered into the conversation again on
probationary employees and material handling me-
thods, and we called Billy Paul into the office and
asked him about Willis Stanford, instructed Billy to go
get Willis' personnel file and return and we sat there
and reviewed his performance from his personnel file.
Foreman Hierman was then at home having that day
started a 10-day vacation. At Guengerich's request, Paul
called Hierman into the office. Guengench testified:
... Kenny [Hierman] came into work and into my
office. We discussed our problem, handed Kenny
Willis' folder and asked him to read it and tell me if this
man was going to make it. Kenny read through it and
said ... "He's just not really doing any better. He
visits too much, talks too much, he constantly has to be
badgered to move material." So I told Kenny to think
about it, we were going to go to lunch. After lunch we
would get back together and talk about it some more. I
returned from lunch and Kenny said, "We're going to
have to turn him loose." I agreed.
Hierman prepared a "termination report" and an "inform-
ation report," which were then countersigned by Guenge-
rich and Paul. The termination report indicates that
Stanford was being discharged for unsatisfactory work and
that he would not be rehired. The written text reads:
Willie spends to much time visiting with anybody that
17 Stanford testified that the termination report in the record was not the
same as that shown to him at the time of the discharge It appears likely,
however, that he simply had failed to read the continuation of the remarks
201
will talk instead of working. We have talked about this
before but any improvement is only temporary. Willis
is on a probationary period and [continued on reverse
side] we feel that it is unfair to keep him any longer
when he don't seem able to adapt to our work.17
The accompanying "information report" reads:
Willie is still spending to much time visiting instead of
working. I don't feel that Willie has a desire to do his
work or utilize his time, and unless some body would
have the time to direct his every move I don't feel that
he will ever become a good employ [sic].
Shortly before the end of the shift Hierman called
Stanford into the office, informed him of the discharge,
showed him the termination reports, and solicited his
written statement and signature . Stanford refused to sign.
According to Stanford, Hierman said that there was
nothing personal involved.
Hierman corroborated the absence of any "hard feel-
ings ." Stanford reminded Hierman that sometime previ-
ously Hierman had offered Stanford a transfer to opera-
tion of a machine, at which position he could make more
money than he was making as the material moveman.
Stanford, having refused that offer when it was made,
suggested he could now be put at a machine off by himself,
where he could not talk to other employees. Hierman
rejected the suggestion.
At his request, Stanford then spoke to Guengench.
Guengerich maintained that the decision to discharge
Stanford had been made by Hierman and Guengerich felt
he had to back up the discriminatory decisions of first-line
supervisors. He also rejected Stanford's suggestion of a
transfer to a machine. Stanford testified that Guengerich
offered to provide a recommendation if needed.
c. Discussion
(1) Claimed overstaffing
Hierman testified that when he was called into the plant
on August 18 Guengerich said "that we had too many
employees and we had to cut some down." However,
Guengerich testified that he "would not say [they] had lack
of work" at that time. As Respondent itself says in its brief,
"the employment picture had improved by the time of
Stanford's discharge." According to Respondent, the
number of "excess" employees had declined from 15 to 5,
at most, despite the fact that two new employees had
reported for work on July 19 and no employees had been
terminated.
Guengench testified that shortly after he arrived at the
plant in July, accompanied by Snow, he addressed the
employees, saying that, while there was then an apparent
lack of work, management had great hopes for expansion
and would be devoting considerable effort to increasing
the work of the plant. According to his testimony, the
thrust of his remarks was reassurance to the employees,
with no intimation of any anticipated reduction in force,
either permanent or temporary.18 Such assurances were
repeated at employee meetings , which are held at approxi-
on the back of the form
18 Guengench testified "All I said was, I reassured them You know, I'm
new on the scene, what I saw I liked , as you know the plant was, designed to
(Continued)
202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mately monthly intervals. Respondent consistently made
public statements concerning anticipated growth.
The fact is that by September Respondent's net employ-
ment level had increased by three employees.19 By the time
of the hearing, in November, employment had risen from
70 to 100.
(2) Undischarged employees
At the hearing Respondent attempted to introduce into
evidence certain employee production records, the purpose
of the offer being, in the words of Respondent's counsel, to
"prove that Mr. Carruth is substantially ... below the
performance of other employees listed on the document."
Respondent argues that Carruth was probably the most
active union supporter and "was vulnerable to discharge
on the basis of his performance being marginal." From
these facts Respondent apparently argues that Carruth's
continued employment negatives an antiunion motivation
in Stanford's discharge.
It is perhaps more reasonable to argue that the retention
of Carruth despite his "marginal" performance seriously
undermines Respondent's insistence that inefficiency
virtually required Stanford's discharge, particularly when
Carruth's allegedly inferior productivity coincided with the
period in which Respondent contends the plant had some
15 extra employees. In any event, it has long been
recognized that an employer's failure to discharge all union
activists does not negative an antiunion motivation for
discharges shown. "A violation of the Act does not need to
be wholesale to be a violation." N.L.R.B. v. Puerto Rico
Telephone Co., 357 F.2d 919 (C.A. 1). "The fact that
respondent retained some union employees does not
exculpate him from the charge of discrimination as to those
discharged." N.L.R.B. v. Nabors Co., 196 F.2d 276 (C.A. 5),
cert. denied 344 U.S. 865.
Finally, it may be observed Stanford is the only
individual employee whose union sympathies were shown
to have been known to Respondent. According to
Respondent's witnesses, Carruth had voluntarily disa-
vowed any such sympathy.
(3) Alleged "elimination" of Stanford's job
After Stanford's summary discharge on August 18
material handling was performed on a somewhat makeshift
basis. For a week or so the forklift was operated by a
summer employee who was unable to operate his machine
because of an injury. Around the end of August that
employee left Respondent's employ to return to school.
Thereafter the forklift was operated by employees who
were temporarily out of work or by machine operators to
obtain their own parts.20
Around October 1 the system was changed so that a
expand and that 's what I was going to put my efforts to bring more work
into support the overhead I told them that we did have a lack of work in
house, for people not to get excited about it , my every effort would be spent
getting work into the house."
19 According to Paul, two employees were hired in July, two in August,
and six in September , six employees quit in July and August Stanford was
the only employee discharged.
20 This fact reinforces the conclusion heretofore reached that there were
no "excess" employees at the time of Stanford 's discharge
forklift truck brought the material from outside to a supply
area within the plant, from which individual operators got
their own materials , using battery-powered, hand-directed
trucks. The forklift truck was used for moving materials or
products within the production areas only upon specific
request, on infrequent occasions. The forklift operator's
title is "material supply man," rather than "material
moveman," which had been the designation of Stanford's
position. The revised job was not under Hierman's
jurisdiction, but rather assigned to the inventory supply
department. The revised position does not entail moving
material or products within the production area and, so far
as appears, the successor employee is not charged with
keeping the interior of the plant in a neat and orderly
condition. The new employee has somewhat more invento-
ry responsibilities than Stanford had had. The record is
silent as to whether Vaughn, the present material supply
man, was previously employed by Respondent and, if so,
what his prior job was.
The evidence thus establishes that, while Stanford's job
was somewhat revised, it was not eliminated. An employee
now works full time supplying materials for the machines
removing finished products, and providing and removing
clip barrels. As did Stanford, he uses a forklift truck.
Even is it be assumed that Stanford's job was "eliminat-
ed," such elimination could not practically occur until
there was a viable alternative method of handling materi-
als. The existing method was continued until the new
equipment arrived around October 1. Thus, the alleged
"elimination" of the job could not explain Stanford's
precipitous discharge on August 18.
(4) Stanford's "probationary" status
Respondent's emphasis of Stanford's "probationary"
status deserves some analysis. First, it should be noted that
Respondent's employee handbook does not refer to
"probationary" employees as such; nor does it specifically
state that unsatisfactory employees will not be retained
beyond 90 days. All it says is that persons who do not meet
production standards by the end of 90 days will be subject
to "disciplinary action." There were no "production
standards" applicable to Stanford's job. So far as the
present record indicates, the major effect of an employee's
having completed 90 days is that his wage is then raised to
the level established for the particular job he is then
performing, as distinguished from the lower wage range at
which new employees work.
In practice "probationary" employees are no more
vulnerable to discharge than are "regular" employees.
Since Respondent entered the area, it has discharged more
"regular" than "probationary" employees.21
Stanford had received a merit increase effective July 5, a
month after starting to work. To minimize the probative
21 Paul 's testimony was "Q. ( By the Trial Examiner). Did you testify
that four probationary employees in addition to Stanford have been fired9
A No, ma'am, eight, including-Now, I'm almost positive it's eight I would
have to actually look at my personnel records to know Q Have any
been fired who have been there more than 90 days? A Yes, ma'am Q How
many9 A Oh, another 10, 12, 15 maybe . Again, I'd have to look About
25-28 people have either been terminated or resigned since we started Q.
I'm talking about those just terminated involuntarily Fired. A. Well, we
discussed with them, we felt that involuntarily future would be greater
HYSTER COMPANY 203
effect of this fact, Respondent maintains that, at least prior
to Guengerich's arrival, 80 percent of the probationary
employees had received merit raises during their proba-
tionary periods. If that is accepted as true, the necessary
inference is that employees not receiving such increase
were notoriously or hopelessly unsatisfactory. Yet there is
no evidence that such employees, or any of them, were
discharged.
Employee Richard Hargett, called by Respondent,
testified that he had received a merit increase when he was
shifted from an unskilled job to skilled maintenance work.
He testified: ". . . your merit increases would be by how
you could do your job. If you did a real good job and they
thought you were performing real good you would get a
merit raise after so many days, after say 30 days or two
months or something like that." Thus, at least employee
Hargett did not consider merit increases as routine for
probationary employees.22
There is no evidence that Stanford was ever warned of
possible discharge or other disciplinary action if his
performance did not reach a satisfactory level by the end
of a so-called probationary period. If a probationary
employee had been performing well enough to receive a
merit increase, one would reasonably expect that he would
be warned of his precarious plight. Hierman maintained
that he did not even know that Stanford had received a
merit increase-a fact which casts considerable doubt on
the alleged practice of periodically reviewing probationary
employees.
(5) Stanford's alleged deficiencies
As previously observed, Butler testified that he noticed a
"gradual" decline in Stanford's performance between June
22 and 26. He further testified that thereafter he had
occasion to observe inadequate performance by Stanford.
However, Butler did not mention this to Stanford or,
apparently, to anybody else. He did nothing to counter-
mand his recommendation of a merit increase.
Hierman testified that at least once every day he had to
tell Stanford to do something. And Hierman said that very
often he had to go find Stanford to have material delivered
to employees who were waiting for them. Hierman
maintained that frequently it took him up to 10 minutes to
locate Stanford and that 50 percent of the time Stanford
would be found talking to some employee. On cross-
examination , however, Hierman conceded that Stanford's
job required him to move around the plant, and, because of
the distances involved, it could take Hierman as much as
10 minutes to find Stanford when he was doing precisely
what he was supposed to be doing. And Hierman further
conceded that it would be necessary for Stanford to talk to
other employees in the course of his duties.
discussed with them , we felt that involuntarily . . future would be greater
elsewhere " Respondent did not produce any employment records
22 Paul testified that shortly after arriving Guengench announced a
change , under which employees would henceforth not be evaluated until the
end of their first 90 days because "you can't determine if a man really is
deserving of an increase until his 90-day probationary period is over"
Guengench did not testify to any such change
23 As said by Trial Examiner Ohlbaum in Federal Envelope Co, 147
NLRB 1031, 1036• "1 have also taken into account that all [the specified
witnesses 1 are still employed by Respondent and therefore, by testifying as
Although working under the supervision of Butler and
then Hierman, Stanford also had to service the employees
working under Foreman Frank Seripin. On direct exami-
nation Seripin testified that he often had to look for
Stanford and that 25 percent to 30 percent of the time he
found Stanford off his forklift, standing talking to
employees. According to Seripin, there was no need for
Stanford to leave his truck to talk to the machine
operators. Seripin later raised to 75 percent the number of
times Stanford was found off his truck, standing talking to
employees. The discrepancy was unexplained. Seripin and
Hierman testified that Seripin spoke to Hierman about the
problem on two occasions, once in the first week of July
and once toward the latter part of July. Seripin' s alleged
dissatisfaction, however, was never noted in Stanford's
personnel file.
Most significant is Hie-man's testimony that he had
daily complaints from machine operators who, paid on an
incentive basis, were being prejudiced by Stanford's failure
to keep them supplied with materials when needed.
Although Respondent called three employees as witnesses,
none of them was questioned concerning Stanford's work.
There was no corroboration of Hierman's testimony
concerning employee complaints. On the other hand, the
General Counsel presented two employee witnesses who
testified unequivocally that Stanford performed efficiently
and kept them properly supplied.
Respondent would apparently seek to discount the
General Counsel's testimony and excuse Respondent's
failure to present primary evidence of employee complaints
on the ground that, in the words of Respondent's brief, "it
is generally inferred that employee witnesses will testify in
corroboration of other employee witnesses." But the
established presumption is to the contrary. See Bush Hog,
Inc., 161 NLRB 1575, 1580, enfd. 405 F.2d 755 (C.A. 5).23
According to Paul, the two employees who testified to
Stanford's efficient performance had previously disavowed
any union sympathies. It is unlikely that such persons
would voluntarily give false testimony adverse to Respon-
dent.
As previously noted, Stanford was never warned that his
performance was so poor as to place him in jeopardy of
discharge or disciplinary action. On the other hand,
according to Paul, Stanford was specifically warned twice
in July that, as set forth in Respondent's employee
handbook, "Excessive garnishments of wage assignments"
might "be cause for disciplinary action." These warnings
were given when Stanford's uncle suggested that he might
garnish Stanford's wages if Stanford did not turn over the
proceeds from a horse that Stanford had sold for the uncle.
No garnishment was brought, so the incident could not
serve tojustify Stanford's discharge.24
Respondent contends that Stanford failed to fulfill his
they did in a sense exposed themselves to economic peril in the form of job
retaliation of various varieties, and that their testimony in that sense was
contrary to their own best interests , so to speak " Cf. N LR.B v Gissel
Packing Co, 395 U S 575, 608, "We also accept the observation that
employees are more likely than not, many months after a card drive and in
response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony damaging to
the union , particularly where company officials have previously threatened
reprisals for union activity in violation of § 8(a)(1)."
24 In its brief Respondent argues that Paul's warning Stanford about the
possible effect of garnishments "shows the Company's desire to have helped
(Continued)
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obligation before leaving work each day to see that the
machines were all supplied with sufficient materials for the
second and third shifts. Hierman testified that Stanford
was supposed to do this but never did, and that Hierman
had spoken to him about this deficiency. Although the
handwritten list of Stanford's duties does list the require-
ment, Stanford denied having had this responsibility.
Nobody explained how the obligation could have been
met. So far as appears, it would have presented considera-
ble difficulty, since there was then no storage area within
the plant and the evidence clearly indicates that there was
sufficient space at each machine only for the material then
being worked on. It was for this reason presumably that it
was so important that Stanford not delay in removing
finished products and full chip barrels and promptly
supply new material and empty chip barrels when needed.
Apparently machine operators could not be (or at least
were not) supplied at one time with sufficient material for
the entire shift. The shortage of space at the machines was
the prime reason for Respondent's insisting upon Stan-
ford's seeing that tote boxes were kept out of the aisles and
for the ultimate decision to discontinue the use of a forklift
truck for internal movement of material. In any event,
Guengench indicated that the first-shift material handler
was not required to service the other two shifts. In
describing the temporary makeshift operation following
Stanford's discharge. Guengerich testified that the first-
shift machine operators obtained their own materials
-"Just like on the second and third shifts." Finally, it
should be noted that Stanford's failure to supply materials
for the second and third shifts is not referred to on the
termination report or on any of the three "information
reports" introduced into evidence by Respondent.
The evidence does establish that sometime after Hier-
man became first-shift foreman he did talk with Stanford
and gave him a handwritten list of his specific duties.
Stanford conceded that this was helpful to him. According
to Stanford, Hierman did not then "chew" Stanford "out."
The employee report referring to this list corroborates
Stanford's view, saying that the list was provided because
Hierman [a]ssum[ed] that Willie didn't understand his
duties." Stanford on his part acknowledged that Hierman
had once spoken about Stanford's spending too much time
talking to employees. Hierman, who testified that he had
spoken about the matter more often, conceded that on
each occasion the conversation was very brief and
Stanford immediately went about his work. There was no
affirmative evidence that Stanford's excessive talking to
other employees was for extended periods or unrelated to
his work. Hierman conceded that, to some extent at least, it
was necessary for Stanford to talk to other employees in
the line of duty. Hierman did not specifically corroborate
Seripin's view that it was unncessary for Stanford to get off
his truck for such talk. And even Seripin failed to testify
that alighting from the truck would itself cause any
substantial delay.
Stanford testified that in his termination interview with
Guengerich Stanford referred to a recent "gripe session" in
which "someone mentioned they needed another forklift,
and a lot of times [Stanford] was tied up doing stuff,
working," and Guengerich "said he was working on that."
This testimony was uncontradicted. It may be inferred that
the revised system of handling materials was the result of
Guengerich's "working on" the problem.
The evidence as a whole fails to establish that Stanford's
performance or conduct was so deficient as reasonably to
lead to summary discharge without warning or notice. If
his performance was short of fully meeting the plant's
needs, the major problem lay in the inadequacy of the
established method for handling materials, as evidence
Snow's and Guengench's almost immediate decision to
revise and administratively reorganize the system.
(6) The circumstances of the discharge
The immediate circumstances of the discharge require
analysis. As heretofore noted, Hierman was called into the
plant from his vacation. The explanation that Respondent
was desirous of effectuating the termination, if there was to
be one, before Stanford's "probationary" period ended is
not entirely convincing. One is tempted to ask why the
matter could not be left for Hier man's return on August
30, a day or two before the end of Stanford's first 90 days.
If the discharge could be effected so expeditiously on
August 18, presumably it could be done on August 30 or
31.
Significant questions are why Hierman's presence was
required at all and why he had to review Stanford's
personnel file before he could express an opinion as to
whether Stanford was "going to make it." If the informa-
tion reports dated July 15 and August 5 (and signed by
Guengerich) were in Stanford's personnel file, it is difficult
to understand what further information Guengench and
Snow needed. If necessary, Hierman could have been
asked on the telephone if Stanford had shown any recent
improvement. If, as Hierman testified, the need to criticize
Stanford on at least a daily basis had persisted unabated,
there is no apparent reason for his having to review the
personnel file before expressing his opinion. Hierman
testified that before being called into the plant on August
18 he had no intention of firing Stanford. On the contrary,
he had previously offered Stanford a transfer to a job
where he could realize higher earnings. Hierman did not
indicate what he found in the file that changed his mind.
The only item in the file which Hierman presumably ad
not prepared or previously seen was Butler's successful
recommendation of a merit increase. That document could
hardly have led Hierman to decide in favor of discharge.
And there is no suggestion that Butler's explanation or
views were solicited.
The foregoing discussion necessarily leads to considera-
tion of the "information reports" bearing the dates July 15
and August 5, the existence of which was never disclosed to
Stanford.
If Hierman had made out the first report at the same
time he prepared the undated list of Stanford's duties, it is
reasonable to assume he would have shown it to Stanford.
Stanford secure his job with Hyster" The Trial Examiner does not fully
understand why Respondent would want to help Stanford "secure his job"
if, as Respondent contends, his work had been unsatisfactory for over a
month and the Company had decided to "eliminate" Stanford's job and
wanted to discharge excess and/or "probationary" employees
HYSTER COMPANY
On the other hand, if he was sufficiently dissatisfied with
Stanford's work to prepare the report, he would hardly
have recorded his "assumption" that Stanford simply did
not fully understand his duties. Further, if the report had
been prepared by Hierman and read by Paul on July 15,
presumably it would have been mentioned in the confer-
ences on July 16 and 17, when Snow was allegedly
complaining about the failure to discharge any "probation-
ary" employees and the plant's overstaffing. And Guenge-
rich would probably have taken some action the next week,
when he said he saw and signed the report. This, it should
be added, was after Respondent maintains it had decided
to "eliminate" Stanford's job. Thus, the evidence as a
whole casts considerable doubt on the accuracy of the July
15 date appearing on the first information report.
The second report is dated August 5. There is no
substantial evidence that around that time Paul or
Guengench, who signed the report, considered discharging
Stanford despite Respondent's testimony that Snow had
emphatically insisted on the necessity of discharging
unsatisfactory "probationary" employees. Paul's and
Guengerich's apparent ignorance of the report when Snow
returned to Sulligent in the middle of August leads the
Trial Examiner to doubt whether that report was complet-
ed on August 5, the date it bears.
In any event, whenever the information reports were
prepared, they played no causative role in the discharge.
The discharge was instigated by management personnel,
who then were at great pains to place the onus on
Hierman.
Since the change in the method of handling materials
could not be effectuated immediately, and in view of
Guengench's concession that there was no shortage of
work at the time, the reasonable inference is that
management's initiation of the discharge was motivated by
unspoken and unrevealed considerations. The involvement
of Hierman was designed to hide management's role so as
to make it appear a routine operational event rather than a
"policy" decision.
The discharge came within a few days after Paul and
Maddox returned from a vacation they had taken together.
Whether the timing of Snow's second visit was purely
coincidental, it was providential. The entire sequence of
events leads to the inference that Respondent was "making
a record" for the discharge of Stanford, who had admitted
his union sympathies to Maddox.
d. Conclusion
The record as a whole, together with careful observation
of the witnesses, leads the Trial Examiner to conclude that
high-ranking management had Stanford discharged shortly
after learning of his union sympathies and activities and
for the purpose of discouraging union membership, in
contravention of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
205
1. James Hill Maddox, chairman of the town council of
Sulligent, Alabama, acted as agent of Respondent.
2. By coercively interrogating employees concerning
union sympathies and activities; by soliciting an employee
to report on union activities; by threatening employees
with discharge for supporting the Union; and by threaten-
ing that the plant would close down or move away,if the
employees chose to be represented by the Union, Respon-
dent, through Billy Paul, personnel manager of its plant in
Sulligent, Alabama, and James Hill Maddox, its agent,
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1).
3. By discharging Willis Stanford on August 18, 1971,
and failing and refusing to reinstate him thereafter,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The General Counsel has not shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Respondent has engaged in any
unfair labor practices other than those found above.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, the Trial Examiner will recommend that
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
take affirmative action of the type customarily ordered in
such cases.
Having found that Respondent discnminatorily dis-
charged Willis Stanford in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act, the Trial Examiner will recommend that Respon-
dent be required to offer him immediate and full
reinstatement, with backpay, to be computed in the
manner established in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, together with interest at 6 percent per annum
in accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, the Trial Examiner hereby issues the following
recommended: 25
ORDER
Respondent, Hyster Company, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
union activities involving Respondent's plants in Sulligent
and Beaverton, Alabama.
(b) Threatening discharge of employees who sign union
authorization cards.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Threatening to move away or close down the
Sulligent, Alabama, plant if the employees choose to be
represented by a labor organization.
(d) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discharging any employee or by discnnunating in any
other manner in regard to hire and tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form or join labor organiza-
tion, and to engage in any other concerted activity for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Willis Stanford immediate and complete
reinstatement to his former job or, if that position is no
longer in existence , to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
him, in the manner set forth in "The Remedy" section of
this Decision.
(b) Notify Willis Stanford, if he is presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full
reinstatement upon application after discharge from the
Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service
Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
as amended.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze and compute the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Post at its facilities in Sulligent and Beaverton,
Alabama, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed
by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it
hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not specifically found herein.
26 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board ." Dated By
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to
present their evidence , it has been found that we violated
the law and we have been told to post this notice about
what we are committed to do.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join , or help unions
To bargain as a group through a representative
of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
We assure all of our employees that:
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these
rights.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with plant closure,
removal of our operations , discharge, or any other
types of reprisals if they join or support United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
union.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees
concerning their union membership , activities, or
desires , or concerning any union activities among our
employees ; and we will not request that employees
report to us concerning any such activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against employees because they select the United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
union , as their collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL offer Willis Stanford immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job (or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent job) without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make Willis Stanford whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered by reason of his
discharge by us on August 18, 1971, together with
interest.
WE WILL notify Willis Stanford , if currently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States , of his right
to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after
his discharge from the Armed Forces.
HYSTER COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
HYSTER COMPANY 207
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with Peachtree Building, Room 701, 730 Peachtree Street, NE.,
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone 404-526-5760.