Home Pride Provisions, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 31, 1966

161 N.L.R.B. 634 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Home Pride Provisions, Inc. and Food Handlers Union Local 371,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA-5228. October 31, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 27, 1966, Trial Examiner Sidney Sherman issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respond-
ent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Jenkins and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiners' Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire rec-
ord in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions? and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.],
'In the absence of exceptions thereto we adopt, pro forma, the Trial Examiner's find-
ings that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by polling its employees with
respect to their union sentiments and by granting them a wage increase in order to cause
them to renounce their union affiliation Also, in the absence of exception thereto, we
adopt, pio forma, the Trial Examiner s finding that Respondent did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a) (1) of the Act by its prediction that several years of increased labor costs might
force it out of business
In adopting the Tiial Exaniinei's conclusion that the Union repreeuted a majority
of the employees in the appropriate unit as of October 15, 1965, and thereafter, we do not
rely on the union authorization card of Moulton Hence, we find it unnecessary to reach
or pass upon the question as to the validity of that card. Further, although we find in
agreement with the Trial Examiner that the authorization card of Dombek is valid, we
do not adopt the Trial Examiner's subsidiaiv finding that Dombek testified that "reure-
sentation was one of [his] reasons for signing"
In finding a number of authorization cards valid, the Tiial Examiner discredited testi-
mony that misrepresentations were made concerning the number of other employees who,
had already signed, or lie found that the card signers had not relied upon such representa-
tions. Even it such inisiepiesentation had been made we would not in the circumstances
of this case regard them as material in determining the validity of authorization cards
See Merrill Eiigmneeiing Laboratories, 158 NLRB 1113, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in N L R B v. Sagamore Shirt Co , 365.
F.2d 898.
161 NLRB No. 47.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 635
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
The original charge herein was served on Respondent on November 15, 1965,1
the complaint issued on December 22, and the case was heard before Trial
Examiner Sidney Sherman on March 16 and 17, 1966 After the hearing briefs were
filed by Respondent and the General Counsel The issues litigated related to alleged
unlawful interrogation, promises of benefit, threats of reprisal, and a refusal to
bargain.
At the hearing I reserved ruling on certain motions to dismiss various allegations
of the complaint. Those motions are disposed of in accordance with my findings
below.2
Upon the entire record in the case, and my observation of the witnesses, I adopt
the following findings and conclusions:
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Home Pride Provisions, Inc., herein called Respondent, is a corporation under
Connecticut law, and is engaged at its plant in Stafford Springs, Connecticut, in the
piocessmg and distribution of meat products. Respondent annually ships from its
plant to out-of-State points goods valued in excess of $50,000.
Respondent is engaged in commerce under the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Food Handlers Union Local 371, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work-
men of Noith America, AFL--CIO, is a labor organization under the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
The pleadings raise the following issues:
1. Whether Respondent refused to iecognize the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. Whether Respondent unlawfully polled its employees concerning their desire
for representation by the Union.
3. Whether Respondent coercively interrogated its employees concerning their
Union activities.
4. Whether Respondent granted a wage increase to deter its employees from
assisting or joining the Union.
5. Whether Respondent threatened its employees with loss of benefits if they
assisted or joined the Union.
B. Sequence of events
In October Union Agent Donahue gave a number of union authorization cards
to DaDalt, an employee of Respondent, who on the following day gave the cards
to Victor Posocco.3 The latter in turn gave about half the cards to his brother,
Bruno, and both brothers proceeded to solicit their fellow employees to sign the
cards. During the next 2 days they obtained 24 signed cards, which were returned
to Donahue. In the morning of the second day of this solicitation campaign Victor
Posocco had a conversation about the Union with Resopndent's general manager,
Negro, in the course of which it was proposed that the employees meet with Negro
that evening to see if they could come to terms with management, without the
intervention of the Union. Such a meeting was held and, after ascertaining that the
employees' principal concern was for a wage increase, Negro informed them that
Respondent had been contemplating granting a 10-cent-an-hour increase at the end
of the year but he was willing to grant such a raise forthwith. When the employees
1 All events herein related occurred in 1965 , unless otherwi,e stated
2 Ruling was also reserved on certain objections to evidence Those objections are hereby
disposed of as follows:
1 General Counsel ' s objection , at page 145, line 10: page 170, line 5; and page 176,
line 5 , are overruled
2. Respondent ' s objections at page 195, lines 1 and 2 , and page 300 , line 5, are overruled.
3 Conflicting evidence as to whether this occurred on October 21, or on an earlier date
in October will be considered below.
636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
remained silent, Negro offered them an immediate raise of 18 cents an hour, which
he promptly enlarged to 20 cents an hour, and at the suggestion of Bruno Posocco,
this was amended to an offer of a 10-percent increase 4 Ballots were then distributed
and the employees were polled on the question whether they would abandon their
union activity if such a raise were granted. The overwhelming majority voted in the
affirmative,5 and the raise was granted. On October 27, the Union filed with the
Board a petition for an election, which was scheduled to be held on November 16.
However, on November 15, the election was canceled because of the filing on that
date of the original charge herein. On November 26, Union Agent Donahue visited
the plant, informed Negro that he had obtained 24 signed cards (which constituted
a clear majority of the employees in the appiopriate unit) and requested contract
negotiations. Negro rejected this request, asserting, Intel alia, that most of the
employees did not want a union. At the hearing, Negro reiterated his refusal to
recognize the Union.
C. Discussion
1. The wage increase
It cannot seriously be disputed that the timing and size of the wage increase
was dictated by antiunion considerations. This is clear from Negro's own account
of the events which led up to the offer of a 10-percent raise, as well as from the
fact that the question admittedly put to the employees on the occasion of offering
them the raise was, in effect, whether they could renounce their union activity in
consideration of such increase. Accordingly, I find that the wage increase violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The poll
It is well settled that the polling of employees by an employer concerning their
union sentiments violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so found with regard
to the poll just described.
3. Other interrogation
Victor Posocco testified that in the morning before the meeting on the wage
increase, Negro, after indicating his awareness of the employees' union activity,
asked the witness who started the Union. While Negro denied this, he admitted
asking Victor why he wanted a Union. Whichever version is credited, it is clear
that Negro interrogated Victor about a matter pertaining to employee union activity.
Moreover, on the basis of Johnson's uncontradicted testimony, I find that soon
after he signed a union card, Negro asked him if he had done so. In the context of
the other unfair labor practices found herein, the foregoing interrogation of Victor
Posocco and Johnson is deemed unlawful.
4. Alleged threats
According to Victor Posocco, in the course of his aforedescribed conversation
with Negro about the Union, Negro asserted that the plant was too small and
could not afford a Union, that he could not afford to pay overtime after 40 hours,
and "maybe after a year or two he would have to lock the doors." Negro's version
was that he told Victor:
. .. if the Union demands are too tough we have to cut overtime then we
have to cut these [sic] giving them coffee and steaks and everything else free.
We will have to cut a lot of those things out. If we can't come out to a black
figure at the end of the year if the demands are too big I said I didn't know,
but if there is anyway we can get together now I would like to get together.
I said if it gets too bad in a year or two we may have to close because
we don't have no backing, we don't have no money we would be financially
broke.6
4 For many of the employees this would have meant a raise of somewhat more than
20 cents an hour.
5 According to Negro's credible testimony, there were 22 affirmative votes and the 7 re-
maining ballots were returned blank.
6 No attempt has been made here to correct the reporter's obvious failure to punctuate
properly, as the sense seems sufficiently clear, in any event.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 637
As Victor Posocco did not specifically deny that the discussion of reduction in
overtime (and elimination of other benefits) was related to the possibility of exces-
sive demands by the Union, I credit Negro in that regard.?
The question remains whether his remarks should be construed as threats or
as privileged predictions of the adverse economic effects of unionism. Respondent
contends that these remarks should be viewed merely as a prophecy. Under this
view, Negro's meaning would seem to be that if Respondent was forced by the
Union to grant such excessive wage increases that it could not operate at a profit,
it would have to eliminate certain lunge benefits, and that, if such measures did
not suffice, Respondent would eventually have to get out of business. I am inclined
to agree that this was the thought Negro intended to convey. Moreover, the refer-
ence to a possible shutdown "after a year or two," as testified to by Victor
Posocco, himself, smacks more of a prediction regarding an economic situation
that might develop in the relatively distant future as a result of the advent of the
Union rather than of a threat of reprisal for union activity.
Under all the circumstances, I do not believe that the evidence preponderates
in favor of a finding of a violation here.
5. The violation of Section 8(a)(5)
a. The appropriate unit
Based on the parties' stipulation at the hearing, it is found that the following
unit is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining.
All production and maintenance employees and truckdrivers employed by the
Respondent at its Stafford Springs plant, excluding office clerical employees, pro-
fessional employees, salesmen, guards, watchmen, general manager, foremen, and
all other supervisors as defined in the Act.
b. The Union's majority status
It was stipulated that on November 26, when the Union requested recognition,
the unit described above comprised not more than 31 employees, and the General
Counsel agreed at the hearing to the exclusion of one of those 31 (Nelson Sfreddo)
as a supervisor.8 The General Counsel would exclude two others-Fisher and
Webber-on the ground that they are essentially salesmen. The record shows that
they drive trucks, in which they make deliveries to customers, and that on Saturday
morning they assist in the loading of the trucks at the plant. Webber is paid
entirely on a commission basis, whereas Fisher receives a base salary, as well as
commission. All of Webber's customer have been obtained by him through solici-
tation of their business as have about 25 percent of Fisher's customers. They are
under the same immediate supervisor as the production and maintenance employ-
ees, and enjoy the same fringe benefits, except that, unlike such employees they
do not punch a timeclock, and Webber does not have the same vacation benefits
as the others.
Whether they should be included in the unit appears to depend on whether they
would be treated as "salesmen"-an excluded category-or as "truckdrivers"-an
included category. The Board has held that employees who, as here, not only
operate delivery trucks but also sells products from their vehicles are "truly sales-
men" and not "merely deliverymen or truckdrivers," and that they are therefore
excludable from a unit of production and maintenance employees which includes
truckdrivers.9 Accordingly, Fisher and Webber will be excluded.
As there is no dispute as to the inclusion of the remaining 28 employees, it is
found that at the time of the Union's demand for recognition, there were 28 in
the unit.
The General Counsel presented 21 cards at the hearing, all of which were duly
authenticated as to signatures. One of the cards, that of Nelson Sfreddo, was
7 Victor Posocco was not an articulate witness , due, at least in part, to a language
barrier Moreover , his above -cited testimony attributes to Negro several apparently dis-
connected remarks, whereas Negro's version makes some attempt to supply a logical news
for these remarks
8It is also found on the basis of the parties' stipulation and Respondent ' s Exhibits
2 and 3 , that the plant complement during the latter half of October was the same as on
November 26, except for the hiring of one truckdriver on November 10
U Plaza Provision Company, 134 NLRB 910 ; E. H. Koester Baking Co., Ine , 130 NLRB
1006 , 1007-08.
638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rejected because of his supervisory status. Most of the remaining 20 cards are
attacked by Respondent on various grounds.
(1) The "date" issue
It is appropriate to consider at the outset the date on which the cards were
signed. While it is not seriously disputed that the cards were all signed before
November 26, when the Union made its demand for recognition,10 it is relevant,
for reasons that will appear below, to determine whether the cards were signed
before the meeting described above, at which the employees were offered a raise
in consideration of their repudiation of the Union.
While the cards are variously dated October 22, 23, 24, and 25, it is conceded
that they were not dated at all at the time they were signed," and that the dates
now appearing on the cards were arbitrary ones, inserted by an office employee of
the Union, when the Board's Regional Office, to which the cards had been sub-
mitted, called the Union's attention to the fact that the cards bore no date.
The Posocco brothers testified that all the cards were signed on October 21 and
22, and that the plant meeting discussed above occurred in the evening of the 22d.
However, all of the other signatories who testified, only O'Neill professed to be
able to recall the date of signing." Negro insisted that the plant meeting was held
on October 15, and not October 22, and Respondent offered in evidence its pay-
roll records for the payroll weeks ending October 12 and 19, for purpose of cor-
roborating Negro's testimony that the increase allegedly announced on October 15
was first reflected in the paychecks for the pay period ending October 19. A com-
parison of the two payrolls submitted shows that the employees' hourly rate of
compensation 13 was substantially increased, during the October 13 to 19 pay
period. In view of the foregoing documentary corroboration, I am inclined to
accept Negro's recollection of the date of the meeting. However, it does not
necessarily follow that the Posoccos were mistaken in their recollection that the
meeting was held some hours after they completed their solicitation of cards. That
the cards were in fact signed shortly before the meeting is corroborated by the
testimony of most of the employee witnesses, including some whose testimony was
not otherwise favorable to the General Counsel. I conclude therefore that, while
the plant meeting was held, as Negro testified, on October 15, the cards were all
signed, as the Posoccos testified, within the space of 2 days, the last one in the
morning before the meeting, and that Respondent's granting of a wage increase
and other unfair labor practices occurred after a majority of the employees had
signed a union card.14
10 It was stipulated that on October 27 the Union filed an election petition with the
Board and the record shows that the cards were submitted to the Board in support of such
petition. The cards all bear the Board's date stamp of October 29.
31 No space on the card was reserved for a date.
"He agreed with the October 21 date given by the Posoccos.
Even Donahue could not recall the exact date in October when he supplied the blank
cards to DaDalt, but he did confirm the testimony of the Posoccos that the signed cards
were returned to him on October 22.
12 The payrolls do not give the hourly rate directly, but list under "regular" earnings
amounts which apparently represent weekly earnings, exclusive of overtime. The hourly
rate may presumably be derived by dividing such amounts by the number of "regular"
hours worked.
11 No witness testified affirmatively that any of the cards were signed after the meeting,
and, in view of the overwhelmingly favorable response at the meeting to Negro's proposal
that the employees renounce their union activity in consideration of a wage increase, as
well as Negro's own uncontradicted testimony that the next day Victor Posocco assured
him that all the employees were satisfied and "it was all over," It seems inherently im-
probable that there were any subsequent solicitation or signing of cards
Indeed, in its brief Respondent appears to concede that the cards were in fact executed
before the October 15 meeting, but contends that the erroneous testimony of the Posoccos
as to the date of their solicitation activity should be deemed to reflect on their credibiliy.
However, the brief fails to suggest any ulterior motive for such error or any persuasive
reason for regarding it as anything other than an honest mistake ; and, while a mistake
as to the exact date of a past event may have some bearing on the reliability of a witness'
recollection (and I have given due weight thereto in evaluating the Iosoccos' credibility),
such a mistake is entitled to less weight in that regard than, for example, inability to
recall what actually happened on the date in question.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 639
(2) The alleged misrepresentations
It may not bey amiss at this point to make a few general observations about the
law applicable to misconceptions and misrepresentations about union cards. Absent
any misrepresentations by the Union, it is well settled that an employee 's subjec-
tive reasons for signing a card or his conception of the meaning of the card has
no bearing on the validity of the card . 15 However, such reasons or conception
may become relevant where it appears that they are suggested by misrepresentations
of union agents. The question of misrepresentation often arises, as it does here,
with regard to the purpose for which the card is sought . Here, the cards on their
face purport only to be a designation of the Union as an "agent for collective
bargaining , for wages , hours and all other conditions of employment. " Yet, many
of the card signers testified that they were told by Victor or Bruno Posocco that
the card had a different purpose (e.g., to find out what the Union had to offer),
and that they signed the card relying on such representation . The governing princi-
ple here is that the attribution to a card of a purpose other than that stated on
its face is not fatal , unless such other purpose is represented to be the only one
for which the card is to be used.16
Many of the card signers testified also that, before signing, they were told by
one of the Posoccos that most or all of the other employees had already signed
union cards. While such a representation , if false, has been held by one court to
invalidate a card signed by an employee to whom the representation was made, it
affirmatively appeared in that case, as the court pointed out, that the employee had
signed the card in reliance on that representation ,17 and in subsequent cases the
Board , in conformity with the foregoing holding, has given weight to such a mis-
representation when it appeared that there was reliance thereon , but not otherwise.18
Finally, cutting across all the foregoing questions is the issue of the Union's
responsibility for any of the alleged misrepresentations by the Posoccos , who were
employees of Respondent and held no position in the Union . There is some author-
ity for finding that, under such circumstances , their representations to fellow
employees about the purpose of the cards could not bind the Union so as to
invalidate the cards . 19 However , as the law on this point seems to be as yet
unsettled, it will be assumed for the purpose of this Decision that the Union is
chargeable with the conduct of the Posoccos.
We turn now to the specific contentions relating to the cards under attack by
Respondent.
Rui:, Victor Posocco testified that , when he gave Rui a card , he told him "This
is a union card to join the Union , if you want to sign okay if you don 't you don't
have to." 20 This was substantially corroborated by Rui , who testified that Victor
stated the card was "to have the Union ." Moreover, Rui acknowledged that he
signed the card "for a union," and that he was favorably disposed to the Union.
However , Rui testified that before he signed the card , Victor told him that every-
body else had signed a card , and the witness testified at one point that that was
his reason for signing , but when the question was put to him whether he would
have signed the card but for such representation , he gave an unresponsive answer.
15 Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N L .R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 743 (C.A.D.C.) ; N.L R.B. v. Greenfield
Components Corporation, 317 F 2d 85 , 89 (C.A. 1)
ie Cumberland Shoe Corporation , 144 NLRB 1268 , enfd. 351 F 2d 917, 920 ; S: E. Nichols
Company, 156 NLRB 1201, footnote 1 (holding that even a representation that the primary
purpose of the card was to obtain an election did not suffice to invalidate the card). This
rule appears , however, to be subject to the exception that, where an employee signs a
card without reading it, the card is invalid , if it is shown that the union agent did not
disclose to the employee the purpose stated on the card but attributed to it some other
purpose, and this is true even though the agent does not in terms represent that such
other purpose was the only one for which the card was to be used Trend Mills, Inc. 154
NLRB 143. However , the mere failure to read a card before signing does not invalidate it,
if the employee is otherwise properly informed of the purpose thereof Benson Veneer
Company, Inc., 156 NLRB 782; J.M. Machinery' Corporation, 155 NLRB 860.
11 N.L.R B. v. Rohtstesn , 266 F.2d 407 (CA. 1)
i8 Compare S. E. Nichols Co , supra, with John Kinkel it Son, 157 NLRB 744, and
Engineers if Fabricators , Inc., 156 NLRB 919
19 Jas. H. Matthews if Co. v. NLRB , 354 F.2d 432 ( C.A 8). But cf Central Veneer,
Inc., 131 NLRB 189.
0i As to punctuation of this excerpt , see footnote 7, above
640 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Victor Posocco, on the other hand, insisted that he made no such representation
to Rui or to any other employee. On the basis of the demeanor as well as Rui's
apparent confusion regarding his reasons for signing the card , I credit Victor, and
find Rui's card valid 21
Silvio Sfreddo: Victor Posocco testified that he said nothing to Sfreddo when he
gave him a card. Sfreddo, on the other hand, asserted that Victor explained to him
that the card would- be used to induce the Union to meet with the employees and
explain what it had to offer, and that, although the witness read the card before
signing it , he accepted the foregoing explanation. But Sfreddo did not claim that
Victor said the foregoing use was the only one to which the card would be put,
and, as a desire to learn more about the benefits of unionism is not necessarily
inconsistent with a present desire for union representation , I find nothing in Sfreddo's
testimony, even if credited, to require rejection of his card.
Marconi: Victor Posocco testified that, when he gave her a card, he said, "Here
is a union card, if you want to sign it okay, if you don't you don't have to." Marconi
admitted that she read at least part of the card and that she "thought" she read all
of it. She testified variously whether she was interested in having a union; that she
"automatically took it that the card was for the union"; that, when she asked Victor
.what the card meant, he told her that "they were interested . . . to get the Union
in to see what they had to offer the help"; that she signed the card for that reason,
but that she did not remember whether Victor offered that explanation, before or
after she signed the card. In view of these and other vacillation and conflicts in
her testimony, and her final admission that she could not recall whether it was
before or after she signed the card that Victor told her that the cards would be used
as a means of obtaining more information from the Union about its program for
Respondent's employees, I cannot credit her testimony that it was this representa-
tion that influenced her to sign the card. Her testimony, as a whole, lends itself
rather.to the interpretation that she understood, when signing the card, that she was
thereby manifesting an interest in representation by the Union. I find her card valid.
Zigniond: Bruno Posocco testified that he visited Zigmond at her home and gave
her a card, with the remark ". . . you have a chance to join the Union, if you
think it is all right sign it." She admitted reading the card, and under direct exami-
nation ,-she was unable to recall whether Bruno made any comment when he handed
her the card at her home, but under cross-examination, she related that she had had
conversations with Bruno at the plant concerning her interest in representation by
the Union. When the question was put to her by Respondent's counsel whether
Bruno told her he needed a certain number of signed cards to induce the Union to
talk to the employees, the witness, answered in the affirmative. When asked further
whether that was the reason she signed the card, she gave a qualified affirmative
answer, explaining that the main reason she signed was to go along with the other
employees. However, she could not recall whether Bruno told her that others had
signed. She testified, further, variously, that, when Bruno gave her the card, she
supposed- that it was "for the Union" that he told her at her home that the purpose
of the card was to get the Union interested in representing the employees; that she
thought that, if a majority signed, there would be a vote; and that she believed in
unions, and did not sign the card to vote against the Union. Finally, she asserted
that she signed the card not because she wanted an election but because she did
not want to stand in the way of an election, if the other employees desired one.
It appears from the foregoing that the only consistent aspect of her testimony
was her insistence that she signed a card to conform to what she believed the other
2' With regard to the credibility of Rut , as well as certain others of the card signers
discussed below , allowance has been made for the fact that they were called by me rather
than by Respondent ( This was made necessary by the fact that Respondent 's counsel
announced at the hearing ( off the record ) that he had not interviewed these individuals
himself because of certain rulings by the Board restricting the right of counsel for a
respondent to interrogate employees in preparation for trial , and Respondent 's counsel
requested an adjournment to enable him to interview the employees in question I did not
regard this request as meritorious , but rather than deprive Respondent entirely of the
benefit of the testimony of such employees I proceeded , without objection by any party, to
call them as witnesses for the Board ) However , as against this, it is necessary to weigh
the fact that they were still in Respondent 's employ , and, while there was still a possibility
that the union movement might be revived by Board fiat , Respondent had considerably
diminished he Union's appeal by its illegal wage increase, and, in any event , immediate
considerations of self -interest , dictated that the card signers minimize the significance of
their antimanagement gesture.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 641
employees wanted. However, that is no reason for invalidating the card, since there
is no evidence that any belief she may have had that the other employees had
signed cards was induced by misrepresentation. For, even if one takes the view of
her testimony most favorable to Respondent, all that can be found is that she was
told by Bruno that he needed to have a certain number of signed cards in order to
interest the Union in talking to the employees.22
Accordingly, even if I were to credit Zigmond's testimony despite its obvious
deficiencies, I would'still find her card valid.23
Molitoris: Victor Posocco testified that, when he solicited Molitoris, he told him,
"This is an application card for the Union," and that Molitoris remarked, "It's
about time," and signed the card. However, Molitoris asserted that Victor told him
the card was "for the purpose of having a meeting with the Union so we could see
what they had to offer," and that he understood from what Victor said that was the
only purpose of the card, and that was why he signed it.24 Victor denied that he had
made any such remark. Even under Molitoris' version there is no evidence that
Victor said the only purpose of the card was to find out what the Union had to
offer. In: any event, on the basis of demeanor, and in view of the vagueness of Moli-
toris' recollection as to various matters, including the extent of his perusal of the
card before signing, it,25 I credit Victor, and find the card valid.
Gregory- Her card was solicited by Bruno Posocco, who testified that he told all
the employees whom he solicited that the card was "to join the Union." 26 Gregory
admitted reading the card before she signed it, but she averred that she understood
that the only purpose of the card was to induce the Union to meet with the employ-
ees and explain its program, that she probably gained that impression from gossip
in the plant, rather than from what Bruno said, and that was her reason for signing.
She added that Bruno told' her (1) that "some others" had signed, (2) that most of
the others had signed and (3) that "quite a few" had signed; and that she "imagined"
that had some influence on her. Finally, she confessed that she did not really
remember what Bruno said . Bruno denied that he told anyone that all or most of
the employees had already signed cards.
-Gregory's testimony, even if credited, affords no basis for determining whether
Bruno said that cards had been signed by most of the employees, or some, or quite
a few; and only a statement that most of the employees had already signed would
appear to have been materially misleading.27
As for Gregory's (understanding as to the limited purpose of the card, her own
testimony precludes any finding that such belief was induced by any representation
by Bruno. Accordingly, even if her testimony is credited, it affords no ground for
invalidating her card 28
Dombek: Brupo"Posocco testified that, in soliciting Dombek, he said, "You have
a chance to join the Union," and Dombek replied; "All right," and signed the card.
•Dombek testified variously that Bruno told him the card was about the Union; that
the employees were going to try to have the Union brought into the plant; that
22 Moreover, this alleged representation was not shown to have been untruthful. Indeed,
the record shows that the Union did meet with the employees soon thereafter, and it seems
fair to assume that there would have been no such meeting had the employees shown no
interest in representation by the Union. Nor is there any evidence that Bruno told
Zigmond that the only purpose of the cards was other than that set forth on the face
thereof.
23 Moreover, if it were necessary to resolve the conflict between Zigmond and Bruno
I would credit the latter. Zigmond appeared to be the victim of a fitful memory, which
'seemed susceptible to suggestion by the tenor of leading questions
24 Molitoris also testified, contrary to Victor, that the latter told him that "quite a few,
sdveral" had signed* it card. However, as it is clear from Molitoris' own testimony that
this did not influence him to sign, there is no need to dwell on this point.
25 Under the well settled rule of law, it is presumed, absent any cogent evidence to the
contrary, that he did in fact read what he signed.
20 Tr p. 346.
27 From Bruno's uncontradicted chronology of his solicitation activity, it appears carat
he obtained three signatures before Gregory's In addition Victor's credible testimony
shows that he had obtained at least two signed cards earlier that evening, and it seems
fair to infer that both the Posoccos, who signed their cards on the first day of their solici-
tation, did so before they began soliciting
29 In any event, in view of her many self-contradictions, and the vagueness of her
memory, I would not credit her as against Bruno.
264-188-67-vol. 161-42
642 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they were going to have a meeting with the Union and "negotiate" with it about
wages; and that the witness signed for that reason. He added that Bruno told him
that "everybody" or "almost everybody" or other employees had signed; that he did
not remember exactly how Bruno put it; and that representation was one of the
witness' reasons for signing. The witness admitted that he read the card before
signing and, upon rereading the card at the hearing, he acknowledged that its stated
purpose was different from what he had thought it to be when he first read it. Even
if one credits Dombek, it is clear that he does not attribute to Bruno any representa-
tion that the only purpose of the card was to meet with the Union to discuss its
wage proposals, and there is no necessary conflict between such a purpose and a
present desire for representation by the Union. While Dombek professed to have
mental reservations about committing himself to the Union until he had heard what
it had to offer, he does not ascribe to Bruno any representation that Dombek was
not committing himself by signing the card.
As to the alleged misrepresentation by Bruno concerning the signing of cards by
others, the record shows that at least three others had signed before Dombek.29
Accordingly, whether this was a material misrepresentation depends on which, if any,
of Dombek's various versions of this representation is to be credited. As no reason
appears for preferring one version to another, and, as I deem more credible, in any
event, Bruno's testimony that he made no representation to anyone that most or all
of the employees had already signed cards, I find Dombek's card valid.
Conklin: Victor Posocco testified that, when he gave Conklin a card, he said,
"This is a union card, now we get a chance to join the union," and that Conklin
remarked, "It's about time." Conklin asserted, on the other hand, that in explaining
the purpose of the card, Victor said that the employees were going to have a
meeting with the Union to see what it had to offer30 However, Conklin did not
specifically contradict Victor's testimony that he told Conklin the card meant a
chance to join the Union, and that the witness expressed his gratification at that
prospect, and I credit such testimony. Moreover, the witness did not contend
that Victor represented that the holding of a meeting with the Union was the only
purpose of the card, nor is it clear from his testimony, in any event, that the witness
signed the card for that reason . Accordingly, I find Conklin's card valid.31
DaDalt: This witness, as already related, had acted as the intermediary between
Union Agent Donahue and the Posoccos. He testified that, in turning the blank
cards over to Victor, he retained one of them, which he signed later that day, that,
before the cards were delivered to him, one of the Posoccos told him ( 1) that the
cards were about having a union election and (2 ) "they were going to have an
election and this card was to get the officials in," and that he understood the card
was for "union bargaining and in my mind it was for an election ." When asked
whether he was told that the only purpose of the card was to get an election, he
answered ambiguously, "Yes, to bring the officials in." He then explained that he
construed the reference to bringing in the union officials to mean that the employees
would meet with the union agents to learn about its program before any election
was held. However, he admitted that he read the card before signing it, and that
he did not recall any one telling him that he might sign the card and still have
an election, and he nowhere attributes to the Posoccos a representation that
bringing the union officials "in" meant what the witness professed to have under-
stood that the card was for "union bargaining" and that to him that meant the
holding of an election casts doubt on the veracity of his testimony that he was told
anything about an election by the Posoccos; for, at this point, his contention seems
to be only that he was aware, either from reading the card or from talking to the
Posoccos, that the card related to bargaining by the Union, but that he took this
to mean that there would be an election . In view of the foregoing , and the other
2D Marconi and Posoccos. See footnote 28, above.
30 While under direct examination, Conklin denied that he read any part of the card
other than the name of the Union ; under cross-examination he professed inability to
recall the extent of his perusal of the card. I do not deem such vague testimony sufficient
to rebut the legal presumption that he read what he signed.
11 While Conklin attributed to Victor a representation that most of the employees had
already signed cards (which was not true as of that moment), he did not claim to have
been influenced by that representation Accordingly, there is no need to resolve the
credibility issue on this point between Victor, who denied making such representation,
and him.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 643
deficiencies in DaDalt 's testimony I do not credit it, as against the denials of the
Posoccos , insofar as DaDalt's testimony may be deemed to imply that one of the
Posoccos told him that the only purpose of the card was to get an election or to
bring about a meeting with the Union to explain its program.32 DaDalt's card
is accordingly deemed valid.
Panciera : Bruno Posocco testified that, when he gave Panciera a card, he said
only that the employees had a chance to join the Union . Panciera , however , testified
variously ( 1) that Bruno on that occasion did not tell him why he wanted the
card signed , ( 2) that Bruno told him that he wanted the witness to sign the card
so that the employees could meet with the Union and find out more about it, (3)
that Bruno did not tell him this , but it was told to him by some unidentified per-
son, and that was why he signed the card,33 and (4 ) that he could not remember
a word that Bruno said on that occasion.
It is clear from the foregoing that Panciera's testimony , even if credited , affords
no basis for finding that any notion that the witness may have had that this card
was solely for the purpose of obtaining more information about the Union or for
any purpose other than that stated on its face 34 was induced by Bruno . Moreover,
in view of the witness ' final avowal that he could not recall what , if anything,
Bruno said , the record contains no credible contradiction of Bruno 's testimony on
that point , and I credit it. Accordingly , Panciera's card is found to be valid.
Moulton : Bruno Posocco testified that when he handed Moulton a card, he
told her only, "Here is a card to join the Union ." While acknowledging that Bruno
told her the card was for the Union, Moulton testified that he also told her that
the card was not binding and did not mean anything ; that he told her this after
she had already begun to fill in the card ,35 but before she signed it, and she
signed it "on that basis"; that she understood the card to mean that she was
"interested" in the Union , but she explained that by this she meant that she
wanted to find out more about the Union . Bruno denied that he told Moulton the
card did not mean anything . Even if one construes her testimony as signifying
that she signed the card because of Bruno's alleged assurance that the card was
not binding on her-that is, she was free to change her mind about the Union-
it is not apparent how this constituted a misrepresentation, and there is thus
nothing to vitiate the effect of Moulton 's execution of the card as a designation
of the Union as her representative , at least until such time as she revoked such
designation . Moulton admitted that she never sought to revoke her card, and she
did not ever profess to have decided that she did not want to be represented by
the Union 38 Moreover, the fact that, by her admission , she had already begun
to fill in the card before Bruno 's alleged characterization of the card as not binding
is persuasive that such characterization was not what induced her to sign the card.
Thus, even if one credits Moulton , there is insufficient basis for rejecting her card.
Johnson : Victor Posocco testified that he handed Johnson a union card without
any comment . However, Johnson insisted that he received the card from Bruno,
who told him that the purpose of the card was "just to hear what they had to
say." He added that Bruno also told him that everybody else had signed and that
was the only reason the witness signed the card. Bruno corroborated Victor's
testimony that it was he, and not Bruno, who gave Johnson the card. While
Bruno acknowledged that Johnson returned the card to him after signing it, he
denied that he had any discussion with Johnson at the time . As the validity of
this card will not affect the result herein, there is no need to resolve the fore-
going credibility questions , and no determination will be made as to the validity
of Johnson's card.
as Both Posoccos denied that they made any representation to any employee that the
purpose of the card was to arrange a meeting with the Union to find out more about its
program or that they told the employees anything about the card other than that it was
a union card or a card to join the Union.
83 The witness testified also that he did not want the Union without an election.
8' Panciera admittedly read the card before signing
ae It appears from her rather confused testimony on this point , that, after writing on
the card, she asked Bruno if she could have another card, apparently because of some
mistake she made on the first card , and that it was in the context of a discussion of
correcting or replacing the card, that Bruno stated that the card did not "mean anything."
11 She asserted only that she was still undecided on that point.
644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As to Mazza, Mattorelli, O'Neill, Worthington, Majors, the Posoccos, and
Zelonka, there was no substantial evidence tending to impeach the validity of
their cards 37
Recapitulating, I find that on October 15. the Union had been validly designated
by at least 19 of the 27 38 employees then in the unit, and that it then represented
a majority of such employees.
I find further that the foregoing 19 card signers still constituted a majority of
the 28 in the unit on November 26, when the Union requested recognition and
that none of them at any time revoked their designation of the Union, except
insofar as the affiimative vote for management's proposal on October 15 may be
deemed such a revocation This point will be considered below.
c. The refusal to bargain
It is undisputed that on November 26, Negro rejected the Union's request for
recognition. According to Union Agent Donahue, Negro asserted on that occasion
that only theee or four employees wanted the Union, and that his employees did
not need a Union. At the hearing Negro acknowledged that he told Donahue
that most of his employees did not want a union, and stated that this was his belief,
and it is apparent that he based this belief on the result of the October 15 poll.39
Negro asserted, moreover, at the hearing that he told the union agents on Novem-
ber 26 that he would not sign a contract because he had agreed with a Board
agent on or about November 16, to settle the original charge in the instant case,
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), by posting a remedial notice. Negro
explained at the hearing that, when the consent election 40 scheduled for Novem-
ber 16 was canceled by the Board, he was informed by a Board agent that the
cancellation was due to the filing of the original charge herein, alleging violations
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that, if such violations were found by the
Board, Respondent would have to post a notice for 60 days and "then you have
the election." Negro added that he thereupon agreed to post the notice on the
assumption that there would be an election after the posting period, and it was
this agreement to post to which he had reference in his above-cited remarks
to Donahue. Moreover, according to Negro, soon after rejecting the Union's
recognition request, he called the Board agent and reported to him that he had
been asked to bargain with a union, and he was told by the Board agent not to
do so.
It is thus apparently Negro's contention that he refused to bargain in November
because he believed that under Respondent's proposed settlement agreement it
3' While Majors, Worthington, and Zelonka testified that they were under the impression
that the purpose of the caid was to have the Union meet with the employees and explain
its program, they admitted, in effect, that they did not obtain that impression from Victor
Posocco, who solicited their cards, but from other sources
In its brief, respondent contends that the constant reiteration by the employee wit-
nesses of the theme that they understood the purpose of the cards was to obtain informa-
tion as to the Union's program, considered in conjunction with the evidence that Victor
Posocco on October 15, suggested to Negro direct negotiations for a wage increase, proves
that the Posoccos' object in soliciting the cards was merely to play off the Union against
Respondent, and "sell out" to the highest bidder, and that this purpose must have been
communicated to the employees by the Posoccos The difficulty with this argument is
that, while it is true that Victor Posocco testified that lie proposed direct negotiations,
Negro insisted that it was he who made that proposal In any ei ent, both witnesses agreed
that, after consulting with the other employees, Victor announced that they opposed
direct negotiations, and Negro admitted that Bruno Posocco concuried in ruling out direct
negotiations despite Negro' s urgent plea that he be allowed to meet with the employee,
( There is conflicting testimony as to who actually called the meeting held later that day.
According to Negio, the employees, themselves, finally decided to hold such a meeting
According to O'Neill, Negro announced at the meeting that lie had called it As I do not
deem the point material, there is no need to resolve this conflict ) Accordingly, there is
no basis for inferring that the Posoccos intended to use the cards only for the purpose of
conducting an "auction " between Respondent and the Union.
38 See footnote 9, above.
3e He admitted that he regarded that poll as a repudiation of the Union by 90 percent
of his employees.
10 As already noted, the Union had filed an election petition on October 27.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 645
would be relieved of any duty to bargain until the expiration of the posting period
and the holding of an election. It hardly need be stated that this belief was
erroneous. For one thing, the settlement agreement had not yet been consummated
on November 26,41 and, in any event, that agreement could not per se relieve
Respondent of the duty to bargain, upon request. However, the question remains
whether Negro in good faith believed that he was under no legal obligation to
bargain pending consumation of the settlement agreement, and, if so, whether that
would be a valid defense here. The latter question will be considered first.
While good faith is relevant to the defense of a refusal-to-bargain charge, where
the contention is that the respondent did in fact bargain in good faith, or that
his refusal to bargain was based on a good-faith doubt of the union's majority
status, even a bona fide mistake as to the applicable law does not excuse an
admitted refusal to bargain with a union, which, as here, represents a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit.42 Nor, as a matter of law, is there any merit
to Respondent's contention that Negro's mistake was induced by a Board agent.43
Moreover, it was only after he had already rejected the Union's bargaining request
that Negro, by his own account, was specifically advised by the Board agent not to
recognize the Union. Prior to November 26, the only information he had received
from the Board agent was that under the proposed settlement agreement there
would be an election after the expiration of the posting period, but Negro was
not told that in the interim he was free to refuse to recognize the Union 44 It is
thus clear that, in rejecting the Union's November 26 demand for recognition, he
was, even if his own account be credited, not relying on anything other than his
own erroneous belief as to the legal situation existing pending consummation of
the settlement agreement.
Finally, I am convinced that Negro's asserted reliance on such erroneous belief
was not bona fide but merely pretextual. This is manifest from the fact that, even
after the alleged source of such belief, the Board's Regional Office, issued the
complaint herein, which alleged that his refusal to bargain on November 26 was
unlawful, he persisted in his refusal to bargain , asserting at the hearing that he
would still not bargain with the Union without an election . From the foregoing,
it is clear that Negro's reason for not bargaining was more basic than any con-
fusion about the legal situation created by the proposed settlement agreement,
and that any claim that he was misled by a representative of the Board 's Regional
Office into believing that he need not bargain cannot explain his continued refusal
to bargain even after the issuance by such office of the instant complaint based
on such refusal.
Insofar as Respondent relies on any good -faith doubt that Negro may have
entertained as to the Union 's majority status on November 26, that reliance is
misplaced. It is evident that Negro did not entertain any such doubt on October 15,
when, by his own admission, he was told by Victor Posocco that the employees
wanted union representation; for he did not question this statement but promptly
embarked on a campaign to destroy the Union 's majority through unfair labor
practices , offering the employees a substantial wage increase in consideration of
their pledge to renounce the Union . While it is true that, after obtaining such a
pledge from the majority of the employees , Negro was justified in believing that
they no longer desired union representation , it is well settled that an employer
cannot refuse to recognize or bargain with a union because its majority status has
been impaired by defections induced by, or attributable to, his unfair labor prac-
tices.45 Accordingly , I find ( 1) that the employees ' renunciation of the Union , secured
by Respondent's unfair labor practices , did not affect the continuing validity of the
'i It was, in fact, never consummated, due presumably to the fact that on December 1,
the Union filed an amended charge, alleging a violation of Section 8(a) (5) on November 26.
West Texas Utilities Company, Inc, 85 NLRP. 1396, 1399, and cases there cited;
Poultry Enterprises, Inc, 102 NLRB 211, 220
43 See cases cited in preceding footnote.
"It is well settled that the mere pendency of an election petition does not excuse a
refusal to bargain
S° Sullivan Surplus Sales, Inc., 152 NLRB 132 (card counted for union, even though
revoked by employee before union requested recognition, where such revocation attributable
to employer's unfair labor practices) ; Pizza Products Corp , 153 NLRB 1265 ; Medo Photo
Supply Corporation v. AT L It B . 321 U S 678
646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cards, and (2) that Respondent was not entitled to rely upon such renunciation as -a
basis for doubting the Union's majority status 46
In conclusion , it is found that Respondent 's refusal to recognize the Union
was not prompted by any good -faith doubt of the Union 's majority status but
represented the culmination of a campaign to circumvent the collective -bargaining
requirements of the Act.
It is accordingly found that Respondent's refusal on and after November 26, to
recognize the Union violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.47
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent refused to bargain with the Union which
represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Accordingly, I
shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to bargain, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All Respondent's production and maintenance employees and truckdrivers,
excluding office clericals, professional employees, salesmen, watchmen, guards, gen-
eral manager, foremen, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. At all times material the Union has been and still is the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing to bargain collectively with the aforesaid labor organization as
the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, the Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By questioning and polling its employees concerning their union activities and
sentiments and by offering them inducements to renounce such activities, Respond-
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not threaten reprisals for union activity.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent, Home Pride Provisions, Inc.,
Stafford Springs, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment with Food Handlers Union Local 371, Amalga-
46 Corrie Corporation of Charleston, 158 NLRB 468, where the Board found a violation
of Section 8(a) (5), notwithstanding that prior to the union's bargaining request all the
union adherents had been discharged, in anticipation of such request, and the respondent
cited such discharge as pieot that the union larked a n'a,iority
471n any case, even if there were no unlawful refusal to bargain here, the appropriate
remedy for Respondent's illegal dissipation of the Union's majority status through the
October 15 wage raise would be to order it to bargain with the Union upon request.
Engineers f Fabricators, Inc, 156 NLRB 919, footnote 5
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC. 647
mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive representative of all its production and maintenance employees and truck-
drivers, excluding office clericals, salesmen, professional employees, watchmen,
guards, general manager, foremen, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Coercively questioning and polling employees concerning their union activ-
ities or sentiments, or offering them inducements to renounce such activities.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their Light to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of then own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right is
affected by the provisos in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is deemed necessary to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Food Handlers Union Local 371,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of all employees of the Respondent, in the unit described
above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions
of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in
a signed written agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Stafford Springs, Connecticut, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 48 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by the Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.49
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Deci-
sion and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner " in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
S9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL bargain, upon request, with Food Handlers Union Local 371,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described
below in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached , embody it in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, and truckdrivers at our Stafford
Springs plant, excluding office clericals, professional employees, salesmen,
watchmen, guards, general manager, foremen, and all other supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT coercively question or poll our employees about their union
activities or sentiments, or offer them inducements to renounce such activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form,
join, or assist Food Handlers Union Local 371 , Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by the provisos in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
All of our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain from becoming or
remaining , members of Food Handlers Union Local 371, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
HOME PRIDE PROVISIONS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street , Boston, Massachusetts 02108,
Telephone 223-3353.
Viking Bag Division , Shurfine-Central Corporation and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Pulp , Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers,
AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-2289. October 31, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 1, 1966, Trial Examiner Benjamin B. Lipton issued his
Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Neither the General
Counsel nor the Charging Party filed exceptions in the above case.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.]
161 NLRB No. 51.