Hanes Hosiery, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 22, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 338 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hanes Hosiery, Inc. and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and
Helpers Local Union No. 391 , International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America . Cases 11-CA-5681 and
11-CA-5745
July 22, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING , JENKINS , AND KENNEDY
On November 11, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Fitzpatrick issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a brief. The General Counsel filed cross-
exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Deci-
sion together with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in the light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge ex-
cept as modified below.
The Administrative Law Judge found, inter alia,
that Foreman Loggins' interrogation of employee
Beeson was not unlawful. We do not agree.
During their long, cordial work relationship, Bee-
son and Loggins have discussed a myriad of topics in
a relaxed, easy manner, including the advent of the
Union. The Union was introduced into their conver-
sation by Beeson who, on Friday, March 1, 1974,
informed Loggins that she had been invited to attend
a union meeting to be held that evening, and teasing-
ly asked him if he were going to attend. On the fol-
lowing Monday morning, Loggins subjected Beeson
to a series of union-related questions, each of which
fed upon Beeson 's previous answer. Thus, he asked
her whether she had attended the union meeting.
Beeson replied that she had and stated further that
employee Baker also was at the meeting where he
acted as spokesman for Respondent's employees who
were present. Loggins then asked, "What Baker had
to do with the meeting," and was told that Baker had
introduced the speakers. Loggins then asked Beeson
for the speakers ' names (both of whom were union
officials), and when Beeson supplied this information
Loggins asked Beeson for the spelling of one of those
names . In addition, during conversations concerning
the Union in which Beeson and Loggins engaged
over the following 3 days, all of which were initiated
by Beeson and conducted in a casual and relaxed
manner, Loggins continued to ask Beeson whether
Baker had attended the union meeting.
Based primarily on the longstanding and friendly
work relationship between Beeson and Loggins, the
relaxed manner in which they conducted all of their
conversations, including those concerning the Union,
and Beeson's initiation of all of the above union con-
versations after that which occurred on Monday, the
Administrative Law Judge found that the entire con-
text of those conversations was bereft of coercion
and did not constitute sufficient actual interference
to amount to a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
We long have recognized that the test of interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act does not turn on Respondent's motive, cour-
tesy, or gentleness, or on whether the coercion suc-
ceeded or failed. The test is whether Respondent has
engaged in conduct which reasonably tends to inter-
fere with the free exercise of employee rights under
the Act.' We find that Loggins' interrogation of Bee-
son falls within the purview of this test and, there-
fore, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Our dissenting colleague cannot find any factual
basis to support a finding of unlawful interrogation.
He asserts we are holding that the interrogation of
Beeson is unlawful per se. As we have found, supra,
the record clearly shows that despite the cordial rela-
tionship between Loggins and Beeson, and notwith-
standing the friendly manner in which their union
conversations were conducted, the fact remains that
Loggins, a representative of management, in what
our colleague refers to as "conversations," interrogat-
ed Beeson as to her union activity, interrogated her
as to the names, and the spelling thereof, of those
who spoke at the union meeting, and repeatedly in-
terrogated her as to the union activities of employee
Baker. Moreover, those interrogations did not occur
in a vacuum since , as the record shows, they were a
prelude to Respondent's subsequent discriminatory
application of its no-solicitation rule against another
known union adherent. The facts that the questioner
and questioned employee were otherwise on friendly
terms and the interrogation was conducted politely
and without overt hostility provides no legal basis for
concluding that Respondent's conduct lost its coer-
cive effect .2 Nor does an absence of direct evidence
1 N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (C.A 7, 1946), enfg. 61
NLRB 1129 (1945).
2 The Board and the courts long have held that, subject to certain limita-
tions and safeguards, an employer lawfully may interrogate its employees
In, e.g ., the investigation of unfair labor practice charges and for the prepa-
ration of its defense , Saunders Leasing System, Inc, 204 NLRB 448 (1973);
Guild Industries Manufacturing and Paul A Saad, 321 F.2d 108, 114 (C.A. 5,
1963), or to verify a union 's majority status, Struksnes Construction Compa-
ny, Inc., 165 NLRB 1062 (1967). Absent such legitimate purposes, however,
and despite our dissenting colleague's protestations to the contrary, interro-
gation which otherwise is unlawful is not made lawful merely because it is
219 NLRB No. 47
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
show that employees were, in fact, coerced. Experi-
ence has shown that statements made during an or-
ganizing campaign are the subject of discussion, rep-
etition, and dissemination among the employees, cf.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 172 NLRB 1122 (1968).
The absence of direct evidence does not indicate that
the interrogatee or employees may not, in fact, have
been coerced, or that such unlawful conduct had no
tendency to affect unlawfully their Section 7 rights.
As we have noted, the test is whether the conduct
tends to interfere with the exercise of employee rights
under the Act.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Hanes Hosiery, Inc., Weeks plant, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, its officers, agents , successors, and
assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees with respect to their
union activities, support, and membership.
(b) Applying its no-solicitation rule in a discrimi-
natory manner.
(c) Discriminating against employees because they
engage in union activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
the right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and
Helpers Local Union No. 391, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Expunge from its records the final warning in
writing issued to employee Brenda Collins on May 9,
1974, and forthwith advise her in writing of such ac-
tion.
(b) Post at its Weeks plant in Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
conducted in a friendly, pleasant , and courteous manner . Monroe Manufac-
turing Company, Inc., 200 NLRB 62 (1972). It is the fact , and not the man-
ner, of interrogation which interferes with or coerces the employees in the
exercise of their rights.
7 Standard Knitting Mills, supra.
339
vided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after
being duly signed by Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi-
al.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of un-
fair labor practices contained in the complaint which
have not been found herein are hereby dismissed.
MEMBER KENNEDY, dissenting:
I agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the
conversations between Respondent's foreman, Log-
gins, and employee Beeson were not coercive and did
not constitute sufficient actual interference to
amount to a violation of Section 8(a)(1). My col-
leagues summarily conclude, without any apparent
rationale, that these conversations fall within the test
of "conduct which reasonably tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act."
Absent any factual basis, such a conclusion is in real-
ity no more than a ruling that interrogation is per se
unlawful, an approach rejected by both the Board
and the courts.'
The Board, in Blue Flash Express,6 long ago reject-
ed such a per se rule because it "would mean that a
casual, friendly, isolated instance of interrogation by
a minor supervisor would subject the employer to a
finding that he had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice . . . ." Indeed, that is precisely what has hap-
pened here. As the Administrative Law Judge found,
employee Beeson has long worked "in close conjunc-
tion" with Knitting Department Foreman Loggins
and in her capacity as factory clerk "is frequently in
and out of his office," and regularly helps him with
4In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
5 Blue Flash Express, Inc, 109 NLRB 591 (1954), Frtto-Lay, Inc, 151
NLRB 28, 34 ( 1965); Bourne Co. v. N L R B, 332 F.2d 47 (C A. 2, 1954). It
is now well settled that interrogation of employees as to union matters is
unlawful only when it is conducted against a background of employer hos-
tiltty and discrimination towards unionization as would induce in its em-
ployees a fear of reprisal for lawfully pursuing their union activities or when
it contains an express or implied threat or promise . N L.R.B. v. Ralph Print-
ing and Lithographing Company, 379 F.24 687, 690 (C.A. 8, 1967); N.L.R.B.
v. J E. McCarron, et al , d/bla Prince Valley Lumber Co, et al., 216 F 2d
212, 216 (C.A. 9, 1954).
6 Supra
340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his weekly reports.
My colleagues concede that Beeson and Loggins
have shared a "long, cordial work relationship" and
that they have discussed many topics, including the
advent of the Union, in a "relaxed, easy manner."
They even concede that, as the Administrative Law
Judge found, on the Friday before the Monday
morning "interrogation," Beeson informed Loggins
that she had been invited to a union meeting to be
held that evening and "teasingly asked him if he were
going to attend." It was in this context that Loggins
asked Beeson, when she arrived at his office on Mon-
day morning to work with him on the weekly reports,
whether she had attended the Friday night meeting.
Beeson did not merely respond that she had, in fact,
attended; rather, she "volunteered little gossipy de-
tails" about the meeting. She volunteered that em-
ployee Baker was the spokesman for the company
employees present. Loggins responded to this unsoli-
cited outpouring of information with a question as to
Baker's part in the meeting and was told by Beeson
that Baker had introduced the speakers. All subse-
quent discussions concerning the Union were initiat-
ed by Beeson and, like the initial conversation, con-
tained absolutely no threats of warnings, either
expressed or implied.
Without question, the test to be applied in de-
termining the lawfulness of interrogation is "whether,
under all the circumstances, the interrogation reason-
ably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act."' The
circumstances surrounding Loggins' interrogation of
Beeson precluded any possibility that Beeson or any
other employee could have felt restraint in pursuing
union activities.8 Moreover, the only unfair labor
practice committed by the Respondent herein in-
volves a single incident with respect to 1 employee in
a plant employing nearly 2,300 employees. It is in-
conceivable to me that "interrogation" of a single
employee in this context could, as my colleagues
find, tend to interfere with the exercise of employee
rights under the Act. Indeed, my colleagues do not
suggest any basis whatsoever for their contrary con-
clusion, and their finding of a violation herein is to-
tally inconsistent with Board and court holdings that
interrogation is not per se unlawful.
In N.L.R.B. v. Huntsville Mfg. Company, a subsid-
iary of M. Howenstein & Son Inc., 514 F.2d 723 (C.A.
5, 1975), approximately 10 employees out of a work
force of 1,000 had been interrogated by their imme-
diate supervisors who questioned the employees as to
7 Blue Flask Express, Inc., supra, 593.
8 Certainly employee Baker could not possibly have felt restrained by the
questions concerning his part in the union meeting. There is absolutely no
evidence , or even allegation , that Baker knew of such questions or was in
any manner interfered with in the exercise of his rights under the Act.
what they thought about the union . The court's hold-
ing in Huntsville is clearly applicable to the majority's
decision herein . In refusing to enforce the Board's
order the court stated:
... These incidents must be placed in the con-
text of a three -month organizing campaign of a
total workforce of over 1,000 employees and in
which any other incidents of an "anti-union ani-
mus" are noticeably absent .4
Further militating against the Board 's conclu-
sion that the questioning was coercive is the gen-
erally innocuous nature of the questions asked
and that the "interrogations" were in employee
working or break areas. The questions on the
whole were permissible under § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. §
158(c) (1970) [footnote ommitted ], were asked by
low-echelon supervisors , most of whom were in
daily contact with the employees questioned, and
there was no testimony that any of the employees
were purposely evasive in their answers.
We would note here that the Board apparently equates in this
case an employer's opposition to the union with an anti -union ani-
mus. The Act does not mandate that employers willingly embrace
union representation of their employees nor do we think that opposi-
tion to a union can be converted into an anti -union animus without
some proof, absent here , that the employer engaged or has engaged in
the past in a pattern of conduct hostile to unions.
Further, finding that there were no "threats of repri-
sal" violative of the Act, the court in Huntsville quot-
ed with approval the following from Salinas Valley
Broadcasting Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 334 F.2d 604 (C.A. 9,
1964), a decision also apposite to the majority's find-
ings in this case:
Neither mere inquiry by employer of employ-
ees without harassment or undue frequency, as
to the fact of the existence of a plan to unionize,
nor a single somewhat vague prediction of antic-
ipated loss of economic benefits can be trans-
formed or transmuted by the magic of semantic
labels into "repeated interrogations" or "threats
of economic reprisals," sufficient to swing the
balance against the other facts in the record.
A fortiori the "semantic labels" applied by my col-
leagues cannot transform the conversations herein-
involving only 1 employee among 2,300 conducted in
a friendly atmosphere in response to the employee's
voluntary discussion of the Union, containing abso-
lutely no threats of reprisals, and to which the em-
ployee responded not only unevasively but with fur-
ther, unsolicited information-into "interrogation
which is unlawful."
In view of the friendly and relaxed relationship of
Beeson and Loggins and Beeson 's gossipy nature, I
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
cannot conceive of circumstances in which questions
concerning union activity could be less likely to in-
terfere with the free exercise of employees' rights un-
der the Act. Unquestionably, Beeson's interrogation
by Loggins under the circumstances herein did not
tend to restrain or inhibit her in the exercise of her
rights in any way. She, in fact, continued to volunteer
information concerning the Union, bringing up the
subject herself.
I cannot agree with my colleagues' reversion to the
rule that interrogation is per se unlawful? I would
find, as did the Administrative Law Judge, that in the
circumstances of this case, Loggins' interrogation of
Beeson was bereft of coercion, did not interfere with
the employees' exercise of their rights under the Act,
and, therefore, is not unlawful. Accordingly, I would
dismiss the complaint in regard to such interrogation.
9 My colleagues disavow taking such a per se approach . They specifically
ignore , however, "the friendly manner in which their union conversations
were conducted ," the obvious fact that Beeson was not inhibited by the
conversations and, in fact , continued to volunteer information about the
Union in conversations which she initiated , and the fact that the only unfair
labor practice committed involves I employee out of 2,300. The exclusion of
these factors from their consideration and their blind reliance on the fact
that the "interrogations" occurred belies the majority's disclaimer of a per se
approach to interrogation.
My colleagues misstate my position . They state that "despite [my] protes-
tations to the contrary, interrogation which otherwise is unlawful is not
made lawful merely because it is conducted in a friendly , pleasant, and
courteous manner ." I have not "protested " to the contrary . Rather, I find
such a statement irrelevant to the discussion herein . Under the test set forth
in Blue Flash Express, supra-interrogation does not become unlawful un-
less "under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to in-
terfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act"-the interrogation herein is not "otherwise unlawful ." Monroe Manu-
facturing Company, Inc., 200 NLRB 62, on which the majority relies to
support their conclusion that unlawful interrogation is not made lawful by
the manner in which it is conducted , does not support their application of
that conclusion herein ; indeed , their reliance on it merely emphasizes the
per se approach they now pursue . In Monroe, an employee who had already
been unlawfully interrogated on several occasions and had been the subject
of other unlawful interrogations was sought out by the respondent 's presi-
dent, who questioned her as to why she favored the union , attempted to
change her mind about the union , and asked her if his arguments had
changed her mind. My colleagues noted in Monroe the master-servant rela-
tionship and found that the president's seeking out the employee and the
discussion which followed "was calculated to, and would reasonably be
interpreted by the employee involved as an attempt to, interfere with her
right to self-organization , regardless of the courtesy and civility of the
inquiry."
It cannot be seriously suggested that employee Beeson was the victim of
a "master-servant" relationship or that she interpreted Loggins ' responses to
her voluntary outpouring of information about the union meeting as an
attempt to interfere with her right to self-organization.
I refuse to join my colleagues in their per se approach to interrogation,
regardless of the facade with which it is veiled.
APPENDIX
341
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all sides had a chance to
give evidence, the National Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees with
respect to their union activities, support, and
membership.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner,
do anything that interferes with, restrains, or
coerces employees with respect to these rights.
WE WILL NOT apply our no -solicitation rule in
a discriminatory manner.
WE WILL NOT reprimand or otherwise discrimi-
nate against employees because of their union
activities.
WE WILL expunge from our records the written
final warning given Brenda Collins on May 9,
1974, and advise her in writing of that action.
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Law Judge: These
consolidated cases arise initially from charges in Case 11-
CA-5681 filed March 19, 1974 t and later amended on
April 8 and 18 and May 9. The charges in Case 11-
CA-5745 were filed May 17 and amended June 5. All the
charges were filed by Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local Union No. 391, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
(the Union) against Hanes Hosiery, Inc. (the Respondent).
On June 14 a consolidated complaint issued based on these
charges alleging that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices consisting of multiple violations of Section 8(a)(1)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the
Act), and a single violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The allegations respecting 8(a)(1) involve a no-solicitation
1 All dates herein are 1974 unless otherwise noted.
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rule, interrogation of employees regarding union activity,
and warning employees to remove , or coverup , union but-
tons . The allegations respecting Section 8(a)(3) involve the
issuance of a final warning to employee Brenda Collins.
Respondent filed an answer admitting the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint but denying the alleged viola-
tions of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. The answer admits a
final warning was issued to employee Brenda Collins but
denies it was issued because of her union or concerted ac-
tivities.
The issues were heard before me at Winston -Salem,
North Carolina , on July 18 and 19.
Upon the entire record , my observation of the witnesses,
and consideration of the brief filed by General Counsel, I
make the following:
Weeks plant started on March 1 with a meeting of between
75 and 80 plant employees at a local motel . The organizing
went forward with handbilling outside the plant , beginning
about March 7 and with further meetings of employees
including a mass meeting held on March 10. In addition an
in-plant organizing committee was set up to solicit employ-
ees signatures on union authorization cards . The union or-
ganizing effort continued through April, May, June, and
July and was in progress at the time of the hearing herein.
Simultaneously Respondent has been engaged in a cam-
paign to counteract the Union organizing.
B. The Alleged Threats, Coercion, and Restraints
1. The no-solicitation rule
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
Respondent is a North Carolina corporation engaged in
the manufacture and sale of women's hosiery . It operates a
plant known as the Weeks plant at Winston -Salem, North
Carolina , the only facility involved in the present matter.
Respondent annually receives at its Weeks plant at Win-
ston-Salem goods and raw materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which come to it directly from points outside
North Carolina . It also annually sells and ships from the
Weeks plant to points outside North Carolina goods val-
ued in excess of $50 ,000. Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
The Weeks plant employs between 2200 and 2300 per-
sons in three shifts . Eighty percent of the employees are
women.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is an organization which represents employ-
ees respecting wages , hours , and working conditions and
which admits to membership employees of various employ-
ers, including employees of Respondent . It is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
At the time of the events involved in this case and con-
tinuing through the time of the hearing the Union was en-
gaged in a campaign to organize the employees at the
Weeks plant . On May 28 the Union filed a petition (11-
RC-3922) seeking a Board election. Following a hearing
on June 20, the Board's Regional Director for Region 11
on July 5 issued a Decision and Direction of Election di-
recting that a representation election be held among the
production and maintenance employees of the Weeks plant
on August 7. At the time of the unfair labor practice hear-
ing herein the election remained scheduled but had not yet
been held.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union Organizing Campaign
The union campaign to organize employees of the
The complaint alleges , and the answer denies , that Re-
spondent promulgated , maintained , and enforced an inval-
id no-solicitation rule prohibiting employees from union
solicitation during nonworking time on company property.
There is no dispute that a no-solicitation rule has long been
in effect in the form of Rule 17 in the employees hand-
book . The General Counsel contends that rule 17 on its
face is invalid because its language is too broad , and, fur-
ther , that it was discriminatorily applied.
The rule in question reads as follows:
17. Solicitations , collections, sales.
Except by the express permission of management,
there shall be no-solicitations , collections , or sales on
the job or which in any way interfere with work or
production.
In arguing that this rule in invalid on its face because it
is too broadly worded the General Counsel first relies on
Daylin, Inc., Discount Division, d/b/a Miller 's Discount
Dept. Stores, 198 NLRB 281 (1972). The thrust of the argu-
ment appears to be that as read by the ordinary employee
rule 17 would be understood to ban all union solicitations
on plant premises even though the employees involved
might not be working at the time . Apparently the General
Counsel does not contend , and in any event there is no
evidence to indicate , that rule 17 was initially established
for a discriminatory purpose . Cf. Serv -Air, Inc., 161 NLRB
382 (1966).
Looking to the language of the rule itself , it prohibits
solicitations "on the job." Contrary to the contention of
the General Counsel I find that ordinary employees read-
ing those words would understand that they applied to sit-
uations where employees were working . In the past the
Board has considered rules banning solicitations "on the
job" and has found that such rules are not on their face
invalid . Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Miami, Inc., 155 NLRB 527
(1965). See also Southwire Company, 145 NLRB 1329
(1964), enfd . as modified 352 F.2d 346 (C.A. 5, 1965);
White Oak Acres, Inc., 134 NLRB 1145 , 1150 (1961).
The General Counsel seems to read rule 17 as including
two rules : one prohibiting solicitations on the job and the
other prohibiting solicitations which interfere with work or
production . The rule forbids solicitations in circumstances
described in the following language , "on the job or which
in any way interfere with work or production." The Gener-
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
al Counsel emphasized the use of the disjunctive "or" to
support his reasoning that two rules are involved . But this
is a strained reading . There is no punctuation preceding the
disjunctive "or." As I read the rule, and as I think the
ordinary employee would read it , the words "or which in
any way interfere with work or production " modify and
explain the words which precede them and serve to empha-
size that the purpose of the rule is to protect the production
process . I have been referred to no case where language
forbidding solicitations which interfere with work produc-
tion has been held per se invalid.
The General Counsel further contends that the opening
words of rule 17 allowing an exception to the rule if per-
mission of management is obtained serves to encourage
solicitations for causes popular with management while si-
multaneously discouraging solicitations for the Union.
There is some validity in this argument where the employ-
er, as here , is engaging in a campaign in opposition to the
Union . Yet one must not lose sight of the fact that the rule
as a whole is short and easily read . It takes up only three
lines in the employee handbook . It is not a long involved
statement with numerous exceptions requiring an employ-
ee to be a Philadelphia lawyer to figure it out . Compare
Fasco Industries, Inc. v . N.L.R.B., 412 F.2d 589 (C.A. 4,
1969), enfg . 173 NLRB 522 (1969). Whether stated in the
rule or not , management has the inherent power to change
the rule or grant exceptions to it . This language merely
announces that authority . I do not think it significantly
encourages or discourages employees in their solicitations.
The General Counsel also contends that rule 17 , whether
or not invalid on its face , was disparately applied against
union solicitations . In this connection the record shows
that rule 17 was ignored insofar as the sale of various prod-
ucts such as Tupperware , Rubbermaid , Avon , and candy
and jewelry . In addition, various collections were at times
taken up such as collections for the flower club fund used
on the occasion of funerals or serious mishaps . Some col-
lections were taken up to purchase Christmas gifts for su-
pervisors . The record indicates that management knew
about these solicitations and allowed them to continue
without restrictions . There was also some buying and sell-
ing of firearms in the plant . But the record indicates that
management was unaware of these sales . The plant manag-
er testified that he received no complaints from employees
that they were being bothered or pressured by these vari-
ous solicitations . Perhaps he himself did not receive any
complaints . But with a work force of over 2 ,000 it is hard to
believe that some disgruntled individual has not on some
occasion groused to a supervisor about such solicitations.
The General Counsel contends that rule 17 was applied
to the union solicitations in a discriminatory manner and
points to the disciplining of Brenda Collins as evidence of
such disparate application . I so find . The evidence is treat-
ed hereinafter in connection with the alleged discrimina-
tion against Collins.
2. The alleged interrogations
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
various dates in March and April three of Respondent's
supervisors unlawfully interrogated employees about the
343
union activities, membership, and desires of those employ-
ees as well as other employees. The three supervisors in-
volved are Elbert Loggins, first-shift foreman in the knit-
ting department, George Tucker, first-shift foreman in the
pairing department, and Jerry Warren, plant manager.
a. The alleged interrogations by Elbert Loggins
At the time of the events involved here Louise Beeson
was employed as a factory clerk on the first shift in the
knitting department under the supervision of Foreman El-
bert Loggins. She has been an employee of Respondent for
20 years. In her capacity as factory clerk Beeson works in
close conjunction with Loggins and is frequently in and out
of his office. She keeps the department records such as the
style and size setups necessary for production. She regu-
larly helps Loggins with his weekly reports. This latter ac-
tivity takes place early each Monday morning in his office.
Beeson and Loggins converse with each other daily. The
scope of their conversations include not only their work
but also many other topics of mutual interest.
On the evening of Friday, March 1, the Union had
scheduled a meeting of employees to which Beeson had
been invited. Earlier that day while at work she came into
the office of the superintendent in charge of her operation
at a time when Loggins was there. Beeson volunteered that
she had been invited to a union meeting and asked Loggins
why he did not go also. Loggins declined, saying he had
not been invited. According to Beeson they have discussed
the Union many times.
The following Monday morning, March 4, when Beeson
arrived at Loggins' office to work on the weekly reports
with him, he asked her if she attended the meeting on Fri-
day night. She said yes. According to Loggins she volun-
teered that she had gone to the meeting. His version is
consistent with her testimony that they often talked about
the Union, that she told him about union activity without
his asking, and that his questions in this regard came after
the subject was being discussed. Nevertheless, I credit the
testimony of Beeson and find that on Monday, March 4,
Loggins brought up the matter by asking her if she had
attended the Friday meeting. I reach this finding because it
seems logical in light of their interchange on Friday that he
would ask her if in fact she went.
The conversation continued with Beeson volunteering
many details about the Friday night meeting and with Log-
gins asking some questions along the way. From the total
evidence it is clear that he did not grill her. Beeson told
about various things that happened such as her difficulty in
getting into the meeting when the man on the door of the
meeting place asked her what she was doing there. She also
told of another man at the meeting who apparently had
been drinking and had to be told to sit down. She told
Loggins what the speaker said in his opening remarks. She
told him that an employee named Talmadge Baker was the
spokesman for the company employees present. According
to Beeson , Loggins specifically asked her if Talmadge Bak-
er was at the meeting, to which she replied that she did not
know, and also specifically asked her the identity of the
spokesman for the employees present, to which she replied
that she did not know. On these differences I do not credit
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Beeson . The account of Loggins upon which I base the
above finding was more detailed than hers . In any case, it
seems to me that a 20-year employee such as Beeson, who
admittedly had often talked about the Union with Loggins
and who had volunteered little gossipy details such as her
experience with the doorman when she arrived and the
incident about the man who got out of order, would not
have been so reluctant to mention the name of the employ-
ee spokesman or so quick to plead ignorance in this regard.
After learning that Talmadge Baker had been the em-
ployee spokesman , Loggins admittedly asked Beeson what
Baker had to do with the meeting . She replied that he intro-
duced the speakers. Loggias then admittedly asked her
who the speakers were and she gave him the name of two
union officials , a Mr. Durham and a Mr. Lauk (which she
pronounced as Lock). He then asked her how to spell the
name Lauk . He testified that that was all he asked her. He
denied asking her if other employees , specifically certain
changer-mechanics , were there . Beeson testified that he
had asked her if some changer-mechanics were at the meet-
ing and that she had pleaded ignorance . I credit Loggins in
this respect. It is not clear from her testimony whether Bak-
er was one of those she referred to.
On the following day, Tuesday, Beeson again had occa-
sion to be in Loggins office. They conversed on various
topics including job relations . Beeson brought up the sub-
ject of the Union. She testified that Loggins again asked
her if Baker was at the meeting and that she again said she
did not know . Beeson further testified that on the following
Wednesday and Thursday, March 6 and 7, approximately
the same general conversations occurred . She admittedly
raised the subject of the Union each time. She testified that
on each of these days Loggins again asked if Baker had
been at the Friday meeting. Loggins , without giving any
details about the Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday con-
versations , categorically denied asking about Baker on any
of those days . I do not credit his denial.
Whether Loggins violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act is a
close question . He, a supervisor, while in his office, the
locus of authority , clearly asked Beeson , a rank-and-file
employee, about union activities. Yet the entire context of
the conversations is bereft of coercion. The relationship
between Beeson and Loggins was a cordial one. Even
though he was a supervisor and she was not, they were in
part coworkers. There is no question that she was not a
supervisor . Yet her duties involved her in management's
work much more than was the case with the ordinary mill-
hand . Loggins' office was for her a normal work area.
A longstanding mutual relationship allowed them to fre-
quently converse on many topics. They often talked about
the Union . On each of the particular occasions discussed in
the evidence, except one, she brought up the topic of the
Union. Any questions or comments he had followed there-
after as in normal conversation . The one exception was on
the morning March 4 when he asked her if she had gone to
the meeting the previous Friday night , a meeting she had
earlier told him about and invited him to attend.
Whether Loggins' questions , although not coercive, were
nevertheless an interference , is arguable . Plainly Beeson
and her fellow employees were not quite as free of employ-
er influence after her supervisor's questions were put and
she had responded. In the first place, as in any conversa-
tion , she necessarily was under some slight pressure to re-
spond in some manner . Secondly, she and her fellow em-
ployees could reasonably believe that , at least to the extent
of the scope of the questions asked, their employer was
interested to learn what they were doing and thinking. This
conceivably could have an inhibiting effect on future exer-
cise of their statutory rights. But the same context which
leads me to find no perceptible coercion present in these
conversations also leads me to find insufficient actual in-
terference to amount to a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Accordingly I find that Loggins did not commit an
unfair labor practice.
b. The alleged interrogation by George Tucker
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies , that in the
second week of April George Tucker, foreman in the pair-
ing department , unlawfully interrogated employees about
their own union activities , membership , and desires and the
activities, membership , and desires of other employees.
At the Weeks plant Respondent follows the practice of
having a supervisor interview each employee once a year.
On April 8, Tucker routinely called in Novella Adams, em-
ployed in the pairing department as a material handler on
the first shift, for her regular annual interview . Although
the union organizing campaign was then in progress, and
Adams had twice been solicited (once in March and again
in April) to sign a union card by Brenda Collins , a member
of the union organizing committee , while they were work-
ing, I find, based on the credited testimony of Tucker, that
the interview with Adams was routinely scheduled, that he
took her in order, and that the scheduling of the interview
was unrelated to the union campaign then in progress.
The interview was held in Tucker's office. When Adams
appeared he asked her to sit down , asked her how she was
getting along , and told her it was her regular yearly inter-
view. He then went over her absentee record , her work
record, and checked her current address. According to Ad-
ams she asked Tucker in the course of the interview if a
person did not sign a union card would they be subjected
to dues. Tucker answered no. Adams further testified that
Tucker then asked her how she felt about the Union and
she answered that she wanted no parts of it. She further
testified that Tucker asked her if she thought the Union
would get in and she answered no, not with Brenda Collins
pushing it.
It is clear from the testimony of both Adams and Tucker
that she brought up the topic of the Union. On cross-exam-
ination Adams testified that prior to Tucker saying any-
thing about the Union she said she wanted no parts of the
Union . Further along in the cross-examination she testified
she did not remember whether she had told Tucker first or
whether he had asked her first about the Union, that it
could have been either way. She testified that Tucker did
not grill her about the Union, that his statements were in
answer to her questions , that he talked to her in a nice way
without putting pressure on her or making her fearful. And
finally she testified that she probably told Tucker about the
Union without him asking.
On his part Tucker testified credibility that, when Ad-
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
ams brought up the topic of the Union by asking him if the
Union should come into the plant, would she have to join
the Union or belong to the Union, he answered no, that it
was each person's privilege. According to Tucker, Adams
explained the reason she had asked was because a girl that
had been wearing a union badge in the pairing department
had been trying to get her to sign a union card and she did
not want anything to do with it. Tucker unequivocally de-
nied he ever asked Adams how she felt about the Union or
if she thought the Union would win or lose or what the
feelings of other employees were about the Union. He testi-
fied further that, when Adams mentioned the union card,
he suggested that she read it very carefully, including the
fine print. According to him he did not suggest that she not
sign one nor did he ask her if she had signed one.
According to Tucker he did not report to the plant man-
ager on his interview with Adams. During the interview,
however, he filled out a routine personnel form which be-
came a permanent part of Adams' file. On the back of the
form in a space provided for general comments Tucker
wrote, "Novella said she appreciated her job and all that
Hanes has done for her. She ask (sic) about the Union if
they get in here could they make you join. Said she did not
want any part of it."
I find the above evidence insufficient to establish that
Tucker coercively interrogated Adams about the union ac-
tivities , membership , and desires of herself or other em-
ployees. I reach this finding because even though the inter-
view took place at the locus of authority, it was scheduled
as a routine matter in accordance with established practice.
I further rely on the fact that the employee injected the
subject of unionism into the conversation. Moreover, her
testimony, which is the only evidence offered to support
the allegation, was vacillating and contradicted by the un-
equivocal denial of Tucker. Accordingly, these allegations
of the complaint should be dismissed.
c. The alleged interrogation by Jerry Warren
As noted earlier herein employee Novella Adams had
twice been solicited to sign a union card by fellow employ-
ee Brenda Collins while they were on the job. On the first
occasion in March Adams indicated she was undecided.
On the second occasion in April Adams indicated she had
not made up her mind. She did not sign an authorization
card on either occasion . It was after these two incidents
that she had her annual interview with her foreman,
George Tucker, detailed above.
Some time in April, after her interview with Tucker, Ad-
ams encountered Collins in the break area during break-
time. Other employees were also present . At the time Col-
lins was angry with Adams. She pointed to Adams, calling
her a Miss Hanes Hosiery "ass -licker ." Adams was much
embarrassed by the uncomplimentary epithet.
As a result of the incident in the break area Adams re-
quested an interview with Plant Manager Jerry Warren. He
was not immediately available but a few days later he
called her to his office pursuant to her request. She told
him about all three incidents involving Collins, the two
occasions when she was solicited to sign a union card as
well as the abusive language in the break area. She asked
345
Warren if there was anything that could be done about
Collins and her conduct, saying she did not like Collins'
attitude trying to get her to sign a union card.
According to Adams, whom I credit, Warren then asked
her if she thought the Union had a chance. She replied she
did not think so with people like Collins working for it
because Collins was hurting it more than she was helping
it. Adams said she did not want any part in the Union. She
also testified that Warren may have asked her about her
feelings about the Union. She did not remember his exact
words. Inasmuch as her testimony is uncertain in this re-
gard I find the evidence insufficient to warrant a finding
that Warren asked her how she felt about the Union.
Moreover, it is clear he already knew what her feelings
were.
Warren denied that he asked Adams how she thought
the Union was doing, or whether it had a chance, or who
was for or against the Union. But the account of Adams is
very clear and I credit her version that he asked if she
thought the Union had a chance.
If Warren had called Adams to his office on his own
motion and inquired of her if the Union had a chance, his
interrogation would clearly have been coercive and a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. But because she sought
the interview , voluntarily reported about her encounters
with Collins which involved the Union, asked Warren if
anything could be done about Collins' conduct, voluntarily
expressed her antiunion attitude, and only then did Warren
ask her opinion about the Union's chances, I find the evi-
dence as a whole insufficient to establish that the circum-
stances were coercive. Accordingly, I find that Warren did
not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in this regard.
3. Warnings to remove or cover up union buttons
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) in that Foreman Joe Gil-
lespie in mid-March, on March 18, and in late March,
warned employees to either remove or cover up union but-
tons which they were wearing. The real issue is whether
business reasons justified such directions.
Buttons were distributed by the Union in March for use
by union supporters during the union campaign. They were
round metal campaign buttons about 2 inches in diameter,
with yellow background, the words "Vote Teamster" in
black across the top, and a drawing of a smiling face be-
low. The buttons were affixed to the wearer's clothing by a
pin across the back, the point of the pin protruding about
one-fourth inch beyond the periphery of the button. The
surface of the button itself , which appears to be painted, is
generally smooth . However, the particular button offered
in evidence by the General Counsel, which witnesses testi-
fied is identical to all of the others used, is slightly rusted
along the edge.
Joe Gillespie is the section foreman on the third shift in
the knitting department. The shift starts work at 11:50 p.m.
and continues for 8 hours. The knitting department is the
principal activity in the plant during the night hours. Gil-
lespie supervises 56 employees operating 28 production
lines . The area under his supervision encompasses approxi-
mately 25,000 square feet.
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In approximately the second week of March quality
checker Lola White wore a union button to work. Gillespie
told her she would either have to take it off or cover it up.
In mid-March fixer-mechanic James Chatman also wore a
button and was told the same thing by Gillespie. On the
night of Friday, March 15, quality checker Faye Long
wore a button without incident. The next Monday morn-
ing, March 18, quality checker Helen Witaker wore a but-
ton and Gillespie told her to take it off or cover it up. That
same night Faye Long again wore her button and Gillespie
told her the same thing. In each case he gave the employee
the option of removing the button or continuing to wear it
but covering it up. He gave no indication as to how it
should be covered up, whether by a transparent or opaque
covering.
Chatman, the fixer-mechanic involved, works in and
among the running knitting machines . His duties include
the handling of hosiery. He was wearing his button on the
neck strap of his apron.
The quality checkers involved, White, Whitaker, and
Long are each responsible for two production lines. As a
knitting machine produces hosiery it blows the finished
product into a bag. When a quality checker finds that a
machine is running defects , her duties involve pulling all
the hose produced by the machine out of the bag. This is
done by hand. The number of hose handled on any given
occasion may be small but may also be substantial. The
evidence indicates that on occasion bunches of hose are
held in the arms and even against the body and that the
employees must take care not to nick or pick the hose.
Considerable evidence was offered respecting picks. A
pick is a single strand of yarn in a hose which has been
pulled out of place with the result that the hose is defective.
Some picks are repairable but they present a problem be-
cause hand labor is required to repair them. Larger picks of
2, 2-1/2, and 3 inches in length are not repairable and the
hose become waste. About 1-1/2 mile of yarn go into each
conventional hose.
Picks are a constant problem. The number of picks has
varied from as little as 6 percent of the hose produced to as
much as 22 percent. Gillespie testified credibly that he is
under constant pressure from higher management to keep
down the number of picks. In 1973 when picks were run-
ning particularly high, his superiors specifically instructed
him to get the level of picks down. He also testified credi-
bly, and I find, that the yarn currently used in the produc-
tion of hosiery is more susceptible to picks than that previ-
ously used. As a result more effort is being made to reduce
picks.
In order to avoid picks employees are required to wear
gloves. If they wear a wristwatch not covered by the gloves,
they are required to wear a cover for the watch. No special
restrictions are put on the clothing the employees wear ex-
cept that the Company prefers they wear clothing which is
smooth in front to avoid the possibility that stockings may
be picked by brushing against rough clothing or against
buttons and the like. Quality checkers are provided with
aprons covering them below the waist. However, they are
not required to wear the aprons. Fixer-mechanics appar-
ently wear aprons which have a bib front covering the
chest as well as the lower body.
Although the above noted evidence shows a valid busi-
ness concern with picks, some evidence in the record tends
to indicate a nonbusiness motivation for Gillespie's in-
struction regarding the union buttons. Thus, he gave his
instructions while the union campaign was in progress and
while Respondent admittedly was engaged in a campaign
to counter the union campaign. Whitaker testified without
contradiction that after Gillespie told her to take off or
cover up the union button she asked him why and he re-
plied that it was against company rules. She then com-
mented she thought it was silly and he replied, "We're not
supposed to go within a mile of those people." It is not
alleged that this comment was an unfair labor practice, but
the General Counsel contends it indicates why Gillespie
restricted her in wearing the union button. Chatman testi-
fied, without contradiction, that when Gillespie told him to
leave the button on or cover it up he also stated, "It's
against the company policy."
Gillespie testified, and I find, that there is no company
policy against wearing union buttons or any other kind of
buttons as such. Chatman and Long both testified, and I
find, that in the 1972 presidential campaign they both wore
political campaign buttons similar to the union button in
question here and in about the same location. No limita-
tion was put upon them. Long also testified that since Gil-
lespie limited her she has seen others in the plant wearing
union buttons. I give little weight to the fact that political
buttons were worn in 1972 because of the passage of time
and because of the evidence that the problem of picks has
since become more serious and the yarn is apparently more
fragile than used at previous times.
Whitaker testified, and I find, that she has often worn
necklaces and pins in the same general location as she wore
the union button and has never snagged a hose. However,
she did not testify that Gillespie never objected to these
ornaments. She denied that during her work hose comes
close enough to such ornaments to be picked. I do not
credit her denial in view of the substantial testimony of
other witnesses to the contrary. Respecting Whitaker, Gil-
lespie testified credibly that he never observed her wearing
a long necklace although he had seen her wear a short one
which fell inside her blouse and was therefore covered. I
credit his testimony in this reagrd. However, he did not
recall Whitaker wearing brooches with long pins sticking
out in front so her testimony respecting pins stands unde-
nied.
Gillespie admitted that White has worn long chains and
that he has had to talk to her about it. His instructions,
however, appear to have been exceedingly mild because he
allowed her to continue to wear the chain for the balance
of the shift and asked her not to wear it again. According
to him she also on occasion wore a necklace with a cross
pendant. He had her put this down inside her blouse.
Long testified, and I find, that she sometimes wears a
small metal clip in the form of an American flag up on her
shoulder in the same location as the union button she wore.
According to her the flag pin snaps on like a tie clasp and
would tend to snag hose if it came into contact with them.
Nothing has ever been said to her about wearing the flag
clip.
There is evidence in this record going both ways. Some
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
tends to support an inference that restrictions were put on
employees of union buttons in order to hamper the union
campaign . Other evidence supports an inference that busi-
ness reasons were behind the restrictions . Gillespie, who
was a forthright and credible witness, testified that his re-
strictions on wearing the union button were not related to
the fact that they were union buttons but only to the fact
that they posed a problem regarding picks. He testified that
the union buttons were on the front of the employee's
chest. This is in conflict with all of the employee witnesses
who testified that the union buttons were placed high up
near the shoulder. I think Gillespie was mistaken and ac-
cordingly I credit the employee witnesses on this point.
I find that the union button could, if it came into contact
with hose, cause picks in them. Obviously the pin which
protrudes a quarter inch beyond the periphery of the circu-
lar button could cause a pick or snag. Secondly, Gillespie
demonstrated at the hearing how a hose could catch on the
round edge of the union button which was offered in evi-
dence by the General Counsel. There is a slight rust mark
on the edge of this particular exhibit. The evidence is to the
effect that all of the union buttons were the same. The
record is silent as to whether buttons other than the one
offered in evidence had any rust on the edge. I make no
finding in this respect. Yet Gillespie's demonstration viv-
idly portrayed the hazard involved in the button coming
into contact with hose.
The evidence shows that some risk of picks did exist
from the wearing of the union buttons as well as other
articles. The evidence shows that on some but not all occa-
sions Gillespie took measures to limit employees' use of
such ornaments. Thus, Long was never restricted in the use
of her flag pin while others were told to put hanging neck-
laces inside their blouses or not to wear them in the future.
And Long observed union buttons being worn in the plant
after the incidents involved here.
I find there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclu-
sion that business justification existed for Gillespie's re-
strictions respecting the union buttons. The difficulty with
the General Counsel's case here is that the type of clothing
and ornaments worn by the employees have a direct rela-
tionship to production. Management on the spot must be
allowed a reasonable discretion in guarding against defects
in the product which might be caused by clothing or orna-
ments . Here I think Gillespie was within the bounds of that
discretion. He did not absolutely ban the wearing of the
buttons. His restrictions permitted employees to continue
wearing them if they were covered. I find they could have
been covered by a transparent material and still have com-
plied with his restrictions. In my view it is unwarranted to
find unlawful a foreman 's restrictions on use of a union
button which has been demonstrated in the courtroom to
be capable of causing picks in the hosiery produced.
Whether Gillespie was entirely correct in his judgment that
the buttons placed high on the body of the employee were
nevertheless a hazard is an arguable matter. The hazard
appears to have been greater in the case of Chatman than
with the quality checkers because he had to get in and
around the running machines which were using the fragile
yarn and he also had to handle some hosiery. But even
restrictions on the quality checkers were within the
347
foreman's legitimate discretion. Given the particular cir-
cumstances here, to find that Gillespie committed an un-
fair labor practice would be to second guess his judgment
regarding the production of the product.
I might reach a contrary result if the button involved
were not so clearly demonstrated to be a potential hazard
to the product. Compare Consolidated Casinos Corp. Saha-
ra Division, 164 NLRB 950 (1967). If, as I find, the union
buttons were a hazard to the product and Gillespie acted
accordingly, it is immaterial that he failed to so act on all
occasions , whether with respect to union buttons worn by
employees other than the four involved here or with respect
to other ornaments on clothing. Respondent's inefficiency
on some occasions does not warrant a finding that occa-
sions of efficiency amount to unfair labor practices even if
some restriction of employee rights to propagandize is in-
volved. I find that the risk to the product shown here are
special circumstances which legitimize Gillespie's actions.
C. The Alleged Discrimination
The complaint alleges , and the answer admits , that on
May 9 Respondent issued a written "final warning" to em-
ployee Brenda Collins. The complaint further alleges, but
the answer denies, that the warning was issued because of
her union or concerted activities.
1. Collins' employment history and union activity
Collins was hired on October 14, 1968. At the time of the
events involved here she worked on the first shift as a pair-
er of hose in the pairing department. She first involved
herself in union activity on March 10 when she attended a
mass meeting of employees. At that time she joined the
in-plant organizing committee and thereafter endeavored
to persuade other employees to execute union authoriza-
tion cards. She talked about the Union to fellow employees
in the plant. At times when she was not working she sta-
tioned herself in the parking lot near her car (where she
kept a supply of blank authorization cards) and tried to
interest employees in signing them. She also passed out
union handbills outside the plant. Her union activities were
known to management.
Respondent maintains a system for administering three
types of discipline depending upon the gravity of the em-
ployee offense. Minor derelictions such as unexcused ab-
sences result only in oral reprimands. After two oral repri-
mands the employee is given a written reprimand. More
serious faults such as sleeping on the job result in a written
reprimand for the first offense and in discharge on the sec-
ond occasion. Company guidelines for the type of offenses
within this category also include interfering with the work
of others, abusive language to fellow employees, and
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with fel-
low employees on company premises. For even more seri-
ous offenses employees are discharged on the first offense.
Examples of offenses in the most serious category are fight-
ing, abusive or profane language to supervision, and im-
moral or indecent conduct.
On May 9 Respondent issued a written reprimand to
Collins. It was handed to her by her supervisor, George
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Tucker. She refused to sign the reprimand. It reads in perti-
nent part as follows:
It was explained to Brenda Collins that she has been
bothering and interfering with the work of other em-
ployees while they were working.
She was advised that any further occurrence of this
nature that results in her neglecting her work or inter-
fering with the work of others will result in her em-
ployment being terminated.
"THIS IS A FINAL WARNING."
2. The reasons for the reprimand to Collins
Respondent asserts its reprimand to Collins was justified
by her dealings with three fellow employees , Novella Ad-
ams, Robert Zimmerman , and Larry Glenn, all of whom
complained that she was bothering them.
a. The incidents with Novella Adams
As noted earlier herein Collins had on two occasions
endeavored to interest Adams in the Union . On each occa-
sion both were working . Collins on each occasion was at
her work station pairing stockings . The evidence indicates
that she could do this work while conversing with others. I
find that on the two occasions when she solicited Adams,
Collins did not interfere with her own work. On the other
hand, Adams in the performance of her duties moved
about from place to place and even from department to
department . Her job classification was material handler in
the pairing department . She generally used a handtruck in
her work . In the course of her work she came into contact
with many employees with whom she conversed. I find that
she was not on a tight time schedule and that satisfactory
performance of her duties permitted her to take a few min-
utes from time to time for social conversation with fellow
workers . I base this finding on uncontradicted testimony
that on occasions she was asked to look up telephone num-
bers or do other errands for employees required to stay at
their work stations.
On the first occasion which occurred in late March or
early April, Adams in the course of her work came to the
place where Collins and another employee were working.
They had a short exchange of words and Adams moved on
with no significant delay. On the second occasion which
occurred 3 to 4 weeks later Adams was not passing imme-
diately by Collins' work station but was in another aisle
about 16 to 18 feet away from Collins. Collins called her
over. Adams complied because she did not know what Col-
lins wanted and it was not unusual for employees to make
requests of her . Instead , Collins sought to interest Adams
in signing a union card . Collins made comments about the
pay and also urged Adams to sign a union card in the
interest of a fellow employee present even if she was not
interested for her own benefit . The evidence shows that on
this occasion Adams was delayed a few minutes in contin-
uing her further duties but that no adverse consequences
resulted from her delay. She was, however, bothered by the
conversations because she was not in favor of the Union
and would have preferred that Collins not speak to her
about it.
It was after this that she had her annual interview with
her foreman, George Tucker, detailed above . Some time
after that Adams encountered Collins in the break area on
which occasion Collins pointed to her and called her an
obscene name . Adams then requested an interview with
Plant Manager Warren who saw her at his convenience
several days later. She reported to him on all three inci-
dents and asked him if anything could be done about Col-
lins conduct.
b. The Zimmerman incidents
Robert Zimmerman is employed in the service depart-
ment . His duties include the hauling of waste material from
the plant to a truck-trailer or dumpster in the parking lot.
For this purpose he uses a handtruck which he pushes
across the parking lot. On a number of occasions while he
was thus working Collins, who had stationed herself in the
parking lot near her car and was not working , tried to in-
terest him in signing a union authorization card. She talked
to Zimmerman several times even though he told her he
did not want to sign a union card . He testified that about
every time he went out the door she would be after him to
sign . I find this was an impression of his because she obvi-
ously was in the plant working during her shift. As noted
earlier Collins kept a supply of blank authorization cards
in her car in the parking lot. Part of her technique was to
persuade employees to go over to her car to sign a card.
Zimmerman testified that he never indicated to her that he
was interested in signing a card or in going over to her car
for that purpose. On one occasion on May 3, however, she
succeeded in getting him to stop to talk with her. She tried
to talk him into signing . Before talking to her he had
stopped in line behind another employee with a truck to
whom Collins was speaking . Zimmerman listened to what
they were saying and then talked to Collins himself. He
said he was not interested. The whole incident took be-
tween 3 and 5 minutes during which he was not continuing
with his work.
Zimmerman reported Collins' efforts to talk with him to
his superior, Harold McCulloch, complaining that he was
getting tired of it. He asked McCulloch to have it stopped.
McCulloch said he would see what he could do. Later, a
Mr. Williams from Respondent's personnel office took a
written statement on the matter from Zimmerman. It was
this statement that was handed to Plant Manager Warren
and which in part formed the basis for his discipline of
Collins.
c. The incident involving Larry Glenn
Larry Glenn is also a service department employee
whose duties include pushing a waste truck across the
parking lot from plant to dumpster.
Some time in early May, Glenn and fellow employee
Roosevelt "Poochy" Harrison (who was not a witness),
were pushing waste handtrucks across the parking lot when
Collins called to them asking, "How about you all?" Harri-
son responded, "There's no way you're gonna get me in the
HANES HOSIERY, INC.
car." I find that Collins was speaking to both Harrison and
Glenn.
Glenn was under the impression that she was talking to
him. Glenn testified that Collins asked him if he wanted to
sign a union card. He said he was not interested. She told
him she would see him another day. It is not clear whether
this was on the occasion when he was with Harrison or on
another occasion. On cross-examination he was asked,
"You did think, when Brenda Collins, this nice-looking
lady, asked you to get in the car with her, that was serious
enough to complain to the Company? Is that correct?" He
answered, "That's right." He was then asked directly, "she
asked you to get into the car with her?" He answered,
"Yes, She asked me to get in there, so I could sign a union
card."
It should be noted here that Collins is a well endowed
young adult female Caucasian. During her testimony she
gave the impression she was no shrinking violet. Glenn is a
20-year-old male Black. During his testimony he gave the
impression of being a somewhat timid person. When Glenn
was asked if he had other encounters with Collins, he testi-
fied as follows, "Well, when I go in the breakroom, she give
them eyes. Looking." When asked what he meant by this,
he explained, "Looking me right hard with her eyes." He
also testified, "One day, she asked me did I look like I was
dead."
Glenn also reported to McCulloch that Collins was both-
ering him in his work. As a result Williams took a state-
ment from him which was transmitted to Plant Manager
Warren.
After receiving the reports from Zimmerman and Glenn,
Warren instituted the discipline against Collins. But he did
not investigate to find out her version of the events report-
ed. He had Tucker deliver the reprimand to her but she
had no opportunity to make a defense. She inquired of
Tucker about who had made the complaints. He refused to
tell her saying only that employees had complained about
her.
In explaining his decision Warren testified, "I looked at
the three major complaints in front of me. And I felt that
this was serious. I considered the fact that Brenda had
worked there for 4 or 5 years, and that her work record was
not that bad. And that I felt a written warning would cor-
rect the situation to the point that we didn't have to termi-
nate her."
3. Discussion
It is significant that Warren did not take action based on
the reports from Adams alone. At that point Collins' con-
duct was not sufficiently serious to precipitate action by
Warren. The written warning of May 9 makes no reference
to her use of abusive language. So far as she knew that was
not in the picture. Although Respondent made no oral ar-
gument and filed no brief, Warren's position at the hearing
appeared to be that another element , abusive language,
was also a reason justifying the reprimand. Warren's solici-
tude for the feelings of Adams in not referring to Collins'
use of abusive language , which was already public knowl-
edge, does not ring true. If her vulgarity had been a signifi-
cant consideration, he would have taken action immedi-
349
ately. In view of his delay, I think Respondent must be
taken at its written word as contained in the written repri-
mand as to the reasons for the discipline.
The important language in the reprimand is, "that she
has been bothering and interfering with the work of other
employees while they were working." Considering first the
matter of interfering with the work of others, I find there is
insufficient evidence of real interference with work to war-
rant Respondent in limiting the statutory right to organize.
See N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113
(1965); Daylir, Inc., 198 NLRB 231 (1972). The evidence
shows some short delay of employees while working but
does not show that it made any difference in the produc-
tion process. Thus, the first time Collins spoke to Adams
there was no significant delay at all; on the second occa-
sion there was a few moments' dalay. Given the nature of
Adams' work and the fact that frequent minor delays for
other reasons were allowed, I find that the delay which
Collins caused her was of no consequence to her job func-
tion.
Zimmerman was also delayed but the bulk of his delay
was caused by the fact that he was waiting behind another
employee who was in front of him and who was talking to
Collins. It does not appear that anything kept him in line
or prevented him from going around the employees in
front of him. Nor does it appear what Collins and the em-
ployees in front were talking about. That employee made
no complaint about Collins. Zimmerman made no com-
plaint about the person in front of him. Even assuming that
it all involved the Union, there is no concrete evidence that
the work of Zimmerman or of Glenn in disposing of waste,
or any of their other duties, was measurably impaired by
Collins' solicitations.
With respect to Glenn, his testimony indicates that she
called across the parking lot to him. The evidence does not
indicate that at any time that she spoke with him a signifi-
cant amount of time was taken away from his performance
of his duties.
Considering the testimony of Adams, Zimmerman,
Glenn, Tucker, and Warren, I find that the reason the
three employees complained about Collins was that they
were personally opposed to the Union and annoyed that
she was pressing them to declare themselves in favor of the
Union. In addition, of course, Adams complained about
the abusive epithet in the break area. But, as noted earlier,
that was excluded from the written reprimand.
Turning next to the matter of "bothering" other employ-
ees, I find that the written reprimand is ambiguous in that
it is not clear whether bothering means bothering employ-
ees in their work or bothering them personally. With the
possible exception of the name-calling incident in the
break area, no record evidence suggests that Collins' union
activity caused a discipline problem. As noted earlier, her
name calling did not precipitate her discipline nor was it
included in the written reprimand. Bothering employees in
their work is equivalent to interfering with them in their
work. Interference with work is discussed above. Respon-
dent apparently takes the position that employees who are
personally bothered or upset inevitably will be affected ad-
versely in the performance of their work. This is not an
irrational position for a manager to take in the operation of
350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a plant but I find it is not a defense to a charge that an
employer has unlawfully limited the exercise of employees'
statutory rights. Warren testified that he held that view.
But this is a generalization . Absent proof of actual effect
on work , I find such justification insufficient reason to lim-
it employee rights to discuss the Union. This is not to say
that an employer does not have an interest in, and a right
to control, the production process as well as the circum-
stances of employment which affect employee morale. But
the right of employees to discuss unionism , pro or con,
necessitates that the exercise of those rights not be limited
to situations where participants are in agreement. Dis-
agreement is a normal part of discussion . Annoyance to
some on some occasions is unavoidable. In a plant as large
as the one involved here there inevitably will be some em-
ployees personally annoyed by persistent pro or antiunion
proselytizing. Those so annoyed have no individual right
under the Act to handcuff the free speech of others with
whom they do not agree. They do not acquire such rights
by asking management to act as their surrogate . And ab-
sent some concrete showing that discussion about union-
ism meaningfully affects the production process, manage-
ment has no such right. No such showing is made here. The
showing is that the three complaining employees were up-
set by Collins' proselytizing. But there is no showing that
this really affected the work.
With respect to Glenn there are racial and Freudian ov-
ertones that are troublesome . Assuming, without finding,
that he was deeply troubled by Collins' forwardness, it still
must be recognized that this is the world in which he lives.
As already noted, there is no evidence that his work was
actually affected . If management was protecting his stan-
dard of values, it was not entitled to do so at the expense of
rights guaranteed by Section 7.
Even though management acted on the complaint of em-
ployees, it ended up limiting solicitations on behalf of the
Union while permitting all other manner of solicitations,
the only difference being that the three employees had
complained about the union solicitations. That is not
enough to legitimize the discipline of Collins . The net ef-
fect was that in Collins' case Respondent banned union
solicitations, which were not shown to have actually im-
peded work, while allowing others . The language of her
written reprimand tracks rule 17, the no-solicitation rule. I
find that it was a discriminatory application of that rule in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I find also
that Respondent disciplined Collins because of her union
activity and that this action tended to discourage member-
ship in the Union. For this reason also the reprimand was
an unfair labor practice prohibited by Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III
above, occurring in connection with the operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relationship to trade , traffic , and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes bur-
dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce. They are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 7 of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By applying its no-solicitation rule in a discriminatory
manner to the union activity of employee Brenda Collins,
Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, and has committed, and is committing , unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act.
4. By issuing a final warning in writing to employee
Brenda Collins, Respondent discriminated in regard to her
hire or tenure of employment thereby discouraging mem-
bership in a labor organization, the thereby violated, and is
violating, Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices found above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices , I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. I recommend that Respondent be ordered
to expunge from its records the final warning in writing
issued to employee Brenda Collins on May 9, 1974, and
that it advise Brenda Collins of such action in writing. I
further recommend that Respondent post appropriate no-
tices at its premises.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]