Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 735-S (Bemi

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 1, 2019

04-CB-215127 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 1, 2019)

JD–14–19
West Hazelton, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
LOCAL UNION NO. 735–S,
and Case 04–CB–215127
BEMIS COMPANY, INC.
Counsel:

Lea F. Alvo-Sadiky, Esq. (NLRB Region 4)
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the General Counsel
Ira H. Weinstock, Esq. (Law Offices of Ira H. Weinstock, P.C.)
of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent
Timothy C. Kamin, Esq. (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.)
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Charging Party
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This case involves allegations by the
government that a union unlawfully threatened employees and unlawfully attempted to have the
employer discipline an employee. As described more fully herein, I find that the union unlawfully
threatened employees in two of three instances alleged by the government. I dismiss the
allegations relating to the union’s alleged attempt to have the employee disciplined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 20, 2018, the Bemis Company, Inc. (Bemis or Employer) filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging violations of the Act by the Graphic Communications Conference/
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 735–S (Union), docketed by Region 4 of
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) as Case 04–CB–215127. The charge was amended
on March 6, 2018, amended for a second time on May 29, 2018, and a third time on June 18,
2018.
Based on an investigation into this charge, on June 25, 2018, the Board’s General
Counsel, by the Regional Director for Region 4 of the Board, issued a complaint and notice of
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2
hearing in this case alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). The Union filed
an answer denying all violations of the Act on June 29, 2018.
A trial in this matter was conducted on October 22, 2018, in Hazelton, Pennsylvania.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Employer, and the Union filed posttrial briefs in support of 5
their positions by December 3, 2018.
On the entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions of law, and
recommendations.
10
JURISDICTION
At all material times, Bemis has been a corporation with an office and place of business in
West Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and has been engaged there in the production and distribution of
packaging used for the food, consumer products, healthcare, and other industries. During the 15
past year, Bemis, in conducting its business operations described above, purchased and received
at its West Hazelton facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. At all material times, Bemis has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At all material times the
Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Based on the 20
foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board has jurisdiction of this
case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
25
Background
Bemis manufactures bread bags at its West Hazelton, Pennsylvania facility. Since and
before Bemis acquired the facility in 1993, the Union has represented the facility’s production,
maintenance, and warehouse employees.1 At the time of the hearing, Human Resources 30
Manager Leslie Pienkowski estimated that there were approximately 350 union-represented
employees working at Bemis. The current collective-bargaining agreement between the Union
and Bemis was effective August 15, 2016, and is scheduled to terminate no earlier than August
14, 2020.
35
Around December 14, 2017, an employee reported to management that a coworker—
Union President Dominic DeSpirito—had been verbally harassing another employee, Joseph
Stasko, on an ongoing basis, since September 2017. The Employer immediately suspended
DeSpirito and launched an investigation, which, among other things, involved individually calling
employees to the human resources office, where Bemis officials interviewed the employees and 40
took statements from them about DeSpirito’s conduct.

1At all relevant times Bemis has recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following unit of employees, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Sec. 9(b) of the Act:
All hourly paid production, maintenance and warehouse employees of the
Company at its West Hazleton, Pennsylvania plant, excluding
professional, administrative, supervisory, office and plant clerical,
receiving clerk, plant laboratory technicians, guards, salespeople, office porters,
and truck-drivers.
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3
On January 18, 2018, Bemis terminated DeSpirito. At the hearing in this matter, the
Union represented that it is challenging the termination through an arbitration process that was
ongoing at the time of the hearing in this matter.
Bemis bargaining unit employee Michael Samsel works as a press assistant in the press 5
room. In mid-December, the day that he gave a statement to Bemis about DeSpirito’s conduct,
Samsel was exiting the Bemis parking lot after work when DeSpirito called Samsel on his cell
phone. DeSpirito asked Samsel “what was going on in the plant,” and Samsel replied that “we
were getting called in about things going on with him.” DeSpirito told Samsel that he had been
suspended. Samsel told DeSpirito that he was not going to lie for him and DeSpirito told Samsel 10
that he did not want or expect him to do so. Then DeSpirito told Samsel that “when he gets back,
that nobody was safe, they better watch their back, and he wasn’t going to do anything for them.”2
Andrews confronts Stasko in the break room
15
Joseph Stasko works at Bemis as a press assistant. Stasko testified that in the middle of
December, a day or two after DeSpirito had been suspended, he was seated at a table in the
press department breakroom with fellow press assistant Michael Samsel. The Union’s secretary-
treasurer, Lynn Andrews, entered the press department breakroom and
20
came right to me and started yelling with her finger in my face about 12, 14 inches
from my nose telling me . . . that she is going to get to the bottom of it. How could
we do this to Dominic? And she doesn’t know what’s going on and she wanted
to—she was going to conduct her own investigation.
25
Stasko described Andrews as “loud” and “upset.” The whole incident took about 30–45
seconds, and then Andrews left.
Other than dating the incident as occurring after Christmas or early in January, Samsel
corroborated Stasko’s account of this incident. He testified that Andrews entered the break room 30
and “basically got in Joe’s [Stasko’s] face” saying “how could he do this to Dominic, that they
were going to do their own investigation to get to the bottom of what was going on.” Samsel
testified that Andrews “pointed her finger in [Stasko’s] face very aggressively” and that “her mood
was upset, agitated.”
35
Andrews testified about this incident, saying that it occurred on December 18, 2017.
According to Andrews she went to find Stasko after “Dominic told me that I need to go and see
these people, that, you, know, that if I could talk to them myself about the investigation.” Andrews
testified that on break she left her machine in the bag department and went to the press area
where she asked the supervisor “who’s Joe Stasko?” Andrews was told that he was in the break 40
room so she entered to speak to him. However, according to Andrews, she simply asked Stasko
“Joe, do you mind if I talk to you tomorrow,” and he did not reply. According to Andrews, nothing
further was said by her to Stasko. Andrews testified that she began talking to another employee

2I credit Samsel’s credibly offered and unrebutted testimony. I recognize that this incident
was not in Samsel’s pretrial affidavit. But I accept Samsel’s explanation that “I may not have
recalled it at the time I went to Philly [to give the affidavit].” In addition to being unrebutted, I note
that Samsel’s account included segments favorable to DeSpirito—such as DeSpirito’s allowance
that he did not want or expect Samsel to lie for him—that only enhance Samsel’s credibility about
the incident. I note that testimony about this incident was offered only as background. (Tr. 164.)
This incident is not alleged as a violation of the Act.
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4
who asked her some questions and she was “not in that break room not even a minute.”
Andrews denied waving her finger at Stasko. She suggested that any finger-waiving occurred
when she was talking to the other employee, and she allowed that “I talk with my hands.”
I credit Samsel and Stasko’s credibly offered testimony as to this incident. Both testified 5
with credible demeanor—their accounts appeared to avoid exaggeration and there did not appear
to be any artifice in their responses to questions. Their accounts were consistent, with the
exception that Samsel dated the incident as occurring in late December or early January, but that
does not, in my estimation, undermine the credibility of the account.3 To the contrary, it supports
my feeling that their testimony was unscripted. Andrews, on the other hand, was evasive at times 10
and her testimony repeatedly lapsed into indirection and digression. Her account also seems
unlikely: admittedly sent by DeSpirito to talk to Stasko, she simply let the matter drop when she
found him. I credit Stasko and Samsel’s account of the conversation over Andrews’. I do find
that the incident occurred on or about December 18, 2017. This is consistent with both Andrews’
and Stasko’s recollection. Samsel recalled the incident occurring later in the month, but it is more 15
plausible that it occurred immediately after the investigation of DeSpirito and his suspension.4
Posting of The Communicator memo
On January 22, 2018, the Union posted the following memo, under the heading of The 20
Communicator—the name for the Teamster’s Graphic Communications Conference newspaper:
ATTENTION
The events that have happened are very troubling. We as [ ] Union Brothers and 25
Sisters do not turn each other in if we have an issue[ ] we go to a steward or a
board member. Turning in fellow Union members is a violation of the Union by
laws and could result in fines and black listed from all union jobs. It has also come
to the Union attention that people are writing on walls and contacting the people
that went to the company instead of doing the right thing. Please do not do this or 30
jeopardize your job. This issue as most have stated is unfair. We will fight this as
we fight all issues. Do not let this Company divide this union or pit brother and
sister against each other.
Thank you
Dominic DeSpirito35
President GCC/IBT Local735-s

3“Dates, and even sequence, are notoriously the subject of testimonial confusion without
substantially affecting credibility determinations relating to disputed conversations.” L. D.
Brinkman Southeast, 261 NLRB 204, 209 fn. 5 (1982) (citations omitted); Hearst Corp., 281
NLRB 764, 779 (1986) (“obvious inaccuracy of dates provided for certain events . . . appears to
have been no more than a confusion as to details”) (internal quotations omitted), enfd. mem. 837
F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Longshoremen Local 10, 283 F.2d 558, 562–563 (9th Cir.
1960).
4As stated, above, I credit Samsel and Stasko. I do so notwithstanding my concerns with
other parts of Samsel’s testimony, discussed below. I note in this regard that credibility findings
need not be all-or-nothing propositions. Indeed, “nothing is more common in all kinds of judicial
decisions than to believe some and not all” of a witness' testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera
Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950), revd. on other grounds 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Daikichi
Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 622, enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
JD–14–19
5
The parties stipulated that this memo was posted by the Union for less than 24 hours on
the union bulletin board and at the break room entrance.
Incident with Union Vice President Davidovich 5
Samsel testified that in late January 2018, as he was ending a shift, the union vice
president, Kevin Davidovich, approached him and asked Samsel if HR Manager Pienkowski had
been “on the floor shaking hands and congratulating people that Dominic got fired.” Samsel
denied that Pienkowski had done this, but used the opportunity to10
Ask [Davidovich] about the stuff going on, on my press, told him I didn’t appreciate
the things that were being found or left at my press. They were leaving notes.
They were leaving a fake rat, like homemade paper rats around the work area.
15
Davidovich testified and, although he contended that Samsel approached him, and not
vice versa, he confirmed that he and Samsel discussed the “little artifacts” that were being left
around his machine “that people are finding offensive.”
At this point, however, Samsel and Davidovich’s accounts of events diverge in significant 20
ways. Samsel testified that Davidovich replied that
it could get much worse. And I asked him what he meant by that. He said, they
can settle like the old days, caving in skulls, smashing lockers, people’s personal
properties and cars. I told him that he was the vice president of the Union and he 25
shouldn’t be talking that way. That’s not how it’s supposed to go, which he replied,
it’s going to get worse. And I said, well, why? He said, because Dominic’s told
him to go after the rats.
Davidovich testified that he told Samsel, 30
I don’t know who’s doing it or where it’s coming from, I can’t stop it. And then I
proceeded to say, well, you know, thankfully, it’s not like in years past where
people’s toolboxes were getting vandalized, lockers were being caved in, or cars
were being keyed.35
According to Davidovich, that’s where the conversation ended. Davidovich denied that he
told Samsel that he or anyone would engage in physical violence against him or cause property
damage to anyone, or that DeSpirito had instructed him to harass employees who reported
misconduct.40
This dispute raises some difficult credibility issues. I found Samsel to have an engaging
and credible-seeming demeanor. But nonetheless, there are some issues in his testimony that
are significant.
45
Samsel gave two prior statements about this incident—first, an affidavit to the NLRB
investigators on February 27, 2018, approximately one month after the incident. But before that,
the day after the incident, Samsel gave an unsworn but signed statement to the Employer
providing his account of the incident, complete with quotation marks identifying what Davidovich
reportedly said to him. 50
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6
Much about the three accounts (his testimony and the two prior statements) is
consistent—that is to say, in many respects the prior statements do not impeach, they
corroborate Samsel’s testimony. One would expect differences in three separate accounts of a
single event, and for the most part the differences are unremarkable, minor, and plausible. But
there are two exceptions.5
Most significant, in my view, is the fact that unlike Samsel’s testimony and his pretrial
affidavit—in which Samsel claimed that Davidovich told him that in the old days things were
settled with “caving in skulls”—in the statement Samsel gave to the Employer the day after the
incident there was no claim that Davidovich mentioned “caving in skulls,” or skulls at all, or made 10
any reference to bodily violence against persons. This is a highly significant omission.5
It strikes me as very unlikely that someone providing a statement intended to report a
threatening event would overlook and omit a reference to physical assault or “caving in skulls.”
The statement given by Samsel the day after the incident recorded Davidovich talking about the 15
“old days” when there was property damage initiated against “rats,” including the “caving in of
things,” but there is no mention of assault against a person or bodily damage. But a month later,
when he gives his pretrial affidavit, and then nine months later, when he testifies, the list of
transgressions Davidovich is said to have threatened now includes the “caving in [of] skulls.” This
broadening of the threat to include threats of physical assault raises some doubts about Samsel’s 20
testimony.
Not as serious, but nonetheless of note, is the fact that while Samsel testified that
Davidovich told him that “they could settle things like in the old days, caving in skulls, smashing
lockers, people’s personal properties and cars,” in his day-after-the incident statement to the 25
employer Samsel wrote that Davidovich told him “Lucky this isn’t settled like the old days, stealing
people’s personal belongings, caving things in, sabotage of work areas, and so on.” In his pretrial
affidavit, Samsel’s account omitted any reference to the “old days” but averred that Davidovich
stated, “it could get a lot worse, we could start damaging personal property, lockers, and cars,
and caving in skulls.” Thus, in the day-after-the incident statement to the Employer, the recitation 30
of potential damage is mediated by phrasing stating that Samsel is fortunate that scores are no
longer settled that way—in the trial testimony and pretrial affidavit the mediating phrase is gone—
Davidovich is flatly saying that these things could happen, not that Samsel is lucky that they no
longer happen. It is one further example of the elaboration of Samsel’s account over time. I think
the day-after statement undercuts Samsel’s trial version. Whether or not the difference avoids 35
the threatening implications of Davidovich’s point is another matter altogether, but in terms of the
credibility of Samsel’s trial testimony, it is something I consider.
40

5Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957) (“Every experienced trial judge and trial
lawyer knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the
events before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony
and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The
omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same
facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of
testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony”).
JD–14–19
7
We now have two points of Samsel’s testimony—one serious, one less so—in which
Samsel’s testimonial and affidavit account paint Davidovich’s comments in a more negative light
than what he first reported the day after it occurred.6
Samsel’s trial testimony must be considered in light of these differences in his pretrial 5
statement. And of course, in light of Davidovich’s testimony. Notably, while denying any threats,
or that he said that DeSpirito was telling him to harass or “go after the rats,” or that things could
“get much worse,” Davidovich’s testimony corroborates the essential core of Samsel’s testimony:
after Samsel reported that he had been subject to a series of “rat” notes and messages,
Davidovich responded by saying that he could not stop it but fortunately, (“thankfully”) it is not like 10
in years past where employees were subjected to significant property damage, of which
Davidovich provided several examples.
However, Davidovich’s demeanor while testifying was not exemplary. He avoided eye
contract with questioners, even while the oath was being administered, something that, in my 15
experience, is highly unusual. I do believe that his account of the incident is modified in an effort
to put it in a more benign light.
Taking all these factors together, my best judgment and finding is that Samsel’s account
should be (and is) credited—but without the reference to physical assault on a person (“caving in 20
skulls”) and Davidovich’s statement was not “they can settle like the old days” but, rather,
something to the effect of “they don’t” or (as Davidovich testified) “thankfully it’s not like in years
past.” Thus, my finding is that conversation was to the following effect:
Davidovich said “it could get much worse.” Samsel asked him “what he meant by 25
that.” Davidovich said “thankfully it’s not settled like the old days, smashing
lockers, people’s personal properties and cars.” Samsel told him that he was the
vice president of the Union and he shouldn’t be talking that way. “That’s not how
it’s supposed to go,” to which Davidovich replied, “it’s going to get worse. Samsel
said, “well, why?” He said, because Dominic’s told him “to go after the rats.”30
Andrews’ reporting of Stasko
On January 25, Andrews repeatedly approached management about purported 35
misconduct by Stasko.
The morning of January 25, Andrews came to Pienkowski’s office and said that the
previous evening, as she was in her car getting ready to leave the Employer’s parking lot, she

6I note that I reject the Respondent’s suggestion that Samsel’s testimony should be
discredited for a third reason—based on the fact that his pretrial affidavit does not specifically
reference Davidovich’s reported comment that DeSpirito “told him to go after the rats.” It does
allude to it—the affidavit says that DeSpirito was telling union board members to harass us”—
and, moreover, the day-after-the-incident statement to the employer specifically mentions the
instruction from DeSpirito “to harass rats.” Thus, while all three (the live testimony, the affidavit,
and the next-day statement given to the employer) are phrased differently, they all consistently
have Davidovich relaying the same point. I do not discount Samsel’s testimony on this point.
JD–14–19
8
noticed Stasko staring at her from approximately two parking spaces away. Stasko denied the
incident. Bemis dropped the matter.7
Later that day, Andrews was walking to the bag department office and spotted Stasko
walking across the floor to press 23 where he worked. He did not have his “earmuffs” on—noise 5
protective gear that employees are required to wear. Andrews immediately reported Stasko to
the supervisors and the bargaining unit safety advocate, Denise Eisley, in the press office.
Andrews did not use Stasko’s name but agreed that “they knew” she was “referring to him.” As
Andrews explained it: “So I saw him, and I just went in and I said, you know, he doesn't have his
earmuffs on. None of you say anything, and that was pretty much it.”10
Andrews had made safety complaints in the past, but this was the first time that she had
reported an employee for a safety violation.
Stasko testified that he had removed his earmuffs only briefly in order to have 15
conversation, something he and the plant’s environmental health and safety manager, Carl
Passler, described as commonplace, but nonetheless, a violation of safety protocols. Four or five
minutes after Andrews reported Stasko, Eisley came out and told Stasko to wear his hearing
protection. Stasko described that this is in keeping with what happens if someone is not wearing
hearing protection: 20
Supervision or one of the safety advocates or the safety manager will come over
and, you know, [tell the employee] put your safety protection on, whether it be your
glasses or your hearing protection.
25
Eisley also testified that Stasko “is occasionally seen not wearing his proper hearing
protection. When I see him, I usually will tell him about putting it in, putting it on; probably, I
would say, maybe half a dozen times I have actually told him about it.” Eisley testified that she
was unaware of Stasko, or any other employees receiving discipline for safety equipment,
glasses, or shoes, certainly not “in the last few years.” 30
In his testimony, the plant’s environmental health and safety manager, Safety Manager
Passler made clear that employees at Bemis are not disciplined for such isolated violations. He
testified that with regard to removing ear muffs momentarily to have a conversation on the shop
floor, while a “violation” it was not, as longstanding matter of practice and policy, an event for 35
which someone would be disciplined. Passler testified that employees are not disciplined by
Bemis for not wearing hearing protection when they are having a conversation in the plant. He
has never written someone up for not wearing protective gear. Indeed, Passler testified that if
someone is seen not wearing PPE it is reported by supervisors and employees without naming
the employee. 40

7At the hearing Andrews testified that when she was in her car getting ready to leave she
looked up “Stasko was standing there staring at me.” Andrews testified that her response to
seeing Stasko staring at her from two parking spaces away was that she
almost panicked because I thought that if I say anything or do anything, it’s more
icing for his case.
Andrews claimed she was so upset she almost wrecked and the next day, for the first time in 42
years, she did not want to go to work and was late. Stasko, for his part, denied the incident. He
testified that he has “no idea where [Andrews] parks” and doesn’t know what her car looks like.
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9
That same day, January 25, there was a safety committee meeting for the A crew safety
committee, one of four voluntary safety committees in the facility. The meeting lasted one hour,
beginning at about 12 noon. The meeting was conducted by Safety Manager Passler. Between
12 and 14 employees were present. Pizza was served, which Passler had bought for the group.
Stasko was present, and at some point used the razor blade from the hook knife he uses to cut 5
film for work to cut a slice of pizza. This was a safety violation, both for using a work blade on
food that could later be used on plastic bread bags, but also for using the blade without a “cut
glove” to protect against injury.
Passler was in the room when this incident occurred. There was conflicting testimony as 10
to whether Passler observed Stasko cutting the pizza—he denied it, but an employee who was
there, Michelle Herndandez, testified that Passler observed and jokingly commented on it. In any
event, while I need not resolve that dispute in the testimony, it is clear that Passler knew about
the incident, as Hernandez, who was upset by it, told him about it during the meeting. No
discipline or much ado at all was made of it at the time by Passler and the meeting concluded. 15
Passler testified that for “a first offense like that we don’t write people up.” Indeed, Passler
testified directly that if he had witnessed the incident “I would not have issued disciplinary action.”
Hernandez, who was unhappy with the “problems” that Stasko had recently caused
“between other employees,” reported the incident to Andrews—her “union representative on the 20
floor” as there was no shop steward on that shift at that time. Hernandez told Andrews that
management seen him do this and he’s causing all these problems between other
employees, and they’re not reprimanding him, not even verbally, that it’s not fair
that he can cause problems with the Company, with other employees, and laugh it 25
off.
That afternoon Andrews placed a call to Bemis’ 1-800 corporate compliance hotline, a
corporatewide system through which employees can file complaints. The issue as recorded by
Bemis on the hotline call was as follows: 30
These girls came to me and said that they were at a safety meeting and they had
pizza. This gentleman that was sitting next to Michelle took out his cut knife, took
the razor blade out with his bare fingers, cut the pizza, wiped it on his pants, put
the blade back in his knife and put it in his pocket. The safety director Carl Passler 35
said “I didn't see anything.” I am not allowed to touch or remove the razor blade
and have to use gloves if I use the knife. This all happened right in front of the
safety director. I wonder if he is going to go cut film with that blade because we
make plastic bags for bread.
40
In addition, that evening, January 25, Andrews left a voicemail for Bemis Safety Manager Passler:
Hello, this is Lynn Andrews calling. I heard what happened at the safety meeting
with a gentleman taking a razor blade out and cutting the pizza, putting it back in
his knife to go cut film. And you said nothing, absolutely nothing. He used a razor 45
blade between his fingers and didn't have any protection on, and you let that
happen at a safety meeting? Unbelievable.
The next day, on January 26, Andrews called Pienkowski’s cell phone between 9 and 10
a.m. and left a voicemail. Pienkowski was in a meeting when Andrews called and after the 50
meeting, along with Bemis Safety Manager Carl Passler, she called Andrews from her office.
Andrews was upset. She wanted an investigation conducted into the pizza-cutting incident.
JD–14–19
10
Andrews complained that Bemis was “giving him [Stasko] preferential and that . . . we’ve
disciplined people for less.” At the hearing, Andrews credibly denied that she said that she
wanted Stasko disciplined (“I don’t think I said discipline because I wouldn’t – I don’t say that”),
but admitted only that “I wanted something done.”8
5
Passler directed the plant safety advocate, bargaining unit employee Denise Eisley, to
speak with Stasko and make sure that he replaced the blade in the knife he used to cut the pizza.
He was later told by Eisley that Stasko had replaced the knife even before she spoke with him, a
point Eisley corroborated when she testified at the hearing.
10
Analysis
The General Counsel and the Employer contend that the Union threatened employees in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, specifically by Andrews’ confronting Stasko in the press
area break room on or about December 18, 2017, by posting The Communicator notice in the 15
plant on January 22, 2018, and by Davidovich’s confrontation with Samsel in the press area in
late January 2018.
In addition, the General Counsel and the Employer contend that the Union attempted to
cause the employer to discriminate against Stasko in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, by20
Andrews’ reporting of Stasko for two minor safety violations on January 25, 2018.
I will consider each alleged violation in turn.
I. The alleged 8(b)(1)(A) threats25
Paragraph 6 of the Complaint
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents “to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.”
30
“Integral to the policy underlying both Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act was the intent
to separate membership obligations owed by employees to their labor organizations from the
employment rights of those employees.” Longshoremen, Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Association),
228 1383, 1385 (1977), enfd. 581 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978). “The policy of the Act is to insulate
employees' jobs from their organizational rights.” The Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial 35
Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
In analyzing an alleged 8(b)(1)(A) violation, the Board applies an objective standard that
focuses on whether the union conduct would have a reasonable tendency to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners' 40
Assn.), 335 .NLRB 814, 815 (2001), enfd. 50 Fed.Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002); Letter Carriers, Branch
#47 (USPS), 330 NLRB 667, 667 fn. 1 (2000) (“The test for a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A),

8I do not credit Passler’s assertion that Andrews asked Pienkowski and Passler on this call
“how we were going to discipline.” This was credibly denied by Andrews (“I don’t think I said
discipline because I wouldn’t—I don’t say that”), not recounted by Pienkowski, and unmentioned
by Andrews in the recorded phone message or in the corporate safety complaint she made on the
issue. Andrews admitted that she was “very upset that nothing happened.” Asked whether she
was upset that he was not disciplined, Andrews replied, “Yeah, he wasn’t even told about it.”
Contrary to the assertions of the Employer (CP Br. at 17), this is not an admission that she
attempted to have Stasko disciplined, that this was the purpose of her reporting him, or that she
told Bemis so. Indeed, the gravamen of this testimony and circumstances refutes it.
JD–14–19
11
however, does not depend upon an examination of a respondent's motivation. Rather, it depends
on whether or not the respondent's statement or conduct would have a reasonable tendency to
restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of statutory rights”); Teamsters Local 162
(American Steel, Inc.), 255 NRLB 1230, 1233 (1981) (“the test is an objective, rather than a
subjective, one and depends on whether, in the circumstances of a given case, the probable 5
effect of the conduct is to restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of his Section 7 rights”).
In this case, the General Counsel and the Employer allege that the Union violated Section
8(b(1)(A) in three separate incidents.
10
1. First, the General Counsel and Employer contend that Andrews’ December 18, 2017
confrontation—and tirade—with Stasko in the press break room violates the Act. I disagree.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) was not violated by this conduct.
Andrews was angry, for sure. And wagging a finger in someone’s face is always 15
objectionable in terms of manners—but neither finger-wagging nor angry confrontation is
actionable under the Act. In this case Andrews’ “threat” was to chastise the employees for
turning in DeSpirito (“how could we do this to Dominic”) and to announce that the Union was
going to conduct “their own investigation to get to the bottom of what was going on.”
20
The Union is entitled to conduct its own investigation about an employee’s suspension
(and later) discharge. It is a core union activity. The suspension and firing of any employee, and
no less the union president, is a big deal. The Union represents DeSpirito. And the Union is
entitled to investigate the matter, all the more so when the Employer has called numerous
employees to the office in order to develop the basis for the DeSpirito discipline. I do not think it 25
surprising, or suspicious, or actionable, that this would raise concern on the part of the Union. If
tempers flared, that is not surprising and does not transform the incident into an unlawful threat.
The General Counsel’s theory is that the threat of an investigation is an implicit threat to
take reprisals against Stasko and/or Samsel in a manner that affects their employment. This 30
assumes a lot—far too much—and serves to categorize as illegal any union expression of intent
to “get to the bottom” of these events. But getting to the bottom of an employee’s discipline is,
after all, a basic and legitimate function of a union. The “threat” of a union investigation into an
employee’s suspension does not reasonably tend to restrain or coerce other employees.
35
Importantly, I think the appropriate way to review this incident is without assuming the guilt
or the innocence of DeSpirito as to the serious charges levied against him. Indeed, Andrews and
the Union are entitled to dispute, disbelieve, and contest DeSpirito’s guilt, even if they are wrong.
Even if the Union is wrong about DeSpirito, this does not turn Andrews’ announcement that the
Union will conduct its own investigation into DeSpirito’s suspension and discharge, and not 40
merely rely on the Employer’s investigation, into an independent unlawful threat of reprisal. I
dismiss paragraph 6(a) of the complaint.
2. The General Counsel and the Union contend that the Union’s January 22, 2018 posting of
The Communicator message on January 22, 2018, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). I agree. The 45
Union’s notice threatens fines and “black list[ing] from all union jobs” in retaliation for “[t]urning in
fellow union members.” While the threat to “blacklist” members from “all union jobs” may have
been intended simply to refer to barring members from holding positions within the Union—I think
the phrasing is, at best, ambiguous, and would reasonably likely be interpreted by members as a
threat to employment. Teamsters Local 391, 357 NLRB 2330, 2330–2331 (2012) (ambiguous 50
statement that might have been intended as lawful request to withdraw grievance is unlawful
JD–14–19
12
violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) because reasonable listener could conclude that statement was
threatening unlawful action). This more troublous reading, which is advanced by the General
Counsel (GC Br. at 23–24) and the Employer (CP Br. at 8), presents an obvious violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A). It is a threat to unlawfully retaliate against members by denying them job
opportunities should they join together to complain about working conditions in a manner that 5
implicates another employee. It is a threat to their employment rights and is unlawful.9
3. Finally, the General Counsel and the Employer allege that Davidovich’s confrontation with
Samsel in the press area in late January 2018, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). Although I have not
accepted entirely, either witness’s account, the credited version is clearly an unlawful threat. For 10
convenience, I repeat here the credited version of what Davidovich told Samsel in response to
Samsel raising the “rat” paraphernalia and messages being left near his worksite:
Davidovich said “it could get much worse.” Samsel asked him “what he meant by
that.” Davidovich said “thankfully it’s not settled like the old days, smashing 15
lockers, people’s personal properties and cars.” Samsel told him that he was the
vice president of the Union and he shouldn’t be talking that way. “That’s not how
it’s supposed to go,” to which Davidovich replied, “it’s going to get worse. Samsel
said, “well, why?” He said, because Dominic’s told him “to go after the rats.”
20
Thus, Davidovich concluded the conversation by telling Samsel that DeSpirito had told
him to “go after the rats,” in a conversation that began with Samsel telling Davidovich about the
rat messages and figures that had been showing up in his work area. Davidovich told Samsel
that “it could get much worse,” and then that it was “going to get worse.” In response to Samsel
asking him what he meant by “it could get much worse,” Davidovich listed a series of property 25
crimes that “thankfully” no longer occur. I do not believe that Davidovich was suddenly moved to
musings on discarded historical responses to unapproved employee activity. This was a not-so-
veiled threat—a classic implicature —less direct but no less explicit in meaning. Davidovich was
responding to Samsel’s complaint that he was being harassed with messages accusing him of
being a “rat”—i.e., disloyal and/or hostile to the Union. Davidovich’s response was to threaten 30
further reprisals against Samsel. These threats fall squarely within the ambit of threats that
violate Section 8(b)(1)(A).10

9I do not reach the issue of whether, had the Respondent merely threatened internal union
discipline—such as barring of members from positions within the Union—it would have similarly
amounted to an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. See CWA Local 5795 (Western Elec. Co.), 192 NLRB 556
(1971); Transit Union Local 1225 (Greyhound Lines), 285 NLRB 1051 (1987).
10I agree with the General Counsel that Davidovich’s threats are attributable to the Union. He
was vice president at the time he made the remarks. Stasko specifically reproached him for
making the remarks in his capacity as vice president—something that Davidovich did not
disavow—and Davidovich even referenced his instructions from President DeSpirito as the
motivation for his remarks. As the Board explained in Security, Police & Fire Professionals
(SPFPA) Local 444, 360 NLRB 430, 436 (2014):
“The Board regularly finds elected or appointed union officials to be agents of that
organization. Although the holding of elective office does not mandate a finding of
agency per se, it is persuasive and substantial evidence that will be decisive in the
absence of compelling contrary evidence. [Internal case citations omitted.]
There is no contrary evidence.
JD–14–19
13
However, I do not find and dismiss the allegation to the extent—and only to the extent—it
alleges that Davidovich threatened physical bodily violence. As found, his threats related to
damage to personal and company property, and other unspecified reprisals.
II. Andrews’ alleged effort to have Stasko disciplined 5
Paragraph 7 of the Complaint
The General Counsel and the Employer contend that the Union, through Andrews,
violated Section 8(b)(2) by attempting to have Stasko disciplined by Bemis for two alleged safety
violations: when Andrews reported Stasko for momentarily not wearing his ear muffs, and again 10
when she reported him for cutting the pizza with his work knife. In addition, the General Counsel
contends that this same conduct by Andrews violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Section 8(b)(2) of the Act states, in relevant part, that
15
[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents … to
cause or attempt to cause . . . an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3).
There is no requirement that an 8(b)(2) violation involve coercive efforts to “cause or 20
attempt to cause” the employer to discriminate. An “efficacious request” is sufficient. San Jose
Stereotypers’ and Electrotypers’ Union No. 120 (Dow Jones & Co., Inc.), 175 NLRB 1066, 1066
fn. 3 (1969); NLRB v. Jarka Corp. of Philadelphia, 198 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1952) (“This
relationship of cause and effect, the essential feature of Section 8(b)(2), can exist as well where
an inducing communication is in terms courteous or even precatory as where it is rude and 25
demanding”); Iron Workers Local 455 (Precision Fabricators), 291 NLRB 385, 387 (1988)
(“statements which ‘contain directions or instructions’ . . . fall within the ‘attempt to cause’
language of 8(b)(2)”).
Moreover, “[t]he Board has found that direct evidence of an express demand by the Union 30
is not necessary where the evidence supports a reasonable inference of a union request” for
discrimination. Avon Roofing & Sheet Metal, 312 NLRB 499, 499 (1993). This can occur when
circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that an express request, in fact, was made.
Avon Roofing, supra at 499, 503. It can also occur when the union’s conduct warrants an
inference of an implied request to discriminate. See e.g., Paperworkers Local 1048 (Jefferson 35
Smurfit Corp.), 323 NLRB 1042, 1044 (1997) (union’s report to employer of allegation of racial
harassment by employee where union had “full knowledge of the Employer’s rules concerning
such conduct and of its policy of assigning strong discipline to violators of those rules [and other
indicia]. . . warrants the inference of an implied request that [the employee] be disciplined”).
40
In this case, the General Counsel’s 8(b)(2) allegations must be dismissed. Even
assuming Andrews’ hostility to Stasko, there is insufficient evidence to prove that she attempted
to cause Bemis to discriminate against Stasko.
First, in neither incident in which Andrews is alleged to have attempted to cause Bemis to 45
discriminate against Stasko did Andrews explicitly request that Stasko be disciplined. Thus, there
were no “directions or instructions” to discriminate against Stasko. Iron Workers Local 455, 291
NLRB at 387.
Of course, efforts to have an employer discriminate against an employee are actionable 50
even if indirect, so the fact that Andrews was not explicit is not dispositive. However, for there to
be a violation of 8(b)(2), there must be union action from which a violation of 8(a)(3) would be a
JD–14–19
14
foreseeable consequence. SEIU, Local 87 (Able Building Maintenance Co.), 349 NLRB 408, 412
fn. 10 (2007) (“If a foreseeable consequence of the communication is discharge, an explicit
demand is not required”); Longshoremen, Local 1332 (Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n), 150
NLRB 1471, 1476 (1965) (there must be union action intended to cause a violation of 8(a)(3) and
“reasonably calculated to bring about that result”); see also, cases cited below at fn. 11.5
One thing is absolutely clear on this record—it is something that was known by Andrews,
Stasko, Eisley, Pienkowski and Passler—and it is this: there was no chance—none—that Stasko
was going to be disciplined or have any adverse action taken against him by Bemis for either or
both of the two alleged safety violations for which Andrews reported him.10

According to Bemis’ own witnesses, the violations for which Andrews reported Stasko
were not acts for which Stasko would be disciplined. The momentary failure to wear hearing
protection is, by all evidence, a common occurrence, which, when brought to management’s
attention, results in the bargaining-unit safety advocate, or, possibly a manager, mentioning it to 15
the offending employee and telling him or her to wear their hearing protection. Passler was very
clear on this in his testimony. In addition, Eisley, unit employee who functioned as a safety
advocate, passed on safety violations to management without naming names or with any
anticipation of discipline—which again, highlights the nondisciplinary approach that Bemis took to
minor safety violations. Eisley testified that she has talked to Stasko a half a dozen times. There 20
was no prospect of discipline. Stasko seemed to confirm this as his understanding too. By all
evidence only in the most extreme case of repeated violations would an employee even end up in
the progressive disciplinary system for these sorts of “PPE violations.” Stasko was not even
close with half a dozen “coachings” from Eisley. Notably, the General Counsel is in complete
agreement that there was no prospect of discipline for this incident, pointing out (GC Br. at 33) 25
that the record
showed that Bemis’ policy with regards to wearing PPE was to remind employees
when they were not wearing their hearing protection to put it on, rather than
seeking to discipline them for it.30
The pizza incident was a little more unusual, but the evidence is clear that discipline was
not even a consideration—indeed, the open question (that I have not resolved) is whether or not
Passler literally laughed it off with a joke. In any event, he knew about it and took no action other
than telling the bargaining unit safety coordinator Eisley to check with Stasko to make sure he 35
threw the pizza-contaminated blade away. To quote Bemis’ brief (CP Br. at 14–15), which
accurately summarizes the record on these points:
Ms. Pienkowski, Human Resources Manager, also testified that she was not aware
of any employee ever being disciplined for that type of safety violation. (Tr. 42.) 40
With regard to PPE, the Company typically does not engage in formal discipline for
minor violations. (Tr. 55.) Typically, the Company will repeatedly coach an
employee, and if there is a habitual offender, the Company will use progressive
discipline. (Tr. 55.) Mr. Passler did request that the Safety Advocate, Denise
Eisley, discuss the issue with Mr. Stasko, which is consistent with his typical45
response to such incidents. (Tr. 156.)
Ms. Eisley confirmed that she was not aware of any employees receiving
any formal discipline for minor safety violations such as PPE violations, within at
least the past few years. (Tr. 212.)50
JD–14–19
15
Reporting an employee for a violation for which he will not be disciplined is not an attempt
to have him disciplined.

Bemis brought this charge, alleged that the Union attempted to cause it to discriminate,
yet asserts that the incidents for which the union reported Stasko are not offenses for which 5
Bemis employees are disciplined. Is the contention that Union—reasonably but mistakenly—
believed otherwise? Absent a finding that Andrews was totally ignorant of the management
practices and policies with regard to safety violations in a plant where she has worked and
represented employees for many years—and there is no evidence for such a finding—it is not
tenable to contend that reporting Stasko for violations for which he will not be disciplined 10
constitutes an “efficacious” attempt to have Bemis discipline him.
This is a fundamental fallacy in the General Counsel’s theory. Andrews’ and/or the
Union’s hostility to Stasko is not sufficient to prove this case. Without a finding of union
“causation”—i.e., a finding that the union caused or attempted to cause the employer to take 15
action against an employee—there is no case.
The General Counsel argues that “[t]he Board has found the necessary element of
causation in a union’s reporting of supposed employee misbehavior to an employer.” GC Br. at
28. But the General Counsel ignores that the causation finding in such cases is rooted in and 20
requires a finding that the union reasonably would know that discipline would likely result from
reporting the employee. This is a crucial component of an 8(b)(2) violation based upon a finding
of an implicit circumstantial union attempt to cause an employer to discriminate.11

11Caravan Knight Facilities Management, Inc., 362 NLRB 1802, 1805 (2015) (finding that
employer’s past application of its rules meant that union caused discharge because when union
filed statement incriminating employee in “major offense for which employees are subject to
discharge without warning . . . they knew full well that doing so would in all likelihood result in
Powell’s discharge. Accordingly, we find that the Union effectively caused Powell’s discharge”);
enfd. in relevant part, 844 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2016); Good Samaritan Medical Center, 361 NLRB
1294, 1296 (2014) (“These facts support an inference, which the judge drew and with which we
agree, that when the Union's representatives reported Legley's conduct to management, they
reasonably would have foreseen that Legley would be disciplined (at least) for violating the
workplace civility policy. . . . Based on the foregoing, we find that union conduct caused Legley’s
discharge”), enf’t denied, 858 F.3d 617 (1st Cir. 2017); Security, Police & Fire Professionals
(SPFPA) Local 444, 360 NLRB 430, 435 (2014) (union representative “knew that [employee]
would be removed from worksite and suffer adverse employment action” based on union
representative’s disclosures to client, thus “the element of causation necessary to establish a
prima facie case violation of Section 8(b)(2) is met by the aforementioned disclosures”); Town &
Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB 1410, 1430 (2004) (Rongers’ “14 years as President of IEU
taught him that Strack discharged employees for making threats to employees or customers. . . .
[H]e did not deny that his experience as IEU President showed him the likelihood that upon
learning of Peters' threat to “kick his ass” Strack would discharge her. Accordingly, I find that by
Rongers' complaint, IEU was requesting Strack to discharge Peters for threatening him”).
Nationsway Transport Service, 327 NLRB 1033, 1045 (1999) (“Even if [union representative] did
not act for the specific purpose of causing the Employer to refuse to work Noweski, he
nevertheless acted knowing that this particular result would follow. That is sufficient causation
[under 8(b)(2)]”); Paperworkers Local 1048 (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), 323 NLRB 1042, 1044
(1997) (“the Union's representative, Rick Young, reported an allegation of racial harassment to
the Employer with full knowledge of the Employer's rules concerning such conduct and of its
policy of assigning strong discipline to violators of those rules [along with other similar indirect
indicia] warrant[ ] the inference of an implied request that Ramsey be disciplined”).
JD–14–19
16
Here we have the diametrically opposite circumstance. Not only did Andrews not explicitly
request that Stasko be disciplined, she had every reason to believe that Stasko would not be
disciplined (or otherwise discriminated against) by the employer in any way) for the reported
offenses. This was right, of course. The whole thing was kicked over to Eisley, in both cases, a
coworker “safety advocate.” It was, according to Passler and Pienkowski, Stasko, Bemis’ 5
posthearing brief, and the General Counsel’s posthearing brief, Bemis’ policy not to discipline
employees for such matters. This significantly, fatally in my view, and undercuts the General
Counsel’s view that it is reasonable to interpret or infer Andrews’ actions as a true attempt to
cause Bemis to discriminate against Stasko.
10
In truth, this is obvious. Andrews was making a point. One does not have to endorse or
agree with her point to recognize it. She was raising—and she was explicit about it—her view,
shared by the Union and some employees, that Bemis had enlisted a “certain group” of
employees in the termination of DeSpirito and that those employees were being protected by the
employer. Andrews was making a point about favoritism and what she believed was disparate 15
treatment by the Employer of the local union president. In the first incident, when she saw Stasko
without his protective gear she walked into the press office and said “you know, he doesn't have
his earmuffs on. None of you say anything.” That’s it. The second incident involved more—
angry calls to the corporate safety hotline and to Passler and Pienkowski until they called her
back—but she was acting on the urging of an angry unit employee—Hernandez—who, like 20
Andrews, believed that Bemis played favorites and allowed some employees to ignore rules in
front of the management without even a reproach. This is the substance of Andrews’ complaint
to management: “This all happened right in front of the safety director”; “you said nothing,
absolutely nothing. He used a razor blade between his fingers and didn’t have any protection on
and you let that happen at a safety meeting? Unbelievable.” One need not approve of Andrews’ 25
making her point by reporting Stasko. But in the context of Bemis’ longstanding method of
dealing with safety violations, none of this amounts to an attempt to cause Bemis to discipline or
otherwise discriminate against Stasko.
Section 8(b)(2) is a protection for employees from union attempts to leverage its power or 30
position to have an employer discriminate against employees. It is not a catch-all provision
violated by any union hostility to an employee, however unjustified. It is not a trap for a union
representative who complains to management about minor but valid safety violations carrying no
risk of adverse action by the employer against the employee. Such careful “policing” of union
action—in this case, instigated by the employer—is not within the ambit of 8(b)(2)’s prohibition. 35
The Board should not be drawn into such an effort. I dismiss the Section 8(b)(2) allegation of the
complaint.12
40

12I note that the General Counsel does not rely on or claim that Andrews’ reporting of Stasko
for “staring at [her]” in the parking lot the previous evening constituted an attempt to have Stasko
disciplined. Andrews’ description of the event contains nothing that Stasko could be disciplined
for or that could reasonably be construed as “intimidation.” Apparently, the Employer too, figured
this one out (“there was no merit found”). Andrews’ testimony that she “panicked” when she saw
Stasko “because I thought if I say or do anything, it’s more icing for his case,” seems to be as
close to an admission of Stasko’s nondelinquency as one can expect. In any event, Andrews’
reporting of this incident—which did not involve her asking for Stasko to be disciplined seems like
a ham handed, unconvincing, and sure to be disbelieved effort to lodge a complaint of favoritism.
I reiterate that the General Counsel does not rely on this incident as a basis for any violation.
JD–14–19
17
The General Counsel also contends that Andrews’ reporting of Stasko violates Section
8(b)(1)(A). However, the General Counsel advances no argument for finding this to be an
independent violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Neither does the Employer. Rather, the General
Counsel contends only (GC Br. at 29) that “[a] derivative violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) arises
where an 8(b)(2) violation has been proven.” In the absence of any argument from any party that 5
Andrews’ reporting of Stasko is an independent violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), I decline to reach
the issue. Based on the dismissal of the 8(b)(2) allegation, I dismiss any theory of derivative
violation.13
10
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Graphic Communications Conference/ International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local Union No. 735–S (Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. 15
2. The Respondent, on or about January 22, 2018, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, by
posting a message in its publication, The Communicator, threatening to blacklist members
from employment opportunities in retaliation for reporting union members to their employer for
misconduct. 20
3. The Respondent, in or about late January 22, 2018, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
threatening employee Michael Samsel with reprisals including destruction of property in
response to Samsel’s complaint about hostile notes calling him a “rat” being left at his
workplace. 25
4. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent affect commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
30

13I note that while there are cases in which the Board has adopted without comment
administrative law judge findings that a derivative violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) arises where an
8(b)(2) violation has been proven (see e.g., SPFPA Local 444, 360 NLRB at 435 and Postal
Workers, 350 NLRB 219, 222 (2007)) there are also longstanding unreversed Board cases
holding otherwise. E.g., Plumbers Local 669 (Lexington Fire), 318 NLRB 347, fn.4 (1995) ( “It is
well established that other 8(b)violations do not give rise to derivative violations of Sec.
8(b)(1)(A)”); Local 340, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers (Consumers Energy Co.), 347 NLRB 578, 578 fn. 4 (2006) (reversing 8(b)(1)(A)
finding based on 8(b)(2) finding because “It is well established that other 8(b) violations do not
give rise to derivative violations of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)”); Truck Drivers Local 705 (Pennsylvania
Truck Lines), 314 NLRB 95, 95 ft. 4 (1994) (”In adopting the judge's finding that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by attempting to cause and by causing the Employer to deny the
discriminatees’ seniority, we do not rely on the judge's characterization of the 8(b)(1)(A) violation
as “derivative”); National Maritime Union, 78 NLRB 971 (1948), enfd.175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied 338 U.S. 954 (1950). Given my conclusion that there was no 8(b)(2) violation, I need
not treat with this conflict.
JD–14–19
18
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that
it must be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed 5
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in the
attached Appendix. This notice shall be posted in the Respondent's offices or wherever the
notices to members are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing 10
its contents. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its members by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. When the notice is issued to the Respondent, it shall 15
sign it or otherwise notify Region 4 of the Board what action it will take with respect to this
decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended1420
ORDER
The Respondent Graphic Communications Conference/ International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local Union No. 735–S (Union), West Hazelton, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, 25
and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening members with loss of employment opportunities in retaliation for 30
reporting members for misconduct to their employer.
(b) Threatening employees with reprisals in response to complaints that they have
received messages implying they are disloyal and/or hostile to the Respondent.
35
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
40
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its West Hazelton,
Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”15 Copies of

14If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the
Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
15If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
JD–14–19
19
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. In addition
to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, 5
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its members by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
10
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver to the Regional Director for
Region 4 signed copies of the notice in sufficient number for posting by the
Employer at its West Hazelton, Pennsylvania facility, if it wishes, in all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
15
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 4 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations 20
of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 1, 2019
25
David I. Goldman
U.S. Administrative Law Judge
ht,t CIL
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of employment opportunities in retaliation for reporting
union members for misconduct to your employer.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with reprisals in response to complaints that you have received
messages implying that you are disloyal and or hostile to the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO 735–S
(Union)
Dated By
(Representative)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the
Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional
Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04–CB–215127 by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354.