Glendale Associates, Ltd.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 23, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 27 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

1
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Board volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Glendale Associates, Ltd., Glendale II Associates
Limited Partnership, Glendale Orbach’s Associ-
ates, and Donahue Schriber and National Asso-
ciation of Broadcast Employees and Techni-
cians, the Broadcasting and Cable Television
Workers Sector of the Communication Workers
of America, AFL–CIO. Case 31–CA–22759
August 23, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On March 4, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Michael
D. Stevenson issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Respondents filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs, the General Counsel filed a brief in sup-
port of portions of the judge's decision, the Respondent
filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel’s ex-
ceptions, and the General Counsel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as modified
below.1
For the reasons set forth below, we adopt the judge’s
finding that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) by
maintaining and enforcing a rule that prohibited union
handbillers from identifying by name any tenant at the
Respondents’ facility. We also adopt the judge’s finding
that the Respondents did not violate the Act by maintain-
ing another rule requiring the Union to furnish in ad-
vance the names of all prospective handbillers.
I. THE RELEVANT FACTS
The Respondents own and operate a large retail shop-
ping center in Glendale, California, known as the Glen-
dale Ga lleria (Galleria). As set forth more fully by the
judge, the Respondents promulgated comprehensive
rules and guidelines applicable to all groups seeking to
engage in political or other noncommercial activity at the
Galleria. The Respondents did so in response to the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of California in Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 153 Cal.
1 No exceptions were filed to the judge's dismissal of Respondent
Glendale Orbach's Associates from the proceeding on jurisdictional
grounds.
Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), holding that the free
speech and petition provisions of the California state
constitution protected the exercise of speech and peti-
tioning in private shopping centers, subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations by the property
owner.2
In spring of 1997,3 union officials, including employ-
ees of ABC, Inc., handbilled at the Galleria in front of or
near the Disney Store, Inc. (Disney Store), a retail tenant
of the Galleria. The Union was then engaged in a labor
dispute with ABC, Inc., which is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Disney Enterprises, Inc.4 The purpose of the
handbilling was to apply pressure to ABC, Inc., and to its
parent company, in order to facilitate the successful reso-
lution of collective-bargaining negotiations with ABC,
Inc.5 After commencing handbilling, union officials
were informed that the Respondents maintained rules
regulating handbilling at the Galleria and received an
application and a packet of materials explaining what
was necessary for compliance.
On June 2, the Union submitted the application to the
Respondents and was subsequently given permission to
handbill on June 7, subject to curing certain deficiencies
in the application. These deficiencies included the fail-
ure to furnish to the Respondents the names of those ex-
pected to participate in the handbilling and the failure to
remove reference to the “Disney Store” on the handbills.
Thereafter, the Union complied with the request to iden-
tify by name likely handbillers, but declined to remove
from the handbills' reference to the “Disney Store.” In
light of the failure to comply with the rules, the Respon-
dents asked the union handbillers to leave the Galleria or
be subject to arrest for illegal trespass on private prop-
erty. Union handbilling continued on that date, however,
and the Respondents did not, in fact, contact police offi-
cials.
2 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court upheld California's right under its state
constitution to restrict the property rights of shopping centers.
3 All dates are 1997 unless noted otherwise.
4 The Disney Store is also a separately incorporated wholly owned
subsidiary of Disney Enterprises, Inc.
5 The handbill at issue refers both to the “Walt Disney Company”
and the “Disney Store,” and st ates, inter alia, that “Disney is demanding
take-backs from workers” in negotiations with ABC and urges that
customers of Disney “should buy their toys elsewhere next time.”
Whether the handbill is considered a form of consumer information
handbilling as to the Union’s dispute with ABC, Inc., consumer boycott
handbilling, or even a “less-favored” form of secondary handbilling, it
is clearly protected under Sec. 7 of the Act. Oakland Mall , 316 NLRB
1160, 1163 at fn. 14 (1995), enfd. 74 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See
also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Building and Construction
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)(Act does not proscribe peaceful
handbilling urging even a total consumer boycott of neutral employers).
335 NLRB No. 8
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. ANALYSIS
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), the
Supreme Court held that an employer may lawfully bar
nonemployee union organizers from private property
(unless the employees are inaccessible through usual
channels). In the absence of a private property interest,
however, the Court’s holding in Lechmere is not control-
ling. See Bristol Farms, 311 NLRB 437, 438, fn. 6
(1993)(“employer’s exclusion of union representatives
from private property to which the employer lacks a
property right entitling it to exclude individuals likewise
violates Section 8(a)(1) assuming the union representa-
tives are engaged in Section 7 activities"). See also Indio
Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1142 (1997), enfd. 187
F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).6
The Board looks to State law to ascertain whether an
employer has a property right sufficient to deny access to
nonemployee union representatives. Bristol Farms, 311
NLRB at 438. The Board does so because it is State law,
not the Act, that creates and defines the employer’s prop-
erty interest. Thus, an employer cannot exclude indi-
viduals exercising Section 7 rights if the State law would
not allow the employer to exclude the individuals. Id. at
638; Johnson & Hardin Co., 305 NLRB 690 (1991).
As discussed, California law permits the exercise of
speech and petitioning in private shopping centers, sub-
ject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations by
the property owner. As the judge found here, removal of
the reference to the “Disney Store” on the union’s hand-
bills appears to be essentially a content-based restriction
and not a “time, place, and manner” restriction permitted
under State law.7 Indeed, there is no evidence in this
record explaining how application of the Respondents’
rule to the handbilling at issue serves to promote the kind
of time, place, and manner restrictions that would pass
muster under California law.8 As a practical matter, it
6 Accordingly, to the extent the judge's comments regarding the ap-
plicability of Lechmere suggest that Lechmere controls regardless of
state law limit ations on the employer's property rights, we do not adopt
them.
7 In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d supra at 910,
the Supreme Court of California endorsed the right to implement time,
place, and manner rules to assure that the activities at issue “do not
interfere with normal business operations [and] would not markedly
dilute [the owner’s] property rights.” The United States Supreme Court
has also endorsed time, place, and manner restrictions under the First
Amendment “provided the restrictions are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
8 In Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees [UNITE]
v. the Superior Court of Los Angeles County , 56 Cal. App. 4th 996, 155
LRRM 3047 (1997), the court of appeals indicated that it shared the
trial court’s concern as to the constitutionality of potential content-
appears that the purpose and effect of the rule, as applied
here, was simply to shield the Respondents’ tenants, such
as the Disney Store, from being the subject of otherwise
lawful handbilling.9 Accordingly, we find, in agreement
with the judge, that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by maintaining and enforcing a rule prohibiting
activities which identify by name the center owner, man-
ager, or any tenant of the center and by threatening to
call the police to enforce that rule.10
In agreement with the judge, however, we find that the
Respondents' rule requiring advance identification of
handbillers by name does not violate Section 8(a)(1). In
contrast to the content-based rule prohibiting identifica-
tion of a tenant on the handbill, the rule requiring ad-
vance notice of prospective handbillers is consistent with
legitimate time, place, and manner purposes under State
law. Thus, the rule allows indentification of persons who
may previously have caused injury or damage to the
shopping center and facilitates verification, for liability
purposes, of the identity of those authorized by the appli-
cant to handbill.11 Indeed, the identical rule at issue here
was upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner regu-
lation under California law. Union of Needletrades, In-
dustrial & Textile Employees [UNITE] v. the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 56 Cal. App.4th 996, 155
LRRM 3047 (1997)(finding it proper for the shopping
centers to learn in advance the identity of the participants
because this is information which case law had held can
be taken into consideration in deciding whether to re-
quire insurance). In these circumstances, we agree with
based regulations similar to the present case; however, the court de-
clined to rule on the issue because it was not adequately raised before
the trial court.
9 The Respondent’s rules expressly permit communicative “labor ac-
tivities” at the Galleria when there is a dispute “with the Center owner,
or with any tenant in the Center.” Accordingly, it appears that, under
its rules, the Respondents would permit consumer handbilling naming
the “Disney Store” in furtherance of a primary labor dispute but not as
to lawful secondary consumer handbilling. Drawing a distinction be-
tween forms of protected activities reinforces that the rule at issue is
content based.
10 In so finding, we do not rely on the judge’s comments in section
III,B,3,b, of his decision regarding “general theoretical” rights of the
Respondents under State law to exclude persons from their property or
his finding that the Respondents are “rebuttably presumed” to be within
their rights to do so. As noted at fn. 6 above, we also do not rely on the
judge’s discussion regarding the Respondents’ rights under Lechmere.
We find merit to the Respondent’s contention that the judge’s or-
der is overly broad to the extent that it requires the Respondent to cease
and desist from maintaining, and to affirmatively delete and expunge,
rules and guidelines prohibiting activities that are not protected under
the Act. Accordingly, we shall modify the judge’s recommended Order
and limit the remedy to the intrusion on Sec. 7 rights.
11 We agree with the judge that the Respondents’ willingness to ac-
cept last -minute additions for authorized handbillers does not render
invalid the advance notice requirements.
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD. 3
the judge that the Respondents properly exercised its
entitlement under State law to maintain and apply a rea-
sonable time, place, and manner regulation. It follows
that the Respondents did not violate the Act by requiring
advance notice of the identity of prospective handbill-
ers.12
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondents, Glen-
dale Associates, Ltd., Glendale II Associates Limited
Partnership, and Donahue Schriber, Glendale, California,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
"(a) Promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing by
threats to call the police a rule at Glendale Galleria pro-
hibiting handbilling or other expressive activities pro-
tected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
which identify by name the center owner, manager or
any tenant of the center."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Modify its Rules for Noncommercial use of
Common Areas, its Internal Policies and Guidelines for
Noncommercial Use of Common Areas of Glendale Ga l-
leria and any other document within the custody and con-
trol of Galleria where such rules may be contained, to
permit handbilling and other such expressive activities
protected under Section 7 of the Act, which identify by
name the center owner, manager, or any tenant of the
center.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
12 The General Counsel contends that the private property right as-
serted by the Respondents is, at best, an ancillary one and must “yield”
to employees’ Sec. 7 rights here. We decline to engage in a balancing
test with regard to the Respondent’s advance-notice rule. Once the
Respondents establish a legitimate time, place and manner regulation
pursuant to state law, then “the law that creates and defines the em-
ployer’s property rights” allows them to exclude the non-complying
individual or party. Bristol Farms, 311 NLRB at 438. And, under
prevailing Board law, it is inappropriate to engage in the kind of bal-
ancing test that the General Counsel seeks in such circumstances. See
Oakland Mall, supra; Leslie Homes, 316 NLRB 123 (1995). Member
Truesdale dissented in the foregoing cases and Member Liebman did
not participate. However, for institutional reasons, they shall apply that
precedent as controlling here.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 23, 2001
Peter J. Hurtgen, Chairman
Wilma B. Liebman, Member
John C. Truesdale, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEE

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, nor enforce by
threats to call the police any rule prohibiting handbilling
or other expressive activities protected by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act which identify by
name, the center owner, manager, or any tenant of the
center.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our rules for Noncommercial Use of
Common Areas, our Internal Policies & Guidelines for
Noncommercial Use of Common Areas of Glendale Ga l-
leria, and any other document within our custody and
control of Galleria where such rule may be contained to
permit handbilling and other such expressive activities
protected under Section 7 of the Act, which identify by
name the center owner, manager, or any tenant of the
center.
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD., GLENDALE II
ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP , AND
DONAHUE SCHRIBER
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Alice Garfield, Atty., for the General Counsel.
Thomas J. Leanse and Jamie Rudman, Attys . (Katten, Muchin
& Zavis), of Los Angeles , California, for the Respondent.
Gena M. Stinett, NABET, CWA, of Burbank, California, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
M ICHAEL D. STEVENSON, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was tried before me at Los Angeles, California, on No-
vember 2, 1998,1 pursuant to a consolidated amended com-
plaint issued by the Regional Director for the National Labor
Relations Board for Region 31 on June 30, 1998, and which is
based upon charges filed by National Association of Broadcast
Employees and Technicians, The Broadcasting and Cable Tele-
vision Workers Sector of the Communications Workers of
America, AFL–CIO (the Union), on June 16 and September 19
(original and first-amended charge in 31–CA–22759). The
complaint alleges that Glendale Associates, Ltd., Glendale II
Associates Limited Partnership, Glendale Orbach’s Associates,
and Donahue Schriber (the Respondents) have engaged in cer-
tain violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended.
Issue
Whether Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining and enforcing certain rules for noncommercial use
of common areas, purporting to regulate the solicitations and
distribution of materials to members of the public present at an
indoor shopping mall:
(1) Rule prohibiting the naming of any [mall] tenant in
printed materials;
(2) Rule requiring the naming in advance of the noncommer-
cialnoncommercial expressive activity in question, all persons
who will or may engage in that activity.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and to cross-examine
witnesses, to argue orally and to file briefs. Briefs, which have
been carefully considered, were filed on behalf of General
Counsel and Respondents.2
On the entire record of the case, and from my observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fo llowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS
For all times material to this case, Glendale Associates, Ltd.,
a California limited partnership; Glendale II Associates, a Cali-
fornia partnership, and Glendale Orbach’s Associates, a Cali-
fornia general partnership, each owned a separate portion of a
retail shopping center known by the fictitious business name,
“Glendale Galleria,” located in Glendale, California. In addi-
tion, the three entities named above employed Donahue
1 All dates herein refer to 1997 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The transcript prepared for this case is of such poor quality, that it
must be noted for the record. The garbled syntax, misspellings, and
wrong speakers cited are an embarrassment to the NLRB and to all
involved in this hearing.
Schriber, a management company with an office and place of
business located in Newport Beach, California, to manage the
operations of the Galleria.
During the 12-month period ending December 31, each Re-
spondent, in conducting its respective business operations, pur-
chased and received within the State of California, goods or
services valued in excess of $50,000 from other enterprises
located within the State of California, each of which other en-
terprises had received these goods in substantially the same
form directly from points outside the State of California. Du r-
ing the same 12-month period, each Respondent, in conducting
its respective business operations, annually derives gross reve-
nues in excess of $500,000. Accordingly, with the exception of
Glendale Orbach’s Associates, all other Respondents admit and
I find that for all times material to this case, all Respondents
except for Glendale Orbach’s Associates, have been employers
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondents admit, and I find that National Association of
Broadcast Employees and Technicians, The Broadcasting and
Cable Television Workers Sector of the Communication Work-
ers of America, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR L ABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1.
This case involves the distribution of certain leaflets in an
enclosed shopping center by representatives of the Union.
General Counsel challenges certain of the rules which regulate
this activity. Prior to hearing, a companion case, 31–CA–
23189, involving the same parties and arising out of the same
facts as the present case, was settled, and severed from the con-
solidated complaint. For the remaining case, the essential facts,
if not all the facts, are undisputed.
The events in question, occurred at the Glendale Galleria
(Galleria), a retail shopping center, located in Glendale, Cali-
fornia. Consisting of 1.3 million square feet under roof, Galle-
ria contains five major department stores and about 60 other
stores on two levels (GC Exh. 2). It has 13 entrances with signs
on each welcoming customers and announcing general bans on
bicycles, radios, roller skates, and “soliciting.” At various loca-
tions in Galleria, there are directories containing locations of
the stores and the management and security offices. As of
June, Galleria is open 10 a.m.–9 p.m. (Monday–Friday), 10
a.m.– 8 p.m. (Saturday), and 11 a.m.–7 p.m. (Sunday).
Different portions of Galleria are owned by Respondents,
Glendale Associates, Ltd., Glendale II Associates Limited Part-
nership, and Glendale Orbach’s Associates. Together they
employ a management company, Respondent Donahue
Schriber. General Manager of Galleria is Cynthia Chong who
did not testify. In addition to employing a general manager,
Galleria employed 40–45 security officers in June, with about
10–12 officers working on the property at any given time. The
Galleria director of security in June was Greg Flosty, who testi-
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD. 5
fied as Respondents’ witness. The current Galleria director of
operations, since October 1996 and former Galleria director of
security is Michael Cross, who also testified as Respondents’
witness.
One of the tenants of Galleria is the Disney Store, Inc., a
California corporation, which store is located on the lower level
in a segment of Galleria owned by Glendale II Associates Lim-
ited Partnership (Tr. 17, R. Exh. 5). Two interior views of Gal-
leria with a focus on the Disney Store location from different
perspectives are contained in the record (R. Exhs. 6 and 7).
The parties to the case stipulated and agreed that the Disney
Store is a separately incorporated wholly owned subsidiary of
Disney Enterprises, Inc., hereinafter called DEP, a California
corporation. DEP, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Walt Disney Company, hereinafter called Disney, a Delaware
corporation.
ABC, Inc., hereinafter called ABC, and fo rmally known as
Capitol Cities/ABC, Inc. is a New York corporation and a
wholly owned subsidiary of DEP. DEP acquired ABC on or
about February 9, 1999. Neither ABC nor the Disney Store is a
parent or subsidia ry of the other (Tr. 17).
2.
Sometime in 1991, after experiencing problems with certain
groups wishing to use Galleria property for political or other
noncommercial purposes, officials of Galleria formulated
“Rules For Noncommercial use of Common Areas” hereafter
Rules (R. Exh. 1). These rules are interpreted with the guid-
ance of a second document called “Internal Policies & Guid e-
lines for Noncommercial Use of Common Areas of Glendale
Galleria” (R. Exh. 2) (The second document is sometimes re-
ferred to as “in-house rules.”)
General Counsel’s sole witness was Gena Stinett, president
of Local 57 of the Union since July 1994, and currently on a
leave of absence from her job as a video tape editor for ABC.
The Union and ABC have a collective-bargaining relationship
for a bargaining unit which includes video tape editors. The
last labor agreement expired on March 31 and as of the date of
hearing, a new agreement had not been reached.3 According to
Stinett, on May 10, she and other members of Local 57 were
handbilling inside Galleria in front of or near the Disney store.
The purpose of the handbilling was to apply pressure to the
Disney store’s parent company and to ABC so the Union could
obtain a new labor agreement to their liking. Sometime after
Stinett and the others began their activity, they encountered
Cross, who informed them of the Rules which regulated hand-
billing and other types of noncommercial activity. Stinett re-
quested and received a packet of materials necessary for com-
pliance. The materials included,
(1) Free Speech Rights in California Shopping Cen-
ters. This single page document purported to state briefly
the free speech rights with citations to U.S. Supreme Court
and certain California state court cases (GC Exh. 4(a)).
3 According to recent news reports, the Union and ABC have re-
solved a side issue which had resulted in a nationwide lock-out of bar-
gaining unit employees.
(2) Rules for Noncommercial Use of Co mmon Areas
(GC Exh. 4(b)) with attached maps of Galleria (GC Exh.
2).
(3) Application for Access to Glendale Galleria For
Noncommercial Expressive Activity.
This document informs the user, “The information contained
in this application will be kept confidential and will only be
used by center management in furtherance of its business ac-
tivities” (GC Exh. 4(c)).
(4) Notification Form—This document tells the appli-
cant of Galleria’s response to the application (GC Exh.
4(d)).
(5) Indemnity Agreement—This document asks for in-
formation on a specific person who will be responsible for
the activity in question (GC Exh. 4(e)).
The Union’s completed application dated 6–2–97 and In-
demnity Agreement are contained in the record (GC Exh. 5).
Also part of the same exhibit is the notification form indicating
that the Union was given permission to handbill on the date
sought, Saturday, June 7, subject to the curing of certain
claimed deficiencies in the application:
(1) Names of participants must be e xplicitly identified.
Stinett had provided her own name, several other names
and then wrote “others.” On June 7, Flosty asked her to
line out “others” and supply additional names of those per-
sons expected to participate. Stinett complied and added
three additional names.
(2) Indemnity Agreement must identify an individual.
The original agreement dated 6–2–97 had “NABET-CWA
Local 57” listed as name of individual applicant, and was
signed by Daniel Mahoney, Local 57’s Secretary -
Treasurer (GC Exh. 8). Because this was felt to be out of
compliance, Stinett executed a second Indemnity Agre e-
ment, dated June 6, wherein she supplied her own name as
the Applicant and signed the document as Pres ident of
NABET-CWA, Local 57 (GC Exh. 5).
Finally (3) Reference to the “Disney Store” on the
Flyer must be removed. This was not done and the flyer
distributed by Stinett and others on June 7 is contained in
the record:

GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD. 7
With the flyer, the handbiller also distributed a postcard to be
filled out by sympathetic recipients with the person’s name and
address and then mailed to the Union, with a preprinted mes-
sage to certain legislators in Washington, D.C. (GC Exh. 6(b).)
This final issue could not be resolved by the parties. On June 6,
Flosty spoke to Stinett by phone and offered her the option of
lining out the name of the Disney Store on the flyer but she
refused.
As part of the service provided to applicants, Galleria em-
ployees set up a table and chair in front of or very nearby the
Disney Store. This location desired by Stinett happened to be
one of several, so-called “designated areas” located at various
points in Galleria and used for noncommercial activity. The
policy is to allow an applicant to select any des ignated area to
perform activities under the Rules, so long as no other group
has selected it first and so long as it is otherwise available.
Under the Rules, at any given time, only three participants are
permitted to handbill, and they may stand or sit at the table as
they choose. On June 7, about 10 a.m., Stinett found the table
and chairs set up in the designated area requested. A few min-
utes later, Flosty arrived and he and Stinett agreed on the cor-
rections of “others” and of the indemnity agreement. Ho wever,
when Flosty noted that the Disney name had not been deleted
or lined out in the flyer, he stated Stinett and Neal Noorlag,
General Counsel’s rebuttal witness and fe llow union handbiller,
were not in compliance with the Rules. Accordingly, Flosty
ordered them to leave Galleria immediately, or be subject to
arrest for illegal trespass. Stinett refused to leave and continued
to leaflet until about 2 p.m. During the handbilling, various
other union members assisted in the handbilling arriving and
leaving at various times during the day and continuing the ac-
tivity until about 4 p.m. For unknown reasons, these other
individuals failed to sign-in on a sheet (GC Exh. 3) brought to
the table for that purpose, shortly after Stinett began handbill-
ing. As to Flosty’s threat to call the policy, he never did so.
Instead he left Galleria shortly after speaking to Stinett.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Jurisdictional Issue Regarding Glendale
Orbach’s Associates
During the hearing, Respondents argued that the Board
lacked jurisdiction over one of the four Respondents, Glendale
Orbach’s Associates, on the grounds that it has no employees.
Without objection, I admitted in support of that contention, an
“Offer of Proof of Patrick S. Donahue” (R. Exh. 12). That
document reflects that Donahue is a General Partner of Re-
spondent’s Glendale Orbach’s Associates and that he would
testify, if called as a witness, that Respondent Glendale Or-
bach’s Associates does not have, and has never had, any em-
ployees.
Not only was there no objection to Respondent Exhibit 12
(Tr. 89), but in fact, General Counsel stipulated to the docu-
ment (Tr. 106), meaning that she agreed that if Donahue had
been called as a witness, he would have testified as indicated in
Respondent exhibit 12. Further, General Counsel candidly
represented at hearing that she had no rebuttal to that evidence
(Tr. 106). Accordingly, I find that Respondent Glendale Or-
bach’s Associates does not have, and has never had, any em-
ployees.
General Counsel refused at hearing to dismiss Respondent
Glendale Orbach’s Associates from the hearing on the grounds
that

simply because I have no evidence to the contrary that they
have no employees that doesn’t release them from liability.
Because it is a joint enterprise and they operate . . . and to the
public they are one entity, Glendale Galleria and the reason
that I wouldn’t want to dismiss them from the complaint is
that I would like to make the argument in brief that they are
liable —even though they are not the employer, they are liable
for the acts of the Mall—it is a joint enterprise. [Tr. 106]

In their brief, pages 15–16, Respondents renew their argu-
ment that Glendale Orbach’s Associates should be dismissed.
In support of their argument, they cite the case of Operating
Engineers Local 487 Health & Welfare Trust Fund , 308 NLRB
805 (1992). There the Board stated at 807

the “ordinary meaning” of “employer” does not include an en-
tity that has no employees. Rather, the plain meaning of
“employer” is one who employs employees to work for
wages and salaries. Indeed, we believe it would be “far-
fetched,” and therefore contrary to congressional intent, to
hold that an “employer” need not employ any employees.

At page 18, footnote 18 of her brief, General Counsel makes
a rather brief argument, first again conceding the lack of evi-
dence showing that Glendale Orbach’s Associates has any em-
ployees. Then, it is alleged without citations to the record, that
Respondents operate the shopping center as a single, integrated
business enterprise. I have read the case of G.M. Trimmings,
Inc., 279 NLRB 890 (1986), cited by General Counsel, but
conclude it does not apply to the present case because the evi-
dence does not support a single or joint employer theory and
neither concept was litigated in this case. Therefore, I adopt the
argument advanced by Respondents above.
In further support of Respondents’ argument that jurisdiction
over Glendale Orbach’s Associates does not exist, I note that
the parties apparently agreed to delete Glendale Orbach’s As-
sociates as a Respondent in the Settlement Agreement of Case
31–CA–23189 and signified their agreement by lining out the
name of said Respondent and by the opposing attorneys appar-
ently initialing the deletion. I find that this fact supports Re-
spondents’ contention advanced here because it appears Gen-
eral Counsel conceded the issue in the related case.4 For the
reasons stated above, I will dismiss Glendale Orbach’s Associ-
ates from the case on the grounds that the Board lacks jurisdic-
tion.

4 At p. 85 of Tr., I inquired of the parties whether anyone thought the
Settlement Agreement in Case 31–CA–23189 should be made a part of
the record. No one did. Now because I think it should be, on my own
motion, I reopen the record and admit the Settlement Agreement as
ALJ Exh. 1 and reclose the record.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8
2. General Counsel’s Motion to Strike Portions of Respon-
dents’ Brief to the Administrative Law Judge
General Counsel has moved to strike Exhibit E to Respon-
dents’ brief which is an Advice Memorandum pertaining to
another case (31–CA–23189). In support thereof, General
Counsel contends that said Advice Memorandum is not part of
the record in this proceeding, that an Advice Memorandum
does not constitute Board law and has never been accepted
legal authority, and finally, the facts in the Advice Memoran-
dum are distinguishable from the facts in the present case.
Respondents opposes the Motion.
I agree with General Counsel’s argument that Advice Memo-
randa do not constitute Board law. Geske & Sons, 317 NLRB
28, JD at 56 (1995), citing Kysor Industrial Corp. 307 NLRB
598, 602 fn. 4 (1992). Various State court decisions appended
to Respondents’ brief, also do not constitute Board law and also
are outside the record, but General Counsel does not move to
strike them. The State court cases are appended to the brief, as
a courtesy to the undersigned who does not have ready access
to State court reports. All such legal authorities will be care-
fully considered in due course. As a matter of discretion, I
decline to strike Respondents’ reference to the Advice Memo-
randum because said document may yield legal authorities or
factual arguments which may relate to one or more issues in the
present case. In addition, it may otherwise be helpful to me or
to a reviewing body. Cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 303
NLRB 87 fn. 2 (1991).
3. The Challenged Rules
a.
A long history of cases manifests a h ierarchy among Section
7 rights, with organizational rights asserted by a particular em-
ployer’s own employees being the strongest, the interests of
nonemployees in organizing an employer’s employees being
somewhat weaker, and the interests of uninvited visitors in
undertaking area standards activity, or otherwise attempting to
communicate with an employer’s customers, being weaker still.
Thus under the Section 7 hierarchy of protected activity im-
posed by the Supreme Court, nonemployee activity in which
the targeted audience was not (an employer’s) employees but
its customers “warrants even less protection then non-employee
organizational activity.” United Food & Commercial Workers
Local 880 v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 292, 297–298 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 52 (1996), citing NLRB v. Great Scot,
Inc., 39 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 1994).5
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992), the
Supreme Court has created a bright line rule: “An employer
cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by
non-employee organizers on his property, absent evidence that
satisfies one narrow exception to accommodate workers who
are truly inaccessible.” Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB , 968 F.2d
991, 998 (9th Cir. 1992). This rule applies with special force

5 Secondary consumer boycott handbilling is included among the
less favored Sec. 7 activities. Oakland Mall Ltd., 316 NLRB 1160,
1163 (1995), enfd. 74 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S.
Ct. 153 (1996).
where the handbills are aimed at the general public. Id. 997–
998.
In Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB, 130 F.3d 1209, 1212 (6th Cir. 1997),
the court discussed and distinguished an earlier case which it
had decided, Cleveland Real Estate Partners (CREP) v. NLRB,
95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996). In CREP , the Court held that it
was permissible for the owner of a private retail shopping mall
to preclude union representatives from distributing handbills
directed at shoppers in order to discourage them from patroniz-
ing nonunion retailers, even though the owner permitted hand-
billing and solicitation by nonunion permittees in the mall.
While there is no issue in the instant case of disparate applica-
tion of the Rules, 6 the court’s explication of CREP in the later
case is instructive. At page 1213 of Meijer, Inc., the court ex-
plained:

First, as a general rule an “owner of private property . . . need
not . . . permit the distribution of union literature on its prop-
erty.” Second, “there is a substantial diffe rence between the
rights of employees and [that] of non-employees with respect
to the distribution of union literature on privately owned
property.” Third, the non-employee union representatives
were engaged in non-organizational informational picketing
directed at the general public.”

The court in Meijer, Inc. went on to conclude that because
the three considerations discussed above were not present in the
case under review, the holding in CREP did not apply and the
Board’s decision was enforced.
By contrast, the three considerations recited above and much
more are present here. Thus, Respondents did not seek to ban
the distribution of union literature, as it may have a right to do,
but merely to regulate it with reasonable time, place, and man-
ner rules. The issue presented here involves the rights of non-
employees of the Disney Store. All such participants who
sought access to Galleria pursuant to the Rules in question were
employees of ABC. The relationship between the Disney Store
and ABC, such as it is, has been described above and need not
be repeated. It suffices to say that I find that Stinett, Norlag,
and all other participants in the handbilling were nonemployees
of the Disney Store. Finally, the nonorganizational activities
here were directed at the general public.
General Counsel does not challenge the overall regulatory
scheme, or the avowed purpose underlying the Rules as being
pretextual. Among the provisions of the Rules not challenged
are the requirements of applicants to use designated areas, to
sign in/sign out and to refrain from any noncommercial activity
during a limited number of so-called “peak shopping days,”
e.g., Chris tmas season.
The Rules specifically provide that they do no apply to a “la-
bor dispute,” as defined under California law (R. Exh. 2, pp. 1–
2, fn. 4).7 During the hearing no party contended that the ac-

6 Compare Price Chopper, 325 NLRB 186 (1997).
7 The applicable definition of “labor dispute”
. . . involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests; or who are
employees of the same employer; or who are members of the
same or an affiliated organization of employers of employees. A
"labor dispute” further includes any controversy concerning terms
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD. 9
tivities in question constituted a “labor dispute” as defined in
the Internal Policies & Guidelines (R. Exh. 2). This “safe har-
bor” for a labor dispute tends to undermine General Counsel’s
case. See Riesbeck Food Markets v. NLRB , 91 F.3d 132 (4th
Cir. 1996).
The discussion above includes citations to several decisions
of courts of appeals which failed to enforce Board orders. I
acknowledge that where conflict between a Board holding and
a court of appeals exists, I am bound by the Board’s holding.
However, I am entitled to interpret the Supreme Court’s Lech-
mere decision which is binding on both the Board and courts of
appeals. Moreover, the material collected from the cited cases
above is not generally at odds with Board law. For example, in
Oakland Mall Ltd., supra, 316 NLRB at 1162–1163, the Board
held that, based on Lechmere, an employer may prohibit non-
employees from gaining access to its private property to engage
in area standards or consumer boycott activities. The Board
went on to state that no balancing of employee and employer
rights is appropriate unless the union can first demonstrate that
it lacks reasonable access to the employer’s customers outside
the employer’s property. See also Leslie Homes, 316 NLRB
123 (1995), and Galleria Joint Venture , 317 NLRB 1147
(1995). I find that no such showing was made here.
b.
In her brief, General Counsel claims that Lechmere does not
apply; rather, I must look to State law to determine the rights of
the parties to this case. To a certain extent, Respondents seem
to agree with General Counsel’s analytical framework (brief,
pp. 19, 27 et. seq.). I do not agree and find that Lechmere is the
primary authority to determine the rights of the parties here. To
be sure, in Farm Fresh, Inc., 326 NLRB 997 at 1001 (1998),
the Board cited Indio Grocery Outlet , 323 NLRB 1138 (1997),
for the proposition that, in cases in which the exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights by nonemp loyee union representatives is assert-
edly in conflict with a respondent’s private property rights,
there is a threshold burden on the respondent to establish that it
had, at the time it expelled the union representatives, an interest
which entitled it to exclude individuals from the property. To
determine the property interest,(the Board) looks to the law that
created and defined the Respondent’s property interest which is
State, rather than Federal law. In Farm Fresh, Inc., the Board
looked to the law of the State of Virginia and concluded that
respondent had acted properly by removing union agents from
sidewalks in front of four stores, and improperly with respect to
three other stores.
I note that the union organizers in Farm Fresh, Inc. were at-
tempting to organize the Respondent’s employees, unlike the
instant case, where union representatives were attempting to
reach the public. In addition, there was no time, place, and
manner rules in issue. Notwithstanding all of this, I assume
arguendo, that a discussion of California State law is required

and conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, filing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ-
ment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the relation-
ship of employer and employee. [Alleged source of definition in
California law not stated.]
under the facts and circumstances of the present case. General
Counsel directs my attention to two cases, Bristol Farms, Inc.,
311 NLRB 437 (1993), and Payless Drug Stores Northwest,
Inc., 311 NLRB 678 (1993).
In Payless Drug Stores, 311 NLRB at 679, the Board ex-
plained that in Bristol Farms, the Board looked to the law of
the State of California, to establish the extent of the respon-
dent’s property rights and thus whether respondent had the
requisite property interest to support a property-rights defense.
The Board went on to note that a California Supreme Court
decision had held that a shopping center’s property right was
limited by the free speech and petition provisions of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. The Board then noted the U.S. Supreme
Court’s affirmance of that California Supreme Court decision
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Finally, the Board noted that after Pruneyard Shopping Center,
another California appellate court case extended Pruneyard to
permit the distribution of union handbills at a shopping center.
Northern California Newspaper Organizing Committee v. So-
lano Associates, 239 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. App. 1 Dist., 1987).
Applying the Payless Drug Stores case to the present case, I
first note fn. 3 (p. 679) of the Board’s decision where the Board
acknowledged that under Pruneyard , a shopping center could
adopt reasonable time, place, and manner rules concerning the
exercise of free speech at the shopping center. I find generally
that the rules in question here are reasonable time, place, and
manner rules. Based on Lechmere , Oakland Mall, and other
authorities, there is at least a strong presumption of validity
which General counsel must overcome to prevail.
In addition, I adopt Respondents’ argument, brief, page 26,
that as owners of Galleria, Respondents herein have a general
theoretical right under California law to exclude persons from
their property. Allred v. Harris , 14 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (1993).
The right of owners to exclude persons under California law
may be greater than that of lessees, but this question need not
be addressed. I find only that Respondents here exercised their
private property rights in light of the reasonable time, place,
and manner rules referred to above and they are rebuttably
presumed to be within their rights to do so.
c.
I turn finally to the two rules under challenge and begin with
Galleria’s Rule H requiring applicants to provide in advance the
names of all persons who are expected to participate in the
noncommercial activity. The rationale for providing the names
of participants relates to potential liability problems for injuries
which may occur during the activity and, so that participants
with a history or record of misconduct can be monitored closely
or excluded altogether. However, Cross testified that Galleria
will accept last-minute additions to the list of participants even
though this practice undercuts a portion of the purported ration-
ale, since the last minute furnishing of names does not gener-
ally permit a record check of the names for past trouble. Ho w-
ever, these last-minute names must be verified by the responsi-
ble person who submitted the application. I am unwilling to
find that the relaxed enforcement of this rule somehow uncuts
its strong presumption of validity under Pruneyard . I note the
recent case of Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Founda-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10
tion, Inc., 525 U.S.182, (1999), where the court held that under
the First Amendment to the US Constitution, initiative petition
circulators need not be registered voters, wear identification
badges with their names nor comply with certain other rules
relating to reporting requirements. In its decision, the Court
recognized the State’s “strong interest in policing lawbre akers
among petition circulators.” The interest in reaching law viola-
tors, however, the Court stated, “is served by the requirement,
upheld below, that each circulator submit an affidavit” to au-
thorities setting out, among several particulars, the [circulator’s
name] and address at which he or she resides. . . .” The affid a-
vit sufficed and rendered other requirements overly burden-
some. I find this decision supports Respondents’ defense here.
More to the point is the case of Union of Needletrades, In-
dustrial & Textile Employees [UNITE] v. the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County , 56 Cal. App. 4th 996 (1997). In that case,
the court affirmed a trial court’s ruling refusing to issue a pre-
liminary injunction sought by a labor union to bar enforcement
of cert ain time, place and manner rules maintained by six shop-
ping malls. The labor union sought access in order to publicize
its labor dispute with a specific retailer.
General Counsel, reverses field at this point from her posi-
tion earlier, brief at 6–7, where she contended that property
rights are generally within the purview of State rather than
Federal law and therefore, she says, I must look to the law of
California. At page 12 of General Counsel’s brief, I am told to
ignore the UNITE case because the Board is not bound by deci-
sions of state courts, because the California court did not con-
sider the issues in the context of Section 7 rights and because
although the California court “examined the identical rules of
Respondents, the facts were different as was the nature of the
proceeding.”
General Counsel does not satisfactorily explain why this case
does not explicate California State law on the issue of Galle-
ria’s property rights. Rather the argument advanced here seems
inconsistent and even contradictory to that advanced earlier. I
find that the UNITE case is a strong factor in support of Re-
spondents’ defense of its rules requiring the identification of
participants. See also Farm Fresh, Inc., supra, 326 NLRB 997
at 1001. For the reasons cited above, I will recommend that
this segment of the case be dismissed.8
Finally, I address the rules prohibiting the naming of any
tenant in handbills distributed to Galleria’s customers –unless
there be a labor dispute in effect rendering these rules not ap-
plicable. Both sides agree that UNITE did not address the rule
prohibiting identification of a tenant by name, because the issue
had not been properly raised below. I have expressed the view
that under Lechmere, Galleria may have the right to bar the
nonemployee union organizer completely absent a showing of
nonaccessibility. However, in its wisdom, Galleria has seen fit
to formulate certain rules regulating union demonstrators and
others. These rules must past muster on their face and as ap-
plied. To find them lacking, I too reverse field.
In the instant case, the union partic ipants were permitted to
use a designated area in front of or very near the Disney Store.

8 I have given no weight to the Advice Memorandum submitted as
Exh. E to Respondent’s brief.
This was pure coincidence and other union handbillers in other
cases could be assigned a des ignated area much further from a
targeted store. The handbill in this case reads in pert inent part,
“Hey Mouseketeer, Before you shop in the Disney Store, you
should know what Disney is doing with your money.” (GC
Exhs. 6(a), (b)). If the handbills were not allowed to name the
Disney Store, many people, particularly immigrants, who did
not grow up with the pervasive Disney influence, might be
uncertain of what the handbill was referring to. Moreover,
other Galleria tenants may not be as well-known. I find that the
rule prohibiting the naming of a mall client is a content-based
restriction prohibited both by the First Amendment and by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. If found valid, said rule could render any
handbilling meaningless. I find the promulgation, maintenance
and enforcement of said provision, by a threat to call the police
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Whatever interests Respon-
dents have generally in protecting their tenants’ rights to con-
duct their business without undue interference is outweighed by
the First Amendment and Section 7 of the Act.9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents are employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. National Association of Broadcast employees and Techni-
cians, the Broadcasting and Cable Television Workers Sector of
the Communication Workers of Ame rica, AFL–CIO is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Repondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by pro-
molgating, maintaining, and enforcing a rule prohibiting activ i-
ties which identify by name the center owner, manager or any
tenant of the center and by threatening to call the police to en-
force said invalid rule.
4. Respondent Glendale Orbach’s Associates is dismissed.
5. The unfair labor pra ctices described above are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found the Respondents engaged in certain unfair la-
bor practices, I shall recommend that they be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action nec-
essary to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended Order.10

9 Nothing in this recommended decision to the NLRB is meant to re-
strict Galleria’s ability to regulate or ban entirely handbills containing
so-called “fighting words,” obscenities, grisly, or gruesome displays or
highly inflammatory slogans likely to provoke a disturbance. UNITE,
p. 12 of Exh. B to Respondent’s brief.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections shall be waived for all pur-
poses.
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD. 11
ORDER
The Respondents, Glendale Associates, Ltd., Glendale II As-
sociates Limited Partnership, and Donhue Schriber, its officers,
agents, successors and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Promulgating, maintaining and enforcing by threats to
call the police a rule at Glendale Galleria prohibiting activities
which identify by name the center owner, manager or any ten-
ant of the center.
(b) In any like or related manner violated the provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Delete and expunge from its Rules for Noncommercial
use of Common Areas, from its Internal Policies & Guidelines
for Noncommercial use of Common Areas of Glendale Galleria
and from any other document within the custody and control of
Galleria where such rules may be contained, any rule prohibit-
ing activities which identify by name the center owner, man-
ager or any tenant of the center.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Glendale Galleria, Glendale, California copies of the attached
Notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director, in English and such other
language as the Regional Director determines are necessary to
fully communicate with employees, after being signed by the
Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondents and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondents to ensure the notices are not altered, defaced
or covered by other material. In the event that, during the

11 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted By Order Of The
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant To A
Judgment Of The United States Court Of Appeals Enforcing An Order
Of The National Labor Relations Board.”
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondents has gone out
of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondents shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondents at any time after June 7,
1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondents has taken to comply.
Issued at San Francisco, California, this 4th day of March,
1999.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has o rdered us to post and
abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain nor enforce by threats to
call the police any rule prohibiting activities which identify by
name, the center owner, manager, or any tenant of the center.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL delete and expunge from our rules for Noncommer-
cial Use of Common Areas, from its Internal Policies & Guid e-
lines for Noncommercial Use of Common Areas of Glendale
Galleria, and from any other document within our custody and
control of Galleria where such rule may be contained, any rule
prohibiting activities which identify by name, the center owner,
manager, or any tenant of the center.

GLENDALE ASSOCIATES, LTD., GLENDALE II
A SSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP , GLENDALE
ORBACH’S A SSOCIATES, AND DONAHUE SCHRIBER