Glenda Wearren, Complainant,v.Leon E. Panetta, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Finance & Accounting Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 6, 2012
0120112046 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 6, 2012)

0120112046

01-06-2012

Glenda Wearren, Complainant, v. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Finance & Accounting Service), Agency.




Glenda Wearren,

Complainant,

v.

Leon E. Panetta,

Secretary,

Department of Defense

(Defense Finance & Accounting Service),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120112046

Hearing No. 532-2009-00098X

Agency No. DFAS-00104-2008

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s January 31, 2011 Final

Order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §

791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the

Agency’s Final Order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as an Accounting Technician at the Agency’s Defense Finance Accounting

Service facility in Columbus, Ohio. On August 14, 2008, Complainant

filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against

her on the basis of disability (skeleton degenerative, lumbar/sacral

arthritis and allergies) and reprisal when:

1. In April 2008, Complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation;

2. Complainant was subjected to non-sexual harassment including

the following incidents of harassment:

a. On June 23, 2008, a co-worker sprayed something in

the workspace;

b. On June 23, 2008, Complainant’s supervisor (S1) told Complainant

"go to the nurse because you are disturbing the workplace", or words to

that effect;

c. On June 23, 2008, S1 refused to talk to Complainant;

d. On June 23, 2008, S1 yelled at Complainant and told her “I am

sick of you and get out of my office”, or words to that effect; and

e. In April 2008, Complainant’s desk was moved.

Previously, in Wearren v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal

No. 0120083945 (December 31, 2008), the Commission reversed the Agency’s

dismissal of the complaint and ordered the Agency to investigate

Complainant’s claims. At the conclusion of the investigation, the

Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and

notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. Over Complainant's

objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion

for a decision without a hearing. The AJ issued a decision without a

hearing on January 20, 2011.

In her decision, the AJ assumed, without so finding, that Complainant had

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on disability and

reprisal. AJ’s Decision Without a Hearing (AJ Decision), January 20,

2011, at 10; Record on Appeal (ROA) at 26. The AJ considered evidence

that Complainant requested an accommodation in the form of a partition

for her work area and a different seat assignment to alleviate symptoms

associated with her allergies. AJ Decision at 10. However, the AJ found

that Complainant did not show that the accommodation that she requested

would be effective. The AJ noted that the Agency provided Complainant

with equipment, permitted her to use a face mask, and allowed her to use

flexible leave and breaks as an accommodation. Id. The AJ found that

the Agency did not fail to provide Complainant with an accommodation. Id.

With respect to harassment, the AJ found that the incidents of harassment

described in Complainant’s complaint were not so severe or pervasive

as to rise to the level of harassment. Specifically, the AJ noted that

Complainant did not establish who sprayed perfume in her cubicle, did not

show that the workplace was permeated with offensive behavior, and did

not report her co-worker’s objectionable behavior to her supervisor.

The AJ found that considering the totality of circumstances, Complainant

did not present evidence of a hostile work environment. Id. at 11

The AJ concluded that Complainant did not show that she was subjected

to discrimination on the bases of disability or reprisal as alleged in

her complaint. The Agency subsequently issued a Final Order adopting

the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency

subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Agency’s Final Order

(Ag Order), January 31, 2011; Complainant’s Notice of Appeal, at 2.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to

properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could

order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion

for a decision without a hearing).

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request

No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in

accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt

v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324

(D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Dep’t of

Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant

may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1)

he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware

of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected

to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the

protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep’t of

the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).

In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's

disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply

the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village

Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68

(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).

Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, complainant

must demonstrate that: (1) she is an "individual with a disability"; (2)

she is "qualified" for the position held or desired; (3) she was subjected

to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding

the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden

of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order

to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant must then demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason is a

pretext for disability discrimination. Id.

In the instant case, we assume, without so finding, that Complainant

is a qualified individual with a disability as alleged. We further

assume, as did the AJ, that Complainant established a prima facie case

of disability and reprisal discrimination. We find no dispute that

Complainant previously engaged in EEO activity and that her request for

a partition for her cubicle was denied.

We find, as did the AJ, no evidence presented by Complainant, that

the proposed accommodation Complainant requested (a partition for

Complainant’s cubicle) would have addressed Complainant’s medical

condition. We note no dispute in the record that the Agency responded to

Complainant’s requests for accommodation in April 2008, with a number

of measures intended to permit Complainant to perform the duties of

her position by addressing the symptoms associated with her documented

medical conditions. Neither party disputes that Complainant’s

work station was evaluated in April 2008, and that recommendations to

provide Complainant with a humidifier and air purifier were followed.

Complainant’s Memorandum In Opposition to Agency’s Motion for a

Decision Without a Hearing, September 29, 2009 at 4. We note that the

parties continued the interactive process in the following months during

which a number of alternative arrangements suggested by both parties were

considered. We find that the agency reasonably accommodated Complainant's

claimed disabilities. We do not find that Complainant was entitled to an

accommodation of her choice. Cramer v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal

No. 0120061921 (December 12, 2008). Complainant has not shown that a

partition for her cubicle was necessary due to her claimed disabilities.

Furthermore, Complainant has not shown how any Agency action in the

complaint was motivated by disability or reprisal discrimination. We

concur with the AJ that assuming the incidents of harassment occurred

as alleged, they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute

a hostile working environment.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the Agency’s Final Order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 6, 2012

__________________

Date

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0120112046

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120112046