Glenda Wearren, Complainant, v. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Finance & Accounting Service), Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 241,300 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,686 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,210 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Hlth
198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999) Cited 280 times
Finding that an employer could "regard as" disabled an employee who had lymphoma where the employer had knowledge of employee's diagnosis and a previous employee had died from the same disease
Lawson v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001) Cited 217 times
Holding that the plaintiff's diabetes and related medical conditions, which affected “many of the organ systems in his body,” were physical impairments under the ADA
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology
545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) Cited 249 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in balancing the scope of reasonable opposition conduct, "[t]he requirements of the job and the tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting must be explored"
Swanks v. Washington Met. Area Transit
179 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1999) Cited 50 times
Observing that an employer "`may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy . . . selectively'" (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1998))
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, Etc.
425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976) Cited 87 times
Holding that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement
Section 2000e - Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 2000e Cited 52,481 times 130 Legal Analyses
Granting EEOC authority to issue procedural regulations to carry out Title VII provisions
Section 794 - Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs
29 U.S.C. § 794 Cited 12,645 times 30 Legal Analyses
Adopting ADA standards for Rehabilitation Act claims
Section 791 - Employment of individuals with disabilities
29 U.S.C. § 791 Cited 2,303 times 6 Legal Analyses
Adopting standards for ADA claims under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 12112, which forbids discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability . . ."

Glenda Wearren, Complainant, v. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Finance & Accounting Service), Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Finding that an employer could "regard as" disabled an employee who had lymphoma where the employer had knowledge of employee's diagnosis and a previous employee had died from the same disease

Holding that the plaintiff's diabetes and related medical conditions, which affected “many of the organ systems in his body,” were physical impairments under the ADA

Holding that, in balancing the scope of reasonable opposition conduct, "[t]he requirements of the job and the tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting must be explored"

Observing that an employer "`may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy . . . selectively'" (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1998))

Holding that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement

Granting EEOC authority to issue procedural regulations to carry out Title VII provisions

Adopting ADA standards for Rehabilitation Act claims

Adopting standards for ADA claims under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 12112, which forbids discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability . . ."