General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 2, 1954

110 N.L.R.B. 1109 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1109
4. By failing and refusing on, and at all times since , March 11, 1953, to bargain
collectively with International Stereotypers & Electrotypers Union of North America,
AFL, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
.unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (I) of the Act.
5. By refusing employment to Jesse James on March 11, 1953, thus discriminating
in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of said Jesse James thereby dis-
couraging membership in International Stereotypers & Electrotypers Union of North
America, AFL, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY' and INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEC-
TRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, CIO 2 and UNITED ELECTRI-
CAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UE) ; AND LOCAL
937 , UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
(UE). Case No. 7-CA--817. December 2,1954
Decision and Order
On January 29, 1954, Trial Examiner Earl S. Bellman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed
in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, all the parties filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report. The General Counsel, the IUE, and the UE
filed supporting briefs.3
• The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and fields that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,
and recommendations with the following modifications.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent did not
violate Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act by the following conduct
which occurred during the pendency of representation proceedings
involving the Respondent's Detroit Apparatus Service Shop, herein
called the Detroit Unit : The Respondent's failure on June 17, 1952,
to forestall the automatic renewal of its national agreement of 1950
with the UE, the incumbent Union; amending the said contract on
1 Herein called GE.
2 Herein called IUE.
8 However, the UE subsequently withdrew its exceptions and part of its brief.
110 NLRB No. 182.
1110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or about September 12, 1952; and taking no action to exempt the
Detroit Unit from the national agreement as renewed and modified.
We find it unnecessary, however, to pass upon the Trial Examiner's
reasoning in support of his conclusions. The Board recently held in
the Associated Spring case 4 that the Midwest Piping doctrine,5 which
established a general prohibition against employer execution of a bar-
gaining agreement with 1 of 2 or more competing labor organizations
during the pendency of representation proceedings, is in the interest
of industrial stability to be no longer applied to situations where an
employer continues normal contractual relationships with an incum-
bent union which represents the employer's employees. Accordingly,
we find for the reasons fully stated in the Associated Spring decision
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the
Act by permitting its national agreement with the UE to be auto-
matically renewed on June 17, 1952, and modified on September 12,
1952, without taking steps to exempt the employees of the Detroit
Unit therefrom. We shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its
entirety as recommended by the Trial Examiner.6
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
`William D. Gibson Co ., Division of Associated Spring Corporation , 110 NLRB 660.
5 See Midwest Piping & Supply Co , Inc., 63 NLRB 1060, and such related cases as
William Penn Broadcasting Company, 93 NLRB 1104.
9 Member Murdock , who concurred in Associated Spring, but dissented from the rationale
therein , considers himself bound by the majority' s decision in that case. Member
Rodgers , who dissented in part from the Associated Spring case , also regards himself
as bound by the majority' s decision in that case.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on October 16, 1952, by International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, CIO, herein called the IUE, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board , herein called respectively the General Counsel
and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region ( Detroit, Michigan),
issued the complaint herein, dated January 16, 1953, against the General Electric
Company, herein called the Respondent , alleging unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , herein called the Act. Copies of the charge , the com-
plaint , and notice of hearing hereon , were duly served upon the IUE; the United
Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers of America ( UE), herein called the UE;
Local 937, United Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), herein
called Local 937; and the Respondent , which had previously been duly served with
a copy of the charge.
-With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint alleged , in substance: (1)
That at all times after June 16, 1952, the Respondent has granted exclusive recog-
nition to and has dealt with the UE and Local 937 as representatives of a unit of the
Respondent 's employees at its Detroit Apparatus Service Shop , herein called respec-
tively the Detroit Unit and the Detroit Shop , despite the fact that "valid questions
concerning the representation of said unit of employees were pending and /or con-
tinued to be pending before the Board in cases numbered 7-RD-109, 7-RC-1618,
7-RD-133, and 7-RC-1835"; ( 2) that the Respondent , on June 17, 1952, while
the aforesaid valid questions of representation were pending before the Board, re-
newed and thereafter has given effect to a collective-bargaining agreement with the
UE, dated September 15, 1950, herein called the National GE-UE Agreement, said
agreement governing wages, hours, and conditions of employment in the Detroit
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1111
-Unit; (3) that the Respondent, on September 12, 1952, while said valid questions
were pending, executed a wage agreement with the UE amending the National GE-
UE Agreement; (4) that by the foregoing acts, the Respondent, in violation of
Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act, has interfered with, assisted, and contributed to the
-support of the UE and Local 937; (5) that all of the Respondent's aforesaid activities
have additionally interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act; and (6) that under the circumstances the above-
-mentioned renewed National GE-UE Agreement and the wage agreement of Sep-
tember 12, 1952, and any modifications or extensions thereof are invalid and in
violation of the Act, insofar as applicable to the Detroit Unit.'
The respective answers filed by the Respondent and the UE denied that the acts
alleged constituted unfair labor practices, and took the general position that con-
tractual relations between them had been pursuant to certifications of the Board.
-Among defenses detailed in the Respondent's answer were essentially the following:
-(1) The Respondent had no means of determining, and actually was precluded from
ascertaining, whether any valid question concerning representation had been raised
by the representation proceedings enumerated in the complaint, and the Board has
dismissed the petitions in two of said cases without deciding that crucial question.
(2) The contracts put in issue by the complaint as applicable to the Detroit Unit
were negotiated between the Respondent and the UE under statutory duty imposed
by Board certifications as part of a pattern of national contracts with the UE which,
in addition to the general agreement and the wage agreement cited in the complaint,
also included the National GE-UE Pension and Insurance Agreement, effective
until September 15, 1955. (3) Various contractual amendments, including provi-
sions for wage increases, which the Respondent entered into on September 12, 1952,
with the UE, did not vary in any respect from provisions which were offered both to
the IUE and to the Respondent's nonorganized employees, and the wage increases
in issue stem from negotiations begun in March 1952, under wage reopening provi-
sions of the National GE-UE Agreement. (4) The Respondent's policy of non-
interference with employee rights under, the Act, a policy which has been main-
tained throughout numerous elections contested by the UE and the IUE, has been
well known to the employees in the Detroit Unit, and the Respondent has not know-
ingly or intentionally assisted the UE or interfered with employee rights, nor could
or did such employees so interpret any of the Respondent's actions described in the
complaint.
Pursuant to the Regional Director's duly issued notice of postponement, and an
order of the Chief Trial Examiner duly designating me as the Trial Examiner herein,
a hearing was held in Detroit, Michigan, on February 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1953. The
General Counsel, the Respondent, the IUE, the UE, and Local 937, were all repre-
sented and participated throughout the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence bearing on the
issues was afforded all parties.
At the opening of the hearing, the Respondent moved that, to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act, the complaint be dismissed and that the election directed by the
Board in the Detroit Unit be held forthwith.2 In the alternative, the Respondent
moved that the election be held forthwith, even if the complaint were not dismissed.
The Respondent further moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
allegations thereof do not constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. The Re-
spondent also moved for clarification of the complaint. The UE moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that it demonstrated on its face that no unfair labor
practices were involved, and that any course other than that pursued would itself
have been an unfair labor practice. After indicating that a Trial Examiner lacks
the power to direct the holding of an election, oral argument on the record was
heard on all of the foregoing motions. During said argument, all parties outlined
their respective theories as to the issues involved. Before the conclusion of this
I Said Detroit Unit, the composition of which the pleadings herein no not put in dis-
pute, consists, in the words of the complaint, of "all employees" of the Respondent's
Detroit Shop, "excluding all office and clerical employees, salesmen, service engineers,
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act."
2 The Board's order of September 30, 1952, directing said election, and its order of
October 21, 1952, amending same, are discussed below. If such an election as the Re-
spondent proposed weie to be held, the Respondent offered to post a notice or to write
individual letters to employees in the Detroit Unit, informing them that it was wholly
neutral as between the UD and the IUE, and that employees would be accorded equal
treatment regardless of which one represented them, or whether they decided against repre-
sentation by any union.
1112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fairly extensive argument, the Respondent withdrew the motion addressed to me
for an immediate election, stating that a separate request therefor would be filed
with the Board.3 The Respondent also indicated that it would not press for further
clarification of the complaint, in view of positions taken by the General Counsel
during the argument.4 As to the motions of the Respondent and the UE to•dismiss
the complaint, ruling was reserved thereon without prejudice to their renewal at
the close of the General Counsel's case.
After the introduction of a substantial amount of documentary evidence, the par-
ties further clarified their positions. At the close of the General Counsel's case, the
Respondent renewed its motions to dismiss and also additionally moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the General Counsel's evidence had failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case. After considerable argument thereon, conducted on the
record, I reserved ruling upon all motions to dismiss for the Intermediate Report. All
of said motions are now disposed of in accordance with the findings and conclu-
sions made hereinafter. Opportunity was afforded all parties at the close of the hear-
ing to argue orally upon the record and to file briefs and proposed findings and con-
clusions. The General Counsel, the Respondent, the IUE, and the UE argued orally
on the record. Pursuant to extension of time for filing, granted by the Chief Trial
Examiner upon the request of the IUE, briefs were filed by the Respondent, the IUE,
and the General Counsel on March 20, 1953. The Respondent also filed detailed
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are ruled upon at the close
of this report.
Upon the entire record in this case, which by stipulation of all parties in practi-
cal effect also includes the entire records in Cases Nos. 7-RD-109, 7-RC-1618,
7-RD-133, and 7-RC-1835, and from my observation of the witnesses appearing
before me, I make the following: 5
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
General Electric Company, the Respondent herein, is a New York corporation
which at all material times has been licensed under the laws of the State of Michi-
gan to transact business therein. Its principal corporate and general office is located
at Schenectady, New York. At all material times the Respondent has owned, oper-
ated, and maintained service and manufacturing plants in various States of the United
States, through which it has engaged in the manufacture, sale, and service of elec-
trical equipment. Its plant located at Detroit, Michigan, the Detroit Apparatus
Service Shop, herein called the Detroit Shop, is an integral part of the Respondent's
multistate operations. The sales made annually by the Detroit Shop outside the
State of Michigan are in excess of $25,000.
As to its general operations, the Respondent has, over a long period of time,
caused substantial quantities of raw materials and equipment used in the manu-
facture and servicing of its products to be purchased and transported between and
among the various States of the United States, and has caused substantial quantities
of raw materials and equipment produced by it to be sold and transported between
and among the various States of the United States.6 It is admitted and hereby found
that the Respondent is, and has been at all material times, engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, herein called the
IUE, is the Charging Union in the instant matter, and the Petitioning Union in Cases
'The foinial files show that in Cases Nos 7-RC-1618 and 7-RD-109 the Respondent,
under date of February 10, 1953, filed a 10-page motion seeking "the prompt scheduling
of an election," and that said motion was denied by the Boaid on February 24, '1953,
"because of pendency of unfair labor practice proceeding."
4 The General Counsel took the position that the issues herein stein essentially from
what is known as the Midwest Piping doctrine; that no independent 8 (a) (1) issues
are involved, and that the Respondent's moth es are not material and not in issue.
6 Consideration has been given to correcting the transcript in the instant matter on
my own motion, but upon careful review thereof, it appears that most of the errors are
sufficiently obvious to make material misinterpretations of intended meanings unlikely.
6 At the hearing, it was stipulated that the term "substantial" at both points In the
above admitted language of the complaint would mean "in excess of $1,000,000."
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1113
Nos. 7-RC-1618 and 7-RC-1835, both involving the Detroit Unit. It is a labor
organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), an unaffiliated
labor organization which is herein called the UE, and its Local 937, are parties to
the case at bar by virtue of contractual relations with the Respondent covering the
employees in the Detroit Unit. By virtue of said contractual relations, said organiza-
tions also. earlier became parties to the four R-case proceedings whose records are
part of the record herein.?
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introductory statement
The numerous and sharp differences in the positions of the parties prevailing in
this case revolve around which of the largely undisputed primary facts are relevant,
what conclusions logically flow from such facts, and what administrative and legal
principles are applicable to the various issues, some of which appear novel. For the
present, the above analysis of the pleadings and the motions will serve as orientation
to the central contentions of the parties. Other details of these contentions will be
developed as the essential facts are set forth. It should be noted that since the con-
tentions of the parties cover some 200 pages of oral argument and briefs, it would
unduly protract this report to set out all of the factual details which all of the
parties appear to believe material, and to analyze all of the contentions of the par-
ties. Hence what follows will necessarily be somewhat selective.
However, it should be noted that the issues posed by this case raise fundamental
problems with respect to the Midwest Piping doctrine 8 and legal and contractual
principles having broad significance in labor relations. I have, therefore, exercised
great care in considering all facets of the complex factual context within which these
issues arise; in studying not only the decisions cited by the parties, but many others
revealed by further research; and in weighing the bearing of all of the arguments on
the numerous aspects of this case. We turn now to an essentially chronological pres-
entation of the pertinent facts, interspersed with various preliminary conclusions.
B. Chronology of facts and conclusions as to subsidiary contentions
1 Early bargaining background and inception of rivalry between the UE and IUE
On or about October 28, 1939, a local of the UE, Local 737, was certified by the
Board as the exclusive representative of "the production and maintenance employees"
in the Respondent's Detroit Shop.9 Following certification, Local 737 was covered,
along with other locals of the UE which had been certified for units composed of
employees of the Respondent, by a series of national agreements entered into between
the UE and the Respondent, the terms of which were uniformly applicable to all
locals of the UE which represented employees of the Respondent. About January
15, 1943, the number of Local 737 was changed to "937" and thereafter Local 937
was covered by this series of uniformly applicable national agreements.
I It should be noted that Air T. G Hartmann, the individual decertification petitioner
in Cases Nos 7-RD-109 and 7-RD-133, did not appear in the hearing before me in the
instant matter
8This doctrine has its toots in the Board's decision in Midwest Piping & Supply Co,
Inc., 63 NLRB 1060 The gist of what has come to lie known as the Midwest Piping
doctrine is summarized as follows by the Board in Lnsher, Alexander (C Barsoon, Inc.,
74 NLRB 1443, 1444
In Midwest Piping, and in other like cases which followed it, [footnote citing cases]
the Board held that the employer usurped the Board's exclusive function to deter-
mine questions concerning repiesentation of employees by executing an exclusive
bargaining contract with one of two rival unions while a proceeding was pending
before the Board to determine iepresentatives for collective bargaining In those
cases, the employer knew at the time he entered into such a contract that there
existed a real question as to whether the contracting union represented a majority
of big employees in an appropriate bargaining unit [Emphasis supplied.]
'The above quoted unit is from a stipulation of the parties The certification is not
in evidence, not does it appear in the Board's published reports There is, however, no
contention that said unit varies in any way from what is herein referred to as the Detroit
Unit, nor is there any evidence indicating that its composition differs from that detailed
In footnote 1 above. Hence it will be called the Detroit Unit.
1114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Under the foregoing practice, the employees in the Detroit Unit, represented first
by Local 737 and then by Local 937, would receive such national general wage in-
creases as were negotiated from time to time between the Respondent and the UE,
acting on behalf of itself and its affiliated locals. In addition, under the terms of
and to the extent permitted by this series of general national agreements and national
wage agreements, the various locals, including Local 937, negotiated with local
management representatives at the Respondent's respective establishments, pertaining
to local applications of wage rates, hours, and working conditions. For about the
last 10 years, during which he has been the superintendent of the Detroit Shop,
A. D. King, one of the principal witnesses in the instant matter, has served as the
Respondent's representative in such local negotiation pertaining to the Detroit Unit.
During at least the most recent of these local negotiations, later discussed, the prime
mover on the part of Local 937 appears to have been its president, Charles Kelly.'°
About November 2, 1949, the affiliation of the UE with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations terminated. About November 15, 1949, the IUE notified the Re-
spondent that it claimed to represent all of the employees of the Respondent who
were then being represented by the UE, including the employees in the Detroit Unit
represented by Local 937. The national agreement which, with various amendments,
was at that time in effect between the UE and the Respondent, had first been executed
in 1946. By virtue of amendments made in 1948, said agreement was to remain in
effect for a 2-year term, until April 1, 1950. That agreement was also automatically
renewable for 1-year periods, in the absence of termination upon at least 90 days'
notice prior to April 1 of any year, beginning with April 1, 1950.
It is thus evident that, more than 6 weeks prior to the " Mill B" or automatic
renewal date of the above-described agreement, the Respondent was confronted with
conflicting claims as to representation of many of its employees. The Respondent
thereupon, as permitted by the terms of its national agreement with the UE, gave
notice of termination of said agreement, to become effective April 1, 1950. The
Respondent explained the situation in an issue of the "General Electric Commen-
tator," dated December 9, 1949.11 The Respondent's explanation to its employees
of the situation which had developed, as a result of the IUE's challenge of the UE's
status as the "certified bargaining agent for a great many of our employees," in-
cluded these points. On October 20, before any questions as to representation had
arisen. the Respondent had offered the UE a new contract, but upon advice of "legal
counsel that it would be an unfair labor practice to make a new contract with the
UE while the representation question was pending before the Board," the UE had
been notified by the Respondent that it "must suspend the offer and not come to a
new contract until the representation issue had been settled." After pointing out
that the Respondent would cooperate with the Board "in every 'way possible" '
10 Kelly, who did not testify, is not an employee of the Respondent Clemens
Pszczolkowski, an employee of the Respondent and chief steward for the employees in
the Detroit Unit since October 1952, was confused and vague in his testimony as to the
composition of Local 937, leaving the record ambiguous as to what employees other than
those of the Respondent are included within Local 937.
u This general house organ, which will herein be called the Commentator, is published
by the Respondent from time to time to keep its employees informed on "matters affect-
ing the Company and its operation." A number of such Commentators are in evidence.
There was a series pertaining to the period now under consideration, seven of which are
in evidence. Among other things, those Commentators depicted the Respondent's policy
as one of neutrality and assured the employees of their freedom to pick whatever union
they desired. By at least one of several methods, all employees of Respondent, includ-
ing those in the Detroit Unit, learned of the positions taken by the Respondent in the
various issues of the Commentator The first of the series immediately concerning us
was dated November 11, 1949, and was entitled "The Choice Must Be Yours." It opened
by pointing out the fact that "two or more national union groups are now struggling to
represent employees for whom UE has been bargaining " The last of this series, dated
May 26, 1950, and entitled "Whether Your Choice Won or Lost," was an attempt to
build morale and seek cooperation, whatever individual employees may have felt about
the results of the various Board elections conducted on May 25. All seven of the Com-
mentators in this series closed with the printed signature of "L. R. Boulware, Vice Presi-
dent Employee Relations " The issue of December 9, discussed at this point at some
length in the body, is pertinent with respect to the IUE's position that the Respondent
later pursued a course of action in 1952 prejudicial to the IUE, and substantially at
variance with that which the Respondent pursued during this earlier period. However,
several essential differences between those two periods will become self-evident as the
facts are developed.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1115
expedite a resolution of the representation issues, the Commentator for December 9
contained the following paragraph:
UE's contract with the Company runs until April 1, 1950. We believe we are
obligated to carry out the terms and conditions of that contract and to continue
negotiating with UE as long as its authority to represent our employees continues
in force. This of course we plan to do, despite any confused reports to the
contrary. In some locations, however, questions have arisen as to who are the
proper officers of the Local, and at these locations local union negotiations have
had to be postponed until these questions could be settled.
Among numerous petitions filed about this time was an employer 's representa-
tion petition in Case No. 5-RM-152, covering the Detroit Unit. That petition was
consolidated for a hearing, along with 100 other employer petitions filed by the
Respondent , and 12 representation petitions filed by 5 different labor organizations.
A consolidated hearing on these 113 petitions, which involved plants of the Re-
spondent "at some 57 different locations," was held in New York City between
January 17 and March 4, 1950. On April 26, 1950, the Board issued its decision,
in which it found 98 appropriate units and an additional 25 voting groups, and
ordered 123 elections therein . 12 In every one of the elections so directed , a local
of the UE was to appear on the ballot; on each ballot there was also to appear either
a local of the IUE or the IUE itself.13 Most of these 123 elections involved only
the UE and the IUE. However, in about one-sixth of these elections, there were
also one or more additional labor organizations on the ballots. Among such addi-
tional unions, to use their abbreviated designations which were to appear on various
ballots, were the AFL, the Machinists, the Operating Engineers, the Die Sinkers,
the Boilermakers, the Teamsters, the Technical Engineers, the Pattern Makers, and
the UAW-AFL. The unit in this decision found to be appropriate at the Detroit
Shop was set out in precisely the quoted terms detailed in footnote 1 of this report.
The election directed in the Detroit Unit was between Local 937 and the IUE.
The results of the original election in the Detroit Unit showed, as stated by
the Board, "that there were 53 eligible voters and that 53 ballots were cast of which
5 were for the IUE(CIO), 26 for the UE, 21 were cast against participating organi-
zations, and 1 was challenged ." As no objections to said election were filed, the
Board directed a runoff election in the Detroit Unit. On September 21, 1950, fol-
lowing said runoff election, the Board certified Local 937 as the exclusive represent-
ative in the Detroit Unit, using the unit terminology quoted above in footnote 1.
2. The 1950 negotiations and agreements
In the meantime , the Respondent had entered into national negotiations with
the UE and the IUE for the employees in the respective units for which each organi-
zation, either directly or through its affiliated locals, had been certified. Negotiations
also were simultaneously going on with various other unions which represented em-
ployees of the Respondent. On June 27, 1950, after such negotiations had been
under way with various labor organizations for varying periods of time, the Re-
spondent made a detailed offer to all of the unions involved , including the commit-
tees of the UE and the IUE, which have been the only unions to bargain with the
Respondent on a national basis. In addition, this offer, following lines which have
become the established pattern for subsequent negotiations later to be discussed,
was also made to unorganized employees of the Respondent at the same time. This
offer, the details of which in printed form fill some 12 letter-sized pages, included
proposals for general contract provisions , pay increases , pensions , and insurance
coverage , ranging from group life, sickness , and accident to hospitalization and sur-
gical benefits.
In the various negotiations which followed , individual contracts for various single
locations were reached with various unions. In addition , the UE and the IUE,
through their respective national negotiations with the Respondent , arrived at their
respective general agreements with the Respondent , both of which were entered into
as of September 15, 1950. In addition, the Pension and Insurance Agreement,
which by its terms was to remain in effect until September 15, 1955, was entered
into between the Respondent and the UE on September 15, 1950. At about the
1289 NLRB 726. Some idea of the complexity of the representation problems at that
time can readily be obtained by a perusal of this decision covering some 73 printed
pages.
>s The above was subject to the deletion of certain UE and IUE locals if compliance
defects were not satisfactorily rectified.
1116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
same time, the Respondent also evidently entered into substantially identical 5-year
pension and insurance agreements with all of the unions involved in these various
negotiations, including the IUE. It should also be noted that benefits thus con-
tractually given to employees who were represented by unions were also given, so
far as applicable, to all of the Respondent's unorganized employees. Incidentally,
of the approximately 100 employees in the Detroit Shop, some 30 were unorganized
while the remaining 60 or 70 employees fell within the Detroit Unit represented
by Local 937. The organized employees came under the UE's 1950 agreement
upon the certification of Local 937 for the Detroit Unit on September 21, 1950.
Certain provisions of the various agreements entered into on September 15,
1950, should be noted. The Pension and Insurance Agreement, signed as of that
date in New York City by 3 representatives of the UE and 3 representatives of the
Respondent, sets out 42 units as "currently certified" to enumerated locals of the UE.
It was further specifically provided that the term "employees" as used therein should
mean, unless otherwise clearly indicated, all of the Respondent's employees "within
a bargaining unit" for which the UE or one of its locals "is and continues to be,
during the term of this Agreement, the exclusive collective bargaining agent certi-
fied" by the Board. This 16-page agreement, which has been supplemented by a
31-page booklet entitled "General Electric Pension Plan as Amended 1950," and
a 32-page booklet entitled "General Electric Insurance Plan," also specifically pro-
vided that after ratification by any affiliated local of the UE which "shall hereafter
be certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the collective bargaining
representative of other Company employees, this Agreement shall, as of the date of
certification, but in no way retroactively, automatically became effective as to such
certified bargaining representative and employees represented by it." Reopening
for modifications or additions to the insurance or pension provisions, upon written
notice by either party on or after September 15, 1951, was also provided. In my
opinion, no purpose would be served by any further discussion of the involved and
detailed provisions of either the insurance plan or the pension plan.
It should be noted, however, that the evident strategy as to coverage, implicit in
the provisions of these 5-year agreements, was to include within their scope all of
the units certified to the respective unions by the Board at the time of the execution of
said agreements, to add units subsequently certified as of the date of such subsequent
Board certifications, and to remove units from the coverage of any given agree-
ment at the time a union ceased to be the most recently certified bargaining agent
for any given appropriate unit.14 That a similar scheme was intended to operate
with respect to the general national agreements executed by the Respondent with
the UE and the IUE, respectively, is evident also from a careful examination of
those documents, some of the provisions of which are now discussed.
The 1950 National GE-IUE Agreement, signed at New York City on September
15 by 5 representatives of the Respondent and 11 representatives of the IUE, was,
according to its preamble, entered into by the IUE "for itself and in behalf of"
various enumerated locals which were designated as "initially parties" for the 50
enumerated units for which they were then the "currently certified:' bargaining
agents, and also for such other locals "as may hereafter be certified." 15 This IUE
agreement was for an initial 1-year period and was subject to automatic renewal
for yearly periods thereafter, in the absence of written notice "not later than 60 days
prior" to any anniversary date thereof. Article I of this agreement, entitled "Union
Recognition," read as follows:
1. The Company agrees to recognize the Union on behalf of and in con-
junction with its Locals for those bargaining units of Company employees for
which the Union or any of its Locals, through National Labor Relations Board
certifications, is and continues to be lawfully designated as the exclusive collec-
tive bargaining representative of employees within such units for the purpose
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
and other conditions of employment. [Emphasis supplied.]
2. Where the Union or any of its Locals through National Labor Relations
Board certifications has been lawfully designated as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of any additional bargaining units of Company em-
ployees, such certified representatives shall be recognized as provided above
and become a party thereto, and the terms of this National Agreement shall
thereupon be applicable to the employees within such unit.
14 Said basic provisions have not been materially changed by amendments.
ss Several locals were shown in a table in the preamble of thr printed version of this
agreement as having been certified for more than one unit.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1117
The 1950 National GE-UE Agreement, signed at New York City on September
15 by 5 representatives of the Respondent 16 and 11 representatives of the UE, was,
according to its preamble, entered into by the UE "for itself and on behalf of"
various "currently certified" locals which were designated for various of 45 units,
and for such locals "as may hereafter be certified." 17 This UE general agreement,
like the above-discussed very similar one of even date with IUE, devotes its first
article to Union Recognition. The language thereof is almost identical with that
quoted above from the IUE agreement on the same subject, except that the UE
language omitted the last 22 above-quoted words, thus ending with the phrase "as
provided above."
It is my opinion, when the preambles of these two agreements and their total
content is considered, that the omission of the 22 words from the UE agreement
does not in any material way vary the provision thereof from that contained in
the IUE agreement. In fact, a subsequent phrase in article XXIII of the UE agree-
ment provides that said agreement shall "automatically become effective as to such
certified bargaining representative and employees represented by it," should the UE
or a local thereof be certified by the Board for any additional employees during the
term of the agreement. Most of the variations in language between parallel UE
and IUE contractual provisions discussed hereinafter are even less noticeable than
the above, and usually have no more bearing on the issues in this case.
Certain other provisions of this 1950 UE agreement, which becomes a major
focus of issues in this case, should be noted. During this agreement's original
2-year term, reopening for "general revision of wages" was provided upon specified
notice "on or after the 15th day of March 1951, and at six-month intervals there-
after." The agreement specified that all matters concerning pension and insurance
be provided for in a separate agreement which "shall not be considered a part of
this Agreement." Notice by either party concerning proposed modifications or
additions,to the agreement could be given "not more than 60 days and not less
than 30 days prior to the 15th day of September, 1952, and any anniversary date"
thereafter. The final article of the National GE-UE Agreement, entitled "Termina-
tion," read as follows:
This Agreement shall, as to the Company, and recognized Union and recog-
nized UE Locals, and each bargaining unit so represented, as provided in this
Agreement, continue in full force and effect until the 15th day of September,
1952, and from year to year thereafter unless not later than 90 days prior to
such date or anniversary thereof either the Company or the Union shall notify
the other in writing of its intention to terminate the Agreement upon such date
or anniversary date.
3. Developments during 1951
We come now to the 1951 negotiations and certain agreements resulting therefrom.
In keeping with the above-discussed general pattern, the Respondent conveyed to all
of its employees, organized and unorganized, through an issue of the Commentator
dated September 7, 1951, entitled "We Propose," the gist of the offer it was then
making to all of the unions engaged in negotiations. Among other things, this offer
included a 21/2-percent general pay increase and an additional cost-of-living increase.
The settlement at that time negotiated between the 1UE and the Respondent took
the", form of another 1-year renewable agreement signed in New York City on
October 11, 1951, by 5 representatives of the Respondent and 10 representatives
of the IUE, but entered into as of September 15, 1951. Termination and modifica-
tion of this agreement were both made subject to not more than 60 and not less
than 30 days' written notice prior to September 15 of any succeeding year. The
only material change from the 1950 agreement in the above-quoted article on Union
Recognition was the deletion from the IUE's 1951 agreement of the phrase "and
continues to be" from the first sentence. The 1951 language immediately following
the word "certification" as thus amended read: "is designated as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of employees within such units." In addition, at
the end of the preamble of said agreement, there was inserted a new paragraph,
stressed by the General Counsel and the IUE in their positions. An asterisk indi-
le The same five individuals who had that day also signed the IUE agreement.
17•9everal locals were shown in a table in the preamble of the printed version of this
agreement as having been certified for more than one unit. Local 937 was 1 of 2 locals
designated by asterisks as having been certified after September 15, 1950
1118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cated that said paragraph placed a qualification upon which locals were to be con-
sidered "initially parties" to the 1951 IUE agreement. The new paragraph read:
*This Agreement is not applicable to any unit or group of Company employees
for whom the IUE(CIO) or one of its Locals is the most recently certified
bargaining representative if such unit or group is involved in an unresolved
NLRB representation proceeding as of the date of execution of this Agreement.
In the event the IUE(CIO) or one of its Locals continues as the certified bar-
gaining representative of such a unit or group upon final dismissal or other
determination of such representation proceeding, such unit or group shall be
deemed initially covered by this Agreement.
The 1951 settlement between the Respondent and the UE, acting for itself and on
behalf of its locals, was not reached until December, after two representation peti-
tions involving the Detroit Unit had been filed. The 1951 UE settlement took the
form of 3 separate documents, each of which was signed at New York City on De-
cember 7, by 4 representatives of the Respondent and 13 representatives of the UE.18
The shortest of the three documents was an amendment to the Pension and Insur-
ance Agreement. It essentially provided for reopening that 5-year agreement for
proposals for modifications or additions upon not more than 60 or not less than 30
days' notice prior to September 15, 1952. The second document was entitled "Wage
Settlement Agreement," and was described therein as a settlement of "all issues
currently subject to negotiation" under the above-cited wage reopening provisions
of the 1950 National GE-UE Agreement. This 1951 wage settlement contained,
under the caption "Scope of Wage Settlement," the following paragraph:
With respect to any collective bargaining units covered by the GE-UE Na-
tional Agreement where there are unresolved representation proceedings as of
the date of execution of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be made effective
and construed in conformity with applicable rules and decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board notwithstanding any foregoing provision of this
Agreement.
The third document was entitled "Supplement Dated December 7, 1951 to GE-UE
National Agreement Dated September 15, 1950." It should be noted that this was
not a new agreement but a supplement to the earlier general agreement . No changes
were made in the above-cited reopening and automatic renewal provisions of the
1950 agreement. The first modification of the 1950 general agreement, provided for
by the December 7 amendments, made the same change in the first paragraph of the
Union Recognition article as is described above for the 1951 IUE agreement, namely
the deletion of the phrase "and continues to be," following the word "certification."
The second paragraph of that article on recognition was stricken entirely by the
December 7 amendments. There was added, however, to article XVI pertaining to
arbitration, a paragraph concerning units covered which is identical in wording to the
above-quoted paragraph from the 1951 UE wage settlement, except that the word
"Supplement" appears therein instead of the word "Agreement."
It should be noted at this point that there is not to be found in the three UE docu-
ments executed on December 7, 1951, the same language contained in the above-
quoted new paragraph preceded by the asterisk which was inserted at the end of the
preamble of the IUE 1951 agreement. However, it is my considered judgment, after
carefully studying and comparing all of the above-discussed documents in the light
of the contentions of the parties, that up to this point no significant variation in
evident intent or practical effect had been incorporated in contractural provisions,
particularly as to any representation questions which may have been pending at the
time said agreements were consummated. This is true despite some divergent word-
ing in provisions as to the coverage of the respective agreements of the UE and the
IUE. In any event, with the removal of the phrase "and continues to be" from both
the UE and the IUE agreements, what was to happen to any unit whose certification
was challenged during the life of said contracts was left ambiguous as to each con-
tract's own terms.19 Furthermore, I find no language in either of the 1951 agree-
"There is no evidence that any of the individuals signing as representatives of the
UE on any of the documents mentioned throughout this report was a member of Local
937. In fact, the record as a whole warrants the conclusion that not one of the na-
tional committee members was from Local 937. However, it seems obvious that some
of the other smaller locals did not have any of their members on those negotiating com-
mittees either.
1s It should be noted that the removal of the phrase "and continues to be" from the
UE contract did not occur until after the petitions about to be discussed had been filed,
and that this phrase became a pivotal point in the Board's decision in those cases.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1119
ments whereby either could be automatically renewed as to only part of the units
covered thereby. Each contract clearly was a master agreement, and was apparently
automatically renewable only as such.
We come now to the representation proceedings in Cases Nos. 7-RD-109 and
7-RC-1618, which had been initiated in the meantime. Both of these cases pertain
only to the Detroit Unit, and will sometimes be referred to as the first pair of cases
to distinguish them from a second pair of cases initiated later, which also pertain only
to the Detroit Unit.
The petition in Case No. 7-RD-109 was one for decertification of the UE. It was
filed on November 16, 1951, by T. G. Hartmann, an individual employed in the
Detroit Unit. A copy thereof was forwarded to the Respondent by the Regional
Director with a letter dated November 19. This petition for decertification de-
scribed the UE contract as expiring September 15, 1952; specified the unit as "shop
hourly payroll" with "1 watchman" excluded; set the number of employees in the
unit as 63; and stated that 44 employees as "per attached list" supported said decertifi-
cation petition.20
The petition in Case No. 7-RC-1618 was one for certification of representatives
filed by the IUE on November 29, 1951. A copy of this petition was forwarded
to the Respondent with a letter from the Regional Director dated December 6. The
IUE petition set the date of the expiration of the UE's contract of September 15,
1952; contained no answer in the space provided for designating the number of
employees supporting the petition ; and specified the unit as including "all produc-
tion and maintenance employees" of the Detroit Shop , excluding "office and clerical
employees , guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." Before going further with
the discussion of this first pair of representation cases, certain events which had
preceded the filing of these petitions should be noted.
It appears from credited testimony of Superintendent King that the last meeting at
the local level between the Respondent 's management of the Detroit Shop and rep-
resentatives of Local 937 had-taken place about December 1950, and that by October
1951 the dissatisfaction being expressed by the employees in the Detroit Unit, whom
King knew personally and dealt with on a first-name basis, had reached such propor-
tions that employees, including the chief steward of Local 937, Fred Ward, were
asking King about decertification procedures . King's testimony as to how the chief
steward 's inquiry led to a shop "informative" meeting of the type held from time
to time to improve operations , relations , and morale, was as follows:
I proceeded to endeavor to obtain a correct legal procedure to follow, and told
the chief steward of these facts and he in turn asked that we have a general
meeting and acquaint all the employees with it because he was getting tired of
trying to explain it to each one individually.
The general meeting which King thereafter called , using the standard practice of
blowing the whistle to assemble employees in the lunchroom, took place about Octo-
ber 31, 1951. At the opening of the meeting, King explained to his "best ability to
the employees the procedure to follow in obtaining decertification." King also told
the employees that "it was their prerogative to choose and select their bargaining
agent as they saw fit." He also told them that "they were hired on a basis of merit to
perform a certain job and that Union affiliations would not enter into our reckoning
at all." As King was about to leave the room so the employees could "discuss it
by themselves," the president of Local 937, Charles Kelly, who is not an employee
of the Respondent, entered the door and said that "he had heard that we were having
a Union-busting meeting and asked if he could say a few words to the employees."
King gave his permission.
Thereupon Kelly "started off with the statement that the reason we wanted to get
the Union out of the shop was so that we could pay lower wages." King interrupted
Kelly at that point, telling him that he did not "care to get into that type of a meet-
ing." When Kelly "proceeded along the same line of damning the Company" and
King in particular, for "trying to work the Union out of the shop," King asked Kelly
to leave the room. After "considerable heated argument," King and Kelly left the
room together. King escorted Kelly to the back door and "invited him to leave the
Company property." Subsequently, according to King:
The shop committee came to 'my office immediately after the meeting and
apologized for the occurrence, and assured me that they had no part in ar-
21 Neither this list, nor any evidence of such a nature pertaining to this or any of
the other three petitions subsequently filed, is in the record before me. Positions urged
by the parties with respect to such evidence will be discussed below.
1120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ranging the unfortunate meeting. Other employees later expressed their dissat-
isfaction with the behaviour of Mr. Kelly at the meeting.
The quotations in the foregoing three paragraphs are all taken from credited
and uncontradicted testimony elicited from King upon examination by counsel for
the Respondent. King also testified that he later learned from Chief Steward Ward
that about 80 percent of the employees joined in the decertification petition. King
further testified that at the time the decertification petition was filed, approximately
45 to 50 percent of all of the employees in the Detroit Unit were having their dues
checked off under the voluntary checkoff provisions of the UE's agreement, which
permitted revocation of the individually signed authorizations on 30 days'-written
notice to the Respondent. While I deem this background relevant to a realistic
appraisal of the issues in this case, it should be noted that there is no contention that
King's actions with respect to the above meeting constituted unfair labor practices,
or discrimination against the UE, despite the obvious resentment which it evoked on
the part of the president of Local 937. Nor is there any contention that Local 937
had become defunct in its administration of the contract at the local level.
4. Events from January through May 1952
Returning now to the above-discussed pair of representation petitions filed in
November 1951, the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, on January 16, 1952,
issued an order consolidating said cases, and a notice of hearing. The hearing in
Cases Nos. 7-RD-109 and 7-RC-1618 was thereafter held on February 6, 1952,
at Detroit, Michigan. The parties to the instant matter were all parties to said pro-
ceeding and were represented at said hearing. The unit agreed to by stipulation on
the record of said hearing followed precisely the unit wording quoted in footnote 1
above.21 It was also stipulated by the representative of the Employer at said hear-
ing that Ray Hobbs, a field representative of the IUE, by letter dated November 27,
1951, had requested recognition for "the employees in the unit stipulated to" and that
a letter was addressed by the Employer to the IUE on November 29, "declining
recognition pending resolution of the matter by the Board."
The focus of disagreement among the parties at the hearing was whether or not
the UE's agreement of September 15, 1950, with its supplement of December 7, 1951,
constituted a bar, as the UE and Local 937 contended. The IUE, pointing out that
its petition of November 29 had been filed prior to the signing of the UE's supple-
mental contract, was patently in agreement with the Respondent that there was no
contract bar because of language in article I of the National GE-UE Agreement 22
The record shows that at the close of the February 6 hearing, the Respondent moved
to dismiss the IUE petition "on the basis of lack of showing of appropriate' interest,"
stating that the "Company on information and belief doubts that the IUE has a suf-
ficient interest to sustain an RC Petition." This motion was referred to the Board by
the hearing officer with a "reminder" that a determination of "showing of interest
is an administrative matter for consideration of the Board as the Board has so often
held." 23
n The record does not show any motion to amend either of the petitions
22 The positions of the parties were not spelled out at the February 6 heaiing, reliance
being placed rather upon a stipulation incorporating by reference the testimony and
exhibits in a Board hearing conducted in Cleveland, Ohio, on January 24, 1952, ln'-Cases
Nos. 8-RC-1524 and 8-RC-1533, involving the Respondent's plants at Tiffin and Niles,
Ohio, where the seine contract issue had been litigated. It is sufficient at this point
to indicate that the language particularly in question was the phrase "and continues to
be," which appeared in the 1950 contracts of -both the IUE, and the UE, but was later
dropped.
23 Superintendent King, one of the representatives of the Respondent at the February 6
hearing, testified at the hearing before me that during the February 6 hearing he had tried
unsuccessfully to get the showing of interest checked against payroll signatures which
he was then willing to furnish, and that he was not sure whether his unsuccessful at-
tempt had been made on the record or off the record King also testified that lie had
furnished a payroll list of employees in the unit prior to the February 6 hearing. From
all of the evidence it seems clear that at that time no recognition by a consent check of
authorization cards against employees' signatures was in prospect. The. record shows
several off-the-record discussions at the February 6 healing, In view of the forthright-
ness of King's testimony on this matter, and because of the above-quoted statements
appearing on the record at the close of the hearing, I find, for such bearing as it may
have on contentions of the Respondent later to be discussed, that King did make an
unsuccessful attempt during an off-the-record discussion at the February 6 hearing to
get showing of interest checked against employee signatures
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1121
Before Board action in the first pair of cases had eventuated, the Respondent was
again engaged in national bargaining negotiations with both the UE and the IUE on
wage reopenings under their respective national agreements. On March 6, 1952, the
Respondent wrote very similar letters to the UE and the IUE, making the same
detailed wage-settlement offer to each. The substance of said offer was also con-
veyed, orally or in writing, to other unions and to nonorganized employees.24 The
Respondent's offer was not accepted by the UE or the IUE, and wage problems thus
left pending were later merged, as appears more fully below, in national negotiations
with those two unions during August and thereafter. In the meantime, the approxi-
mately 30 unorganized employees at the Detroit Shop received a cost-of-living wage
increase that spring of slightly over 1 percent, but the 60 or more employees in the
Detroit Unit did not receive such an increase because the UE and the Respondent
had not reached a wage agreement.
While the complexities of the various problems involved in the Respondent's offer
of March 6 need not concern us, there are certain portions of its letters to the UE
and the IUE which shed light on the general pattern of negotiations and on matters
later to be considered. For instance, both letters point out in identical language
that the Respondent was "desirous of working out locally any mutually agreeable
plan for this, as well as any previous not-yet included general raises." Each letter
stated that the offer was "made subject to approval by WSD and to be effective as
of March 15, 1952, if accepted between now and March 31, 1952," and that if the
offer was "accepted after March 31, 1952, the date of reaching agreement will be
the effective date." The first half of the last paragraph of the respective letters to
the UE and the IUE read as follows:
We assume you would naturally prefer our making your union a prior, better,
or different offer than we do any of the 60-odd other unions to which we are
making a comparable proposal today. But this couldn't be done if we tried.
And it wouldn't be right, if it could be done. These 60-odd unions are the free
choice of our employees, and we have been instructed by the U. S. Government
to deal with them in good faith as the accredited legal representatives of our
employees. These unions are intermingled at various locations-with as many
as nine or ten of them being separately represented at a given plant.25
On May 16, 1952, the Board issued decisions in seven representation cases, includ-
ing Cases Nos. 7-RC-1618 and 7-RD-109, which involved similar contentions by
the Respondent and the IUE, to the effect that the National GE-UE Agreement,
principally because of the phrase "and continues to be," was not a bar to elections in
the various units involved. The controlling decision, in which the Board analyzed
the contentions of the parties, was that pertaining to the units in the two above-
mentioned Ohio plants.26 In said decision, after setting out the full language of
the Union Recognition and the Termination clauses of the UE's 1950 national agree-
ment , already detailed hereinabove, and after differentiating several cases cited to
support the position that said language rendered the contract inoperative as a bar to
a rival petition, the Board found that there was nothing in the words "and continues
to be" which justified a construction of said recognition and termination clauses as
a "general waiver of the Board's contract bar doctrine." In connection with the
dismissal of the petitions therein, the Board stated:
In view of the public interest in the maintenance of industrial stability, we do
not believe it too much to require that a party to a' contract who wishes to
waive or avoid the Board's contract bar doctrine should be required to obtain
from the other party approval of contractural provisions which do so in clear
and unmistakable language. [Emphasis supplied.]
As to its decision of May 16 in the first pair of cases involving the Detroit Unit,27
the Board, after referring to its reasoning in the above-controlling decision issued
that same day, said:
As we stated in that case, we find nothing in the provisions relied upon by the
Employer and the Petitioners which would justify a construction of those provi-
sions as a general waiver of the Board's contract bar doctrine. We believe those
21 Issues of the Commentator, dated February 15 and March 17, 1952, discussed those
wage negotiations and the Respondent's offer.
23 In round numbers, of the Respondent's approximately 220,000 employees, about
40.000 were represented in national negotiations by the UE, and about 80,000 by the IUE.
28 See footnote 22, supra, and 99 NLRB 155.
" 99 NLRB 955.
33 3 2 0 7-5 3-vol 110-72
1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provisions can more reasonably be construed as relieving the Employer of con-
tractual liability in the event that the Board should find, upon application of
its own contract bar principles , that the contract was rendered inoperative as a
bar and another union certified as the bargaining representative in the unit here
sought.
The Board accordingly, as it did in all of the similar GE cases decided on May 16,28
found that the UE contract was a bar, and dismissed the petitions in Cases Nos.
7-RC-1618 and 7-RD-109, just as it dismissed the petitions in the other five cases
involving the same contract provisions 29
5. Developments during June and July 1952
It should be noted at this point that the Board made no finding in any of its deci-
sions of May 16 as to the question of the Mill B date of the UE agreement, a problem
which becomes pertinent as of about the middle of June. However, in later decisions
to be discussed below, the Board found two different Mill B dates, namely June 15
and June 17, 1952. This point should be borne in mind, as June 16 is a material
date with respect to each of the second pair of cases involving the Detroit Unit to
which we turn presently.
Following the Board 's dismissal of the first petitions , Hartmann again secured
signatures to support a second decertification petition which was filed on June 16,
1952, in Case No. 7-RD-133. There was considerable discussion in the Detroit Shop
about this decertification activity, some of it reaching King. In fact, about the time
he filed his second petition , Hartmann told King that he had secured the signatures
of 74 percent of the employees for decertification. At "approximately the same
time," the chief steward of Local 937, Ward, dropped into King's office. This is
King's credited version of what then transpired:
And I believe that he made the remark to the effect that the decertification peti-
tion was being prepared or had been prepared, I don't know the exact tense of
it, and that he didn't think the IUE had a chance in the election, and that they
probably had a very small percentage of representation, words to that effect 30
While it is not clear from King's testimony precisely when , with respect to June 16,
King had the above conversations with Hartmann and Ward , I think it likely those
conversations occurred shortly before June 16, which was on a Monday, although it is
possible that they did not occur until June 16 or slightly thereafter. In any event,
I have no doubt from King's testimony as a whole that he had heard rumors in the
shop about the second decertification petition several days before June 16. For
instance , King testified that he "would presume" that Hartmann had told him prior
to June 16 that "he would reinstitute the Petition that had been dismissed." King
also testified that "about June 15th or earlier ," it was "more or less generally a known
fact" that the petition was "being prepared to be filed" and that he knew that it was
"in the process of being prepared."
The date upon which the Respondent was officially notified of the filing of the sec-
ond decertification petition is not definitively established. However, the letter from
the Regional Director which accompanied that petition was dated June 17, and the
Respondent's reply was dated June 19. In the absence of other evidence, I infer and
find that the Respondent received notice on June 18 that the decertification petition
had been filed. Said date clearly fell after the UE's 1950 agreement had automati-
cally renewed itself by its own terms, since there is no contention that the Mill B
thereof was later than June 17, and since it is undisputed that neither the Respondent
nor the UE ever gave notice under the 90-day termination clause of their agreement.
By registered letter mailed on Saturday, June 14, which the Respondent received
on Monday, June 16, 1952, the IUE notified the Respondent that a majority of its
employees had "indicated a preference" for the IUE, and asked for "a meeting to
discuss wages, hours and other conditions' of employment." This letter, addressed
to the attention of Superintendent King, was signed by Hobbs, the same field repre-
sentative of the IUE who had signed the letter of November 27, 1951, which it had
been stipulated during the hearing in the first pair of R cases had been addressed
to the Respondent asking for recognition in the Detroit Unit. The Respondent's
letter of reply to this second request for recognition, dated June 19, 1952, and signed
11 In addition to the decisions already cited, see 99 NLRB 954 and 99 NLRB 956.
ii The IUE was the petitioner in 6 of the 7 cases decided on May 16, namely Cases
Nos. 2-RC-4122, 7-RC-1618, 8-RC-1524, 8-RC-1533, 20-RC-1633, and 20- RC-1672.
80 King testified that he "never knew" whether Ward told him "the facts or not" with
respect to the extent of interest in the IUE.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1123
by King, was written pursuant to advice received from the Respondent's legal de-
partment, and was substantially identical to the reply which the Respondent had
made on November 29, 1951, to the IUE's earlier request for recognition. The
Respondent's letter of June 19 did not raise any question as to the unit sought or as
to the intended meaning of the IUE's letter of June 14 31 It merely stated that the
Respondent had "no reason to believe" that a majority of its employees had "expressed
a preference" for the IUE; that there was accordingly no basis for a meeting at that
time; and that the IUE should go to the Board if it wished "to pursue this subject
further."
While the IUE's letter of June 14 might well have been more artfully drafted, I
am satisfied and find, contrary to the contentions of the Respondent, that said let-
ter, under all the circumstances of this case, constituted a sufficient claim of majority
representation by the IUE in the Detroit Unit, and that the Respondent so under-
stood when it received that letter on June 16.
On June 20, the IUE filed its petition in Case No. 7-RC-1835, in which it speci-
fied the appropriate unit in the previously quoted terms of its earlier petition; 32 set
the date of expiration of UE's contract as September 15; and affirmed that the peti-
tion was supported "by 30% or more" of the employees in the unit . The Regional
Director's letter to the Respondent accompanying the IUE's second petition was dated
June 20. The Respondent's letter in reply, over King's signature, was dated June 24.
Clearly the IUE's petition in Case No. 7-RC-1835 followed its naked claim as to
representation within the 10-day period required by the Board's contract-bar rules.33
On June 20, 1952, President Kelly of Local 937, which had not held a meeting
with Respondent's local management concerning the Detroit Unit for some 18
months, wrote the Respondent, requesting a meeting to discuss "adjustments in wage
rates" to bring the rates in the Detroit Shop in line with other shops in the area, and
to discuss "intra-plant inequities." Such a meeting was held on June 26 at the De-
troit Shop. It was attended by King and another representative of the Respondent,
by an International representative of the UE, and by Ward and two other stewards
of Local 937. That meeting adjourned with the understanding that another meeting
would be set. Thereafter a meeting at the Detroit Shop was held on July 11 "for
further discussion on the subjects brought up" on June 26. It was attended by the
same individuals, augmented by one additional International representative of the
UE. The minutes of those 2 meetings, as detailed in 4 pages, show that discussion
centered largely about adjustments with respect to specific individuals; that King
would not discuss general increases, taking the position that those would have to
follow the pattern set in national negotiations; that the meetings were indeterminative
in nature; and that they ended with the Respondent requesting that the UE's de-
mands be submitted in writing so that they could be carefully analyzed. Under date
of July 18, the UE detailed in a 2-page letter the adjustments it desired the Respond-
ent to make, going beyond mere individual adjustments. In a meeting thereafter
held on August 8, attended by representatives of the Respondent, the UE, and Local
937, there was some indeterminate discussion of individual rates. However, the con-
trolling factor was the Respondent's position that local negotiations were untimely
because national negotiations were again in progress. The union representatives
were informed that their requests would be considered further after the national
negotiations had finally set the pattern.
Certain preliminary considerations, largely of a factual nature, should be noted
now about the foregoing meetings. In my opinion those meetings unquestionably
constituted continued recognition of Local 937 as the exclusive bargaining agent
for the Detroit Unit. Those meetings, however, conformed to past procedures and
contract provisions for local adaptations by local representatives. Reserving for
subsequent consideration the central question of law with respect to the Midwest
Piping doctrine, I find nothing in those meetings, or in the correspondence pertain-
ing to them, which warrants any inference adverse to the Respondent. It is true that
there had been no such meetings for 18 months, but it was the UE, confronted with
the rival claim of the rival IUE and a decertification petition, which instituted those
,meetings. Furthermore, there is no evidence that anything transpired at those
meetings whereby the Respondent gave the certified representatives of the Detroit
Unit any more than said representatives were entitled to receive under the terms of
11 Hereinafter, when the year is omitted in giving dates, it will be understood to be
1952.
82 The unit wording used by Hartmann in his second petition varied from the earlier
quoted language of his first petition only in that it added "1 office employee" to the
-exclusions
13 See General Electric X-Ray Corporation, 67 NLRB 997.
1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the then unexpired agreement , regardless of any question concerning the auto-
matic renewal of said agreement.
We turn now to the second pair of representation cases which in the meantime
had been consolidated and noticed for hearing by the Regional Director on July 8.
The hearing in Cases Nos. 7-RC-1835 and 7-RD-133 was held in Detroit on July
15, all parties to the instant matter being represented at said hearing . The unit
stipulated by the parties as appropriate appears in the transcript of said hearing as
follows:
Included, all Production and Maintenance employees, excluded Office and
Clerical employees, Guards and Supervisors, as defined in the Act.
The above language followed the phraseology of the IUE's petition in Case No.
7-RC-1835. The decertification petitioner, Hartmann, moved to amend his petition
in Case No. 7-RD-133 to conform to the stipulated language. The record of the
July 15 hearing is silent as to why the language of the Board's 1950 certification of
Local 937 in the Detroit Unit was not followed, as it had been in the stipulation at
the hearing in the first pair of cases. There is nothing in the record of the July 15
hearing, or in the record before me in the instant matter , considering also everything
incorporated by reference , which discloses the duties of the salesmen , service engi-
neers, and professional employees , three groups additionally excluded from the ap-
propriate unit of "all employees " by the admitted language of the complaint , quoted
in footnote 1 of this report , which were not mentioned among the exclusions from
the "production and maintenance " unit stipulated on July 15.
Since proof that a question of representation was pending in an appropriate unit
is indispensible to a finding of a violation under the Midwest Piping doctrine,34 it
must be determined at some point in this report whether the unit stipulated on July 15
was appropriate, since the Board has never passed on that point. This is particularly
true because the election which the Board later directed in the Detroit Unit, under
circumstances discussed below, is based not on the second pair of petitions but on
the first pair, so that the language of the pending direction of election follows the
language of the certification of 1950. It seems to me that there can be little doubt
that salesmen and professional employees are actually excluded from the unit
stipulated at the July 15 hearing by virtue of the use of the phrase "production and
maintenance employees" to base the inclusions, in place of the phrase "all employ-
ees." Certainly within the usual meaning of the terms, salesmen and professional
employees cannot be fitted into production and maintenance categories. However,
the answer is not so simple with respect to service engineers. Candor compels the
admission that they may be maintenance employees, although it also is possible
that they may render service to customers outside the shop and thus not be con-
sidered shop employees. Although the matter is not completely free from doubt,
I believe that the term "production and maintenance employees" was understood
by the parties to the unit stipulation on July 15 to exclude by its basic nature service
engineers along with salesmen and professional employees. If the situation were
otherwise, surely in a case as closely litigated as the one at bar, some of the parties
would have been aware of the deviation and placed the matter in issue.
I am persuaded to the foregoing position after careful study of the appearances
at all of the hearings involved. For instance, Superintendent King, who would be
thoroughly conversant with the functions performed by personnel at the Detroit
Shop, appeared in both of the R-case hearings and in the hearing before me. It is
very probable that he would have noticed and raised questions about any actual
deviation from the already established appropriate unit, if any actual deviation had
resulted from the variation in the unit wording adopted on July 15. Moreover
Ray Hobbs also appeared in all three hearings for the IUE, and Chief Steward Ward
appeared for the UE in both R-case hearings. Under all the circumstances, I find-
that the variation in wording used on July 15 actually constituted only another way
of spelling out the same unit as is detailed in footnote 1. Hence hereafter the unit
stipulated on July 15 will also be referred to as the Detroit Unit.
Returning to the hearing of July 15, the principal issue was whether the UE's;
2-year agreement, the original term of which ran to September 15, constituted a
bar in view of its 90-day automatic renewal clause, no notice having been given
by either party. The UE 35 specifically and repeatedly contended that the agreement.
A For two cages which turn upon failure to establish appropriateness of the respec-
tive units sought , and resulted in holdings , that no real questions of iepresentgtion had
thereby been raised, see William Penn Broadcasting Company, 93 NLRB 1104, and
Roegelein Pi ovision Company, 99 NLRB 830.
>- Where used under such circumstances throughout this report , the term UP, embraces
Local 937 also. The converse is likewise true.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1125
had automatically renewed itself on June 15, and that it therefore constituted a bar
because both petitions had been filed after that date. The UE accordingly moved
that both petitions be dismissed, said motion being referred to the Board by the
hearing officer. The UE made an additional motion to dismiss upon two further
grounds: (1) Because the IUE's letter of June 14 could not constitute a timely
request for recognition since it could;.not have reached the Respondent prior to
June 16, hence after Sunday, ,June 1'5; tl'it contended automatic renewal datelya't9'd
(2) because the testimony given by King was that he was not able to state the date
upon which he "first saw" the IUE's letter, which he had received opened and
without its envelope.36 That motion was also referred to the Board. A third motion
to dismiss was advanced by the UE on the ground that no proof had been submitted
at the hearing that "the IUE had secured new cards" to support its petition. In
referring this motion to the Board, the hearing officer, as had a different one during
the hearing on the earlier petitions, stated that the sufficiency of any showing of
interest was an administrative matter for the Board's determination.
The Respondent's position, as stated at the July 15 hearing by King, was that
the agreement had automatically renewed itself "90 days prior to September 15"
because neither party has given notice to terminate, although the agreement had
"been opened for wage discussions" and other matters at the national level. King
did not specify a Mill B date, or take issue with the UE's contention that said date
was June 15. Nor did Superintendent King specifically contend that the agree-
ment constituted a bar. In fact, King stated at one point toward the close of the
hearing that because the Detroit employees had "very little to say" and Local 937
contributed "very little towards writing the national contract," it was his "feeling
that the Local employees have a right to be heard on their request for recognition for
decertification." The transcript of this July 15 hearing, conducted on the eve of
national negotiations to be considered shortly, reveals no specific contention that any
date other than June 15 was actually the Mill B date of the UE's agreement.
A letter filed on July 22, in lieu of a brief by the UE in the second pair of
R cases, supports its contention at the hearing as to the untimeliness of the petitions
by citing a Board decision dated June 26, 1952, in which the Board referred to the
automatic renewal date of the UE's agreement as June 15, 1952. Said decision in
General Electric Corporation, Case No. 13-RC-2428 (not reported in printed vol-
umes of Board Decisions and Orders), undoubtedly referred to the same national
agreement here involved. The copy of said agreement in evidence in the instant
matter shows that said agreement covered a unit of masons at the Respondent's
Fort Wayne plant, the very unit in issue in the June 26 Board decision cited. In
its holding with respect to the UE's contention in that case, namely that its national
agreement, "expiring on September 15, 1952" which had "a 90-day automatic re-
newal provision," was a bar to the IUE's petition for the Fort Wayne mason's unit,
the Board stated that in accordance with its "usual practice, as the automatic re-
newal date of the contract on June 15, 1952, has already passed and the contract
is about to expire, we find that the contract is no bar."
Essentially two points concerning the timeliness of its actions were made in the
1UE's letter of reply dated July 31. The first was that its letter demanding recog-
nition, which had been received by the Respondent on June 16, had been supported
by its timely petition, filed within the 10 days permitted by the General Electric
X-Ray rule. The second point was stated as follows:
Assuming, without conceding, that the contract had only one "Mill B" date
and that such date was, as stated in Article )XVI, 90 days prior to Septem-
ber 15, 1952, application of simple arithmetic yields a "Mill B" date of June
17, 1952. See Miles Laboratories, 92 NLRB 23. The petitioner's demand was
therefore timely.
Under date of July 31, 1952, the IUE filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Board's orders of May 16 dismissing its petitions in the six representation cases
enumerated in footnote 29 above, one of which was Case No. 7-RC-1618.37 The
IUE's motion pointed out that since the "respective Regional Offices of the Board
demanded fresh evidence of representative interest," it was "virtually impossible"
for the IUE effectively to refile its petitions in those cases within less than 1 month
which- remained "between the date of service of the Board's orders of dismissal and
June 17, 1952, the 90-day notice of UE's contract," because the-units involved,'
except for the Detroit Unit, included "large numbers of employees." As to the
3O Later during the hearing, a receipt for registered mail, bearing the signature of an
employee in King's office and establishing delivery on June 16, was introduced In evidence.
"Under date of August 6, the UE also filed an opposition to said motion for recon-
sideration
1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Detroit Unit, the motion stated that since it involved relatively few employees, the
IUE had been "able to obtain the necessary additional showing and demand recog-
nition prior to June 17, 1952." Pointing out that the UE had "formally proposed
extensive modifications" to its contract, which it was contending was a bar because
it had automatically renewed itself, and noting that the IUE did "not concede that
June 17, 1952 was the sole appropriate 'Mill B' date" of the UE's contract, the IUE
urged the Board to withdraw its dismissals and to direct immediate elections in all
such cases, setting forth its further reasons as follows:
Under all the circumstances, the Board should not have dismissed on May 16,
1952 the petitions filed by IUE-CIO but should either have directed an elec-
tion to take place within a reasonable time before the terminal date of the
contract or should have held the petitions for a short while longer until such
elections could have been directed. The Board's dismissal of the petitions was
erroneous since it acted at a time when, by reason of its own delay, such
petitions had become timely and were no longer barred by the existing contract.
Certainly, under the Board's practice a petition filed on May 16, 1952 would
not have been premature, assuming, without conceding, that June 17, 1952 was
a "Mill B" date.
Before outlining developments during August and September, it should be noted
that nothing further was heard from the Board with respect to any of the above
representation cases until September 30, 1952, a date prior to which certain crucial
actions complained of had already taken place as part of the total pattern of national
negotiations to which we now turn.
6. Further developments during August 1952 and thereafter
Details as to the inception of the negotiations during the latter part of the summer
of 1952, which included simultaneously conducted national negotiations with the
UE and the IUE, respectively, along with negotiations with various other unions, are
not too clear in the record and need not concern us. It is evident that such negotia-
tions were pursuant to reopening provisions of the various contracts, at least as they
pertained to the UE and the IUE, and that they all followed the general pattern pre-
viously discussed therein. With respect to the UE and the IUE, the wage increase
issues embraced matters left pending as a result of the failure of those two labor
organizations to reach an agreement with the Respondent during the above-discussed
spring reopenings. On August 13, when negotiations had apparently begun to crys-
tallize somewhat, the Respondent, as it had done earlier that year on March 6, made
substantially identical offer on a number of matters to all of the unions involved and
also to its unorganized employees.38
As to the IUE and the UE, the Respondent's offers were made in almost identical
5-page letters dated August 13. In broad terms, these letters offered, with certain
alternatives, a wage increase consisting of two parts,39 amendments to the respective
insurance agreements providing for increases in sickness, accident, hospital, and ma-
ternity benefits, and a March 15, 1953, reopener for'general wage adjustments only.
We need not 'get involved in the rather complicated details and tables pertaining to
the offers on the foregoing general subjects. But it should be noted that, before
closing with a statement that the Respondent was prepared to work out with the
respective committees such details as were necessary to incorporate its "general terms"
into definite contractual provisions, each letter contained the following identical
paragraph:
The entire proposal contained in this letter is offered with the understanding
it will be put into effect as of the effective dates mentioned herein, only after
any necessary Wage Stabilization Board approval, that it is subject to our reach-
ing agreement on all modifications to our National Agreement which may be
proposed and that it is subject to our reaching agreement to continue our Pension
and Insurance Agreement in effect until its present termination or expiration
date without further reopenings. If all such agreements have not been reached
by September 15, 1952 the proposal would become effective as of the date
such agreements are reached.
While negotiations were still proceeding, the Respondent, in preparation for putting
agreements into effect as rapidly as possible after reaching them with various labor
38 The evidence shows that the Respondent's offers were reported in newspapers of
general circulation and were also later discussed in issues of the Commentator.
89 One part was a percentage wage increase. The other was a cost-of-living adjust-
ment. Both were tied in with a minimum hourly increase.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1127
organizations, filed a supplemental statement with the Wage Stabilization Board on
September 8, a week prior to the anniversary date of its contracts, setting forth its
proposed wage adjustments and reasons in support thereof. Said statement re-
quested approval of the proposed increase for unorganized employees, and urged
administrative approval for organized employees, contingent upon subsequent filing
of copies of agreements with unions embracing such terms.
After a total of about "a dozen days" had been spent in meetings between the Re-
spondent and the UE, an 8-page document, to which was appended 12 pages of
exhibits, was signed on September 12 at New York City by 6 representatives of the
UE and 7 representatives of the Respondent. This single document was composed of
three major sections, the name of each of which was incorporated in the full title
set out as follows on its cover page: 40
WAGE AGREEMENT
AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL GE-UE AGREEMENT
Dated September 15, 1950, as Amended
and
AMENDMENTS TO THE GE-UE PENSION AND INSURANCE AGREEMENT
Dated September 15, 1950, as Amended
The prefatory paragraph of the above document, which was entered into by the
UE, "Acting for Itself and on Behalf of its Affiliated GE-UE Locals," recited that
the provisions which were incorporated therein were in "settlement of all issues cur-
rently subject to negotiation between the parties" under the respective provisions for
modification of the National GE-UE Agreement and the Pension and Insurance
Agreement. The first section of said document was devoted to wages, covered about
6 pages, and did not incorporate any of the appended exhibits. After spelling out in
detail the generally applicable wage rates and provisions, this wage section reserved
problems of local adaptations for local negotiations by quoting the following language
of article VI, section 1, from the national agreement:
Any question which affects hourly wages, piecework rates or salary of individuals
or groups, shall be subject to negotiation between the Local and the local
Management.
The evidence establishes that the wage provisions of the September 12 agreement were
eventually put into effect in the Detroit Unit about January 15, 1953, after approval
by the WSB, and that said provisions were made retroactive to September 15, 1952.
In my opinion, the wage provisions agreed to by the Respondent and the UE on
September 12 show no variation from the general pattern of provisions revealed by
the bargaining history which would warrant the slightest inference of favoritism
toward the UE.
The pension and insurance amendments and the attached exhibits incorporated
thereby covered some four pages of the September 12 agreement and extended
benefits along lines proposed in the Respondent's letter of August 13. Said benefits
were put into effect with respect to the Detroit Unit about October 15, retroactive
to September 15, and have since continued in effect. As to the various amendments
to the national agreement, which incorporated attached Exhibits B through J, some
9 pages, several were not applicable to the Detroit Unit. Those which were ap-
plicable evidently became effective about October 15, retroactive to September 15.
With a single exception , I find , upon careful examination of the September 12 pro-
visions as to the foregoing subjects in the light of the record as a whole, nothing
to raise any doubts adverse to the Respondent. For the most part, similar or
identical provisions were later incorporated into the IUE's national agreements by
amendments thereto which were later agreed to on October 28, 1952, after several
additional bargaining conferences 41 An exception stressed by the General Counsel
40A subsequently discussed agreement of October 28 between the Respondent and the
IUE was very similar in title, arrangement, major divisions, and content.
41A very minor difference in wage rates between the UE and the IUE agreements stems
from the difference in their dates of execution and is not material to any of the issues
herein. Nor am I able to see any warrant for inferring a discriminatory motive or
effect, as the WE apparently would have me do, from the Respondent 's actions point-
1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and the IUE arises from the fact that the Respondent 's agreement of September 12
with the UE did not include a paragraph like the one quoted earlier in this report,
which first appeared at the end of the preamble of the IUE's 1951 national agreement,
and was not modified by the 1952 amendments thereto. Said paragraph was the
one preceded by an asterisk which made the IUE's agreement not applicable initially
as to any units "involved in an unresolved " question of representation before the
Board as of the date of the execution of said agreement , which date was October 11,
1951 . There is no evidence that the IUE tried during its 1952 bargaining to get
this provision deleted from its agreement . In any event , as I understand this pro-
vision, it had become essentially a vestigial appendage by the time the 1952 national
negotiations got under way; it was in no way revitalized by any of the IUE amend-
ments of October 1952 ; and there is nothing in the total context of this case which
persuades me that the Respondent was remiss in not insisting upon the inclusion
of such a provision in the UE's agreement of September 12, 1952, whatever may
have been its reason for failing to do so.
A general provision in the consolidated document executed by the Respondent
and the UE on September 12 required that evidence of ratification "by the UE
Locals covered" be furnished the Respondent not later than October 15, 1952.
In my opinion the evidence does not establish that any proof of ratification by
Local 937 was ever furnished to the Respondent, although said local did, in fact,
vote to ratify at a duly called meeting on October 9 In a document dated October
16, 1952, the action taken at that meeting was duly certified to the UE over the
signature of Charles Kelly, president of Local 937. Said document apparently was
never forwarded to the Respondent. However, as of October 15, 1952, the Re-
spondent was furnished certified copies of ratification resolutions by 24 UE locals
other than Local 937, together with a certification by an official of the UE to the
-effect that under the rules of the UE's conference board, the ratifications, for which
proof was therewith furnished , constituted "ratifications by a majority of the UE-GE
Locals," and that the effect of said ratification under said rules was to make the
September 12 agreement "binding upon and applicable to all UE-GE Locals."
Under all of the circumstances , I find that said September 12 agreement in all
of its applicable ramifications become applicable to the Detroit Unit , pursuant to
the UE's proof of ratification furnished to the Respondent as of October 15, despite
the fact that the timely ratification of Local 937, which was tardily transmitted to
the UE, was never thereafter forwarded to the Respondent. Furthermore, there
can be no doubt, especially in view of the forthright testimony of Superintendent
King pertaining thereto, that from about October 15, and retroactively to September
15, the Respondent recognized Local 937 as the exclusive representative of the
Detroit Unit, pursuant to the various applicable provisions of the September 12
document relating to wages, and amending the general agreement and the pension
and insurance agreement.
Two contentions can be the more expeditiously disposed of now than later. In
the first place , I find no merit in the Respondent 's position that because the IUE
failed to ask for bargaining rights for its members in the Detroit Unit, it follows,
that the recognition which the Respondent accorded Local 937 did not exceed what
was legally appropriate . Assuming that during the pendency of a representation
proceeding before the Board an employer may extend recognition for its members
only to any competing labor organizations which may seek it, I am convinced that
the Respondent 's recognition of Local 937 was no mere members-only recognition,
but actually a continuation of the exclusive recognition granted after the Board's
certification , and that this fact was not in any way altered by the failure of the
IUE to attempt to get some form of members -only recognition for the Detroit Unit.
In the second place, I find no merit in the IUE's contention that the September 12
document constituted a "new contract," in any sense material to the issues here to be
determined . While the provisions pertaining to wages were new, it appears to
have been the practice to write new wage provisions rather than to attempt to amend
the old ones. There can be no doubt, however, that the UE general agreement of
1950, as amended in 1951, was merely further amended in certain relatively limited
ways, and that this was also true of the Pension and Insurance Agreement. I have
checked carefully the 1952 amendments made to both of these basic agreements
and find that said amendments were not so extensive as to make either the general
agreement or the Pension and Insurance Agreement actually , tantamount to a - new .
mg toward getting agreements executed by September 15, the anniversary date of its
contracts , since I am not persuaded that the Respondent ever withdrew its general offer
of August 13 during its subsequent negotiations with the IUE, despite the IUE's re-
luctance to accept the Respondent 's terms as readily as other unions had done.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1129
agreement The same thing holds true, incidentally, for the later amendments of
October 28 to the IUE's general agreement and its Pension and Insurance Agreement.
Accordingly, I find, contrary to the IUE's contentions, that the provisions executed
by the Respondent and the UE on September 12, 1952, constituted amendments to
their general agreement and their Pension and Insurance Agreement, in accordance
with the respective provisions for modification contained in said agreements, and
did not constitute new agreements 42
Before returning to developments in matters pending with respect to the four
representation cases, it should be noted that during the latter part of October 1952
letters were exchanged between President Kelly and Superintendent King with respect
to local adjustments in the Detroit Shop. On October 22, Kelly wrote King that the
Respondent's oral answers with respect to various grievances stated in the UE's
letter of July 18 had not been satisfactory. On October 23, King wrote Kelly that
those responses had been made at a time "when the National pattern had not been
established on rate adjustments," and that as soon as WSB approval was received for
the wage rates agreed upon as of September 15, he would "be glad to discuss any
inequities." In a letter dated October 28, Kelly in effect acquiesced in King's sug-
gestion that the matter be deferred until action by the WSB. This apparently was
done, and the matter later adjusted without a further meeting at the local level.
In my opinion, the foregoing exchange of letters, while further evidence of the
continued recognition of Local 937 by the Respondent as the exclusive representative
for the Detroit Unit, conforms to the established pattern and, like the earlier dis-
cussed negotiations of July and August, involved nothing which can be construed as
favoring Local 937 unless the Respondent's continued recognition of said Local was
itself violative of the Act under the application of the Midwest Piping doctrine urged
by the General Counsel and the IUE. On the other hand, since the crux of this
case with respect to the Midwest Piping doctrine turns on the Respondent's con-
tinued exclusive recognition of the UE and Local 937 for the Detroit Unit after
mid-June 1952, I do not believe that the Respondent's contention that the employees
in said unit would have received the benefits offered on August 13 in any event, even
if no union had been considered as representing them, is itself a defense to the alleged
Midwest Piping violation. However, it does seem clear, under all of the circum-
stances of this case, that nothing which the employees in the Detroit Unit received
in the way of improvements in their wages and conditions of employment through
such continued recognition would necessarily have operated to augment the prestige
of the UE or Local 937 in their eyes.
We now revert to the representation cases, the developments in which have been
narrated up through the end of July. On September 30, 1952, after the agreement
between the UE and the Respondent had been signed on September 12, and before
the UE had submitted evidence of its ratification as of October 15, the Board issued
supplementary decisions, orders, and directions of elections in the series of repre-
sentation cases covered by the IUE's above discussed motion for reconsideration of
July 31. As was true of the earlier decisions of May 30 in those cases, the con-
trolling decision in the September series pertained to the Respondent's two Ohio
plants.43 In said decision, after spelling out the 90-day automatic renewal provisions
of the UE's national agreement, the Board stated. "Thus, the Mill B date of the
contract was June 17, 1952." Then, after summarizing the UE's contentions in its
motion for reconsideration, the Board reached this conclusion:
The over-all equities in this case , particularly the fact that the necessary
delay in issuing the original decision contributed to the Petitioner's inability to
refile timely new petitions and that the actual dismissal of the petitions herein
occurred only about 30 days from the Mill B date of the contract, convince us
that our original dismissal order does not effectuate the policies of the Act.
[Cases cited.] Accordingly, we find that the national agreement does not con-
stitute a bar, and that a question affecting commerce exists concerning repre-
sentation of employees of the Employer, within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1)
and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
In its Supplemental Decision, Order, and Direction of Election in Cases Nos.
7-RC-1618 and 7-RD-109 44 which it will be recalled constituted the first pair
of R cases involving the Detroit Unit, the Board incorporated by reference the reasons
set out in the above Ohio decision; vacated its order of May 16, 1952, dismissing
42 In my opinion , the term "new contract" as used by the Board in one of its General
Electric decisions , 103 NLRB 752, was not intended as a term of art in a sense applicable
to the point here decided.
48100 NLRB 1318. See also 100 NLRB 1315; 100 NLRB 1317; and 100 NLRB 1489.
" 100 NLRB 1317.
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the petitions; found a question of representation which was not barred by the UE
national agreement; and directed an election in the Detroit Unit, defining said unit
in the terms quoted above in footnote 1. Thus, by action taken at Washington on
September 30, the Board, for the first time with respect to any of the four R cases
involving the Detroit Unit, found that there was a question of representation as to
the employees in said unit. It should be noted, however, that in neither its supple-
mental decision of September 30, nor in its original decision of May 16 in this first
pair of cases, did the Board rule upon the above discussed motion referred to it by the
hearing officer at the close of the February 6 hearing, to the effect that the IUE's
-petition be dismissed for "lack of showing of appropriate interest."
Whatever the Board's reason for not ruling on said motion, it appears to me, after
studying decisions bearing on the relationship between Board determinations in
representation cases and the role of Trial Examiners in subsequent complaint cases,
that the Board's supplemental decision of September 30 is controlling as to whether
a question of representation was duly raised as to the Detroit Unit by the petitions
in those cases. Accordingly, I deem it not now incumbent upon me either to rule on
the motion made at the close of the representation hearing on February 6, or to pass
upon the matter of the sufficiency of the IUE's showing in Case No. 7-RC- 1618 as
a part of the complaint case now before me 45
On October 6, the Board dismissed the petitions in Cases Nos. 7-RC-1835 and
7-RD-133 without passing in any way upon the merits of said petitions and without
ruling on any of the motions referred to it by the hearing officer during the July 15
hearing on this second pair of petitions . In its order dismissing said petitions, the
Board stated that the petitions were "dismissed in view of the fact that the issues raised
in these cases are resolved by the Board 's Decision" of September 30, discussed im-
mediately above. It thus seems evident that any determination as to whether and
when this second pair of petitions created genuine questions of representation with
respect to the Detroit Unit must be determined by me as an integral part of my find-
ings in the case at bar. Before turning to such problems, however, a few further
points should be noted in rounding out the chronology of developments.
The IUE filed its charge in the instant matter on October 16, 1952.46 Thereafter
on October 21, 1952, the Board, because of the "currently pending" charge, issued
an order amending its direction of election in Cases Nos. 7-RC-1618 and 7-RD-109
which had the effect of postponing indefinitely the election in the Detroit Unit which
the Board had directed on September 30. The fact that the IUE did not reach agree-
ment with the Respondent on contractual provisions until October 28, 1952, has
already been noted. The findings already made also show that the Respondent con-
tinued its recognition of the UE and Local 937 for the Detroit Unit during and
after October 1952. We turn now to the remaining issues which fall essentially into
two groups , those pertaining to whether and when genuine questions of representa-
tion material to the issues may have been pending, and those centering around the
.applicability of the Midwest Piping doctrine to the circumstances of this case.
C. Concluding findings
1. Pending questions of representation
From the foregoing findings, it is clear that there has been a real question of rep-
resentation pending since September 30, 1952 , when the Board , reversing its earlier
decision , issued a supplemental decision in the first pair of representation cases. Said
decision embodied the only determination which the Board has made that any
question of representation has existed as to the Detroit Unit at any time material to
the issues herein. It will be recalled that the petitions in those two cases, 7-RC-1618
and 7-RD-109, had originally been dismissed on May 16, about a month before the
Mill B date of the UE national agreement. In my opinion , said original dismissal,
despite the IUE 's petition of July 31 for reconsideration , had the effect of removing
"It should be noted that the position which I am taking at this point is bottomed
upon reasons different from those supporting a position similar in effect taken later with
respect to the second pair of R cases, upon the merits of which the Board itself has
never passed.
as Charges were also filed with respect to the units in the five additional above-enumer-
ated R cases wherein the IUE had been the petitioner, but the only one of those charges
which has resulted in a hearing is the one involving the Detroit Unit. That unit'was
also the only one where a new petition was filed by the IUE after its original petition
had been dismissed by the Board on May 16.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1131
`this first pair of petitions entirely from the picture , as far as the issues in the case at
bar are concerned , from May 16 to September 30, 1952.47
The facts pertaining to the petitions in Cases Nos. 7 -RC-1835 and 7-RD-133,
and the hearing of July 15 on that second pair of petitions , have already been de-
tailed in section III, B , 5, of this report . Since the Board's only action as to said
petitions was to dismiss them on October 6, without passing on their merits, it de-
volves upon me to determine whether and when those petitions created real ques-
tions as to representation , particularly with respect to the applicability of the Board's
contract-bar rules. In general , the determinations which follow are made upon what
I believe to be the principles applicable to the unusual circumstances surrounding
this second pair of petitions . In my opinion , no purpose would be served by detail-
ing the numerous decisions which have been carefully studied in reaching these
determinations , since there is not here involved any departure from established rep-
resentation case procedures , equally applicable to both certification and decertification
proceedings.
We start with the confusion surrounding the crucial Mill B date of the National
GE-UE Agreement . In my opinion , the 90-day automatic renewal provision of said
2-year agreement of September 15, 1950 , yields only one Mill B date. That date,
upon following the appropriate rules for calculating a Mill B date , is established to
my satisfaction as June 17, 1952. This is the Mill B date which the Board fixed in
its above-quoted decision of September 30, 1952. It is apparent that the June 15
Mill B date recited by the Board in its above .. discussed decision of June 26 , and relied
upon by the UE in stating some of its motions at the hearing on July 15, was an erro-
neous Mill B date. It thus follows that the UE's motions of July 15 to dismiss the
petitions , which were referred to the Board by the hearing officer and have never been
ruled upon, were without merit , insofar as they were bottomed upon said erroneous
Mill B date.
As to the remaining motion made at the July 15 hearing by the UE to dismiss
on the ground that no proof had been submitted that "the IUE had secured new
cards," in my opinion the hearing officer correctly indicated that the Board's policy
is that the sufficiency of any showing of interest is an administrative matter to be
determined by the Board . The Board has repeatedly so held. And while the
Board also sometimes adds a "moveover " statement to the effect that it is also
satisfied that the "showing of interest is adequate ," 48 I do not believe that it is
incumbent upon me to investigate the challenged showing of interest , whatever the
Board might have done if the UE's motion had reached it for ruling.
A similar problem with respect to the showing of interest arises in a different and
apparently somewhat novel context , due to the positions taken by the Respondent
and the UE in the complaint case hearing before me. During said hearing, each
contended essentially that the record in the instant matter had to contain an affirma-
tive showing of interest by a substantial number of employees in the Detroit Unit
in order to raise a valid question of representation ,49 since the Board had never
passed upon the merits of any of the issues with respect to the second pair of peti-
tions. After carefully considering this problem in its broader implications and in
the light of such decisions as appear to have bearing, it is my opinion that the
General Counsel was under no duty to disclose affirmatively in the record before
me what showing of interest had been made to the Regional Director when either
or both of the second pair of petitions had been filed. In view of the nature of
the function assigned under Board policy to the showing of interest , I am con-
vinced that the "Order Consolidating Cases and Notice of Representation Hearing,"
issued by the Regional Director in Cases Nos. 7-RC-1835 and 7-RD-133 on July 8,
1952, constitutes sufficient evidence , for all necessary purposes in the case at bar,
that the Regional Director duly performed his preliminary administrative function
of determining at the appropriate time that a sufficient showing of interest had
67 See General Electric Company ( Niles Glass Works, Lamp Division), 103 NLRB 752.
In said decision in Case No 8-RC-1533 , one of the six R cases covered by the IUE's
motion of July 31 and involving the same UE contract involved in the instant matter,
the Board stated, with respect to the IUE's contention as to the applicability of the
Midwest Pipang doctrine , that said doctrine did not apply " to a situation such as this
where at the time of the execution of the new contract the Board had disposed fully of
all issues in the case and the only matter pending was a motion for reconsideration of
the Board 's decision dismissing the petition."
48 See for instance , Walterboro Manufacturing Corporation, 106 NLRB 1383.
49 The UE's apparent desire to shield such a showing from the full disclosure of a
public record does not accord with Board procedure. See Joseph ironauer, Incorporated,
106 NLRB 1382 , footnote 1.
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been made with respect to the two petitions to warrant setting in motion the Board's
machinery for further determinations with respect to them 50
It has already been found above in section III, B, 5, that the unit stipulated by
the parties at the July 15 hearing was an appropriate unit, and that the IUE' s letter
of June 14, which the Respondent received on June 16, constituted a sufficient re-
quest for recognition in the Detroit Unit. Since commerce is conceded, there
remains for determination, in view of all of the foregoing, the question of whether
either or both of the petitions were barred by the National GE-UE Agreement
That agreement automatically renewed itself, according to its own terms, on -June
17, 1952, since admittedly no notice to terminate had been given prior to its Mill
B date by either the UE or the Respondent. However, since the decertification
petition in Case No. 7-RD-133 had been filed with the Regional Director on June
16, the day preceding the Mill B date of the agreement, said agreement did not
constitute a bar to a determination of representatives pursuant to that petition, even
though formal notice of the filing of said petition was not received by the Respond-
ent until June 18. Moreover, since the IUE's letter requesting recognition, which
was received by the Respondent on June 16, was thereafter followed up by the filing
of its petition in Case No. 7-RC-1835 on June 20, within the period allowed under-
the General Electric X-Ray rule,51 the UE agreement did not constitute a bar to a
determination of representatives pursuant to the IUE's petition in Case No.
7-RC-1835.
In reaching the foregoing conclusion that neither of the second pair of petitions
was bared by the UE's agreement, I am aware that no case which has come to my
attention has involved fully comparable combinations of factors52 However, I
have applied what I understand to be the intent of the Board's contract-bar rules
to the circumstances of this case 53 In short, it is my opinion that as of June 16,
the day before the UE's agreement had automatically renewed itself, two events had
occurred, the filing of the decertification petition in Case No. 7-RC-133 and the
receipt by the Respondent of the IUE's request for recognition, both of which, in
the total context of this case, constituted the institution of real quesions of repre-
sentation which remained pending until after September 30, 1952, the date upon
which the second pair of petitions became moot only because the Board's supple-
mental decision of that date established pending questions of representation of an
identical nature in the Detroit Unit through the first pair of petitions. Thus there
have been real questions of representation as to the Detroit Unit pending since
June 16, 1952. We turn now to various questions pertaining to the applicability of
the Midwest Piping doctrine under the circumstances of this case as heretofore
detailed.
2. The applicability of the Midwest Piping doctrine
This report will not be protracted by summarizing the facts and conclusion already
detailed in context, or by setting out all of the contentions of the parties. It would
be well at this point, however, for the reader to recheck the analysis of the pleadings
appearing under "Statement of the Case" and also the "Introductory statement,"
particularly footnote 8.
It is obvious from an appraisal of the facts and conclusions already stated that if
recognition of a labor organization as exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of em-
ployees as to which a real question of representation has been raised constitutes a
violation of the Act under the Midwest Piping doctrine, the Respondent's actions
have been in error. Clearly the Respondent permitted the National GE-UE Agree-
ment to renew itself on June 17, 1952, after. a question of representation had been
raised on June 16. The Respondent also clearly continued to recognize the UE and
Local 937 as exclusive bargaining agent for the Detroit Unit during the rest of
so For holdings under similar although not identical circumstances, compare the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in N. L. R. B v. J. I. Case Company,
201 F 2d 597, and that of the Seventh Circuit in Kearney ct Trecker Corp. v. N. L. R B ,
209 F. 2d 782
51 This 10-day -rule was established in General-Electric X-Ray Corp., 67 NLRB 997.
ss It should be noted that the above conclusion stems from the total context of this
case, it being deemed unnecessary to determine, for instance, what would have been the
status of the IUE's petition with respect to contract bar if said petition had stood alone.
See Monroe Co-Operative Oil Company, 86 NLRB 95, 97. Also compare Westinghouse
Electrec Corporation, 106 NLRB 1233.
Is See the Board's Sixteenth Annual Report (1951), pages 63-83, particularly pages
74-79, and cases cited therein. See also the Board's Seventeenth Annual Report (1952),
pages 48-50, and cases there cited.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1133
the original 2-year term of the UE agreement. It also is obvious that on September
12, 1952, just prior to the completion of the original term of said agreement, the
Respondent signed a document which included modifications of said agreement, ne-
gotiated pursuant to the provisions thereof. And it is equally obvious that the Re-
spondent has since continued its recognition of the UE and Local 937 for the Detroit
Unit and its application of the modified UE agreement to said unit. That the fore-
going actions of the Respondent are violative of the Act under the Midwest Piping
doctrine constitutes the essence of the positions of the General Counsel and the IUE,
except that the IUE differs with the General Counsel in that it apparently takes no
excepion to the Respondent's having continued the UE agreement as to the Detroit
Unit for the rest of its original term, until September 15, 1952.
Broadly speaking, the defenses in this case, which the Respondent has developed
in more detail than has the UE,54 fall into two groups. One group amounts essen-
tially to this. Under Board and court decisions and Section 8 (d) of the Act,5 the
Respondent was affirmatively required to continue to recognize for the Detroit Unit
the bargaining agent which had been certified by the Board until said certification
had been rescinded or superseded by action of the Board itself. The core of the
other group of defenses is that there is no warrant in Board policy or sound labor
relations for extending the Midwest Piping doctrine to a situation such as the facts
here establish; where the continued recognition was pursuant to valid contractual
provisions and ran to an incumbent union which the Board had certified; where the
Board itself has neither modified nor rescinded said certification, which the Re-
spondent properly continued to honor; where no other unfair labor practices are
involved; and where nothing in the surrounding circumstances warrants an inference
that the employer knowingly or intentionally favored or assisted the incumbent union,
or that the employees involved could or did reasonably so interpret the employer's
conduct.
Such a case as the present one, going as it does to the very heart of a doctrine
fraught with broad significance to labor relations, lends itself to no simple solution.
This is true, despite the superficial attractiveness of such suggested answers as (1)
dismissal on the ground that the case really is a "comedy of errors" or (2) finding
a technical violation because no real penalty would be involved in requiring the
Respondent to undo the consequences of its error.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Board has never applied the Midwest
Piping doctrine to a set of circumstances really comparable to those involved in the
case at bar. I am not unmindful of the cases cited by the General Counsel and the
i4 It is deemed unnecessary to differentiate at all points as to which of the two parties
advance particular aspects of defenses hereafter stressed, as there is no essential con-
flict In the positions of the Respondent and the UE. In most cases, however, it is the
Respondent's position to which specific reference is hereafter made.
5' The Respondent's position with respect to the impact of Section 8 (d) is summarized
in the following section quoted from its brief :
Thus at the time the allegedly improper agreement was signed on September 12,
1952, there was in effect between Respondent and UE Local 937-in the language of
Section 8 (d) of the Act-
a collective bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting
commerce.
Also, at that time, UE Local 937 was the certified representative of the Detroit Shop
bargaining unit.
The Proviso to Section 8 (d), therefore, required that Respondent not terminate
or modify such Agreement unless it, among other things :
(2) offer[ed] to meet and confer with the other party [the UE] for the purpose
of negotiating a new contract. . . .
And the first sentence of the final paragraph of Section 8 (d) specifically pro-
amides that the obligation set out in (2) of the Proviso should become
. . inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which
the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been
superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the
provisions of Section 9 (a). . . . [Emphasis supplied ]
From the foregoing, the only reasonable interpretation which can be placed on
the plain words of the statute is that wherever there is in effect a contract [as there
was here], an employer may not terminate it or cease giving effect to it [as it is
here claimed Respondent should have] until there has intervened a new certifica-
tion of rep? esentatives [as there has not in this case].
1134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IUE, all of which have been carefully studied. In my opinion, the only one of said
cases, involving elements near enough to the complex of factors in the instant matter
to merit attention, is International Harvester Company, 87 NLRB 1123. However,
a careful reading of the Board's decision in that case reveals such substantial dif-
ferences from the facts herein as to offset similarities which exist. In my opinion, it
is particularly significant that in International Harvester the employer entered into a
clearly new agreement, covering along with other plants the disputed unit there
involved, after its former contract had clearly expired, and some weeks after a
question of representation as to said unit had been "inferentially" acknowledged by
the execution of a consent election agreement.
It is also noteworthy that major exceptions to the Midwest Piping doctrine so far
developed in Board decisions are not here applicable because the facts of this case
establish that there were pending herein, at the time of all of the challenged actions,
questions of representation which have proved to be real, valid, and genuine, to use
the terms most frequently associated with this type of issue.56 It is also important
to bear in mind that the Board has pointed out that its Midwest Piping doctrine
should be "strictly construed and sparingly applied" in order to avoid interrrupting
collective bargaining.57 Nor is it without significance that the opinion expressed in
the language quoted in the IUE's brief from the Board's decision in the Phelps
Dodge case,58 turns on employer actions taken "during the pendency of an election
directed by the Board to resolve a question concerning representation." [Emphasis
supplied ] Nor should it be forgotten that, in the International Harvester case,
stressed by both the General Counsel and the IUE, the employer, as one of the par-
ties to a consent election agreement, had acknowledged by its own action the exist-
ence of a question of representation some weeks prior to the conduct found violative
of the Act under the Midwest Piping doctrine.
Let us consider next the position so forcefully advanced, particularly by the
Respondent, to the effect that the provisions of the Act and the weight of decisional
precedent affirmatively required the Respondent to follow the course which it did. If
this position were to be accepted, not only would the issues of this case be disposed
of, but a large area of uncertainty which surrounds the applicability of the Midwest
Piping doctrine to incumbent union situations would be clarified and simplified.59'
But despite the great weight which I feel should be given to the line of Board and
Court decisions to the effect that a lawfully made Board certification "must be re-
spected by the employer until changed conditions are reflected by a later ruling by
the Board altering or setting aside the certification," 60 and the desirability of clari-
fication and simplification in this field, I feel constrained, after long study and patient
deliberation, to pass on to the second group of defenses in this case.
This is so in large part because any such affirmative holding as the Respondent
urges would have broader repercussions on Board policy and on labor relations in
general than I am convinced would be sound, especially without defining certain
safeguarding exceptions, the specification of which would precipitate me further
into the field of policy discussion and decision than the facts of this case compel me
to go.61 Moreover , since the UE agreement had already automatically renewed
CO For circumstances under which no violation of the Midwest Piping doctrine has
been found because no real question was ultimately found to have been raised by the
petition involved, consult William Penn. Broadcasting Company, 93 NLRB 1104;
Roegelesn Provision Company, 99 NLRB 830; and Wood Parts, Inc., 101 NLRB 445.
11 In this connection the Boaid, in the Ensher case cited and quoted above in footnote 8,
stated at 74 NLRB 1445:
That doctrine, necessary though it is to protect freedom of choice in certain situa-
tions, can easily operate in derogation of the practice of continuous collective' bar-
gaining, and should, therefore, be strictly construed and sparingly applied
Compare also the language used by the Board in the William Penn case, 93 NLRB 1104,.
last paragraph on 1105, which indicates that the Board was influenced in making that
exception to the Midwest Piping doctrine by the importance to industral stability of
the "benefits of an uninterrupted bargaining relationship" with an incumbent union.
58 Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 63 NLRB 686, 687
ii The extent of this area is indicated in an article in the Labor Law Journal for May
1953, entitled "The Eternal Triangle in Labor Relations."
w The quotation is from the decision of the Fifth Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. Samson
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 195 F. 2d 350. See also cases cited in footnote 1 of said decision
81 As an example of the type of problem involved in the above approach, it is instruc-
tive to study the Board's holdings in National Carbon Division, Union Carbide and Car-
bon Corporation and National Carbon Company, Inc., 105 NLRB 441; 104, NLRB-416; and,
100 NLRB 689.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1135
itself for a year prior to the negotiations leading to the modifications executed on
September 12, 1952, I am not convinced that the type of Section 8 (d) situation en-
visioned by the Act actually confronted the parties at any time material to the issues
herein. In any event, I am convinced that the holdings which follow are fully dis-
positive of the issues before me, involve less discussion of policy questions, and
justify my leaving certain contentions undetermined.
We come now to various questions pertaining to whether or not the Respondent
had the right under the Act to take its several challenged actions, even if it may not
have been required to take them. We must keep in mind, moreover, that the actions
here challenged were only a small part of a broad course of dealings with various
labor organizations and must be evaluated in their full context. It also should be
acknowledged that this case is devoid of elements justifying any inference that the
Respondent favored or assisted the UE or that the employees in the Detroit Unit
would reasonably have so believed.62 While I am fully aware, as the IUE stresses,
that the Board held such factors to be immaterial in the International Harvester case,
I feel that a fair appraisal of the total background is necessary in order to determine
whether we have here a purely Midwest Piping problem. To my mind there can be
no doubt that this case adds up to a Midwest Piping violation on a per se basis, if
any violation were to be found, rather than one conditioned by questions of motive,
intent, or effect.
Hence the essential element common to the remaining group of problems in this
case is whether or not considerations of policy, and of public interest in industrial
stability arising from benefits to be derived from continuity of collective-bargaining
and contractual relations with an incumbent union which has been duly certified
by the Board, outweigh, in the context of this case, values which the Midwest Piping
doctrine has been evolved to protect.
It is my considered judgment that to apply the Midwest Piping doctrine to the
facts of this case would be to extend that doctrine to the point where it would
straitjacket industrial relations out of all proportion to the realities of the particular
situation involved. In addition, such an extension of the Midwest Piping doctrine
does not seem to me to be indispensable to any scheme of procedures or practices
necessary to a full effectuation of the purposes of the Act. In fact, I believe that
there is considerable merit in the Respondent's contention that such a broad ex-
tension of the Midwest Piping doctrine as is urged herein might eventually be held
to run counter to the Supreme Court's decision in Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v.
N. L. R. B., 338 U. S. 355. Be that as it may, the findings which follow are bot-
tomed upon factors elsewhere discussed. It should be noted, however, that the
Supreme Court used the following language in its Colgate decision of December
5, 1949:
To achieve stability of labor relations was the primary objective of Congress,
in enacting the National Labor Relations Act.
Let us consider now in some detail my reasons for both of- the foregoing major
conclusions, neither of which has direct support in Board decisions. Incidentally,
the fact that the nearest comparable holdings of which I have knowledge are those
made in my own Intermediate Report of January 30, 1953, in Westinghouse Electric-
Corporation, Small Motor Division, Case No. 8-CA-654, to which no exceptions,
were filed, and to which the Respondent and the IUE have both alluded in their
briefs, has undoubtedly impelled me, in order to avoid prejudging the issues herein,
to a time-consuming and meticulous evaluation of the issues and contentions in
the instant matter, which arise in a context differing in material ways from those
prevailing in the Westinghouse case.63 It is in the light of this careful evaluation
that I am persuaded that to extend the Midwest Piping doctrine to the Respondent's
actions in this case would unrealistically stifle labor relations.
Take the General Counsel's position that the Respondent, when a real question
of representation arose on June 16, was not permitted to continue applying the
National GE-UE Agreement to the Detroit Unit even for the remainder of its
original term, a position with which the IUE does not concur.64 I am convinced
In fact, the contrary might be argued on the basis of certain conduct of Superin-
tendent King In any event, President Kelly of Local 937 failed to see any assistance
to the UE in the meeting which King called in the shop about October 31, 1951.
13 See 31 LRRM 233 to 235 and 31 LRRM 1525.
ai It should be noted that the General Counsel's position on this point, if sound, may
have a logical advantage over the IUE's position with respect to the Section 8 (d) posi.
tion posed by the Respondent. Cf. Wilson & Co., Inc., 89 NLRB 310.
1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that such a position, for which I find no Board or court authority,65 would be dis-
ruptive of continuity in contractual relations and would not contribute to sound
procedure in labor relations.
Nor do I believe, as the General Counsel and the IUE contend, that the Respond-
ent was under any obligation to prevent before June 17, 1952, the automatic renewal
of its national agreement with the UE. It will be recalled that this was a master
agreement, affecting some 40,000 employees, and that the automatic renewal pro-
vision thereof made no provision for exemption from automatic renewal of even
so small a group as the 60 or 70 employees in the Detroit Unit. It is not without
significance that the president of Local 937 had had a heated altercation with
Superintendent King some months earlier; that a substantial number of employees
in the Detroit Unit were still having their dues checked off to the UE; and that
the chief steward of Local 937 had represented to King, sometime around June 16,
that the IUE's following in the Detroit Unit was very small. Thus since the Re-
spondent could not know on June 16, when it received the IUE's naked claim as to
representation in the Detroit Unit, that the IUE would thereafter file a petition
within 10 days, I see nothing in the facts surrounding Case No. 7-RC-1835 which
would have required the Respondent to give notice preventing the renewal of the
UE agreement, assuming that the Respondent had had time to do so.66
The facts surrounding Case No. 7-RD-133, while involving a different context
as to dates, lead me to a similar conclusion. The decertification petition in that
case was filed on June 16, but the Respondent did not receive notice of such filing
until June 18. It is true that Hartmann may have told King by or before June 16
that he had secured the signatures of 74 percent of the employees for decertifica-
tion, but this is not certain. It does seem certain that King knew before June 16
that a second decertification petition was being prepared for filing. But King also
knew that some months earlier, when Hartmann had told him that about 80 percent
of the employees had joined in the first decertification petition, some 45 or 50
percent of those same employees were also having their dues to the UE deducted
on the basis of revocable checkoff authorizations. It seems to me that to invest
mere knowledge by an employer, that a dissatisfied group is preparing a decertifi-
cation petition, with the same significance as a request by a rival union for recog-
nition, provided that the general knowledge which reaches the employer is there-
after "supported" within 10 days by a decertification petition, would be doubtful
procedure.67 In any event, everything considered, I find that the Respondent was
not obligated by Board policy to prevent the automatic renewal of the National
GE-UE Agreement, and that its failure to do so was not violative of the Act under
the Midwest Piping doctrine.
Its automatic renewal having taken place on June 17, 1952, without violation of
the Act, in my opinion the Respondent was contractually obligated to live up to the
provisions of the renewed National GE-UE Agreement as to the Detroit Unit, even
though the Board's contract-bar rules prevented said agreement from functioning as
a bar to an election. Said contractual obligations were continuing ones, but voidable
as to the Detroit Unit by the UE's decertification, or the IUE's certification for the
Detroit Unit in place of the UE. There can be little doubt, from the general scheme
implicit in the IUE's and the UE's national agreements and from the Respondent's
procedure thereunder, that the Detroit Unit, in the latter eventuality, would readily be
shifted from coverage by the UE agreement to coverage by the IUE agreement.
Under all of the circumstances, I find no violation of the Midwest Piping doctrine
in the Respondent's execution on September 12, 1952, of modifications of said re-
newed agreement.68 Those modifications were negotiated pursuant to specific pro-
visions of said agreement, following lines of procedure established by bargaining
relations between the Respondent and unions representing its employees. Under
6 -In fact, it is not novel for a representation proceeding to be progressing while the
employer involved continues to accord recognition to an incumbent union and to live
up to its contract therewith See Stewart-Warner Corporation, 102 NLRB 1153, 1157,
and cases cited in footnote 6 thereof. Also compare the General Counsel's administra-
tive ruling of October 9, 1953, in Case No. 818, reported at 32 LRRM 1663
° Whether the Respondent actually had time to give such notice is not clear from the
record, but the Respondent did not produce evidence establishing such inability.
071t should be noted that the facts here fall short of posing the question which would
have arisen had Hartmann clearly served notice on King before June 16 that he was in
the process of filing a second decertification petition. Cf. De Soto Creamery and Prod-
ucts Company, 94 NLRB 1627.
68A careful analysis of the complaint shows that the General Counsel construed the
wage agreement executed on said date as an amendment to the UE national agreement.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 1137
circumstances here prevailing , no violation arises from the Respondent 's continued
application of this modified and renewed agreement to the Detroit Unit, although
in my opinion the agreement as to said unit has become "defeasible ," subject to the
outcome of the pending questions as to representation . As to the defeasibility of an
agreement otherwise legally binding, see American Seating Company , 106 NLRB
250.69
From all that has been said , it should be apparent that an extension of the Mid-
west Piping doctrine to cover the facts of this case is not necessary to an effective
scheme of labor relations under the Act. It is clear , from exceptions which already
have been made to a rigid and literal application of the Midwest Piping doctrine,
that the Board will not automatically interpret , as usurpation of its functions, every
bargaining relationship with an incumbent union during the pendency of a repre-
sentation case. Moreover , in the light of the position which the Board has now
taken in its American Seating decision , it is unnecessary to refine contract-bar rules
or the Midwest Piping doctrine to a point where their operation is so precise that
continuing to operate under a contract which is not a bar automatically becomes a
violation of the Midwest Piping doctrine , provided it later turns out that a real
question of representation had arisen . This is so because, under circumstances not
otherwise repugnant to the Act , a contract which is held not to be a bar simply would
become defeasible , pending the outcome of the representation proceeding.
That there is little certainty as to how a given representation proceeding may turn
out is illustrated in the following paragraph from the Respondent 's brief at a point
where the Respondent protests the contention that it violated the Act by permitting
its agreement with the UE automatically to renew itself:
Respondent respectfully submits, however , that the novel and startling sug-
gestion of IUE and the General Counsel above discussed should-if for no other
reason-be rejected because it would require an employer to disrupt an existing
contractual relationship on the chance , speculation or possibility that a valid
representation question would later arise-and the further speculation that the
claimant union would win the election requested . Among the various con-
tingencies are the following - The demand for recognition may never be per-
fected by the filing of a timely petition ; if a petition is filed, it may not be sup-
ported by the requisite showing of interest ; the demanding union may not be
in compliance with the filing requirements of Section 9 (f) (g) or (h) of the
Act. Compare in this respect the reasoning of the Board in Matter of Hoover
Co., 90 NLRB 1614, 1618 ( 1950).
In summation , my intensive study of the basic problems raised by this case leads
me to the conclusion that to extend the Midwest Piping doctrine to a situation such as,
the one here posed, where an employer continues uninterrupted contractual relations
of a normal nature with an incumbent union whose certification the Board has not
modified or rescinded , and where the overall picture is devoid of anything which
normally would influence employees, who have had experience in the democratic
process of determining their own representatives ,70 to believe that their employer is
assisting the incumbent union, would not be consistent with any realistic sense of
equilibrium between the right of employees to self-organization and the right of
society to industrial stability under contractual relations . Accordingly I find that
it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to extend the Midwest Piping doctrine
to the circumstances of this case.
3. Ruling on the Respondent's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
The Respondent's proposed findings of fact which are detailed in paragraphs num-
bered 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, and all of their various subparagraphs,
are granted.
The Respondent's proposed findings of fact which are detailed in paragraphs
numbered 1, 4, and 7, are granted to the extent consistent with the findings and
record herein, the deviations being so minor as to be relatively immaterial.
The Respondent's proposed "subsidiary" conclusions of law numbered 2 and 5
are granted.
O9 Also compare The Grace Company, 84 NLRB 435, 448, in which case the Board
skirted a finding as to defeasibility made in my Inteimediate Report.
40 Employees generally are gaining such experience under the Act, and citizens of
democracies have long been accustomed to an incumbent administration continuing in
office during the very election pioceduies which may result in unseating it.
338207-55-vol 110-73
1138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent's proposed "subsidiary" conclusions of law numbered 1, 3, 4,.
and 6, are denied 71
The Respondent's proposed "ultimate" conclusions of law numbered 1 and 2 are
granted.
Upon the basis of all of the above findings of fact and conclusions, and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, General Electric Company, is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, CIO; United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE); and Local 937, United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not, by reason of any of the actions alleged in the com-
plaint, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and
(2) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
7' The denials as to numbers 1 and 3, where Section 8 (b) conclusions are involved,
are for reasons stated earlier.
SWISS CHEESE CORPORATION OF AMERICA and GENERAL DRIVERS, DAIRY
EMPLOYEES & HELPERS LOCAL UNION 579, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS.
OF AMERICA , A. F. L. Case No. 13-CA-1605. December 3,1954
Decision and Order
On July 6, 1954, Trial Examiner Alba B. Martin issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth-in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as
the record, including the exceptions and rrief, adequately presents
the issues and positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner with the following addition.
The Respondent contends that it had no knowledge of the union
activity of its employees, including Thompson, Jacobson, and Kolden.
The record, however, in our opinion discloses that the Respondent did
have such knowledge through its foreman, Paul Risser, who, as
detailed in the Intermediate Report, had full information regarding
110 NLRB No. 183.