Furriers Joint Council of New York, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (The Resident Fur Buyers Association)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 6, 1982

261 N.L.R.B. 701 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

FURRIERS JOINT COUNCIL
Furriers Joint Council of New York, United Food
and Commercial Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO (The Resident Fur Buyers Associ-
ation) and Louis Kaminsky & Sons, Inc. and R
& E Trading Corp. Case 2-CE-133
May 6, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS JENKINS AND HUNTER
On December 3, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Jay R. Pollack issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief and Charging Par-
ties filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs1 and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, 2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Furriers Joint
Council of New York, United Food and Commer-
cial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, New
York, New York, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby
denied as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge: I heard
this case at New York, New York, on September 21 and
22, 1981. Pursuant to a charge filed against Furriers Joint
Council of New York, United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO,' herein called
I The name of Respondent appears as corrected at the hearing.
261 NLRB No. 106
Respondent or the Union, on July 15, 1981, by Louis
Kaminsky & Sons, Inc., and R & E Trading Corp.,
herein called the Charging Parties, the Regional Director
for Region 2 of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on August 28,
1981. The complaint alleges in substance that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 2 by maintaining and giving effect to an
agreement with the Resident Fur Buyers Association,
herein called the Association, whereby the employer-
members of the Association ceased or refrained or
agreed to cease or refrain from doing business with per-
sons not having a bargaining relationship with Respond-
ent.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to par-
ticipate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Based upon
the entire record, upon the briefs filed on behalf of the
parties, and upon my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
The Association is a multiemployer association consist-
ing of employers engaged in the business of purchasing,
on behalf of their accounts, fur garments and related
products, and which exists, inter alia, for the purpose of
representing its employer-members in collective bargain-
ing and negotiating and administering collective-bargain-
ing agreements on behalf of its employer-members with
labor organizations, including Respondent.
Annually the employer-members of the Association
ship from their respective facilities within the State of
New York fur garments valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly to accounts located outside the State of New
York. Accordingly, the Association and its employer-
members are now and have been at all times material
herein employers engaged in commerce and in a business
2 Sec. 8(e) of the Act provides:
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization
and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express
or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to
cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or other-
wise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided,
That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement be-
tween a labor organization and an employer in the construction in-
dustry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of
a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for the
purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(bX4X1B) the terms "any
employer," "any person engaged in commerce or in industry affect-
ing commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the terms
"any other producer, processor, or manufacturer," "any other em-
ployer," or "any other person" shall not include persons in the rela-
tion of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working
on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or perform-
ing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and
clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall
prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the fore-
going exception.
701
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
R & E Trading Corp. is a New York corporation en-
gaged in the manufacture of fur garments. R & I Furs,
Inc., is a New York corporation engaged in the nonretail
sale of fur garments manufactured by R & E Trading
Corp. Neither R & E Trading Corp. nor R & I Furs,
Inc., is signatory to a contract with Respondent. The
parties stipulated that R & E Trading Corp. and R & I
Furs, Inc., at all times material herein, have been persons
and employers engaged in commerce and in industries af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
Respondent and the Association have been party to a
series of collective-bargaining agreements for at least 20
years. The most recent agreement between Respondent
and the Association was effective by its terms from No-
vember 1, 1978, through October 31, 1981.3 Section
XI(c) of the collective-bargaining agreement (hereinafter
called the purchasing prohibitions) provides as follows:
The Employer shall purchase fur garments only
from sources whose workers work under the terms
and conditions prevailing in the fur manufacturing
industry. The Employer may rely upon copies of al-
phabetically arranged lists furnished to the Employ-
er by the Union of all such sources known to it and
shall notify the Employer of any changes in these
lists, as such changes take place during the term of
this Agreement. The Employer shall not be liable
hereunder if the Union shall not furnish such list.
The complaint alleges that Respondent has violated
Section 8(e) of the Act, commonly known as the ban on
hot cargo agreements, by maintaining and enforcing the
purchasing prohibitions of the agreement. Respondent
contends that the agreement was entered into more than
6 months prior to the filing of the instant charge and
thus, that the complaint herein is barred by the statute of
limitations set forth in Section 10(b) of the Act. Further,
Respondent contends that the agreement is privileged by
the garment industry proviso to Section 8(e).
B. The Business of the Resident Buyers
As stated earlier, Respondent contends that the gar-
ment industry proviso privileges its agreement with the
Association. An inquiry into the nature of the business of
the resident buyers who comprise the Association is nec-
essary to decide this issue.
I Respondent has been recognized as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative for all buyers, shipping clerks, stock clerks, receiving
clerks, delivery employees, and porters, employed by the employer-mem-
bers of the Association.
A resident fur buyer acts as an agent for his accounts.
An account can be a retailer, department store, or a
wholesaler. As a rule, these accounts come to New York
at market time, March or May, to place orders for fin-
ished fur garments for their stores. The resident buyer
takes his account to visit various manufacturers and acts
as consultant, representative, and adviser to the account.
This process results in the buyer placing orders with a
manufacturer or manufacturers for the goods desired by
the account. The buyer later follows through on these
orders. When ready, the goods are delivered to the
buyer who examines the garments and then ships them to
his account. The buyer does not purchase the garments
directly and does not take title to the goods. Rather, the
account is billed directly by the manufacturer. The buyer
receives a fee or commission from the account and a
commission from the manufacturer.
The resident buyers are not involved in the manufac-
turing process. They do not supply manufacturers with
raw materials to make the goods nor do they perform
any work on the goods. The buyers employ shipping and
receiving employees but do not employ any workers in
the manufacturing process. Since buyers advise their cli-
ents as to what kind of garment is in style, to that extent
they have some input in styling.
Respondent further argues that resident buyers "are
the functional equivalent of the jobbers described in the
garment industry proviso."
A jobber in the fur industry buys finished fur garments
from the manufacturers. The jobber buys the merchan-
dise and takes title; he in turn sells the garments to his
customers. The jobber's customers are retail stores (de-
partment stores or boutiques), the same type of clients
serviced by the resident buyers. The jobber needs sub-
stantial capital because he usually must pay the manufac-
turer quickly and then extend credit to his customers.
Jobbers in the fur industry do not buy skins and have it
manufactured by someone else. Thus, the differences be-
tween jobbers and buyers is that the jobber buys on his
own account and takes title while the buyer buys on his
client's account and does not take title. Jobbers are in-
volved in the manufacturing process only to the extent
that they might tell the manufacturer how the garment
they want to buy should be made or what style garment
should be made.
C. The Maintenance and Enforcement of the
Purchasing Prohibitions
As indicated above, the purchasing prohibitions pro-
vide that the employers shall purchase fur garments only
from sources whose workers work under the terms and
conditions prevailing in the fur manufacturing industry
and that the employers may rely on lists furnished them
by Respondent. Several principals of the employer-mem-
bers of the Association testified that they do not do busi-
ness with any person not on the list maintained by the
Union under this provision of the contract. 4
4 The contract provides for liquidated damages if the purchasing prohi-
bitions are violated.
702
FURRIERS JOINT COUNCIL
In May 1981, Joseph Model, president of the Associ-
ation, received a list of all manufacturers of fur garments
who were contributing to the union trust funds. This list
was then distributed by Model to the employer-members
of the Association. The employer-members were in-
formed that the list was the most recent list of the union
manufacturers and reminded, that pursuant to their con-
tract with Respondent, the buyers were not to buy from
manufacturers who were not on the list.
Model had requested a list of manufacturers that met
the requirements of the purchasing prohibitions from
Arthur Katoros, the Union's secretary-treasurer, and
John Theoharris, business agent, sometime in April.
Model had had several conversations with Katoros and
Theoharris in which the union representatives claimed
that members of the Association were violating the pur-
chasing prohibitions of the contract. Model had an-
swered that sometimes manufacturers represented that
they were under a union contract when they were not.
Thus, Model requested an updated list so that the resi-
dent buyers could ascertain whether a particular manu-
facturer qualified.
Theoharris testified that the list of manufacturers sup-
plied to Model in May was based on Model's request.
According to Theoharris, Respondent maintained no list.
Rather, Respondent received a computer printout from
the trust fund office which showed all persons contribut-
ing to the Union trust funds; i.e., manufacturers, buyers,
retailers, wholesalers, designers, and contractors. Howev-
er, copies of this complete list have been furnished to the
Association under the contract in the past. Both Theo-
harris and Katoros admitted that the purchasing prohibi-
tions mean that buyers can only do business with manu-
facturers that have contracts with the Union.
While this case was pending, on August 24, 1981, Re-
spondent's counsel notified the Association that the
Union would not enforce article XI(c) of the collective-
bargaining agreement until the Board had decided the in-
stant case. However, on September 18, Katoros and
Theoharris told Model that the agreement not to enforce
the clause had been rescinded and that the resident
buyers were to continued to abide by the contract.
Analysis and Conclusions
As the Supreme Court explained in National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 633-
634 (1967), Section 8(e) was intended to supplement the
existing prohibitions against secondary boycotts. It does
not prohibit all union-employer agreements which may
have the incidental effect of a cessation of business with
other employers. Rather, Congress intended that Section
8(e) embody the same distinction between lawful primary
and unlawful secondary boycott activity contained in
Section 8(b)(4). Id. at 632-639. Accordingly, a collective-
bargaining agreement violates Section 8(e) if it is "tacti-
cally calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,"
rather than to forward the interests of the "employees
within the unit." Id. at 644-645. The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to
the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis
his own employees.
Accordingly, Section 8(e) does not prohibit agree-
ments for the puspose of preserving for the contracting
employees themselves work traditionally done by them.
National Woodwork Manufacturers, supra; N.L.R.B. v. In-
ternational Longshoremen's Association [New York Ship-
ping Assn.], 447 U.S. 490 (1980). Further, a union has a
legitimate interest in preventing the undermining of the
work opportunities and standards of employees in the
contractual bargaining unit by restricting subcontracting
to employers who meet the prevailing wage scales and
employee benefits covered by its contract. See, e.g.,
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1854 and United
Mine Workers of America (Amax Coal Company), 238
NLRB 1583, 1627 (1978), affd. in relevant part 614 F.2d
872 (3d Cir. 1980). The primary object of such a so-
called union standards clause is to eliminate the econom-
ic advantage to the employer of subcontracting unit
work.
However, the object of the purchasing prohibitions at
issue herein is not to protect or preserve the work op-
portunities or standards of employees employed by the
resident buyers. Rather, the object of the clause is to
protect or preserve the work opportunities or standards
of employees employed by manufacturers. The work op-
portunities and standards of the resident buyers' employ-
ees are the same whether garments are purchased from
union or nonunion manufacturers. The clause is not ad-
dressed to the labor relations of the resident buyers vis-a-
vis their own employees but to the labor relations of the
manufacturers. Clearly, the object of the clause is calcu-
lated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere; i.e., not in the
instant bargaining unit, and not to advance the interests
of the bargaining unit employees. Accordingly, the
clause violates Section 8(e).
I find no merit in Respondent's argument that the pur-
chasing prohibition is a lawful work-preservation clause
under the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association, supra. In that case,
the Supreme Court stated that a lawful work-preserva-
tion provision must meet two criteria:
First, it must have as its objective the preservation
of work traditionally performed by employees rep-
resented by the union. Second, the contracting em-
ployer must have the power to give the employees
the work in question-the so-called "right of con-
trol" test of [N.LR.B. v. Enterprise Association of
Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, etc., General
Pipefitters [Austin Co.], 429 U.S. 507 (1977)]. (447
U.S. at 504).
But before the foregoing criteria can be applied:
. . . the first and most basic question is: What is
the "work" that the agreement seeks to preserve?
(Id. at 505).
Here, the work that the agreement seeks to preserve is
the work performed in the manufacture of finished fur
garments. This work is traditionally performed by em-
ployees represented by Respondent. However, these em-
ployees are not employed by the resident buyers. The
703
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contracting employer, the Association (and its employer-
members), does not have the power to give the employ-
ees the work in question. Respondent argues that the
resident buyers have the power to choose whether to do
business with union or nonunion manufacturers. That ar-
gument misconstrues the "right of control" test of Pipe-
fitters, supra. It is the manufacturer and not the buyer
who determines whether the employees performing the
work do so under union conditions or under a union
contract. It is the manufacturer who determines whether
to do the work himself or whether to subcontract the
work and, if the work is subcontracted, the terms of the
subcontract. The resident buyers are clearly not involved
in that process. Thus, even though Respondent's work-
preservation provision may be valid in its intendment
and valid in its application with manufacturers, jobbers,
or contractors, application of such a provision to some-
one other than the immediate employer, such as a resi-
dent buyer, is secondary in nature. See George Koch Sons,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 490 F.2d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 1973).
The collective-bargaining agreement containing the of-
fending clause was executed outside the 6-month statute
of limitations established by Section 10(b) of the Act.5
The issue then becomes whether Respondent engaged in
any conduct within the 10(b) period which can be char-
acterized as an "entering into" of the unlawful provision.
The Board has interpreted the words "to enter into"
broadly to encompass the concepts of reaffirmation,
maintenance, or giving effect to any agreement which is
within the scope of Section 8(e). See, e.g., International
Union, United Mine Workers, of America, et al. (Garland
Coal & Mining Company), 258 NLRB 56 (1981); Dan
McKinney Co., 137 NLRB 649, 653 (1962). Here, the
record shows that Respondent furnished resident buyers
with a list of union signatories and a list of union manu-
facturers within the 10(b) period. Further the Resident
Fur Buyers Association was reminded within the 10(b)
period of the obligation of its members under the clause.
The maintenance and enforcement of such an unlawful
clause violates Section 8(e), notwithstanding that the
agreement was itself executed outside the 10(b) period.
Dan McKinney, supra.
As stated earlier, Respondent contends that its agree-
ment is privileged by the garment industry proviso to
Section 8(e). The General Counsel and the Charging
Parties, on the other hand, contend that the garment in-
dustry proviso does not apply to the resident buyers be-
cause "they are not involved in the integrated process of
production in the apparel and clothing industry."
The Legislative History of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Public Law 86-
257,6 reveals that the original bill in the House of Repre-
sentatives, commonly called the Landrum-Griffin Act,
prohibited all "hot cargo" agreements. 7 Through the
I Sec. 10(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with
the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against
whom such charge is made ....
a Hereinafter cited as I Leg. Hist. and II Leg. Hist.
7 The Senate bill originally prohibited hot cargo agreements only in
interstate trucking.
urging of Senator Javits, a joint conference committee
member, an exception was granted to the garment indus-
try to allow for the "unionization of contractors who do
work which is farmed out by people who are called job-
bers." s According to Javits the elimination of sweat-
shops was attributed to the garment industry practice
whereby jobbers agreed with the unions not to do busi-
ness with contractors who did not operate under a union
contracts Javits inserted into the record an article from
the New York Times which reveals the then existing
conditions in the garment industry and the purpose for
exempting the industry from the prohibitions of Section
8(e):' 0
In these industries the firms responsible for the man-
ufacture of clothes (called jobbers) design and cut
the goods but farm out to other shops (called con-
tractors) the sewing and pressing-run by firms
which are fiercely competitive, constantly changing
and difficult to organize. The vast improvement in
working conditions in the contractors' shops has
largely come out through agreements between the
jobbers and the unions which require jobbers to
farm out their work only to contractors who live
up to union standards.
So close have these two parts of the single pro-
duction process become that jobbers and contrac-
tors have been considered as one in applying the
provisions of the Taft-Harley law which prohibit
secondary boycotts ....
However, it is quite clear that Congress intended the
exemption to be an extremely limited one, restricted to
employers and labor organizations who actively partici-
pate in the integrated process. I The Conference Report
of the House Managers stated that the statutory language
"grants a limited exemption in three specific situations in
the apparel and clothing industry, but in no other indus-
try regardless of whether similar integrated process of
production may exist between jobbers, manufacturers,
contractors and subcontractors."i2 According to Senator
Goldwater, one of the Joint Conferees, the three specific
situations in which the exemption arises are:
. . . where the relationship between such employer
and other employers in said industry-that is, be-
tween primary and secondary employers-is that of
a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor
and where first, the subcontractor performs his
work for and on the premises of the contractor,
jobber or manufacturer; or second, the subcontrac-
tor performs his work for and on goods or materials
supplied by such contractor, jobber, or manufactur-
er; or third, an employer is engaged in an integrated
process of production with the other employers.' 3
8 II Leg. Hist. at 1384.
9 II Leg. Hist. at 1385.
'1 II Leg. Hist. at 1385.
ii Botany Industries v. N. Y. Joint Board, 375 F.Supp. 485 (D.C. N.Y.
1974).
12 1 Leg. Hist. at 944.
'a II Leg. Hist. at 1857.
704
FURRIERS JOINT COUNCIL
Thus, for the garment industry proviso to apply, the
employer-members of the Association must be employers
that meet one of these three conditions. As can be readi-
ly seen the resident buyers are not jobbers, manufactur-
ers, contractors, or subcontractors. They do not perform
work on the goods or contribute to the manufacturing
process. Rather they assist retailers in purchasing fin-
ished garments and incidentally assist manufacturers in
selling such garments. The garment industry proviso was
intended to extend to the process of production and not
to the transportation, shipping, or selling of garments.
Respondent argues that the operations of the resident
buyers are so similar to that of jobbers in the fur trade
that the garment industry proviso should apply. That ar-
gument is based on a false assumption. As discussed
above, in the fur trade, persons called jobbers purchase
finished fur garments from manufacturers and resell such
garments to retailers, extending credit to the retailers in
the process. However, that is not how the term jobber is
used in the Legislative History of Section 8(e). As dis-
cussed above, jobbers in the apparel and clothing indus-
try were persons responsible for the manufacture of
clothes who designed and cut the goods but farmed out
to other shops the sewing and pressing. 4 A typical ex-
ample given by Congressman Teller:
The jobber is engaged in the manufacture of dress-
es. He buys piece goods. He employs designers to
design the garments and perhaps cutters to cut the
goods. But the dresses are not sewn and finished in
his own shop. Instead the jobber sends out the cut
goods or sometimes the uncut goods, to contractors
whose workers sew and complete the dresses ac-
cording to the jobber's specifications. Then the con-
tractor sends the finished dresses back to the jobber
who sells them to the trade.' 5
From this example, Congressman Teller argued that the
jobber was the virtual employer of the workers in the
contractors' shops and that the contractor was nothing
more than the jobber's outside agent to obtain his re-
quired production. However, it is clear that the resident
buyers at issue herein are not in any way responsible for
the manufacture of garments and are not involved in the
employment of the workers involved in manufacture.
The resident buyers are simply involved in selling and
shipping. Thus, while the operations of fur buyers may
not differ greatly from jobbers in the fur industry, it is
not axiomatic that the garment industry proviso was in-
tended to apply to such persons. Rather, it was intended
that the garment industry proviso apply only in the three
specific instances listed by Senator Goldwater and cited,
supra.
In sum, I find that by maintaining and enforcing article
XI(c), the purchasing prohibitions, of the Resident Fur
Buyers Agreement, Respondent entered into an agree-
ment in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act and that
such conduct was not privileged by the garment industry
proviso to Section 8(e). ' 6
14 II Leg. Hist. at 1385.
II Leg. Hist. at 1680.
16 No serious consideration of Respondent's argument that Sec. 8(e)
does not apply to buyers or retailers is necessary. With the exception of
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The employer-members of the Resident Fur Buyers
Association are employers engaged in commerce and in
an industry affecting commerce wthin the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Furriers Joint Council of New York,
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Article XI(c), the purchasing prohibitions, of the
Resident Fur Buyers Agreement of 1978-81 is an agree-
ment violative of Section 8(e) of the Act.
4. By maintaining and enforcing the purchasing prohi-
bitions of the Resident Fur Buyers Agreement, within
the 10(b) period, Respondent reentered into an agree-
ment in violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.
5. The garment industry proviso to Section 8(e) does
not privilege Respondent's conduct herein.
6. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce and the free flow of com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom. In order to effectuate the purposes of
the Act, I shall also recommend that Respondent take
certain affirmative action.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to
the provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER' 7
The Respondent, Furriers Joint Council of New York,
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, New York, New York, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Entering into, maintaining, giving effect to, or en-
forcing article XI(c) of the Resident Fur Buyers Agree-
ments of 1978-81.
(b) In any like or related manner violating Section 8(e)
of the Act.
the garment industry proviso, the term employer in Sec. 8(e) is obviously
intended to include all categories and subcategories of employers within
the meaning of the Act.
In its brief, Respondent takes exception to certain rulings at the hearing
excluding evidence concerning the business operations of the Charging
Parties. As I have found that the employer-members of the Association
are neutrals to any dispute between Respondent and any manufacturer,
including the Charging Parties, I reaffirm my ruling that evidence con-
cerning such a dispute is irrelevant.
17 All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order
are hereby denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by
Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations
Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
705
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the Act:
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' 8 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 2, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of the above-named labor organization,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the above-named labor organiza-
tion to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and deliver to the Regional Director for
Region 2 sufficient copies of said notices, to be furnished
by the Regional Director, for posting by Louis Ka-
minsky & Sons, Inc., R & E Trading Corp., and the em-
ployer-members of the Resident Fur Buyers Association,
if willing.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
18 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT enter into, maintain, give effect to,
or enforce the following clause (article XI(c)) of the
Resident Fur Buyers Agreements of 1978-81:
The Employer shall purchase fur garments
only from sources whose workers work under
the terms and conditions prevailing in the fur
manufacturing industry. The Employer may rely
upon copies of alphabetically arranged lists fur-
nished to the Employer by the Union of all such
sources known to it and shall notify the Employ-
er of any changes in these lists, as such changes
take place during the terms of this Agreement.
The Employer shall not be liable hereunder if the
Union shall not furnish such list.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner vio-
late Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
FURRIERS JOINT COUNCIL OF NEW YORK,
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORK-
ERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO
706