Epe, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 11, 1985

273 N.L.R.B. 1375 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

EPE, INC. 1375
EPE, Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-16111
11 January 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 2 August 1984 Administrative Law Judge
Marvin Roth issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and the Charging Party
and the General Counsel each filed a response to
the Respondent's exceptions with a supporting
brief.'
The Board has considêred the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, finaings, 2 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, EPE, Inc.,
Fredericksburg, Virginia, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.
1 The General Counsel and the Charging Party each moved to strike
the Respondent's exceptions as not conforming to the requirements of
Sec. 102.46(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations. We find it unneces-
sary to pass on these motions in view of our determination that the ex-
ceptions lack merit.
2 In adopting the judge's conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(aX5) and (1) of the Act, mter alia, by canceling its collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union, we find it unnecessary to rely on his finding
that the wage reopener provision of the agreement does not provide for
the cancellation of the entire collective-bargaining agreement in the event
of the failure of the parties to reach agreement in reopener negotiations.
We rely instead on the other grounds stated by the judge for finding that
the Respondent unlawfully canceled the collective-bargaining agreement.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard at Washington, D.C., on May 30, 1984. The
charge was filed on January 24, 1984, by Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO (the
Union). The complaint, which issued on March 6, 1984,
and was amended on March 15, 1984, and at the hearing
alleges that EPE, Inc., formerly European Parts Ex-
change, Inc. (Respondent or the Company),' violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act. The gravamen of the complaint is that the Compa-
ny allegedly (1) approached wage reopener negotiations
with a fixed position, (2) insisted to impasse on a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining, and (3) unilaterally ter-
1 The caption of this case was amended at the hearing to reflect Re-
spondent's new name, effective as of January 1, 1984.
minated its contract with the Union. The Company's
answer denies the commission of the alleged unfair labor
practices. All parties were afforded full opportunity to
participate, to present relevant evidence, to argue orally,
and to file briefs. Briefs were waived.
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the demeanor of the one witness, and having con-
sidered the arguments of the parties, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Company, a California corporation, with an office
and place of business in Fredericksburg, Virginia, is en-
gaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale and distribu-
tion of foreign automobile parts and related products. In
the operation of its business, the Company annually sells
and ships from its Fredericksburg facility, products
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside of
Virginia. I find, as the Company admits, that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec:
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE BARGAINING UNIT INVOLVED
It is undisputed, and I so fmd, that since September 28,
1982, and at all times material, the Union has been and is
the certified and exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by the Company at its Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia location, including parts department employ-
ees, but excluding all other employees, office cleri-
cal employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
IV. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF PRIOR LITIGATION
The Company's response to unionization has been the
subject of two previous unfair labor practice proceed-
ings. The facts of the second case are closely related to
those of the present case. In June 1981, the Union com-
menced an organizational campaign among the employ-
ees at the Fredericksburg facility. In European Parts Ex-
change, Case 5-CA-13517, the administrative law judge
found, in sum, that the Company responded to this cam-
paign by discriminatorily discharging the leading union
adherent after subjecting him to harassment, isolation, al-
tered working conditions, and unwarranted discipline,
and otherwise violating the Act by coercive interroga-
tion, creating the impression of surveillance of union ac-
tivities, and unlawfully restricting employee union activi-
ty. The judge found and concluded that the Company
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and
recommended, inter alia, a broad cease-and-desist order
by reason of the Company's "flagrant disregard for the
273 NLRB No. 169
1376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fundamental rights guaranteed employees by the Act."
No exceptions were filed and, on June 2, 1983, the
judge's recommended Order was adopted by the Board.
On September 28, 1982, following a Board-conducted
election, the Board certified the Union as representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit. The certifica-
tion is reported at 264 NLRB 224. In late January 1983,2
the Company and the Union commenced contract nego-
tiations, and on April 25 reached complete agreement on
the terms of a contract. That fact has never been in dis-
pute. Nevertheless, despite its own promises and repeat-
ed requests by the Union, the Company did not execute
the contract until December 5, following an unfair labor
practice hearing before a second administrative law
judge. In the meantime, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges which resulted in the issuance of a con-
solidated complaint and the practice hearing on Decem-
ber 5 in Cases 5-CA-15584 and 5-CA-15777. On Janu-
ary 20, 1984, the judge issued his decision, finding and
concluding that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act by (1) failing and refusing to execute
and abide by the terms of the agreed-upon contract, (2)
unilaterally increasing the unit employees' health care in-
surance premiums without notifying and bargaining with
the Union, (3) unilaterally increasing wages without noti-
fying and bargaining with the Union, and (4) dealing di-
rectly with the unit employees and bypassing the Union
by polling the employees as to whether they desired
health insurance coverage and if so, what type of cover-
age they desired. The above third violation consisted of
a 15-cent hourly wage increase which was granted on
September 12 and announced to the employees by letter
shortly thereafter. The judge recommended, inter aim, by
way of affirmative relief, that the Company be ordered
to forthwith sign the contract, reimburse the employees
for any losses as a result of its failure to honor the con-
tract, reinstitute the insurance premiums as they existed
prior to the July 8 increases, pay the carrier the differ-
ence between those premiums and the increased premi-
ums, and reimburse the employees for the increases they
paid as a result of the July 8 increase. However, the
judge recommended that: "This obligation shall be tolled
either on the date Respondent bargains to an agreement
with the Union over the premium increases involved
herein or on the date a bona fide impasse exists after
good-faith bargaining over the matter." Respondent filed
exceptions which were pending before the Board at the
time of the present hearing. On June 19, 1984, the Board
issued its Decision and Order in 270 NLRB 1244. The
Board affirmed the judge's findings and conclusions but
modified the proposed order. The Board rejected the
Company's argument that the contract permitted it to
grant wage increases without discussion with the Union.
The Board deleted from its order, the proposed qualifica-
tion regarding bargaining over insurance premiums. The
Board held that article XIX of the contract precluded
the Company from increasing premiums paid by the em-
ployees for insurance coverage during the effective
period of the contract without the agreement of the
Union. The Board reserved for the compliance stage of
2 All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise indicated
the proceeding the Company's argument that 5 cents of
the 15-cent wage increase was to compensate the em-
ployees for the insurance premium increase.
V THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN THE
PRESENT CASE
A. The Facts
The evidence submitted in the present proceeding con-
sists of stipulated or admitted matters and the uncontro-
verted testimony of Union Vice President and Regional
Director Bruce Dunton, the only witness. The contract
between the Company and the Union was effective by its
terms from March 15, 1983, through July 1, 1984, and
subject to renewal from year to year thereafter. The con-
tract contained in pertinent part the following articles:
ARTICLE XIX—HEALTH AND WELFARE INSURANCE
PLANS
During the life of this Agreement, the Company
will maintain their present insurance plans. The cost
of such plans, paid by the employees, shall not be
increased during the life of this Agreement. . .
ARTICLE XXI—WAGE RATE AND CLASSIFICATIONS
A. The wage rate and classification Schedule A, at-
tached hereto, and made a part of this Agreement,
shall become effective on April 25, 1983. This
schedule does not prohibit the Company from
paying higher rates for any employee or any clas-
sification.
B. Wage Reopener.
1. Between the dates of November 1 and No-
vember 15, 1983, either party, by written notice
to the other party, can open this Agreement on
wages only.
2. The parties shall meet within five (5) work-
ing days after receipt of said notice and try to
reach agreement on new wage rates.
3. Should the parties fail to reach agreement
on the new wage rates by December 15, 1983,
then either party can give five (5) working days
notice to cancel said agreement and the Agree-
ment will be cancelled after the five (5) day
notice unless extended in writing by both parties.
4. Should the parties reach agreement on new
wage rates, then said rates will be effective De-
cember 16, 1983.
The language of articles XIX and XXI was drafted by
the Company and submitted as part of its final offer,
which was accepted by the Union.
By letter dated November 15, the Company informed
the Union that it was reopening the contract in accord-
ance with terms of article XXI. By letter dated Novem-
ber 21, the Union indicated that it was available to meet,
and again requested the Company to sign the contract
By letter dated November 22, the Company stated as fol-
lows.
EPE, INC. . 1377
Our proposal for a wage increase is that which was
received by the employees on September 12, 1983.
The specifics are as follows:
(1) 10t per hour cost of living increase.
(2) An additional 5t per hour to pay for in-
creased insurance cost.
(3) We propose an additional 10$ per hour for
the lead personnel due to the increased duties and
responsibilities.
We would like your written answer no later than
December 2, 1983.
In a subsequent position letter to the Board's Regional
Office following the filing of the present charge, the
Company's labor relations consultant confirmed that the
November 22 proposal consisted of the wage and insur-
ance increases which were the subject of the then pend-
ing unfair labor practice proceeding. By letter dated No-
vember 29, the Union requested a meeting to, discuss the
Company's proposal and any proposals which the Union
might wish to submit.
On December 5, immediately following the unfair
labor practice hearing, company and union representa-
tives met informally for about 15 minutes. The Union
asked if there was any new money involved in the pro-
posal beyond that for the lead personnel. The Company
answered that there was not and that there was no
money available for further increases. At this point
Union Representative Dunton responded that: "If you
find any money between now and spring, give us a call
and we will sit down and conclude." There was no fur-
ther discussion of the matter of wage increases. The
Union confirmed its position by letter dated December 9.
Thereafter, by letter dated December 19, the Company
asserted that: "It would appear by our meeting on De-
cember 9th, that the parties have reached an impasse per
the Wage Re-opener provision of the Agreement. There-
fore the Company has put our last offer in 'effect, and
hereby gives notice to the Union of our terminating said
Agreement per its Provisions." At the present hearing,
the Company stipulated that by its letter of December
19, the Company acted to cancel the entire contract.
By letter dated January 6, 1984, the Union again re-
stated its position, asserted that it had not broken off ne-
gotiations, and requested a meeting and that "if neces-
sary, a Federal mediator be present at that meeting." The
Company did not respond to this letter. Instead, by letter
dated March 30, 1984, the Company asserted that:
After review of the -sales of the Company by Head-
quarters in California, it was decided by the Board
of Directors to increase the hourly rates of all em-
ployees. Therefore we would propose a ten cents
(.10) per hour increase effective April 1, 1984. Said
amount covers any additional amounts of insurance
premiums that might have been or will be necessary
at some future date.
The Company also proposed negotiations for a new con-
tract "as the old agreement was cancelled." By letter
dated April 12, the Union refused to agree "to an in-
crease in wages, as outlined in your letter, that is cou-
pled with insurance premiums." The Union agreed to
commence negotiations for a new or amended contract
in accordance with the terms of the current contract. As
of the time of the present hearing the Company had not
implemented the proposed 10-cent-per-hour increase.
Concluding Findings
I find that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act by the manner in which it purported to
reopen the contract, and by unilaterally repudiating the
contract when it did not get its way. First, the Compa-
ny's action in purporting to reopen the contract for wage
negotiations was nothing more than a transparent at-
tempt to coerce the Union into ratifying the Company's
unilateral and unlawful actions in raising insurance pre-
miums and granting a general 15-cent-per-hour wage in-
crease. It is established Board policy that where, as here,
an employer unlawfully (whether for discriminatory mo-
tives or in violation of a collective-bargaining obliga-
tion), grants wage increases, the Board will not punish
the employees by directing the employer to rescind the
increases. Rather, the Board will simply order the em-
ployer to refrain from such conduct in the future and to
bargain in good faith with the representative. See, e.g.,
Dayton Blueprint Co., 193 NLRB 1100, 1111 (1971); Cen-
tury Papers, Inc., 155 NLRB 358, 362-363 (1965). Indeed,
in Case 5-CA-15584 the Board left open the possibility
that part of the wage increase might be used as an offset
against reimbursement for the insurance premium in-
creases. The Company never rescinded the wage in-
creases. Therefore, in purporting to reopen the contract
for wage negotiations, the Company did not propose
anything which the employees were not already receiv-
ing. Moreover, the Company proposed that 5 cents per
hour of the proposed increase be used to pay for in-
creased insurance costs, although that increase itself was
unlawful insofar as it was passed on to the employees.
Therefore, the Company was engaging in another step in
an unlawful course of conduct. As for the proposed in-
creases to lead personnel (assuming that they had not al-
ready been put in effect), they could have been handled
by negotiations under the second sentence of article
XXI, paragraph A, without any need to formally reopen
the entire article. As found, when the parties met briefly
on December 5, the Company . told the Union that its so-
called "proposal" did not involve any new money and
the Company could not afford any increases. The Com-
pany thereby precluded any meaningful bargaining con-
cerning wages, and disclosed the true motivation for its
actions. The Company placed the Union in a position
where it could only (I) propose wage decreases which
neither party wanted, (2) accept the Company's bogus
proposal, and thereby give approval to the Company's
prior unlawful actions, or (3) reject that proposal and
thereby give the Company a pretext (which it used) to
unilaterally terminate the entire contract. I find that the
Company violated Section 8(a)(5) by dealing in bad faith
with the Union and by submitting a proposal which was
nothing more than a demand for approval of its prior un-
lawful actions, and that the Company did not in fact, or
in good faith, reopen article XXI for true wage negotia-
1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions Therefore although the Company's proposal nomi-
nally dealt with the subject of wages, the Company did
not validly reopen article XXI. For this if no other
reason the contract remained in effect It follows that the
Company also acted in bad faith by later proposing a
wage increase effective April 1, 1984, notwithstanding
that the time for validly reopening article XXI had ex-
pired and the contract term ran until July 1, 1984. As the
proposed wage increase purported to compensate the
employees for the unlawful increased insurance premi-
ums, the Company's proposal, if implemented, would
have been unlawful for this additional reason.
Even if the Company, in November, validly reopened
article XXI for bona fide wage negotiations, this did not
give the Company the right, as it did, to use failure of
agreement as an excuse to cancel the entire contract.
First, the Union did not break off negotiations Rather,
the Union requested further negotiations "if you find any
money between now and spring." Therefore, even as-
suming good faith on the part of the Company, there
was no impasse in negotiations. See generally Hi-Way
Billboards, Inc , 206 NLRB 22, 23 (1973), revd on other
grounds 500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir 1974); Taft Broadcasting
Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), affd. sub nom American
Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Second, article XXI does not
provide by its terms for cancellation of the entire con-
tract. Rather, when considered in context, it is evident
that the phrase "said agreement" as used in pargaraph 3
refers to the wage reopener agreement. Therefore, if the
parties fail to reach agreement on new wage rates after
bona fide negotiations, the contract, including wage
rates, remains in effect and both parties are precluded
from taking unilateral action. Although the meaning of
paragraph 3 is not crystal clear, the language was drafted
by the Company. Moreover, the Company's interpreta-
tion, if correct, would mean that failure of agreement on
one subject, i.e. wages, could have drastic and disruptive
results, namely, cancellation of the entire contract and
potential strike or lockout action. Therefore, insofar as
paragraph 3 may be ambiguous as to its meaning, the
doubt should be resolved against the Company and in
favor of contract stability. Third, even if paragraph 3
sanctioned cancellation of the entire contract, the Com-
pany could not lawfully do so because there was no
compliance by either or both parties with the notice pro-
visions of Section 8(d) of the Act. In his closing argu-
ment at the hearing, the Company's representative assert-
ed that: "There is no case that we could find that had to
do in regards to contracts that are so-called cancelled in
mid-term because the parties couldn't get together." Evi-
dently the Company's representative, who has many
years of experience in labor negotiations, did not look
hard In NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U S 282, 291-293
(1957), the Supreme Court held, insofar as pertinent to
the present case, that the notice requirements of Section
8(d) operate "wholly independently of whatever notice
requirement the parties have fixed for themselves," and
that the statutory notice requirements are applicable "in
the middle of a contract which authorizes a reopening on
wages." See also NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377
F 2d 963, 968 (8th Cir 1967), Pacific Grinding Wheel Co.,
220 NLRB 1389 (1975), enfd. 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.
1978).
Therefore I find, as discussed, that the Company vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. I find that the
Company's position in this case is not only lacking in
merit, but may fairly be characterized as frivolous I fur-
ther find that the Company's actions were also violative
of the Board's broad cease-and-desist order in Case 5-
CA-13517, and a continuation of the unfair labor prac-
tices found in Case 5-CA-15584.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by the Company at its Fredericksburg, Virginia
location, including parts department employees, but ex-
cluding all other employees, office clerical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a
unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material the Union has been and is the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the unit described above.
5. By improperly invoking the wage reopener provi-
sion of its contract with the Union, dealing in bad faith
with the Union, continuing its prior course of unlawful
conduct, and unilaterally terminating its contract with
the Union, the Company has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has committed viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall recom-
mended that it be required to cease and desist therefrom,
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that the
Company be ordered to maintain and give full effect to
its collective-bargaining contract with the Union and any
successor contracts, to bargain in good faith with the
Union, to reimburse the unit employees for their loss of
wages and of other employment benefits, if any, as a
result of the Company's termination of the contract, with
interest, in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service,
183 NLRB 682 (1970), and Florida Steel Corp, 231
NLRB 651 (1977), and to post appropriate notices.
The Company's conduct in this case demonstrates both
a proclivity to violate the Act and a tendency to engage
in frivolous litigation before the Board. 3 Thus the Com-
3 Although no exceptions were filed in Case 5-CA-13517, the Judge's
decision may properly be considered in determining whether the Compa-
ny has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act Operating Engineers
Local 12 (Associated Engineers), 270 NLRB 1172 (1984)
EPE, INC. 1379
pany persisted in litigating Case 5-CA-15584 etc., not-
withstanding that it never disputed that it had negotiated
the contract with the Union. Therefore, like the adminis-
trative law judge in Case 5-CA-13517, I am recommend-
ing that the Company be ordered to cease and desist
from infringing in any manner on the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act. I am also recommending to the
General Counsel that it seek judicial enforcement of the
outstanding orders against the Company. I am further
recommending that the Company be ordered to reim-
burse the Union for its costs and expenses incurred in the
preparation and conduct of contract negotiations during
the period from November 15, 1983, through April 12,
1984, and in the investigation, preparation, presentation,
and conduct of this proceeding. See Wellman Industries,
248 NLRB 325, 329 (1980); Koval Press, 241 NLRB 1261,
1263-64 (1979), enfd. 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980). But
for the Company's action in reopening the contract for
unlawful reasons, there would have been no need for
such negotiations. Therefore, the Union's expenses are at-
tributable to the Company's unfair labor practices.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed4
ORDER
The Respondent, EPE, Inc., Fredericksburg, Virginia,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith
with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit, by invoking the
wage reopener provision of their contract for improper
or unlawful reasons, dealing in bad faith with the Union,
continuing to engage in prior unlawful conduct, or uni-
laterally terminating its contract with the Union.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Maintain and give full effect to its collective-bar-
gaining contract or contracts with the Union.
(b) Bargain collectively and in good faith with the
Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in
the appropriate unit.
(c) Reimburse the unit employees for their loss of
wages or other employment benefits, if any, as a result of
its termination of the contract with the Union, with in-
terest, as set forth in the section of this decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(e) Pay to the Union the costs and expenses incurred
by it in the preparation and conduct of contract negotia-
tions during the period from November 15, 1983,
through April 12, 1984, and in the investigation, prepara-
tion, presentation, and conduct of this proceeding, in-
cluding salaries and travel expenses, such costs and ex-
penses to be determined at the compliance stage of this
proceeding.
(f) Post at its Fredericksburg, Virginia place of busi-
ness copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 5, after being signed by Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
5 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively and
in good faith with Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our employees in the appropriate unit,
by invoking the wage reopener provision of our contract
for improper or unlawful reasons, dealing in bad faith
with the Union, continuing to engage in prior unlawful
conduct, or unilaterally terminating our contract with
the Union. The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by the Company at its Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia location, including parts department employ-
ees, but excluding all other employees, office cleri-
cal employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your right
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to engage in union or concerted activities, or to refrain
therefrom.
WE WILL maintain and give full effect to our contract
or contracts with the Union.
WE WILL bargain collectively and in good faith with
the Union as the exclusive representative of our employ-
ees in the appropriate unit.
WE WILL reimburse you for your loss of wages or
other employment benefits, if any, as a result of our un-
lawful termination of the contract with the Union, with
interest.
WE WILL compensate the Union for its costs and ex-
penses incurred in preparing for and participating in con-
tract negotiations during the period from November 15,
1983, through Apnl 12, 1984, and in preparing for and
conducting this case.
EPE, INC.