Eaton Yale & Towne Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 21, 1968

171 N.L.R.B. 600 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

600 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne Inc.
and Local No. 407 , International Union , United
Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America , UAW-AFL-CIO.
Case 30-CA-572
May 21, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 29, 1967, Trial Examiner
Benjamin B . Lipton issued his Decision in the
above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had not engaged in the unfair labor practices al-
leged in the complaint, and recommending that the
complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Deci-
sion and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a
brief in support of the Decision.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the
briefs, and the entire record in the case , and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner only to the extent con-
sistent herewith.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent did
not engage in conduct in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act as Respondent's contract with
the Union "sanctioned" the former's unilateral ac-
tion in (1) changing the method of handling and
loading forgings by the installation of new equip-
ment, (2) eliminating the classification of shipping
loader, an incentive rated position, and (3 ) reclassi-
fying the loading employee as an hourly rated in-
dustrial truckdriver. The Trial Examiner also gave
as an additional or alternative ground for dismissal
of the 8(a)(5) allegation the absence of Respon-
dent animus toward the Union and the availability
of established grievance-arbitration machinery for
the resolution of the dispute which involved in-
terpretation of the contract. We do not agree with
these findings of the Trial Examiner.
As indicated in the Trial Examiner's Decision,
Respondent representatives and the Union's
grievance committee held weekly meetings at
which they presented grievances and discussed sub-
jects such as bumping rights and shift preferences.
All dates herein are for 1967
' However, until the changeover was complete, S7alacnski was to he
paid the incentive rate « henever required to handle forgings in the old
manner
' The Union did not at this time or on any subsequent occasion invoke
the grievance -arbitration procedure with respect to this subject
171 NLRB No. 73
Near the close of the meeting held on March 31,'
David H. Langeland, employee relations manager,
announced for the first time the following change in
the shipping room effective April 10: Respondent
would begin using a scale that had been installed in
the shipping room for weigh-counting forgings, and
would gradually "do away" with the "antiquated
method" of handling and counting each forging
that was to be shipped to or from the plant. The
classification of "shipping loader" would be
eliminated and the full-time employee in that posi-
tion, Joseph Szalacinski, who was being paid on an
incentive basis, would continue working in the
shipping room but would be classified as an hourly
rated industrial truckdriver.'2 Local President Alfred
Gruenwald and the other union representatives in-
sisted that Respondent could not institute such
changes without prior discussion and negotiation
with the Union. Langeland replied that the Com-
pany had the right to make the changes and that
there was nothing further to discuss. Langeland also
asserted that the Union could, if it so wished, file a
grievance as the matter was subject to the
grievance procedure provided in the contract.3
At the April? meeting, Jim Lukasavitz, chief
steward of the Union, demanded discussion of the
proposed change. When Langeland refused, Gruen-
Wald cited article III, section 6, of the supplementa-
ry agreement of Respondent and the Union which
provides that "before any changes in these incen-
tive plans are made or new plans established, they
will be agreed upon by the parties." Gruenwald
further stated that the Company had no right "to
arbitrarily change the contract without talking with
the Union." Landeland answered, "why should we
talk anything over with the union, the union never
agrees with us, anyway." On May 1, Gruenwald
again requested that Respondent "sit down and talk
to someone in the bargaining committee" about the
change which had already gone into effect on April
10. Langeland replied that the parties had already
talked about it.
As noted above, the contract provides specified
incentive rate schedules under which shipping
loader functions are paid on a "man-hour daily ba-
sis" for the total tonnage handled. Prior to April
10, most of this work was performed full time on
the first shift by Szalacinski who, as noted above,
was classified as a shipping loader for about 8
years." When the inspected forgings were brought
to the dock by the industrial truckdrivers, Szalacin-
' Four additional employees in such classifications as inspector and in-
dustrial truckdriver, namely, Ronnie Jatimski, Jim Nelson, Wayne Wenka,
Gary Plewa, performed part-time loading work on various shifts for which
they were paid the incentive rate The record also shows that a smaller
amount of loading work was done by four other unnamed employees
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION
ski carried out his responsibility of getting the
forgings "ready for shipment out the door" by
physically handling, counting, loading, and moving
the individual forgings, with the assistance of a fork-
lift truck as needed. Although Szalacinski was
newly classified as an hourly rated industrial
truckdriver as of April 10, he nevertheless con-
tinued to work in the shipping room where he han-
dled forgings in bulk rather than individually. Thus,
the forgings were brought up to the dock in boxes,
skids, or wooden containers, and were weighed,
tagged , and loaded for shipment. However,
Szalacinski received the incentive rate when he
handled some forgings by the old method. As
shown by the charts appearing in the Trial Ex-
aminer 's Decision , Szalacinski's average hourly in-
centive earnings for the 3 months prior to April
ranged from $4.78 to $4.85 as compared with
$3.13 for June by which time the proportion of
work performed and paid for on an incentive basis
had sharply decreased.'
As the Trial Examiner found , it is undisputed that
Respondent acted unilaterally in changing the
method and equipment for the handling of forgings
in the shipping department, thereby affecting the
working conditions and reducing the earnings of
the employees who devoted all or part of their time
to doing shipping loader work. The Trial Examiner
reasoned as follows in finding meritorious Respon-
dent's defense which rests exclusively upon the
terms of its collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union:
Paragraph 116 of the contract' contains in
specific language the form of an unusually broad
waiver of bargaining rights and goes well beyond
the phrasing of the type of "wrap-up or zipper
clause" which the Board has found insufficient to
constitute a clear waiver of a statutory right. The
Union expressly and consciously waived in para-
graph 116 its statutory bargaining rights where the
subject is covered or referred to in the contract, or
where it is fairly implied that the subject, although
not specifically mentioned, is within the general
embrace of the agreement. Respondent's unilateral
action was also in accordance with the other provi-
sions of the contract which permitted it to
reestablish a production rate or change an incentive
rated job due to a technological change in method
and equipment.
As the Trial Examiner correctly states, a union's
statutory right to be notified and consulted con-
' It appears that there was it corresponding decline in the earnings of the
other employees who had done loading work on a part-time basis
" See the Trial Examiner's Decision for the text of this and other contrac-
tual provisions referred to herein
601
cerning any substantial change in employment may
be waived by contract, but such waiver must be ex-
pressed in clear and unmistakable terms , and will
not lightly be inferred.' We also agree with the
Trial Examiner that the mere existence of contrac-
tual grievance and arbitration procedures will not
by itself warrant a finding that the union waived its
right to bargain on changes planned by the em-
ployer. However, we do not agree with the Trial
Examiner that paragraph 116 or other provisions of
the contract in the instant case constitute a clear
waiver of the Union's right to be consulted about
Respondent's change in the mode of operating its
shipping room.
In Rockwell-Standard,' which involved a waiver
provision identical to the one herein, the Board
adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that "even
when a `waiver' is expressed in a contract in such
broad, sweeping terms ... it must appear from an
evaluation of ... negotiations that the particular
matter [in issue] was fully discussed or consciously
explored and the union consciously yielded or
clearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the
matter." Applying this test to the situation herein, it
does not appear from the record or the various con-
tractual provisions alluded to by the Trial Examiner
and analyzed herein that the Union consciously
yielded or clearly waived its interest in changes
such as the one in dispute herein.
Article III is entitled, "Incentive Schedules and
Time-Study Procedure-General Rules Applying to
All Incentive Workers in the Plant." As noted
above, section 6 thereof provides that "before any
changes in . . . incentive plans are made or new
plans established, they will be agreed upon by the
parties." Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we regard
as a radical change the discontinuance of the incen-
tive plan in favor of a straight hourly plan for load-
ing work in the shipping room. As such, it would be
governed by the contractual requirement that it
cannot be put into effect without approval of the
Union. We note also that earnings for loading work
declined subsequent to the change and that
Respondent did not meet its obligation under sec-
tion 2 to "provide for the same average earning op-
portunity."
In view of the foregoing, we see no basis for in-
ferring that the Union surrendered to Respondent
the right unilaterally to make a sweeping change in
the method of compensating employees for per-
forming loading functions. Although, as the Trial
C & C Ph q and Corporation, 148 NLRB 414
" RocAu ell-Standard Corporation, Transmission and Axle Division, Forge
Division, 166 NLRB 124
602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner points out, the Union in the master
agreement recognizes the right of the Company to
"constantly [improve] product quality and ...
[lower] product cost through time-saving methods
and equipment" (par. 91) and to "restudy or
retime" a job when such a change is made (par. 93
and 95), these provisions must be construed in the
context of article III, section 2, and especially sec-
tion 6, which clearly delimits the exercise of the
Company's right to bring about changes by making
them subject to the approval of the Union. That the
contract provides for the utilization of grievance
procedures in the event of union dissatisfaction
with rates of production set by the Company (par.
96) or with respect to incentive rates (art. II, sec.
3) does not preclude the Union from insisting on its
right to utilize an alternative course of action,
namely the right to bargain about "changes in ...
incentive plans" as spelled out in article III, section
6, of the supplementary agreement.' In this connec-
tion, we have already expressed our disagreement
with the Trial Examiner 's holding that there was no
unlawful refusal to bargain on the part of Respon-
dent because of the long history of amicable bar-
gaining and the existence of established grievance-
arbitration machinery for the resolution of dif-
ferences of the parties. As the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia stated in the
Fibreboard case,10 "it is not necessary to find an
anti-union animus as a predicate for a conclusion
that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) which
commands good faith bargaining on wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment." And, as
the Supreme Court observed in the same case,"
"cost-cutting decisions, even though not motivated
by discriminatory considerations, are suitable for
resolution within the collective bargaining
framework," and "it is not necessary that it be like-
ly or probable that the union will ... supply a feasi-
ble solution but rather that the union be afforded
an opportunity to meet management's legitimate
complaints ...."
Contrary to our dissenting colleagues, who con-
cede that the availability of grievance-arbitration
procedures does not preclude the Board from exer-
cising its undoubted authority to assert jurisdiction
over the unfair labor practices herein, we find
ample reason for doing so in the instant proceed-
ing.12 The Board is the forum chosen to decide the
issue of, and to remedy, the asserted violation of
employee statutory rights. The controversy is not
one that is beyond our competence to resolve, and
as long as it is unresolved it may have a continuing
impact on the bargaining relationship. The Board's
remedial authority is likewise clear and adequate.
The parties have litigated the matter fully, and it is
over a year since the events giving rise to the
dispute occurred. We are unwilling, therefore, to
withhold our determination in these circumstances
and to send the parties away empty-handed to seek
their resolution elsewhere. As the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit stated in its Huttig opinion,13
it is desirable "to avoid delay either in the courts or
in the arbitration process; to emphasize and pro-
tect, in cases of doubt, and to give priority to, statu-
torily declared rights, to regard as no more than
secondary any contract interpretation aspect of
what is regarded as basically an unfair labor prac-
tice dispute ... ; to take a broad, and not a narrow
or technical, approach to the Act ... ; and not to
close the door upon Board expertise when such
restraint is clearly not violative of congressional
mandate."
Accordingly, we find that by its unilateral action
with respect to changing the methods of operation
and compensation Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The General Counsel urges that Respondent be
directed fully to restore the status quo ante. In
fashioning an appropriate remedy, we shall, in ac-
cordance with established policy, adapt it to the
particular situation that calls for redress." We are
of the opinion that reinstitution of the old loading
procedures in advance of good-faith bargaining on
this subject is not essential in this case to the mold-
ing of a meaningful remedy suited to the practical
needs of the situation herein. However, effectuation
of the policies of the Act does require that Respon-
dent be directed now to remedy the violation found
by offering to bargain not only about the effects on
the employees of the changes made on April 10,
1967, but also about the restoration of the status
quo ante. Our Order will so provide.
It must be presumed that the employees who
spent all or part of their time on loading work as in-
centive rated employees would have continued on
this basis at least until Respondent had fulfilled its
bargaining obligation by negotiating to a bona fide
impasse. Effectuation of the Act's policies therefore
further requires that the employees whose statutory
rights were violated by reason of Respondent's un-
lawful unilateral action, and who have suffered loss
"NLRB v Mang Sash &Door Co,Inc, 377F2d964(CA 8)
"'Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v NLRB, 322 F 2d 411
(CA DC)
379 U S 203, 214
2 Under Section 10(a) of the Act, "The Board is empowered to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise
N L R B v Hattig Sash & Door Company, Inc , supra
Winn-Dude Stores, Inc , 147 NLRB 788
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION 603
in consequence thereof, be reimbursed for such
losses until such time as Respondent remedies its
violation.
Accordingly, we shall order that Respondent
shall make whole the employees who did loading
work on an incentive rate basis for any loss of pay
they may have suffered as a result of Respondent's
unfair labor practices . The liability for such
backpay shall cease upon the occurrence of any of
the following conditions : ( 1) reaching mutual
agreement with the Union relating to the subjects
which Respondent is herein required to bargain
about; ( 2) bargaining to a bona fide impasse; (3)
the failure of the Union to commence negotiations
within 5 days of the receipt of Respondent's notice
of its desire to bargain with the Union; or (4)
failure of the Union to bargain thereafter in good
faith. Of course, if Respondent decides to resume
the status quo ante with employees once again
receiving incentive pay for loading work, its liability
will cease as of that date. Backpay shall be based
upon the earnings which affected employees would
normally have received , absent the changes, less
any net interim earnings , and shall be computed on
a quarterly basis with interest thereon.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
and on the record as a whole, we make the follow-
ing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All of Respondent's hourly rated production
and maintenance employees at its Milwaukee,
Wisconsin , plant , but excluding direct representa-
tives of management , office employees , clerical em-
ployees, timestudy men, engineering personnel,
professional employees , plant protection patrol-
men, kitchen and cafeteria employees , superintend-
ents, foremen , assistant foremen , and all other su-
pervisors within the meaning of the Act , constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. At all times material herein , the Union has
been the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in the aforesaid unit within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally instituting operational changes
significantly impairing the terms and conditions of
employees doing loading work in the shipping
room, and refusing to bargain over these changes,.
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act , as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent,
Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne
Inc., Milwaukee , Wisconsin , its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local
No. 407, International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW-AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the aforesaid
appropriate bargaining unit.
(b) Unilaterally changing the wages , hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees without prior consultation and bargain-
ing with the above -named Union concerning such
decision and the effects thereof.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist the above-
named Union or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing , and to engage in concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such ac-
tivities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act.
(a) Offer to , and upon request , bargain collec-
tively with the Union concerning the reinstitution
of the shipping loader classification , the shipping
loading procedures , and the method of compensa-
tion used in the shipping room prior to April 10,
1967, and , if no agreement is reached with respect
thereto , bargain collectively with the Union con-
cerning the effects of the discontinuance thereof on'
the employees in the above-described unit.
(b) Make Joseph Szalacinski, Ronnie Jasinski,
Jim Nelson , Wayne Wenka , Gary Plewa , and any
other employees adversely affected by the uni-
lateral changes , whole for any loss of pay suffered
by them in the manner and under the conditions
and circumstances set forth in the Board 's Deci-
sion.
604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 5 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 30, after being
duly signed by Respondent's official representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to its employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
MEMBERS BROWN and ZAGORIA, dissenting:
Contrary to the majority, we are of the opinion
that the basic dispute in this case should be left for
resolution within the framework of the settlement
procedures agreed upon by the parties in their cur-
rent collective-bargaining agreement.
Respondent and the Union have enjoyed a con-
tractual relationship for more than 25 years, with
grievance-arbitration provisions contained in their
present agreement. The issue presented here arises
out of certain operational and incentive wage
changes effected by Respondent. When the Union
and Respondent disagreed as to whether the con-
tract entitled Respondent to have made the
changes, the Union initially filed a grievance alleg-
ing a breach of the contract and Respondent stated
its willingness to have the grievance processed
through the arbitration provisions of their agree-
ment . Notwithstanding, the Union then filed a
charge, and the General Counsel issued the present
complaint urging the Union's interpretation of the
contract and accordingly alleging that Respondent
had engaged in unilateral conduct violative of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
The Trial Examiner 's Decision sets forth the con-
tract provisions pertaining to the substantive
dispute, and the parties' conflicting interpretations.
Finding that the parties asserted their respective
positions in good faith, the Trial Examiner accepted
Respondent's interpretation and dismissed the com-
plaint. Our colleagues, on the other hand, disagree
with the Trial Examiner's interpretation, and on
such basis they conclude that Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
If there is any situation in which the Board
should defer to the parties' own agreed-upon
methods for resolving contract disputes, this is the
case. Thus, the parties have an established bargain-
ing history; they have a dispute involving substan-
tive contract interpretation, each party asserting a
reasonable claim in good faith and in a situation
wholly devoid of 8(a)(1) or other unlawful con-
duct; and they have contractual grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures which Respondent has urged the
Union to use for resolving their dispute. In this con-
text, and mindful of our competency in the area,16
we believe that the policy of promoting industrial
peace and stability through collective bargaining
impels us to defer to the grievance-arbitration
procedures the parties themselves have voluntarily
established."
Without deciding the merits of the controversy,
we would dismiss the complaint.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforc-
ing an Order "
"' N L R B v Acme Industrial Co, 385 U S 423, N.L R B v C & C
Plp" ood Corp , 385 U S. 421
" United Steehuirkers of America v American Mfg Co , 363 U S 564,
United .Steehiorkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co , 363
U.S 574, United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp,
363 U S 593 Cf International Harvester Co , 138 NLRB 923, affd 327
F 2d 784 (C A 7),cert. denied 377 US 1003
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify you that:
After a trial in which both sides had the opportu-
nity to present their evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we violated the Act
and has ordered us to post this notice and to keep
our word about what we say in this notice.
WE WILL NOT make changes in our opera-
tions or in the method of payment for work
without first discussing and negotiating such
changes with the Union.
The Board found we violated the law when
we did not consult or bargain with the Union
before making changes in the manner of
operating the shipping room and stopping the
incentive method of paying employees doing
loading work.
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION
As the Board found that we violated the law
when we made the changes in the shipping
room, we will offer to bargain with the Union
about going back to the old way of operating
that room and paying for loading work. How-
ever, if good-faith bargaining does not result in
the Company's agreeing to return to the old
system, we will then bargain with the Union
about the effects of the changes.
WE WILL also pay all employees who spent
part or all of their time doing loading work be-
fore April 10, 1967, the difference between
what they would have earned on the incentive
basis and what they actually did earn after the
Company started to operate the shipping room
in the new way. We will continue this backpay
until the Company reaches some agreement
with the Union, or until the Company and the
Union find they cannot reach an agreement
after bargaining in good faith.
UNIT DROP FORGE
DIVISION EATON YALE &
TOWNE INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 2d Floor, Commerce Building, 744 North
4th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Telephone
688-5801.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN B. LIPTON, Trial Examiner: This case
was heard on July 20, 1967, in Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin, on a complaint issued by the General Counsel
alleging violation by Respondent of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.' At the hearing , all parties ap-
peared and were afforded full opportunity to
present relevant evidence. Oral argument on the
record was waived, and briefs were filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent after the close of
the hearing.
Upon consideration of the entire record in the
case, including the briefs, and from my observation
605
of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne
Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of steel forgings
at a plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, solely involved
in this proceeding. During a representative annual
period, Respondent had a direct outflow in in-
terstate commerce of products valued in excess of
$50,000, and a direct inflow of products valued in
excess of $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find,
that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local No . 407, International Union , United Au-
tomobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America , UAW-AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union , is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue Involved
With virtually no dispute as to material facts, the
essential question which emerges from the entire
record is whether Respondent, as it contends, was
legally justified under provisions of an existing con-
tract with the Union in making certain changes of
method and equipment, affecting the classification
and earnings of employees working as shipping
loaders, without prior consultation or bargaining
with the Union.
B. The Relevant Facts
1. Setting and development of the dispute
Since 1942, Respondent has had contractual
relations with the union as collective-bargaining
representative in a production and maintenance
unit consisting of about 275 employees. As specifi-
cally provided in the contract, regularly scheduled
meetings each week are held between representa-
tives of the Union and Respondent.' In these
meetings, normally scheduled on Friday from 1 to 3
p.m., the purpose and practice have been to pro-
vide a continuous forum for processing grievances
and discussing various questions or disputes con-
cerning job postings, rights of "bumping" by em-
ployees, shift preferences, and other matters not
' The original charge was filed by the Union on April 14, 1967, and the
complaint thereon was issued on June 30, 1967
t Paragraph 10 (see Appendix hereto) The provision for an agenda to be
submitted in advance has not been adhered to in practice
606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the subject of formal grievances as may be brought
up by either party. At all times material at these
meetings, the Union was represented by its
grievance committee consisting of Alfred Gruen-
wald, local union president, Jim Lukasavitz, chief
steward, Stanley Kornacki, committeeman, and
Richard N. Immel, committee secretary; and
Respondent was represented by David H. Lange-
land, employee relations manager, Ernie Page, first
shift plant superintendent, and Harry Sherer, times-
tudy engineer.
Toward the close of the meeting on March 31,
1967,3 Langeland announced to the union commit-
tee in substance that, effective April 10, Respon-
dent would begin using a scale that had been in-
stalled in the shipping room for weigh-counting the
forgings, with the intention of eventually "doing
away" with the "antiquated method" of hand load-
ing and counting every forging that was shipped (to
or from the plant). The present classification of
"shipping loader" would be eliminated,' and the em-
ployee holding that job would be reassigned as an
hourly paid truckdriver.5 However, `until the
change was 100%," this employee would be paid,
as before, on an incentive basis for such time that
he was required physically to handle the forgings in
the manner of the original method.' Gruenwald and
other union representatives expressed strong objec-
tion, and insisted that Respondent could not in-
stitute such change without prior discussion and
negotiation with the Union. Langeland replied that
the Company had the right to make the change and
that there was nothing further to discuss. His stated
position was that the matter was subject to the con-
tract grievance procedure, which the Union could
invoke if it so desired.
At the April 7 meeting, essentially the same posi-
tions were expressed by the parties. Lukasavitz, the
chief steward, specifically demanded discussion of
the changes which were going to be made in the
shipping room, and Langeland again declined.
Gruenwald then cited and read to Langeland from
article 3, section 6, of the contract, which provides
that "before any changes in these incentive plans
are made or new plans established, they will be
agreed upon by the parties." Langeland made no
response . Gruenwald further stated that the Com-
pany had no right "to arbitrarily change the con-
tract" without talking with the Union. Langeland
All dates hereinafter are in 1967
Based on the testimony of Immel and Kornacki
There are three other similarly classified "industrial truck drivers" in
the department
" Neither the Union nor the employees affected were advised of the con-
templated change before the March 31 meeting
r At the meetings on and subsequent to March 31, various other matters,
including formal grievances , were discussed by the parties Considerable
testimony was adduced on both sides concerning notes which were taken at
each meeting by Langeland for Respondent and by Immel for the Union
The contract provided for posting in the plant of such notes or "minutes of
all meetings of the Grievance Committee," after they are approved and
answered , "why should we talk anything over with
the union, the union never agrees with us, anyway."
On April 10, the announced changes were put
into effect. As earlier noted, the Union filed
charges with the Board on April 14. At the meeting
on May 1, Gruenwald "made one last pitch" by
pointing out to Langeland that the Company was
making a grave mistake concerning the loader in
the shipping room, and that "they should sit down
and talk to someone in the bargaining committee."
Langeland merely replied that they had already
talked about it. Regarding the dispute in question,
the Union did not attempt to pursue the grievance-
arbitration procedures of the contract.?
2. Substance of the shipping loader change
Under specified incentive rate schedules pro-
vided in the contract,' shipping loader functions are
paid on a "man-hour daily basis" for the total ton-
nage which the employee handles. Before the
change was effected on April 10, the principal por-
tion of the shipping loader work was performed full
time on the first shift by Joseph Szalacinski, who
had held such classification for about 8 years. In
addition, certain employees having other regular
classifications, one on the first shift and two on the
second shift, also performed such work, as
required, on a temporary part-time basis, and when
doing so were paid the same incentive rates.
Szalacinski described in detail his duties as shipping
loader: After the forgings were inspected, a
truckdriver brought them to the dock. It was then
Szalacinski's "responsibility to get the forgings
ready for shipment out the door." His work
generally consisted of the physical handling, count-
ing, loading, and moving the individual forgings,
with the assistance of a forklift truck as needed.
Since April 10, in his actual duties as truckdriver,
he continued the same basic function with respect
to the forgings, but now in bulk form rather than by
individual pieces.' From the inspection floor, the
forgings were "brought up to the dock in boxes,
skids or wooden containers." In this form, he now
weighed, tagged, and loaded them to be shipped.
However, he also performed part-time work as
"shipping loader" when he handled individual
pieces, which function gradually diminished to a
signed by both parties . Gruenwald refused to sign Langeland 's notes for the
March 31 meeting because they failed to record the Union 's opposition to
the announced changes While the notes for certain of these meetings were
admitted in evidence, without objection, they are not established as official
records or "minutes" and cannot in any event serve as a substitute for the
actual testimony herein described.
"About 75 percent of the plant employees are compensated under the
contract incentive system.
" It does not appear that the other three " industrial truck drivers" in the
department , after the change on April 10, performed the same type of
work as Szalacinski in preparing forgings to be shipped ( and also forgings
to be received in the plant).
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION 667
substantial degree after a period of time, and his in- declined. The following charts from Respondent's
centive earnings for such work correspondingly records were admitted by stipulation:
Week Endings
Record of Hours Worked and Earnings Paid to
Joseph Szalacinski for the period beginning
1-1-67 and ending 7-2-67
HS Paid HS Paid Total Total Average Hrly
as Loader as Trucker Hours Pay Earnings
1-1-67 55.0 55 267.21 4.86
1-8-67 40.5 40.5 204.86 5.06
1-15-67 40.0 40.0 208.16 5.20
1-22-67 48.3 48.3 217.93 4.51
1-28-67 16.0 *16 61.47 3.84
*Leave of absence - 3 days
199.8 199.8 959.63 4.80
2-5-67 41.5 41.5 188.28 4.54
2-12-67 39.5 39.5 192.79 4.88
2-19-67 40.0 40.0 219.33 5.48
2-26-67 48.0 48.0 219.39 4.57
169.0 169.0 819.79 4.85
3-5-67 49.5 49.5 243.63 4.92
3-12-67 40.0 40.0 193.36 4.83
3-19-67 40.0 40.0 179.23 4.48
3-26-67 41.3 41.3 201.01 4.88
170.8 170.8 817.23 4.78
608
Week Endings
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
HS Paid HS Paid Total Total Average Hrly
Earningsas Loader as Trucker Hours Pay
4-2-67 45.5 45.5 182.32 4.01
4-9-67 40.0 40.0 194.30 4.86
4-16-67 31.7 8.3 40.0 162.89 4.07
4-23-67 28.5 11.5 40.0 182.46 4.56
4-30-67 30.2 15.8 46.0 •231.94 5.04
175.9 35.6 211.5 953.91 4.3r
5-7-67 15.3 24.7 40.0 148.91 3.72
5-14-67 14.8 25.2 40.0 167.91 4.20
5-21-67 19.9 20.1 40.0 166.07 4.15
5-28-67 1.5 14.5 *16.0 50.01 3.13
*Vacation - 3 days
51.5 84.5 136.0 532.90 3.92
6-4-67 9.2 22.8 *32.0 103.22 3.23
6-11-67 .8 39.2 40.0 122.28 3.06
6-18-67 .2 39.8 40.0 129.80 3.25
6-25-67 .2 39.8 40.0 120.35 3.01
To-.4 141.6 152.0 475.65 3.13
7-2-67 17.6 34.6 **52.2 172.41 3.30
Paid 8 Hrs for Holiday
Vacation - 1 day
**/ Paid 8 Hrs for Holiday
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION
Loading hrs. Jan.1 to March 31, 1967
Clock #
609
271 596.6 hrs. 1st. shift. Joe Szalacinski
134 II332.1 1st. shift. Ronnie Jasinski
482 II33.9 1st, shift. Jim Neslson
489 39.5 " 2nd. shift, Wayne Wenka
315 60.5 " 2nd, shift. Gary Plewa
319 5.1 " 2nd. shift.
66 I1. 2nd. shift.
67 II2.5 2nd. shift,
70 2.5 it 2nd. shift.
3. The contract
Respondent's defense rests exclusively upon the
terms of its collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union." Of particular import is the following
clause, as to which it is alleged that the Union ex-
pressly waived its statutory right to bargain respect-
ing the subject matter in dispute herein:
116. The Company and the Union, for the life
of this Agreement, each voluntarily and
unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees
that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain
collectively with respect to any subject or
matter referred to, or covered in this Agree-
ment, or with respect to any subject or matter
not specifically referred to or covered in this
Agreement even though such subject or
matter may not have been within the knowl-
edge or contemplation of either or both of the
parties at the time that they negotiated or
signed this Agreement.
In evaluating the above clause as to "any subject
or matter referred to" in the agreement, and
generally to ascertain the intent of the parties to the
instrument , other pertinent provisions of the com-
prehensive contract, set forth in the Appendix at-
tached hereto, need to be examined.
Initially, paragraph 18 may be reasonably con-
strued as defining the basic purpose of the
grievance procedure to resolve differences as to the
meaning and application of the agreement." Fol-
lowing step V of the grievance procedure, the un-
resolved dispute is mandatorily referred to final and
binding arbitration if either party gives appropriate
written notice to the other of such desire (art. II,
sec. 1).
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The evidence is clear, and it is not denied, that
Respondent acted unilaterally in changing the
method and equipment in the handling of forgings
in the shipping department and thereby affected the
earnings and work conditions of one full-time em-
ployee and several part-time employees engaged in
the function of shipping loader. Although Respon-
dent gave the Union prior notice of its intentions, it
rejected the Union's requests for discussion and
bargaining concerning the change, and relegated
the Union to seek redress under the contract
grievance procedures. General Counsel contends
that Respondent's conduct in these circumstances
constitutes a denial of the Union's statutory bar-
gaining right and a violation of Section 8(a)(5)
under the Fibreboard doctrine.'2 Respondent relies
entirely upon the terms of the existing contract in
justification for its unilateral action, contending
that the Union expressly waived any right to bar-
"' The governing contract consists principally of a master agreement with
the International Union covering various plants of the Company and a
"supplementary agreement" embracing the Unit Drop Forge Division
and Local 407. Provisions in the master agreement are identified by the
numbered paragraph , and those in the supplementary agreement by
article and section.
" While the language as drawn refers to differences arising "between the
Company and any of its employees," undoubtedly the provision is intended
to include differences between the Company and the Union as a separate
entity and as representative of the employees, as indeed is reflected in
other contract clauses and in the evidence of the practice which the parties
follow
" Fibreboard Paper Products Corp , 138 NLRB 550, enfd 322 F 2d 411
(C A D C.), affirmed 379 U S 203 See also, e g , Century Papers, Inc , 155
NLRB 358, The Weston and Brooker Company, 154 NLRB 747;
Northwestern Publishing Conipanv, 144 NLRB 1069
610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gain which might otherwise exist, and in any event,
that the dispute involved differences as to the
meaning and application of the contract as to which
the parties contractually intended that the
established grievance and arbitration machinery
would be utilized to resolve such disputes.
As an incident to the determination of these is-
sues raised by Respondent, it is of course necessary
and appropriate in this proceeding to construe the
collective-bargaining agreement.13 While the Union
has the statutory right to be notified and consulted
regarding any substantial change in employment
conditions, or any mandatory subject of bargaining,
this right may be surrendered or waived by con-
tract. The strict caveat, however, is that such
waiver must be expressed in clear and unmistakable
terms, and will not lightly be inferred." The mere
existence of contractual grievance and arbitration
procedures appropriate to resolve a dispute will not
warrant a finding that the Union waived its right to
bargain on the subject."
With careful regard to these well-settled princi-
ples, it appears that the provision in paragraph 116,
quoted above, contains in specific language the
form of an unusually broad waiver of bargaining
rights .16 This provision goes well beyond the phras-
ing of the type of wrap-up or zipper clause which
the Board has found insufficient to constitute a
clear waiver of a statutory right." Here, not only do
the parties "unqualifiedly" waive the right to bar-
gain concerning any subject "referred to" in the
contract, but any subject "not specifically referred
to or covered in this Agreement even though such
subject or matter may not have been within the
knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the
parties at the time that they negotiated or signed this
Agreement." (Emphasis supplied.)" Under ordinary
rules of contract construction, effect should be
given , if fairly possible, to the form of words which
the parties have used, taking all parts into con-
sideration .'a Whether the parties herein intended to
commit to the provisions and procedures of their
contract all possible disputes and the whole scope
of their relationship-a sweeping and vital conces-
sion by the Union-need not be considered.20 For
the purpose of the issues raised, it is sufficient, and
I find, that the Union expressly and consciously
waived in paragraph 116 its statutory bargaining
rights where the subject is covered or referred to in
the contract, or where it is fairly implied that the
subject, though not specifically mentioned, is within
the general embrace of the agreement.
" E g , C & C Plyitood Corporation, 148 NLRB 414, 416, enforcement
denied 351 F 2d 244 (C A 9), reversed 385 U S 421, Cloverleaf Divivon
of Adain s Dairy Co, 147 NLRB 1410, 1415
" E g , Puerto Rico Telephone Co , 149 NLRB 950, 963, Beacon Piece
Dveing and Finishing Co , Inc , 121 NLRB 953, 956
" E g., Acute Industrial Company, 150 NLRB 1463, 1465, set aside 351
F 2d 258 (C A 7), reversed and remanded 385 U S 432
'" Except as derived from the wording of the contract itself, there is no
evidence of the subjects and positions explored in the bargaining negotia-
tions
As earlier shown , under the grievance -arbitration
procedures of the contract ( paragraph 18, et seq.),
machinery is provided for resolution of differences
between the parties as to the meaning and applica-
tion of any provisions of the contract . Under para-
graph 91, it is specifically recognized and contem-
plated that the Company will "constantly " seek to
lower product cost " through time-saving methods
and equipment." Under paragraphs 93 and 95, the
company is accorded the right to restudy any job,
for the purpose of reestablishing production pay
rates , "when change in material , design of product,
tool or tools , equipment or sequence of operations
have been made ." Under paragraph 94, the Union
has the right to question the timestudy of any job
and obtain a retiming. Under paragraph 96, the
Union has the right , after a fair trial, to challenge
"the rate of production as established or changed by
Management ," and in doing so is required to pursue
a specified procedure culiminating in the settlement
of the dispute on the basis of the Company's
disposition or by means of the formal grievance ap-
paratus . The procedures of paragraph 96 are ap-
plicable to rates of production where an incentive
system is in effect ( e.g., the shipping loader opera-
tion). Under article II, section 3 ( of the supplemen-
tary agreement ), all disputes pertaining to incentive
rates shall be referred to the Union 's timestudy
steward for study until a satisfactory rate is set or a
formal grievance is filed . Under article III, section
2, incentive rated jobs that have been changed due to
change in methods or materials , "which will affect
the earnings on that job shall be restudied to provide
for the same average earning opportunity with nor-
mal effort for that job ." Under article III, section 6,
it is provided that before any changes are made in
the "incentive plans ," which are set forth in "this
Article," or new plans established , they will be
agreed upon by the parties . The incentive "plan"
thereafter described for the shipping loader speci-
fies the basis (e.g., on tonnage and man-hours
worked ) for computing the incentive rate.
As previously indicated , at the April 7 meeting,
the Union took the position that Respondent's an-
nounced change in the loader operations violated
article III, section 6 . The General Counsel also ar-
gues in its brief that Respondent 's unilateral
elimination of the incentive pay plan for the clas-
sification of shipping loader was contrary to this
contract provision . For its part , Respondent con-
tends that no classification was eliminated but,
because of the installation of new equipment, one
it Cf Neu Yorl, Mirror, Division of the Hearst Corporation, 151 NLRB
834,837,840
"Cf. IVestinghouse Electric Corporation (Mansfield Plant), 150 NLRB
1574, 1585, involving similar waiver language but limited to "subjects not
specifically referred to or covered in [the contract [ it /uch n ere discussed
during the negotiations of [the contract) "(Emphasis supplied
Williston on Contracts, 4th ed , 4 600
Cf The Tunden Roller Bearing Conipant, 138 NLRB 15, 16
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION 611
employee was transferred from shipping loader to
truckdriver and paid the contract rate for the new
classification. And it asserts that the dispute in
question is clearly one involving "an alleged im-
proper classification and an alleged violation of
negotiated rates."
The evidence fairly shows that, before and after
the operational change made on April 10, the basic
job performed by Szalacinski was that of handling
and loading forgings in the process of shipment into
or from the plant. Apart from the formality of
reclassification, the nature of the change in his job
was essentially that, after April 10, for the most
part the forgings would not be handled individually
but in bulk form, thereby reducing and ultimately
eliminating his incentive earnings. Particularly con-
sidering paragraphs 91, 95, and 96, and article III,
section 2, supra, Respondent had acted within the
framework of the contract in reestablishing a
production rate or in changing an incentive rated
job due to a technological change in method and
equipment. In such circumstances, Respondent had
obligated itself to restudy the job as changed and to
provide for "the same average earning opportunity
with normal effort for that job." (art. III, sec. 2)
Such a result or other redress could be sought by
the Union. Reasonably construing the collective
agreement as a whole, and more especially para-
graph 96 and article II, section 3, supra, the
prescribed recourse of the Union lay in the utiliza-
tion of the specific procedures and machinery pro-
vided in the contract.
Returning to article III, section 6, relied upon by
the General Counsel, it does not reasonably appear
that the parties intended this provision to be opera-
tive in the instant circumstances, as distinguished
from the other provisions already discussed. I would
not find that, under these facts, Respondent
changed or introduced a new incentive "plan." Nor
would I find, as against paragraph 116 and article
II, section 3, that the Union intended to reserve its
statutory bargaining right in the limited situation of
article III, section 6.
As contemplated by the contract, regular weekly
meetings are conducted for the purpose of
processing grievances and considering related mat-
ters. Respondent could well have agreed on an in-
formal basis to the Union's request for discussion of
the shipping loader dispute at least in its initial
stages, but Respondent insisted, within its right as I
find, that the matter was subject to the formal
grievance procedures. It is not indicated why
(although no explanation is required) the Union
refused to resort to the contract procedures in an
effort to resolve the dispute by such means, but in-
stead filed charges with the Board.
For all of the reasons stated above, it is found
and concluded that the changes instituted by
Respondent were clearly sanctioned within the
scope of the existing contract and, accordingly, that
the allegations of unlawful unilateral action are not
sustained in the evidence.21
Moreover, a conclusion for dismissal of the com-
plaint is warranted upon the following additional or
alternative grounds: The parties have by contract
established grievance-arbitration machinery for
resolution of their differences involving the mean-
ing and application of their collective agreement. It
is clearly shown that on both sides the essential
dispute concerns honest differences of interpreta-
tion of particular contract provisions. A long histo-
ry of apparently amicable bargaining relations has
existed between these parties. It is neither alleged
nor evidenced that Respondent was motivated by
animus toward the Union, that it consciously sought
to bypass the Union's representative status, or that
it advanced its positions in bad faith. Indeed, it is
found herein that the contract provisions in
question are reasonably susceptible of Respon-
dent's asserted interpretations to justify its conduct.
The Board has frequently held in similar circum-
stances that the policies of the Act, to encourage
collective bargaining and to stabilize industrial rela-
tions, are best effectuated by leaving the parties to
their own devised contractual procedures to resolve
disputes arising over the meaning of provisions of
their agreement.22
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The allegations of the complaint that Respon-
dent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
have not been supported by substantial evidence.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the complaint herein be
dismissed in its entirety.
E g , Justesen 'v Food Stores, Inc , et al, 160 NLRB 687, Ador Corpora-
tion, 150 NLRB 1658, 1660, Leroy Machine Co , Inc , 147 NLRB 1431,
1432
" E g , American Oil Company, 152 NLRB 492, Shell Oil Company, 149
NLRB 283, 289, National Dairy Products Corporation, Detroit Creamery
Division, 126 NLRB 434, 435
APPENDIX
REPRESENTATION
*
10. There shall be a regularly scheduled
meeting starting at 10:00 A.M. between
representatives of Local Management and the
Executive Shop Committee once each week,
provided an agenda of subjects to be discussed
is submitted at least one (1) day in advance.
The Executive Shop Committee may meet by
themselves for thirty (30) minutes prior to the
353-177 0 - 72 - 40
612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
regular scheduled meeting . Special meetings
may be arranged by mutual agreement as the
necessity arises.
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
18. It is mutually agreed and understood
that should any difference arise between the
Company and any of its employees as to the
meaning and application of any of the
provisions of this Agreement, or should any
local trouble of any kind arise in the plant,
there shall be no interruption of operations by
any employee or groups of employees until
Step V of the Grievance Procedure has been
exhausted.
PRODUCTIVITY
91. The Company and the Union recognize
that job security and opportunity depend upon
constantly improving product quality and
lowering product cost through time-saving
methods and equipment so that the Company's
competitive position in the industry may be
maintained.
93. The Management agrees that in
establishing rates of production, it will make
studies on the basis of fairness and equity con-
sistent with quality of workmanship, efficiency
of operation and the reasonable working
capacities of normal operators . Before the
Company studies any job, the employee who
works on the job shall be notified in advance
and shall be told the purpose of the study. New
jobs shall be timed as soon as reasonably possi-
ble. The Company will advise the Union and
the operator of the production standard when
established.
94. The Union shall have the right to
question the time study of any job that may ap-
pear to be improperly timed , even to the extent
of asking for retiming of any job. The retiming
of any job requested by the Union shall be
made as soon as reasonably possible.
95. The Company shall have the right to
restudy or retime any job when change in
material, design of product, tool or tools,
equipment or sequence of operations have
been made . At the time such changes are made
or at any subsequent date such retiming shall
be on the basis of the effect of such changes on
the job. The foregoing limitation does not
apply to group operations.
96. When an employe or group of employes
claim after a fair trial that the rate of produc-
tion as established or changed by the Manage-
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment is incorrect, the following procedure shall
be followed:
A. The complaint should first be
presented to the Department Steward. The
foreman shall explain the established rate
of production. If the challenged rate of
production is based upon an estimated
standard, a time study shall be made
promptly by the Company.
B. If the foreman's explanation is not
satisfactory, a committeeman may, upon
reporting to the foreman of the depart-
ment involved, examine the job and all the
facts shall be made available.
C. If the foreman's explanation is not
satisfactory a committeeman may file a
written protest with the foreman on forms
provided for this purpose, setting forth the
specific elements of the data being
questioned and pointing out why the rate
of production cannot be maintained. The
operation may then be restudied jointly by
the Company and the Union.
D. If the rate is still in dispute, the
Union's claim and the Company s disposi-
tion shall be reduced to writing on the
protest forms. If the case is not appealed
within five (5) days to Step III of the
Grievance Procedure, it shall be con-
sidered settled on the basis of the Com-
pany's disposition.
In divisions where an incentive system is in ef-
fect, it is understood that this section may be
supplemented by the Supplementary Agree-
ment.
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
Article II
ADJUSTMENT OF GRIEVANCES
* * * * *
Section 2. Both the Company and the Union
agree to use their influence and effort to
secure observance of this Agreement in spirit
as well as in letter by their respective members.
Section 3. Members of the Grievance Com-
mittee and stewards shall be allowed and com-
pensated for the necessary time, within reason,
to adjust grievances that may arise . Compensa-
tion to each member shall be at the employe's
average earned rate.
All grievances pertaining to incentive rates
shall be referred to the time-study steward as-
UNIT DROP FORGE DIVISION 613
signed to that department, who shall carry out
the study until a rate is set or a grievance filed.
Article III
INCENTIVE SCHEDULES AND TIME-STUDY
PROCEDURE
General Rules Applying to All Incentive
reasonable incentive pace, earn at least fifteen
(15) cents above the timing rate.
Section 2. Jobs that have been changed due
to chan&e in methods, design, materials, tools,
etc., which will affect the earnings on that job
shall be re-studied to provide for the same
average earning opportunity with normal effort
for that job.
Workers in the Plant *
Section 1. Jobs shall be so priced as a result Section 6. In this Article are the recognized
of time-study that the average competent incentive plans in effect, and before any
worker, working at a reasonable pace, shall not changes in these incentive plans are made or
earn less than the timing rate applied to that new plans established, they will be agreed upon
particular operation, and can if working at by the parties.