Dodger Theatricals Holdings

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 2006

347 N.L.R.B. 953 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC.
347 NLRB No. 94
953
Dodger Theatricals Holdings, Inc. and its successor
Dodger Theatricals, Ltd. and Actors’ Equity As-
sociation. Case 2–CA–36048
August 22, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS SCHAUMBER, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
On March 28, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Fish issued the attached decision.1 The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun-
sel and the Charging Party each filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions3
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Dodger
Theatricals Holdings, Inc. and its successor Dodger The-
atricals, Ltd., New York, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Promptly furnish the Union with the information it
requested in its letters of December 19, 2003, and Janu-
ary 27, 2004, as later modified by the Union to limit its
request to information subsequent to March 29, 2002.”

1 On April 6 and 13, 2006, the judge issued “Errata” correcting inad-
vertent typographical errors, amending his conclusions of law and
recommended Order, and amending the notice.
2 In adopting the judge’s 10(b) finding, we agree that Southern Cali-
fornia Gas Co., 342 NLRB 613 (2004), is distinguishable, and therefore
we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s extended discussion of
that case.
3 Member Schaumber does not necessarily agree with Board prece-
dent that a union can simply state a reason for its request for informa-
tion without giving any factual basis for the same. See Hertz Corp. v.
NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1997). He would, however, find a
violation where the union apprises the employer of its factual basis at
the unfair labor practice hearing, the union’s disclosure supports the
relevancy of the information, and the employer continues to withhold it.
See Contract Flooring Systems, 344 NLRB 925 (2005). Member
Schaumber would find the violation occurred when the Respondent
refused to provide the requested information after the Union apprised
the Respondent at the hearing of the facts underlying its belief that the
Respondent was affiliated with Big League Theatricals. This change in
the date of the violation would have no effect on the remedy. The
Respondent will be ordered to furnish the Union with the information
requested.
4 We will modify par. 2(a) of the judge’s amended recommended
Order to correct an inadvertent error, and we shall substitute a new
notice to conform its language to the recommended Order as modified.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Ac-
tors’ Equity Association, by refusing to furnish it with
information that it requests that is relevant and necessary
to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights set forth above.
WE WILL promptly furnish the Union with the informa-
tion it requested in its letters of December 19, 2003, and
January 27, 2004, as later modified by the Union to limit
its request to information subsequent to March 29, 2002.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC.
Rhonda Gottlieb, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Lawrence D. Levien, Esq. and Laura E. FitzRandolph, Esq.
(Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP), of Washington,
D.C., for the Respondent.
Franklin E. Moss, Esq. and Lydia Sigelakis, Esq. (Spivak, Lip-
ton, Watanabe, Spivak, Moss & Orfan, LLP), of New York,
New York, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN FISH, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to
charges filed in Case 2–CA–36048, on January 16, 2004, by
Actors’ Equity Association (the Union or Equity), the Regional
Director for Region 2 issued an order consolidating cases, con-
solidating the above case with charges filed by Equity in Cases
2–CA–36027 and 2–CA–36069, and alleging that Dodger The-
atrical Holdings, Inc. (Respondent or the Dodgers) and two
other Respondents Clear Channel Entertainment (Clear Chan-
nel) and Nederlander Producing Co. (Nederlander) violated
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD954
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to supply infor-
mation to the Union.
Subsequently, Cases 2–CA–36069 and 2–CA–36027 were
severed from Case 2–CA–36048, based on non-Board settle-
ments in the above cases.
The trial with respect to the portions of the complaint dealing
with the Dodgers in Case 2–CA–36048 was held before me in
New York, New York, on November 16 and the December 2,
2005. At the trial, the complaint was amended to reflect the
current and correct name of Respondent as Dodger Theatricals
Holdings, Inc. and its successor Dodger Theatricals, Ltd.
Briefs have been filed by the parties, and have been carefully
considered. Based on the entire record,1 including my observa-
tion of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent is engaged in the production of theatrical plays
and musicals. Annually, Respondent purchases and receives at
facilities located in New York State goods and materials valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the
State, of New York.
It is admitted, and I so find, that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section (2)(6) and
(7) of the Act.
It is also admitted, and I so find, that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. FACTS
A. Background
Respondent produces Broadway, Off-Broadway, and touring
shows. The two current principals of Respondent are Michael
David and Edward Strong. They have been involved with a
number of different entities over a 20-year period, using the
name “Dodger” in its name, often with different partners or co-
producers. All of these entities are referred to as “The Dodg-
ers.” When the Dodgers produce a show, it is often produced
jointly with other producers or production entities.
The League of American Theatres and Producers (the
League) is a trade association for producers and theater owners,
that negotiates collective-bargaining agreements with Equity, as
well as with other labor organizations. Equity represents actors
and stage managers in the theater industry. Equity and the
League have been parties to a contract, which is also used by
some nonleague members, and is known as the production con-
tract. Respondent and the League were parties to the produc-
tion contract, effective from June 26, 2000, through June 27,
2004. While Respondent withdrew from League membership
in 2001, it was still bound by the agreement until it expired.
The Dodgers, although not currently League members, were
coordinated bargaining partners in the negotiation of the new
agreement which runs from June 2004 until June 2008, and are
signatories to that agreement as independent producers.
The recognition clause of the production contract defines the

1 Subsequent to the close of the trial, I granted in a conference call,
Charging Party’s motion, which was not opposed, to introduce two
additional documents into the record.
unit as “all the Actors (Principals, Chorus, Extras, Stage Man-
agers and Assistant Stage Managers.)”
Additionally, rule 8 of agreement is entitled, “Binding Effect
of Agreement.” It reads as follows:
All contracts of employment signed pursuant to these
Rules are binding not only upon the signers on the face
thereof, but upon any and all corporations, co-
partnerships, enterprises and/or groups which said signers
or each of them directs, controls, or is interested in and are
hereby agreed to be adopted as their contract by each of
them.
At times various producers have negotiated modified ver-
sions of the production contract with Equity, for particular pro-
ductions, often on tour, but sometimes for a Broadway show.2
In such cases, the parties agree to be bound by the production
contract, with whatever modifications that the parties agree on.
B. The Prior Information Request
On March 19, 2001, Alan Eisenberg, executive director of
the Union, sent a letter to Respondent’s principals, David and
Strong, requesting information concerning the relationship
between the Dodgers and Big League Theatrical LTD (BLT).
The letter indicates that Equity is concerned that Strong, David,
and the Dodgers “have and are diverting productions covered
by the Production contract” to BLT.3 Thereafter, on July 12,
2001, Equity filed a charge in Case 2–CA–33920, alleging that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by failing to pro-
vide a relevant information to the Union.
On December 21, 2001, the Regional Director issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing alleging that Respondent (as well
as Strong and David individually, as joint employers) violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to supply information to the
Union, relevant to the Union’s performance as the collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees. Al-
though the record is not totally clear, it appears that the genesis
of the Union’s request was a tour of the show Music Man by
BLT and its affiliates. In that connection, the Union also at-
tempted to organize the employees of the tour of Music Man in
Case 2–RC–22544. In that case, an election was directed and
held on November 1, 2002. The Union lost the election, and
filed objections which were dismissed by the Regional Direc-
tor. The Union sought review, and the Board affirmed the Re-
gional Director, and dismissed the objections, with Member
Liebman dissenting.4
Meanwhile, the Dodgers had produced a revival of the show
42nd Street on Broadway. However, the Dodgers decided not
to produce a national tour of that show under the production

2 For example, Respondent and Equity entered into such an agree-
ment concerning the show Jersey Boys by which the production con-
tract was incorporated by reference, and modified slightly.
3 The request encompasses information with regard to relationships
with and transactions between Respondent and BLT since July 1, 1996.
It requested 38 specific items of information.
4 Big-Brass Band, LLC, 339 NLRB 973 (2003). While the name of
the employer in the above case is Big-Brass Band, LLC, all parties
appear to agree that BLT was an employer of the employees on this
tour.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 955
contract for financial reasons. Thereafter, Equity and Respon-
dent began negotiations in an attempt to agree on a modifica-
tion of the production contraction for a tour of 42nd Street by
Respondent. The parties were successful in negotiating such an
agreement, and reached an understanding in principle on March
29, 2002. As part of that agreement, the parties agreed to re-
solve all of their prior outstanding disputes, including the
aforementioned information request and NLRB complaint. On
March 29, 2002, the parties executed a “settlement agreement
and release,” which confirmed the understandings reached, and
included the agreement by Equity to withdraw the unfair labor
practice charge in Case 2–CA–33920. The settlement agree-
ment and release, reads as follows:
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE
This Settlement Agreement and Release (“Agree-
ment”) is entered into effective March 29th, 2002 by and
between Actors’ Equity Association (“Equity”) and
Dodger Theatrical Holdings, Inc. (“Dodger”), herein sin-
gularly referred to as “Party” and collectively referred to
as “The Parties.”
WHEREAS, due to, as is contemplated in, and as a
part of the agreement regarding 42nd Street, the Parties
wish to resolve all differences and disputes between them
and their constituents that were or could have been raised
regarding certain matters;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. Equity agrees that it will promptly request withdrawal with
prejudice of the unfair labor practice charge that it filed on or
about July 12, 2001 with Region 2 of the National Labor Re-
lations Board (“NLRB”) against Dodger, Dodger Endemol
Productions, Edward Strong and Michael David, Case No. 2-
CA-33920. Equity further agrees that it will take any and all
appropriate action to ensure that the December 21, 2001 com-
plaint issued in that case by the NLRB is withdrawn and dis-
missed with prejudice. In the even that the NLRB does not
withdraw the complaint, Equity agrees that neither it nor its
representatives or agents will voluntarily assist in the prosecu-
tion of such complaint.
2. Further, Equity irrevocably releases and discharges Dodger
and its present and former officers, directors, employees,
agents, representatives, affiliates, parents, and subsidiaries
(hereinafter collectively referred to as (“Dodger Released Par-
ties”) and Dodger irrevocably releases and discharges Equity
and its present and former officers, directors, employees,
agents, representatives, affiliates, parents, and subsidiaries
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Equity Released Par-
ties”) (Dodger Release Parties and Equity Released Parties
hereinafter collective referred to as “Released Parties”) from
any and all grievances, claims, or causes of action and any
and all alleged damages or requested relief in relation thereto,
whether arising under contract or by operation of statutory or
common law, and whether known or unknown, which either
party now has or may have had, arising before the date of this
Agreement, in any way relating to any alleged relationship
with, connection between, or interaction among any or all of
the Released Parties and Big League Theatricals (“BLT”) or
any or all of BLT’s present or former officers, directors, em-
ployees, agents, representative, affiliates, parents or subsidiar-
ies in any way pertaining to the business or operations of
BLT. It is understood that this release includes, and that nei-
ther Party will assert a claim or cause of action or seek dam-
ages of relief against any of the Released Parties in relation to,
the previously mounted and ongoing BLT tour of The Music
Man. It is further understood that nothing in this Agreement
shall limit Equity’s ability to engage in any otherwise lawful
activity with respect to such tour of The Music Man.
3. It is further agreed that neither Party will make, file or join
in, or assist or encourage others in making or filing, any
grievances, charges, claims, lawsuits, complaints, or other
proceedings, including but not limited to any suits in the local,
state or federal courts, before the National Labor Relations
Board or any other agency, or before any arbitral board or tri-
bunal, against any of the Released Parties, concerning or relat-
ing to any matter described in Paragraph 2 of this Agreement.
4. A Party shall be entitled to recover costs and reasonable at-
torneys’ fees incurred in defending against any claim or cause
of action brought in violation of or in enforcing the terms of
paragraph 2 or 3 of this Agreement.
5. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the assigns, affiliates, members, employees, officers
and representatives of Equity and the assigns, affiliates, sub-
sidiaries, parents, employees, officers and representatives of
Dodger.
6. This Agreement may be modified or amended only by a
written agreement executed by all parties hereto.
7. This Agreement may be executed in one (1) of more coun-
terparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but
all of which together shall constitute one and the same in-
strument.
8. If any terms of the Agreement are found null, void or inop-
erative for any reason, the remaining provisions will remain in
full force and effect. The language of all parts of this Agree-
ment shall in all cases be construed as a whole, according to
its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against either of the
Parties.
Entered into this 29th day of March, 2002.
On April 12, 2002, Equity and the Dodgers executed the
previously agreed contract covering the 42nd Street national
tour. On April 12, 2002, Equity requested that the Regional
Director approve the withdrawal of the charges and the com-
plaint in Case 2–CA–33920. On May 9, 2002, the Regional
Director issued an order approving the charge and dismissing
the complaint in such case.
C. The 2003 Information Request
By letter dated December 19, 2003, Eisenberg wrote to Re-
spondent once again, this time asserting that it had learned that
BLT will be sending out a non-Equity tour of 42nd Street, and
that the Union was concerned that Respondent may have di-
verted work to BLT, or maintained BLT as a Dodger alter ego.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD956
Therefore, the Union requested information from July 1,
2000, with regard to the relationship between BLT and the
Dodgers. The request asks for 10 items of information as de-
scribed below:
December 19, 2003
Michael David
Ed Strong
Dodger Stage Holding Theatricals, Inc.
230 West 41st Street
New York, NY 10036
Gentlemen:
We have recently learned that Big League Theatricals will be
sending out a non-Equity tour of 42nd STREET.
Equity is concerned that Dodger Stage Holding Theatricals,
Inc. or its affiliates (“Dodger”) may have diverted work to Big
League Theatricals or its affiliates (“Big League”) or have
participated in maintaining Big League as a Dodger alter ego.
In order to investigate whether to file a grievance and to pre-
pare proposals for the 2004 negotiations concerning the diver-
sion of Production Contract work to producers that do not
provide area standards terms and conditions of employment, I
am writing to request the following information covering the
period from January 1, 2000 to the date of your response.
1. State the name of each Dodger affiliate that has had a gen-
eral partnership, limited partnership or other financial interest
in any Big League production.
2. State the name of each Dodger affiliate that has ever had
an ownership interest or option with respect to any rights in-
volved in any Big League production(e.g., music, book, de-
signs, etc.), and describe the nature of that ownership or op-
tion interest.
3. Provide copies of all agreements and contracts by virtue of
which Dodger affiliate has assigned to any other person or en-
tity, any ownership or option interest with respect to any mu-
sical or play that has been produced by Big League.
4. Identify employees of Dodger who have been employees,
shareholders, officers, directors or partners of Big League, de-
scribing the partnership, stock ownership, director, officer or
employment status of each such individual.
5. Describe each financial transaction between Dodger and
Big League.
6. Describe each contractual arrangement between Dodger
and Big League.
7. Describe each joint venture between Dodger and Big
League.
8. Identify by production (if any), type of service, personnel
involved and date, each occasion when Dodger employees
performed services for or to Big League.
9. Identify by production (if any), type of service, personnel
involved and date, each occasion when Dodger employees
performed services for or to Big League.
10. Identify all plays and musicals in which Dodger had a fi-
nancial or managerial interest which subsequently were pro-
duced by Big League, and for each such play or musical, de-
scribe all financial transactions, business dealings and other
interactions between Dodger and Big League.
I look forward to your prompt response. If an accommoda-
tion cannot be made by January 12, 2004, I am prepared to
file an unfair labor practice charge.
Sincerely yours,
Alan Eisenberg
Executive Director
Cc: Franklin K. Moss, Esq.
This information request is similar to the 2001 information
request, except that it is less extensive. However, it essentially
requests much of the same information requested by Equity in
its 2001 letter.
The charge in the instant case was filed on January 7, 2004.
On January 12, 2004, Respondent’s counsel, Lawrence
Levien, responded to Eisenberg’s request by sending the Un-
ion’s counsel, Franklin Moss, a copy of the aforementioned
settlement release agreement, and stating that in light of the
document, he was perplexed by the request and asked that it be
withdrawn.
Moss responded by letter of January 15, 2004, asserting that
the March 29, 2002 release applies to claims “arising before the
date of this Agreement,” relating to the relationship between
the Dodgers and BLT, as well as to claims concerning the “Mu-
sic Man” tour. Moss added that it does not apply to an infor-
mation request in 2003.
Levin responded by letter of January 22, 2004. Levien reit-
erated his position that the Union’s 2003 information request
violated the March 29, 2002 settlement agreement, and pointed
out the similarity of some items in the two requests, and re-
quested that the Union explain why the 2003 request was not
encompassed by the settlement agreement.
Moss responded as follows, by letter dated January 27, 2004.
Lawrence D. Levien, Esq.
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Re: Actors’ Equity Association and the Dodgers
Dear Larry:
I am bewildered by your January 22, 2004 letter. Among
other things, while the ULP was withdrawn “with prejudice,”
there was no discussion, nor is there anything in the Settle-
ment Agreement and Release, to suggest that the information
request itself was withdrawn “with prejudice,” nor is there
anything in the Settlement Agreement and Release prohibiting
Equity from making a new information request.
Moreover, paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement and Re-
lease does not prospectively “specifically release the very type
of grievance set forth on the December 19 letter.” It does re-
lease certain claims for the period prior to March 29, 2002
(and certain ”Music Man” related claims prospectively), but
we see information as to that prior period not in order to pre-
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 957
sent a claim with respect to that period, but to ascertain facts
that would permit a current claim to be filed and to obtain in-
formation to assist in the preparation of proposals for out fu-
ture collective bargaining negotiations. If, prior to 2003, there
was a material change in the nature of the relationship be-
tween the Dodgers and Big League, and you provide Equity
with all requested documents detailing that change and the na-
ture of the relationship following that change, information
covering the period prior to that change will have little rele-
vance to the present and we will not require information for
the period of time predating such change.
With this clarification, I trust the Dodger will fully comply
with the information request.
Very truly yours,
Franklin K. Moss
Respondent failed to provide the information requested, but
instead filed a notice of dispute with Equity, contending that the
Union violated the settlement agreement by filing the January
7, 2004 charges with the Board. Respondent sought withdrawal
of the charges and attorney’s fees and costs in both defending
the unfair labor practice and prosecuting Respondent’s griev-
ance.
The Union responded by filing an additional unfair labor
practice charge on August 30, 2004, in Case 2–CA–36489,
alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
“pursuing a meritless grievance in retaliation for the Union’s
filing of unfair labor practice charges.”
Thereafter, after several letters, meetings, and discussions
between the parties, Equity and Respondent agreed to resolve
the most recent unfair labor practice charges filed, and the Un-
ion agreed to limit its information request to the period subse-
quent to March 29, 2002 (the date of the settlement agreement).
As a result Respondent withdrew its grievance and its unfair
labor practice charge, and Equity withdrew its retaliation
charge.
Respondent has admittedly failed to provide the information
requested in the Union’s 2003 letter5 covering the period since
March 29, 2002.
Flora Stamatiades, Equity’s national director of organizing,
testified concerning the basis for and relevance of the Union’s
information request. She had previously served as a business
representative for Equity, as well as business representative for
road touring.
Stamatiades first became familiar with BLT in her capacity
of business representative for tours. She was informed by some
acquaintances who worked there, that the Dodgers and BLT
shared office space at 1501 Broadway, New York, New York.
She was told at one time that the entities were in the same suite,
and then at another time, were in separate suites in the same
building.
Stamatiades also began to notice a progression, that a num-
ber of shows that were produced by the Dodgers either on
Broadway or on a national tour by the Dodgers would then

5 The Union clarified its request by a letter from its attorney, dated
January 27, 2005, with regard to a typographical error in the original
letter.
result in another non-Equity tour, produced by BLT. Some of
these shows included the The King and I, Tommy, Footloose,
and A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum.
Stamatiades had discussions with Equity members employed
by the Dodgers either during these tours or on Broadway, dur-
ing which the subject on non-Equity tours would come up.
During these discussions, the members would tell Stamatiades
that BLT and the Dodgers were “one company,” and asked her
“Why can’t we stop Big League because we all know, we be-
lieve, and see this relationship between Big League and the
Dodgers?”
Equity began to investigate the issue in 2000 and 2001, prior
to its 2001 information request. It obtained a report from the
New York State Secretary of State, which listed Elaine Warner
as chairman CEO of BLT. Another document obtained by
Equity from the internet showed that Elaine Warner was the
wife of Sherman Warner, who Stamatiades knew to be a princi-
pal of the Dodgers. Stamatiades, although familiar with most
individuals actively engaged in the theater industry, had never
heard of or known Elaine Warner to be active in the industry.6
Stamatiades was also informed that sometime between 1997
and 2000 that Jonathan David, Michael David’s son was a cor-
porate officer of BLT. Equity subsequently obtained, through a
search from a commercial service with respect to corporate
identities, a document, which is not dated. It shows that Jona-
than David held the position of “Chairman” of BLT.7
Stamatiades was also informed that representatives of the
Dodgers “encouraged” the estate of Meredith Wilson to award
second-class touring rights of the Music Man to BLT, when the
Dodgers decided not to produce their own tour of that show.
She also testified that she believed that the Dodgers also en-
couraged the award of such rights to tours of Tommy and Foot-
loose to BLT.
As a result of the above information, Equity filed its 2001 in-
formation request as described above, which resulted in an
NLRB complaint. As also noted, the complaint, as well as the
underlying charge were withdrawn, based on a settlement
agreement, which was in turn precipitated by an agreement to
modify the production contract, and permit a tour of 42nd
Street by the Dodgers.
In the course of Equity preparing for negotiations for a new
contract with the League, Equity noticed an article in Back
Stage, which is a trade publication which reports on the theater
industry. The article which is dated May 2003, reported on the
issue on non-Equity touring. The article states that BLT is a
subsidiary of the Dodgers. The thrust of the article is the rise of
non-Equity tours. It contained several quotes from Dan Sher,
identified as the executive producer of BLT, defending the use
of non-Equity tours, as serving actors who are gaining experi-
ence, and serving communities that might not get major tours.
The article also suggests that Equity, unlike other Union’s in

6 Stamatiades conceded, however, that she knew that although
Sherman Warner had been a principal with the Dodgers, that he retired
from and was no longer associated with the Dodgers as of late 2000 or
early 2001.
7 The document also lists affiliated entities as “Mane Co., L.L.C.”
The Dodgers are not mentioned in this document
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD958
the industry, is being inflexible not allowing its members to
work in non-Equity productions. The article states further that
Equity officials refused to comment on the subject.
In late 2003, Stamatiades had conversations with Equity
members who were performing on the Dodgers tour of 42nd
Street. The members told her that they were aware that the
agreement covering the tour was due to expire on June 27,
2004, and that they were hearing discussions that there would
be a subsequent non-Equity tour operated by BLT. The mem-
bers informed Stamatiades that representatives from BLT
would be at various touring engagements looking over items
such as sets, costumes, and discussing a non-Equity tour of the
show. Some of the members made comments to Stamatiades,
similar to those made to her in prior years by other members,
such as “Why can’t we stop Big League?, because we all know
we believe, we see this relationship between Big League and
the Dodgers.”
Stamatiades also became aware that BLT used the same art-
work as the Dodgers for various shows such as the The King
and I, and 42nd Street.8
Stamatiades also was aware that BLT and the Dodgers were
represented by the same attorney, and that she believed that
there was a relationship between the two companies, because
the names of both companies consist of baseball references.
Finally, Equity procured a document from the internet9
which appears to be a resume of a theater producer and director
named Kurt Wollan. The resume states that Wollan “produced
three national tours of Forbidden Broadway with Big League
Theatricals and Dodger productions of New York.”
Based on the above evidence, Equity believed that there was
a relationship between BLT and the Dodgers, and that since
rule 8 of the contract, makes it binding upon signers, as well as
also upon enterprises which the signer “directs, controls or is
interested in,” there is the possibility of filing a grievance based
on that rule. Thus, Equity needed to find out more information
in order to understand the exact interrelationship between BLT
and the Dodgers, and to decide whether or not to file a griev-
ance, based on violation of that contractual provision.
Stamatiades also testified that Equity needed the information
in order to prepare for negotiations of a new contract with the
League. In that connection, negotiations began on April 1,
2004. During these negotiations, Eisenberg, on behalf of Eq-
uity, complained about the alleged diversion of work by League
members. Eisenberg specifically mentioned the Union’s belief
that there was a relationship between League members such as
the Dodgers, and non-Equity tour companies such as BLT and
others. He also mentioned specific tours such as 42nd Street,
and other shows, such as Oklahoma and Oliver, that were alleg-
ing being diverted by League members including the Dodgers.
The Union submitted two proposals during the negotiations,
in order to address its concerns about diversion of work. They
included a proposal that entitled “Preservation of Work,” which

8 Additionally, Stamatiades was unaware of any Dodger production
that was ever performed on a non-Equity tour by anyone other than
BLT. This record contained evidence of seven BLT tours, six of them,
all but Miss Saigon, originated with the Dodgers.
9 The search was made by Equity on February 20, 2004.
provides that if a producer divests itself of touring rights, the
producer agrees to require that the actors employed on such
tour shall reserve wages and benefits under the agreement. The
proposal further provides that if a producer does not transfer
such rights but the producer receives compensations as a result
of a touring production where actors receive less than contract
wages, then the producer must pay 50 percent of such compen-
sation to the Equity Health Fund.
While David was present at the negotiations, neither he nor
the negotiators for the League, Bernard Plum, or Seth Popper,10
denied the Union’s accusations that there was a relationship
between the Dodgers and BLT or between the other companies
and other non-Equity entities. The League negotiators did re-
spond that the Union had filed unfair labor practice charges
seeking to find out if that assertion is accurate, so “that will
come out in the wash.” With respect to Equity’s proposals the
League negotiator stated that they were “ridiculous” and was
not addressing the real issues. That issue is that the reason why
work is not being done under the production contract is because
it was economically not viable to do so. The negotiations then
proceeded to discuss those issues. An agreement was reached
in July 12, 2004. The agreement did not contain either of the
proposals advanced by the Union to address their concerns
about alleged diversion of work. It also contained no changes
in the recognition clause, and also included rule 8 without
change. In fact no changes were proposed in either of these
clauses by either side.11
Respondent produced Morse and Popper as its witnesses.
Morse has been an employee of Respondent since 1995. Prior
to that date, she worked in various other capacities in the indus-
try, including a period of time as an official of ATPAM (Asso-
ciation of Theatrical Press Agents and Managers.)
Morse furnished testimony concerning some of the areas tes-
tified to by Stamatiades with respect to Equity’s belief that
BLT and the Dodgers are related entities. In that regard, Morse
testified it is quite common in the theatrical industry for unaf-
filiated entities to share office space. Morse provided several
examples of unaffiliated companies that share office space in
the industry. Further, Morse testified that BLT and the Dodg-
ers never actually shared space. Morse asserted that Dodger
Touring, LTD, which is the booking agency for the Dodgers
did sublet space from BLT. The rest of the Dodgers organiza-
tion was located on a different floor in the building at 1501
Broadway, from 1995–2002. In 2002, the Dodgers and Dodger
Touring moved together to larger space on 41st street.
Morse also asserted that sometimes newspaper articles about
the theater industry are inaccurate, and provided an example of
where the New York Times in an article about Jersey Boys
discussed the director, Des McAnuff. According to Morse, the
article stated that McAnuff had directed the show Good Vibra-
tions, which was inaccurate, and that McAnuff had no connec-

10 Plum is an attorney and the League chief negotiator. Popper is di-
rector of labor relations for the League.
11 My findings, with respect to the discussions during the 2004 nego-
tiations, is based on a compilation of the credible portions of the testi-
mony of Stamatiades, Popper, and Sally Campbell Morse, Respon-
dent’s general manager.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 959
tion whatsoever to that production.
Morse also testified that it is not unusual for theatrical re-
sumes to contain inaccuracies. Morse also testified that she had
never heard of Wollan and that there is no such entity as “the
Dodger Group.”
Morse also asserted that the Dodgers grant permission to
publishers of songbooks to use Respondent’s artwork for par-
ticular shows. She further testified that the artwork for shows
on songbooks for the shows Footloose, 42nd Street, and Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum were identical to the
artwork used by Respondent when they produced the show
either on Broadway or on a tour. According to Morse, the
Dodgers would grant such permission to the songbook publish-
ers, because “it’s free advertising in a sense. But additionally if
the author requests that we permit use of the artwork, we’re
unlikely to deny it.”12
Morse added there is no relationship between Respondent
and any of the songbook publishing companies. Respondent
also introduced the rights agreements between the authors and
the producers for various shows such as 42nd Street, The King
and I, and Footloose. These documents reflect that any entity
that desires to use the Dodgers’ original artwork for these
shows must ultimately obtain permission to do so from either
the author, owner, and the licensor, and or from the Dodgers.
Finally, Morse in response to Stamatiades’ belief that the
names of BLT and Dodgers were both related to baseball, was
asked what she understood the reference “Big League” to refer
to? Morse responded that she had not “over-analyzed” it, but
she assumed that BLT was “trying to be a little grander than it
was,” and was an ambitious reference to being “bigger than the
Leagues that existed.” Thus, in Morse’s view, “League” in the
business meant the League of American Theaters.
Morse also provided substantial testimony concerning the is-
sue of “first-class” and “second class” tours, and her view as to
contract coverage of the production contract to these kinds of
tours. Morse testified that when a producer, such as Respon-
dent produces a show, it must first obtain the rights to produce
the show from the author or from a licensing agent, which has
been designated by the author or the author’s estate. There are
many different kinds of rights that can be obtained, including
“first class,” “second class,” “off-Broadway,” “stock” and
“amateur.” These terms are defined in the Approved Produc-
tion Contract (APC), which is a model contract that reflects the
minimum terms under which members of the Dramatists Guild
will grant rights to their work. The APC defined “first class
performance,” as
Live stage productions of the (work) or the speaking stage . . .
under Producer’s own management in a regular evening bill
in a first-class theatre in a first class manner with a first class
cast and a first class director. Second class performances are
described in the APC as all performances . . . other than stock,
amateurs and ancillary performances . . . off Broadway per-
formances . . . and First class performances and developmen-

12 Morse conceded on cross-examination, that it was not the Dodgers
practice to provide the advertising for their competitors; since “we
would be advertising the competitor’s product.”
tal (i.e. workshop productions.)
Morse testified that based on 30 years of experience in the
industry that in her view the production contract covers only
first-class productions, and furnished testimony as to her under-
standing of the difference between first-class and second-class
productions. According to Morse, some of the hallmarks of
first-class productions and tours are first-class tours replicate
Broadway productions as closely as possible, in areas such as
productions values and the quality and size of the cast. These
tours travel slower and heavier, and will generally play en-
gagements of not less then a week, often from 2 to 8 weeks.
First-class tours also play generally in “first-class cities,” such
as large metropolitan areas with an established theater and in a
first-class theater that has larger seating capacity and that meet
a certain technical standards. Second-class tours, on the other
hand, are generally smaller and less expensive productions, that
command smaller guarantees from the presenter, and will gen-
erally play in smaller cities, characterized by smaller engage-
ments; i.e., split weeks which is a week where the production
plays in more then one city, and “one nighter” which is a pro-
duction that plays only one night in a particular city.
Respondent also introduced a number of exhibits into evi-
dence, consisting on itineraries of tours produced by the Dodg-
ers and by BLT. Morse furnished testimony concerning these
tours, and why she viewed them as first- or second-class tours.
The Dodgers tours of Tommy, The King and I, Footloose, and
42nd Street were first-class tours, based on their directors, cast
size, length of engagements, and cities visited. For example
42nd Street played in cities such as Chicago, Philadelphia,
Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San Francisco with en-
gagements of from 2–8 weeks in those cities. The King and I
played 40 performances in Washington, D.C., 24 performances
in Boston, 32 in San Francisco, and 16 in Los Angeles, and 3 in
Seattle. Footloose had 32 performances in Seattle, 21 in De-
troit, 24 in Cleveland, 16 in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Ft.
Lauderdale. Tommy, when produced by Respondent, had 53
performances in Boston, 40 in Washington, D.C., 23 in Detroit,
32 in San Francisco and Chicago, and 29 in Denver. Further,
none of these Dodger tours played in single split week engage-
ment.
Additionally all of the Dodger tours employed the same di-
rector and choreographer as employed by the Broadway pro-
duction and had a cast size similar to the Broadway produc-
tions.
In contrast, Morse testified that in her opinion, the produc-
tions of these shows by BLT were second-class tours. Morse
contended that the BLT tour of 42nd Street was a second-class
tour, because most of the cities played such as West Point, New
York; Abilene, Kansas; Schenectady, Utica, and Elmira, New
York; and Columbia, South Carolina, are not first-class cities,
and are not normally places where first-class tours play. Fur-
ther Morse points out that most of the engagements are small in
size, including several split weeks. For example for the week
of September 28 through October 2, 2005, the BLT tour gave
seven performances in five different cities, the week of October
3–4, 2005, it performed eight times in four different cities, and
for the week of January 16–22, 2006. The BLT tour was
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD960
scheduled to play six different cities in 6 days. Some other
cities on BLT’s tour, addition to the ones named by Morse,
were Roanoke, Virginia, Sarasota, Florida, Lima, Ohio, and
Saginaw, Michigan.13
On the other hand, the itinerary for the BLT tour of 42nd
Street also revealed that there were some longer engagements
on the tour. They included eight performances in a single week
at the Chrysler Hall in Norfolk, Virginia, the Carpenter Center
in Richmond, Virginia; the Providence Performing Arts Center
in Providence, Rhode Island; The McCallum Theatre in Palm
Desert, California; the New Jersey Arts Center in Newark, New
Jersey; Civic Center Music Hall in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;
and the Tulsa14 Pac Theatre in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Additionally, the BLT tour of 42nd Street played or was
scheduled to play for 3 weeks in Redondo Beach, California, 2
weeks in Dayton, Ohio, 1 week in Phoenix, Arizona; Thousand
Oaks, California; Birmingham, Alabama; Spokane, Washing-
ton; Richmond, Virginia; San Bernardino, California; Toledo,
Ohio; Anchorage, Alaska; and West Palm Beach, Florida.15
Morse also characterized the BLT tour of The King and I, as
second-class, since it played “second-class” cities, such as
Lubbock, Texas, Cupertino, California, Sherman, Texas, and
Reno, Nevada, and it consisted of frequent short engagements.
Morse specifically noted the week of September 1–6, 1998,
where the BLT tour played in six cities on 6 consecutive
nights.16
The BLT itinerary also includes a number of cities, which
were not included in the Dodgers tour of that show, such as
Muncie and West Lafayette, Indiana, Sandusky, Ohio, and
Flint, Michigan. The BLT tour also included several split
weeks, in addition to the one referred to by Morse, including
the week of February 2, 1999, where it played five cities in 6
days.
On the other hand, the BLT tour of The King and I also in-
cluded several longer engagements, such as eight performances
during 1 week periods at the Pace Theatrical Group venues17 in
Austin and San Antonio, Texas; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and
Long Beach, California; and at theatres in Rochester, New
York; Providence, Rhode Island; Des Moines, Iowa; St. Louis,

13 Additionally, the cast of Respondent’s 42nd Street Street tour was
51, as compared to 36 for the BLT of that show.
14 I note that the Dodgers tours of the The King and I, and Footloose
both played eight performances at the same Chapman Theatre in Tulsa,
as did the BLT tour of 42nd Street. Additionally, the Dodgers tour of
Footloose had eight performances at the Providence Pac Theater, and
its tour of Tommy gave eight performances at the McCallum Theater in
Palm Desert, California.
15 Notably, the Dodgers tours of Tommy and The King and I, both
performed at the same Kravis Theatre, in West Palm Beach for the
same number of performances, (8) as did the BLT tour of 42nd Street.
16 I note however that one of the cities included in that week was one
night in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, referred to by Morse in the other
parts of their testimony as a ”first-class” city. Indeed Philadelphia was
also part of the itinerary for the Dodgers tour of The King and I, but for
an engagement of eight performances. It is also noted that the Dodgers
“first-class” tour of Tommy played eight performances in Cupertino,
California, characterized by Morse as a second-class city.
17 Morse conceded that Pace Theatricals generally utilize first-class
venues.
Missouri; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Detroit, Michigan; Buf-
falo, New York; New Orleans, Louisiana;18 and Calgary, Can-
ada. The BLT tour also had a 4-week engagement at the
Zanadu Theatre, Taj Mahal in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and a
2-week tour at the Victoria Theatre in Dayton, Ohio, and 2-
week engagement at the Shubert in New Haven, Connecticut.19
Morse also testified that she considered the BLT tours of
Tommy and Footloose to be second-class tours, based on the
cities played and the length of engagements. Morse specifi-
cally referred to the week of September 25 through October 1,
1995, of the BLT Tommy tour, which included 1 day in La
Crosse, Wisconsin, and 5 days in Des Moines, Iowa.20 Morse
also referred to cities on the BLT itinerary of Kalamazoo,
Michigan, Lincoln, Nebraska, and Fort Wayne, Indiana, as
cities not normally booked with first-class tours. The BLT
tours of both Tommy and Footloose contained a number of split
weeks including several weeks where performances were given
daily in a different city.21 Morse testified further that no first-
class tour could accomplish six cities in 6 days.
Although as related above, the BLT itineraries of Tommy
and Footloose, both contained a number of short engagements
(less than a week), both tours also contained a number of en-
gagements of 1 week or more. BLT’s Footloose tour, gave a
full week of eight performances in Norfolk, Virginia; Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma; Buffalo, New York; Richmond, Vir-
ginia; Fort Worth, Texas; Rochester, New York; Kansas City,
Missouri; Spokane, Washington; and Anchorage Alaska, as
well as 2 weeks in Dayton, Ohio, and a week and a half (12
performances in 9 days) in Wilmington, Delaware.22
BLT’s tour of Tommy demonstrates that it played eight per-

18 I note that the Dodgers tours of Footloose and 42nd Street, per-
formed at the same New Orleans Theater as the BLT tour of the The
King and I. The Dodgers first-class tours of 42nd Street, Tommy and
Footloose all played in Detroit. The Dodgers tours of these shows also
played in St. Louis, Missouri, and San Antonio, Texas, at the same
theatres that housed the BLT tours of The King and I. The Dodgers
tours of 42nd Street, and Tommy also performed in Austin, Texas. Its
42nd Street tour played in Buffalo and Rochester, New York, and the
Dodgers Footloose tour played in Providence, Rhode Island, and Des
Moines, Iowa, at the same theatre that housed BLT’s The King and I
tour.
19 The Dodgers tour of Footloose gave 16 performances at the same
Shubert Theatre in New Haven that housed the BLT The King and I
tour.
20 As I have noted, above, however, the Dodgers tour of Footloose
also played in Des Moines, giving eight performances at the same Civic
Center venue as the BLT Tommy tour. Additionally, the Dodger 42nd
Street tour also played at the Civic Center in Des Moines.
21 The BLT Tommy tour traveled to six cities in 7 days in October
1996. (Olympia, Bellingham, and Tacoma, Washington, Eugene, Ore-
gon, Tacoma, Washington, and Klamath Falls, Oregon). The BLT
Footloose tour visited five cities in 1 week, Tyler, Abilene, Orange,
Galveston, and College Station, Texas, in November 2000.
22 As I have noted above, the Dodger’s 42nd Street tour played in
Rochester and Buffalo New York for 1 week and performances of that
tour was housed at the Shea Theatre and the Auditorium Theatre, re-
spectively, the same venues used by the BLT Footloose tour. Further
the BLT Footloose tour also performed at the Kravis Center in West
Palm Beach, Florida, where as detailed above, the Dodger tours of
Tommy and The King and I performed.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 961
formances in a 1-week period at Pace Theatrical theatres in
Miami and Orlando, Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; and
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Morse conceded that these theatres
were normally considered first-class venues.23
Further, BLT’s Tommy tour also contained a number of 1
week, eight performance schedules, including Charlotte, North
Carolina; Dayton, Ohio; Mexico City, Mexico; Grand Rapids,
Michigan; Providence, Rhode Island; Omaha, Nebraska; Buf-
falo and Rochester, New York; Baltimore, Maryland; Raleigh,
North Carolina; Fresno, California; Portland Oregon; Salt Lake
City, Utah; and Anchorage, Alaska.24
Morse also testified that generally the Dodgers contract only
for first-class rights to shows and that for shows such as 42nd
Street, The King and I, Footloose, and A Funny Thing Hap-
pened on the Way to the Forum, this was the case.25 The record
revealed and Morse conceded that the Dodgers initially ob-
tained both first-and second-class rights for Tommy. However,
these secondary rights were subsequently conveyed to Music
International (MTI), a licensing agency, who in turn licensed
the second-class rights to BLT. Morse also admitted, however,
that the Dodgers also obtained second-class rights to shows
such as Dracula and Good Vibrations. Since neither of these
shows were successful, there were no first-or second-class tours
of either show.
According to Morse, she was always under the impression
that the Dodgers run only first-class tours, and does not recall
any discussion among Respondent’s officials concerning
whether Respondent should or should not run a second-class
tour. Morse also testified and the record confirms that Respon-
dent’s first-class tours of Footloose, The King and I, and
Tommy were directed by the same director as the Broadway
productions of these shows, while the BLT productions of these
shows were directed by someone else. The record also dis-
closes that the cast size for Respondent’s tours of The King and
I, Footloose, and Tommy was substantially higher than the BLT
tours of these shows.26
Morse also testified that after the Dodgers produced Music
Man on Broadway it decided to that it was not economically
feasible to produce any tour of that show and then returned the
first-class rights to the widow of the author, Meredith Wilson.
Subsequently, BLT obtained the rights to Music Man and pro-
duced a tour of that show.

23 As noted above, the Dodgers tours of 42nd Street and Footloose
played in New Orleans for eight performances. Additionally, the
Dodgers Footloose tour performed for a week in Milwaukee, and its
42nd Street Tour played 1 week (8 performances) in Orlando, and in
Miami.
24 As I have detailed above, Respondent’s tours of 42nd Street and
Footloose each played 1 week in Buffalo and Rochester, New York.
The Dodgers tours of 42nd Street, The King and I, and Footloose, all
played 1 week engagements in Charlotte and Baltimore. Respondent’s
Footloose and 42nd Street tours played a week in Grand Rapids, its
42nd Street and The King and I tours performed in Portland and Salt
Lake City, its Footloose tour played Providence, and the Dodgers 42nd
Street tour performed for a week in Raleigh and Omaha.
25 That testimony is corroborated by the rights agreements for these
shows which were introduced into the record.
26 They were 46–35, 35–26, and 30–24, respectively.
The record does not disclose whether BLT obtained first-
class, second-class, or both rights from Wilson. However, Sta-
matiades testified that based on Broadway scuttlebutt, Michael
David had encouraged the estate of Wilson to award second-
class rights to BLT, when the Dodgers decided not to produce
their own tour. She also testified that she had “heard” that BLT
had obtained rights to produce Tommy, Footloose, and 42nd
Street in the same fashion, i.e., Respondent “encouraged” the
rights holders to give BLT the rights to produce these shows.
The BLT Itinerary for the Music Man was introduced into
the record. Interestingly, Respondent did not ask Morse her
opinion as to whether the BLT tour of Music Man was a first-or
second-class tour. However, on cross-examination, Morse
conceded that nearly all the cities listed on BLT’s Music Man
tour were first-class cities. Stamatiades testified in this regard
that all the cities on that itinerary with the exception of White
Water, Wisconsin, are considered “first-class cities,” and most
of the venues listed are theaters that have played first-class
productions, produced under the production contract.
The evidence of the BLT Music Man itinerary in the record,
consists of a one-page document which lists the tour from Sep-
tember 30, 2001, to October 18, 2002. It does not list the ven-
ues, but does indicate the cities and the dates of the tour. It
shows 2-week engagements in Cleveland, Ohio; Denver, Colo-
rado; and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.27 This portion of the BLT
tour listed a total of 34 cities, with all of the engagements of at
least a week. It also included an engagement of 16 perform-
ances over a period of slightly over 2 weeks in Cincinnati,
Ohio.28
Other cities on this portion of the BLT itinerary included
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michi-
gan; Atlanta, Georgia; New Haven, Connecticut; Seattle, Wash-
ington, and other cities, where as related above Respondent has
toured a number of its shows.
The itinerary then reflects a break in the tour, and a rehearsal
for a period of 11 days in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Subsequent
to that, the tour consisted of a few split weeks in smaller cities
such as Ames, Iowa; Flint, Michigan; Jackson, Mississippi;
Akron, Ohio; Madison, Wisconsin; Benton Harbor, Michigan;
Danville, Kentucky; Youngston, Ohio; Sioux Falls, South Da-
kota; and Logan, Utah. However, this phase of the BLT tour
also consisted of several longer engagements, such as 2 weeks
in Boston, Massachusetts (16 performances), Dayton, Ohio (16
performances), and Wilmington, Delaware (12 perform-
ances).29

27 Respondent’s tours of 42nd Street, The King and I, Footloose, and
Tommy all played in Cleveland. (Footloose, 4 weeks; 42nd Street, and
The King and I, 2 weeks; and Tommy, 1 week; and Denver (The King
and I, 4 weeks, Tommy, 3 weeks, Footloose and 42nd Street, 2 weeks.)
The Dodger tours of 42nd Street, Tommy, and Footloose performed
in Ft. Lauderdale for 2 weeks each.
28 Cincinnati, Ohio, also played host to tours of the Dodgers shows
of Footloose, The King and I, and 42nd Street for 16 performances and
of Tommy for 8.
29 The BLT tour gave 16 performances at the Colonial Theatre in
Boston. Respondent’s tour of Footloose gave 16 performances at the
same theatre. Its tour of 42nd Street gave 8 performances at the Wang
Theatre in Boston, where Respondent’s The King and I tour gave 24
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD962
This phase of the BLT tour of Music Man, also included 1
week (eight performance) engagements in New Orleans, Lou-
isiana; Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Oklahoma; Providence,
Rhode Island, Rochester, New York; Houston, Texas; Salt Lake
City, Utah; St. Louis, Missouri; and Nashville, Tennessee.30
Further, the itinerary included another rehearsal for a 2-week
period, followed by stops of short duration, entirely of split
weeks in smaller cities31 plus several layoffs of from 1–5
weeks.
Stamatiades testified that in her view the Music Man tour of
BLT can be characterized as a first-class tour, which commonly
starts out in major cities with longer engagements, and then in
later years will perform in smaller cities, with shorter engage-
ments.
Evidence was also presented concerning the cast size of the
Music Man tour. The Broadway production provided by Re-
spondent had a cast of 42 performers. Respondent introduced
into the record a copy of a program of BLT’s Music Man tour,
which was undated, and reflected 32 cast members. However,
Charging Party introduced into evidence a playbill collected by
Equity for an April 16, 2002 performance of BLT’s Music Man
tour, which consisted of 39 cast members.
Furthermore, as detailed above, Equity attempted to organize
BLT’s Music Man tour, and the decision on objections revealed
that the number of eligible voters in the election held on June
11, 2002, was also 39, the number of employees on the Excel-
sior list submitted by BLT.
Charging Party introduced into evidence BLT’s tour of Miss
Saigon, which began on September 6, 2002, and lasted until
February 1, 2004.32 According to Stamatiades, the venues listed
on this itinerary were all cities and theatres where first-class
tours have played, and she considered this to be a first-class
tour.33
The itinerary for this tour consisted entirely of engagements
from 1 to 3 weeks (8–24 days) except for one four-performance
engagement in West Point, New York, and a five-performance
engagement in State College, Pennsylvania.
The cities listed included: Miami, Florida; Omaha, Nebraska;
Baltimore, Maryland; Phoenix, Arizona; Lake City, Utah; Chi-
cago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Providence, Rhode
Island; Palm Desert, California; and Charlotte, North Caro-
lina.34

performances. The Dodgers tour of Tommy gave 53 performances at
the Colonial Theatre in Boston, and then later on the tour performed 16
times at the Wang Theatre.
30 As noted most if not all of these cities, were venues for one or
more of the Dodgers tours described above.
31 These cities included Amherst, Massachusetts, Johnstown, Penn-
sylvania., Athens, Ohio; Muncie, Indiana; Edmond, Oklahoma; Har-
lingen, Texas; Lima, Ohio; Rockford and Decatur, Illinois.
32 The Dodgers had never produced a tour of Miss Saigon.
33 Neither Morse nor any other witness from Respondent testified to
the contrary.
34 All of these cities, as detailed above have been venues for shows
produced by Respondent. The BLT Miss Saigon tour also gave eight
performances in Montreal and Vancouver, Canada, where the Dodgers
42nd Street tour also performed. The tour also includes some smaller
Popper also testified on behalf of Respondent, and corrobo-
rated Morse’s opinion, that the production contract covers only
first-class productions. In support of that assertion, Respondent
through Popper presented various letters between the parties on
this subject.
On November, 21, 2000, Harriet Slaughter, Popper’s prede-
cessor as director of labor relations for the League sent a letter
to Eisenberg. The letter which was attached to a list of League
members, which included the names of David and Strong as
officials of Respondent.
The letter reads as follows:
November 21, 2000
Mr. Allan Eisenberg
Actor’s Equity Association
165 West 46th Street
New York, NY 10016
Dear Alan:
Attached is a list of (i) League members who may have a con-
trolling ownership interest in a production company(ies), and
where appropriate the name of such company(ies), that are in-
cluded in the multi-employer bargaining unit bound by the
Production Contract when producing “first-class perform-
ances (as that phrase is used in Dramatists (Guild APC:) of
theatrical productions on Broadway and/or on tour that are not
subject to any other collective bargaining agreement covering
stage performers” (“League/Equity Shows”); and (ii) other
companies included in the multi-employer unit when produc-
ing League/Equity shows. In those instances where a listed
League member is not identified on the list as having a con-
trolling ownership interest in a production company, produc-
tion companies that the League member has a controlling
ownership interest, in, and which produce League/Equity
Shows, are or will be bound by the Production Contract.
Nothing herein is included to expand or contract the scope of
the existing multi-employer bargaining unit.
Sincerely,
Harriet Slaughter
Director, Labor Relations
According to Popper, this letter was intended to capture the
understanding between the parties, that the contract is intended
to apply to first-class productions. This letter was sent after the
terms of the production contract had been reached. Agreement
had been reached on October 10, 2000, on terms of a new con-
tract to run from 2000 to 2004. No such letter was sent to Eq-
uity prior to the negotiations, and in fact this letter was the first
time that the League had sent such a letter to the Union.
Popper was not involved in the decision by the League to
send such a letter to Equity, and did not know if an issue con-
cerning this subject had come up during or prior to negotia-
tions. Popper testified further, “I think it was just an intention
to memorialize what the understanding of the industry was,

cities, such as Peoria, Illinois; Scranton, Pennsylvania; Kalamazoo,
Michigan; and Schenectady, New York, which do not appear on the
itineraries of any of Respondent’s shows in evidence in this proceeding.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 963
which had not been done before.” He further asserts that
“From our prospective it clarified and described who was
bound by the Production Contact.”
Equity sent no response to this letter.
On March 7, 2001, Slaughter sent another letter to
Eisenberg, reflecting an updated list of League members.
Strong, David, and the Dodgers appeared on the attached up-
dated list. This letter contained no reference to contract cover-
age or to first-class versus second-class coverage.
On January 23, 2002, Slaughter sent another letter to Equity,
reading as follows:
January 23, 2002
Mr. Alan Eisenberg
Actors’ Equity Association
165 West 46th Street
New York NY 10036
Dear Alan:
This is the updated list for League members as of January 23,
2002.
This is a list of (i) League members who may have a control-
ling ownership interest in a production company(ies), and
where appropriate the name of such company(ies), that are in-
cluded in the multi-employer bargaining unit bound by the
Production Contract when producing “first-class perform-
ances (as that phrase is used in the Dramatists Guild APC) of
theatrical productions on Broadway and/or on tour that are not
subject to any other collective bargaining agreement covering
stage performers” (“League/Equity Shows”); and (ii) other
companies included in the multi-employer unit when produc-
ing League/Equity shows. In those instances where a listed
League member is not identified on the list as having a con-
trolling ownership interest in a production company, produc-
tion companies that the League member has a controlling
ownership interest in, and which produce League/Equity
Shows, are or will be bound by the Production Contract.
Nothing herein is intended to expand or contract the scope of
the existing multi-employer bargaining unit.
Sincerely,
Harriet Slaughter
Director, Labor Relations
The list of members attached to this letter, did not include
David, Strong, or the Dodgers, since Respondent had resigned
from the League sometime in 2001. However, it is undisputed
that the Dodgers were bound by the 2000–2004 contract at the
time of the January 23, 2002 letter. No such letter was sent to
Equity from the Dodgers concerning the issue of contract cov-
erage.
Equity did not send a response to the League’s January 23,
2002 letter.
On August 7, 2003, Popper sent a similar letter to Equity,
containing an updated list of members as of June 30, 2003, and
containing the same language of as in Slaughter’s letters of
2000 and 2002, with respect to first-class productions. Neither
the Dodgers, Strong, nor David were listed on the attached list
of members to this letter. As noted, however, the parties have
stipulated and agreed that David was a member of the League’s
negotiating committee, and the Dodgers are bound by the
agreement reached between the League and Equity in 2004.
Popper conceded that Equity never agreed to the League’s
view of contract coverage as detailed in these three letters, but
emphasizes that Equity did not dispute such an interpretation
until a letter from Moss, the Union’s attorney, and Popper,
dated January 27, 2004.35
This letter reads as follows:
January 27, 2004
BY FACSIMILE (212) 719-4389
& FIRST CLASS MAIL
Seth M. Popper
Director of Labor Relations
League of American Theatres and Producers, Inc.
226 West 47th Street
New York, New York 10036
Re: Production Contract
Dear Seth:
As a follow-up to last Thursday’s meeting, this is to confirm
the following:
1. Equity requests a copy of the League’s Constitution and By
laws and any other document setting forth the League rules
for establishing how a League member elects to participate in,
or not to participate in, League negotiations with Equity.
2. Inasmuch as multi-employer bargaining is consensual, this
is to place the League on notice that Equity reserves the right
to refuse to permit particular League members to participate
in the multi-employer unit and in particular, that Producers
who seek to join the League multi-employer unit after nego-
tiations have commenced will be permitted to do so only with
Equity’s prior consent.
3. Equity does not agree with the characterization of the scope
of the existing multi-employer bargaining unit set forth in the
cover letter to the updated lists of League members, except
that we agree with the statement that nothing in the cover let-
ter was intended to expand or contract the scope of the exist-
ing multi-employer bargaining unit. In particular, Equity be-
lieves that Producers included on your list are included in the
multi-employer bargaining unit for all purposes to the extent
described in the Production Contract; that the definitions in
another Guild’s contact are not controlling; and that bargain-
ing unit Producers and the production companies they direct
and control are necessarily bound by the Production Contract
and cannot opt out of that Contract for a particular production
without Equity’s consent.
We look forward to the commencement of negotiations on
April 1, and appreciate the League’s willingness to schedule
sufficient days for negotiations in order to ensure that negotia-
tions will be able to conclude in a timely manner.

35 Note that this letter was sent after the Union filed the instant
charge earlier in January.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD964
Very truly yours,
Franklin K. Moss
KM:gm
CC: Bernard Plum, Esq.
Alan Eisenberg
Ken Greenwood
Flora Stamatiades
Walt Kiskaddon
No response was sent by the League to this letter, and as
noted bargaining for the 2004–2008 contract took place from
between April1 to July 12, 2004, when agreement was reached
on a new agreement running from June 28, 2004, to June 29,
2008.
Neither during these negotiations, nor as far as the record
discloses, at any prior negotiations did the League make any
proposal to change the recognition clause, or any other provi-
sion of the contract, to reflect what the League believed to be
the description of the unit as contained in its prior letters.
According to Popper, at one bargaining meeting, the date of
which he did not recall, Eisenberg stated that he did not under-
stand the League’s cover letters, and needed further explana-
tion. Popper did not testify what response, if any, was made by
League representatives to Eisenberg’s inquiry. In any event,
Popper conceded that at no time during any negotiations did
any Equity representative ever state that it agreed with the
League’s position as stated in the prior letters that the contract
applied only to first-class productions. Popper also did not
recall any discussion during the negotiations of the issue of
first-class versus second-class tours, and whether the contract
covered one or the other or both. He did recall that during ne-
gotiations there was extensive discussion of the economics of
touring, and that during these sessions Eisenberg stated “that
there was a certain level of touring that Equity was not desirous
of representing.” Popper contends that Eisenberg said, without
defining what he meant, that there is, certain level of touring
that the Union has never been involved in and don’t desire to be
involved in. Popper added that he believed that Eisenberg’s
comment was “to convey a desire not to have salaries be too
low for actors.”
Stamatiades, on rebuttal, furnished testimony on this subject.
She asserts that what Eisenberg said was that Equity was not
interested in negotiating on behalf of the very small, one
nighter tours, what Eisenberg called “itty, bitty tours.” She
further defined the issue, when asked whether any of the pro-
ductions which had been discussed previously during the trial
would qualify as “itty bitty.” Stamatiades responded as fol-
lows:
Some of the—think some of the other tours we looked
at. Maybe the “Tommy” tour. The non Equity “Tommy”
tour might. Without looking at them__you know, the very
late part of the “Music Man” tour maybe went in to play
more than two cities a week. I mean basically that was
the—the understanding of it was that split week is really
two cities a week. Smaller than that, more than two cities
a week was not what we were trying to cover with the
production contract negotiations.
Popper also testified, similar to the testimony of Stamatiades
and Morse, that Equity did assert during the negotiations that it
was concerned about an alleged “diversion” of work from
League members to non-Equity tour companies, such as BLT,
and that the Union presented a proposal in response to this per-
ceived problem. Popper further testified that this proposal re-
ceived little discussion and that most of the negotiations were
concerned with the issue of how to make tours economically
feasible for League members and to satisfy the Union’s con-
cerns about loss of work.36 Eventually, the parties reached an
agreement on a clause entitled “Experimental Touring Pro-
gram.” This program consists of eight pages detailing certain
conditions wherein musical tours can qualify to pay lower
wages and per diem and other changes in benefits than is re-
quired in the production contract.
Popper also provided testimony, corroborating Morse, that
League members generally acquire only first-class rights to
productions, although he adds that at times League members
will acquire second-class rights not to produce shows under
such rights, but to put a “hold” on such rights, so that someone
else does not acquire such rights while a League member still
has the first-class rights to a particular production.
Popper also testified in support of Morse’s definition of first-
class versus second-class rights, by asserting that “it’s a little
like the definition of pornography. You know it when you see
it.” He then went on to testify similarly to Morse that first-class
tours are characterized by experienced actors, directors, and
choreographers, with significant capitalization, at first-class
venues with engagements of 1 week or more.
Popper also testified concerning rule 71(b) of the contract,
known as the split-week provision. According to Popper, this
clause came into being in the 1980’s and was part of an effort
by the parties to capture work that had not been part of the con-
tract before. The clause is a provision that defines a split-week
tour as based on a formula involving the number of weeks of
the tour of 1 week or less of engagements of 4 weeks or more,
and Actor’s compensation of $10,000 per week or less. If a
tour qualifies for split-week contract treatment, the Union
agreed to a number of concessions, vis á vis, the production
contract in various areas, such as salary, rehearsal, per diem
overtime, health, days off, and layoffs. Popper testified how-
ever that this clause has not been used that often, and in fact he
could not remember a show that used it since he had been at the
League.37
The Charging Party points out that based on the itinerary of
BLT’s Tommy tour it would have barely satisfied the special
concessions of the Production Contract. (i.e., 51 percent of the
weeks of BLT’s Tommy tour are engagements of less than a
week).
In this regard, Morse testified that although split weeks are
one of these “hallmarks” of second-class tours, all split-week
tours are not necessarily second-class tours. Thus, Morse ex-
plained that once tours are constructed in a manner that permits
split weeks in multiple cities within a week, and the economics
are established, the quality of production, caliber of talent, and

36 Stamatiades did not dispute Popper’s testimony in this regard.
37 Popper has been employed by the League since December 1998.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 965
number of the cast will determine whether it is considered to be
a first or second-class production.
Stamatiades also provided testimony that the production con-
tract has been applied to various off-Broadway Productions,
which are not deemed be first-class. Further, she testified that
Ken Gentry produced a tour of the show Jekyll and Hyde under
the production contract even though he had only second-class
rights to that show. However, Stamatiades conceded that Ken
Gentry is not a member of the League, and that he agreed with
Equity to tour the show of Jekyll and Hyde, under the produc-
tion contract. She further admitted that Gentry produced tours
of Oliver and Oklahoma without signing a production contract
with Equity, and as non-Equity productions.
Finally, the Charging Party introduced into the record a copy
of an agreement signed by the producers of Jersey Boys, a
Dodgers’ production, and Equity, dated July 9, 2005. This
agreement entitled, “Independent Producer’s Agreement for
Productions Contract,” states that the producer recognizes Eq-
uity as the representative of all actors (Principal and Chorus),
including understudies, stage managers, and assistant stage
managers employed by producers in all of producer’s produc-
tions wherever they may take place. Further under the agree-
ment the producer agrees to be bound by the production agree-
ment, with certain modifications, as specified in the independ-
ent agreement.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Settlement Agreement and the Motion in Limine
Respondent, in its answer, argued that the Union by signing
the settlement agreement with Respondent dated March 29,
2002, waived its right to the information requested from Re-
spondent. Respondent has not made any reference to this con-
tention in its brief, and appears to have abandoned that asser-
tion, in light of the Union’s agreement to limit its information
request to information subsequent to March 29, 2002.
However, since Respondent did not formally withdraw the
contention raised in its answer, I shall briefly consider it. The
settlement covers, as described above, claims and causes of
action that arose prior to its execution date of March 29, 2002.
Therefore, since the complaint has been amended and the Un-
ion has modified its information request, to reflect that no in-
formation is sought for the period prior to March 29, 2002,
Respondent’s affirmative defense has no merit and must be
dismissed.
Respondent filed prior to the trial, a motion in Limine, to
preclude the introduction of certain evidence at the trial. Re-
spondent contended that based on the above-settlement agree-
ment, General Counsel and the Union, should be precluded
from introducing any evidence that preceded March 29, 2002,
particularly evidence bearing on whether Equity had a reason-
able belief of an alter ego relationship between Respondent and
BLT that arose prior to that date.
The motion was argued on the first day of trial. I denied the
motion at that time. Respondent has renewed its request in its
brief, and requested that I reconsider my ruling on that subject.
Respondent argues in its brief, as it did in its motion, and in its
argument at trial, that the agreement “reasonably construed,”
prohibits the introduction of such evidence. It points to the
broad language in the settlement, by which the Union agreed to
release Respondent from any claims or grievances arising be-
fore March 29, 2002, “In any way relating to any alleged rela-
tionship with, connection between, or interaction among” the
Dodgers and BLT, “pertaining to the business or operations of
BLT,” and not to “make, file or join in, or assist or encourage
others in making or filing any grievances claims, lawsuits,
complaints or other proceedings” before the National Labor
Relations Board concerning the relationship between Respon-
dent and BLT.
Respondent further contends that this language precludes
Equity and the General Counsel from relying on evidence pre-
dating March 29, 2002, in support of their burden to establish
relevance of the information request made in 2003. It asserts
that allowing such evidence would nullify the provisions of the
agreement, and would deny Respondent the full benefit of its
agreement, and be an “unreasonable and unfair result.”
However, as I indicated in my initial ruling, the General
Counsel was not a party to the settlement, and is not bound by
said agreement. More importantly, the settlement agreement
says nothing about evidence, and refers only to claims or griev-
ances, arising prior to March 29, 2002. The current charge was
filed in 2004, and is based on a new information request made
by Equity in 2003, well after this agreement was signed.
It is clear that General Counsel may introduce evidence of
pre-settlement conduct, to shed light on the legality of conduct,
which has occurred after the settlement agreement was exe-
cuted. Monongahela Tower Co., 324 NLRB 214, 215 (1997);
Kaumagraph Corp., 316 NLRB 793, 794 (1995); Special Mine
Services, 308 NLRB 711, 720–721 (1992), enfd. in pertinent
part 11 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1993).
Here, as in the above precedent, General Counsel is not seek-
ing a finding that Respondent violated the Act prior to March
29, 2002, but is offering the evidence to shed light on the law-
fulness of Respondent’s denial of the Union’s information re-
quest made in November 2003. Thus it is permissible to con-
sider such pre-settlement evidence to evaluate the Union’s al-
leged reasonable belief concerning the relationship between
BLT and Respondent when it made its request in 2003.
I therefore reaffirm my ruling made at trial, that Respon-
dent’s motion in Limine is denied.
B. Section 10(b)
Pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, a violation of the
NLRA cannot be found, “which is inescapably grounded in
events predating the limitations period.” Machinists Local
1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 422 (1960). However, events
outside the 10(b) period can be used to shed light on critical
events within the 10(b) period. Id. at 416. The crucial distinc-
tion between these principles is that the Board may not give
“independent and controlling weight” to the pre-10(b) evi-
dence. Id. at 417; Monongahela Power Co., supra.
Respondent argues that since here most of the evidence es-
tablishing the Union’s alleged “reasonable belief” concerning
the relationship between Respondent and BLT, occurred out-
side the 10(b) period, that relying on such evidence would
“give independent and controlling weight” to events occurring
more than 6 months prior to service of the charge, and therefore
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD966
the complaint must be dismissed. Southern California Gas Co.,
342 NLRB 613, 614–616 (2004). I do not agree.
I find Southern California Gas, supra, to be distinguishable
in several important respects, and that Respondent’s position is
contrary to well-established Board precedent, supported by the
Courts. Such precedent establishes that in information cases,
the crucial dates for measuring Section 10(b) is the date of the
requests for the information and the dates of the denial. The
fact that some or even all of the evidence supporting the request
took place outside 10(b) period is not conclusive, since the pre-
10(b) evidence merely sheds light on the violation which took
place within the 10(b) period. Union Builders, Inc., 316 NLRB
406, 411 (1995), enfd. 68 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 1995); (All evi-
dence supporting information request outside 10(b) period);
Crowley Marine Service, 329 NLRB 1054, 1059 (1999), enfd.
234 F.3d 1295 (D.C. Cir 2000); Knappton Maritime Corp., 292
NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988) (Arbitrator issued a decision Sep-
tember 26, 1986 finding employer related entity with another
company to which it illegally diverted work. On February 28,
1987, employer allegedly discontinued part of its business, and
union believed, based primarily on arbitrator’s award that em-
ployer was again diverting work and violating contract. Union
made information request on February 23, 1987, which was not
denied until May 28. Based primarily on pre-10(b) arbitrator’s
award Board found that union had a reasonable belief that em-
ployer was violating contract, within 10(b) period, justifying
request.)
Moreover, there are a number of Board cases, where the
10(b) issue is discussed in terms of when the Respondent has
“clearly and unequivocally” denied a union’s request. Quality
Building Contractors, 342 NLRB 429, 431–432 (2004); Public
Service Electric & Gas Co., 323 NLRB 1182, 1188 (1997),
enfd. 157 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1998); Oliver Insulating Co.,
309 NLRB 725, 726 (1992); and California Nurses Assn., 326
NLRB 1362, 1367 fn. 10 (1998).
Thus, in these cases all or most of the evidence supporting
relevance of the requests occurred outside the 10(b) period, and
the Board without even discussing or considering the issue of
whether such evidence is time barred, found no 10(b) viola-
tions, based on the fact that the refusal to supply the informa-
tion occurred within the 10(b) period. Quality Building, supra
(Union learned of alleged contract violation, which supported
its information request in October 2002). The union did not
make its request for information until April 2004, and it was
denied on June 2004 by the employer. The 10(b) period begins
to run from June, date of denial, not from October 2002 when
the union learned of possible contract violations as contended
by employer); Public Service Gas, supra (Union relied on evi-
dence gathered for period of 2 years to support its information
request made on May 18, 1993. Employer responded on June
4, 1993, but did not clearly deny request, until a letter in Sep-
tember 1993. Charge filed on March 4, 1994, was not barred
by 10(b), since no unequivocal denial until September 1993.)
Therefore, these cases also make clear, that evidence support-
ing the information request is not barred by Section 10(b), as
long as the denial of the request is within the 10(b) period.38
Additionally, 10(b) cases dealing with other sections of the
Act also support the conclusion that the pre-10(b) evidence here
supporting the violation can be considered. Sheet Metal Work-
ers Local 80 (Limbach Co.), 305 NLRB 312, 315 (1991), enfd.
989 F.2d 515, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (In an 8(b)(4) case, most of
the evidence establishing motivation of union’s action occurred
outside 10(b) period. The Board, with court approval, relied on
such evidence to shed light on Union’s actions within 10(b)
period); Grimmway Farms, 314 NLRB 73, 74 (1994) (Employ-
ees engaged in protected concerted activity by walkout in May
1990.) Employees were terminated at that time. In 1991, em-
ployees requested rehire and Employer denied request based on
their conduct in walking out in 1990. Administrative law judge
dismissed refusal to hire on 10(b) grounds finding the 1999
events were essential “missing proof,” necessary to find a vio-
lation. Board reverses, finding that statement by Employer in
1999 referring to prior walkout is sufficient to permit consid-
eration of the pre-10(b) evidence to shed light on Employer’s
motivation for refusal to hire within 10(b) period); Outdoor
Venture Corp., 327 NLRB 706, 709–710 (1999) (Board consid-
ers pre-10(b) evidence concerning issue of whether strike was
an unfair labor practice strike, since only allegations General
Counsel seeks to remedy is refusal to reinstate returning strikers
within 10(b) period.) Jennie-o-Foods, 301 NLRB 305, 314
(1991) (ALJ and Board considers pre-10(b) evidence of unlaw-
ful promulgation of no-talking, no-socializing rule, in evaluat-
ing allegation of enforcement of rule within 10(b) period.)
A close examination of the facts in Southern California Gas,
reveals that it is not dispositive and clearly distinguishable from
the instant case.
There, the union had made an information request in Febru-
ary 2001, for information based on a possible grievance con-
cerning safety matters. The Employer rejected that request 4
months later. In February 2002, the Union made another in-
formation request, asking for similar information, but this time
stating the reason for the request, that it had filed a safety com-
plaint with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
The Board, with Member Walsh dissenting, found that the
Union had not established relevancy for its 2002 request. It
concluded that the information request referred only to its com-
plaint to CPUC a state agency, a matter outside the collective
bargaining context. The General Counsel and the dissent ar-
gued that since the earlier request made reference to a threat to
file with CPUC, that the instant request was relevant to an in-
vestigation of the grievance. The Board majority disagreed,
emphasizing that the Union’s 2002 request made no reference
to a possible grievance, and that the Employer could reasonably
believe that the information was being requested for the pur-
pose of seeking discovery before CPUC.
Thus, the primary grounds for the Board’s dismissal was that
even considering the prior information request, the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the current request was rele-
vant to any grievance or other collective-bargaining function of
the Union.

38 Here, there is no dispute that the denial and the request for infor-
mation in 2003, were within the 10(b) period.
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 967
Alternatively, and in what can only be described as dicta, the
Board then considered the 10(b) issue. It concluded that since
there is nothing in the 2002 requests that refers to the 2001
requests the 2002 request “must be evaluated on its own terms,
and, for the reasons stated above, the relevancy has not been
shown.” The Board observed that in these circumstances, reli-
ance on the 2001 request to establish relevancy, “would be to
give independent and controlling weight to events occurring
more than 6 months to the service of the charge.”
Furthermore, the Board relied on two additional reasons to
dismiss the complaint. They were that the Union was pursuing
its claim before a third party and not for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining, citing, WXON-TV, 289 NLRB 615 (1988),
enfd. 876 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1989), and that finally even assum-
ing that the information was presumptively relevant, the pre-
sumption has been rebutted. The Respondent has affirmatively
shown that the information was not relevant to any grievance or
bargaining purpose.
It is clear that the issue in Southern California Gas was not
the same as the present case. There the Union could not show
that its information request in 2002 was relevant to any collec-
tive-bargaining purpose, but instead its request was based on a
complaint to an outside agency, which the Board viewed as
outside the Union’s role as collective-bargaining representative.
Here, there is no question that both the current and the Union’s
prior requests were based on the same issues (possible griev-
ances and negotiations), which are clearly related to the Un-
ion’s functions as collective-bargaining representative. There-
fore, by relying in part on pre-10(b) evidence, which bear upon
the Union’s reasonable belief in support of the timely request is
not giving “independent and controlling weight” to such evi-
dence, but merely shedding light on the reasons for its request
and the lawfulness of Respondent’s refusal to comply. Union
Builders, supra; Limbach Co., supra.
More importantly, unlike Southern California Gas, here the
record reveals some evidence within the 10(b) period, support-
ing the Union’s reasonable belief. While much of the evidence
is outside the 10(b) period, such as reports from employees
concerning prior productions, information obtained concerning
names, address and officers of the two companies, and a back-
stage article in May 2003, within the 10(b) period, the Union
received reports from employees concerning BLT’s 42nd Street
production, and obtained a resume from a producer-director
which asserted a relationship between BLT and the Dodgers.
While Respondent dismisses this post-10(b) evidence as un-
reliable and hearsay, this contention has no bearing on the 10(b)
issue. The record here contains evidence within the 10(b) pe-
riod, which could support the Union’s reasonable belief, and
therefore dismissal based on 10(b) is not appropriate.39 Further,
as I have detailed above, the portion of the decision in Southern
California Gas is only dicta, and was one of only four reasons
cited by the Board in dismissing the complaint. Finally, as I
have also noted above, the conclusion reached by the Board on

39 Indeed, as I discuss in more detail below, Respondent is not cor-
rect in its assertion that hearsay or allegedly unreliable evidence cannot
be considered as evidence supporting the Union’s reasonable belief of a
relationship between BLT and the Dodgers.
the 10(b) issue, is in my view, contrary to the Board and Court
precedent that I have cited and detailed, particularly Union
Builders, supra; Crowley Marine, supra; and Knappton Mari-
time, supra, which were neither cited, distinguished nor over-
ruled by the Board in its discussion therein.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, I shall reject Respon-
dent’s contention that the complaint should be dismissed based
on Section 10(b) of the Act.
C. The Union’s Information Request
The general principles regarding the obligation of an em-
ployer to supply information to the union are clear and not in
dispute. An employer, on request must provide a union with
information that is relevant to its carrying out its statutory du-
ties and responsibilities in representing employees. Pulaski
Construction Co., 345 NLRB 931, 935 (2005); NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The duty to provide in-
formation includes information relevant to contract administra-
tion and negotiations. CEC, Inc., 337 NLRB 516, 518 (2002);
Barnard Engineering Co., 282 NLRB 617, 619 (1987).
Where, as here, the information sought concerns matters out-
side the bargaining unit, such as those related to single em-
ployer or alter ego status, a union bears the burden of establish-
ing the relevance of the requested information. Reiss Viking,
312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993); Pulaski Construction, supra. A
union has satisfied its burden when it demonstrates a reasonable
belief supported by objective evidence for requesting the in-
formation. Cannelton Industries, 339 NLRB 996, 997 (2003);
Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 258, 259
(1994).40
In determining the relevance of requested information, the
Board uses a broad, discovery type standard, wherein the Un-
ion’s burden is not an exceptionally heavy one, requiring only a
showing of probability that the desired information is relevant,
and that it would be of use to the Union in carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities, SBC Midwest, 346 NLRB
No. 8 slip op. at 3 (2005); Shoppers Warehouse, supra. In this
regard, the Board does not pass on the merits of the Union’s
claim of breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, in de-
termining whether information relating to the processing of a
grievance is relevant. Pulaski Construction, supra; Shoppers
Warehouse, supra.
In applying these principles to the instant case, the crucial is-

40 I note that a number of Board cases, phrase the burden on union’s
in such cases as needing only to establish a “reasonable belief” that the
information is relevant, without adding the requirement that it must also
be based on objective factors. Oklahoma Fixture Co., 333 NLRB 804,
811 (2001); Public Service Gas, supra, 323 NLRB at 1186 and 157
F.3d at 229; AAA Fire Sprinkler, 322 NLRB 69, 89–90 (1996); West-
moreland Coal, 304 NLRB 528 (1991); Barnard Engineering, supra at
600; Joseph Stern & Sons, 297 NLRB 1 (1989).
However, an examination of the facts in these cases reveals the exis-
tence of such objective facts, in order to establish the Union’s “reason-
able belief.” In my view, the added requirement of objective facts to
establish “reasonable belief,” is meant to make clear that the Union’s
belief cannot be construed as “reasonable,” where it is not based on
objective facts, but rather, suspicion, surmise conjecture or speculation,
Bohemia Inc., 272 NLRB 1128, 1129 (1984); Anchor Motor Freight,
296 NLRB 944, 949 (1989).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD968
sue to be determined is what kind of evidence is appropriate to
meet the Union’s burden of establishing “objective facts” sup-
porting its reasonable belief that its information request is rele-
vant. More specifically the Union must show the existence of
objective facts to support its “reasonable belief” of a single
employer and ego relationship between Respondent and BLT.
In this regard, evidence was presented establishing a number
of alleged “objective facts.” They include reports from mem-
bers to the Union both prior to its 2001 information request and
in 2003, by performers on Respondent’s tours, to the effect that
BLT and the Dodgers are “one company,” and why can’t we
stop Big League because “we see the relationship between Big
League and the Dodgers.” Further, the members on Respon-
dent’s 42nd Street tour informed the Union that BLT represen-
tatives were at various tour sites of Respondent, inspecting sets,
and costumes and discussing a non-Equity tour of the show.
The Union also became aware that BLT used the same artwork
as the Dodgers for various shows such as The King and I and
42nd Street.
Additionally, prior to 2001, Stamatiades began to notice that
a number of shows produced by the Dodgers either on Broad-
way, on tour or both, would then result in another non-Equity
tour produced by BLT.
Upon further investigation the Union obtained documents
from the New York. Secretary of State and the Internet, which
showed that Elaine Warner, the wife of Sherman Warner, a
principal of the Dodgers, was listed as chairman CEO of BLT.
Stamatiades, who was familiar with most individuals actively
engaged in the industry, had never heard or known Elaine War-
ner to be active in the industry. The Union was informed that
Jonathan David the son of Michael David, another principal of
the Dodgers, was a corporate officer of BLT, which was subse-
quently corroborated by a search from a commercial service,
which listed Jonathan David as “Chairman” of BLT.
Stamatiades was also informed that the Dodgers and BLT
shared offices at one time.41
Stamatiades was also informed that representatives of the
Dodgers had “encouraged” the estate of Meredith Wilson to
award second-class touring rights to BLT for Music Man, and
that the Dodgers had also encouraged such an award of rights
of Tommy and Footloose to BLT.
In May 2003, while preparing for negotiations, Equity no-
tices an article in Backstage, a trade publication, which stated
that BLT is a subsidiary of the Dodgers.
Stamatiades also was aware that BLT and the Dodgers were
represented by the same attorney, and testified that she believed
that there was a relationship between the two companies, be-
cause the names of both companies consist of baseball refer-
ences.
Finally, Equity procured a document in February 2004, ap-
pearing to be a resume of Curt Wollan, a director-producer,
which reflect that he produced tours of shows with “Big League
Theatricals and Dodger Productions of New York.”
While General Counsel and Charging Party argue that the
above evidence is more than sufficient to meet the Union’s
burden of establishing a “reasonable belief” based on objective

41 The fact was confirmed by Respondent’s witness Sally Morse.
facts, Respondent not surprisingly disagrees. Respondent’s
principal argument in this regard, is that the Union’s burden
may not be met by “hearsay” evidence, and that most if not all
of the facts relied on by the Union consists of such evidence.
However, Respondent’s contention is simply incorrect, as it is
well settled by Board precedent, supported by the Courts, that a
Union’s “reasonable belief” may be established by “hearsay
evidence.” Contract Flooring Systems, 344 NLRB 925, 928
(2005); CEC, Inc., supra at 518; Cannelton Industries, 339
NLRB 996, 1005 (2003); Walt Disney World, 329 NLRB 904,
907 (1999); Crowley Marine Services, supra; Public Service
Gas, supra at 1187; Shoppers Warehouse, supra at 259; Reiss
Viking, supra at 625; Magnet Cole, Inc., 307 NLRB 944 fn. 3
(1992); Herbert Industrial Insulation Co., 312 NLRB 602, 608
(1993); George Koch & Sons, 295 NLRB 695, 699 (1989),
enfd. 950 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1991); Walter N. Yoder & Sons,
Inc., 270 NLRB 652, 656 fn. 6 (1984), enfd. 754 F.2d, 531, 534
(9th Cir. 1985); Leonard Herbert, Jr., 259 NLRB 881, 885
(1981), enfd. 696 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983); Heck Elevator
Maintenance, 197 NLRB 96, 98 (1982), enfd. 471 F.2d 547 (2d
Cir. 1973).
Indeed several cases go further by observing that it is not
necessary that the Union’s information be shown to be accu-
rate, non hearsay or even ultimately reliable. Public Service
Gas, supra, 323 NLRB at 1182; Electrical Energy Services,
Inc., 288 NLRB 925, 931–932 (1988); W.L. Molding Co., 272
NLRB 1239, 1240 (1984); Boyers Construction Co., 267
NLRB 227, 229 (1983).
Moreover, from a definitional standpoint, the evidence char-
acterized by Respondent here is not technically hearsay evi-
dence at all, since it is not being offered for the truth of the
reports, but merely to show that the Union had some basis for
its request. Reiss Viking, supra at 625; Hebert Industrial, supra
at 620; George Koch, supra at 699; Walter Yoder, supra, 270
NLRB 657 fn. 6, and 754 F.2d at 534.
The cases cited by Respondent in support of its assertion that
“hearsay” evidence cannot be used to establish the Union’s
“reasonable belief” are inapposite. Midland Hilton & Towers,
324 NLRB 1141 fn. l (1997); Times Herald Printing, 315
NLRB 700, 709 (1994); Auto Workers 651 (General Motors),
331 NLRB 479, 481 (2000), are cases dealing with issues of the
admissibility and reliance on hearsay evidence, where the evi-
dence is being offered for the truth of the assertion made, such
as proof of animus or motivation. That is unlike the case here,
where as I have observed, and the cases consistently confirm,
the evidence is not being offered for the truth of the allegations,
but only in connection with the Union’s reasonable belief,
based on the information that it received.
Accordingly, based on the precedent cited above, contrary to
Respondent, I do rely on the various items of information sup-
plied to the Union, including alleged “hearsay” reports, in as-
sessing whether the Union has met its burden of establishing a
“reasonable belief” of an alter ego or other relationship between
Respondent and BLT.
An examination of Board and court law, convinces me that
the Union has more than met its burden in this regard. Indeed,
a substantial number of cases have relied on similar types of
evidence, in whole or in part, to support a union’s “reasonable
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 969
belief,” sufficient to trigger an information request for nonunit
information. Cannelton Industries, supra, 339 NLRB at 1005
(Union relied on reports from employees and companies shared
same address.); CEC, Inc., supra, 337 NLRB at 517, 518 (Un-
ion relied on reports from its representatives in other cities, and
the companies shared offices and were in the same industry.);
Oklahoma Fixtures, supra at 811 (similar names of employers)
E. J. Alrich Electrical Contractors, 325 NLRB 1036 fn. 2
(1998) (Union relied on statement from employee that the two
companies involved “are the same company.” Employee also
told union that companies were in the same building and had
same receptionist. Also relied on fact that son was president of
one company, and father was president of the .other company
alleged to be alter ego.); National Broadcast Co., 318 NLRB
1166, 1168–1169 (1995) (Union relied on article published, as
well as reports from employees); Herbert Industrial, supra, 312
NLRB at 608 (Union relied on reports from employees, and
competitors of employer.), Reiss Viking, supra, 312 NLRB at
626 (Reports from unit employees of alleged subcontracting);
Magnet Coal, supra, 307 NLRB at 448 (Reports from employ-
ees that companies shared equipment and had same mailing
address.); Briscoe Sheet Metal Co., 307 NLRB 361, 367 (1992)
(Union relied on fact that wife of owner of one company was
co-owner of other company, as well as reports from unit em-
ployees that bargaining work was performed by nonunit em-
ployees.); D.J. Electrical, Inc., 303 NLRB 870 (1991) (Union
informed by employees of company that president informed
them that he had another company doing electrical work);
George Koch & Sons, supra; and 950 F.2d at 1333 at 644 (Un-
ion received reports from employees about unit work. Also,
Union relied on fact that that where one company did not per-
form work of erection of product, the other alleged alter ego
company did work); Maben Energy Co., 295 NLRB 147, 153
(1989) (Union relied in part on newspaper articles, plus fact
that labor relations of both companies were handled by same
individual.); Bently-Jost Electrical Co., 283 NLRB 564, 568
(1987) (Union relies on shared offices plus the fact that son of
official of one company is associated with other company.);
Pence Construction Co., 281 NLRB 322, 323, 325 (1986) (Un-
ion relied on statements of carpenters concerning relationship
between companies, and the fact that companies shared same
address.); Carson L. Gruman Co., 278 NLRB 327, 335 (1986)
(Complaints from unit employees that company was transfer-
ring work and same attorney represented both companies.); W.
L. Molding Co., 272 NLRB 1239, 1241 (1984) (Reports from
employees as to alleged contract violations.); Walter Yoder,
supra, 270 NLRB 652 fn. 1, 655; 754 F.2d. at 536 (1984) (Un-
ion relied in part on reports from employees that one employer
operating the other and was “the same company.”); National
Cleaning Co., 265 NLRB 1352, 1353 (1982), enfd. 723 F.2d
746, 747 (9th Cir. 1984) (Complaints from unit employees that
they were not receiving contract wages.); Leland Stanford Jun-
ior University, 262 NLRB 136, 154 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473,
474 (1983); and Heck Elevator Maintenance Co., 197 NLRB
96, 98 (1972), enfd. 471 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973) (Reports from
members, plus shared office space.)
Respondent offered some evidence in an attempt to discredit
the Union’s alleged “reasonable belief,” such as the fact that
newspapers such as the New York Times frequently often mis-
takes in their reporting on theatre issues. Such evidence is
unpersuasive. Although it may be true as testified to by Morse,
that newspapers do at times make errors in their reports on the
theatre industry, it is also true, and is not disputed by Morse,
that at other times such reporting is accurate. Here, the report-
ing was done by “Backstage,” a periodical specializing in the
theater industry. One would expect that such a periodical
would be more likely to report accurately on the industry, than
a regular paper, even the New York Times. More importantly,
the issue here is not whether the article is or is not accurate, but
whether the Union acted reasonably in relying on the article. I
find that it was certainly reasonable for the Union to rely on the
article by a well respected industry periodical which stated that
“BLT is a subsidiary of the Dodgers.” I note in this regard that
the article contained direct quotes from Dan Sher, a principal of
BLT, in discussing the rise of non-Equity tours. I find that it
was reasonable for Equity to conclude therefore that the arti-
cles’ statement concerning the relationship between BLT and
Respondent was based on information from Sher, and thus
more likely to be accurate.
Much of the other evidence offered by Respondent, such as
that it is common in the industry for unrelated activities to share
offices, that Morse never heard of Wollan (the producer-
director whose resume the Union relied on), and Morse’s opin-
ion that the name of BLT was a reference to “League” of thea-
tres and not baseball, as believed by Stamatiades, is also not
persuasive. That evidence may be relevant to issues of whether
BLT and Respondent are alter egos, but not to the Union’s
“reasonable belief” as to that question. It is not necessary for
General Counsel or Charging Party to show or for me to find,
which I do not, that there is an alter ego relationship between
BLT and the Dodgers. Cannelton Industries, supra at 1004;
Bentley-Jost, supra at 563; Pence Construction, supra at 324.
The relevant issue is whether the Union has shown that it had a
“reasonable belief,” based objective facts that there is an alter
ego or other relationship between BLT and the Dodgers.
Based of the above precedent, which frequently have found
“reasonable belief,” based on far fewer “objective facts,” than
are present here, I conclude, in agreement with General Coun-
sel and Charging Party, that the Union has more than met its
burden of proof in this regard.
That finding does not end the inquiry, since the Union must
also show that, even assuming a finding of alter ego or some
other relationship between the companies, that such informa-
tion is relevant to the Union’s function as a collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees. There can be
little doubt that the evidence has established such connection,
based on Stamatiades’ testimony, plus an examination of the
contract and the Union’s negotiation proposal. This evidence
establishes that the Union based on its “reasonable belief” that
there is a relationship between BLT and Respondent, believes
that the contract may have been violated by work being per-
formed by BLT that should have been covered by the agree-
ment. More specifically, the Union relied on rule 8 of the pro-
duction contract, which provides that contracts of employment
are binding on all corporations as enterprises which “each
signed directs controls or is interested in.” Further, the Union
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD970
was aware that BLT was about to and in fact subsequently did,
produce a non-Equity tour of 42nd Street which Equity believes
should be covered by the contract. Therefore, in order to de-
termine whether it should file a grievance over this or any other
tour (run by BLT), it needs the information it sought about the
relationship between BLT and the Dodgers.
Stamatiades also testified that the Union needed the informa-
tion for negotiations. In that regard, the record establishes that
Equity did raise the issue in the negotiations for a new agree-
ment beginning in April 2004, that it felt that work was being
diverted by League members to non-Equity companies, and
specifically referred to the Dodgers and BLT, as well as other
companies and other non-Equity tour companies. The Union
also asserted that there was a relationship between BLT and the
Dodgers, as well as between the other league members and
other non-Equity touring companies. In order to address these
concerns, the Union submitted two proposals, entitled “Preser-
vation of Work.” These proposals were summarily rejected by
the League negotiators, although no one denied the Union’s
accusation of a relationship between BLT and the Dodgers.
The parties eventually negotiated a new clause entitled “Ex-
perimental Touring Program,” which consisted of a certain
conditions where a tour could qualify for lower wages and
other benefits, than are required in the production contract.
Thus the Union argues that it needed the requested informa-
tion in order to assist it in the negotiations, and if it had the
information and was able as a result of such information, to
argue more intelligently concerning the relationship between
BLT and the Dodgers, that it might have had more success in
arguing for acceptance of its preservation of work proposal.
Respondent makes several arguments in response to the posi-
tion of Equity and the General Counsel on these issues. With
respect to the possible grievance, as testified to by Equity, Re-
spondent contends that as “a matter of Law,” Respondent could
not have violated the contract, and therefore the information is
not relevant. In this regard, Respondent makes several argu-
ments. They include that Respondent has only first-class rights
to produce shows, that BLT has only second-class rights, and
that rights derived by BLT for their productions, were obtained
directly from the rights holders. Therefore, the Dodgers could
not have diverted any work to BLT, and the Union has no pos-
sible grievance to file. Further, Respondent asserts that the
production contract applies only to “first-class” tours, and all of
BLT’s tours, including 42nd Street were “second-class” tours.
Therefore, even if an alter-ego relationship was established
between Respondent and BLT, there can be no contract viola-
tion. Finally, Respondent asserts that rule 8, the provision re-
lied on by the Union, applies only to contracts of employment
between actors and producers, and has no bearing on contract
coverage issues. The problem with all of these contentions is
that they are largely irrelevant to the issue before me. Respon-
dent has misperceived my role in this case. I am not acting as
an arbitrator, and need not and do not decide whether a contract
violation would be found, if an alter ego or other relationship
was established. Indeed what Respondent is asking me to do is
to make a determination on the merits that the Union did not
establish a contract violation. Such a decision by me would be
error, since such a determination properly rests with the arbitra-
tor. Shoppers Warehouse, supra at 260.42 The Board does not
pass on the merits of the Union’s claim that the contract may
have been violated. Schrock Cabinet Co., 339 NLRB 182 fn. 6
(2003); Cannelton Industries, supra, at 1005; Public Service
Gas, supra at 1182; Reiss Viking, supra; Crowley Marine v.
NLRB, supra, 234 F.3d at 1297.
The Board need only decide whether the information sought
has some “bearing” on these issues, or would be of use to the
union. Crowley v. NLRB, supra; George Koch, supra at 699;
Associated General Contractors of California, 242 NLRB 891,
893–894 (1979), enfd. 633 F.2d 766, 779–772 (9th Cir. 1980);
Pfizer Co., 268 NLRB 916, 917 (1984). See also Detroit
Newspaper Union Local 13 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
Thus I need only find here, which I do, that the information
requested by the Union has “some bearing” on its assertion that
Respondent may have violated the contract between it and the
Union.
I also conclude based on examination of the record that I
cannot find as “a matter of law,” that the contract has not been
violated, since the evidence on this issue is murky and uncer-
tain, and susceptible of more than one interpretation.
While the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses, Morse and
Popper, with respect to first-class and second-class rights is
essentially undisputed, the conclusion that Respondent seeks to
draw from such testimony is uncertain. Thus, Respondent con-
tends that it could not have diverted work to BLT, since it only
has first-class rights and BLT obtained only second-class rights.
However, the record shows, and Morse admitted that Respon-
dent had at one time second-class rights to Tommy, as well as
for other shows like Good Vibrations and Dracula.
Respondent’s principal contention, that the Production Con-
tract does not apply to second-class tours, and then BLT pro-
duces only second-class tours, received some support from the
mutually corroborative testimony of Morse and Popper. It is
further supported by the admission made by Stamatiades that
there is certain kind of tour, phrased as an “itty bitty tour,”
which Equity does not seek to cover. She further conceded that
the BLT tour of Tommy could be construed as such a tour, and
that such tours are characterized by visiting more than two
cities per week.
On the other hand, there is other evidence in the record, tend-
ing to support Equity’s position that the production contract
applies to any productions, including both first- and second-
class tours. The most important evidence supporting this asser-
tion is simply the wording of the recognition clause of the con-
tract which makes no distinction between first and second-class
productions, and purports to cover “all” employees in the speci-
fied job classifications. Further, the contract also contains a
clause entitled “split-week” tours, which gives certain conces-
sions to tours meeting the criteria set forth therein. Since
Morse testified that “split-weeks” are one of the hallmark of
second-class tours, a strong argument can be made by Equity,

42 See also P. R. Mallory & Co., 272 NLRB 457, 458 (1968), where
the Board reversed an ALJ’s dismissal of a complaint based on an
information request, and observed “we are not concerned in this case
with the merits of the Union’s grievance.”
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 971
that the fact that parties bargained about and agreed to the
“split-week” provision is an indication that they considered
second-class tours to be covered by the contract.
While as noted, both Morse and Popper testified that in their
view, the production contract does not cover second-class tours,
neither witness presented any evidence that any Equity repre-
sentative ever agreed to that interpretation. Respondent did
submit into evidence, letters sent to Equity, by Harriet Slaugh-
ter, the director of labor relations for the League, dated No-
vember 21, 2000; January 23, 2002; and August 7, 2003, which
updated the list of League members, and included a statement
that the members is bound by the contract, “when producing
first-class performances.” Equity did not respond to the first
three of these letters. Respondent appears to contend that the
failure to so respond constitutes acquiescence in the League’s
position. This is an argument that could be made, and has some
resonance, but on the other had, as correctly pointed out by
Charging Party and General Counsel, these letters were all sent
after negotiations for the 2000 contract had concluded. More-
over, a March 7, 2001 letter sent by Slaughter to the Union,
also updating League membership, made no mention of the
first-class production issue. Most significantly of all, prior to
the start of the 2004 negotiations, the Union’s attorney sent a
letter, dated January 27, 2004, to Popper, disputing the charac-
terization of the unit, set forth in the prior letters, and stating
Equity’s position that as per the recognition clause, the contract
covers the productions for “all purposes.” This position was
reiterated by Equity during bargaining, and the League made no
attempt to change the recognition clause during the negotia-
tions.
Moreover, as also pointed out by Charging Party, the Dodg-
ers had withdrawn from membership in the League in 2001,
and no letter such as was sent by the League mentioning first-
class productions, was sent to Equity by the Dodgers. Finally,
Charging Party argues that any possible doubts about the scope
of the Equity-Dodger bargaining unit, are resolved by the latest
agreement signed between Equity and Respondent. The parties
signed a Jersey Boys independent agreement, in 2005, by which
Respondent agrees to recognize Equity as the collective-
bargaining representative for all actors and other classifications,
employed by producers in all of producer’s productions wher-
ever they may take place. According to Charging Party, this
clause expands the coverage of Respondent’s employees over
and above the coverage in the production contract, and makes
no limitations as to first-or second-class productions. Respon-
dent of course could make the argument that this agreement
applies only to Jersey Boys productions, but that issue as well
as the other matters raised by Respondent in its defense, should
be raised before an arbitrator.
Similarly, the record contains substantial amounts of testi-
mony from Morse, Popper, and Stamatiades, as well as numer-
ous exhibits concerning issues of how to define first-and sec-
ond-class tours, and whether particular productions of the
Dodgers and BLT should be characterized in either category. I
have recounted that evidence in the facts, and shall not repeat
that evidence here. Nor do I find it necessary or appropriate to
resolve the conflicting testimony between the witnesses of Re-
spondent and Equity as to this issue. I will note, however, that
the definition of first-and second-class tours is not entirely
clear, and the record is somewhat confusing, particularly since
a number of cities and venues, such as Palm Desert, California,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Providence,
Rhode Island, were played by both BLT’s 42nd Street tour,
characterized by Morse as a second-class tour, and by other
alleged first-class tours of the Dodgers. Similarly, various
other cities and venues, such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, St.
Louis, Missouri, New Orleans, Louisiana, Detroit, Michigan,
Buffalo and Rochester, New York, and New Haven, Connecti-
cut, were places where both Dodgers alleged first-class tours,
and BLT’s alleged second-class tours gave performances. Fur-
ther, as pointed out by Charging Party and General Counsel, the
BLT tours of Music Man and Miss Saigon appear to be even
under Morse’s definition, first-class tours, since they played
longer engagements in “first-class” cities.
Of course other evidence presented by Respondent, which I
have recounted above in the facts, supports Respondent’s posi-
tion as to the distinction between second-and first-class tours,
and their position that Respondent produces first-class tours
and that BLT generally produces second-class tours.
Respondent also asserts that rule 8 in the production con-
tract, applies only to contracts of employment between actors
and producers, and relies on the admission of Stamatiades to
this effect. Once again this is an argument that should be made
to the arbitrator, who could accept that interpretation, or instead
find the clause applicable to the contract in general. However,
even absent a specific clause, such as rule 8, Equity would be
able to make a plausible argument to an arbitrator, that if an
alter ego relationship between BLT and Respondent is estab-
lished, employees of BLT, automatically by operation of law,
become employees of Respondent, and are thereby covered by
the contract. Indeed, in many of the cases that I have cited
above, the decisions contained no reference to any specific
clauses binding alter-ego employers to the contract. Yet, the
Union’s were found to be entitled to the information requested,
to enable it to make the assertions to an arbitrator that the con-
tract applied to the employees of the alleged alter ego em-
ployer.43
I shall not recount any more of the evidence with respect to
the issues of contract coverage, except to conclude that as de-
tailed above, both sides have adduced credible evidence in
support of their respective positions. I emphasize, once more,
that I need not and do not find it essential or even appropriate to
resolve these issues, or to offer an opinion, as to which side’s
argument are more persuasive. Consistent with the precedent
that I have cited above, this is not for me or the Board to de-
cide, but for an arbitrator, in the event the Union chooses to file
a grievance. I need only find, which I do the Union has estab-
lished a nonfrivolous position that if an alter-ego relationship is
found to exist between BLT and the Dodgers, that a violation of
the contract can be found. I do conclude that the arguments
presented by Charging Party as to that position is more than
nonfrivolous, but reasonable and plausible.

43 See, for example, Cannelton Industries, supra at 1003; CEC Inc.,
supra; Oklahoma Fixtures, supra; Hebert Industrial, supra; and Pence
Construction, supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD972
Therefore, I find that Respondent has not established its de-
fense that “as a matter of law,” Respondent could not be found
to have violated the contract. Therefore the Union has estab-
lished the relevance of the information requested, and I find
that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act,
by failing to supply such information to the Union.
I also conclude, in agreement with General Counsel and
Charging Party, that the record discloses that the Union also
established the relevance of the information requested for nego-
tiations. In that regard, it is undisputed that the Union ex-
pressed its concerns during the negotiations in 2004 that work
was being diverted by League members and negotiators, such
as the Dodgers and other firms to non-Equity companies such
as BLT, who were producing non-Equity tours. In that connec-
tion, Equity also asserted there was a relationship between Re-
spondent and BLT, as well as between certain League members
and other companies. In response to these concerns, Equity
presented a proposal entitled, “Preservation of Work.” This
proposal was not accepted, nor did it produce much discussion,
other than derisive comments by League Negotiators. The
parties eventually agree on a proposal entitled “Experimental
Touring Program,” which detailed conditions where League
members could qualify for certain concessions from the Pro-
duction Contract on tours.
Stamatiades testified that since it became clear during nego-
tiations that Equity was not going to receive the information
about relationships between the companies that it was seeking,
“It became difficult if not impossible to continue to argue these
proposals.” The above evidence is more than sufficient to con-
clude, which I do that the Union has established the relevance
of the information requested for negotiations, clearly a function
of the Union’s responsibilities as collective-bargaining repre-
sentatives. Shoppers Warehouse, supra, 259–260; George
Koch, supra, 695 and 699 and at 950 F.2d at 1334; Leland Stan-
ford Junior University, 262 NLRB 136, 155 (1982).44
Respondent’s arguments in response to this contention have
absolutely no merit. It argues that the evidence discloses that
the proposals advanced by the Union at negotiations were “so
off target that they were withdrawn by Equity without either
any discussion or substantive response by the League.” Thus
Respondent asserts that Equity did not need any information
concerning the relationship between Equity and the Dodgers,
and “the information Equity needed, should have requested,
and obviously requested from the League, was information on
first-class touring, including information concerning guaran-
tees, cost and crew sizes, travel, recoupment, advertising and
the like.” However, it is not up to Respondent to decide what
information Equity needed or should have requested. As long
as the Union has demonstrated a plausible relevant reason for
the request, which it has done, the Union is entitled to receive
the information from Respondent. The fact that the Union may
have withdrawn its proposal does not render the issue irrelevant
to negotiations. Shoppers Warehouse, supra at 260. As Stama-

44 Although the 2004 contract has been negotiated and agreed on,
the issue is not moot, since by the time this case is finally decided by
the Court of Appeals, it could very well be time to negotiate a new
agreement.
tiades credibly testified, had the Union had the information that
it requested from Respondent, it might have been able to muster
stronger arguments in support of its proposals to remedy its
concerns about diversion of work.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Union has also estab-
lished the relevancy of the information it requested for use in
negotiations, and that this constitutes an additional reason, that
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
failing to supply such information to the Union.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Dodger Theatricals Holdings Ltd. is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Actors’ Equity Association is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation requested in its letter dated December 19, 2003, as
modified subsequently by the Union to cover information for
the period after to March 29, 2002, Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended45
ORDER
The Respondent, Dodger Theatricals Holdings Ltd., New
York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Actors’ Equity As-
sociation, by refusing to furnish it with information that it re-
quested which is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining represen-
tative of Respondent’s unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Promptly furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested in its letter of December 19, 2003, as modified subse-
quently by the Union to cover information for the period after
to March 29, 2002.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
New York, New York facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”46 Copies of the notice, on forms provided

45 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
46 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
DODGER THEATRICALS HOLDINGS, INC. 973
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since December 19, 2003.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.