District Council Of Painters And Allied Trades No. 36

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 18, 1986

278 N.L.R.B. 1012 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
District Council of Painters and Allied Trades No.
36 and J . A. Stewart Construction Co. and Dis-
trict Council of Painters and Allied Trades No.
48; District Council of Painters and Allied
Trades No. 52; Southern California Drywall
Contractors Association, Inc., Parties to the
Contract. Cases 21-CB-8856, 21-CC-2835, 21-
CC-2837, and 21-CE-330
18 March 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND BABSON
Upon charges filed by J. A. Stewart Construc-
tion Co. (Stewart) on 10 May and 6 June 1984, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board issued a consolidated complaint on 13 Sep-
tember 1984 against District Council of Painters
and Allied Trades No. 36 (the Union), alleging that
it has violated Section 8(e), Section 8(b)(4)(i),
(ii)(A) and (B), and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Copies of the charges
and complaint and notice of hearing were served
on the parties. On 28 September 1984 the Union
filed an answer to the complaint denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
On 28 March 1985 the parties filed a stipulation
of facts and motion to transfer the case to the
Board.' The parties agreed that the stipulation of
facts and attached exhibits shall constitute the
entire record in this case and that no oral testimo-
ny was necessary or desired by any of the parties.
The parties further waived a hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge, the making of findings of
fact and conclusions of law by an administrative
law judge, and the issuance of an administrative
law judge's decision, and submitted the cases di-
rectly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and a Decision and Order.
On 20 May 1985 the Board issued an order ap-
proving the stipulation and transferring the pro-
ceeding to the Board. Thereafter, the General
Counsel and the Union filed briefs in support of
their positions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the stipulation and its
exhibits, the briefs, and the entire record in this
proceeding and makes the following
' The Southern California Drywall Contractors Association did not
sign the motion to transfer or the stipulation of facts . By letter dated 6
March 1985 to the Regional Director for Region 21 (included in the ex-
hibits attached to the stipulation of facts ), the Association expressly
waived its rights to be a party to this proceeding and to contest the
motion to transfer the proceeding to the Board or the stipulation of facts.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
Stewart is a general contractor in the building
and construction industry in southern California.
From October 1983 through at least February
1985, Stewart has been engaged as general contrac-
tor in constructing a maintenance facility for the
Southern California Rapid Transit District located
at 742 North Mission Road, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia. Stewart has purchased and received goods at
this project in excess of $50,000 directly from sup-
pliers located outside the State of California within
the 12-month period ending on 28 February 1985.
Class A Construction (Class A) and Gypsum En-
terprises (Gypsum) at all times material herein have
been , and are now, employer-members of the
Southern California Drywall Contractors Associa-
tion, Inc. (the Association). The Association at all
times material herein has been, and is now, an or-
ganization composed of employers engaged in the
building and construction industry, and which
exists for the purposes, inter alia, of representing its
employer-members in negotiating and administering
collective-bargaining agreements with various labor
organizations , including the Union. The employer-
members of the Association, in the aggregate, an-
nually purchase and receive goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 from suppliers located
in the State of California, each of whom purchases
and receives those same goods and materials direct-
ly from suppliers located outside the State of Cali-
fornia.
The parties stipulated, and we find, that Stewart
is, and has been at all times material , an employer
engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act and that Stewart and Gypsum have
been and are now persons engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. The parties fur-
ther stipulated, and we further find, that the Asso-
ciation is, and at all times material has been, an em-
ployer engaged in commerce and in an industry af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
2(6) and (7) and 8(b) and (e) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The parties stipulated, and we find,, that the Re-
spondent, District Council of Painters and Allied
Trades No. 36, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(b) and (e) of the
Act.
278 NLRB No. 138
PAINTERS LOCAL 36 (STEWART CONSTRUCTION) 1013
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Stipulated Facts
As noted above, Stewart is the general contrac-
tor in the construction of a maintenance facility in
Los Angeles for the Southern California Rapid
Transit District (the RTD project). Stewart first
subcontracted for drywall, plaster, and metal stud
work on the RTD project to be performed by
Class A Construction, which began work in March
1984. Class A was a member of the Southern Cali-
fornia Drywall Contractors Association, Inc.,2
which, on behalf of its members, had a collective-
bargaining agreement, called the Master Labor
Agreement (MLA), with the Union for the period
of 1 July 1980 through 30 June 1985.3 Article 26,
section 7, of the MLA provided, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Wherever a Signatory Employer has taken
over a contract for a job that has been com-
menced by another contractor, he shall be re-
quired to notify the District Council in writ-
ing. When any job or project that has been
commenced by one Contractor and work
thereon stopped by the Union because of fail-
ure of the contractor to meet his current or
past contract obligations, or the contractor has
failed to abide by an arbitration award or satis-
fy a court judgment, to the extent such stop-
page is not based upon the subcontracting
clauses . . . it shall not be a violation of this
Agreement for the Union to refuse to permit
persons covered by this Agreement to work
said job or project until such wages and fringe
benefits have been paid. It shall not be a viola-
tion for the Union likewise to remove work-
men who are working on said job. The
Union's right to remove workmen from the
job because of unpaid wages and fringe bene-
fits may be taken without prior resort to the
grievance and arbitration procedures contained
in this Agreement. Workmen may be furnished
to the contractor commencing work at a job-
site upon the execution of a written agreement
which obligates the general contractor or Sig-
natory Employer to pay all of the indebted-
ness, known or unknown, arising prior to or
during the course of that project, or upon
written notification from the Union giving the
Employer clearance to start work on said job
site.
8 Stewart was not a member of the Association nor did it have a con-
tract with the Union.
8 District Council of Painters and Allied Trades No. 48 and District
Council of Painters and Allied Trades No. 52 also were parties to this
collective-bargaining agreement
In early April,4 Class A became delinquent in its
contribution to trust funds set forth in the MLA
for employees working on the RTD project, and in
mid-April Ben Cox, union business representative,
ordered employees of Class A to cease working at
the RTD project, which they did. Stewart learned
from the Union that Class A was delinquent in its
trust fund contributions, and Robert Krieger, Stew-
art's project manager, informed Leonard Small, the
Union's business manager , that Stewart would
make good any amounts owed to the Union by
Class A for any work performed on the RTD
project. Small informed Krieger that the Union
was not going to let anyone work on the project
until Class A had made good on its obligations to
the Union, and he then agreed to Krieger's offer.
The first payment by Stewart of Class A's delin-
quency was tendered in early May. However, the
trust funds refused to accept the check because of
restrictive endorsement language on it.
Stewart replaced Class A on the RTD project
with Gypsum Enterprises, which was also a
member of the Association. Gypsum was to begin
work on 4 May. However, when Gypsum's em-
ployees arrived at the RTD project on 4 May, Cox
ordered them to leave the project because Class
A's trust fund liability had not been paid, and the
employees left. On the same day, Small informed
Stewart representative Friedman by telephone that
"for Gypsum to come on the jobsite, it would have
to assume all trust fund liabilities of Class A," or
words to this effect.
On 9 May, Cox again ordered employees of
Gypsum to leave the RTD project because of Class
A's outstanding trust fund delinquencies, and em-
ployees of Gypsum ceased work and left. On 11
May, Cox told Friedman at the RTD project that
Gypsum employees would have to be sent home
because of Class A's trust fund delinquencies and
because of Class A's alleged payroll liabilities.
About the same day, Cox ordered employees of
Gypsum to leave the RTD project and informed
them that if they failed to do so, the Union would
file internal union charges against them and they
could be fined by the Union. Cox repeated these
statements to employees of Gypsum about 14 May
and about 15 May. These actions of Cox and Small
during the period of 4 May through 15 May were
performed under the authority of and pursuant to
article 26, section 7, of the MLA.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Distinguishing Operating Engineers Local 12
(Griffith Co.), 212 NLRB 343 (1974), reversed and
4 All dates are in 1984.
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
remanded 545 F .2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 854 (1977), on remand 243 NLRB
1121 (1979), enfd . 660 F .2d 406 (9th Cir . 1981),
cert . denied 457 U.S. 1105 ( 1982), the General
Counsel contends that article 26, section 7, of the
MLA violates Section 8(e) of the Act because it is
secondary in nature and, although it comes within
the construction industry proviso of Section 8(e), it
authorizes use of self-help as a means of enforce-
ment . The General Counsel also argues that, al-
though the MLA was entered into more than 6
months before the charges in this case were filed, a
finding of an 8(e) violation is nevertheless warrant-
ed because the clause in issue is facially invalid and
was unilaterally reaffirmed by the Union within the
10(b) period by various actions of Small and Cox
during 4 May through 11 May . The General Coun-
sel further maintains that the Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(i), (ii)(A) and (B) by resorting to self-
help measures to enforce the clause . Finally, the
General Counsel contends Ahat the Union 'violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) when Cox threatened Gypsum
employees that the Union would fine them if they
continued to work on the RTD project while Class
A's trust fund and employee salary liabilities were
unpaid.
The Union argues that the clause in issue serves
the community of interests at the jobsite and conse-
quently comes. within the construction industry
proviso of Section 8(e). The Union also contends
that the clause has no secondary object or effect
because Gypsum , the employer from which the
employees withheld their services, was an ally of
and joint employer with Class A , the employer that
was delinquent in its trust fund contributions.
Gypsum and Class A were allies or joint employ-
ers, according to the Union , because the multiem-
ployer bargaining unit of which they were both
members constituted one employer and because
Gypsum succeeded to the same subcontract that
Class A had had on the RTD project . The Union
asserts that Stewart was not an object of any of the
Union 's conduct that was alleged to be violative of
the Act . The Union distinguishes this case from
Griffith Co., supra , in that the provisions of the
contract clause at issue here are limited to the job-
site at which work by a contractor has ceased be-
cause of the contractor 's failure to meet its contract
obligations, while the clause at issue in Griffith Co.,
barred a general contractor from engaging a sub-
contractor that had become delinquent in its trust
fund contributions even if the delinquency oc-
curred at an unrelated jobsite.
C. Discussion and Conclusions
We agree with the General Counsel that article
26, section 7, of the MLA violates Section 8(e) of
the Act insofar as it permits the Union to employ
economic self-help to enforce secondary restric-
tions on replacing contractors . Section 8(e) makes
unlawful an express or, implied agreement between
an employer and a labor organization whereby the
employer agrees to cease doing business with any
other person. As interpreted by the Supreme
Court , Section 8(e) applies when "the tactical
object of the agreement and its maintenance is [the.
boycotted] employer, or benefits to other than the
boycotting employees or other employees of the
primary employer thus making the agreement or
boycott secondary in its aim." National Woodwork
Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U . S. 612, 645 (1967).
"The touchstone is whether the agreement or its
maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of
the contracting employer vis -a-vis his own employ-
ees." (Footnote omitted.)
Article 26 , . section 7 , of the -MLA contemplates
that, when work on a job or project commenced
by one contractor is stopped by the Union because
of the contractor 's failure to meet his contract obli-
gations, the Union may refuse to permit persons to
work the job or project (presumably now under-
taken by a different contractor) and may remove
workmen who have started working until the
wages and fringe benefits owed by the original
contractor have been paid. The contract clause fur-
ther provides that workmen may be furnished to a
contractor commencing work at the jobsite on exe-
cution of an agreement obligating the general con-
tractor or the signatory employer to pay the in-
debtedness . Thus, this clause authorized the Union
to strike or refuse to supply workers to a drywall
contractor on a project until the contractor or the
general contractor agreed to pay the delinquent
wage or fringe benefit obligations of a prior
drywall contractor whose work at the project was
stopped because of the delinquency. It is clear that
this contract provision is not addressed to the labor
relations of the replacement drywall contractor vis-
a-vis his own employees, as it concerns the wage
and fringe benefit delinquency of -the . original
drywall contractor with respect to his employees.
Moreover , it is apparent that the tactical objects of
the agreement include bringing pressure to bear on
the general contractor and, indirectly , on the origi-
nal drywall contractor to pay the delinquency or
to prevent the original drywall contractor from
doing further work on the project until the delin-
quency is paid. That the clause expressly provides
that workers will be supplied by the Union if the
PAINTERS LOCAL 36 (STEWART CONSTRUCTION) 1015
general contractor agrees to pay the delinquency
makes manifest that the general contractor is an
object of the clause.
We reject the Union's contention that the origi-
nal contractor and the replacement contractor are
allies or joint employers and that, therefore, the
clause has no secondary object or effect. The job
taken over by the replacement contractor was not
given, to it by the original contractor, but rather
was awarded to it by the general contractor after
the original contractor lost the job. Additionally,
the fact that the replacement contractor succeeded
the original drywall contractor on the project and
that they are covered by the same multiemployer
collective-bargaining agreement does not make
them joint employers. Thus, the two contractors
are neither allies nor joint employers. See generally
Teamsters Local 560 (Curtin Matheson Scientific),
248 NLRB 1212 (1980).
We agree with both the General Counsel and the
Union that this case is distinguishable from Griffith
Co., supra. That case concerned a clause in a multi-
employer contract in which the contracting em-
ployer agreed not to subcontract work to any sub-
contractor ' whose name appeared on a list of em-
ployers delinquent in their fringe benefit trust fund
payments. Employees of covered employers were
entitled to benefits from the trust funds regardless
of whether their employers were current in their
contributions. However, as the benefit payments
came from common trust funds, delinquencies in
payments by an employer could result in reduced
benefits to all employees, regardless of whether
their employer was the one who was delinquent.
Therefore, the Board held the clause in question
not to violate Section 8(e), as it addressed the labor
relations of the contracting, employers vis-a-vis
their own employees. The clause at issue in the
present case, however, covers delinquencies in
wages and fringe benefits and thus is broader than
the one at issue in Griffith Co. Employees of one of
the covered contractors have no direct economic
interest in assuring that other covered contractors
do not fail to pay to their, employees wages or
fringe benefits, other than payments to the trust
funds. Accordingly, Griffith does not control the
outcome of the present case.,-, Nor is an 8(e) viola-
tion 'unwarranted because of the construction in-
dustry proviso of Section 8(e). Although ,the clause
in issue is, in the terms of the proviso, "an agree-
ment between a labor organization and an employ-
er in the construction industry relating to the con-
tracting or subcontracting of work to be done at
the site of the construction," proviso protection
5 We therefore find it unnecessary to pass on the Board's holding in
Griffith Co.
does not extend to the clause's authorization of
self-help, that is, removal and nonreferral of work-
ers, as a means of enforcing its secondary restric-
tions. See Plumbers District Council 16 (Jamco De-
velopment), 277 NLRB 1281 (1985).
We also agree with the General Counsel that the
Union's action at issue here violated Section
8(b)(4)(i), (ii)(A) and (B). Specifically, with respect
to Gypsum, a neutral employer in the Union's dis-
pute with Class A, Cox on 4 May and 9 May en-
couraged or induced Gypsum employees within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) not to work for
their employer with the 8(b)(4)(B) object of forcing
Gypsum to cease doing business with Stewart on
the RTD project and the 8(b)(4)(A) object of forc-
ing Gypsum to pay Class A's delinquencies under
article 26, section 7, of the contract and thus
comply with self-help contract provisions violative
of Section 8(e). See Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 NLRB
839, 844-845 (1965), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Elec-
trical Workers IBEW Local 769, 405 F.2d 159 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 921 (1969). The
Union, through Cox, also violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) on 4 May and 9 May when
Gypsum employees, through the Union's induce-
ment, left the RTD jobsite, thereby coercing
Gypsum within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii),
into complying with contract provisions violative
of Section 8(e) and ceasing to do business with
Stewart. See Laborers Union Local 270 (Howard J.
White, Inc.), 161 NLRB 1313, 1322 (1966), enfd.
398 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1968)_
Additionally, with respect to Stewart, also a neu-
tral employer in the Union's dispute with Class A,
Small's statement to Stewart on 4 May that "for
Gypsum to come on the jobsite, it would have to
assume all trust fund liabilities of Class A" violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), in that it amounted to a
threat to Stewart that the Union would engage in a
work stoppage against Gypsum for failure to pay
Class A's trust fund debts, thereby impeding
progress on the RTD project, of which Stewart
was ' the general contractor. Cox's statement to
Stewart on 11 May that Gypsum employees would
have to be sent home because of Class A's trust
fund delinquencies and alleged payroll liabilities
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) on the same basis.
Moreover, under the circumstances we infer that
the Union expected that Stewart would relay these
statements to Gypsum and that Stewart, in fact, did
so. Accordingly, by these statements the Union
also coerced Gypsum to cease doing business with
Stewart in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
Finally, we agree with the General Counsel that
the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) when, on 11
May and 15 May, Cox, its business representative,
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
threatened Gypsum employees that if they failed to
leave the RTD project they could be fined by the
Union. A union rule may not be enforced by fine if
the rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy
of the labor laws." Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,
430 (1969). Section 8(b)(4) of the Act establishes a
policy making certain types of "secondary" activi-
ties unlawful. A fine levied by a union against ` a
member who has refused to engage in activity pro-
hibited by Section 8(b)(4) frustrates an overriding
policy of the labor laws. By the same token, threat-
ening to fine employees as a means to induce them
to take part in an activity forbidden by Section
8(b)(4) also frustrates the same overriding labor
law policy. See Carpenters Orange County Council
(Stewart Construction), 242 NLRB 585 (1979), Elec-
trical Workers IBEW Local 153 (Belleville Electric),
221 NLRB 345 (1975). Accordingly, by threatening
to fine Gypsum employees if they did not leave the
RTD project, conduct which would violate Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B), the Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A).
REMEDY
Having found that the Union has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(e), Section 8(b)(4)(i), (ii)(A) and (B), and
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, we shall order it to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af-
firmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act. Specifically, we shall order that the
Union cease and desist from the following: (1) In-
voking, reaffirming, maintaining, enforcing, or
giving effect to the self-help aspects of article 26,
section 7, of the MLA to the extent they apply to
contracting restrictions; (2) inducing or encourag-
ing employees of Stewart, Gypsum, or any other
person engaged in commerce, or in an industry af-
fecting commerce, to refuse to perform services in
the course of their employment, or coercing or re-
straining Stewart, Gypsum, or any person engaged
in commerce where an object thereof is (a) forcing
or requiring an employer to enter into an agree-
ment with self-help aspects violative of Section 8(e)
of the Act or (b) forcing or requiring Stewart,
Gypsum, or any other person to cease using,-sell-
ing, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with Class
A or any' other person; and (3) coercing employees
of Gypsum by threat of fine to engage in a work
stoppage that violates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or (B)
of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. J. A. Stewart Construction Co. is an employer
engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. Class A Construction and Gypsum Enterprises
are persons engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4) of the Act.
3. Southern California Drywall Contractors As-
sociation, Inc., of which Class A Construction and
Gypsum Enterprises are members, is an employer
engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6),
and (7) and 8(b) and (e) of the Act.
4: The Respondent, District Council of Painters
and Allied Trades No. 36, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(b) and
(e) of the Act.
5. The Respondent has violated Section 8(e) of
the Act by entering into, maintaining, and enforc-
ing the_ self-help aspects of article 26, section 7, of
the Master Labor Agreement between the Re-
spondent and Southern California Drywall Con-
tractors Association, Inc., effective 1 July 1980, in-
sofar as they apply to the secondary contracting re-
strictions.
6. The Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(4)(i)(A) and (B) of the Act by encouraging or
inducing employees of Gypsum Enterprises on 4
May not to work for their employer at the RTD
project.
7. The Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act when on 4 May
and 9 May employees of Gypsum Enterprises,
through the Respondent's encouragement. or in-
ducement, refrained from working for Gypsum En-
terprises at the RTD project.
8. The Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by, on 4 May, informing J.
A. Stewart Contruction Co. that "for Gypsum to
come on the jobsite, it would have to assume all
trust fund liabilities of Class A" and, on 11 May,
informing J. A. Stewart Construction Co., that em-
ployees of Gypsum Enterprises would have to be
sent home because of Class A Construction's trust
fund delinquencies and alleged payroll liabilities.
9. The Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by, on 11 May, 14 May, and
15 May, threatening employees of Gypsum Enter-
prises that if they failed to leave the RTD project
they could be fined by the Respondent.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
PAINTERS LOCAL 36 (STEWART CONSTRUCTION) 1017
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that
the Respondent, District Council of Painters and
Allied Trades No. 36, its officers, agents , and rep-
resentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Invoking, reaffirming, maintaining , enforcing,
or giving effect to the self-help aspects of article
26, section 7 of the Master Labor Agreement be-
tween the Respondent and Southern California
Drywall Contractors Association, Inc., effective 1
July 1980, insofar as they apply to the secondary
contracting restrictions.
(b) Inducing or encouraging employees of J. A.
Stewart Construction Co., Gypsum Enterprises, or
any other person. engaged in commerce , or in an
industry affecting commerce, to refrain from per-
forming services in the course of their employment,
or coercing or restraining J. A. Stewart Construc-
tion Co., Gypsum Enterprises, or any person en-
gaged in commerce where an object thereof is (1)
forcing or requiring an employer to enter into an
agreement with self-enforcement provisions viola-
tive of Section 8(e) of the Act, or (2) forcing or re-
quiring J. A. Stewart Construction Co., Gypsum
Enterprises, or any other person to ' cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
Class A Construction or any other person.
(c) Coercing employees of Gypsum Enterprises
by threat of fine to engage in a work stoppage that
violates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or (B) of the Act.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the a il;ercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate 'the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."s
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 21, after being signed
by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director suf-
ficient copies of the notice for posting by J. A.
Stewart Construction Co. and Gypsum Enterprises,
if willing, at all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT invoke, reaffirm, maintain, en-
force, or give effect to the self-help aspects of arti-
cle 26, section 7 of our Master Labor Agreement
with the Southern California Drywall Contractors
Association, Inc., effective 1 July 1980, insofar as
they apply to the secondary contracting restric-
tions.
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage employees of
J. A. Stewart Construction Co., Gypsum Enter-
prises , or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce to refrain
from performing services in the course of their em-
ployment, or coerce or restrain J. A. Stewart Con-
struction Co., Gypsum Enterprises, ,or any other
person engaged in commerce where an object
thereof is (1) forcing or requiring an employer to
enter into an agreement with self-enforcement pro-
visions violative of Section 8(e) of the Act, or (2)
forcing or requiring J. A. Stewart Construction
Co., Gypsum Enterprises, or any other person to
cease using , selling, handling, transporting, or oth-
erwise dealing in the products of any other produc-
er, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing
business with Class A Construction or any other
person.
WE WILL NOT coerce employees of Gypsum En-
terprises by threat of fine to engage in a work stop-
page that violates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or (B) of
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES No. 36