Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc. d/b/a Coserv Electric

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 12, 2018

366 NLRB No. 103 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 103
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc. d/b/a Co-
Serv Electric and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Local 220, affiliated with In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
Case 16–CA–149330
June 12, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On June 28, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Robert
A. Ringler issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief.1 Additionally, the General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, the Re-
spondent filed an answering brief, and the General Coun-
sel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions2 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions and

1 The Respondent filed a motion to strike portions of the General
Counsel’s answering brief, the General Counsel filed an opposition,
and the Respondent filed a reply. We deny the Respondent’s motion.
Although a party is “procedurally foreclosed” from asserting cross-
exceptions in its answering brief, White Electrical Construction Co.,
345 NLRB 1095, 1096 (2005), the General Counsel’s answering brief’s
references to record evidence as background information do not consti-
tute cross-exceptions and thus do not warrant striking the brief.
2 There are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of the complaint
allegations that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by failing to re-
duce to writing and honor an alleged collective-bargaining agreement
and by failing to promote employee Derek Wolzen.
The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
3 The General Counsel and the Respondent have excepted to some
of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is
not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
In his decision, the judge inadvertently stated that the parties bar-
gained for an initial contract over the course of approximately 15 ses-
sions. The correct number is 25 sessions. He also inadvertently stated
that Clint Hart, an FMCS mediator, assisted at the last few negotiating
sessions. Hart assisted at the first and last sessions. These errors do not
affect our disposition of the case.
The judge found that a notice-reading remedy is warranted to coun-
teract the coercive impact of the Respondent’s substantial and perva-
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.4
1. Consideration of the Respondent’s previously
settled conduct
We adopt the judge’s factual findings that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by changing its past
practice of increasing employees’ wage ranges without
providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to
bargain, and Section 8(a)(1) when Supervisor Kevin
Vincent blamed the Union for the lack of a raise. In do-
ing so, we reject the Respondent’s contention that the
judge erroneously denied its motion to strike these mat-

sive unfair labor practices, but he inadvertently omitted this remedy
from his recommended Order. We agree with the judge that such a
remedy is warranted in this case, and we correct the omission. In
adopting this remedy, we do not rely on the Respondent’s conduct
regarding annual wage increases or any statements blaming the Union
for such conduct that were made outside the 10(b) period. Rather, we
find justification for the notice-reading remedy in light of the serious
and widespread impact on the unit of the Respondent’s unlawful with-
drawal of recognition, its change in unit employees’ wages without
giving the Union notice and opportunity to bargain, and its failure to
provide relevant information in response to the Union’s request. These
violations not only adversely impacted the entire unit but also under-
mined the confidence of unit employees in the Union’s ability to repre-
sent their interests in bargaining. A notice-reading remedy will dissi-
pate any lingering effect of the Respondent’s actions and enable em-
ployees to exercise their Sec. 7 rights free of coercion. See, e.g., Texas
Super Foods, Inc., 303 NLRB 209, 220 (1991). It will also assure
employees that their employer understands the Board’s order and is
committed to complying with the Act in the future, an assurance of
particular importance when, as here, the Respondent has acted so as to
undermine employees’ decisions regarding unionization. See Print
Fulfillment Services, LLC, 361 NLRB 1243, 1248–1249 (2014).
Contrary to the judge and his colleagues, Chairman Ring finds that a
notice-reading remedy is unwarranted. The Board has recognized that
such a remedy may be warranted “where the violations are so numerous
and serious that the reading aloud of a notice is considered necessary to
enable employees to exercise their Section 7 rights in an atmosphere
free of coercion, or where the violations in a case are egregious.” Post-
al Service, 339 NLRB 1162, 1163 (2003). Here, the three unfair labor
practices remedied in this case—the Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition, failure to provide relevant information, and unilateral
change in unit employees’ wages—are not “so numerous and serious”
as to render the Board’s standard notice-posting remedy insufficient to
dissipate their effects, nor do they rise to an “egregious” level of mis-
conduct. Accordingly, for these reasons, Chairman Ring would not
order the Respondent to read aloud to its employees the Board’s reme-
dial notice.
4 We shall modify the judge’s conclusions of law and recommended
Order to conform to the violations found and the Board’s standard
remedial language. We shall also substitute a new notice to conform to
the Order as modified.
Complaint pars. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 24 allege that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining a number of handbook rules—specifically,
rules 6, 13, 14, 18, 20, 22, and 24 of its “Basic Standards of Profession-
alism” policy, and its “Confidential Information,” “Conflicts of Inter-
est,” and “Protecting CoServ Assets” policies. We find that it will
effectuate the policies of the Act to sever these allegations and retain
them for further consideration.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
ters, which were previously resolved through a bilateral
informal settlement agreement in another proceeding (the
“Settlement ULPs”).5 Specifically, we find no merit in
the Respondent’s arguments that the settlement agree-
ment bars litigation of those allegations, and that the al-
legations are time barred in any event because they in-
volve conduct that occurred more than 6 months before
the filing of the charge in this case, and this conduct is
not closely related to the allegations of that charge.6 We
emphasize, however, that we are considering the Re-
spondent’s presettlement conduct only insofar as it bears
on the legality of the Respondent’s withdrawal of recog-
nition from the Union. We do not impose liability on the
Respondent for that conduct itself.
First, it is well settled that conduct that has been the
subject of a settlement agreement may be litigated in a
subsequent proceeding where the settlement agreement
specifically reserved the right to litigate the conduct. See
Midwestern Personnel Services, 331 NLRB 348, 352
(2000), enfd. 322 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, a
judge, the Board, and the courts may find that presettle-
ment conduct supports allegations of postsettlement un-
fair labor practices where the settlement agreement ex-
plicitly permits them to make “findings of fact” and
“conclusions of law” with respect to the settled conduct.
Id.; see also Outdoor Venture Corp., 327 NLRB 706, 708
(1999) (settled alleged direct dealing and plant closure
threats constituted unfair labor practices that prolonged a
strike, thereby converting it to an unfair labor practice
strike); Council’s Center for Problems of Living, 289
NLRB 1122, 1141–1143 (1988) (settled alleged unlawful
discharges constituted unfair labor practices, such that
subsequent strike was an unfair labor practice strike),
enf. denied on other grounds 897 F.2d 1238 (2d Cir.
1990).
Here, the settlement agreement’s “Scope of the
Agreement” clause stated, in relevant part:
The General Counsel reserves the right to use the evi-
dence obtained in the investigation and prosecution of
the above-captioned cases for any relevant purpose in
the litigation of this or any other cases, and a judge, the
Board and the courts may make findings of fact and/or
conclusions of law with respect to said evidence.
In the complaint in this case and at the hearing, the General
Counsel made clear that he was litigating the Settlement
ULPs only to establish the existence of unfair labor practic-

5 The Regional Director approved the settlement agreement on No-
vember 21, 2014, and the Respondent subsequently posted a remedial
notice and made the employees whole for its allegedly unlawful failure
to provide wage increases in 2014.
6 See Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988).
es that contributed to employees’ disaffection from the Un-
ion, thereby tainting the 2014 petition on which the Re-
spondent based its present withdrawal of recognition from
the Union. The use of the settled conduct for the purpose of
establishing that the withdrawal of recognition was an unfair
labor practice in the instant case falls within the phrase, “any
relevant purpose in the litigation of . . . any other case.” The
clause further allows “findings of fact” and “conclusions of
law” to be made with respect to the settled allegations to
decide the merits of the unfair labor practice allegation in
this proceeding regarding the Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition. We so find, specifically with regard to the
connection between the settled conduct and the petition on
which the Respondent based its withdrawal of recognition
from the Union.
Second, even assuming, as the Respondent contends,
that the allegations concerning its unilateral withholding
of an annual raise and its statements blaming the Union
for the lack of raises are not closely related to the allega-
tion of the timely filed charge in this case, the litigation
of the settled allegations was not barred by Section 10(b)
of the Act. In Council’s Center for Problems of Living,
supra, the Board found a similar argument meritless inso-
far as the settled allegations were not remedied by the
decision in the subsequent case but “merely indicate[d]
the nature of the later . . . conduct examined in the com-
plaint.” 289 NLRB at 1122 fn. 3. Similarly here, as stat-
ed above, we have considered the Respondent’s conduct
outside the six-month 10(b) period only for the purpose
of determining whether that conduct tainted the decertifi-
cation petition. We order no remedy for the pre-10(b)
conduct; our order remedies only the Respondent’s un-
lawful withdrawal of recognition and subsequent refusal
to bargain, conduct that occurred well within the 10(b)
period. Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s denial of the
Respondent’s motion to strike the Settlement ULPs.
2. Unlawful withdrawal of recognition
Applying the four-part test set forth in Master Slack
Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984), the judge found that the
Respondent’s unfair labor practices tended to undermine
the Union in the eyes of the bargaining unit employees
and tainted the decertification petition that the Respond-
ent relied on to withdraw recognition from the Union in
2014. In adopting the judge’s finding, we rely solely on
the two Settlement ULPs discussed above, namely, the
Respondent’s unilateral discontinuance of its annual
practice of increasing employees’ wage ranges, and Su-
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 3
pervisor Vincent’s unlawful statements blaming the Un-
ion for the lack of raises.7
As the judge observed, these unfair labor practices
were unremedied during the time when the decertifica-
tion petition was being circulated.8 And we find, for the
reasons the judge stated and for the additional reasons
stated below, that all the Master Slack factors tend to
establish the requisite connection between these unfair
labor practices and the Union’s alleged loss of support.
The Respondent’s unilateral change to its past practice
of increasing employees’ wage ranges involved the im-
portant, bread-and-butter issue of employee earnings for
which employees sought and gained union representa-
tion, and such a unilateral change, particularly where the
Union was bargaining for a first contract, is likely to
have a lasting effect on employees.9 The unilateral elim-
ination of the annual practice of increasing employees’
wage ranges substantially affected all, or nearly all, unit
employees. Further, each time the employees received a
paycheck without the customary annual raise, they were
reminded of the Union’s ineffectiveness in preserving
such raises, let alone in obtaining additional wage in-
creases. As the Board held in Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 336
NLRB 1066, 1067 (2001), “the possibility of a detri-
mental or long-lasting effect on employee support for the
union is clear” where the employer’s unlawful unilateral
conduct, like here, suggests to “employees that their un-
ion is irrelevant in preserving or increasing their wag-
es.”10

7 We correct the judge’s inadvertent misstatement that Vincent
threatened to withhold raises. Rather, Vincent blamed the lack of raises
on the Union.
We find that the judge correctly rejected the General Counsel’s theo-
ry that Petitioner Trey Williamson’s testimony demonstrates the Re-
spondent’s involvement in preparing and distributing the petition.
Williamson testified that he prepared the petition, disseminated it dur-
ing nonworking time, and collected signatures. Although Williamson’s
testimony periodically conflicted with his affidavit, as the judge found,
his testimony that he did not talk to management about the petition was
unrebutted.
We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent’s maintenance of certain handbook rules and policies also
contributed to the taint. As noted above, we are severing the allega-
tions concerning those rules and policies and retaining them for further
consideration.
8 Employees signed the petition between November 3 and 18, 2014.
The Respondent remedied the alleged unfair labor practices sometime
after November 21, 2014, the date the Regional Director approved the
settlement agreement.
9 See Broadway Volkswagen, 342 NLRB 1244, 1247 (2004), enfd.
sub nom. East Bay Automotive Council v. NLRB, 483 F.3d 628 (9th Cir.
2007); Goya Foods of Florida, 347 NLRB 1118, 1122 (2006), enfd.
525 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2008).
10 The record does not support the judge’s finding that employees
testified they were unaware of the unfair labor practices. Rather, as the
Respondent states in its brief supporting its exceptions, several employ-
Accordingly, we agree with the judge that the Re-
spondent could not lawfully rely on the decertification
petition to withdraw recognition from the Union, and that
by withdrawing recognition, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.11
Unilateral increase in employees’ wages and failure to
provide relevant information

ees testified that the unfair labor practices had no impact on their deci-
sion to sign the decertification petition. Such testimony is irrelevant
under the objective Master Slack analysis. See Saint Gobain Abrasives,
342 NLRB 434, 434 fn. 2 (2000) (“The Master Slack test is an objec-
tive one,” and thus “[t]he relevant inquiry at the hearing does not ask
employees why they chose to reject the Union.”) (emphasis in original);
C.F. Martin & Co., 252 NLRB 1192, 1192 fn. 2 (1980) (disavowing
reliance on employees’ “subjective testimony” about the relative im-
portance of unremedied unfair labor practices in their decision to with-
draw support from the union).
Applying these principles, we find that the judge did not abuse his
discretion by refusing to allow testimony from up to 23 additional
employees regarding their reasons for signing the petition. See also
SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC, 357 NLRB 79, 83 (2011) (“To the extent that
an employer seeks to elicit employee testimony about their reasons for
signing documents supporting or rejecting a union, the Board and the
courts have long recognized the inherent unreliability of such testimo-
ny. . . . [W]e are unwilling to subject petition signers to ex post facto
examination about their reasons for supporting decertification.”), enfd.
700 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
11 Having found that the withdrawal of recognition was unlawful on
the basis of the Respondent’s reliance on a tainted disaffection petition,
Chairman Ring and Member McFerran find it unnecessary to pass on
the General Counsel’s exceptions to the judge’s failure to find, in addi-
tion, that the withdrawal of recognition was unlawful on the basis that
(1) the parties reached a contract on November 25, 2014, which pre-
cluded withdrawal of recognition during its term, and that (2) the set-
tlement agreement required the Respondent to recognize and bargain
with the Union for a reasonable period of time, which had not yet
elapsed when it withdrew recognition.
Member Pearce would find merit in the General Counsel’s exception
regarding the settlement agreement. As the notice attached to the set-
tlement agreement made clear, the Respondent agreed to notify and,
upon request, bargain in good faith with the Union before implement-
ing any changes in wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employ-
ment of bargaining unit employees. It is well established that when an
employer settles unfair labor practice charges and agrees to bargain in
exchange for the dismissal of those charges, the Board will infer an
agreement to bargain for a reasonable period of time following the
settlement. See Poole Foundry & Machine Co., 95 NLRB 34, 36
(1951), enfd. 192 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 954
(1952). If the parties have not bargained for a reasonable period of
time, the employer may not withdraw recognition, irrespective of the
union’s majority status. AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57, 61 (2004).
Here, the Respondent withdrew recognition a mere 5 days after the
Regional Director approved the settlement agreement, and after only
one post-settlement bargaining session. The parties were not at im-
passe; indeed, they had agreed to meet to finalize the last remaining
issue, wages, after Thanksgiving. Under these circumstances, Member
Pearce would find that the Respondent did not bargain with the Union
for a reasonable period of time after the execution of the settlement
agreement and, for this additional reason, its withdrawal of recognition
violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
We also adopt the judge’s findings, for the reasons
stated in his decision, that after unlawfully withdrawing
recognition from the Union, the Respondent further vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally increasing
unit employees’ wages and by failing and refusing to
provide the Union with requested information regarding
the unit employees’ current wages.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the judge’s Conclu-
sions of Law and renumber the remaining conclusions
accordingly.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, we shall order the Respondent to
cease and desist from engaging in such conduct and, as
explained in the remedy section of the judge’s decision,
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act. Among other remedies, the judge
recommended an affirmative bargaining order to remedy
the Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition,
but he did not justify the imposition of such an order as
required by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. Nevertheless, for the rea-
sons set forth below, we agree with the judge that an af-
firmative bargaining order is warranted on the facts of
this case.
The Board has previously held that an affirmative bar-
gaining order is “the traditional, appropriate remedy for
an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-
bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of em-
ployees.” Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64, 68
(1996). In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has required
the Board to justify, on the facts of each case, the imposi-
tion of an affirmative bargaining order. See,
e.g., Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d
727, 738–739 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber & Building
Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1248
(D.C. Cir. 1994). In Vincent, supra at 738, the court
summarized its requirement that an affirmative bargain-
ing order “must be justified by a reasoned analysis that
includes an explicit balancing of three considerations: (1)
the employees’ § 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of
the Act override the rights of employees to choose their
bargaining representatives; and (3) whether alternative
remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of the
Act.” Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s
requirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, supra,
we have examined the particular facts of this case and
find that a balancing of the three factors warrants an af-
firmative bargaining order.12
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining through their
designated representative by the Respondent’s withdraw-
al of recognition and resultant refusal to bargain with the
Union for an initial collective-bargaining agreement. As
discussed above, the Respondent’s own unfair labor
practices contributed to the disaffection of employees
from the Union and tainted the decertification petition.
Moreover, the Respondent’s refusal to recognize the Un-
ion and bargain with it only 5 days after the Regional
Director approved a settlement agreement in which the
Respondent acknowledged the Union’s status as the unit
employees’ bargaining representative evinced a disregard
of its bargaining obligation.13 At the same time, an af-
firmative bargaining order, with its attendant bar to rais-
ing a question concerning the Union’s continuing majori-
ty status for a reasonable time, does not unduly prejudice
the Section 7 rights of employees who may oppose con-
tinued representation by the Union because the duration
of the order is no longer than is reasonably necessary to
remedy the ill effects of the violation. Since the Union
was unfairly deprived of an opportunity to reach an ini-
tial agreement with the Respondent, it is only by restor-
ing the status quo ante and requiring the Respondent to
bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of time
that the employees will be able to fairly assess the Un-
ion’s effectiveness as a bargaining representative in an
atmosphere free of the Respondent’s unlawful conduct.
The employees can then determine whether continued
representation by the Union is in their best interest.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. It removes the Re-
spondent’s incentive to delay bargaining in the hope of
further discouraging support for the Union. It also en-
sures that the Union will not be pressured by the possibil-
ity of a decertification petition or by the prospect of an
imminent withdrawal of recognition to achieve immedi-
ate results at the bargaining table following the Board’s
resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and the
issuance of a cease-and-desist order.

12 Chairman Ring acknowledges that Caterair is extant Board prec-
edent. He notes that no party urges the Board to overrule it and, in
these circumstances, he expresses no view as to whether the Board
should adhere to it. He agrees, however, that an affirmative bargaining
order is warranted here.
13 Under the terms of the settlement, the Respondent reaffirmed the
Union’s representative status by agreeing to notify and, upon request,
bargain with the Union before implementing any changes in wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of employment of its unit employees.
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 5
(3) A cease-and-desist order, without a temporary de-
certification bar, would be inadequate to remedy the Re-
spondent’s withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bar-
gain with the Union because it would permit another
challenge to the Union’s majority status before the taint
of the Respondent’s previous unlawful withdrawal of
recognition has dissipated. Allowing another challenge
to the Union’s majority status without a reasonable peri-
od for bargaining would be particularly unjust in light of
the fact that the litigation of the Union’s charges took
several years and, as a result, the Union needs to reestab-
lish its representative status with unit employees. Fur-
ther, the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition would
likely have a continuing effect, thereby tainting any em-
ployee disaffection from the Union arising during that
period or immediately thereafter. In these circumstances,
permitting a decertification petition to be filed immedi-
ately might very well allow the Respondent to profit
from its own unlawful conduct. We find that these cir-
cumstances outweigh the temporary impact the affirma-
tive bargaining order will have on the rights of employ-
ees who oppose continued union representation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification
bar is necessary to fully remedy the violations in this
case.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc.
d/b/a CoServ Electric, Corinth, Texas, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 220, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(the Union), and failing and refusing to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of unit employees.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
failing and refusing to furnish it with requested infor-
mation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees.
(c) Changing wages, benefits, or other terms and con-
ditions of employment of its unit employees without first
notifying the Union and giving it an opportunity to bar-
gain.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the following appropriate unit concern-
ing terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
INCLUDED: All linemen – Class A1, Class A2, Class
B1, Class B2, Class C1, Linemen Class C2, Class G1,
Class G2, Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen;
Power Quality Technicians, System Operators and Sen-
ior System Operators employed by . . . [CoServ] at our
facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office
clericals, managers, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(b) On request by the Union, rescind the changes in its
unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment
that were unilaterally implemented since November 26,
2014.
(c) Furnish to the Union in a timely manner the infor-
mation requested by the Union on November 27, 2014.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Corinth, Texas facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed at any time since November 26,
2014.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, hold a
meeting or meetings during working time, scheduled to
ensure the widest possible attendance, at which the at-

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
tached notice is to be read to the employees by the Re-
spondent’s president and chief executive officer, Donnie
Clary, or senior vice president of employee relations,
Denise Smithers, in the presence of a Board agent and an
agent of the Union if the Region or the Union so desires,
or, at the Respondent’s option, by a Board agent in the
presence of either Clary or Smithers and, if the Union so
desires, of an agent of the Union.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 16 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations in para-
graphs 5–8 and 24 of the first amended complaint in
Case 16–CA–149330 are severed and retained for further
consideration by the Board.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 12, 2018
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from, and fail and
refuse to recognize and bargain with, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 220, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(the Union), as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested
information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT change your wages, benefits, or other
terms and conditions of employment without first notify-
ing the Union and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if
an understanding is reached, embody the understanding
in a signed agreement:
INCLUDED: All linemen – Class A1, Class A2, Class
B1, Class B2, Class C1, Linemen Class C2, Class G1,
Class G2, Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen;
Power Quality Technicians, System Operators and Sen-
ior System Operators employed by . . . [CoServ] at our
facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office
clericals, managers, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
WE WILL, upon the Union’s request, rescind the
changes in the terms and conditions of employment for
our unit employees that were unilaterally implemented
since November 26, 2014.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the
information requested by the Union on November 27,
2014.
WE WILL hold a meeting or meetings during working
hours and have this notice read to you and your fellow
workers by our President and Chief Executive Officer
Donnie Clary or Senior Vice President of Employee Re-
lations Denise Smithers in the presence of a Board agent
and an agent of the Union if the Region or the Union so
desires, or, at the Respondent’s option, by a Board agent
in the presence of either Clary or Smithers and, if the
Union so desires, of an agent of the Union.
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 7
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/16–CA–149330 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
David Foley and Jonathan M. Elifson, Esqs., for the General
Counsel.
Ronald M. Gaswirth and Carrie B. Hoffman, Esqs. (Gardere,
Wynne, Sewell, LLP), for the Respondent.
Michael A. Murphy, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. RINGLER, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard in Fort Worth, Texas from February 1 to 3, 2016.
The complaint alleged that the Denton County Electric Cooper-
ative, Inc. d/b/a CoServ Electric (CoServ or the Respondent)
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) by: maintaining unlawful employee handbook
provisions; withdrawing recognition from the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 220, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the Un-
ion); unilaterally granting pay raises; and failing to provide
requested information to the Union.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the parties’ post-
hearing briefs and reply briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT2
I. JURISDICTION
CoServ, a corporation, is a utility provider in Corinth, Texas
(the facility). During the 12-month period ending September
30, 2015, it derived gross revenue that exceeded $250,000, and
purchased and received at its facility goods that exceeded
$5000 directly from points outside of Texas. It, thus, admits
and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce, within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It further
admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization, within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

1 GC Exh. 22 and R. Exhs. 12–16 were admitted after the hearing.
2 Unless otherwise stated, factual findings arise from joint exhibits,
stipulations and undisputed evidence.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction3
On July 27, 2012, Region 16 of the National Labor Relations
Board (Region 16) held an election in the following collective-
bargaining unit (the unit), which the Union won:
INCLUDED: All Linemen - Class Al, Class A2, Class B1,
Class B2, Class Cl, Linemen Class C2, Class G1, Class G2,
Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen; Power Quality Techni-
cians, System Operators and Senior System Operators em-
ployed by … [CoServ] at our facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office cleri-
cals, managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
See also (GC Exh. 12). On October 28, 2013, after the Un-
ion’s certification year elapsed, Region 16 held a decertification
vote that the Union survived. On November 26, 2014,4 after
receiving a petition from the unit, CoServ withdrew Union
recognition. (R. Exhs. 8, 11).
At all relevant times between the Union’s initial certification
and loss of recognition, the parties bargained for an initial con-
tract over approximately 15 sessions. The Union’s bargaining
team included: Business Manager Alan Cutler; and Internation-
al Representative Laurence Chamberlain. CoServ’s bargaining
team included: attorneys Ronald Gaswirth and Carrie Hoffman;
and Vice President of Employee Relations Denise Smithers.
Clint Hart, an F.M.C.S. mediator, assisted the last few negotiat-
ing sessions.5
B. Prior Unfair Labor Practice Charges (ULPs) and Settlement
Between April and September, the Union filed ULPs against
CoServ alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) (the prior
ULPs). (R. Exhs. 4–7). On November 4, CoServ entered into
an Informal Settlement Agreement (the Settlement) concerning
the prior ULPs, which covered: its unilateral decision in 2014
to withhold a raise from unit employees; telling unit employees
that they would not receive a raise because of the Union; and its
failure to promote unit employee, Derek Wolzen. (GC Exh. 12;
R. Exhs. 4–7). The Settlement contained a non-admissions
clause, which stated that, “the Charged Party does not admit
that it has violated the … Act,” and provided wage increases
and backpay, and a 60-day notice posting. (GC Exh. 12). Re-
gion 16 approved the Settlement on November 21. (GC Exhs.
1, 12).
1. General Counsel’s theory regarding the settlement
Beyond useful context, the Settlement is crucial to the Gen-
eral Counsel’s litigation theory, inasmuch as he avers that the
Settlement and conduct underlying it precluded the withdrawal
of recognition. First, he contends that CoServ could not with-
draw recognition because the underlying ULPs that were even-
tually settled were un-remedied when the petition was signed,
and created the disaffection that prompted the petition. Second,

3 Judicial notice is taken of the representation case records. Metro
Demolition Co., 348 NLRB 272 (2006).
4 All dates hereinafter refer to 2014, unless otherwise stated.
5 The F.M.C.S., a Federal agency, provides collective-bargaining
mediation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
he asserts that the Settlement required CoServ to recognize and
bargain with the Union for a reasonable duration, which had not
yet transpired when it withdrew recognition.
2. Prior ULPs Covered by the Settlement and Related Evidence
The parties, as a result, presented substantial evidence about
the prior ULPs covered by the Settlement. Such evidence is
detailed below.
a. Supervisor Kevin Vincent’s comments about
the Union
In late-January, employee Robert Shelby met with Supervi-
sor Vincent for an annual performance review. (GC Exh. 7).
He said that Vincent told him that, “there will not be a raise …
because … CoServ … was waiting for the union.” (Tr. 118).
He testified that Vincen . . . we . . . could get raises.” (Id.). On
April 16, Wolzen met with Vincent for a performance review;
he testified that he was told that he would not receive a raise or
promotion “because it’s tied up in union and CoServ negotia-
tions,” and because the Union had, “rejected a contract offer
that would have enabled us to get more money.” (Tr. 44–45).
Chad Beck testified that, on April 16, Vincent told him that,
“the reason you’re not going to get a raise is because of the
union.” (Tr. 329.)
Vincent testified that he solely told employees that raises had
not been approved by CoServ. He denied stating that benefits
were being withheld because of the Union.
Given that Shelby, Beck and Wolzen stated that Vincent
blamed the Union for the lack of raises and promotions, and
Vincent denied such commentary, a credibility resolution is
needed. Shelby, Beck and Wolzen have been credited; they
were consistent and cooperative, and had strong recollections,
and solid demeanors. Vincent was a less than candid witness,
who mostly appeared motivated to aid CoServ and its leader-
ship, and escape culpability.
b. Withholding 2014 Raises
The facts underlying these allegations are undisputed. In
2014, unit employees were either placed in the Employee De-
velopment Program (EDP) or outside of it (non-EDP).6 EDP
employees moved to higher pay range steps under a pay grid
system, as they satisfactorily completed training and testing.7
Non-EDP positions were not offered salary steps; their posi-
tions solely held a pay range, and raises were given within the
parameters of their pay range. Annually, CoServ reviewed its
EDP and non-EDP pay ranges, and applied a percentage in-
crease to EDP and non-EDP pay ranges, in accordance with the
Mercer Study.8 For at least the 5 years prior to 2014, CoServ
increased its pay ranges for EDP and non-EDP slots as dictated
by the Mercer study. In 2014, although the Mercer study rec-
ommended a 2.3 percent increase in unit pay ranges, CoServ

6 Linemen were placed in the EDP, while journeymen, system oper-
ators, and power quality technicians were not.
7 Each step had a pay range.
8 The Mercer Study, an annual compensation study, was prepared
by a human resources consulting outfit. It analyzed CoServ’s com-
petiveness in the labor market, and recommended annual wage adjust-
ments.
froze their pay ranges. This resulted in some EDP employees
still receiving raises, as they moved along their current salary
schedule to higher pay steps, but, resulted in non-EDP employ-
ees’ wages effectively being frozen.9 See also (GC Exh. 11; R.
Exh. 3; tr. 701–702 (Gaswirth testimony)). CoServ failed to
provide advance notice to the Union of its decision to not apply
the Mercer Study in 2014, and implemented this decision with-
out bargaining.
C. November 19—Second Decertification Petition
On November 19, another decertification petition was filed.
(R. Exh. 11). Region 16 took no action, inasmuch as the Set-
tlement’s compliance period had yet to expire. Williamson, a
lineman, testified that he prepared the petition,10 disseminated it
during nonworking time, and collected signatures.11 He stated
that it continuously remained in his possession, until he deliv-
ered it to the Human Resources department. CoServ elicited
testimony from several employees who signed the petition; they
consistently testified that they wanted to oust the Union solely
because its help was no longer wanted, and denied that the prior
ULPs had relevance.
D. November 25—Final Bargaining Session
The General Counsel and the Union contend that the parties
agreed to a final contract at this session, which precluded the
withdrawal of Union recognition. CoServ asserts that the par-
ties never finalized wages, and its withdrawal of recognition
was appropriate. Several facts connected to this session are
undisputed. First, the parties had resolved all outstanding pro-
posals before the November 25 session, with the exception of
duration and wages. (GC Exhs. 4–6, 13). Second, before No-
vember 25, when the parties agreed to a proposal, they consist-
ently signified mutual assent by: marking the relevant article
“TA” (i.e., tentative agreement); and signing and dating it.
Finally, on November 25, they agreed to a 1-year contract term,
and signed and dated a TA on contract duration, but, have not,
to date, executed or created a wage TA.
1. General Counsel’s and Union’s position
Union negotiator Cutler contended that the parties reached a
final agreement on wages on November 25, after the Union
accepted, without reservation, Company 78. He testified that,
when he voiced his assent, Gaswirth cautioned him that he

9 Smithers testified that every non-unit hourly employee received a
raise in 2014, and that unit employees did not receive raises in 2014
because the parties were negotiating. She conceded that, prior to 2014,
raises were given in January (tr. 350), and that, “we did not give them
because we were negotiating.” (Tr. 351); see also (tr. 363). She con-
firmed that the decision to provide raises is based upon the Mercer
Study, and that they made a recommendation to increase wage rates in
2014 by approximately 2.3 percent.
10 He stated that he learned how to phrase the petition from the In-
ternet research.
11 Williamson was, admittedly, a less-than-stellar witness with a selec-
tive memory and crafty demeanor, whose testimony periodically con-
flicted with his affidavit. This circumstance is, however, in isolation,
insufficient to find that his testimony, which is almost entirely unrebut-
ted, meant that CoServ helped him prepare the decertification petition
and aided its distribution, as contended by the General Counsel.
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 9
could not finalize Company 78, until he first verified the under-
lying wage data and confirmed that they were not inadvertently
reducing someone’s wages. (GC Exh. 17.) He said that
Gaswirth pledged to verify the underlying data on the following
Monday (i.e., after Thanksgiving), and recalled this exchange:
We . . . asked if there w[ere] . . . any other issues outstanding
. . . and we both . . . said, no, . . . this is complete . . . because
we expected to get the wages on Monday.
I’d already agreed to the 78 language, as far as job descrip-
tions and job wages . . . [and] Ron said, I guess we have a
contract.
(Tr. 226). He said that mediator Hart congratulated everyone.
He claimed that he would have accepted whatever Gaswirth
later presented, even if it meant cutting someone’s wages.
Chamberlain essentially corroborated Cutler.
2. CoServ’s position
Attorney Gaswirth testified that wages were never finalized
on November 25 because some research remained regarding the
accuracy of CoServ’s proposed rates. He recalled telling Cutler
to contact him after Thanksgiving. He denied announcing a
deal, and insisted that he solely stated that a resolution seemed
closer. He added that, because the parties had a consistent
practice of signing TAs, the Union could not have rationally
concluded that a deal was struck, given the undisputed absence
of a wage TA. Smithers essentially corroborated Gaswirth.
3. Credibility analysis
Although the issue of whether there was a meeting of the
minds on a final contract will be analyzed later, Cutler’s claim
that he would accept any wage package presented after
Thanksgiving raises a key credibility issue. This claim is in-
credible; it is implausible that, if Gaswirth eventually told him
that Company 78 represented a pay decrease for certain work-
ers, the Union would have accepted. It is just unbelievable that
a newly-minted Union, whose election platform involved high-
er wages, would accept pay cuts in a first contract, and accepted
Company 78 without reservation. Given that the Union’s sup-
port was tenuous, as evidenced by repeated decertification ef-
forts, it is improbable that Cutler would have contributed to this
erosion by voluntarily cutting wages. His testimony on this
point is, thus, implausible.
E. November 26—Withdrawal of Recognition
On this date, CoServ announced that it was withdrawing the
Union’s recognition, after receiving a petition signed by 28 of
32 unit members seeking its ouster. (GC Exh. 15). It is note-
worthy that, 23 out of the 28 employees signed before Novem-
ber 4 (i.e., when CoServ signed the Settlement), and that every-
one signed before November 21 (i.e., when Region 16 ap-
proved the Settlement). The payment of backpay, provision of
wage increases, notice posting and other relief under the Set-
tlement, thus, occurred after the petition was signed.
F. November 27—Union Response and Information Request
On this date, Cutler rejected CoServ’s withdrawal of recog-
nition. (GC Exh. 16). He requested an Excelsior list with the
unit’s current wages, which has, to date, not been provided.
G. 2015 Wage Increases
Unit employees received raises in 2015. CoServ provided
raises, as dictated by the Mercer study.
H. Handbook Policies
The General Counsel avers that the following Handbook pol-
icies are invalid. (R. Exh 2.)
1. Professionalism
All employees [must act] . . . professionally . . . Failure to ob-
serve the expected standards of …behavior may result in dis-
ciplinary action, up to and including termination. Below is a
[non-exhaustive] list of … [prohibited] conduct. . . .
6. Unauthorized or improper use or disclosure of … employee
data.
13. Failure to cooperate in any investigation by CoServ.
14. Lack of loyalty to CoServ.
18. [D]isrespectful attitude toward a supervisor.
20. [E]ngaging in . . . conduct which could damage [Co-
Serv’s] . . . image.
22. Failure to enhance the public image of CoServ while par-
ticipating in non-work activities, while off duty or while wear-
ing CoServ logo apparel.
24. Using the CoServ name or its related trademarks and/or
logos, in association with any . . . personal use, without writ-
ten permission.
2. Confidential information
We use confidential information only for the business pur-
pose for which it was developed or given. We respect the con-
fidentiality of information about CoServ, its . . . employees, . . .
and partner. . . . [It] will not be used for personal benefit.
3. Conflicts of interest
We avoid conflicts, or the appearance of conflicts, between
personal interests and official responsibilities. . . . [E]mployees
are under a continuing obligation to disclose . . . the possibility
of a conflict. . . . Disclosure of any potential conflict is the key
to remaining in full compliance with this policy.
4. Protecting assets
We [must] . . . protect the . . . assets entrusted to us from . . .
misuse. . . . [A]ssets, such as . . . equipment . . . or Communica-
tion Systems, may only be used for business purposes and other
purposes approved by management.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Handbook Policies
The contested Handbook rules violated the Act.12 The Board
has held that:
If the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 rights, it is unlawful. If
it does not, “the violation is dependent upon a showing of one

12 These allegations are listed under paras. 5–8 and 24 of the com-
plaint.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe
the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was
promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has
been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”
Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 NLRB 1100 (2012) (citations
omitted).
1. Professionalism
The Professionalism policy is unlawful for several reasons.
First, Rule 6’s ban on discussing “financial . . . [and] employee
data” without authorization is unlawful, inasmuch as it can be
reasonably construed to bar wage discussions with coworkers
or a union. Costco, supra (“[s]ensitive information such as . . .
payroll may not be shared . . . without prior management ap-
proval”). Second, Rule 13’s imposition of discipline for a
“failure to cooperate in any [CoServ] investigation” is unlaw-
ful. Beverly Health, 332 NLRB 347 (2000), enfd. 297 F.3d 468
(6th Cir. 2002) (rule prohibiting “[r]efusing to cooperate in . . .
investigation of … alleged violation of company rules, laws, or
government regulations.”). Third, Rule 14’s ban of a “[l]ack of
loyalty to CoServ” is unlawful, inasmuch as it could be reason-
ably construed to restrict protected concerted activity.
Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB 832, 832 (2005) (rule
prohibited negative conversations about associates or manag-
ers). Fourth, Rule 18’s ban of a “disrespectful attitude” to-
wards a supervisor is unlawful. Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB
No. 148 (2014) (“insubordination or other disrespectful con-
duct”). Fifth, Rule 20’s ban of “engaging in . . . conduct which
could damage the image . . . of CoServ” is unlawful. Costco,
supra, 358 NLRB No. 106 (“statements . . . that damage Cost-
co.”). Finally, Rule 22’s ban on the “[f]ailure to enhance the
public image of CoServ while participating in non-work activi-
ties, . . . while wearing CoServ logo apparel,” and 24’s ban on
“[u]sing the CoServ name or its . . . logos, in association with
any… personal use, without written permission . . .” are unlaw-
ful, inasmuch as such rules might be reasonably construed to
ban “union activity in a uniform bearing a product identifica-
tion.” Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 301 NLRB 1008, 1020 (1991).
2. Confidential information
This policy unlawfully banned sharing confidential employ-
ee data. It could reasonably be construed to ban wage discus-
sions amongst employees or with their union. Costco, supra.
3. Conflicts of interest
This policy, which prohibits conflicts and apparent conflicts,
and has an ongoing disclosure requirement, is unlawful. It can
be reasonably construed to bar protected Section 7 activities,
which may conflict with CoServ’s interests. Sheraton Anchor-
age, 362 NLRB No. 123, slip op. at 1 fn. 4 (2015) (“conflict of
interest with the … company is not permitted”).
4. Protecting assets
This policy, which bans the non-business usage of CoServ
equipment, is unlawful. It can be construed to bar all unauthor-
ized solicitation from CoServ’s facilities, and ban email during
non-working time for Section 7 activities. Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Purple Communications,
361 NLRB 1050, 1066 (2014) (using email for protected com-
munications on nonworking time); Stoddard-Quirk, 138 NLRB
615 (1962) (prohibition on unauthorized distribution of litera-
ture on company premises is unlawful).
B. Withdrawal of Union Recognition
The Complaint alleged that the parties finalized a contract on
November 25, which precluded withdrawal of recognition dur-
ing its term.13 It also alleged that CoServ’s committed ULPs,
which tainted the petition.14 The latter argument is persuasive.
1. Contract bar
The contract bar rule is inapplicable, given that the parties
never finalized a deal on November 25. The existence of a
contract requires a “meeting of the minds” on all substantive
issues. Polycon Industries, 363 NLRB No. 31 (2015). A con-
tract need not be reduced to writing, when a “meeting of the
minds” transpires. Carpenters Local 405, 328 NLRB 788, 793
(1999). The General Counsel retains the burden of proof on
this issue.
The parties did not reach a “meeting of the minds” because
wages were never finalized. They maintained a uniform prac-
tice of writing “TA” and signing off on each closed issue, and
never finalized a wage TA. They only agreed to meet to final-
ize wages after Thanksgiving. Although Cutler claimed that he
would have agreed to anything after Thanksgiving, such testi-
mony was not credited. Under these circumstances, wages
remained open, absent a final TA and knowing understanding
of its contents; a “meeting of the minds” was, therefore, not
reached.
2. Unremedied ULPs
Unremedied ULPs tainted the petition and precluded with-
drawal of recognition. An employer can generally withdraw
recognition, where it can prove a loss of majority status.
Levitz, 333 NLRB 717, 717 (2001). This doctrine is, however,
limited “to cases where an employer has committed no unfair
labor practices tending to undermine employees’ support for
unions.” Id. The Board has, thus, held that, “an employer may
not withdraw recognition from a union, while there are un-
remedied unfair labor practices tending to cause employees to
become disaffected from the union. Olson Bodies, 206 NLRB
779, 780 (1973).
a. ULPs at the time of the petition
When the petition was signed (i.e., between November 3 and
18), CoServ had committed several ULPs, which were then un-
remedied. This includes repeated Handbook violations, and the
several serious ULPs, 15 which were later settled.16

13 See North Bros. Ford, 220 NLRB 1021, 1022 (1975).
14 The Complaint also alleged that the withdrawal of recognition was
unlawful because the Settlement required recognition and bargaining
for a reasonable period, which never occurred. This argument will not
be analyzed, inasmuch as the withdrawal has been found unlawful on
other grounds and a finding on this additional issue will not affect the
remedy.
15 Although the General Counsel also alleged that the failure to pro-
mote Wolzen violated Sec. 8(a)(5), there is insufficient record evidence
showing a uniform practice of automatically promoting trainees, who
met performance expectations after a year of service. Accordingly,
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 11
I. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANNUAL WAGE INCREASES IN 2014
The most significant un-remedied violation involved CoServ
unilaterally changing in 2014 its past practice of increasing
wage ranges for EDP and non-EDP unit positions, as dictated
by the Mercer study. The relevant facts are undisputed, and are
as follows: for at least the 5 years prior to 2014, CoServ in-
creased its wage ranges for EDP and non-EDP slots, as dictated
by the Mercer study; in 2014, the Mercer study recommended
an increase in unit pay ranges of 2.3 percent; in 2014, CoServ
froze pay ranges at their current levels, which resulted in some
EDP employees still receiving raises, as they moved up a salary
step, but, froze non-EDP employees at their current rate; Co-
Serv gave a wage increase to non-unit hourly employees in
2014, as dictated by the Mercer study; and CoServ failed to
notify the Union in advance of its decision to not use the Mer-
cer study’s 2014 recommendations, and implemented this deci-
sion without good faith, pre-implementation bargaining.
The Board has held as follows:
[W]here parties are engaged in negotiations for a collective-
bargaining agreement, the employer must maintain the status
quo of all mandatory bargaining subjects absent overall im-
passe. . . . However, . . . the Board . . . set forth an exception to
the general rule. Under this exception, if a term or condition
of employment concerns a discrete recurring event, such as an
annually scheduled wage review, and that event is scheduled
to occur during negotiations for an initial contract, the em-
ployer may lawfully implement a change in that term or con-
dition if it provides the union with reasonable advance notice
and an opportunity to bargain about the intended change in
past practice.
Neighborhood House Assn., 347 NLRB 553, 554 (2006).
Although the Mercer study increases were a discrete recur-
ring event that would have constituted a Neighborhood House
exception, CoServ nevertheless breached 8(a)(5) by unilaterally
changing its past practice in 2014 of providing Mercer study
raises, by failing to afford the Union pre-implementation notice
and an opportunity to bargain about this topic. Regarding this
point, Gaswirth clearly stated that:
It became 2014 [and] the company had made the decision that
they were not going to increase wages while they were nego-
tiating wages. . . . And so there was no 2014 increase.
(Tr. 701). However, neither Gaswirth, nor any other CoServ
witness, testified that the Union was given pre-implementation
notification of this decision. Gaswirth solely testified that Cut-
ler first raised this matter in February or March (tr. 701), which
was 1 to 2 months after implementation, and occurred when
this subject was a fait accompli. Moreover, Cutler credibly
related that pre-implementation notice was never offered. Giv-

there is insufficient evidence to find a unilateral change. The settle-
ment of this subject, which contains a non-admissions clause, is insuffi-
cient to establish a violation.
16 These ULPs were fully litigated. CoServ was notified in the
Complaint, at conferences, and during opening statements. It examined
the General Counsel’s witnesses, and exhaustively presented its own
testimony.
en that wage increases are mandatory bargaining topics, this
unilateral change was unlawful. Neighborhood House, supra.
II. BLAMING THE UNION FOR LACK OF RAISES
Another serious un-remedied violation involved Vincent re-
peatedly blaming the Union for pay freezes. In late-January, he
told Shelby that he would not receive a raise because, “CoServ
. . . was waiting for the Union,” and that, “if people had not …
petitioned to get the union . . . we . . . could get raises.” (Tr.
118). In mid-April, he told Wolzen that he would not receive a
raise “because it’s tied up in union . . . negotiations,” and the
Union had, “rejected a contract offer that would have enabled
us to get more money.” (Tr. 44–45.) The Board has held that
an employer violates Section 8(a)(1), when it blames a union
for a lack of raises. Atlantic Forest Products, 282 NLRB 855
(1987); Truss-Span Co., 236 NLRB 50 (1978).
b. ULPs Were Unremedied when the petition was signed
The petition was signed between November 3 and 18, which
was before the Regional Director approved the Settlement on
November 21. The settled ULPs were, therefore, not remedied
when the petition was signed. The Handbook issues were simi-
larly un-remedied.
c. Unremedied ULPs caused disaffection and prompted
the petition
Several factors reveal whether there is a causal relationship
between un-remedied ULPs and employee disaffection. These
factors are: (1) duration between ULPs and withdrawal of
recognition; (2) nature of the violation, including the possibility
of a lasting impact; (3) tendency to cause disaffection; and (4)
effect of the unlawful conduct on morale, organizational activi-
ties, and union membership. Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB
78, 84 (1984).
I. DURATION
The duration between the ULPs and the petition demonstrate
causation. First, blaming the Union for wage freezes occurred
7 to 11 months before the petition.17 Second, the unilateral
elimination of the 2014 Mercer study raises occurred 10 months
from the petition, but, was implemented throughout the year.
Third, the Handbook violations were ongoing. Under these
circumstances, the duration between the ULPs and petition,
which ranged from 0 to 11 months, was insufficient to dissipate
the ULPs’ ill effects. Mesker Door, Inc., 357 NLRB 591
(2011)
(7 months supports taint); Beverly Health & Rehabilitation
Services, 346 NLRB 1319, 1328-1329 (2006) (6 to 8 months);
AT Systems West, Inc., 341 NLRB 57, 60 (2004) (9 months).
II. NATURE OF VIOLATIONS
The nature, tendency and extent of the ULPs demonstrate
causation. The ULPs involved core matters such as wages and

17 For several reasons, I find that these statements were disseminated
amongst the unit. First, they were made to multiple employees in a
small workplace. Second, they were made in tandem with the actual
cessation of Mercer study raises. Finally, they concerned core issues
(i.e., the Union and money), and were likely to be repeated.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
threats to withhold raises. The Board has held that, “wage in-
creases and higher bonuses involve ‘bread and butter’ issues
that lead employees to seek union representation, and threats to
withhold them, ‘particularly where the Union is bargaining for
its first contract, can have a lasting effect on employees.’”
Mesker Door, supra, 357 NLRB at 597; RTP Co., 334 NLRB
466 (2001) (blaming the absence of raise on the union).
III. EFFECT OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
There is mixed evidence of effect, which moderately sup-
ports causation. On the one hand, several employees testified
that they were unaware of the ULPs, which weighs against
causation. On the other hand, the Union went from winning a
decertification election and receiving majority support on Oc-
tober 28, 2013 to almost unanimously losing support in the
petition only a short year later. This dramatic swing in support
occurred alongside the ULPs, which is circumstantial, but very
strong, evidence of effect; this is afforded controlling weight.
IV. THE SETTLEMENT DID NOT SANCTION THE WITHDRAWAL
OF RECOGNITION
CoServ’s later settlement of the ULPs did not remove the pe-
tition’s taint, and sanction a withdrawal of recognition. The
notice posting period, backpay, restoration of the status quo
ante, and other remedial relief connected to the settled ULPs
had not yet occurred when the petition was signed. The Board
held in Wyndham Palmas Del Mar Resort
and Villas, 334 NLRB 514 (2001) that the Master
Slack causation analysis is applicable to settled unfair labor
practice conduct, as well as adjudicated un-remedied unfair
labor practices.18 Therefore, given that the Master Slack analy-
sis demonstrated that the petition was tainted by ULPs that
were later settled, the existence of the Settlement itself does not
cleanse such taint.
d. Conclusion
CoServ’s pervasive ULPs bred the disenchantment, which
prompted the petition. Under such circumstances, it could not
lawfully challenge the Union’s majority status on the basis of a
petition emanating from its own wrongdoing. Thus, it violated
8(a)(5).19 Mesker Door, supra.

18 Although on review, the D.C. Circuit criticized the Board for find-
ing that settled ULPs caused the loss of employee support for a union
and noted that, “find[ing] a violation of the Act in the absence of sub-
stantial evidence” was inappropriate, this case in distinguishable be-
cause the record in this case clearly demonstrates by substantial evi-
dence, without resort to or reliance upon the Settlement Agreement
itself, that CoServ violated the Act. BPH & Co. v. NLRB, 333 F.3d
213, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The prior ULPs were comprehensively
litigated.
19 Although the complaint also alleges that CoServ could not with-
draw recognition on the basis of 2 other reasons (i.e., that a reasonable
time period had not yet passed between entering into the Settlement and
withdrawal of recognition, and that CoServ was required under the
Settlement to bargain for a reasonable duration), these theories have not
been analyzed, inasmuch as their resolution will not affect the ultimate
remedy.
C. Other 8(a)(5) Violations
1. Information request
CoServ violated 8(a)(5), when it ignored the Union’s request
for an Excelsior list describing current wages.20 An employer
must provide requested information to a union representing its
employees, when there is a probability that the information is
necessary and relevant to its representational duties. NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). This duty includes
the provision of relevant bargaining information. Postal Ser-
vice, 337 NLRB 820, 822 (2002). Information, which concerns
unit terms and conditions of employment, is “so intrinsic to the
core of the employer-employee relationship” that it is presump-
tively relevant. U.S. Information Services, 341 NLRB 988
(2004). The Union’s request for unit names and wages was
fundamentally relevant, and CoServ’s recalcitrance in replying
was unlawful.
2. Unilateral wage increase
CoServ violated 8(a)(5) by unilaterally increasing unit wag-
es, after its unlawful withdrawal of recognition. Its unilateral
return in 2015 to its past practice of providing Mercer study
raises was invalid. In Mesker Door, the Board held that:
[B]ecause the Respondent . . . [could not] withdraw recogni-
tion from the Union, it could not lawfully change … terms
and conditions of employment without … notice and bargain-
ing to impasse or agreement. By disregarding this obligation
and unilaterally … chang[ing] . . . wage[s, it] . . . violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5).
357 NLRB at 598.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. CoServ is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an over-
broad Professionalism policy, which subjected employees to
discipline for violating these rules:
a. Rule 6–“Unauthorized . . . use or disclosure of . . .
employee data”;
b. Rule 13–“Failure to cooperate in any investigation
by CoServ”;
c. Rule 14–“Lack of loyalty to CoServ”;
d. Rule 18–“[D]isrespectful attitude towards a supervi-
sor”;
e. Rule 20–“[C]onduct which could damage the image
. . . . CoServ”;
f. Rule 22–“Failure to enhance the public image of
CoServ while participating in non–work activities, while
off duty or while wearing CoServ logo apparel”; and
g. Rule 24–“Using the CoServ name or its related
trademarks and/or logos, in association with any personal
advertisement, online profile, or personal use, without
written permission.”

20 North Macon Health Care Facility, 315 NLRB 359, 361 (1994).
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 13
4. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an over-
broad Confidential Information policy, which subjected em-
ployees to discipline for using confidential information for any
non-business purpose.
5. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an over-
broad Conflicts of Interest policy, which subjected employees
to discipline for “conflicts” or “the appearance of conflicts”
with CoServ, and mandated “a continuing obligation to disclose
any situation that presents the possibility of a conflict.”
6. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an over-
broad Protecting CoServ Assets policy that subjected employ-
ees to discipline for all non-business usage of its assets and
equipment.
7. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recogni-
tion from, and failing and refusing to bargain with, the Union as
the exclusive representative of its employees for collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act in the
following appropriate bargaining unit:
INCLUDED: All Linemen - Class Al, Class A2, Class B1,
Class B2, Class Cl, Linemen Class C2, Class G1, Class G2,
Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen; Power Quality Tech-
nicians, System Operators and Senior System Operators em-
ployed by … [CoServ] at our facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office clericals,
managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
8. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing and refusing to
by failing and refusing to provide information requested by the
Union, which was relevant to its representational duties.
9. CoServ violated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally increasing
the unit’s wages, after withdrawing recognition from the Union.
10. The unfair labor practice set forth above affects com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that CoServ violated the Act, it is ordered to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action. It must
rescind the overbroad Handbook rules, and furnish all current
employees with inserts for their current Handbooks that (1)
advise that the unlawful rule has been rescinded, or (2) provide
a lawfully worded rule on adhesive backing that will cover the
unlawful rule; or publish and distribute to all current employees
revised Handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rule, or
(2) provide a lawfully worded rule.
In light of its withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bar-
gain with the Union, it must recognize and bargain with the
Union for a reasonable period of time as the bargaining repre-
sentative of unit employees. An affirmative bargaining order is
a reasonable exercise of the Board's broad discretionary reme-
dial authority. Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64, 64–
68 (1996). As the Board stated in Anderson Lumber, 360
NLRB 538 (2014), “We adhere to the view that an affirmative
bargaining order is ‘the traditional, appropriate remedy for an
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate unit of employees.”’ Id., slip
op. at 1, quoting Caterair, supra, 322 NLRB at 68. Noting its
disagreement with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit regarding a requirement to justify
imposition of a bargaining order in each case, the Board never-
theless found a bargaining order was justified in Anderson
Lumber pursuant to the District of Columbia Circuit balancing
test as set out in Vincent Industrial Plastics v. NLRB, 209 F.3d
727, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On virtually the identical facts, the
same result occurs here.
Vincent Industrial Plastics requires balancing of three con-
siderations. These considerations are (1) employee Section 7
rights, (2) whether other purposes of the Act override the rights
of employees to choose their representative, and (3) whether
alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of
the Act. Id. Because the violation found here is identical to the
violation found in Anderson Lumber, the Board's balancing
rationale is quoted in full and adopted:
(1) An affirmative bargaining order vindicates the Section 7
rights of the unit employees who were denied the benefits of
collective bargaining by the Respondent's withdrawal of
recognition and resulting refusal to bargain with the Union for
a[n] . . . .[initial] collective-bargaining agreement. At the
same time, an affirmative bargaining order, with its attendant
bar to raising a question concerning the Union's continuing
majority status for a reasonable time, does not unduly preju-
dice the Section 7 rights of employees who may oppose con-
tinued union representation because the duration of the order
is no longer than is reasonably necessary to remedy the ill ef-
fects of the violation. To the extent such opposition exists,
moreover, it may be at least in part the product of the Re-
spondent's unfair labor practices.
(2) An affirmative bargaining order also serves the policies of
the Act by fostering meaningful collective bargaining and in-
dustrial peace. That is, it removes the Respondent's incentive
to delay bargaining in the hope of further discouraging sup-
port for the Union. It also ensures that the Union will not be
pressured by the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition to
achieve immediate results at the bargaining table following
the Board's resolution of its unfair labor practice charges and
issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, alone, would be inadequate to
remedy the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union in
these circumstances, because it would permit another chal-
lenge to the Union's majority status before the taint of the Re-
spondent's unlawful withdrawal of recognition has dissipated,
and before the employees have had a reasonable time to re-
group and bargain through their representative in an effort to
reach a successor collective-bargaining agreement. Such a re-
sult would be particularly unjust in circumstances such as
those here, where the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition
would likely have a continuing effect, thereby tainting any
employee disaffection from the Union arising during that pe-
riod or immediately thereafter. We find that these circum-
stances outweigh the temporary impact the affirmative bar-
gaining order will have on the rights of employees who op-
pose continued union representation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirmative bar-
gaining order with its temporary decertification bar is neces-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
sary to fully remedy the allegations in this case.
Anderson Lumber, 360 NLRB at 538–539. Based on this ra-
tionale, the same determination is warranted here and an af-
firmative bargaining order is necessary and justified in order to
remedy the allegations in this case pursuant to the balancing
test of Vincent Industrial Plastics.
It must commence bargaining, upon request, with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of em-
ployees in an appropriate bargaining unit, and embody any
understanding reached in a signed agreement. It shall furnish
the Union with the information requested in its November 27,
2014 letter. It shall, if requested by the Union, rescind the uni-
lateral wage increases implemented in 2015 after the unlawful
withdrawal of recognition. To the extent that these changes
have improved unit terms and conditions of employment, the
recommended Order set forth below shall not be construed as
requiring rescission of such improvements, unless requested to
do so by the Union.
In addition to the traditional remedies for the violations
found herein, Donnie Clary or Denise Smithers will read the
notice marked “Appendix” to unit employees, during work
time, in the presence of a Board agent. A notice reading will
counteract the coercive impact of the instant ULPs, which were
substantial and pervasive. See McAllister Towing & Transpor-
tation Co., 341 NLRB 394, 400 (2004). It shall also distribute
remedial notices electronically via email, intranet, internet, or
other appropriate electronic means to its employees, in addition
to the traditional physical posting of paper notices, if it custom-
arily communicates with workers in this manner. See J Picini
Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended21
ORDER
The Respondent, Denton County Electric Cooperative, Inc.
d/b/a CoServ Electric, Corinth, Texas, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining an overbroad Professionalism policy, which
subjected employees to discipline for violating these rules:
i. Rule 6—“Unauthorized . . . use or disclosure of . . . employ-
ee data”;
ii. Rule 13—“Failure to cooperate in any investigation by
CoServ”;
iii. Rule 14—“Lack of loyalty to CoServ”;
iv. Rule 18—“[D]isrespectful attitude towards a supervisor”;
v. Rule 20—“[E]ngaging in … conduct which could damage
the image . . . of CoServ”;
vi. Rule 22—“Failure to enhance the public image of CoServ
while participating in non-work activities, while off duty or
while wearing CoServ logo apparel”; and

21 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
vii. Rule 24—“Using the CoServ name or its related trade-
marks and/or logos, in association with any personal adver-
tisement, online profile, or personal use, without written per-
mission.”
(b) Maintaining an overbroad Confidential Information poli-
cy, which subjected employees to discipline for using confiden-
tial information for any non-business purpose.
(c) Maintaining an overbroad Conflicts of Interest policy,
which subjected employees to discipline for “conflicts” or “the
appearance of conflicts” with CoServ, and mandated “a contin-
uing obligation to disclose any situation that presents the possi-
bility of a conflict.”
(d) Maintaining an overbroad Protecting CoServ Assets poli-
cy, which subjected employees to discipline for all non-
business usage of its assets and equipment.
(e) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
employees in this appropriate unit:
INCLUDED: All Linemen—Class Al, Class A2, Class B1,
Class B2, Class Cl, Linemen Class C2, Class G1, Class G2,
Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen; Power Quality Tech-
nicians, System Operators and Senior System Operators em-
ployed by . . . [CoServ] at our facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office clericals,
managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(e) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with requested
information that is relevant and necessary to its performance of
its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of unit employees.
(g) Unilaterally changing wages, benefits, and other terms
and conditions of employment, without first notifying and bar-
gaining with the Union.
(h) In any like or related manner restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or modify the language in the following provi-
sions of the Professionalism policy
i. (Rule 6 to the extent that it prohibited the “[u]nauthorized
. . . use or disclosure of … employee data”;
ii. Rule 13 to the extent that it prohibited the “[f]ailure to co-
operate in any investigation by CoServ”;
iii. Rule 14 to the extent that it prohibited a “[l]ack of loyalty
to CoServ”;
iv, Rule 18 to the extent that it prohibited having a “disre-
spectful attitude towards a supervisor”;
v. Rule 20 to the extent that it banned “engaging in … con-
duct which could damage the image or reputation of CoServ”;
vi. Rule 22 to the extent that it prohibited the “[f]ailure to en-
hance the public image of CoServ while participating in non-
work activities, while off duty or while wearing CoServ logo
apparel”; and
vii. Rule 24 to the extent that it prohibited “[u]sing the CoServ
name or its related trademarks and/or logos, in association
with any personal advertisement, online profile, or personal
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A COSERV ELECTRIC 15
use, without written permission.”
(b) Rescind or modify the language in the Confidential In-
formation policy to the extent that it barred using confidential
information for any non-business purpose.
(c) Rescind or modify the language in the Conflicts of Inter-
est policy to the extent that it banned “conflicts” or “the ap-
pearance of conflicts” with CoServ, and legislated “a continu-
ing obligation to disclose any situation that presents the possi-
bility of a conflict.”
(d) Rescind or modify the language in the Protecting CoServ
Assets policy to the extent that it banned all non-business usage
of its assets and equipment.
(e) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the Em-
ployee Handbook that
i. Advise that the unlawful rules have been rescinded, or
ii. Provide the language of lawful rules or publish and distrib-
ute a revised Employee Handbook that
1. Does not contain the unlawful rules, or
2. Provides the language of lawful rules.
(f) Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of bargaining unit employees.
(g) Upon request, meet and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
and embody any understanding reached in a signed Agreement.
(h) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment of unit employees,
notify and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees.
(g) Upon the Union’s request, rescind any or all of the uni-
laterally implemented changes made in the terms and condi-
tions of employment of employees since November 26, 2014.
(h) Provide the Union with the information requested in its
November 27, 2014 letter.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility
copies of the attached notice, marked “Appendix.”22 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after
being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former em-
ployees employed it at any time since November 26, 2014.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that it
has taken to comply.

22 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Dated Washington, D.C. June 28, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which prohibit you from using or disclosing
employee data without authorization.
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook require you to cooperate with any investiga-
tion.
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which prohibit a “[l]ack of loyalty to Co-
Serv.”
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which ban you from having a “disrespectful
attitude towards a supervisor.”
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which bar you from “engaging in … conduct
which could damage the image or reputation of CoServ.”
WE WILL NOT maintain provisions in our Employee Hand-
book, which subject you to disciplinary action for the “[f]ailure
to enhance the public image of CoServ while participating in
non–work activities, while off duty or while wearing CoServ
logo apparel.”
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which prohibit you from “[u]sing the CoServ
name or its related trademarks and/or logos, in association with
any personal advertisement, online profile, or personal use,
without written permission.”
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which ban you from using confidential in-
formation for any nonbusiness purpose.
WE WILL NOT maintain provisions in our Employee Hand-
book, which subject you to discipline for “conflicts” or “the
appearance of conflicts” with CoServ, and mandate “a continu-
ing obligation to disclose any situation that presents the possi-
bility of a conflict.”
WE WILL NOT maintain disciplinary provisions in our Em-
ployee Handbook, which subject you to discipline for all non-
business usage of our assets and equipment.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from, and fail and refuse
to bargain with, the International Brotherhood of Electrical
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
Workers Local 220, affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers (the Union) as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of our employees in the follow-
ing unit:
INCLUDED: All Linemen - Class Al, Class A2, Class B1,
Class B2, Class Cl, Linemen Class C2, Class G1, Class G2,
Groundmen, Journeymen, Servicemen; Power Quality Tech-
nicians, System Operators and Senior System Operators em-
ployed by . . . [CoServ] at our facility in Corinth, Texas.
EXCLUDED: All other employees, including office clericals,
managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to provide the Union with re-
quested information that is relevant and necessary to its per-
formance of its duties.
WE WILL NOT change your wages, benefits, or other terms
and conditions of employment, without first notifying and bar-
gaining with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights set forth
above.
WE WILL rescind or modify these provisions of our Employee
Handbook:
1. The Professionalism policy to the extent that it prohibits
you from:
a. Disclosing employee data without authorization un-
der Rule 6;
b. Failing to cooperate in any investigation by us under
Rule 13;
c. Having a lack of loyalty to us under Rule 14;
d. Maintaining a “disrespectful attitude towards a su-
pervisor” under Rule 18;
e. “[E]ngaging in . . . conduct which could damage …
[our] image or reputation” under Rule 20;
f. “Fail[ing] . . . to enhance the public image of CoServ
while participating in non–work activities, while off duty
or while wearing CoServ logo apparel” under Rule 22; and
g. “Using the CoServ name or its related trademarks
and/or logos, in association with any personal advertise-
ment, online profile, or personal use, without written per-
mission” under Rule 24.
2. The Confidential Information policy to the extent that it
prohibits you from using confidential information for any
non-business purpose.
3. The Conflicts of Interest policy to the extent that it bars
“conflicts” or “the appearance of conflicts” with us, and man-
dates “a continuing obligation to disclose any situation that
presents the possibility of a conflict.”
4. The Protecting CoServ Assets policy to the extent that it
prohibits all non-business usage of our assets and equipment.
WE WILL furnish all of you with inserts for the current Em-
ployee Handbook that:
1. Advise that the unlawful provisions, above have been re-
scinded, or
2. Provide the language of lawful provisions, or publish and
distribute revised Employee Handbooks that:
a. Do not contain the unlawful provisions, or
b. Provide the language of lawful provisions.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of our unit employees concerning terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the un-
derstanding in a signed agreement.
WE WILL, upon the Union’s request, rescind any or all of the
unilaterally implemented changes that we made in the terms
and conditions of employment of employees since November
26, 2014.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information requested
in its November 27, 2014 letter.
WE WILL hold a meeting or meetings during working hours
and have this notice read to you and your fellow workers by
either President and Chief Executive Officer Donnie Clary or
Senior Vice President of Employee Relations Denise Smithers,
in the presence of an agent of the National Labor Relations
Board.
DENTON COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. D/B/A
COSERV ELECTRIC
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/16–CA–149330 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.