Daimler Chrysler

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 25, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 1324 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1324
DaimlerChrysler Corporation f/k/a Chrysler Corpo-
ration1 and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Inplement
Workers of America (UAW), Local 412, Unit 53,
AFL–CIO. Cases 7–CA–40899, 7–CA–40956(1),
7–CA–40956(2), and 7–CA–41417
August 25, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On May 21, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended order as modified.3
We adopt the judge’s findings that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
comply with the Union’s information requests as set forth
in complaint paragraphs 10(a), (h), and (i), 11(a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i), 13, 14, and 16, and that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening
Union Steward Keith Valentin with discipline for filing
information requests which it characterized as “offensive”
and attempting to define and limit his rights as a union
steward. We reverse the judge’s finding that the Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
refusing to provide the Union with requested information
listing all Chrysler employees who have been disciplined
subsequent to any type of “last chance” agreement since
April 23, 1993, as detailed below.

1 The record reflects that, subsequent to the filing of the charges in
this case, Chrysler Corporation merged with Daimler Benz to become
DaimlerChrysler Corporation. We have thus modified the caption to
reflect the Respondent’s new name.
2 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the judge’s find-
ings that the Respondent violated the Act as alleged in complaint
pars. 10(b)–(f), and his recommended dismissal of the allegation con-
tained in complaint par. 11(b) concerning nonunit employees.
3 In adopting the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent unlawfully
refused to provide the Union with requested information, we note, with
respect to the Respondent’s argument that resolution of the 8(a)(5)
allegations should be deferred to the parties’ grievance/arbitration
procedure, that such allegations involving an employer’s refusal to
furnish information requested by an exclusive collective-bargaining
representative are not deferrable. See Clarkson Industries, 312 NLRB
349, 353 fn. 21 (1993) (citing, inter alia, United Technologies Corp.,
274 NLRB 504, 505 (1985), supplemented by 277 NLRB 584 (1985)).
In addition, in adopting the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent’s
May 6, 1998 memorandum, violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by suggesting that
Chief Steward Keith Valentin might be subject to discipline for sending
correspondence to management officials outside its labor relations
department, we do not rely on the judge’s reasoning that “[r]ather than
threatening discipline, Chrysler could have informed Valentin that
correspondence to any management official outside the labor relations
department would be referred to labor relations and not be read by
anyone else.”
The Respondent discharged unit employee and tool
engineer, Arthur Sibert, on November 8, 1996. In order
to return to work, Sibert signed a “last chance” agree-
ment with the Respondent. After returning to work, Si-
bert was discharged again on January 12, 1998, pursuant
to the “last chance” agreement, because he missed work
the previous Friday. The Union filed a grievance on Si-
bert’s behalf the day he was discharged. The grievance
was denied in steps 1 and 2 of the parties’ grievance
procedure. At this point, on April 24, 1998, Chief
Steward Keith Valentin filed an information request
asking the Respondent to provide an alphabetical listing
of all Chrysler employees who had been disciplined
subsequent to any type of “last chance” agreement since
April 23, 1993. The Respondent refused to provide the
information to Valentin because it had an agreement with
the Union that treatment of employees returned to work
under “last chance” agreements would be considered
nonprecedential with regard to the treatment of other
employees. The Respondent argued that information
which could not be used as precedent is irrelevant to
carrying out the Union’s duties, and therefore, it did not
have to furnish Valentin with the list and related
information. The judge agreed with the Respondent, and
recommended dismissal of this allegation. The General
Counsel filed a cross-exception with respect to the
judge’s recommended dismissal. We find merit to this
cross-exception.
Contrary to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we
find that the information requested was relevant to the
Union in carrying out its duties. A broad, discovery-type
standard applies in determining relevance of information
requests. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432,
437 (1967); A-Plus Roofing, 295 NLRB 967, 970 (1989),
enfd. 39 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1994); Westside Community
Mental Health Center, 327 NLRB 661 (1999). An em-
ployer must furnish information that is of even probable
or potential relevance to a union’s duties. Conrock Co.,
263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982). Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure governing discovery, “relevancy” is
synonymous with “germane,” and a party must disclose
information if it has any bearing on the subject matter of
the case. Graphic Communications Work Local 13 (De-
troit Newspaper) v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir.
1979). In considering an information request, the Board
is not concerned with the merits of a grievance, and it is
therefore not willing to speculate about what defenses an
employer will raise in an arbitration proceeding. Con-
rock, supra at 1294.
Information such as that sought by the Union here
about previous discipline imposed by the Respondent in
the context of a “last chance” agreement may well, at a
minimum, be useful to the Union in deciding whether
even to proceed to arbitration on Sibert’s grievance, or
331 NLRB No. 174
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. 1325
whether instead to forego costly and time-consuming
litigation of what the Union might determine (after ana-
lyzing the requested information) is an unmeritorious
grievance. See Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916, 918–919
(1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985). Cf. Postal
Service, 308 NLRB 547, 549 (1992) (respondent refused
to provide union with information about “last chance”
grievance settlement agreements because it claimed, inter
alia, that they had no precedential value; the Board held
that such information was relevant and must be provided
on the grounds, inter alia, that it could assist the union in
determining whether to proceed to arbitration).
Applying these principles here, we find that even if the
information requested by the Union might not have direct
precedential value, it is at least probably or potentially
relevant to the Union’s representational duties in regard
to the processing of Sibert’s grievance. Therefore, we
find that the Respondent violated 8(a)(5) and (1) by re-
fusing to provide the Union with the requested list of,
and detailed information about, all of the Respondent’s
employees who were disciplined under “last chance”
agreements since April 23, 1993.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders the Respondent, Daimler-
Chrysler Corporation f/k/a Chrysler Corporation, Auburn
Hills, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Furnish the Union in a timely fashion the informa-
tion requested by the Union on the following dates in
1998: February 11; March 6 and 27; April 21, 23, 24, and
29; May 5 (to the extent the information requested on
May 5 pertains to employees in unit 53); June 1, 4, 5, and
8; July 6, 15, and 28; and October 16 (to the extent the
information requested on October 16 pertains to employ-
ees in unit 53).”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

MEMBER BRAME dissenting in part.
I agree with my colleagues that the judge correctly
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to provide the Union with the
requested information he found relevant to the Union’s
proper performance of its collective-bargaining duties
and violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening Chief Stew-
ard Keith Valentin with discipline for filing information
requests which it finds offensive and attempting to define
and limit his rights as a union steward. I do not agree
with my colleagues in reversing the judge’s dismissal of
paragraph 10(g) of the complaint which alleged that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by not providing the Union with a list and all related in-
formation concerning unit employees who have been
reprimanded or suspended pursuant to any “last chance”
agreement.1
Employee Arthur Sibert was terminated pursuant to a
“last chance” agreement on January 12, 1998. A griev-
ance was filed but denied at the first two steps. Thereaf-
ter, Valentin filed an information request in which he
asked the Respondent to provide detailed information
regarding all employees who have been disciplined pur-
suant to “last chance” agreements. Lucy Donovan, the
Respondent’s labor relations representative, denied the
request, informing Valentin that it would not provide the
information because the Union and the Respondent had
agreed that the treatment of employees pursuant to “last
chance” agreements would not be used as precedent with
regard to treatment of other employees. Therefore, the
Respondent argued that since the requested information
could not be used as precedent, it was irrelevant to the
Union’s collective-bargaining duties, and, as a result, it
was not obligated to provide Valentin the information.
The judge agreed, finding that the parties had such an
agreement, and dismissed the allegation.
As part of the duty to bargain in good faith under Sec-
tion 8(a)(5), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, an em-
ployer must furnish a union with potentially relevant
information, on request, to enable the union to represent
its employees effectively, including information related
to grievances. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S.
432, 437 (1967). Information concerning employees
within the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant.
NLRB v. Postal Service, 888 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir.
1989) (citing NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410
F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1969)). Further, an employer must
provide information relevant to the “evaluation or proc-
essing of a grievance,” id., and “requested information
should be deemed relevant if it is likely to be of material
assistance in evaluating strategies that may be open to
the union as part of its struggle to minimize the adverse
effects of the employer’s decision-making process on per-
sons within [the] bargaining unit.” Providence Hospital v.
NLRB, 93 F.3d 1012, 1017 (1st Cir. 1996).
I agree with the judge that the Respondent, under the
particular facts presented, was not obligated to provide
Valentin with a list of employees disciplined pursuant to

1 Par. 10(g) of the second amended complaint and notice of hearing
alleges that the Respondent failed to provide information that the
Charging Party requested in an April 13, 1998 letter, from Valentin to
Lucy Donovan, a labor relations representative for the Respondent. In
the letter titled “Request for Information Pursuant to a Grievance Inves-
tigation,” Valentin requested that the Respondent provide an alphabeti-
cally sorted listing of all Chrysler employees who have been disciplined
subsequent to any type of “last chance” agreement. For each case,
Valentin requested that the Respondent describe the action as a repri-
mand, temporary suspension, or discharge; identify the reason for the
disciplinary action, and the duration of the suspension or discharge; and
identify any employees with mental health complications or substance
abuse history.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1326
any “last chance” agreement and the related information
requested. As found by the judge, the Union entered into
an agreement with the Respondent not to use the treat-
ment of employees pursuant to “last chance” agreements
as precedent with regard to other employees. The effect
of the parties’ agreement is that the Respondent is not
bound to treat the instant grievance in the same manner
as it treated any past grievances. Thus, by entering into
this agreement, the Union essentially agreed not to assert
its right to allege disparate treatment based on “last
chance” agreements. In light of this, and contrary to the
majority, I do not find that the requested information can
be relevant for comparative purposes if it has no weight
as precedent. In sum, I would give effect to the parties’
agreement, which I interpret as foreclosing a finding that
the requested information is relevant under the principles
articulated above. As a result, I find that the Respon-
dent’s denial of such information is not a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.2
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the Union with re-
quested information relevant to the Union’s proper per-
formance of its collective-bargaining duties as your ex-
clusive bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce
Keith Valentin or any other union official in the legiti-
mate exercise of their responsibilities as representatives
of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind our May 6, 1998, letter threatening
to discipline Keith Valentin for the performance of his
duties as union steward.
WE WILL furnish the Union in a timely fashion the
information requested by the Union on the following
dates in 1998: February 11; March 6 and 27; April 21,
23, 24, and 29; May 5 (to the extent the information re-
quested on May 5 pertains to employees in unit 53); June
1, 4, 5, and 8; July 6, 15, and 28; and October 16 (to the

2 The cases cited by the majority are distinguishable. Pfizer, Inc.
286 NLRB 916, 918 (1984), enfd. 763 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985), and
Postal Service, 308 NLRB 547 (1992), involve information requests
aimed at supporting disparate treatment claims. Neither involved an
agreement by the parties not to assert a disparate treatment argument in
relation to “last chance” agreements, which is essentially what the
judge found here and which finding I adopt.
extent the information requested on October 16 pertains
to employees in unit 53).

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION F/K/A
CHRYSLER CORPORATION

Michael O’Hearon, Esq., for the General Counsel.
K.C. Hortop, Esq., DaimlerChrysler Corp., of Auburn Hills, Michi-
gan, for the Respondent.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on March 1 and 2, 1999.
The charges in this case were filed April 22, May 8, July 8, and
October 6, 1998. A consolidated complaint was issued Decem-
ber 23, 1998.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the oral argu-
ment made by the General Counsel at the close of the hearing,
and the brief filed by the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Chrysler Corporation,2 manufactures
automobiles and related products. It maintains a facility in
Auburn Hills, Michigan, where this case arises. Respondent
annually derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
manufactures products valued in excess of $100,000 which are
shipped to places outside the State of Michigan. Chrysler
admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and
that the Union, Local 412, unit 53, of the United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Keith Valentin was elected chief steward of unit 53 of UAW
Local 412 in May 1997. In that capacity he represents engi-
neers and employees in related job classifications in the engine
and transmission group in Chrysler’s facility at Auburn Hills,
Michigan. Since his election as steward, Valentin has filed
numerous grievances and requests for information with Re-
spondent. Chrysler management considers a substantial num-
ber of Valentin’s requests for information to be inappropriate
and, has therefore, failed to comply with these requests. As a
result, the General Counsel alleges that Chrysler violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Additionally, the General Counsel alleges that Chrysler
threatened Valentin with discipline in violation of 8(a)(1). This
allegation arises from a memorandum sent to Valentin by Don-
ald Pentecost, a Chrysler human resources executive, on May 6,
1998. This memo informed Valentin that Respondent would
not respond to many of his requests because they were being
made merely to harass and intimidate Respondent. The memo
instructed Valentin to direct all future correspondence to either
1 P. 148, the second sentence of L. 21 of the transcript incorrectly at-
tributes a remark to the judge, which I believe was made jocularly by
the General Counsel.
2 On November 12, 1998, Chrysler merged with Daimler Benz to
become DaimlerChrysler Corporation.
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. 1327
his supervisor or a company labor relations representative, and
not, as he had been doing, to other corporate officials. Pente-
cost’s letter concluded:
You previously were advised by Lucy Donovan [one of Re-
spondent’s labor relations representatives] as to the inappro-
priateness of your requests. This is to advise you that con-
tinuance of this type of inappropriate, harassing activity may
result in disciplinary action being taken up to and including
discharge.
Valentin filed grievances and information requests as a result
of this letter. He asked Respondent to specify which letters
warranted the threat of discipline. The Company did not re-
spond.
Valentin and other union officials met with Pentecost and
other company officials on June 2, 1998, in part to discuss the
May 6 memo. Pentecost lectured Valentin and cited at least
two specific examples of what he considered inappropriate
behavior by the steward. One was a May 6 letter to Monica
Emerson, Chrysler’s workforce diversity and economic equity
manager.3 The memo advised Emerson that the Union was
pursuing unfair labor practice charges against Respondent and
its agents. It continued:

The first priority of Chrysler’s legal staff will (under-
standably) be to act in the Corporation’s best interest. As
a matter of professional courtesy, I strongly recommend
that you seek private legal counsel to protect your individ-
ual rights in the event that Corporate and individual agent
(yourself) interests diverge.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding these
charges, contact me at your earliest convenience rather
than feign confusion and ignorance at a later date.4

At the June 2 meeting Pentecost also cited as objectionable,
Valentin’s practice of writing and sending copies of correspon-
dence to company officials outside of the labor relations de-
partment. He specifically cited a May 1997 memorandum re-
garding Sunday overtime that Valentin sent to Chrysler Vice
President Frank Ewasyshyn in April 1998. Pentecost did not
retract his threat of disciplinary action at this meeting, or on
any subsequent occasion.5
A. Chrysler Violated 8(a)(1) in Interfering with, Restraining,
and Coercing Valentin in the Exercise of his Section 7 Rights as
Alleged in Paragraphs 9 and 15 of the Complaint
It is not necessary to decide whether Respondent had legiti-
mate cause to threaten Keith Valentin with disciplinary action
on account of his May 6 memo to Monica Emerson. Pente-
cost’s May 6 memo to Valentin is much broader in scope. The
Pentecost memo begins by characterizing most of Valentin’s
information requests as attempts to harass, intimidate, and cre-
ate work. The memo, in threatening disciplinary action for
“this type of inappropriate, harassing activity,” can be reasona-
bly read to include virtually any request for information submit-
ted by Valentin. When Valentin asked Chrysler to specify

3 Valentin’s letter to Emerson on which Pentecost was copied, may
have precipitated Pentecost’s memo to Valentin on the same date.
4 Other information requests from Valentin to Respondent concluded
with directions in a similar vein.
5 In August 1998 Morris Simms, a labor relations staff representative
at Chrysler, told Valentin he would not be fired for his letter writing
activities.
which of his letters fell into the category of correspondence for
which he might be disciplined, it failed to do so.
Since the Company’s threat is to discipline Valentin for vir-
tually any request that it finds offensive, it has clearly interfered
with, restrained, and coerced him in his protected rights as
union steward. Pentecost’s letter also suggests that Valentin
may be subject to discipline for sending correspondence to
Chrysler officials outside of the labor relations department.
There is no indication from this record that these officials de-
voted any time to considering Valentin’s correspondence.
Rather than threatening discipline, Chrysler could have in-
formed Valentine that correspondence to any management offi-
cial outside the labor relations department would be referred to
labor relations and not be read by anyone else. In the absence
of evidence that Valentine’s letters interfered with the work of
other Chrysler officials or caused it to misallocate its resources,
I find this part of Pentecost’s letter, an example of overkill, to
violate 8(a)(1), as well.
B. Respondent’s Failure to Respond to Valentin’s Requests
for Information6
Complaint paragraphs 10(a), 13, and 16: Respondent’s fail-
ure to respond to Valentin’s February 11, 1998 request for ac-
cess badge swipe data and boarding lists for Respondent’s shut-
tle flights to and from Kokomo, Indiana, for transmission
unit members.
In December 1997 and January 1998, Valentin filed three
grievances alleging that Respondent was violating the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in offering substantially more over-
time to engineers in the transmission group than to engineers in
the engine group. On February 11, he requested that Chrysler
provide the Union with:
1. An alphabetically sorted listing of all access badge swipes
for all unit 53 bargaining unit members from October 1, 1997,
through February 7, 1998.
2. The boarding lists for unit 53 bargaining unit members on
all Chrysler shuttle flights departing and/or returning from
Kokomo, Indiana (the site of a new Chrysler facility) for the
same period.7
The only response received by Valentin was an April 20,
1998 memorandum, from Chrysler’s labor relations representa-
tive, Desiree Redenz. In paragraph 6 of her memo, Redenz
responded, “Please forward a full explanation of the relevance
of this information as requested to any grievance in, or in the
“drafted” stage in the system.”
Valentin had provided Redenz with oral explanations on
several occasions. In its brief at page 20, Respondent states
that the request for access badge swipes was not relevant as the
underlying grievances had been settled, citing paragraph 8 of
Redenz’ April 20 memo. Redenz’ memo is hearsay evidence
and thus provides an insufficient basis on which I can conclude
that these grievances had been resolved. The portion of the
transcript in which Valentin was cross-examined on this issue
also does not establish Respondent’s contention with regard to
the underlying grievances. I therefore conclude that Valentin’s
request did pertain to an unresolved issue between Respondent
and the Union.
6 The merits of the individual 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations of the com-
plaint, with a few exceptions, are not addressed by Respondent’s brief
or the General Counsel’s closing argument.
7 I infer that this information would be helpful in determining the
amount of overtime worked by employees in the two groups.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1328
Analysis
It is well settled that an employer, on request, must provide a
union with information that is relevant to its carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities in representing employees.
The Board uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining
relevance. Information about terms and conditions of employ-
ees actually represented by a union is presumptively relevant
and necessary and must be produced, Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB
622, 625 (1993). On this record, therefore, Chrysler bears the
burden of establishing that the information sought by Valentin
is not relevant because the underlying grievances had been
resolved. It has not introduced sufficient evidence to do so.
At hearing, Chrysler raised the burdensomeness of comply-
ing with Valentin’s request. The record indicates that it might
take one Chrysler employee 40 hours to obtain the badge swipe
record requested by Valentin. However, Respondent did not
object on this basis when the information was requested, and
thus, may not do so now, Westside Community Mental Health
Center, 327 NLRB 661 (1999). Moreover, while Respondent
has introduced evidence that compliance with the request
would have been burdensome, it has not established that it is
“unduly burdensome.” To assess whether the request was un-
duly burdensome would require a balancing of the burden to
Respondent with the importance and usefulness of the informa-
tion to the Union. There is simply not enough information in
this record to perform such an assessment. In conclusion, the
General Counsel has established the violation of 8(a)(1) and (5)
alleged in paragraphs 10(a), 13, and 16.
C. Complaint Paragraphs 11(a) and (b), 14, and 16: Valentin’s
Further Information Requests Regarding Overtime
Hours Worked
On April 29, 1998, Valentin asked Chrysler for a list, organ-
ized by job classification, of all hours offered transmission
group employees that were not offered to engine group em-
ployees, from October 14, 1997 through April 29, 1998. He
also asked for a photocopy of every transmission group time
card which shows 4 hours of overtime on Mondays, Wednes-
days, and Fridays for the same period of time and an explana-
tion of the emergency nature of the unscheduled overtime.
Respondent never replied to the request.
On May 5, Valentine asked for a copy of all overtime equali-
zation grievances for which an adjustment was granted for cal-
endar years 1996, 1997, and 1998, corporatewide. Addition-
ally, he asked for collaborating information. In response, Lucy
Donovan, a Chrysler labor relations representative, told Valen-
tine that Respondent didn’t make such adjustments any longer.
He received no other response.
Analysis
At trial, Chrysler contends that compliance with these re-
quest would be a monstrous task. As noted, with regard to
complaint paragraph 10(a), the time for raising such objections
is when the request is made. I therefore find a violation with
regard to paragraph 11(a) and with regard to that part of para-
graph 11(b) that pertains to unit 53 employees. With respect to
other employees, not in the unit 53 bargaining unit, the Union
did not meet its burden of establishing the relevance of the
requested information, Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB
258, 259 (1994).
D. Complaint Paragraphs 10(b)–(f): Information Requests
Relating to Respondent’s Failure to Promote Kareem Schkoor
to the Position of Tool Engineer 211 A
On February 19, 1998, Valentin filed a grievance on behalf
of tool engineer, Kareem Schkoor, who was not promoted from
the position of tool engineer 211 B to that of tool engineer 211
A. The grievance alleged possible racial discrimination as a
motive for Respondent’s failure to promote Schkoor, an Afri-
can-American.
Valentin filed a number of information requests relating to
this grievance. On March 6 he requested a list of the experi-
ence, skills, training, education, and other qualifications that
were considered when 12 other bargaining unit members were
hired, transferred, and/or promoted to tool engineer 211 A. On
March 27, he asked for the 1996 and 1997 performance ap-
praisals for Schkoor. On April 21, he reiterated his request for
information regarding William Poland (one the employees
mentioned in the March 6 request), who was hired from outside
Chrysler into the position of tool engineer 211 A. On April 23
Valentin requested an alphabetized list of unit 53 members
who, like Schkoor, did not receive their performance appraisals
on time. On April 21 he asked Monica Emerson, Respondent’s
workforce diversity and economic equity manager, for docu-
ments related to the company practices in this area, including
information regarding the responsibilities of department and
general managers for diversity and affirmative action matters.
Chrysler never provided Valentin with any of this informa-
tion. On April 20 Desiree Redenz informed him that some of
this information would be discussed at a second step grievance
meeting. Respondent has offered no defense for its failure to
reply to the requests regarding Schkoor, and therefore, I find
that it violated the Act as alleged in paragraphs 10(b) through
(f), 13, and 16.
E. Complaint Paragraphs 10(g) Through (i): Information Re-
quests Relating to the Discharge of Unit Member, Arthur Siber
Chrysler’s tool engineer, Arthur Sibert, a bargaining unit
member, was discharged by Respondent on November 8, 1996.
Subsequently, he returned to work pursuant to a “last chance
agreement” between Chrysler and the UAW. On Monday,
January 12, 1998, he was discharged again for missing work on
the previous Friday.
The Union filed grievance No. 98–53–002 on Sibert’s behalf
regarding the January 12, 1998, discharge, the day it occurred.
This grievance was denied in steps 1 and 2 of the parties’ griev-
ance procedure. At this point, on April 24, 1998, Valentin filed
an information request asking for a list and detailed information
regarding all Chrysler employees disciplined subsequent to any
“last chance” agreement since April 23, 1993. Lucy Donovan,
a labor relations representative, informed Valentin that
Respondent would not provide this information because the
Company and Union had agreed that treatment of employees
returned to work pursuant to a “last chance” agreement would
not be considered as precedent with regard to the treatment of
other employees.
Donovan’s rationale for refusing to provide this information
is essentially that it is irrelevant to the carrying out of the Un-
ion’s duties. I agree, and therefore, dismiss complaint para-
graph 10(g).
The Union appealed the denial of grievance No. 98–53–002
in June. Valentin filed two additional grievances on July 6,
1998, alleging that Sibert’s initial discharge in 1996 violated
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. 1329
the collective-bargaining agreement, the American With Dis-
abilities Act and the Family Emergency Medical Leave Act
(FMLA). On July 6 and 15, Valentin filed information requests
regarding these grievances.8 Chrysler essentially ignored these
requests. These requests are presumptively relevant to the Un-
ion’s representation of Sibert. Chrysler has made no effort to
rebut this presumption other than to argue that these requests
are not relevant to the grievance pending before the parties’
Appeals Board. There has been no showing that these informa-
tion requests are irrelevant to the new grievances or that the
new grievances are obviously without merit. I therefore find
violations as alleged in paragraphs 10(h) and (i), 13, and 16.
F. Complaint Paragraph 11(g): Information Request Pertain-
ing to Overtime Work Given to UAW International Representa-
tive Kareem Schkoor
On July 28, 1998, Valentin filed an information request with
Respondent regarding its practice of giving overtime work to
unelected bargaining unit officials, such an international repre-
sentatives. In August, he filed two grievances protesting the
Company’s practice of assigning overtime work to Kareem
Schkoor, a UAW representative, appointed by the International
Union. Chrysler ignored the request and failed to provide the
information. At the hearing and in its brief, the Company of-
fers no defense for not providing the information requested. I
find a violation as alleged.
G. Complaint Paragraph 11(h): Information Request Regard-
ing Authority of Company Supervisors to Settle
Step-1 Grievances
On August 27, 1998, Valentin filed a request for information
regarding the authority of Respondent’s department managers
and supervisors to settle grievances, including spending limits
imposed on such managers. Respondent neither responded to
the request nor provided the information. Although Valentin
claims to have suspected that certain officials with whom he
dealt had limited authority to negotiate, there has been no indi-
cation that this request is linked in any way to the wages, hours,
and working conditions of bargaining unit employees. There-
fore, I find that there is no presumption that the requested in-
formation is relevant to the union’s duties and responsibilities,
and I dismiss the allegations in and relating to complaint para-
graph 11(h).
H. Complaint Paragraph 11(i): Information Request Regarding
Grievance Filed Concerning On-the-Job Injury to Roy Mikitch
On October 5, 1998, Valentin filed a grievance on behalf of
tool engineer, Roy Mikitch, whose finger was caught in the
machinery at work. The grievance asked for the immediate
discharge of some members of management and compensation
far above that provided for under workers compensation. On
October 16, Valentin filed an information request regarding the
grievance, which was ignored by Respondent.9 Although it
appears at first glance that Chrysler may have had legitimate

8 The information sought included records regarding Sibert held by
the Chrysler medical department, records regarding Sibert’s use of
FMLA leave, and company documents notifying Sibert of his rights
under FMLA.
9 Valentin requested information such as all accident reports at the
facility at which Mikitch was injured, a list of bargaining unit employ-
ees disciplined for safety violations in the past 5 years and a report of
the circumstances that resulted in Mikitch working “out of classifica-
tion” at the time of his injury.
objections to some of the requests, Respondent was obliged to
make those objections known to the Union in a timely fashion.
Instead, Chrysler ignored the requests, and I, therefore, find the
violation alleged in complaint paragraphs 11(i), 14, and 16, insofar
as it seeks information regarding unit 53 bargaining unit mem-
bers.
I. Complaint Paragraph 11(d): Information Request Regarding
Contract Work Performed Without Supervision by Bargaining
Unit Members
On January 16, 1998, Valentin filed a grievance alleging that
Respondent violated the collective-bargaining agreement by
failing to schedule bargaining unit members for work on Janu-
ary 17 and 19. Bargaining unit members normally supervised
contractors, who Valentin suspected, worked those days with
supervision by Chrysler management. On June 4, he submitted
an information request regarding this grievance to prepare for a
second step grievance meeting.10 The information was never
provided and Respondent never specifically informed Valentin
why it would not comply with this request. I find that the Re-
spondent violated the Act as alleged in complaint paragraphs
11(d), 14, and 16.11
J. Complaint Paragraphs 11(c), (e), and (f): Information Re-
quests Regarding Chrysler’s Threatened Disciplining of
Keith Valentin
The Union filed four grievances arising out of Donald Pente-
cost’s May 6 letter to Keith Valentin, which threatened Valen-
tin with disciplinary action. Valentin filed four requests for
information relating to these grievances. These requests in-
cluded copies of the notes taken by management personnel at
the June 2 meeting between the Union and management con-
cerning the Pentecost letter. They also included information
regarding the criteria used by management to determine
whether Valentin’s requests were irrelevant and/or unduly bur-
densome.
The only response Valentin received to these information re-
quests was a June 8 memo from Lucy Donovan informing him
that her notes of the June 2 meeting were “personal notes I took
and are not something I wish to release to you.” It is possible
that portions of these notes contained the mental impressions of
management personnel, which may be the subject of a privi-
lege. However, if that is the case, the privilege should have
been asserted immediately. There is no legitimate basis for
denying to Valentin, the recorded recollections of management
personnel of a meeting at which union representatives were
present. I find the allegations of violation in paragraphs 11(c),
(e), and (f), 14, and 16 to have been established by the General
Counsel.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By refusing to provide the Union with requested informa-
tion relevant to the Union’s proper performance of its collec-
tive-bargaining duties, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
10 The information sought included time tickets, invoices, and
work/service reports for contract workers at the Indiana Transmission
Plant on January 17 and 19, 1998.
11 Although the request asked for information about contractor em-
ployees, it was obviously linked to the grievance alleging that contrac-
tor employees were supervised by managers, rather than bargaining unit
members, in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. I con-
clude that the request was therefore presumptively relevant to the Un-
ion’s statutory duties and responsibilities.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1330
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
2. By threatening Union Steward Keith Valentin with disci-
pline for filing information requests that it finds offensive, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By attempting to define and limit the rights of Keith Va-
lentin as union steward, Respondent has violation 8(a)(1).
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, DaimlerChrysler Corporation f/k/a Chrys-
ler Corporation, Auburn Hills, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to provide the Union with requested informa-
tion relevant to the Union’s proper performance of its collec-
tive-bargaining duties as the exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees.
(b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing Keith Valentin
or any other union official in the legitimate performance of
their duties as union stewards or representatives.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union in a timely fashion the information
requested by the Union which Respondent has illegally refused
to provide the Union as determined in the instant decision.
(b) Rescind the May 6, 1998 letter from Donald Pentecost to
Keith Valentin.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Auburn Hills, Michigan facility, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since April 20, 1998.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”