Cranston Print Works Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 27, 1956

115 N.L.R.B. 537 (N.L.R.B. 1956)

CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 537
sufficient community of interest,to constitute an appropriate bargain-
ing unit.'
In determining the unit placement of employees in job classifications
similar to the cameramen and video switchers, the Board has included
them in units together either with the engineering department or
program department personnel, depending on the organizational setup
of the particular station involved' Here it is clear that the camera-
men and video switchers are part of the program production depart-
ment. Furthermore, these employees are not required. to have any
technical knowledge as are the engineers. They are not as highly
paid as the engineers, and they do not interchange with the engineers.
In view of the foregoing we shall not include them in the unit with
the engineering department employees.
Further, as the cameramen-film editors and video switchers are a
segment of the program production department, they do not by them-
selves constitute a separate unit for bargaining purposes.
We find that all engineering department employees at WTTV in-
cluding the stockroom clerk, but excluding cameramen, video switch-
ers, all othere employees, office clericals, guards, the chief engineer,
and other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appro-
priate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] - '
3 See Empire Coil Co., Inc, 106 NLRB 1069
4 See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 108 NLRB 1468, 1472, and cases cited therein
Cranston Print Works Company and Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO. Cases Not. 11-CA-706 and 11-CA-765.
February 27,1956
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 6, 1955, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed -
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.' Pur-
e The Respondent also filed a motion to reopen the record to include among the exhibits
a copy of a collective-bargaining agreement alleged to have been entered into after the
hearing in this case This motion is opposed by the General Counsel. As the parties have
not had opportunity to litigate the further facts surrounding the execution of such docu-
ment, and as in any event we find the contract immaterial to our disposition of the issues
hereinafter set forth, the motion is hereby denied.
115 NLRB No. 89.
538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
suant to the Respondent's request, oral argument was held on Septem-
ber 1, 1955, before the Board in Washington, D. C.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, the oral argument, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, only insofar as they are
consistent with this Decision and Order.
Interference , Restraint, and Coercion
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by : Plant Manager Gregory's threat
to discharge employee Sexton if he heard of Sexton passing out any
more union cards ; Gregory's statement to employee Hoots that "if
the Union got in he would probably have to close the plant," and sub-
sequent remark to Hoots that if the Union did get in he "would make
it hard and fight it to the finish"; and Foreman Gambrell's offer to
see that employee Bobo got-a desk job if Bobo would help the Respond-
ent fight the Union a In the light of the Respondent's threats of re-
prisal and promises of benefit, we also agree that Gregory's inquiry
-whether employee Toney was going to be "agin him or for him" was
likewise coercive and violative of Section 8 (a) (1).
The Trial Examiner found that Foreman Gambrell offered to bet
employee Barnett $100 that, if the Union came in the plant would
close down within 2 weeks. He further found that shortly thereafter
Foreman Parker inquired of Barnett as to what he and Gambrell had
been talking about and, upon receiving Barnett's reply, said, "Well,
you know he is right, the Company moved down here to get away
from organized labor and if they come in here, they will move from
here, too." These findings are based upon Barnett's testimony which
the Trial Examiner has credited. However, the Trial Examiner has
not mentioned, and apparently not considered, the testimony of two
other witnesses, evidently relating to the same series of conversations
with Foremen Gambrell and Parker, which discloses a somewhat dif-
version of the first of these conversations from that givenferent
by Barnett. Thus employee Hamilton, whose testimony the Trial
Examiner has credited as to other matters, testified in substance that
he initiated the conversation with Gambrell by asking him if he had
not been going around offering to make a bet that the plant would
close down if the Union came in, and that Gambrell replied that he
2 We find no merit in the Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner was biased
and prejudiced.
8 Bobo's testimony further reveals that Gambrell threatened that if Bobo rejected the
offer he need not expect any favors from the Respondent.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 539
did not have money to put on it but still said that if the Union came
in the plant would close down. Employee Higgins, likewise credited
by the Trial Examiner in other respects, testified that he,was present
when Hamilton asked Gambrell about wanting to bet, and also testi-
fied, as did Hamilton, concerning Gambrell's reply. The three
witnesses, Hamilton, Higgins, and Barnett, were substantially in
agreement that Parker made a remark such as that quoted above,
following the conversation which they testified they had had with
Gambrell. We believe it to be evident that the testimony of these three
witnesses, in fact, related to the same series of remarks by Foreman
Gambrell and Parker.4 And we further are of the opinion that
Hamilton's and Higgins' testimony more correctly reflects the sub-
stance of Hamilton's conversation with Foreman Gambrell.5 Upon
the entire record, We find that Gambrell reiterated to employees
Hamilton, Higgins, and Barnett a statement that the plant would
close down if the Union came in, and that Foreman Parker thereafter
affirmed Gambrell's remark, adding in substance that the Respondent
had come to this location to get away from organized labor and, if the
Union came in, would move from this location too. We further find
that by these remarks of Foreman Gambrell and Parker the
Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
The Trial Examiner further found, and we agree, that the Respond-
ent violated Section 8 (a) (1) through certain statements appearing in
a letter circulated by Plant Manager Gregory to the employees 3 days
before the representation election. The letter's introductory para-
graph called attention to the Union's organizational campaign with
the statement that "Since this campaign has started, a lot of propa-
ganda, rumors and statements have been made in and about our plant,"
and that "In order that you may know where you stand with respect
to these various statements, I am going to point out to you which
* we note that there is some disparity among these witnesses as to the time of these
remarks, but we do not believe it is such as to impair their credibility or to indicate that
they were not in fact testifying to the same conversations . Thus Barnett placed the date
of these conversations as about 10 days before the election , Hamilton about 3 weeks, and
Higgins "one morning just before" the election . However, Higgins testified, as above set
forth, that be was present at Hamilton 's conversation with Gambrell , and Hamilton testi-
fied that Higgins , Barnett, and himself were present at the conversations with Gambrell
and Parker.
6 The record of Barnett 's testimony indicates that he did not, in fact , purport to relate
what he himself had heard Gambrell say, but rather what had been repeated to him by
others . Thus he began his testimony on this subject by saying, "Some of the boys on the
third shift remarked that Mr . Gamble [ sic] told the boys on the first shift. .. ." Then,
although he was cautioned to relate what had been said to him, some brief argument
ensued, and when he was again questioned concerning what Gambrell had said, be replied
"I have not got to that yet Do you want me to give exactly what he said ?" and there-
after testified that Gambrell had said he would bet $ 100 that if the Union came in the
plant would close down. We do not believe that Barnett clearly comprehended the objec-
tion to the hearsay nature of his testimony and are of the opinion that Barnett 's quota-
tion of Gambrell ' s alleged offer to bet did not, in fact, refer to what Gambrell had said
during the conversation in Barnett 's presence , but rather referred to reports that Barnett
had heard in continuation of his initial hearsay testimony.
540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
statements are true and which are false." The letter was cast in
question-and-answer form. Question No. 2 and its answer were as
follows :
2. Can the Union make Cranston run its plant and furnish
you a job?
No. The Union has no power, legally or otherwise, to force
Cranston to operate its plant for one day, week, month or year.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that this comment must certainly
have derived its meaning from the context of the wide spread rumor
that the plant would close if the Union calve in, supported by actual
threats of this made by Gregory, Gambrell, and Parker, plus -the
Union's reply by leaflet saying that the rumor had been circulated
merely to scare the employees. Although the Respondent was well
aware of this rumor and the statements which fostered it,6 the record
does not indicate that the Respondent at any time sought to disavow
it or to assure its employees that the plant would not close down if
the Union should be successful in the election. In the light of all these
circumstances, we conclude that by this question and answer the Re-
spondent in fact sought to add further substance to reports that the
plant might close, and that, 'viewed in context, the emphasis thus
placed by the Respondent upon its power to close the plant was
coercive.
Further, as found by the Trial Examiner, the Respondent for some
time prior to May 5, 1954, had included among its posted rules of
conduct for employees a rule forbidding "Soliciting for contributions,
membership in organizations, or for the benefit of other outside the
plant activities, without first securing approval of the superintendent
of the plant." This same rule was again included among a list of rules
posted on May 5, but revised by omission of the provision for approval
by the plant superintendent. We find, as did the Trial Examiner,
that the effect of this rule, to the extent that it prohibits union solici-
tation by employees on their nonworking time, is to deprive em-
ployees of rights guaranteed by the Act and is thus violative of
Section 8 (a) (7)?
We do not agree, however, 'that, as the Trial Eaminer further
found, the Respondent violated the Act by Foreman Gambrell's
alleged threat to employee Marion Corn, during the course of the
e As found above, the plant-closing rumor had been fostered by statements of Plant
Manager Gregory and Foreman Gambrell and Parker , Plant Superintendent Cooney's
testimony further reveals that the Respondent was aware of the prevalence of this rumor
in the plant. Thus , in testifying as to the incident in the printrooin which led to the dis-
charge of employee Whitmire , hereinafter discussed , Cooney said that when Paige in-
quired what was meant by Whitmire's iefeience to closing down the plant, he informed
Paige that there was soon to be a representation election and that "there has been a lot
of talk in the mill about this and that."
7 Delta Finishing Conipaney, 111 NLRB 659 ; Republio Aviation Corporation v. N. L. R. B.,
324 U S 793.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 541
strike, that the Respondent was going to hire new employees and that
if Corn would come back to work he would not lose his job. We find,
as more fully set forth hereinafter , that the strike in which Corn was
engaged was economic in its nature. As the Respondent was priv-
ileged to replace economic strikers, Gambrell 's remark was no more
than a statement of what the Respondent might lawfully do in these
circumstances . As Gambrell's statement did not appear to convey a
threat of reprisal against Corn for engagingin union on concerted
activities, we find that the Respondent did not thereby violate the
Act.,'
1. The discharge of Boyce A. Whitmire, Jr.
The Respondent discharged Whitmire on the morning of April 15,
1954, allegedly because of a remark that he had made to a representa-
tive of one of the Respondent's customers in the plant the preceding
day. The Trial Examiner found that this was not the reason for the
discharge, but was merely a pretext upon which the Respondent seized
to rid itself of an outstanding protagonist of the Union during the
Union's preelection campaign in the plant. The Respondent excepts
to this finding, asserting in effect that Whitmire was discharged for
cause. We find merit in the Respondent's exceptions.
There is little factual dispute as to the incident which led to Whit-
mire's discharge. The facts as found by the Trial Examiner are
briefly these : The Respondent's business consists of printing color
or patterns on cloth, on a commission basis, for various commercial
customers. On the morning of April 14, Paige, a representative of
Seneca Textile Corporation,. one of Respondent's customers, was
present in the print department watching the first of a quantity of
this customer's cloth being "struck off" to determine whether the
colors and shading were right. During an interval when the machine
was closed down, Whitmire, an employee in this department, ap-
proached Paige and asked him what he was going to do when the
plant shut down. Paige asked what he meant, and Whitmire replied,
"Mr. Gregory said he was going to shut the plant down if the Union
came in."
Paige went in search of Plant Manager Gregory, but Gregory was
out of the plant and Paige talked to Plant Superintendent Cooney
instead. On the basis of Paige's description, Cooney identified Whit-
mire as the employee who had spoken to Paige, explained to Paige
that there was to be an election in the plant a week hence, that Whit-
mire's remark had apparently arisen from talk in connection with
the election, and then, after much further conversation, succeeded in
reassuring Paige that the Respondent would be able to fulfill its obli-
8 McLean-Arkansas Lumber Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1022, 1040.
542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gation to the customer. Later that night, Gregory returned to the
plant and Cooney told him of the incident. The next morning
Gregory discharged Whitmire for the reason, as stated on his dis-
charge slip , of "jeopardizing business relations with customers."
It is clear that, as found by the Trial Examiner, the Respondent
was aware of Whitmire's active advocacy of the Union, and also that
the Respondent was strongly opposed to the advent of the Union in
the plant. However, we are not satisfied that the Respondent dis-
charged Whitmire for reasons other than the prejudice to the
Respondent's business interests that was inherent in Whitmire's
questioning of its customer's representative. It appears not to be
disputed that the Respondent's business with Seneca Textile, whom
Paige represented, was substantial. There were approximately
300,000 yards of Seneca's goods on hand to be printed in the Respond-
ent's plant at the time of the incident. It is also apparent that Paige
was much disturbed by the possibility that the plant might close
down before the customer's goods could be printed and delivered, and
that it required much persuasion by Superintendent Cooney to re-
assure Paige that the customer's interests would in fact be taken care
of. These facts lend substantial support to the Respondent's asser-
tion that it was concerned with the effect of Whitmire's action upon
its business relations with its customer.
The Trial Examiner, however, has discredited this contention as at
variance with the actions of Superintendent Cooney and Plant Man-
ager Gregory following disclosure by Paige of Whitmire's remark.
Thus Cooney took no action himself against Whitmire but permitted
him to remain at his job for the remainder of the day without being
questioned as to his version of the incident. And Gregory, upon
learning of the matter from Cooney, made no further effort to re-
assure Paige although he immediately took steps to have Whitmire's
card removed from the rack and to inform the plant guards that
Whitmire was to wait the next morning until he, Gregory, came in.
At the hearing, Cooney testified that his delay in taking action was
because of his practice , in order to avoid the possibility of a conflicting
decision by his superior, Gregory, to confer first with Gregory before
taking action in disciplinary matters of a serious nature. Gregory
offered no specific reason for not discussing the matter further with
Paige. However, the record clearly indicates that Cooney had suc-
ceeded in settling Paige's apprehension of loss to his employer. In
the light of all the circumstances , we do not believe that Cooney's or
Gregory's conduct in these respects was entirely unreasonable, or so
inconsistent with the Respondent's asserted reason for discharging
Whitmire as necessarily to deprive the latter of credibility. Accord-
ingly, upon the entire record, we find that it is not established that
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 543
the Respondent discharged Whitmire because of his union member-
ship and activity, but rather that Whitmire was discharged for cause.9
2. The layoffs of Hamilton, Stepp, and Higgins
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree , that the Respondent
discriminatorily laid off Hamilton, Stepp, and Higgins with the in-
tent of discouraging union membership and activity, contrary - to-Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. As found by the Trial Examiner,
these employees went to the home of Foreman Keith on Saturday
morning, April 24,1954, to discuss a warning given by Keith to Stepp
for some "horseplay" ( a water-squirting incident) that had occurred
in the plant on the previous day. The Respondent asserts that the
subsequent layoff of these three employees was a disciplinary layoff
administered because in their visit to Keith's home they had intimi-
dated a supervisor. Like the Trial Examiner , we find no merit in
this contention.
The record discloses a minimum of conflict as to what occurred
during the visit of these three employees to Foreman Keith's home.
Higgins, who had brought the other two in his automobile, remained
in his car while Stepp and Hamilton talked to Keith at or near the
steps of Keith's front porch. The testimony of the various witnesses
reveals that the course of conversation was approximately as follows :
Stepp informed Keith that he was upset about the incident that had
occurred in the plant, and that he wished they could straighten out
the matter of the water squirting and possible "pink slip." 10 Keith
replied that there were authorities over him and he had a job to
carry out (that he himself had in the past been guilty of horseplay),
but that there were rules and they were going to be enforced. Hamil-
ton said that Stepp was upset, and that he had known Stepp for a
long time and thought he would like to talk to Keith and see if he
could straighten the matter out. According to Keith, Hamilton at
one point said, "We hear that you are trying to get rough out at
Cranston." However, Keith and Hamilton both testified in substance
that they argued about the "changes" being made at Cranston, Hamil-
0In his discussion of Whitmire 's discharge , the Trial Examiner observed that Gregory
himself was at least partly responsible for the spread of the plant-closing rumor in the
plant, and apparently cited this as an additional reason why Whitmire 's discharge was
not justified. We do not, of course, condone the instigation of a coercive rumor in viola-
tion of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. However , we do not regard the Respondent's re-
sponsibility for the rumor , nor the fact that Whitmire , as he asserted , approached Paige
in a "joking" manner , as a sufficient defense to Whitmire 's conduct . Whitmire's action
in thus approaching the customer 's representative and invading the Respondent 's busiiu-"
ielationship with the customer was outside his province as an employee engaged at work
within the.department , was not legitimately related to any interests as an employee, and
does not appear to have been justified by any other circumstances that might have made
discussion with such representative a matter of his legitimate concern.
10 Stepp testified that he had heard reports that Keith might put a pink slip in his eni-
ployment record The exact nature of a pink slip is not explained in the record , although
Stepp testified that if he got enough of them it might cause him to lose his job.
544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ton asserting that there were not to be any changes made after the
Union had won the election 11 and Keith saying that he had his job to
run. According to Hamilton, Stepp and Keith eventually changed
the conversation to another topic and, not being interested, Hamil-
ton started back to the car and 2 or 3 minutes later Stepp followed
him.12 Stepp testified that during the course of their interview he
said to Keith, "I hope we have got everything straightened out and
we won't have any more trouble." Hamilton testified that Stepp said
to Keith, "All right now, we will forget the whole matter," and that
Keith and, Stepp shook hands and agreed on it. Keith did not. deny
that this: occurred.
The following Monday, Stepp was called to an interview with
Personnel Manager Hardee and Foreman Keith and Pearson. The
water-squirting incident was discussed and in effect dismissed. Then
Hardee mentioned the- visit to Foreman Keith's house and, accord-
ing to Stepp's testimony, told Stepp that he was not going to put up
with "your strong arm bunch" going to foremen's homes, and that
anything to be settled must be settled at Cranston. Within the period
of a day or two, Stepp was called to another interview with Hardee
and Plant Superintendent Cooney, in which Cooney asked Stepp if
he and his "strong arm bunch" had made a visit to Keith's house,
and told Stepp, "I want to snake a check in for this; you will be off
for a week." On the following Thursday, Hamilton and Higgins were
interviewed by Hardee and Cooney. After they had related their
version of the visit to Keith's home, Cooney said, "I don't intend for
the supervisors to be intimidated. I am going to investigate this thing
thoroughly and get to the bottom of it, and you two fellows are laid
off until further notice to come back to work." Higgins protested that
he had done nothing but drive the car for Stepp and Hamilton, but
Cooney replied, "You were with the wrong crowd and just as guilty
as they are for intimidating." Stepp was laid off without pay for
a week and then returned to work. Hamilton and Higgins were like-
wise laid off without pay, and were notified approximately 12 days
later to return to work. Although Cooney had said that he was going
to make an investigation, there is no evidence that he did. so and
nothing 'further was said about the matter to these employees.
We are satisfied, upon the entire record, that Hamilton, Stepp, and
Higgins did not threaten or otherwise attempt to intimidate Foreman
Keith. There is no direct evidence of such intimidation, and the
interview at Keith's home appears to have ended amicably. Stepp
and Hamilton testified, essentially without contradiction, that there
were no threats of any nature and "no loud talking." Keith did not
n The election had taken place 2 days earlier.
32 According to Stepp, Keith said that he was going to sell his home, that they walked
down and Keith pointed out the boundary lines, and that he, Stepp , told Keith it was a
pretty home and be should be able to sell it.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 545
assert that he had been threatened. As to Hamilton, he testified that
"he was not storming out at me, anything like that, but he was speak-
ing in a firm voice." 13 Keith also testified, "I knew that Hamilton
and Stepp and Higgins were active in the Union, and I could not
say, what their intentions were, I mean their attitude, them being at
my home, I mean I didn't appreciate and I didn't know exactly how
to take it...."
Although he noted that all three of these employees had openly
worn union buttons before the election in the plant, the Trial Examiner
nevertheless concluded that the layoffs were a discriminatory reprisal
directed primarily against Hamilton, who had been known as an open
and outstanding- union leader. We find, in agreement with the Trial
Examiner , that the layoffs were discriminatory, having been made to,
discourage the union membership and concerted activities of these
employees. We further note, however, that Foreman Keith's testimony
above set forth specifically discloses that he was aware that all three of'
these employees were active in the Union, and that quite evidently he
attributed their activity in coming together to his home to that fact.
We also note that both Hardee and Cooney-without justification, as-
we have found-accused Stepp, in effect, of associating with a "strong
arm bunch" and that Cooney accused Higgins of being "with the
wrong crowd." Upon these facts, and the entire record, we find that
Hamilton's, Stepp's, and Higgins' layoffs were directed in reprisal
against the union membership and concerted activities of each of these-
three employees. We further find that the Respondent thereby vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. Refusal to bargain
As the result of the election held on April 22, 1954, the Union was
certified on April 30. The parties met for collective bargaining for-
the first time on May 27, 1954. Seven bargaining meetings were held'
during the period from that date until July 17, when a strike began
which lasted for approximately 10 days, ending on July 27. The
parties continued, however, to bargain, meeting twice during the strike-
and again on various further dates before the hearing in this case-
which began on October 11, The Trial Examiner found that the
13 Keith testified also that Hamilton had a knife ; that he asked Hamilton what lie was-
doing with his knife out, and that Hamilton said he had been `cleaning his fingernails
Hamilton testified that he carried a knife but did not recall having it out. Stepp testified
that he did not see Hamilton having a knife in his hand. Neither Keith nor Hamilton,
desciibed the size or kind of knife to which he referred As Keith did not assert that
Hamilton actually threatened him with a knife and there is no other evidence to so indi-
cate, we find it unnecessary to iesolve any disparity in the witnesses ' testimony concern-
ing the knife
1; The dates of the bargaining meetings were as follows : before the strike on May 27,_
June 21 and 22, and July 13 , 14, 16, and 17 ; during the strike on July 19 and 23; and
after the strike on July 30, August 13, September 22, and October 6 No contract had been.
executed as of the time of the hearing. See footnote 1, supra.
390609-56-vol. 115-36
546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain by taking certain unilateral
action after the Union had been successful in the election and before
the parties met in their first bargaining conference. He also found
that the Respondent refused to bargain by unlawfully assuming, or
proposing and insisting upon, certain positions in the bargaining ses-
sions which preceded the strike of July 17. These matters will be
discussed seriatim.
a. Unilateral changes in plant rules
As found by the Trial Examiner, the Respondent, after the Union's
selection as representative by the employees in the election, but without
notice to or consultation with the Union, posted four new rules which
changed previous practices in the plant, in substance, as follows : to
1. On April 27, a rule requiring each employee to report in advance
if he was unable to report for work on his next regular shift.
2. On May 6, a notice that all smoking booths would be closed for
15 minutes before, and 1 hour after, the beginning of each shift.
3. Also on May 6, a rule that no employee was to enter the plant
before 15 minutes of his regular shift.
4. On May 13, a rule requiring employee contributions for various
purposes in the plant henceforth to be handled by placing donations
in a box at the front gate.
These rules, as shown by the dates set out above, were posted after
the election and before the parties met for their first bargaining con-
ference. Like the Trial Examiner we do not find that they were in
themselves illegally restrictive of employee rights. However, the rec-
ord indicates that each of them constituted a substantial curtailment
of a previous employee privilege.18 The Respondent offered no sub-
stantial reason why so many new and restrictive rules should have been
imposed upon its employees during this particular period. Nor does
the record indicate that such frequent postings accorded with any past
practice in the plant." Therefore, and especially in view of Plant
16 The Trial Examiner also found that on May 5, after the election , the Respondent
posted an entirely revised list of its rules governing the conduct of its employees in the
plant. The record discloses that the list posted on May 5 was substantially identical to
that previously in effect, the principal changes being that by a combination of certain
parts the total number of rules was reduced from 22 to 20 . Therefore , we do not adopt
the Trial Examiner 's finding in this respect . The specific rules set forth above , however,
were not part of either the old or revised list, but were new rules posted separately on the
dates herein stated.
1e Thus , for example , enforcement of the rule requiring advance reporting of absences
appears actually to have worked some hardship. Employee McLaughlin testified that on
a Friday night in June 1954 he was ill and unable to come to work. As he lived about
a mile from a telephone lie could not report to the plant . On the following Monday, when
he reported for work, he was given a disciplinary layoff despite his recital of the foregoing
matters as an excuse
17 We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent advanced in general
no substantial or credible reasons to support the new rules as such. As to the smoking
restriction , Gregory testified that it had been reported by insurance inspectors that more
than the permissible number of persons congregated in the smoking booths at the beginning
of each shift. As to the time for entering the plant, he testified that many employees had
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 547
Manager Gregory's threat before the election, set forth above, that if
the Union came in he "would make it hard and fight it to the finish,"
we find in agreement with the Trial Examiner that these new and re-
strictive rules were imposed by the Respondent following the election
in reprisal for its employees' designation of the Union as representa-
tive, and constituted interference, restraint, and coercion within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1).18
Like the Trial Examiner, we also find that the Respondent's unilat-
eral posting of such rules changing conditions of employment was in
derogation of its obligation to bargain with the Union as the newly
certified collective-bargaining representative. The Respondent asserts
that its action in posting the new rules was in good faith and without
intent to bypass the Union. In support of this contention, it offered
Gregory's testimony at the hearing that he had received no demand
from the Union prior to the postings to discuss working conditions,
and that he did not then know of any representative among the em-
ployees having been appointed to discuss grievances or working con-
ditions. The record discloses, as found by the Trial Examiner, that
before the election the Union, by letters of March 19 and April 13,
had demanded recognition and a bargaining conference. As the record
contains nothing to indicate that the Union at any time thereafter
abandoned its intent to negotiate with the Respondent, we find that
these requests constituted sufficient notice of the Union's desire to bar-
gain concerning working conditions. Moreover, the record shows, and
the Respondent did not deny, that these and other communications
received by the Respondent contained the names of representatives
and other information sufficient to have enabled the Respondent to
get in touch with the Union had it desired to do so prior to instituting
changes in working conditions. Upon the entire record, we find that,
by unilaterally inaugurating changes in plant rules after the Union's
designation as representative, the Respondent failed and refused to
bargain with the Union contrary to Section 8 (a) (5).11
b. Other changes in working conditions
The Trial Examiner found that, as in the case of the plant rules, the
Respondent unilaterally made certain other changes in working con-
been coming in from 20 to 45 minutes ahead of shift change and had been punching the
clock when they came in. He said that the Respondent "had to be very careful" about
the wage and hour law, and hence did not want its employees to punch in so far ahead of
time. As to the new method of handling contributions , he explained that solicitations had
often been made of employees at work throughout the plant for causes such as sickness or
death in an employee 's family, and that there had been complaints that individuals who
had no personal interest were nevertheless caused to contribute solely to avoid embarrass-
ment . Gregory did not testify , however , that these matters had only recently come to
the attention of management , or that there were any other circumstances specifically im-
pelling , the posting of these rules changes during the interval immediately following the
election.
38 Thomason Plywood corporation, 109 NLRB 898, enfd . 222 F. 2d 364 (C. A. 4).
39 Cf. Thomason Plywood Corporatwn , supra.
548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ditions between the time of the election and the parties' first bargain-
ing conference and that these were likewise violative of Section 8
(a) (1) and (5). 'The record discloses the following evidence con-
cerning these matters :
Increased workload in the color shop: Employee Bobo testified
that around the time of the election 1 of the hands in the color shop
was transferred to another department, and on the Monday after the
election 1 of the washboys was taken off. This threw more work on
the other employees, including Bobo, who were working in color on
the second shift. Employee Hamilton, who worked in this department
as a mixer preparing color for the machines that print the cloth, testi-
fied that before the election five print machines were running full time
and the sixth only part of the'time. On the Monday after the election,
the sixth machine also began to run full time. Hamilton further testi-
fied that he called Foreman Parker's attention to the fact that this
was resulting in an increased workload for the color mixers, but Park-
er replied that they were not going to get any more help.
Discontinuance of relief help in the packing room: Employee Hoots,,
a cloth handler in this department, testified that he had observed that
before the election each of the packers would get a 15-minute relief
period in the morning and another in the afternoon. Reliefs were
taken in rotation and a substitute would take the place of each packer
in turn. Then a week or two after the election, the relief man was
taken off and the packers were told to smoke whenever they got caught
up. Employee Hill, a packer, also testified that the packers had pre-
viously been given regular breaks. The Trial Examiner appears to
have credited the testimony of Hoots and Hill rather than that of
Foreman O'Stein, who denied that there had been any fixed practice
as to relief. Apparently, however, in any event some idle periods
occasionally occurred during the normal course of the packers' work.
Hoots, who was not a packer, did not testify as to the extent to which
the discontinuance of specific relief periods affected the packers' op-
portunities to take a break., Hill, the only packer to testify concern-
ing this subject, did not testify that he was adversely affected by
the discontinuance of regular relief periods, but instead complained
that as a nonsmoker he was no longer permitted during idle periods
to go into the smoking booth and had to remain near his machine.
Reduction of overtime in aging: Employee Jackson, who worked
in the aging department, testified that it was the custom in that depart-
ment for each of the 3 shifts in rotation to work 8 hours of overtime
on Saturday at cleaning the machine. 'He further testified that on
the second Saturday, after the election, his shift was permitted to
work only 5 hours, but this was not time enough to get the machine
all cleaned. He further testified that such reduction of the over-
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 549
time work occurred only on this one Saturday and that thereafter
the full 8 hours of overtime was resumed.
Increased workload in folding : About the end of April 1954, the
Respondent installed a new tying machine in the folding department.
It is essentially undisputed that the installation of this machine elimi-
nated the jobs of several women who had been sewing stickers on
cloth. It also resulted, however, in giving the folders some new tasks,
consisting of putting the customers' labels and certain "hang tickets"
on the cloth. The folders were given a 5-cent hourly wage increase
because of this addition to their duties. Plant Manager Gregory
testified without contradiction that both the new machine and the pay
raises had been under consideration as early as December 1953 and
that the machine had been ordered in January 1954.
We are not satisfied that the foregoing facts are sufficient to support
a finding either that the Respondent instituted changes in working
conditions in reprisal for the Union's selection by the employees in the
election or that the Respondent failed to bargain with the Union con--
-cerning working conditions. Unlike the case of the Respondent's
posting of new and restrictive rules, the record is not such as to
persuade us that these changes in working conditions were substantial,
or such as to form the basis of a remedial order against the Respondent.
As to the increase in workload in the color shop and discontinuance
of fixed periods for relief in packing, their timing might render them
subject to suspicion. However, the record contains little to indicate
that these matters were abnormal or unusual and, especially as to the
packers who clearly were not thus deprived of opportunity for relief,
the record discloses little as to the effect of the changes, if such they
were, upon the working conditions of the employees. The reduction of
overtime in the aging department likewise amounted, at best, to 3
hours of 1 shift on a single day and, upon complaint, was immediately
restored. The change in the folders' duties, compensated by an in-
crease in pay, was clearly the result of equipment change according
to decision made and set in motion before the Union's initial demand
for recognition which preceded the representation proceeding. We
find that the Respondent did not violate the Act by instituting unilat-
eral changes in working conditions.
c. Alleged further refusal to bargain concerning plant rules and
changes in working conditions
The Trial Examiner found in substance that the Respondent further
refused to bargain concerning plant rules and changes in working
conditions by persisting until after the date of the strike in refusing
to recognize the Union's right to present grievances concerning newly
posted rules and changes in working conditions, and by insisting on
550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a right unilaterally to make new plant rules. The facts concerning
these matters are essentially as follows :
Alleged refusal to recognize the Union's right to present grievances
involving existing rules and changes in working conditions: At the
first bargaining conference on May 27, the parties agreed that Hamil-
ton, who had a number of employee grievances to present, should put
them in writing and give them to Personnel Manager Hardee for in-
vestigation and reply. It was further understood that if the answers
were not satisfactory the matters were to be discussed at the next
meeting on June 21. Thereafter, between June 2 and 8, Hamilton, as
chairman of the Union's grievance committee, prepared and presented
to Hardee 17 grievances on various subjects including, among others,
all but 1 of the changes in plant rules and working conditions here-
inbefore discussed2° On June 11 Hardee replied by a letter, addressed
to the grievance committee, as follows :
In reply to alleged grievances Nos. 1 through 14, the Company
does not recognize the fact that any part of grievances Nos. 1
through 14 are a proper matter for a grievance, and does not rec-
ognize the authority of the committee to raise these questions.
The answers are given out of a spirit of cooperation and for in-
formation.
The Company has not made an [sic] changes in rules or policies
because of a result of the election, except those necessary to main-
tain a more efficient operation.
With this letter were a number of enclosures setting forth separate
answers to each of the first 14 grievances. As to the new rules re-
stricting the tines for visiting the smoking booths, requiring donations
to be placed in a box at the gate, and prohibiting early entrance to
the plant, these separate answers consisted simply of the following
statement :
This is a matter of Company Policy and Procedure. - We do not
consider this a proper matter for a grievance.
In a number of other instances, including a grievance involving the
rule requiring advance reporting of absences and three of the griev-
ances relating to changes in working conditions discussed supra, the
Respondent furnished a separate answer concerning the merits of
the matter at issue, but appended a further statement likewise indi-
cating that it did not recognize the matter as properly subject to a
grievance. In a letter dated June 21, Hardee gave similar answers
to the remaining 3 of the 17 grievances.
Thereafter, as found by the Trial Examiner, at the next bargaining
meeting on June 21, the Union expressed its dissatisfaction with the
' The matter of the reduction of Saturday overtime in the aging department was not
included.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 551
Respondent's answers and asked to have a discussion of the grievances.
Owens, the Respondent's industrial relations director, replied that he
was not prepared to discuss the grievances at that time but would do
so later 21 During a further discussion of contractual provisions on
the following morning, June 22, Union Representative Lisk objected
to a provision in the Respondent's proposed contract which stated that
as of the date of the contract there were no pending grievances. Lisk
inquired how Owens could insist on having this section in the con-
tract and at the same time -not discuss and settle those grievances.
Owens replied that he wanted to start off with a clean slate.22 On
July 17, Lisk asked for a discussion of grievances, and Owens replied
that he was not prepared to discuss the grievances unless the terms of
the contract had been agreed upon. When Lisk again pointed out
the inconsistency between that position and at the same time insisting
on a provision in the contract specifying that there were no unsettled
grievances, Owens explained that he did not consider the statements
filed by the Union as subject matter for grievances. The Respondent's
minutes 23 disclose that the Union objected again on July 30 to such a
statement in the contract, and that at the meeting on August 13 both
parties indicated their willingness to get together to discuss the pend-
ing grievances. At the bargaining meeting on September 22, the
Union requested and the parties held a grievance discussion, and all
but 4 out of approximately 20 pending grievances were settled."4
Upon the basis of these facts, the Trial Examiner found that the
Respondent failed to bargain with the Union, first by Hardee's letter
of June 11 rejecting the statements submitted by the Union as not
pertaining to proper subjects for grievance, and thereafter by persist-
ing in this position until after the beginning of the strike on July 17.
Upon the entire record as above set forth, however, we are not satisfied
n The Trial Examiner also found that on June 21 Owens insisted that all future
grievances must be signed by the employees who consideied themselves aggrieved. It is
not disputed that the Union immediately agreed to this request and that this became the
practice as to grievances thereafter submitted . It further appeals likewise to be undis-
puted that the Respondent did not reject any of the grievances submitted before June
21 because they were not signed by the individual employees who were involved.
ra As found by the Trial Examiner , Owens also said , at one point in this meeting, that
he had to leave and that if the union representatives wanted to do so they could stay and
discuss grievances with Hardee , but that Hardee had already given his answer and had
no authority to change it
za The Respondent 's personnel manager , Hardee , made handwritten notes of the negotia-
tions at each bargaining meeting , from which either he or Industilal Relations Manager
Owens later dictated typewiitten transcriptions . Puisuant to an agreement made at the
June 21 meeting , the Respondent thereafter furnished the Union at various times with
copies of such transcriptions . Except for a criticism of certain statements in the type-
written transcription of the May 27 meeting , which the Respondent had posted on its
plant bulletin board , the Union does not appear to have questioned any of the statements
contained in these transcriptions.
E4 The Respondent 's minutes of this meeting disclose that among the 4 grievances re-
maining unsettled there were none which concerned the new rules and only 2 which con-
cerned the changes in working conditions above discussed The latter were the grievances
involving the allegations of increased workloads in the color and folding departments, and
were left for a further check of the matters to be made by the Respondent
552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the Respondent in fact failed or refused to deal with the Union
as to the pending grievances concerning plant rules and changes in
working conditions. Thus, despite Hardee's asserted rejection on
June 11 of the Union's statements as not involving a proper subject
matter for grievance, he simultaneously provided answers on the
merits to many of the grievances. Likewise Owens, who similarly
purported to deny the Union's right to present these matters as griev-
ances, nevertheless agreed to meet with the Union and discuss the
grievances, and eventually did so. And despite its position as to the
subject matter of the grievances, the record does not disclose that
the Respondent at any time rejected outright the Union's request to
discuss them; rather the evidence discloses at most that it delayed
entering into a grievance discussion. We are not convinced, under
the circumstances of this case, that the Respondent's delay in dis-
cussing grievances until September 22 necessarily demonstrates lack
of good faith or a desire to evade the bargaining obligation. The
parties were also engaged, during this period, in negotiations for a
first bargaining contract, involving numerous areas of disagreement.
Lisk, in testimony concerning the June 21 meeting, denied that he had
expressed a desire to discuss these other matters rather than griev-
ances, but conceded that "there were two questions before us at the
time, and as I recall the question was which one we were going to dis-
cuss first, or which one we were going to start with, the contract or
the grievances." 25 Upon the entire record, we find that the Respond-
ent did not unlawfully refuse to bargain with the Union as to pend-
ing grievances concerning new plant rules and changes in working
conditions.
Alleged insistence on the right to make rules: The Respondent's
initial contract proposals contained, under the heading of "Discharge
or Discipline of Employees," 29 a list of 17 shop rules, preceded by the
following provision :
The maintenance of discipline of the workforce is the responsi-
bility of Management.
(a) If an employee covered by this agreement violates any of
the following rules he shall be subject to immediate discharge and
said discharge shall not be subject to arbitration... .
The section also included a further list of seven rules violation of
which would be ground for suspension, with provision that a second
violation of these rules should be cause for discharge, and with a fur-
ther provision that such a discharge should be subject to arbitration,
limited, however, to the question of whether the discharged employee
21 Lisk also testified that he did not recall whether he expressed an opinion as to which
one he wanted to talk about first.
^ Section 2 of the Respondent's ai title xV, "Management Rights and Discipline of the
Workforce."
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 553
had in fact committed the alleged act, and with the burden upon the
Union to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not do so.
Lisk testified that at the meeting on June 21, the Union objected to
this proposal on the ground that in effect it gave the Respondent the
sole right to impose rules and discharge employees, and no right to the
Union to make a grievance or go to arbitration over it. In place of the
Respondent's proposal, the Union offered its own contract provision
which specified that all shop rules should be- mutually agreed upon
in writing and signed by the Respondent and the Union, posted on-the
company bulletin boards, and copies furnished to all employees and
the Union. Owens, however, replied that the Respondent reserved
the right to formulate such rules as in management's opinion were
necessary. On July 13, the Respondent submitted a counterproposal
retaining and elaborating the provision that rulemaking was a man-
agement function but extending to all discharges the provision for
arbitration, limited to the question of whether the employee had com-
mitted the alleged act. As noted by the Trial Examiner, Lisk then
inquired if the Respondent wanted to negotiate rules and make them
part of the contract and Owens replied that it was the Company's
privilege to set up and administer rules and regulations. Lisk testi-
fied that on July 17 Owens said that the Respondent had not changed
its position in this respect. He also testified that after the strike the
Union and Respondent reached agreement by revising the language
relating to rules for suspension to read, "It is agreed between the
parties that a violation of any of the following rules, but not neces-
sarily limited thereto, shall be considered as a reasonable cause for
suspension. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]
We believe that three things are apparent from the course of bar-
gaining above described : (1) That the Respondent stated as its posi-
tion in bargaining that it reserved the right unilaterally to make plant
rules; (2) that the Respondent nevertheless proposed to embody
numerous plant rules in the contract, and bargained with the Union
concerning these rules; and (3) that the parties reached an agreement
as to contractual language involving a concession to the Respondent's
position. These facts present only a single issue-whether the Re-
spondent might lawfully assume, as a bargaining position, that it
should have the right to formulate and enforce plant rules?' Under
the circumstances of this case, and especially the fact that during con-
21 we are not at this point confronted with a situation such as that discussed earlier
in this decision , wherein the Respondent had made certain rules curtailing existing em-
ployee privileges without notice to or consultation with the Union In those instances,
as set forth above, we have found the Respondent's unilateral action to constitute an
unlawful refusal to bargain All that appears to be involved here is a position assumed
by the Respondent in bargaining for its own contract proposal and against that proposed
by the Union Here, as at other points in the bargaining negotiations hereinafter dis-
cussed, the record does not show that the Respondent insisted to the point of adamancy
on its proposal.
554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tract negotiations the Respondent of its own volition proposed plant
rules and bargained concerning them, we find that the Respondent did
not violate its obligation to bargain under the Act merely by advancing
the proposal in bargaining that it should have the right to initiate and
enforce plant rules.
d. Proposal of "Management Rights" provision
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent also violated its
duty to bargain, during the negotiations preceding the strike of July
17, by refusing to accord the Union its legal right to'notice and con-
sultation as to future changes in wages, hours, and working conditions,
as shown by its proposal and insistence upon the following provision : 28
The right to hire, to maintain order and efficiency, to promote or
to demote, to transfer and to relieve employees from duty because
of lack of work or other reason is vested exclusively in the Com-
pany.
The Union recognizes other rights and responsibilities belong-
ing solely to the Company, prominent among which, but by no
means wholly inclusive are the rights to decide the number and
location of plants ; the scheduling of shifts and hours of work;
machines and equipment to be used; the products to be manufac-
tured; the methods of manufacturing; the planning, scheduling
and processing of material and the establishment of incentives,
bonuses or job rates, and the operation, administration and con-
trol of the Cranston Print Works pension plan.
The above matters shall not be subject to arbitration unless such
action is specifically authorized by this agreement. [Emphasis
supplied.]
This provision appeared in the Respondent's original proposed con-
tract submitted to the Union on June 11. Lisk testified that at the next
following meeting on June 21 he objected to this provision on the
ground that it would in effect nullify the contract-would give the Re-
spondent "a blanket right to do most anything they wanted to, ir-
regardless [sic] of what the contract said." However, he further testi-
fied that he told the Respondent's negotiator, Owens, that he would
have no objection to writing in a management prerogative section if
it would contain the additional language "except as otherwise provided
in this contract." Thereupon, according to Lisk, the Respondent's
representatives replied that they would consider such language and
saw no reason why they should not put it in the contract. This same
conversation took place again at two, subsequent meetings. Owens
^ Article XV, section 1, entitled "Management Rights" in the Respondent's contract
proposals. The portions upon which the Trial Examiner has relied are indicated by
emphasis.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 555
testified without contradiction that on July 16 the Respondent orally
agreed to insert the Union's proposed language. And such language
appears as part of this provision in the text of the Respondent's pro-
posed contract submitted to the Union on July 26.
The Trial Examiner has found that, after the Union voiced its ob-
jection to the above contract proposal, the Respondent, nevertheless,
continued to insist on its inclusion. In so finding, the Trial Examiner
relied on Owens' admission that it was not until after the strike that
he made a concession and agreed to give the Union "reasonable notice"
before putting into effect job rates and changes in work shifts. The
context of Owens' testimony in this respect discloses, however, that at
this point he was not referring to the contract provision quoted above,
but rather to a separate and different provision entitled "Adjustments
and Establishment of Rates, Bonus or Incentive Plans," also a part of
the Respondent's contract proposals. This latter provision, concerning
which the parties likewise disagreed, in substance provided that the
Respondent might initially establish new job rates or make adjust-
ments in rates or wage rate plans, as required by changing techno-
logical or manufacturing conditions, for specified trial periods,
following which such rates or plans would become subject to negotia-
tion through the grievance procedure, culminating in arbitration 29
The record discloses, in conformance with Owens' testimony, that
dispute over this latter provision was eventually settled in accord with
the Union's request by the addition of a provision for "reasonable
notice" to the Union.
Thus the record shows that the Respondent offered no opposition
to the Union's suggested revision of the Respondent's proposed "Man-
agement Rights" provision, and the matter was adjusted upon the basis
of the Union's suggestion. The Trial Examiner did not find, nor do
we, that the Respondent's proposal and bargaining upon the contract
provision relating to the establishment and adjustment of rates was
necessarily improper, and the dispute as to this provision likewise was
subsequently adjusted upon the basis suggested by the Union. We find,
therefore, upon the basis of the entire record, that the Respondent did
not violate the Act by proposing and bargaining concerning a "Man-
agement Rights" provision 30
e. Alleged refusal to furnish names of employees to accompany
wage rates
The Trial Examiner found in substance that, following its certi-
fication, the Union by letters dated May 10 and 13, 1954, requested
ao This provision appeared as article IX of the Respondent's June 11 proposed contract.
We note, inter aha, that the overall effect of this article appears to differ substantially
from that of article XV, supra, which omitted any reference to trial periods and specifi-
cally forbade resort to arbitration
30 Cf N. L R B v. American National Insurance Company, 343 U. S. 395.
556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent to furnish it with information concerning wages; that
at the first bargaining meeting on May 27 the Respondent gave the
Union a list showing classification code numbers together with corre-
sponding wage rates; that at this meeting and again on June 21 and
July 13 the Union requested the names of all employees to accompany
this information but was given, on the latter date, a report showing the
names to accompany wage rates of only 8 out of the more than 200
employees; and that it was not until August 13, 1954, after the strike•
had taken place and after the Respondent had been served with the
Union's charge of refusal to bargain, that the Respondent finally pro-
vided the Union with the desired information in the form of a list
giving employee names and classifications.
The facts surrounding this matter are in general not disputed. An
issue arises , however, by virtue of the Respondent's denial that the
Union at any time requested the names of the Respondent's hourly
workers. The Respondent asserts that the only employee names
requested by the Union to accompany wage rates were those of its
piece-rate employees, which it furnished. The Trial Examiiler,s
resolution of this issue adversely to the Respondent derives from his
resolution of the conflicting testimony of Lisk and Owens, which in
turn is based upon his evaluation of certain surrounding evidence
hereinafter discussed. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we do
not agree with the Trial Examiner's findings and conclusion.
The Union's letter of May 10, addressed to Plant Manager Greg-
ory and written primarily for the purpose of securing a bargaining
conference, contained the following request :
In the meantime, I would appreciate your sending me a copy
of your wage scale, showing hourly rates, piece rates and average
hourly earnings of the piece-rated employees.
The May 13 letter, addressed to Personnel Director Hardee, referred
to the previous request and asked that Hardee forward the desired
wage scale . In neither of these letters did the Union specifically
request that the Respondent furnish the names of hourly rated em-
ployees to accompany the wage rates. Lisk testified that at the May
27 meeting, after the Respondent had furnished a list of classifica-
tions and wage rates, he asked for the names of hourly workers and
also for the names and average hourly earnings of the piece-rate
employees. On June 21, according to Lisk, he repeated these re-
quests, and on July 13, when he reminded Owens of his requests for
wage information, Owens gave him a typewritten sheet showing the
hookers' job classification and average hourly earnings." Accord-
ai The hookers are paid on a basic hourly rate plus a production bonus computed at
varying rates which depend upon the type of goods handled. It is clear that they were
the only employees receiving pay on a piece -rate basis As of the time in question, there
were only eight of them employed in the plant
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 557
ing to Lisk, lie then told Owens that-he wanted the hookers' names
to accompany this information, whereupon Owens took back this
sheet and gave him one that had the hookers' names on it. Lisk's own
testimony thus discloses that the Respondent's action in furnishing
the names of its eight piece-rate employees was not taken as a mere
partial response to a general request for names to accompany wage
information but consisted, in fact, of compliance with a request for
this specific information.
The Trial Examiner's rejection of Owens' denial that Lisk re-
quested the names to accompany rates of hourly paid employees is,
however, based principally upon his conclusion that the Respondent's
position in this respect is refuted by the Respondent's original draft
of minutes of the June 21 meeting. The minute entry upon which
the Trial Examiner relies is as follows :
8. Wage information. The Union suggested that the Com-
pany furnish it with the low, high and average earnings of all
piece workers. This would be the hookers only. The Company
took the position that it was not willing to divulge personal earn-
ings and that it was of the opinion that the hooker operators
fully realized how their piece rate was determined and that it
expected that if they had a grievance they would take it up to
the regular channels. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is apparent that this minute is specific in its reference to the nature
of the request for information, and that the request referred to was
limited to the names of the hookers. Neither at this point nor else-
where do the Respondent's minutes disclose a request by the Union
for the names of other employees.
As found by the Trial Examiner, the Respondent did furnish the
Union, on August 13, with a list including all its employees' names
and classifications. Contrary, however, to the Trial Examiner's char-
acterization of this as a delay of nearly 3 months in providing the
wage information requested by the Union, the record does not dis-
'close that such a list was furnished in response to any request for
names as part of wage information. Rather Lisk testified that at the
meeting of July 14, during discussion of a contractual provision re-
lating to seniority, he asked for, and the Respondent agreed to fur-
nish, a seniority list. He stated that he wanted it "to determine the
seniority status of the various employees in the plant." The docu-
ment furnished to the Union on August 13 was labelled a "Seniority
Report" and contained three items of information-name, job classi-
fication , and date for determining job seniority-as to each of the
Respondent's employees. As both this document and the information
furnished earlier contained a listing of job classifications, it ap-
parently would have been possible for the Union , by comparing the
558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lists, to ascertain in most instances the wage rates paid the individual
employees. However, as there is no evidence to indicate that -this
later document was in fact furnished to supplement wage informa-
tion,32 we must assume that it was provided in response to the Union's
admitted request for the information which it contains, i. e., the
seniority standings of the employees.
In the light of the entire record, it is apparent that the context of
evidence upon which the Trial Examiner has relied does not contra-
dict but in fact confirms and supports the Respondent's assertion
that no request was made by the Union for the names of hourly paid
employees. In these circumstances we are impelled to the conclusion
that there is merit in the Respondent's contention. Accordingly, we
find that the Respondent did not fail and refuse to bargain with the
Union by failing to comply with a request to supply the Union with
the names of employees as part of wage information.
f. Proposal of clause excluding the Union from the first step of
grievance procedure
As more fully set forth in the Intermediate Report the Respond-
ent's first proposed contract submitted to the Union on June 11 con-
tained provisions for a grievance procedure in which the first step
was set forth as being "between the employee and his supervisor," no
provision being made for opportunity for the Union to be present at
this step. In discussion of this provision on June 22, Lisk protested
this provision as a deprivation of the Union's statutory right to be
present at the adjustment of grievances. On July 13 the Union sub-
mitted a written counterproposal containing the provision which it
desired, couched substantially in the language of the proviso to Sec-
tion 9 (a) of the Act. Although Owens asserted at the hearing that
on that date he agreed to withdraw the Company's proposal and to
recognize the Union's right to be present at the first stage of the
grievance adjustment, the Trial Examiner has credited Lisk's testi-
mony that it was not until July 23, in oral discussion during the
strike, that the Respondent in fact receded from its original position.
We adopt the Trial Examiner's resolution of this issue and find that
.it was not until July 23 that the Respondent agreed that the Union
might be present at the first step of the grievance procedure 33
32 That such was the purpose of this list was suggested by the General Counsel ' in com-
menting on the nature of certain of the General Counsel's exhibits . No witness, however,
so testified
33 The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner 's finding, asserting that the Respond-
ent's minutes of the July 13 meeting support Owens' version rather than Lisk's as to the
date when the Respondent conceded the Union's right to be present at the first step of the
grievance procedure . Thus the Respondent points to its original handwritten notes of
•the afternoon'session of July 13 in which, in discussing the grievance procedure, Owens
is quoted as referring to "Employee , Shop steward and supervisor ," following which the
discussion turned to , the language of another section of the contract to which the Union
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 559
We do not agree, however, that the Respondent thereby violated
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. The Trial Examiner's finding of such
violation is based essentially upon the fact that the Respondent per-
sisted in its original proposal until a few days after the beginning
of the strike. The Trial Examiner apparently has interpreted this
as meaning that the Respondent thus had forced the Union to an
impasse concerning a matter upon which it was not lawfully entitled
adamantly to insist. However, we have found, as more fully set forth
hereinafter, that the strike resulted from the Union's failure in bar-
gaining to obtain any concessions as to its principal, largely-economic,
demands and was not caused by an impasse in negotiations over de-
mands unlawfully insisted upon by the Respondent. The record dis-
closes that although the parties may have reached an impasse in respect
to principally economic issues, the process of bargaining was not
otherwise interrupted and the parties continued during the strike, and
thereafter, to meet in bargaining sessions in an endeavor to narrow the
area of their disagreement. It is apparent that the Union, on its part,
did not rest simply upon its objection to the grievance provision but
continued its course of effort through negotiations to obtain specific
contractual recognition of its right to be present at each state of the
grievance procedure. This effort, moreover, was successful as shown
by the Respondent's withdrawal from its position at least as early
as July 23, a few days after the strike began. Conversely, the agree-
ment thus reached demonstrates that the Respondent on its part
did not adamantly insist upon denying the Union its right to be pres-
ent at the first stage of the grievance procedure. Especially is it
apparent that the Respondent here did not condition the execution of
a contract upon the Union's capitulation to its demand for such a
contract provision 34 We find that the Respondent did not, by con-
tinuing until July 23 to advocate a provision which in effect excluded
the Union from the first step of grievance procedure, thereby violate
its obligation to bargain under the Act.
g. Proposals of less desirable working conditions
Among the Respondent's contract proposals were four provisions
which the Trial Examiner found to embody working conditions less
desirable than those already existing. He also found that, under the
circumstances of this case, the Respondent's advancement of such pro-
was also objecting as an encroachment upon the Union's right of representation. The
Respondent argues in effect that this turning of the conversation demonstrates that the
Union had gotten its way as to the grievance procedure and was then concerned only with
a related problem presented by another contractual provision. It is apparent, however,
that,the minutes are at this point somewhat cryptic and, as noted by the Trial Examiner,
they nowhere expressly disclose that the Respondent had then receded from its original
position . In consideration of the record as a whole, we see no reason to disturb this
resolution of credibility.
31 Cf. Wooster DivisiJon of Borg-Warner Corporatwn, 113 NLRB 1288.
,560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posals and insistence upon them until and during the strike was
demonstrative of bad faith in bargaining. The record discloses the
following facts concerning these provisions :
Proposal of lower minimum wages : Included among the contract
proposals submitted by the Respondent to the Union on June 11 was a
provision fixing minimum wage rates at 75 cents per hour for women
and 80 cents for men. At the following bargaining conference on June
21, the Union expressed disappointment at the proposal of such low
minimum rates in view of the fact that the Respondent had informed
the Union that the existing minimums were $1.02 and $1.12. Accord-
ing to Lisk, Owens replied that the Respondent proposed these
amounts because it might want to hire some new employees and start
them at these rates. Owens testified that on June 21 or 22, after some
discussion, he realized that due to a misunderstanding he had quoted
proposed figures for the starting or initial probationary rates rather
than the minimum established job rates which the Union desired to
discuss.35 According to Owens, he then informed the union represent-
atives that he would negotiate the minimum job rates with them, but
thought they should be lower than the existing established minimums
in order to provide for a lower wage to be paid in certain special in-
stances, as where goods came into the plant not properly threaded and
it was necessary to hire employees on a part-time basis to cut off the
threads with scissors. Accordingly, at the next meeting on July 13,
the Respondent submitted in writing a proposed contract clause pro-
viding for a minimum job rate of $1 for women and $1.10 for men.
The evidence indicates that as of the beginning of the strike on July
17, the Respondent was still adhering to its proposal of minimums in
these amounts, but that at some time during or after the strike the par-
ties reached agreement on the basis of the existing minimums.
Proposal of a new requirement to qualify for vacation: In the pro-
posed contract submitted by the Respondent to the Union on June 11,
there appeared, among the vacation provisions, a requirement that an
employee should have worked 1,500 hours or more during the preced-
ing year in order to receive a vacation. At the next bargaining meet-
ing on June 21, the Union objected to this provision as being a new
requirement, added to those previously in effect. The Respondent ad-
9e Copies of the Respondent's job progression schedules , which were among the various
items of information furnished by the Respondent to the Union following the first bar-
gaining conference on May 27 , show that the existing starting or probationary rates were
S9 cents for women and 94 cents for men. Although the Respondent asserts that its bar-
gaining position on wages was that of attempting to maintain the existing wage scale, it
gave no explanation for the discrepancy between these existing starting or probationary
rates,and the minimums for, such rates that it originally proposed to the Union: In any
event,' however; it does not appear that there was any further discussion of the starting
rates. Rather it appears that beginning on July 13, as above indicated , the parties dis-
cussed the Respondent's proposal of established job rate minimums, which were but 2
cents per hour less than the existing minimums for such rates.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 561
hered to its proposal, and the 1,500-hour requirement appeared again
in the succeeding contracts submitted by the Respondent to the Union
on July 26 and August 9. However, at the meeting on July 13, the Re-
spondent submitted a written proposal which in effect modified the re-
quirement by providing that an employee who qualified for a vacation
in every respect except that he had not met the 1,500-hour requirement
should nevertheless receive vacation pay in an amount equal to a given
percentage of his total straight time earnings during the yearly pe-
riod36 And in its contract proposals of July 26, the Respondent added
a new provision which was admittedly more favorable to the employees
than the existing practice in the plant. This was a provision that em-
ployees who had been in the Respondent's employ for as much as 3
years but less than 5 years should receive 60 hours of paid vacation."
Proposal of change in seniority practices: Among the items of in-
formation furnished by the Respondent to the Union following the
first bargaining meeting on May 27 was a copy of the Respondent's
"Principles for Handling Seniority Problems," which showed that
it had been the practice for layoffs resulting from lack of work to be
made on a departmental basis, the last person in the department being
the first to be laid off and the last to be recalled. In its letter forward-
ing this material the Respondent stated, however, that it was its
intention to propose "something quite different" in any contract with
the Union. Accordingly, in its proposed contract submitted to the
Union on June 11 the Respondent, among other provisions relating
to seniority, advanced the following provision :
Departmental seniority shall concern such matters as layoffs,
and recalls for lack of work. When factors 1 and 2 are relatively
equal, in the opinion of the Company, Departmental seniority
shall govern the order of layoff and recall. These factors are :
1. Knowledge, training, ability, skill, adaptability to do other
work in the department and overall efficiency.
2. Physical fitness.
It is evident that both parties in the course of bargaining regarded
this provision as substantially negating the Respondent's responsibility
for adherence to seniority in determining the order in which employees
should be selected for layoff and recall. This matter was discussed
at the July 16 bargaining meeting, but despite the Union's opposition
a similar proposal appeared again in the proposed contracts submitted
by the Respondent on July 26 and August 9.
30 Two percent in case of an employee with 1 to 5 years ' service, and 4 percent for an
employee with 5 or more years ' service,
as The Respondent had previously proposed , apparently in accord with its customary
practice , that employees with from 1 to 5 years' service be given 40 hours , and that em-
ployees with 5 or more years' service be given 80 hours, of paid vacation
390609 -56-vol 115-37
562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Proposal of a requirement that absences be reported in advance:
As previously set forth, the Respondent on April 27 posted a new rule
requiring an employee to inform the Company in advance if he would
be unable to report for work on his regular shift. At the first bargain-
ing conference on May 27, the Respondent explained that this rule had
been promulgated because of the prevalence of absenteeism in the
plant, amounting to as much as 1,300 working hours during the month
of March. In the Respondent's first proposed contract submitted to
the Union on June 11, there appeared a provision that if an employee
were absent from work without prior authorization, because of illness
or any other reason, and failed to notify the Respondent 6 hours prior
to starting time of his shift, he should be subject to disciplinary
action consisting first of a written warning, then of a week's layoff,
and finally discharge for subsequent violations of the rule. The Union
objected to the clause on the ground that it might not be possible
for an employee in case of illness to give the required notification.
This same provision was included among the proposals submitted by
the Respondent to the Union on July 26. Owens testified that, in
negotiations after the strike, an agreement was reached in which the
time required for advance notice to be given was reduced to 2 hours
and an understanding was reached that the provision was not intended
to be applied to employees failing to notify the Respondent in case
of sudden illness.
It is apparent that as to two of the foregoing proposals-those in-
volving minimum wages and the new requirement to qualify for a
vacation-the Respondent did not insist upon any severe restriction
of existing benefits. Thus as to minimum wages, the Respondent
promptly withdrew, its original proposal, substituted another which
was only 2 cents less than existing rates, and the matter was eventually
settled upon the basis of existing rates. The Respondent also substan-
tially modified its original proposal as to vacation requirements, and
subsequently added a provision more favorable to the employees than
the existing practice. The Respondent likewise modified its proposal
for advance notice of absences by agreeing that it should not apply
to certain hardship cases. Only in its proposal of seniority provisions
did it persist in seeking a revision of practice in a manner substan-
tially adverse to the Union's position-by reserving a greater area
of discretion to itself in determining the order of layoffs and recalls.-
Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we do not find in these facts sufficient
reason to conclude that as to these matters the Respondent did not
bargain in good faith with the Union.
h. Proposal of strike-referendum provision
The Trial Examiner found that by injecting into negotiations on
July 13, and thereafter insisting upon, a contract proposal limiting
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 563
the Union's right to strike by conditioning the exercise of this right
upon approval by the employees voting in a secret-ballot referendum,
the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith. Specifi-
cally the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's repeated pro-
posal of a contractual provision to this effect, in the face of the Union's
consistent refusal, amounted to a plain indication that it would not
sign a contract unless the Union agreed to the inclusion of such a
clause. We do not agree with this conclusion. The facts relating to
the course of bargaining on this subject are essentially undisputed,
and are in substance as follows :
Both the Union's and the Respondent's original contract proposals,
as revealed by the parties' exchange of contract drafts prior to their
second bargaining meeting on June 21, contained general no-strike,
no-lockout provisions. Both contracts also provided for wage reopen-
ings. The Union's proposal was for a midterm reopening at a date
to be determined, whereas the Respondent's proposal limited such re-
opening to a 60-day period prior to the contract's anniversary or ex-
piration date. The Union's proposal made no exception to the
no-strike clause, but provided that if the reopening resulted in an
unsettled wage dispute, it might be taken to arbitration. The
Respondent's proposal, on the other hand, specifically forbade arbitra-
tion but provided that in such case the parties would be free to resort
to strike or lockout. These conflicting proposals were discussed at
the meeting on June 21 and the Respondent's proposal was apparently
again briefly discussed on the morning of June 22.
At the next meeting, on July 13, the Respondent presented to the
Union a substitute proposal for that portion of its wage-reopening
provision which related to the Union's right to strike, 38 providing in
substance that if the parties were not able to reach an agreement within
60 days after they first met in response to a notice to renegotiate wages,
the Union should have the right to strike provided a majority of the
employees voting in the bargaining unit should have voted in favor
of such strike in a secret-ballot referendum held under the supervision
of an impartial State or Federal agency designated by the Union.
Together with this, the Respondent presented a similar proposal,
quoted in the Intermediate Report, for incorporation in the contract's
termination provision. According to Lisk, the Union stated that it
could not agree to these provisions because such a vote was a matter
within the local Union's own prerogative and not something to be put
into the contract. Owens replied that a Federal circuit court had
ruled that this was a subject matter for negotiation.39 Lisk also testi-
fied that the Union reiterated its position concerning the strike vote
38 Paragraph 2 of the Respondent 's article IV entitled "wage Adjustments"
19 Lisk further testified that at this point he "told Mr. Owens many courts had held
many things were subject to negotiations , but his Company was not bargaining with the
Union over these matters."
564 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the July 16 meeting, and that Owens then replied that if the Union
wanted to reserve the right to strike he would have to insist on this
type of proposal. Both the July 26 and August 9 contracts submitted
by the Respondent contained strike-referendum provisions identical
to those proposed by the Respondent on July 13 40 Owens testified,
however, upon cross-examination by the General Counsel, that after
the strike the parties reached an agreement as to the wage-reopening
and termination clauses, and in both instances the provision for a
strike referendum was omitted. The date when such agreement was
reached is not disclosed, but Owens' testimony in this respect is not
contradicted.
In the light of the record facts above set forth, including the course
of negotiations involving the strike-referendum proposal and the Re-
spondent's ultimate capitulation to the Union's objection to the inclu-
sion of suc1.provisions, we do not find that the Respondent unlawfully
insisted upon these provisions.41 As we have found the record insuffi-
cient in most instances to support the other allegations of unlawful
refusal to bargain with which the Respondent is herein charged, we
cannot therefore agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the
Respondent's other conduct compels the conclusion that the Respond-
ent was not motivated by good faith in proposing that the Union
agree to strike-vote provisions in a contract. We find, accordingly,
that the Respondent did not, by proposing and advocating contractual
provisions for a strike referendum, thereby violate its obligation to
bargain under the Act.
4. The strike and nonreinstatement of strikers
As set forth above, the Union was certified on April 30, 1954, and
the Union and Respondent met in their first conference on May 27.
Thereafter they exchanged copies of proposed contracts and met again
to discuss these proposals on the afternoon of June 21 and morning of
June 22. Most of the provisions of a contract appeared to be in dis-
pute. A number of bargaining sessions were held during July, and
40 The Respondent ' s minutes of the afternoon meeting on July 13 comment on the strike-
vote proposal as in the nature of a counterproposal to the Union 's request for a midterm
ieopening , and report Owens as having said that the Respondent preferred to close up the
contract on wages for a year, but would not object to the reopening provided a vote be
taken to determine whether a majority wished to strike in case of an impasse . In addi-
tion to the strike-vote provisions , both the July 26 and August 9 contracts submitted by
the Respondent contained a provision for reopening after 4 months upon 60 (lays ' notice
The Respondent 's witnesses at the hearing (lid not testify concerning the Respondent's
reasons for submitting the strike -referendum proposals However, it is apparent that the
Respondent adopted the Union's proposal for an early wage ieopenmg at or about the
time when it also advanced its proposals for a strike referendum
41 Cf Wooster Dwision of Borq-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, where the Board
found that the employer had adamantly insisted to the point of impasse-in that case by
requiring acceptance of its proposal as the condition of executing an agreement-upon
contractual agreement to a strike -vote referendum Here, unlike that case, the Respond-
ent did not insist to the point of impasse upon such provision
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 565
the parties met again in August, September, and October prior to the
beginning of the hearing herein on October 11.4' During the course
of these negotiations agreement was reached on various portions of
the contract, but a number of provisions, including the Union's prin-
cipal economic demands, remained in dispute. On July 17, following
a vote taken at a union meeting, the employees began a strike which
lasted until July 27. On the latter date, the Union notified the Re-
spondent that the strike was called off and most of the striking em-
ployees reported to the plant. Believing it probable that not all the
strikers might have been notified of the end of the strike, the Respond-
ent gave those who had not reported an additional period in which
to report back for work. However, the Respondent had hired a num-
ber of replacements during the strike, most or all of them having been
put to work on the first shift. Among the returning strikers, some 39
whose places had thus been filled on the first shift were assigned to
other shifts, and approximately 62 others were not immediately re-
instated but were placed on a 6-month preferential hiring list to be
recalled when and if vacancies occurred.
The Trial Examiner found that the strike was an unfair labor prac-
tice strike, having been caused by all the antecedent unfair labor prac-
tices for which he had found the Respondent to be responsible. He
further found, therefore, that as participants in a strike induced by
unfair labor practices, all the strikers were entitled to immediate re-
instatement upon demand, and that in the case of the strikers rein-
stated to other shifts and those placed on the preferential hiring list,
the Respondent, by failing to offer them immediate reinstatement to
their former positions, had discriminated against them in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.43 As it is not alleged that the Respondent
discriminated in the order of the strikers' recall, or otherwise than by
the nonreinstatement of those who had been replaced as above set forth,
the issue of unlawful discrimination against the strikers thus turns
upon the nature of the strike.
In the light of the entire record, we do not find that the strike
was caused by Respondent's unfair labor practices. The strike oc-
curred in July, midway during the course of collective bargaining.
The earlier instances of interference, restraint, and coercion, and the
layoffs of 3 employees herein found to have been discriminatory,
occurred at or near the time of the election, some 3 months before the
strike and a month or more before the parties met in the first collec-
tive-bargaining session. Not only were these instances somewhat re-
42 For the dates of these bargaining meetings , see footnote 14, supra
43 The Trial Examiner also found that by "unilaterally selecting the individuals and
the shifts for reinstatement , after a strike caused by its own unfair labor practices" the
Respondent further failed to bargain in good faith with the Union . In view of our con-
clusion that the strike was not caused by unfair labor practices , we find it unnecessary to
pass upon , and do not adopt, this finding.
566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
moved in time, but the record does not appear otherwise to indicate
that there was any causal relationship between these incidents and the
strike. The instance of unlawful refusal to bargain for which we
have found the Respondent to be responsible consisted of the uni-
lateral posting of new plant rules, and occurred from 2 to 21/2 months
before the strike and more than 2 weeks before the first bargaining
session" The record of the bargaining conferences, which continued
essentially uninterrupted during the strike, indicates that the strike
was caused, not by these matters nor by the Respondent's advocacy
of various propositions in bargaining, heretofore discussed, upon which
it might not have been lawfully entitled to insist to the point of
impasse, but rather by the Union's failure to obtain concessions from
the Respondent as to its principal and most significant demands, chiefly
economic in nature.
Thus Lisk testified that at the July 14 meeting he "told the Company
that there was certain things in the contract that he would like to
have their answers on." These were the Union's demand for a wage
increase , two additional paid -holidays, additional vacation benefits,
and provision for a checkoff. Lisk testified that he did not recall
whether, in addition to this list, he -also mentioned additional in-
surance benefits, but that he did mention the no-strike clause and
the discharge and discipline clause. He further testified :
I told Mr. Owens that unless we could reach an agreement that
I was afraid we had a strike; and among those things that were
involved, and I named four or five things there that were major
issues, and I told him I did not cherish a strike, but I was afraid
if we did not reach an agreement that the people may vote a
strike.45
At the next meeting on July 16, Bamford, a union official who had
attended the first bargaining meetings but who had not been present
at the meetings on July 13 and 14, asked if the Respondent and the
Union had agreed on anything. Lisk testified that he then told Bam-
ford that "a few things had been agreed to, but there was several
major issues that were still in dispute." Lisk conceded that he may
i* It is true, however, that as set forth earlier in this decision, the right of the Union to
present grievances concerning these plant rules was among the subjects discussed during
the bargaining conferences.
95 At the meeting of July 14 the Union transmitted to the Respondent through the
auspices of a Federal mediator a "package proposal," of which the full contents are not
disclosed by the record, but which specifically included the matters of wages, holidays,
checkoff, and insurance benefits. Lisk at first testified that when this package proposal
was presented to the Respondent he told Owens that "some of these items people have a
very definite opinion about" and "I am afraid if we don't come to an agreement on some
of these items the people may vote to strike." On being pressed as to the specific matters
to which he referred , he replied , "I was referring to all the unresolved issues we had."
However, previously , apparently also in reference to these proposals , Lisk had testified,
"I asked him [ Owens] to consider some of our economic demands along with some of the
other contract demands we were discussing."
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 567
have named, as such issues, the matter of wages, paid holidays, check-
off, insurance, seniority, and the discharge and discipline provisions.
The Respondent's typewritten minutes of the meeting on that date
confirm the fact that Lisk enumerated substantially the list of issues
named above. These minutes further disclose that near the close of
the meeting on that date Bamford informed the Respondent in sub-
stance that he believed the Union and Respondent could work out
satisfactorily their differences on all but the monetary allowances and
the checkoff, but that he must report to the employees a deadlock on
these matters. The strike began on the evening of the next day, July
17, after the bargaining meeting of that day.
Upon the entire record we are satisfied that the strike of July 17
to 27 was caused by the Union's failure to achieve its major demands
which were principally economic in nature, and did not result from
the Respondent's unfair labor practices. In these circumstances, the
Respondent was legally entitled to protect and continue its business
by hiring permanent replacements to fill the places of strikers.46 As
the replaced strikers were economic rather than unfair labor practice
strikers, they are not entitled to an order of reinstatement.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Cranston Print
Works Company, Fletcher, North Carolina, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging concerted activity or membership in Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organi-
zation of its employees, by discriminatorily laying off employees, or
in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Threatening its employees with reprisals or promising them
benefits to discourage concerted activities or union membership or
activities. `
(c) Issuing or enforcing a rule prohibiting its employees from
soliciting union membership on company premises during the em-
ployees' nonworking time.
(d) Interrogating employees concerning their union affiliations or
intent to vote in a Board election, in a manner constituting inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1).
(e) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all em-
46 N L R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S 333, 345-346.
568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees in the appropriate unit with respect to wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpos'es of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as-a condi-
tion of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Textile Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the appropriate, unit, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Rescind immediately its rule forbidding employees to solicit
membership in organizations insofar as it prohibits its employees
from soliciting union membership during the employees' nonwork-
ing time.
(c) Make whole Stepp, Hamilton, and Higgins in the manner set
forth in the Intermediate Report in the section entitled "The Remedy"
for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrim-
ination against them.
(d) Upon request make available to the National Labor Relations
Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social-security payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary for a determination of the
amounts of back pay due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its plant in Fletcher, North Carolina, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix A." °7 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, shall,
after being signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it
for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region in.writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps it
has taken to comply herewith.
41 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree 6f a 'United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Deci ec of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order "
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 569
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
-the Respondent violated the Act by conduct other than that found
to be unlawful in this Decision and Order, be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed.
MEMBER MURDOCK, concurring in part and dissenting in part :
I concur in the main opinion to the extent that it affirms findings
by the Trial Examiner of violations by the Respondent of Section 8
(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act; but to the extent that it dismisses
certain other conduct found by the Trial Examiner to be violative of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, I am in partial disagreement with it.
Specifically, I dissent from the majority's conclusions that the Re-
spondent did not also violate Section 8 (a) (5) by refusing to bar-
gain on grievances, by proposing less desirable working conditions,
and by insisting upon employee strike-ballot referenda as a condition
to the Union's right to strike. I shall discuss these issues in order.
We are unanimous in finding that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (5) by unilaterally instituting changes in plant rules after certi-
fication of the Union as bargaining representative on April 30, 1954,
without notice to or consultation with the Union. Thereafter, between
June 2 and 8, Hamilton, as chairman of the Union's grievance com-
mittee, prepared and presented to Personnel Manager Hardee 17
grievances on various subjects including, among others, all but 1 of the
changes in plant rules and working conditions. _ On June 11 Hardee
replied by a letter addressed to the-grievance committee, as follows :
In reply to alleged grievances Nos. 1 through 14, the Company
does not recognize the fact that any part of grievances Nos. 1
through 14 are a proper matter for a grievance, and does not
recognize the authority of the committee to raise these questions.
The answers are given out of a spirit of cooperation and for
information.
The Company has not made an [sic] changes in rules or poli-
cies because of a result of the election, except those necessary to
maintain a more efficient operation.
With this letter were a number of enclosures setting forth separate
answers to each of the first 14 grievances. As to the new rules restrict-
ing the times for visiting the smoking booths, requiring donations to
be placed in a box at the gate, and prohibiting early entrance to the
plant, these separate answers consisted simply of the following state-
ment :
This is a matter of Company policy and Procedure. We do not
consider this a proper matter for a grievance.
In a number of other instances, including a grievance involving the
rule requiring advance reporting of absences and three of the griev-
570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
antes relating to changes in working conditions discussed supra, the
Respondent furnished a separate answer concerning the merits of the
matter at issue, but appended a further statement likewise indicating
that it did not recognize the matter as properly subject to a grievance.
In a letter dated June 21, Hardee gave similar answers to the remain-
ing 3 of the 17 grievances.
As late as July 17, when the strike began, Respondent was still
maintaining that these matters were not a proper subject for griev-
ances. Eventually, after the strike, on September 22 the Respondent
finally bargained on these matters. Plainly the Trial Examiner cor-
rectly found that by the foregoing conduct prior to the strike on July
17 -there was a refusal to bargain on grievances violative of Section
8 (a) (5).
This case is not, as is suggested by the majority, one involving the
question whether mere "delay" in discussing grievances until Septem-
ber 22- demonstrates "lack of good faith." It is a case of outright
refusal to discuss over an extended period based upon an erroneous
legal premise that these involved matters of management prerogative
and hence were not "proper matters for grievance." Particularly
where the matters on which bargaining is sought involve conditions
of employment which have been unilaterally and unlawfully in-
stituted there should be a special obligation promptly to honor a re-
quest for bargaining. The majority's reliance in finding no refusal to
bargain, on the stated fact that with reference to some of the grievances
the Respondent "provided answers on the merits" even though reject-
ing them as not proper subjects for grievances, is erroneous as a matter
of law. Simply stating a reason for the adoption of a rule, with the
simultaneous statement that it is not a proper subject for a grievance,
is obviously not negotiating thereon-it closes the door on negotiation.
Furthermore, it is well settled that even where, unlike here, there is
actual discussion, "an employer who takes the erroneous position that
a particular subject matter is not bargainable `can hardly approach the
discussion of this subject with an open mind and a willingness to reach
an agreement."' N. L. R. B. v. Reed c€ Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d
131, 136 (C. A. 1), enfg. 96 NLRB 850, 857. Moreover, there still re-
main the various grievances on which not even a reason for the
unilateral action was provided.
I likewise can find no sound reason to disturb the Trial Examiner's
finding that Respondent's action in advancing and insisting in col-
lective bargaining upon provisions for working conditions less desira-
ble than those currently existing, in the important field of wages,
vacations, seniority practices, and advance reporting of absences,
demonstrated bad faith in bargaining. Viewed collectively, and
against the background of Plant Manager Gregory's threat to "make
-it hard" if the Union was voted in, the more reasonable inference is
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 571
that in advancing and insisting on agreement by the Union on less de-
sirable conditions of employment even to the point of a strike, the Re-
spondent was implementing this threat rather than making a sincere
effort to reach a reasonable agreement with the Union. Although cur-
rent minimum wage rates were $1.02 and $1.12 per hour for women
and men, respectively, Respondent's contract proposal was 75 and 80
cents. Accepting Owen's testimony that through mistake figures for
intended probationary rates had been submitted instead of for mini-
mum established rates, the fact remains that the proposal was 14 cents
below current probationary rates. Furthermore, as of the time of the
strike, Respondent was still insisting on minimum wage rates which
cut existing rates 2 cents per hour. Although current practice re-
quired only completion of the probationary period for a vacation,'
Respondent's proposal was 1,500 hours' work (or about 9 months) as a
prerequisite. In place of the current departmental seniority rule for
layoffs, Respondent insisted up to and during the strike on a provision
which deprived employees of this protection and to all intents and
purposes in effect gave the Employer the right to pick and choose on
layoffs. Finally the Company proposed a rule requiring 6 hours'
advance notice of absences under penalty of a warning, a week's lay-
off, and finally discharge for the first, second, and third.offense. De-
spite the fact, as the Union pointed out to Respondent, this would
probably be impossible in many cases of illness, Respondent insisted on
such a harsh and obviously unworkable rule up to and during the
strike. It is true that the Respondent eventually settled the strike
for existing wages and modified versions of the other provisions re-
ferred to except for departmental seniority which the Union never
regained. That the Respondent after the strike ultimately receded
on these points does not, as my colleagues suggest, negate the reason-
able inference that in insisting to the point of a strike that the Union
agree to this series of less desirable working conditions in the context
of this case, the Respondent was not engaged in good-faith bargaining.
The majority's reversal of the Trial Examiner's finding that the
Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) by injecting into the negotia-
tions on July 13 and thereafter insisting upon contract proposals con-
ditioning the Union's right to strike upon approval by a majority of
all the employees voting in a secret-ballot referendum, represents a
serious error of law unless the majority intend to overrule recent
precedent.
The Union had originally proposed a general no-strike-no-lockout
provision without exceptions. However, Respondent's original con-
tract proposal, although containing a general no-strike clause, uncon-
ditionally permitted a strike or lockout in case of wage reopening.
Respondent's substitute proposal for the "Wage Adjustment" clause
on July 13, however, was more restrictive by conditioning the right
572 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to strike in a wage reopening on an employee referendum. I do not
believe that the maintenance of such a proposal was proper under
the precedents, even as an amendment to the "Wage Adjustment"
clause. Whether or not the insistence on this part of Respondent's
July 13 proposal is deemed unlawful, however, no conceivable justifi-
cation can be found for the second part. That was a wholly separate
proposal for the duration clause of the contract under which the Union
was bound not to strike for 60 days after the expiration of the con-
tract, and, if no new agreement could be reached within 60 days, its
right to strike thereafter was conditioned upon a majority vote in an
employee referendum. In the recent case of Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, the Board held that such
employee strike-ballot proposals are not subjects on which a union
is obligated to bargain and that an employer therefore is not entitled
to force bargaining on such proposals and to insist on their inclusion
in an agreement. The majority purports to distinguish Borg-Warner
on the basis that there
the Employer had adamantly insisted to the point of impasse-in
that case by requiring acceptance of its proposal as the condition
of executing an agreement-upon contractual agreement to a
strike-vote referendum. Here, unlike that case, the Respondent
did not insist to the point of impasse.
I fail to understand their use of the term "impasse," which they ap-
parently equate to successfully requiring acceptance of a proposal as
a condition to executing an agreement.- Heretofore "impasse" has
been used by the Board to describe situations where parties fail to ar-
rive at a contract because neither party will recede from opposing posi-
tions. It has also been recognized that strikes break impasses and
the fact that following a strike parties ultimately agree, does not
mean that an impasse did not exist before a strike. In Borg-Warner
the union went out on strike because of inability to reach agreement
on a number of issues. Thus there was an "impasse" as that term
is ordinarily used. But this was equally true in the instant case and
the majority's statement that here "the Respondent did not insist to
the point of impasse" is incorrect. These proposals were one of the
important stumbling blocks which prevented the parties here from
arriving at an agreement, as a result of which the Union went out on
strike. The strike broke the impasse and the parties eventually agreed
upon a contract. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that insistence to
the point of an impasse is a prerequisite to finding an 8 (a) (5) viola-
tion, such a condition is here met. The majority's attempt to dis-
tinguish the Borg-Warner case on the ground that there the union
ultimately capitulated on this issue after the strike, while here it
was the Employer who ultimately receded in the contract made after
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 573
the strike, misconceives the controlling legal principles. The sug-
gestion that "requiring acceptance of its [the employer's] proposal as
the condition of executing an agreement" is a prerequisite for find-
ing an 8 (a) (5) violation incorrectly states the Board law on this
subject. This question was first dealt with in Allis-Chabners Manu-
factwring Company, 106 NLRB 939. There, despite the Trial Ex-
aminer's finding that the employer had not "refused to contract unless
the Union consented to the disputed clauses," the Board adopted the
Trial Examiner's finding that the employer violated Section 8 (a) (5)
because it insisted on continuing to bargain on these clauses with other
subjects, thereby causing a breakdown of negotiations. The Board's
decision stated : "We find, like the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent
by insisting upon discussing its proposed clauses XIII and XIV, and
by such, insistence causing the bargaining negotiations with the Union
to cease, refused to bargain with the Union and thereby violated Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5) of the Act." [Emphasis supplied.] In the later Borg-
Warner case, the Board reconsidered and restated at length the legal
principles governing this issue, and made plain that neither employer
insistence to the point of impasse nor requiring acceptance of a pro-
posal as a condition to executing a contract are prerequisites to find-
ing a refusal to bargain. In Borg-Warner the Board made very clear
that while the mere making of a strike-ballot proposal was not im-
proper, and that by mutual consent it might be discussed and agreed
upon, nevertheless, such a proposal was not one of the "obligatory
subjects" for collective bargaining. Hence a union cannot be re-
quired to bargain on it if it does not wish to, and an employer cannot
utilize the bargaining process to require continued bargaining on such
a subject."
On the basis of the admitted facts set forth in the majority opinion,
it is plain that the Respondent here refused to accept the Union's
protest that-the strike-referendum proposals involved a matter of the
Union's own prerogative and did not belong in a contract. Respond-
ent insisted on treating them as a proper subject matter for negotiation
and maintained its insistence on including them in the contract even
after the strike. Thus, it retained the provisions in both the July 26
and August 9 contract versions which it submitted to the Union. This
course of conduct clearly violated Section 8 (a) (5) under the Borg-
Warner decision and the fact relied upon by the majority that ulti-
mately the Respondent capitulated on these proposals after the strike
is irrelevant. Only by ignoring or misinterpreting the Borg-Warner
+a As the decision stated . The Respondent 's liability under Section 8 (a) (5) turns not
upon its good faith , but rather upon the legal question of whether the proposals are per-
missible subjects of collective bargaining For, if the proposals are permissible statutory
demands, the Respondent was privileged to adamantly insist upon bargaining as to them
and the Union could not refuse to so bargain , on the other hand , if they were not, the
cone se is ti ne " [ Emphasis supplied ]
574 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decision can the majority reverse the Trial Examiner and find no viola-
tion on admitted facts.
MEMBER BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT discourage concerted activity or membership in
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other
labor organization of our employees, by discriminatorily laying
off any of them, or in any other manner discriminating in regard
to their hire or tenure of employment.
WE WILL NOT threaten with reprisals or promise benefits to dis-
courage concerted activity or union membership.
WE WILL NOT issue or enforce any rule prohibiting employees
from soliciting union membership on their own time on company
property.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their union
affiliations or intent to vote in a Board-conducted election, in a
manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in viola-
tion of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all
employees in the following appropriate unit :
All production and maintenance employees at our Fletcher
plant, excluding all executives, supervisors, clerical and
professional employees, and guards, as defined in the Act,
and all printers and printers' apprentices.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named
or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such rights may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 575
WE WILL make Clarence N. Stepp, Evans S. Hamilton, and
William B. Higgins, whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason
of the discrimination against them.
WE WILL bargain collectively in good faith, upon request, with
the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the above-described appropriate unit with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becom-
ing or remaining members of the above-named labor organization, or
any other labor organization, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges having been duly filed and served in Cases Nos. 11 -CA-706 and I1-CA-
765, complaints and notices of hearing thereon having been issued and served by
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, an order consolidating
the two cases having been issued by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region,
and answers having been duly filed by Cranston Print Works Company, a hearing in-
volving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1), (3),
and (5 ) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended ( 61 Stat . 136), herein
called the Act, was held in Hendersonville , North Carolina , from October 11 to 20,
1954 , before the duly designated Trial Examiner.
In substance , the complaints allege and the answers deny that the Respondent: (1)
Discriminatorily and to discourage membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, CIO , discharged employee Boyce A. Whitmire , Jr., on April 15, 1954, and laid
off for a period of a week , on April 29 , 1954 , employees Clarence N. Stepp, Evans
S. Hamilton , and William B. Higgins ; ( 2) on and after May 27, 1954 , refused to bar-
gain collectively with the Charging Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit ; ( 3) by its unfair labor practices caused em-
ployees to go on strike on July 17 and 19 , 1954 ; (4) upon their unconditional offer
to return to work on July 27, 1954 , discriminatorily refused to reinstate certain
strikers and assigned others to less desirable shifts; ( 5) unilaterally changed plant
rules and working conditions ; (6) threatened economic reprisals and promised bene-
fits to discourage union membership ; and (7 ) by the aforesaid and other conduct
interfered with , restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by the Act.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard , to examine and cross -examine witnesses , to introduce evidence rerti-
nent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record , and to file briefs and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Briefs have been received from the General
Counsel and the Respondent.
Disposition of the motion to dismiss, made by the Respondent at the close of the
hearing and upon which ruling was then reserved , is made by the following findings,
conclusions , and recommendations.
576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Cranston Print Works Company, a Rhode Island corporation , maintains a plant
at Fletcher , North Carolina , where it is engaged in the bleaching , printing , and dye-
ing of cotton goods. During the year 1953 it manufactured and sold finished prod-
ucts valued at more than $ 650,000, more than 98 percent of which, in value, was sold
and shipped to customers outside the State of North Carolina. During the same pe-
riod it purchased raw materials , supplies, and equipment valued at more than
$240,000, more than 50 percent of which, in value, was shipped in interstate com-
merce to its Fletcher plant.
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of the Respondent at its Fletcher plant.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background events and issues
All of the events in issue took place in the spring and summer of 1954. Histori-
cally, however, they stem from organizational efforts begun by the Respondent's em-
ployees back in 1951. That year, and again in 1953, the Board conducted elections
at the,plant. At both of these elections 2 labor organizations (1 the Charging Union
in this case ) were on the ballot. Neither won, and on each occasion the Board issued
certification to that effect. Also, in the fall of 1953, the Respondent was involved in
a complaint case (Case No. 11-CA-539) which was disposed of informally by a
settlement agreement with the Board and the Charging Union, pursuant to which
the Respondent posted notices notifying its employees that it would not interfere
with rights guaranteed them by the Act.
In the spring of 1954 a third election was held, and this time the Charging Union
was certified as the bargaining agent of the employees. Coincident with the 1954
election the Respondent discharged and laid off , respectively, 2 employee leaders in
that and the 2 previous organizing campaigns-Whitmire and Hamilton . This action
is in issue.
The election and the discharge-layoff action took place following the spread of a
management-inspired rumor that if the Union came into the plant it would close
down. Supervisors engaged in interrogation of employees as to their union sympa-
thies and made promises of benefit-conduct which the General Counsel claims to
have been interference , restraint , and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act.
Immediately after the Union won the election and before negotiations for a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement were begun , management posted many rules, unilaterally,
bearing upon employees ' conduct and working conditions. After negotiations began
management summarily rejected the Union 's submission of some 14 grievances, stat-
ing in a document in evidence that they were not "a proper matter for a grievance,"
and that management would "not recognize the authority of the committee to raise
these questions ." It is General Counsel's claim that this adamant stand taken by the
Employer, as well as other positions taken by it during negotiations-more fully
described below-constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union, and
"that this refusal, among other unfair labor practices, caused the employees to go on
strike on July 17, 1954.
The strike was called off 10 days later and the strikers sought unconditional rein-
statement . It is General Counsel's contention that many such strikers , named spe-
cifically below, were either denied reinstatement or were transferred to less desirable
shifts. This alleged discrimination is one of the main issues.
B. Interference , restraint, and coercion
As context for the issues of discrimination and refusal to bargain , the coercive con-
duct of management representatives should be considered.
The incidents involved were neither isolated nor confined to conduct of minor
supervisors, nor may management reasonably maintain that they occurred in an at-
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 577
mosphere of chance or ignorance. But a few months before the spring campaign of
the Union, and by way of a settlement of a Board case, management had posted a
notice agreeing not to engage in illegal interference. In mid-February the Union, in
a letter to Resident Manager Gregory, claimed that both interrogations and threats
had been made and urged that they be stopped.
During the latter part of the same month, however, Gregory himself threatened an
employee with discharge if he heard of his "passing out any more Union cards." The
employee was James F. Sexton. Gregory, as a witness, admitted the incident, did not
specifically deny making the threat, but said that he told Sexton on that occasion:
"We have a no-solicitation rule . you are not allowed to do that while you are
working on the job." The Trial Examiner does not credit Gregory's testimony that
he cautioned Sexton only about soliciting on the job. His own description of a re-
port made to him which he said prompted him to reprimand Sexton, makes no refer-
ence to this point. The plant rule, identified by Gregory himself as being in effect at
that time, makes no such qualification. That rule reads:
Employees will be subject to disciplinary action . . . for .. .
22. Soliciting for contributions, membership in organizations, or for the
benefit of other outside the plant activities without first securing approval of the
superintendent of the plant.
Nor would it be reasonable to imply that management meant, but did not say in this
rule, that it was limited to while "working on the job " Other rules in the same list
do not lack such specificity. For examples, "horseplay" was limited to "company
property"; the use of alcohol or drugs to "company property"; and idling in the
washrooms to "working hours."
Since the Trial Examiner has found that Gregory did not say anything to Sexton
about any rule, no finding is here made as to the legality of the rule itself. (That rule,
as later amended, will later be discussed in this report.) It is concluded and found
that by Gregory's threat to discharge Sexton if he ever heard of his "passing out any
more Union cards," topmost management of the Respondent at the plant inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by the Act.
It is undisputed 1 that 2 or 3 days before the election, on April 22, Gregory asked
employee W. D. Toney if he was going to be "agin him or for him." The context of
an otherwise innocent, perhaps, inquiry cannot be ignored. As noted below, the dis-
charge of the Union's most openly active leader had been effected by Gregory just a
few days before his interrogation of Toney. And on about the same day of the in-
quiry Gregory, under his own signature , sent to every employee a 3-page antiunion
letter concluding with the statement: "If you vote NO in the coming election, I will
consider it a continuing vote of confidence." Under the circumstances here described,
the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that Greogory's interrogation of Toney was
plainly intended not to seek information because of a bargaining request, but to
coerce an employee in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. Any other inter-
pretation must avoid both reason and reality.
Gregory and his subordinate supervisors instigated and fostered forecasts that
the plant would close if the Union won the election. About a month before the
election the manager told employee Donnell L. Hoots that "if the Union got in he
would probably have to close the plant," according to Hoots' credible testimony, and
later said that "if it did get in, he would make it hard and fight it to the finish." The
Trial Examiner does not credit Gregory's equivocal denial. He admitted talking to
Hoots about the Union, and then said:
I never ever said I would close that plant down; if it ever came up about any-
thing like that it was in line with wages; I told Donnell if the Union demanded,
when they came in and demanded that, I felt we were paying wages that were
competitive, and I would not be able to meet them, if they won out I would try
to run our plant as best we could, but if the people didn't come I would natu-
rally have to close the plant down, I could not do anything else.
Foreman Capers Gambrell openly offered to bet employee James Barnett $100
that if the Union came in the plant would close down within 2 weeks. Foreman
W. C. Parker saw the employee and Gambrell in conversation and asked Barnett
what they had been talking about. Barnett told him. Parker then said, "Well, you
1 As a witness Gregory said only that he did not recall it
390609-56-col 115-38
578 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
know he is right, this Company moved down here to get away from organized labor
and if they come in here, they will move from here, too." The finding is based upon
Barnett's credible testimony. Gambrell's denial is not credited. Parker was not ques-
tioned about this specific conversation with Barnett; he merely denied generally that
he had ever told any employee that the plant had moved south to get away from or-
ganized labor. This general denial is not credited. As quoted specifically in the
section below relating to Whitmire's discharge, Parker's own testimony establishes
that Gambrell's offer to bet was sufficiently well known to him so that he made no
comment when Whitmire raised the question in his presence. The record contains
much credible evidence that Gambrell's offer to bet that the plant would close be-
came almost common knowledge in the plant and that Parker, in effect, told em-
ployees it was a reasonable forecast. It persisted, despite the Union's attempt to ridi-
cule the idea. In an obvious effort to "accentuate the positive" threat to close, insti-
gated by himself and perpetuated by his subordinates, Gregory, on the very eve of the
election, sent to every employee the letter above described, containing the following
question and answer:
Can the union make Cranston run its plant and furnish you a job?
NO. The Union has no power, legally, or otherwise, to force Cranston to oper-
ate its plant for one day, week, month or year.
The forceful denial of the negative, in a letter urging employees to vote against
the Union, was plainly designed as coercive. It would have been meaningless in
any other context than that of the company-sponsored rumor that it would close,
and of a union leaflet distributed at the plant gate to all employees 2 or 3 days
earlier, which said in part:
You all know that this kind of rumor has been circulated to scare us, only it
hasn't scared us and our union has grown stronger day by day.
More simply summarized, the picture presented by the facts is this: Management
circulates a rumor that it will close if the Union wins the election; the Union deprecates
the threat and urges that it is only used to "scare us" into voting against the Union;
and the Company counters with the pontifical protest that the Union cannot make
it keep open I day longer than it wants to.
Foreman Gambrell also used another method to interfere with the employees'
rights under the Act. About 2 weeks before the election Gambrell told employee
John F. Bobo, who worked under him, that there were 2 desk jobs open, that the
Company did not want the Union in the plant, and that if he would help "fight
the Union," he would see that Bobo got I of the jobs. This finding is based upon
the credible testimony of the employee, in part supported by Gambrell. The fore-
man admitted telling the employee he would try to get him the job, did not deny
that he had said he would do so if Bobo would help "fight" the Union, and only
explained that he made the offer in order to get Bobo to do better on the job he
already had. Having observed Gambrell giving this lame explanation, the Trial Ex-
aminer does not believe him. His promise of benefit clearly was of a nature pro-
scribed by the Act.
C. The discharge of Boyce A. Whitmire, Jr.
It is alleged and conceded that Boyce A. Whitmire, Jr., was discharged on April
15, 1 week before the 1954 election. The General Counsel claims that the discharge
was discriminatory in order to discourage union membership; in its answer the
Respondent claims that it was "for good cause and as a result of the malicious,
unlawful and wrongful acts" of Whitmire.
Evidence is overwhelming that top management well knew that Whitmire was
probably the most active leader in the Union's preelection campaign. He was the
first to wear union buttons openly in the plant. He served on the organizing com-
mittee and solicited employees at the plant to join. He distributed union leaflets
at the plant gate. About 2 weeks before his dismissal he was called to the office
by Gregory, resident manager. Gregory deprecated the value of a union to the
employees, and declared that the Company could afford to give no raises and
"would have to shut the plant down." He proposed the idea of an independent
union: Whitmire said he thought such would be illegal and stoutly defended the
Union's campaign.2 About a week before the discharge the local newspaper car-
2 The findings as to this interview are based upon the credible testimony of Whitmire,
much of which is undisputed, although Gregory's version differs in some respects The
Trial Examiner makes no finding that the manager's remarks on this occasion were coer-
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 579
ried a prounion article under Whitmire 's signature . His testimony is uncon-
tradicted that his was the only prounion letter from an employee to be published
in that newspaper during the campaign . On numerous occasions shortly before
his dismissal , Foreman Parker chided him about the Union. According to the
testimony of the foreman himself, he frequently discussed the Union with the em-
ployee-"Oh, my goodness," he said, "practically every time I would go through
there." Whitmire 's testimony is unrefuted , and it is found , that on one occasion
Parker told him that the Company could afford no raises and would have to shut
the plant down . And according to the foreman 's testimony , Whitmire approached
Parker while he was talking to another supervisor , Capers Gambrell , and asked
the latter: "Do you still want to bet $100 that if the Union.comes in the plant will
close down?" Further, according to Parker, "Mr. Gambrell said to him, `No,
I don 't want to bet ,' and we continued on with our conversation of the day 's work."
In this setting , then , in part as described by management witnesses , Whitmire
was summarily dismissed on April 15. Events connected with the actual discharge
are as follows . On the morning of April 14, Eugene Paige, an employee of Seneca
Textile, one of Cranston 's customers , was present in Whitmire 's room in pursuance
of his duties. While standing near Whitmire 's machine , which was running some
of Seneca 's materials , the employee casually asked him what he "was going to
do when the plant shut down ." Paige asked what he meant . Whitmire replied:
"Mr. Gregory said he was going to shut the plant down if the Union came in." 3
Somewhat later Paige went to see Gregory, but he was away from the plant.
About noon, according to the testimony of Plant Superintendent F. X. Cooney,
Paige came to him and asked him, "What is going on around here?" and in ex-
planation told him that an employee, whom Cooney promptly identified as Whitmire,
had asked him what he was going to do with his work when the plant shut down.
Cooney, according to both his testimony and that of Paige, assured Paige that he
had nothing to worry about, and told him not to "pay any attention to any remarks
that may be made by any unauthorized personnel."
With this reassurance , Paige went on about his business . Cooney, according to
his own testimony, did not approach Whitmire. Nearly 12 hours later, just before
midnight, Cooney informed Gregory. Gregory promptly ordered the plant guards
not to let Whitmire into the plant the next morning , and to bar his entry until he,
himself , should arrive.
cive That they were made, however, establishes beyond question that management was
aware of Whitmire's union leadership. And the reference to the shutdown of the plant,
by Gregory, is of material bearing upon the actual discharge, as will be discussed below.
3 The findings as to this colloquy rest upon the credible and forthright testimony of
Whitmire, and the probabilities inherent in the events even as described by Paige, whose
version varies somewhat Paige was not called as a witness before the Trial Examiner.
No showing was made that he was not available. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
Respondent offered in evidence Paige's deposition , taken in New York City some months
before the hearing. It was received under the following circumstances :
TRIAL EXAMINER • I believe I indicated about a week ago I much prefer to have
the witness [Paige] here, and told you I would issue a subpoena at that time. Now,
this is rather late, and the hearing is about over, and in view of the fact there is no
objection on the part of General Counsel, and in view of the fact that the Regional
Director permitted this to be done before the hearing, the Trial Examiner will permit
this to be placed in evidence I admit I do this somewhat reluctantly, and do it only
in the interest of time
In his deposition Paige, in effect, denied that he asked Whitmire what he meant by the
plant closing The Trial Examiner does not believe this denial, for the following reasons :
(1) No opportunity was provided the Trial Examiner to observe Paige's demeanor as a
witness ; (2) as noted above Paige went to see Gregory about it, the specific member of
management Whitmire had cited as cause of the rumor ; and (3 ) the equivocal nature of
Paige's testimony in the deposition as well as his candid admission of lack of memory as
to what Whitmire said to him, revealed by the following colloquy :
Q Do you now know how he said it?
A No
Q You know no more about it today than you did at that tine? [Referring to a
statement given to a Board agent sometime before July, when the deposition was
taken.]
A. That is right.
Q And at that time you did say, did you not, that you did not know how he said it?
A I did not know how he said it.
580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
When Gregory came to the plant the next morning he discharged Whitmire at
once, accusing him of "intimidating a customer." The employee has since that date
been refused reinstatement.
The above-described event is the sole item , so far as the Trial Examiner can
discover, offered in support of the Respondent's claim, in its answer, as being
"malicious, unlawful, and wrongful acts."
It appears to the Trial Examiner that the Respondent had striven to blow bubble
gum to the proportions of the Graf Zeppelin. It explodes under mere scrutiny.
The labored efforts to show that Seneca's business with the Respondent was large,
that Paige was frightened, and that the Respondent might have lost thousands of
dollars had Seneca gone elsewhere has small foundation in fact or likelihood. By
his own testimony Cooney made it clear that he had "settled" Paige's "fears" at
once, and nearly a full day before the discharge. His own testimony, also, es-
tablishes that the incident was of so little importance to him, the plant superin-
tendent, that he did not even bother to speak to Whitmire about it.
To Gregory, however, the reported incident apparently suggested a way to rid
the plant of its most active union leader-whom but a few days before he had been
unable to persuade to abandon his activity. That reprisal was his motive, and not
concern with loss of business, is indicated by the nature of the action he took.
By his own testimony he never, at any time, orally or by letter, made any effort
to reassure-Paige. But he at once ordered that Whitmire be barred from the plant-
although Cooney had permitted him without rebuke or warning to remain on the
job throughout the preceding day. Had management actually considered Whit-
mire's casual remark to have been "malicious, unlawful, and wrongful," it is rea-
sonable to suppose that Cooney, operating head of the plant, would have as readily
have come to that conclusion as Gregory, and have made at least some small effort
to question Whitmire.
Furthermore, it has been found that the rumor of the plant's probable closing was
rife in the plant. Gregory was partly responsible for it, if not wholly. It was so
common, as Parker's testimony quoted above shows, that this foreman made no
comment when Whitmire, in his presence, spoke to Gambrell about it. Finally, it
has also been found that management, in effect, perpetuated its own rumor, even
after Whitmire's discharge, by its letter to employees stating that the Union could
not make it keep the plant running 1 day.
In the face of such facts, it would be unrealistic to believe that the real reason
for Whitmire's discharge was his remark to Paige. The Trial Examiner is convinced
by the preponderance of evidence that it was not. The incident did, however, provide
a pretext, behind which Gregory attempted to hide his real motive: his desire to rid
the plant of its most active union leader just before an election in which the Com-
pany was taking an open , antiunion stand.
In summary, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the reason advanced
by the Respondent for Whitmire's dismissal is without merit. It is specifically
concluded and found that the discharge was discriminatory for the purpose of dis-
couraging membership and activity in the Union, and that it was designed to interfere
with, restrain , and coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act.
D. The layoffs of Hamilton, Stepp, and Higgins
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that Clarence N. Stepp, William B.
Higgins, and Evans S. Hamilton were laid off for a period of 1 week beginning
about April 29, 1954. General Counsel contends that the action was discriminatory,
to discourage union activity. The Respondent pleads that it was because of the
"willful and wrongful acts" of the three.
To focus at once upon the precipitating incident, the 3 employees visited Foreman
Grover R. Keith at his home on Saturday, April 24, 2 days after the election.
Events leading up to the visit are as follows: While at work on Friday, April 23,
a fellow employee came to Stepp's machine and squirted water on him from a test
bottle, while Foreman Keith watched. The same employee repeated the squirting,
this time with a hose. Observing that his foreman was grinning at him after the
second shower, Stepp turned the hose upon the other employee as the latter started
to leave. A couple of hours later Keith came to Stepp and said, "I am telling every-
body, and I want you to know it too-there are rules out there on that board and
from now on they are going to be gone by. . . You boys have got your Union
now . . . and the rules are going to be gone by from now on."
Later that day Stepp was told by other employees that Keith was going to "pink
slip" him-apparently a method of recording misconduct. Reaching home, Stepp
began to worry about it; he told his wife and she worried. The next morning, a
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 581
Saturday and nonworking day, he told his neighbor , Evans Hamilton, of his con-
cern and the latter suggested that they go to see Keith , whom he knew , and straighten
out the matter . Stepp agreed. As they started out of the latter 's place a third
employee, Higgins-on his way to see Hamilton-came by in his car , saw them,
and stopped . When they told Higgins their errand , he offered to drive them to
Keith 's place. They accepted. Higgins stopped his car in the road outside Keith's
house and did not thereafter leave it . Hamilton and Stepp walked up to Keith's
door and rapped . He came out and the three talked for several minutes.
In substance , there is slight difference in the testimony of the two employees and
Keith as to what was said during that visit . Hamilton told the foreman that Stepp
was upset about the incident , and thought the foreman was "picking on him," to
quote Keith . Keith denied picking on anyone. The matter was reconciled , and they
parted amicably. Keith, a witness for the Respondent , readily admitted that "no-
body threatened me," and when asked by the Respondent 's counsel if he "had any
fear" at the time, he replied : "I had no knowledge of what might occur there at the
time, I could not say." He further admitted that Hamilton "was not storming out at
me, anything like that. . . .
Yet Keith, for some reason , apparently reported the visit to higher authority.
The following Monday , April 26, Stepp was summoned to the personnel office.
There, in the presence of Keith and Personnel Manager Hardee, Supervisor Tony
Pearson told Stepp , after they had disposed of the water-squirting incident , "There
is one other little thing I want to remind you of . you and your friends making a
visit to Foreman Keith 's house. . I am absolutely not going to put up with that,
anything that has to be settled will be settled here at Cranston 's, not away from
Cranston . Is that clear '' . That will be all."
On Thursday, April 29, Stepp , Higgins, and Hamilton ( the latter two together)
were called into the same office, where Plant Superintendent Cooney merely called
their attention to the visit to Keith's house and told them they were to be laid off
for a week "while he checked into it."
A week or so later the three were permitted to return to work , but were not paid
for the time lost. It is undisputed that no 1 of the 3 was given any reason for the
loss of pay or what the result of Cooney 's "checking" was, if anything . It is also
uncontradicted that when Hamilton later noted that his pay was short , and he re-
marked to Personnel Manager Hardee, "you must have found us guilty of some-
thing," Hardee replied , "I don 't know if you are guilty of anything."
To the Trial Examiner it is significant that no member of management was ques-
tioned about the layoff-Keith 's testimony being limited to the incident of April 24.
The Trial Examiner is unable, therefore , to discern any evidence in the record to
support the following assertion in the Respondent 's brief:
When the Respondent learned of the incident, it was correct in thinking that
the purpose and probable result of such a visit was pure intimidation . Believ-
ing this, it was justified in its approach to the problem
No member of management testified as to his "thinking ," of any sort , or even
that he learned of the incident . And Keith, who was there, by his own testimony
clearly was not intimidated.
Plainly there is no merit to the reason advanced by the Respondent for the lay-
offs. The Trial Examiner specifically finds that no 1 of the 3 employees engaged
in "intimidation " of Keith, and that by visiting Keith they violated no rule then in
existence.
The real reason lies elsewhere . Hamilton had long been known by management
to be a union leader , even in previous organizational campaigns. As a union repre-
sentative he had attended a Board hearing about 2 weeks before the election. All
three had openly worn union buttons before the election on April 22. And as noted
above, Keith had spoken to Stepp , the day after the election , about having the
Union in there.
The Trial Examiner is convinced and finds that the discriminatory reprisal was
directed primarily against Hamilton , and against the others only incidentally.4
4 In his brief General Counsel argues that a coexistent reason for the discipline of the
three employees was to demonstrate , in reprisal , to the employees that the Union could
not assist them in grievances There well may be merit to this claim , in view of subse-
quent events more fully described . Not until the day the strike began did the Respondent
recede from its position that the Union could not be present at the first step of
the grievance procedure Thus , throughout negotiations until the strike the Respondent
was insisting that employees must be permitted to do precisely what Stepp , Higgins, and
Hamilton had been laid off for doing.
582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Under a similarly flimsy pretext , but a few days before, management had fired the
Union 's other prominent leader-Whitmire . The real motive , it is concluded and
found , was to discourage union membership and activity and coerce and restrain
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
E. The refusal to bargain
1. Continuing request to bargain
Documentary evidence requires the finding that as early as March 1954, the
Union was claiming majority representation among the Respondent 's employees,
seeking recognition as their bargaining agent, and requesting negotiations looking
toward a collective-bargaining agreement . Thus, a letter introduced into evidence
by the Respondent , signed by its counsel , and dated March 9, 1954, states:
Cranston Print Works Company has referred to me your letter of March 1,
with respect to recognition of your organization as bargaining agent.
Our client is not willing to recognize any bargaining representative until
such has been certified as by law provided.
Again, on April 13 , the Union repeated its request, its representative saying in part:
I further request that you set an early date for a conference at which time we
may consummate a collective bargaining agreement covering the heretofore
mentioned conditions of employment for the above described employees.
The Union won the election on April 22 , a fact plainly known to the Respondent
immediately after the results were announced by the Board. (A document bearing
the date of April 22 is in evidence , signed by three authorized observers for the
Respondent , attesting to the proper conduct of the election .) On April 30, the
Board issued its certification . On May 10, the Union again asked for recognition,
pointing out that it had by then been certified.
In his brief General Counsel urges , with merit in the opinion to the Trial Ex-
aminer, that the request for recognition and bargaining made before the election
plainly put the Respondent on notice that the Union sought to be accorded recog-
nition rights as soon as the Board election was held, if not earlier , and that the
request was continuing . It is so found .5
2. Plan of treatment
It is General Counsel 's claim that the Respondent, by unilateral action before
negotiation meetings began, by adamant positions maintained during negotiations,
and by persisting in repeating proposals to which it well knew the Union could not
agree without waiving the very rights won in the election , refused to bargain before
the strike began on July 17, and by such unfair labor practices caused the strike.
Between May 27 and July 17, inclusive , seven negotiating meetings were held:
May 27, June 21 and 22, and July 13, 14 , 16, and 17. The record contains a great
deal of oral testimony concerning these meetings , as well as many pages of docu-
ments, including purported minutes prepared by the Respondent after meetings had
occurred.
Seeking clarity in presentation , the Trial Examiner will attempt to appraise the
evidence , making factual findings and drawing legal conclusions according to the
subject matters in issue, instead of considering events in the actual order of
occurrence.
3. Plant rules of conduct
Despite the continuing request to negotiate concerning wages and working condi-
tions, and despite the Respondent's knowledge of the continuing request, almost im-
mediately after it knew the Union had won the election the Respondent began to
violate its legal obligation by changing unilaterally-without consulting the Union-
many existing plant rules . For example , it posted new and altered rules between the
election day and May 27 , when the first negotiating meeting took place , as follows:
1. On April 27, a rule requiring an employee to report to management the cause
of an absence before such absence occurred . Violation called for disciplinary action.
2. On May 6, a rule forbidding an employee to visit the smoking booths 15 minutes
before a shift change and 1 hour after. Violation called for disciplinary action.
3. On May 6, a rule forbidding employees to enter the plant more than 15 minutes
before the beginning of a shift . Violation called for disciplinary action.
e General Counsel cites N L R. B. v Burton-Dixie Corp , 210 F. 2d 199 (C. A. 10), enfg.
103 NLRB 880
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 583
4. On May 13, a rule requiring donations for deaths, etc., to be placed in a box at
the plant gate.
Also, on May 5 management posted an entirely revised list of "rules of conduct,"
violation of which would warrant discharge. One of the revised rules, referred to
briefly in section 111, B , above, is quoted:
19. Soliciting for contribution, membership in organizations, or for the benefit
of other outside plant activities. [Emphasis supplied.]
In the light of the finding already made that Gregory threatened an employee with dis-
charge if caught soliciting for the Union without restricting such prohibitions to work-
ing time, the Trial Examiner specifically finds that the above-quoted revised rule, ap-
parently still in effect at the time of the hearing, is so broad as to deprive employees
of rights clearly guaranteed by the Act. It is coercive, and violative of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.6
When specifically questioned on the point, Gregory could point to no other period
in the plant history when so many rules of conduct had been revised or posted in so
short a time. No substantial reason or credible necessity for many of these rules'
changes was offered by the Respondent's witnesses. A reasonable inference is that
management imposed them by way of reprisal and because the Union had won the
election. As has been found, before the election Gregory threatened that if the
Union got in he "would make it hard and fight it to the finish." And after the election
Foreman Keith warned another employee: "You boys have got your Union now ...
there are rules out there on that board and from now on they are going to be gone by."
Except as to rule 19, quoted above and found per se to be violative of the Act,
the Trial Examiner makes no finding that the rules thus posted were illegally re-
strictive of employee rights. The finding that they were posted in reprisal, however,
supports the conclusion that such posting was coercive, and violative of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
All such changes were made and published without consultation with or notification
to the Union, at a time when the Union was the legal bargaining representative of the
employees as to all matters affecting working conditions. The Respondent's action
in this respect constituted per se'refusal to bargain, even if taken before the date of
certification.?
Furthermore, with relation to such rules, the Respondent again violated Section
8 (a) (5) when its personnel manager, Hardee, on June 11, after the certification
and after formal negotiations had begun, summarily replied to the Union' s submission
of written grievances concerning rule changes, as follows:
In reply to alleged grievances Nos. 1 through 14, the Company does not recognize
the fact that any part of grievances Nos. 1 through 14 are a proper matter for a
grievance, and does not recognize the authority of the committee to raise these
questions.
It should be common knowledge among all men who have been employed by others
that rules which must be observed while working are, except for wages, the most con-
trolling factor of working conditions. To bar them as matters of negotiation, and to
deny the legally chosen representative its right to "raise these questions," constitute
clear and unmistakable failure on the part of the employer to meet his obligations
under the Act.8
Finally, the preponderance of credible evidence establishes that management
persisted in its refusal to negotiate concerning its unilateral rule changes up to and
including the date of the strike, July 17,9 thereby continuing to violate its statutory
ON. L R. B. v American Tube Bending Co., Inc., 205 F. 2d 45 (C. A. 2) ; also Johmston
Luton Mower Corporation, 110 NLRB 3955
' See Tennessee Valley Broadcasting Company, 83 NLRB 898, footnote 7, confirming a
policy most recently reiterated by the present Board in Valley City Furniture Company,
110 NLRB 1589, footnote 5
8 See Norfolk Shipbuilding d Drydock Corporation, 70 NLRB 391, 442, enfd. 172 F 2d
813 (C A 4), where employer refused to deal with certified union concerning grievances
6 The Trial Examiner does not believe the testimony of Hardee and Owens to the effect
that on July 17 the latter requested the Union to meet with him regarding these grievances
and that the Union declined This finding of disbelief is based upon (1) the Trial Ex-
aminer's careful observation of both witnesses while testifying upon this crucial point ;
(2) the fact that in the Respondent's draft of purported minutes of the July 17 meeting,
prepared and sent to the Union sometime in August, no mention is made of any offer on
the part of the Respondent to negotiate coned ring these grievances ; and (3 ) the inherent
584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obligations. The supporting events, in summary, are as follows: (1) On May 27
the Union orally protested the unilateral rule changes and management asked that
such grievances be submitted in writing; (2) between May 27 and June 11 the Union
submitted many such grievances in writing ; ( 3) on June 11 management replied
as above-quoted, rejecting both the grievances as proper subjects and the Union's
right to submit them, despite the plain indication in the Respondent 's own minutes
of the May 27 meeting that as of that date it would negotiate the matters as
grievances ; (4) at the negotiating meeting on June 21 , when the Union protested
management 's letter of June 11 , management 's top representative , Owens, said he
was not ready to discuss them and insisted that all future grievances must be signed
by the individual employee claiming himself aggrieved: (5) on June 22 Owens again
declined to discuss such grievances , but said , upon leaving the meeting , that al-
though he had no authority to alter his position of June 11 Hardee could discuss
them if he wished ; (6) on July 13, according to the Respondent 's own minutes
of the meeting, the Union proposed negotiating the plant rules but Owens replied,
"No, it is the Company privilege to set up and administer rules and regulations";
and (7 ) by the morning of July 17, just before the strike , management had not
retreated from its original position but persisted in reserving to itself the right to
determine and enforce , unilaterally , plant rules of conduct.1°
Ample substantial evidence also supports General Counsel 's claim , and the Trial
Examiner finds, that throughout actual negotiations up to and including the beginning
of the strike the Respondent refused to bargain concerning plant rules-those already
established and those which might be invoked in the future-during the existence
of the contract . Thus, by the Respondent 's own minutes of the June 22 meeting, as
submitted later to the Union , it is established that when the Union requested that
it be permitted to negotiate concerning plant rules, "Mr . Owens stated the Company
had the right to make reasonable rules and would do so." According to similar
minutes for July 13 • "Mr. Lisk [the union representative] wanted to know if we
wanted to negotiate our rules and made a part of the Contract Mr. Owens replied,
`No, it is the Company privilege to set up and administer rules and regulations.' "
In the minutes of the July 17 meeting , the day the strike began, nothing appears
to show that the Respondent had retreated from its original position of insisting
upon its right to make rules unilaterally . There is indication that on July 17 the
parties discussed certain rules already in effect and agreed that some of them might
be in any contract. The final written proposal by the Respondent to be submitted
before the strike was to the effect that after it had discharged an employee for violat-
ing some rule there might be later arbitration as to whether or not the employee
actually had violated the rule, but none as to the merit of the rule itself. The Trial
Examiner considers and concludes that by maintaining the positions , above de-
scribed , before the strike , the Respondent failed and refused to bargain.
4. Other changes in working conditions
Also shortly after the election, and without consultation with or notification to
the Union , the Respondent made numerous working-condition changes in various
departments, and thereafter refused to negotiate about them as grievances. For ex-
amples: (1) In the color shop-where Hamilton, the union leader above identified,
worked-the workload upon all employees was substantially increased and addi-
tional help denied them; ( 2) in the packing room management stopped providing
employees with relief help; (3) shortly after the election employees in the aging
department, previously allowed 8 hours overtime on Saturday to clean machines,
were reduced to 5 hours overtime; and (4) folders were given additional work as
well as additional pay. As to 3 of these 4 items, the Union protested in writing and,
as noted heretofore, in June Hardee rejected each of them as not being "a proper
matter for a grievance." And as with the plant rules, thereafter the Respondent
probabilities of the situation previously described and based upon the Respondent's own
documents-its refusal to considei these questions as proper grievances It is inciedible,
also, that the Union-so long deprived of its right to discuss the grievances and told in fact
that it had no right to submit them as grievances-should have declined an opportunity
to meet and negotiate concerning then
10 In Arnistrong Cork Co v N L R B , 211 F 2d 843 (C A 5), the court said • "Good
faith compliance with Sections 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act presupposes that an employer
will not alter existing 'conditions of employment' without first consulting the exclusive bar-
gaining representative selected by his employees, and granting it an opportuinty to nego-
tiate on any proposed changes "
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 585
continued its refusal to negotiate regarding these subjects up to and including the
beginning of the strike on July 17.
For the reasons advanced for the conclusions of the matter of rules of conduct,
the Trial Examiner likewise concludes that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1)
and (5) of the Act by its unilateral changing of working conditions, by its refusal
to consider them as grievances for negotiation , and by its refusal to negotiate con-
cerning them before July 17, the day of the strike.
And as in the case of plant rules, the Respondent also refused during negotiations
up to July 17 to accord to the Union its legal right to notice and consultation regarding
future changes in wages, hours, and working conditions. In its original proposal the
Respondent proposed that the Union agree to the following, quoted in part: "The
Union recognizes other rights and responsibilities belonging solely to the Company,
prominent among which, but by no means inclusive, are ... the scheduling of shifts
and hours of work ... the establishment of incentives, bonuses or job rates...." The
Union promptly protested that this proposal would require it to yield rights accorded
by law to the legal bargaining agent. The Respondent insisted. As a witness, Owens
admitted that not until after the strike did he make concession and agree to give the
Union "reasonable notice" before putting into effect job rates and changes in work
shifts. It is plain, and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, that at the time the
strike occurred, on July 17, the Respondent was refusing to bargain, as above de-
scribed, regarding changes in working conditions
5. Wage information
By letters dated May 10 and 13, even before the first negotiating meeting was held,
the Union specifically requested the Respondent to furnish it with a copy of the exist-
ing "wage scale, showing hourly rates, piece rates and average hourly earnings of
piece rated employees." This information was not forwarded by the Company to the
Union. The request was orally repeated at the meeting of May 27. At that meeting
the Respondent gave the Union a document containing some of the information, but
only code numbers and no names of the employees. Thereupon the union repre-
sentative asked for the missing information so "we could tell who and how much they
were making." Owens, for the Company, said he would have this information pre-
pared, as well as still missing information concerning the piece -rated employees.
Three weeks passed, and the information had not been provided. At the meeting
on June 21 the union representative again requested it. Owens said it was not yet
ready, but would be. Another 3 weeks passed. On July 13, at a negotiating meeting,
the Union repeated its request. Owens gave the union representative the earnings
report and names of only 8 individuals-in a plant employing more than 200. When
asked where the rest of the information was, Owens replied that it had not been pre-
pared, but would be. It was not provided to the Union between that date and the day
of the strike, July 17.
Not until August 13, long after the strike was over and the Respondent had been
served with the charge alleging refusal to bargain, was any list identifying names and
classifications given to the Union. _
No credible reason was advanced by management for its nearly 3-month delay
in providing the requested information. It rests, apparently from the Respondent's
brief, upon the denials of Owens and Hardee that such information was requested.
Their denials are wholly unbelievable and are not credited by the Trial Examiner.
The above-cited letters from the Union of May 10 and 13 are specific and clear, and
the Respondent concedes having received them. Owens' denial that any request was
repeated on June 21 finds clear refutation in an exhibit placed in evidence by the
Respondent itself-the first draft of management's purported minutes of the June 21
meeting. From them the following is quoted:
8. Wage information. The Union suggested that the Company furnish it
with the low, high and average earnings of all piece workers.... The Company
took the position that it was not willing to divulge personal earnings....
Mere unwillingness , however, is not a valid defense , as the Board and courts have
found in numerous cases. Nor does the Respondent claim that the complexity of
the information requested made compliance difficult. Other company minutes show
that its office has IBM equipment, and far more complicated data was provided to
General Counsel, upon his demand before the hearing, within 20 days.
The record is not clear as to whether or not all of the requested information had
been provided the Union before the hearing. In any event, it is found that by
the time of the beginning of the strike, July 17, it had not been produced. Whether
considered , as an effective refusal , in view of the admitted unwillingness of the Com-
586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pany to "divulge personal earnings," or as stalling tactics, the Respondent's failure
to comply with the Union's reasonable request constituted a failure to bargain in
good faith."
6. Grievance procedure
In its first written contract proposal to the Union, in June, the Respondent asked the
Union to agree, to waive, in effect, its legal right to be present at the first step of
any grievance procedure. The pertinent language of the proposal:
all grievances respecting hours, wages or other conditions of employment ...
shall ... be handled as follows:
(a) Between the employee and his Supervisor. The Supervisor shall have a
period of two work days in which to give the employee his answer....
When this proposal came up for negotiation on June 22, the Union protested against
such deprivation of its right to be present. Owens declared that he must have a section
of this type in any contract. During negotiations later that same day, the company
representative presented the Union with a proposed "Grievance Procedure Form"
which provided for an employee and his supervisor only in step 1. The Union ob-
jected again and asked that the language of the law permitting the presence of a
union representative be included.
On July 13, at the next meeting, the Union submitted a written counterproposal
on this subject containing the provision: "that the Union representative has been given
opportunity to be present at each stage of the presentation and the adjusment."
Owens said he would not agree to this.
On July 17, before the strike, Owens yielded in his position only to the extent that
he said he would "give consideration" to the Union's proposal that this section- contain
language complying with the requirements of the law.
Finally, during the course of the strike, on July 23, Owens agreed to include ap-
propriate language. It was included in another written proposal offered to the Union
on July 26, and was agreed upon by the parties on July 30.
The foregoing findings are based upon the credible testimony of Lisk, the union
representative at the meetings , and documents placed in evidence by the Respondent
itself. The Trial Examiner can place no reliance upon Owens' testimony, flatly con-
tradicted by Lisk, to the effect that as early as July 13 he withdrew from his posi-
tion concerning step 1 of the grievance procedure. The Respondent's draft minutes
for the morning of July 13 corroborate Lisk's testimony that he submitted the
counterproposal "on individuals to present grievances," and the same minutes indi-
cate "no discussion" at this time. The draft minutes for the afternoon session, on
this point, read: "Owens referred to Grievance Procedure (page 20a) employee,
shop steward & supervisor-however under Article 1, Section 2 page this language
(Owen read new new sub section) Lisk objected to word deal-Owen said we would
use discuss if they wanted it.. . But the final minutes sent to the Union, on
the above point, states: "The Company's proposed grievance procedure on page
20 A was briefly discussed as also was the Company's proposed modification to its
Article 1, Section 2, which Owen read to the group. This was left open." Had
Owens in fact agreed to the Union's request on this important point, at any time
that day, it is reasonable to believe that the minutes would have so indicated. The
only proposal to amend the grievance article, in written form and offered by the
Respondent that day, mentions no word about step 1. The first written mention of
the Company's permitting a steward to be present is contained in its proposed contract
submitted to the Union on July 26, referred to above.
From the preponderance of credible evidence the Trial Examiner concludes that
as of July 17, by persisting in its refusal to permit a union representative to be present
at the first step in any grievance procedure, and its refusal to agree to include in any
agreement the substance of its legal requirements in this respect, the Respondent
failed and refused to bargain in good faith.12
See Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, enfd. 217 F. 2d 593 (C A 4) That the
present Board majority still holds to this view is shown in Valley City Furniture Company,
110 NLRB 1589, footnote 5. See also Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation, 110 NLRB
2097
12 Bethlehem Steel Company, Shipbuilding Division, and Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
Shipyard, Inc., 89 NLRB 341. Section 9 (a) of the Act, in pertinent part, provides that
employees may appeal to an employer directly "Provided . . . that the bargaining repre-
sentative has been given an opportunity to be present at such adjustment."
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 587
7. Less desirable working conditions
During the negotiations before July 17 the Respondent proposed that the Union
agree to bind the employees, by contract, to less desirable working conditions than
they had enjoyed before the election. The General Counsel urges that such tactics
be determined to be elements of bad -faith bargaining.
First: In its initial contract proposals , submitted to the Union on June 14, man'
agement proposed that minimum hourly rates for men and women workers should
be 80 and 75 cents, respectively. The Company's established minimum hourly
rates were then $ 1.12 and $ 1.02, according to oral information given to the Union
on May 27. The Respondent 's own purported minutes of the July 14 meeting,
just before the strike began , state that it proposed to the Union that the existing
minima be lowered to $1 for women and $1 . 10 for men . And even during the
strike, in its proposal of July 26, the same reduced minima for men was offered.
Second: In its initial proposal the Respondent asked the Union to agree that all
employees must have worked at least 1 , 500 hours in a given year to receive a vaca-
tion ; when the proposal was discussed at the meeting of June 21 , Owens admitted
that this qualification or restriction had not been imposed in the past .. The Respondent
persisted in this demand and it still appeared in its proposal of August 9 after the
strike.
Third: In its first seniority proposal the Respondent set up various "factors"-such
as "knowledge , training , ability , skill," etc.-to govern the order of layoff and recall
of employees . This proposal was made despite the fact that the current practice,
as described in a document given to the Union the last of May , was as follows:
Layoffs for lack of work will be made on a Departmental Seniority basis. The
last person in the department will be the first to be laid off and the last to be
recalled.
The newly introduced "factors" had no part in the existing policy. In its proposal
of August 9, after the strike , the Company still insisted upon its original proposal
and the subject, as the Respondent 's minutes show, was one of the bones of
contention on July 16, just before the strike.
Fourth: Not until after the strike began did the Company recede even to a
degree from its previously maintained insistence that any contract must contain a
clause requiring an employee, upon penalty of discharge, to notify management at
least 6 hours before a shift change if he was to be absent. It turned aside the
Union 's reasonable plea that a sudden illness might well make such notification
impossible.
The Union strenuously objected to each of the above-described proposals, yet the
Respondent either insisted outright upon them or repeatedly submitted them for
negotiation.
As examples of the Respondent's attitude at the negotiating table, the Trial Ex-
aminer considers the above items to be ample support of General Counsel's claim
of bad-faith bargaining. Particularly is this conclusion inescapable in the context
of discrimination, coercion, and acts of per se refusals to bargain, previously found.
The conduct of the Respondent in the above respects, the Trial Examiner believes,
is even more demonstrative of bad faith than that described by the court in
N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,13 when it said:
It is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and-in good faith
could have supposed that this proposal had the slightest chance of acceptance
by a self-respecting union, or even that it might advance the negotiations by
affording a basis of discussion , rather, it looks more like a stalling tactic by a
party bent upon maintaining the pretense of bargaining.
8. Strike-referendum clause
Four days before the strike began the Respondent thrust into the negotiations
another demand, the purpose of which General Counsel urges was to divest the
Union of its authority as the bargaining agent of the employees . Its proposal- of
July 13 reads:
If a new agreement cannot be reached within sixty (60) days after the ex-
piration date of this contract, the union shall have the right to strike, pro-
13 205 F. 2d 131 ( C. A. 1).
588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
vided, a majority of the employees voting in the bargaining unit shall have
voted in favor thereof in a secret ballot referendum held under the supervision
of an impartial State or Federal agency designated by the union.
Although the Respondent thereafter receded somewhat from its original demand
that the Union bind itself not to strike for 60 days after the expiration of any con-
tract, Owens insisted even during and after the strike that the referendum must be
provided for in the contract. The clause appears in the company proposal of July
26, and again in its proposal of August 9.
Counsel for the Respondent contends, in effect, that the Company had a right to
propose anything and that the Union could have, had it wished, waived any right
that it possessed under the law. General Counsel claims, however, that repeatedly
proposing such relinquishment of rights, in the face of the Union's consistent re-
fusal, amounted to constructive insistence, with the plain indication that no agree-
ment would be signed unless the Union yielded. Under the circumstances of dis-
crimination, coercion, and bad-faith bargaining in general, heretofore described, the
Trial Examiner is of the opinion that General Counsel's argument has real merit.
This case is not comparable, in substance or even casual appearance, to the facts
in United States Gypsum Company, 109 NLRB 1113, wherein the same Trial Ex-
aminer found, with Board adoption, that the mere proposal of a similar referen-
dum was not bad-faith bargaining, and which counsel for the Respondent here cites.
Specifically, the Trial Examiner finds that the Respondent here both proposed and
insisted upon the referendum in bad faith, and that by injecting this element into
negotiation the Respondent was motivated, not by any sincere desire to reach agree-
ment with the Union, but by its professed intent, expressed even before the elec-
tion, of "fighting" the bargaining agent of its employees.
Conclusions in Summary
As described in detail above, management made it plain by written announce-
ment and by oral threats, even before the election, that if the employees chose the
Union as their bargaining agent they would suffer and not benefit. One union
leader was discriminatorily dismissed, another was discriminatorily laid off. Imme-
diately upon learning of the result of the election the Respondent published new and
restrictive plant rules. It made changes in working conditions and pay without con-
sultation with or notification to the Union.
The Respondent's clearly expressed intent was made concrete at the bargaining
table. Early in negotiations Owens declared that bargaining would produce no eco-
nomic benefits for the employees, and the minutes prepared by the Respondent, up
to the time of the strike, establish beyond question that Owens made no retreat from
his earlier resolve. Even after the strike, management's proposals show that not
only would it not yield a point in the Union's economic requests, but even insisted
that the very subject of wages should not be raised in the bargaining for 6 months
after the contract was signed.
As counsel for the Respondent claims in his brief, during the course of negotia-
tions management did make some concessions. But they were purely negative con-
cessions. Having earlier demanded that the Union agree to waive many of its rights
under the law, the Respondent later and in some respects modified such de-
mands-the only appreciable concessions made throughout the negotiations up to
the strike.
The strategy of the Respondent appears to have been of the military variety-vig-
orous offense as the best defense and wholly consistent with Gregory's promise to
"fight" the Union. From April 22 and until July 17-and indeed up to the present
day-the Union has been mainly engaged in striving to regain for the employees
the rights and working conditions they had enjoyed before the election. It cannot
be reasonably said that such strategy seeks peaceable agreement, but rather that it
aims toward complete discrediting of the bargaining agent and its eventual defeat
and decertification.
In short, for the reasons set out above, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds
that since the day the Union became the legal bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit,14 April 22, 1954, the Respondent has failed and
14 The complaint alleges, the answer in effect admits, and the Trial Examiner finds that
the appropriate unit consists of All production and maintenance employees at the
Fletcher plant, excluding all executives, supervisors, clerical and professional employees,
and guards, its defined in the Act, and all printers and printers' apprentices.
CRANSTON PRINT WORKS COMPANY 589
refused to bargain with the Union in good faith, and thereby has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act.
By its unfair labor practices, including the refusal to bargain, the discriminatory
discharge and layoffs, and by coercion, as found above, the Respondent caused
employees to strike on July 17, 1954.
Since it caused the strike by its unfair labor practices, the Respondent was legally
required to reinstate the striking employees upon their unconditional offer to return
to work. Many such strikers were not reinstated, others were permitted to come
back only to less desirable shifts. The Trial Examiner considers and finds that by
such action, unilaterally selecting the individuals and the shifts for reinstatement
after a strike caused by its own unfair labor practices, the Respondent continued
to refuse to bargain in good faith with the Union.
F. The strike and refusal to reinstate strikers
During the afternoon of July 17 a number of the employees, following a union
meeting at which the Company's conduct during negotiations was reported, went
on strike. They were joined by others on July 19, the following workday.
It is agreed by the parties that on July 27 the strike was at an end, and an un-
conditional offer to return was made by the Union for all strikers. Most of the
strikers reported for work that day. Many of them, listed in Appendix A, attached
hereto, were told that their jobs had been filled and were not reinstated to any
job on any shift. Others, listed in Appendix B, attached hereto, were placed on
shifts other than the one they had worked upon before the strike. The prepon-
derance of credible evidence shows, and the Trial Examiner finds, that putting an
employee upon a shift other than the one previously worked upon did not consti-
tute full reinstatement. Testimony of management witnesses establishes that the
changes were made only because replacements had been hired during the course
of the strike.
General Counsel contends that the Respondent's failure to reinstate the returning
strikers to their regular jobs was discriminatory within the meaning of Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act. Since it has been found above that the strike was caused by
the Respondent's unfair labor practices, the Respondent was obligated, under the
law, to reinstate all strikers-absent reasons not material here-to their same or
substantially equivalent positions. There is merit, therefore, to General Counsel's
contention. Ample evidence sustains that portion of his complaint.
During the strike Foreman Gambrell, previously identified, urged employee
Marion Corn to return to work, telling him that the Company was going to hire new
employees and if he would come back he would not lose his job. During the strike
Gambrell also told Corn that the employees might as well come back because the
Company was not going to "give us any contract," according to the employee's un-
contradicted testimony.
Gambrell's solicitation of Corn's return, under threat of losing his job, was
coercive, and violative of the Act. His statement that the Company would not
sign a contract with the Union bears significantly upon the issue of refusal to bar-gain. (See Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., supra.)
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above, have
a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the
Trial Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
. Having found that the Respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of Boyce A. Whitmire, Jr., Clarence N. Stepp, Evans S.
Hamilton, William B. Higgins, and the employees listed in Appendixes A and
590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B, the Trial Examiner will recommend that the Respondent: (a) offer Whitmire
and the employees listed in Appendixes A and B immediate and full reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges; (b) make whole Whitmire from the date
of his dismissal to the date of offer of reinstatement; Stepp, Hamilton, and Higgins
for the period of their discriminatory layoff; the employees listed on Appendix A
from July 27, 1954, until the date of offer of reinstatement; and the employees
listed in Appendix B 15 for any loss of wages, if any, caused by the discriminatory
transfer to other shifts upon reemployment after the strike. Back pay shall be
computed in accordance with the Board policy set out in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289. It will further be recommended that the Respondent dis-
miss, if necessary, any replacements hired since the strike began on July 17, 1954.
Having found that the Respondent has unlawfully refused to bargain with the
Union, the Trial Examiner will recommend that, upon request, it bargain in good
faith, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement . It will also be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist
from specific coercive conduct, found herein.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices found above, the commission
by the Respondent of similar and other unfair labor practices may reasonably be
anticipated. The remedy should be coextensive with the threat. It will therefore
be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner
upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Boyce A.
Whitmire, Jr., Clarence N. Stepp, Evans S. Hamilton, William B. Higgins, and
the employees listed in Appendixes A and B, and thereby discouraging concerted
activity and membership in the above-named labor organization, the Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at the Fletcher plant of the Re-
spondent, excluding all executives, supervisors, clerical and professional employees,
and guards, as defined in the Act, and all printers and printers' apprentices, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
4. The above-named Union was on April 22, 1954, and since that date has been
at all times, the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on and after April 22, 1954, to bargain collectively with the above-
named Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees in the afore-
said unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
ss The Trial Examiner notes apparent and probably Inadvertent inconsistencies in cer-
tain names appearing in the Appendixes, the complaint, and the record of applications and
recall prepared by the Respondent and placed in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit
No 48 For example, the complaint alleges that Clarence Hill was not reinstated ; Gen-
eral Counsel's Exhibit No 48 shows him as having been placed on the third shift. Also, no
Arthur Merrill, named in the complaint, is listed on General Counsel's Exhibit No. 4'8. It is
assumed that, In the event of compliance with these recommendations, full access to the
Respondent's records will be made available, and inaccuracies, if any, corrected.
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY 591
APPENDIX A
Norman Wilkie Eugene Anders Tony Hoots
Vernon Rhodes Clyde Jones Joseph King
R. L. Roper John London Parlie Baker
Paul Hutchison Arthur Merrill John Hill
William C. Thomas Willie Hoots Jack Gasperman
Ralph W. McMinn Tommie L. Crouch Charlie E. Roberts
James V. Brown Josephine Smith Kenneth Garrett
Hugh Marshall Nora Dill Hugh Hoots
Charles Burrell Madge Signam Joseph Brooks
Millard Corn Leonard Tabor Estel Gordon
Marion Corn Carm Quinn Adger Burns
Lee Edwards Ella Mae Anders James L. Millinax
Arthur Case Charles Wright Berlin Buckner
Carrol Bryson Forest Souther Clarence Hill
Rudolph Stepp Lester F. Emory Elbert Nanney
Euston Lusk Richard Buckner Clyde Thomas
Adger Sexton Bob Melton Wm. J. McLaughlin
James R. Baker John Nix Billy W. Beddingsfield
Vollie Whitaker William R. King Myrtle Livingston
Wade Williams Herbert Capps Ridgeway Russell
Vestil Edwards Orvale Hyder
APPENDIX B
Henry Russell George Justice James F. Sexton
Thurn Bagwell J. D. McClure Joseph N. Boone
Homer Isreal Laughran Stepp ('d. D. Rhodes
June Middleton Calvin Wright James Davidson
Arvil Franklin James Hyder John J. Cagle
Samuel Redrick Robert Bryson Edward Willis
Tommy Young Ray Davis Ben Walden
A. L. Fortner Willie Gibbs Charles Qualls
E. S. Hamilton Hugh Rutledge Redmon Jackson
William B. Higgins Paul Culberson James D. Thompson
James Barnett C. F. Hollingsworth Vernon Drake
John F. Bobo Ernest Justice Tom Collins
Lige Franklin Clarence Stepp Stanbury Franklin
Eastman Kodak Company and Film Technicians of the Motion
Picture Industry , Local 683, of the International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Oper-
ators of the United States and Canada , AFL-CIO , Petitioner.
Case No. 21-RC-4118. February 27, 1956
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Norman H. Greer, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain
employees of the Employer.
115 NLRB No. 91.
1