CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 10, 2018

367 NLRB No. 14 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

367 NLRB No. 14
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center and
its Successor 201 New Road Operations, LLC
d/b/a Linwood Care Center and 1199 SEIU
United Healthcare Workers East. Cases 04–CA–
146362, 04–CA–146670, 04–CA–148705 and 04–
CA–165109
October 10, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND EMANUEL
On April 5, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions1 and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision2 and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions4 only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order, and
to adopt his recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.5
1. We reverse the judge’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to

1 There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that Labor Manage-
ment Consultants employees Jon Buress and Dan Bryan were the Re-
spondent’s agents under Sec. 2(13) of the Act.
2 Other violations that were alleged in the complaint have been sev-
ered and resolved. CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center and
its successor 201 New Road Operations, LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Cen-
ter, 364 NLRB No. 154 (2016) (Linwood I) (soliciting employees to sign
a decertification petition, soliciting grievances from employees and
promising to remedy them in order to discourage employees from sup-
porting the Union, telling employees that no changes in working condi-
tions would be made unless they got rid of the Union or a collective-
bargaining agreement was signed, coercively interrogating employees
about their union sympathies, and threatening employees that continuing
to support the Union would be futile).
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility de-
terminations. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
We adopt the judge’s findings that the Respondent, by Director of
Nursing Valerie Lowman, violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by interrogating new em-
ployees about their union sympathies and by creating an impression that
their union activities were under surveillance. The Respondent’s excep-
tions to these findings are solely based on the judge’s credibility resolu-
tions, which we have adopted in full. We further adopt the judge’s
process employee Mary Jo Halpin’s request for a schedule
change.6 As set forth in the judge’s decision and in the
record, Halpin testified that before the Union arrived on
the scene, the Respondent had “a procedure by which she
could request a different work schedule,” and she “put [her
request] in writing and g[a]ve it to” anyone in “human re-
sources.” In December 2014, Halpin submitted a written
request for a different work schedule to Director of Human
Resources Rose Pryzchodzki. Pryzchodzki said that she
“would get back” to Halpin about her request. Halpin af-
terwards asked Pryzchodzki if she “heard anything about
[her] being able to switch . . . days.” Pryzchodzki replied
that Director of Nursing Valerie Lowman told her that
they could not “make any changes” because of “the nego-
tiations with the Union.” Halpin asked Pryzchodzki when
she thought there would be a change. Pryzchodzki said
that the next negotiations were February 2015 and that she
would not know anything until at least then.
An employer negotiating with a newly certified bargain-
ing representative is prohibited under Section 8(a)(5) from
altering established terms and conditions of employment
without first giving the union an opportunity to bargain
about the contemplated change. See NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 743 (1962). To establish a violation under Sec-
tion 8(a)(5), the General Counsel must prove that the Re-
spondent has made a change to an existing term or condi-
tion of employment without first giving the Union a rea-
sonable opportunity to bargain concerning it. Motor Car
findings, for the reasons he stated, that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing the parties’ agreement concern-
ing the Union’s access to its facility and by unreasonably delaying in
furnishing information the Union requested about personnel files of dis-
ciplined employees. Lastly, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of complaint
allegations that the Respondent, by Buress and Bryan, violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by creating the impression of surveillance concerning employee
support for the Union.
4 The judge neglected to include Conclusions of Law in his decision.
We shall correct this inadvertent omission.
5 Although the complaint did not allege, and the judge did not find,
that the Respondent generally failed and refused to recognize and bargain
with the Union, the judge’s recommended Order included language re-
served for such a violation. We shall correct this error by substituting a
limited bargaining order appropriate to the violations of Sec. 8(a)(5) that
we have found. We shall also modify the judge’s recommended Order
to conform to the violations otherwise found herein and to the Board’s
standard remedial language, and to correct the judge’s inadvertent omis-
sion of a “narrow” cease-and-desist order. Finally, we shall substitute a
new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
6 The complaint did not allege, and the General Counsel did not argue
in his posthearing brief to the judge, that the Respondent unilaterally
changed its procedures for dealing with requests to change employees’
schedules. In the absence of relevant exceptions, we do not reach the
issue of whether the judge acted properly in finding this unalleged viola-
tion sua sponte.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dealers Association of Greater Kansas City, 225 NLRB
1110, 1112 (1976).
The General Counsel bears the burden of establishing
that the Respondent altered the status quo. Here, the judge
defined the status quo as a procedure under which employ-
ees were allowed to make written requests for schedule
changes to the Human Resources department. Contrary to
the judge, we find that the record fails to demonstrate any
departure from that status quo.
To begin, it is undisputed that in December 2014, Hal-
pin submitted a written request to Pryzchodzki to change
her work schedule, as she had done prior to the Union’s
arrival. Thus, the Respondent maintained the status quo
by allowing Halpin to submit to the Human Resources de-
partment a written request to change her schedule. That
Pryzchodzki did not approve Halpin’s request immedi-
ately does not establish a change in the status quo when
there is no evidence that the Respondent had always ap-
proved such requests in the past.7 Compare Water’s Edge,
293 NLRB 465, 465 (1989) (employer violated Sec.
8(a)(5) when it adopted new procedures for changing
work schedules; before the union was elected, employees
were never denied the right to make a change so long as
they found a replacement, but after the election, the em-
ployer sometimes rejected proposed replacements), enfd.
in relevant part 14 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1994).
Similarly, the judge’s finding that the Respondent re-
fused to process Halpin’s request is not supported by the
record. As stated above, Pryzchodzki did not say that the
Respondent would not change Halpin’s work schedule.
Pryzchodzki said that it could not change Halpin’s sched-
ule at that time because of “the negotiations with the Un-
ion.” That a reasonable person would understand the Re-
spondent was delaying the processing of her request rather
than refusing to process it is shown by Halpin’s follow-up
question about when a change would be made. Halpin did
not testify regarding how quickly the Respondent had pro-
cessed prior schedule change requests.8 Thus, there is no
evidence in the record establishing that a delay in respond-
ing to her request reflects a change to the status quo. The
lack of evidence as to this matter weighs against the

7 Indeed, Halpin acknowledged that there may be situations where she
or another employee would want a schedule change but the Respondent
could not accommodate the change.
8 For an employer’s practice to become an established term and con-
dition of employment that cannot be changed without first providing the
union notice and opportunity to bargain, it must occur with sufficient
regularity and frequency that employees would reasonably expect the
practice to continue or recur on a regular and consistent basis. See
Sunoco, Inc., 349 NLRB 240, 244 (2007).
9 Because there is insufficient evidence establishing that the Respond-
ent changed its procedure of processing employees’ requests to change
their work schedules, Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236
General Counsel. Therefore, we find that there is insuffi-
cient record evidence to support the judge’s unfair labor
practice finding.9
2. We also reverse the judge’s finding that the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling Halpin that it would
not process her request because it was in negotiations with
the Union. According to the credited testimony by Halpin,
Pryzchodzki told her that the Respondent “can’t . . . make
any changes” to Halpin’s work schedule because of “the
negotiations with the Union” (emphasis added). Stated
differently, Pryzchodzki simply communicated to Halpin
that the Respondent was obligated to negotiate with the
Union regarding any changes to employees’ work sched-
ules.
This response was in conformity with the Respondent’s
statutory obligation to bargain with the Union over
changes to employee schedules, which is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.10 See Bottom Line Enterprises, 302
NLRB 373, 374 (1991) (where the parties are engaged in
contract negotiations, an employer must refrain from im-
plementing changes to terms and conditions of employ-
ment “unless and until an overall impasse has been
reached in bargaining for the agreement as a whole”),
enfd. mem. sub nom. Master Window Cleaning, Inc. v.
NLRB, 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Meat Cut-
ters, Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965)
(holding that “the particular hours of the day and the par-
ticular days of the week during which employees shall be
required to work” are mandatory subjects of bargaining).
It was lawful for Pryzchodzki to convey to Halpin that
the Respondent was no longer free to change employees’
work schedules unilaterally. Accordingly, we dismiss the
complaint allegation that Pryzchodzki’s statement vio-
lated the Act.
3. The complaint alleged that the Respondent unlaw-
fully imposed discretionary discipline and suspended
and/or discharged several unit employees without prior
notice to the Union and without affording the Union an
opportunity to bargain. The judge correctly dismissed this
allegation on the ground that then-existing precedent im-
posed no pre-implementation duty to bargain over
(1994), enfd. 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1090
(1997), cited by the judge, is inapposite. In that case, there was no dis-
pute that the employer discontinued an established merit-increase pro-
gram that was fixed as to timing and criteria. Thus, in Daily News of Los
Angeles, there was a change, and the issue presented was whether the
rule of Katz applied to that change. Here, in contrast, the record evidence
does not establish a change.
10 The record is silent on the effective date of the schedule change
Halpin requested. Therefore, there is no need to determine the parties’
respective rights and obligations if it had been shown that Halpin re-
quested a schedule change that would take effect before February 2015.
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 3
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
discretionary discipline.11 The judge, however, found that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to
promptly notify the Union of the discharges and suspen-
sions of the unit employees after it discharged or sus-
pended them.12 The Respondent contends that the judge’s
finding must be reversed because the violation found was
neither alleged nor fully and fairly litigated. We find merit
in the Respondent’s contention.
The complaint does not allege that the Respondent vio-
lated the Act by failing to provide post-implementation
notice of the discipline. Nor did the General Counsel seek
to amend the complaint at the hearing to include this alle-
gation. Further, throughout the proceeding, the General
Counsel exclusively focused on the Respondent’s failure
to provide pre-implementation notice, and he did not con-
tend in his posthearing brief to the judge that the Respond-
ent’s failure to provide post-implementation notice was
also unlawful. Under these circumstances, we find that
the Respondent did not have adequate notice that the judge
would make findings of violations of the Act based on an
unalleged failure to provide post-implementation notice.
See Piqua Steel Co., 329 NLRB 704, 704 fn. 4 (1999)
(finding that where complaint alleged only unlawful dis-
charge, employer was not on notice that its failure to recall
was also at issue); WXON-TV, 289 NLRB 615, 616–617
(1988) (finding that where complaint alleged only an un-
lawful failure to bargain over the decision to eliminate the
production department, respondent’s refusal to bargain
over the effects of that decision was not at issue), enfd.
876 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even assuming
the issue of post-implementation bargaining is closely
connected to the complaint allegation of a failure to en-
gage in pre-implementation bargaining, the parties did not
litigate the former issue. See Pergament United Sales, 296
NLRB 333, 334 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, we reverse the judge’s finding of this unal-
leged and unlitigated violation.13
4. The judge found that the Respondent’s agents Buress
and Bryan committed numerous violations of Section

11 Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 NLRB 396 (2012), held that employers have
a duty to bargain before imposing discretionary discipline under certain
circumstances, but that decision had been invalidated by the Supreme
Court prior to the issuance of the judge’s decision in this case. See NLRB
v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014). In Total Security Management
Illinois 1, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 106 (2016), the Board reaffirmed the
rationale of the Alan Ritchey decision and held that discretionary disci-
pline is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and therefore employers may
not impose discretionary discipline of a serious nature without first af-
fording the union notice and opportunity to bargain, subject to certain
exceptions. However, the Board also decided to apply that holding pro-
spectively only. Because this case was pending when Total Security
Management issued, the holding of that decision does not apply here.
Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s dismissal of this complaint
8(a)(1). The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s
failure to find that Buress and Bryan also committed other
violations of Section 8(a)(1). Those violations were al-
leged in the complaint, but the judge, while making rele-
vant findings of fact, did not specifically address them.
We do so below, based on the judge’s findings of fact,
which are uncontested.14
(a) We find that the Respondent, by Buress, violated
Section 8(a)(1) by (1) soliciting employee Harry Waugh’s
grievances, thereby impliedly promising him improved
working conditions, (2) promising Waugh better working
conditions and terms of employment if employees voted
to get rid of the Union, (3) promising increased staffing
and retroactive pay increases in order to discourage
Waugh and other employees from supporting the Union,
and (4) telling Waugh that a pay increase could not be
made because of the Union. See, e.g., Regency House of
Wallingford, Inc., 356 NLRB 563, 563 (2011) (soliciting
employees’ grievances and thereby impliedly promising
to remedy them violated Section 8(a)(1)); Frank Leta
Honda, 321 NLRB 482, 489–490 (1996) (telling employ-
ees that wages were frozen because of the union or be-
cause employees supported the union violated Section
8(a)(1)); Tyson Foods, 311 NLRB 552, 566–567 (1993)
(respondent’s message that tied future wage increases and
bonuses to the decertification efforts violated Section
8(a)(1)).
(b) We find that the Respondent, by Bryan, violated
Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting employee Cassandra Mor-
ton’s grievances and impliedly promising to remedy them
in order to discourage her from supporting the Union. See,
e.g., Regency House of Wallingford, Inc., above. How-
ever, for the reasons discussed below, we find that the Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) when Bryan, at
the same meeting, told Morton that the Union was “not a
good union” and that “[employees] can get another un-
ion.”
Section 8(c) of the Act gives employers the right to ex-
press their views about unionization or a particular union
allegation. In affirming the judge’s dismissal, we find it unnecessary to
pass on the merits of the Board’s decision in Total Security Management.
12 In his decision, the judge inadvertently stated that the Union learned
of the discharges of Dawn Apella and Anthony Barker from the Re-
spondent’s response to the Union’s information request, when in fact the
Union learned of the discharges of Rose Brewer and Barker through the
information request. This inadvertent error does not affect our disposi-
tion of this case.
13 Because the issue of post-implementation notice is not properly be-
fore the Board, it is unnecessary to address the merits of that issue.
14 We find it unnecessary to pass, however, on the General Counsel’s
exceptions to the judge’s failure to make any factual and legal findings
as to complaint allegations that the Respondent, by Bryan, violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by soliciting grievances from employee Lisa Brown. Any such
findings would be cumulative and would not affect the remedy.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as long as those communications do not threaten reprisals
or promise benefits. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 617 (1969).15 By stating that the Union was “not
a good union,” Bryan simply expressed his opinion about
the Union. Further, he made no threats or promises to em-
ployees based on whether they chose to sign the decertifi-
cation petition. See Poly-America, Inc., 328 NLRB 667,
669 (1999) (finding that the respondent did not violate the
Act when it informed employees that the union was “no
good,” had threatened to burn the plant, and would charge
up to $300 in weekly or monthly fees), affd. in part and
revd. in part 260 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2001). Bryan’s state-
ment that employees “can get another union” conveyed
only the truism that employees could select a different un-
ion shortly after the Union’s certification year expired.
Thus, under Section 8(c) of the Act, Bryan’s statements
cannot constitute an unfair labor practice.
Nor do we believe a different result is warranted by the
fact that after making these statements, Bryan solicited
Morton to sign a decertification petition in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).16 It is undisputed that Bryan’s statements
about the Union are alleged as a separate violation from
his unlawful solicitation to sign a petition against the Un-
ion. Further, Bryan’s expression of views about the Un-
ion, which did not refer to decertification, cannot be linked
to his request to sign the decertification petition just be-
cause they occurred in the same conversation. See Flying
Foods, 345 NLRB 101, 105–106 (2005) (employer’s law-
ful campaign video encouraging employees to think about
their decision to sign an authorization card cannot be
linked to decertification activities occurring at the same
time), enfd. 471 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Accordingly,
we dismiss this complaint allegation.17
(c) We find that the Respondent, by Bryan, violated
Section 8(a)(1) by promising employee Mary Jo Halpin
that the Respondent would discharge a disliked supervi-
sor, train a different supervisor Halpin complained about,
increase wages, and change management in order to dis-
courage employees from supporting the Union. See, e.g.,
Bentonite Performance Minerals, LLC, 353 NLRB 668,
668 fn. 2 (2008), reaffirmed and incorporated by

15 Section 8(c) provides that “expressing . . . any views, argument, or
opinion . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
. . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.”
16 See Linwood I, 364 NLRB No. 154, slip op. at 1 fn. 1.
17 The cases relied upon by our colleague to support her finding that
Bryan’s 8(c)-protected statements were unlawful are distinguishable. In
Armored Transport, Inc., 339 NLRB 374, 378 (2003), the statements
found unlawful were direct invitations to employees to go to the Board
and request a new election or to prove to the employer that the union did
not represent a majority of employees. In Wire Products Mfg. Corp., 326
NLRB 625, 626–627 (1998), enfd. mem. sub nom. NLRB v. R.T. Blank-
enship & Associates, Inc., 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000), the respondent
reference, 355 NLRB 582 (2010) (promising employees
improved benefits if they repudiated the union violated
Sec. 8(a)(1)), enfd. 456 Fed. Appx. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
5. The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure
to find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by unreasonably delaying in furnishing the Union re-
quested information concerning the amounts of wage in-
creases of four unit employees. We find merit in this ex-
ception.
As more fully set forth in the judge’s decision, in a letter
to the Respondent dated February 6, 2015, union counsel
Jay Jaffe requested certain information, including the
“date and amount of all wage increases and/or bonuses
paid since December 1, 2013” for each current employee
holding a bargaining-unit position. No response to his re-
quest having been received, on March 3, 2015, Jaffe sent
the Respondent a reminder about the outstanding infor-
mation request. On March 12, 2015, the Respondent pro-
vided the Union the names of four employees, the dates on
which they received wage increases, and the reasons for
each increase. However, the Respondent did not provide
the Union the amounts of the wage increases for the four
employees until March 23, 2015, some 6 weeks after the
Union’s request.
The requested information was presumptively relevant
to the Union’s performance of its duties as the unit em-
ployees’ bargaining representative, as it related to unit em-
ployees’ terms and conditions of employment. See South-
ern California Gas Co., 342 NLRB 613, 614 (2004). The
Respondent has not rebutted this presumption. Thus, the
Respondent had a statutory duty to furnish the amounts of
the wage increases in a timely manner. See Woodland
Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000). The duty to furnish
information requires a reasonable good-faith effort to re-
spond to the request as promptly as circumstances allow.
See Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060, 1062 fn. 9
(1993). An unreasonable delay in furnishing relevant re-
quested information is as much a violation of Section
8(a)(5) as a refusal to furnish the information at all. Wood-
land Clinic, above at 736; Valley Inventory Service, 295
NLRB 1163, 1166 (1989). Absent evidence of a
asserted that union representation was disadvantageous, advised employ-
ees that they could engage in activities to decertify the Union on com-
pany premises, provided a sample decertification petition for that pur-
pose, and wished the employees “Good Luck.” The Board found that
these statements, as a whole, reasonably communicated that employees
would fare better if they decertified the union in accordance with the em-
ployer’s wishes. Thus, the violation found by the Board in both cases
was the unlawful encouragement of decertification, a violation already
found with respect to Bryan’s interaction with Morton. In neither case
did the Board find additional, independent violations of the Act based on
statements that, like Bryan’s, merely opined that the Union “is not a good
union” and expressed the truism that employees “can get another union.”
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 5
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
justification, such a delay will constitute a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) inasmuch “[a]s the Union was entitled to
the information at the time it made its initial request, [and]
it was Respondent’s duty to furnish it as promptly as pos-
sible.” Pennco, Inc., 212 NLRB 677, 678 (1974).18 The
Respondent has presented no evidence justifying its 6-
week delay. The requested information for simply the
amounts of wage increases for four employees was neither
complex nor shown to be difficult to retrieve. Nor has the
Respondent shown a good-faith effort to retrieve the re-
quested information.19 In these circumstances, the Re-
spondent’s 6-week delay was unreasonable and violated
Section 8(a)(5). See, e.g., Postal Service, 308 NLRB 547,
551 (1992) (unreasonable to delay 4 weeks in providing
information that was not shown to be complex or difficult
to retrieve); Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 317 NLRB 809, 813
(1995) (unreasonable to delay 2 weeks in providing the
names of 17 employees who received wage increases and
the amounts of those increases), enfd. 89 F.3d 692 (10th
Cir. 1996).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Lin-
wood Care Center and its successor 201 New Road Oper-
ations, LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center, are employers
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by engaging in the following conduct:
(a) soliciting employees’ grievances and impliedly
promising to remedy them in order to discourage employ-
ees from supporting SEIU 1199 United Health Care
Workers East (Union);
(b) promising an employee better working conditions
and terms of employment if employees voted to get rid of
the Union;
(c) promising increased staffing and retroactive pay in-
creases in order to discourage employees’ support for the
Union;
(d) telling an employee that a pay increase could not be
provided because of the Union;
(e) promising to discharge a disliked supervisor, train a
supervisor, increase wages, and change management in
order to discourage employees from supporting the Union;

18 In evaluating the promptness of the response, the Board will con-
sider the complexity and extent of information sought, its availability,
and the difficulty in retrieving the information. See West Penn Power
Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003), enfd. in relevant part 394 F.3d 233 (4th
Cir. 2005).
(f) coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion sympathies; and
(g) creating the impression among employees that their
union activities were under surveillance.
4. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by engaging in the following conduct:
(a) unilaterally changing the parties’ agreement con-
cerning the Union’s access to its facility; and
(b) unreasonably delaying in furnishing the union re-
quested information about personnel files of disciplined
employees and the amounts of wage increases.
5. The aforesaid violations affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
The Respondent, CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood
Care Center and its successor 201 New Road Operations,
LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center, Linwood, New Jersey,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting grievances from employees and impliedly
promising to remedy them in order to discourage employ-
ees from supporting SEIU 1199 United Health Care
Workers East (Union).
(b) Promising better working conditions and terms of
employment if employees voted to get rid of the Union.
(c) Promising increased staffing and retroactive pay in-
creases in order to discourage employees’ support for the
Union.
(d) Promising to discharge a disliked supervisor, train
a supervisor, increase wages, and change management in
order to discourage employees from supporting the Union.
(e) Telling an employee that a pay increase could not
be made because of the Union.
(f) Coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion sympathies.
(g) Creating the impression that employees’ union ac-
tivities are under surveillance.
(h) Unilaterally changing the parties’ agreement con-
cerning the Union’s access to its facility.
(i) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with requested in-
formation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of bargaining-unit employees.
19 Absent such effort, the Respondent’s assertion that it was unable to
timely provide this straightforward information because it was preoccu-
pied with NLRB proceedings, including the instant unfair labor practice
charges against it, is entirely unavailing.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Comply with the terms of the access agreement with
the Union of May 2014.
(b) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms of employment, notify and, on request, bar-
gain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All full-time, regular part-time and per diem Certified
Nursing Assistants (CNAs), Unit Clerks and Licensed
Practical Nurses (LPNs) employed by CPL at its 210
New Road and Central Road, Linwood, New Jersey fa-
cility, but excluding all other employees, guards and su-
pervisors as defined by the Act.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Linwood, New Jersey, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”20 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, af-
ter being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper no-
tices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business
or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a

20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National
Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
1 The Board thus found in its earlier decision that the Respondent,
following the Union’s certification and shortly after the expiration of the
certification year, committed numerous violations of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the
Act as part of its unlawful campaign to promote decertification. See CPL
(Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center and its successor 201 New
Road Operations, LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center, 364 NLRB No. 154
(2016) (Linwood I) (Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when it solicited
employees to sign a decertification petition; solicited employee griev-
ances and promised to remedy them if employees abandoned their sup-
port for the Union; told employees that no changes in working conditions
would be made unless either employees got rid of the Union or a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement was signed; interrogated employees
copy of the notice to all current employees and former em-
ployees employed by the Respondent at any time since
January 21, 2015.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certification
of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com-
ply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 10, 2018
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MCFERRAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In most respects, the Board members see this case the
same way. We all agree, as an earlier decision reflects,
that the Respondent engaged in an aggressive, unlawful
campaign to coerce employees to decertify 1199 SEIU
United Healthcare Workers East (the Union).1 We also
agree that the Respondent persisted in its course of unlaw-
ful conduct, as shown in this case. As part of its continued
campaign to thwart employees’ choice to unionize, the
Respondent committed multiple Section 8(a)(1) viola-
tions,2 including by soliciting employee Cassandra Mor-
ton’s grievances and impliedly promising to remedy them
in order to discourage her from supporting the Union. Fur-
ther, we agree that the Respondent, in the same post-certi-
fication year period, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
concerning their support for the Union; and threatened employees by
suggesting that it was futile to continue supporting the Union because
contract negotiations could go on a very long time).
2 I thus join my colleagues in finding that the Respondent, as part of
its unlawful decertification campaign, violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by (1) solic-
iting employee Harry Waugh’s grievances, thereby impliedly promising
him improved working conditions; (2) promising Waugh better working
conditions and terms of employment if employees voted to get rid of the
Union; (3) promising increased staffing and retroactive pay increases in
order to discourage Waugh and other employees from supporting the Un-
ion; (4) telling Waugh that a pay increase could not be made because of
the Union; (5) promising employee Mary Jo Halpin that the Respondent
would discharge a disliked supervisor, train a different supervisor Halpin
complained about, increase wages, and change management in order to
discourage employees from supporting the Union; and (6) as noted
above, soliciting Morton’s grievances and impliedly promising to rem-
edy them.
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 7
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
Act by (1) unilaterally changing the parties’ agreement
about the Union’s access to the facility, thus limiting the
ability of union representatives and employees to com-
municate while a first contract was being negotiated; and
(2) delaying in providing the Union with requested rele-
vant information.3 But I cannot join my colleagues in dis-
missing the allegation regarding Respondent’s unlawful
conduct toward employee Morton, where the Respond-
ent’s actions seem to be part and parcel of its pervasive
anti-union campaign.
In late January 2015, Dan Bryan, a consultant hired by
the Respondent to spearhead its decertification campaign,
and the perpetrator of numerous unlawful acts as its agent,
approached employee Cassandra Morton and said that he
came to “find out what was going on with” Linwood and
“why everybody was either getting fired or quitting.” Af-
ter Morton responded with complaints about Director of
Nursing Valerie Lowman’s bad attitude towards the em-
ployees, Bryan told her that “1199 is not a good union”
and employees “can get another union.” Bryan then solic-
ited Morton to sign a decertification petition.
The latter solicitation of decertification was indisputa-
bly unlawful: the Board so found in Linwood I.4 It is sim-
ilarly established that the Respondent, by Bryan, violated
Section 8(a)(1) in this same conversation by soliciting em-
ployee Morton’s grievances and impliedly promising to
remedy them in order to discourage her support of the Un-
ion. My colleagues nevertheless carve out, and find law-
ful, Bryan’s contemporaneous disparagement of the Un-
ion to Morton (“1199 is not a good union”), immediately
followed by yet another reference to decertification of the
current representative (employees “can get another un-
ion”).
Those two employer statements, however must be
viewed in the context in which the Respondent made
them, to determine if they have a reasonable tendency to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel

3 I concur with my colleagues’ dismissal of the allegation that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) when it suspended and/or discharged unit
employees without giving the Union notice and an opportunity to request
bargaining before it decided to suspend and/or discharge them. In Total
Security Management Illinois 1, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 106 (2016), the
Board held that employers must give the union notice and opportunity to
bargain in advance of certain discipline decisions. The Board in Total
Security Management applied this rule prospectively only, however, and
it therefore does not apply to this case, which was pending at the time
Total Security Management issued.
4 See 364 NLRB No. 154, slip op. 1, fn. 1.
5 By directly linking these statements to its unlawful solicitation and
implied remedy of employees’ grievances, the Respondent presented
Morton with the archetypal “fist inside the velvet glove” long ago iden-
tified by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S.
405, 409 (1964). “Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (“[a]ny assessment
of the precise scope of employer expression” permissible
under Section 8(c) of the Act “must be made in the context
of its labor relations setting”); Hendrickson USA, LLC,
366 NLRB No. 7, slip op. at 5 (2018).
Here, Bryan’s admonitions to Morton clearly occurred
within an overall context of coercion, as they were inex-
tricably intertwined with conduct the Board found unlaw-
ful in Linwood I and again in this case. Promptly after
probing into employee dissatisfaction and promising to re-
dress Morton’s workplace complaints, Bryan linked em-
ployees’ dissatisfaction to 1199 (it “is not a good union”),
urged that employees “can get another union,” and directly
and unlawfully solicited Morton’s signature on a decerti-
fication petition. Considering Bryan’s statements in con-
text, as we must, they not only disparaged the Union but
reasonably signaled to Morton the Respondent’s willing-
ness to assist her and her coworkers to “get another union”
and rid themselves of 1199 representation.5 Bryan unlaw-
fully invited Morton to withdraw support from the Union,
which Bryan sought to facilitate by unlawfully soliciting
Morton to sign the decertification petition moments later.6
Accordingly, I would find that the statements, reasonably
tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights under Section 7 and thus vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1). See Armored Transport, Inc., 339
NLRB 374, 378 (2003)(finding employer’s letters sought
to disparage the union and invited employees to get rid of
it, thereby interfering in the relationship between employ-
ees and the union in violation of Section 8(a)(1)); Wire
Products Mfg. Corp., 326 NLRB 625, 626–627 (1998)
(finding employer’s letter sought to disparage the union
and appealed for employees to engage in decertification
activities, thereby coercing employees to decertify the un-
ion in violation of Section 8(a)(1)), enfd. mem. sub nom.
NLRB v. R.T. Blankenship & Associates, Inc., 210 F.3d
375 (7th Cir. 2000).7
For these reasons, as to the above issue, I dissent.
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if [the Employer] is not
obliged.” Id. As the Court explained in Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 686 (1944), “[t]he action of employees with respect
to the choice of their bargaining agents may be induced by favors be-
stowed by the employer as well as by his threats or domination.”
6 As the Board stated in Armored Transport, Inc., “the Respondent did
not simply set forth objective information detailing the manner in which
employees could reflect their interest in retaining the Union as their rep-
resentative.” 339 NLRB 374, 378 (2003).
7 Flying Foods, 345 NLRB 101 (2005), enfd. 471 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.
2006), on which the majority relies, provides no principled justification
for dismissing the Sec. 8(a)(1) allegation at issue here. In Flying Foods,
the Board declined to consider the employer’s campaign video in the
context of an employee’s unrelated decertification activities during the
same month (id. at 105–106). This meaningfully contrasts with Bryan’s
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 10, 2018
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vi-
olated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances and impliedly
promise to remedy them in order to discourage you from
supporting SEIU 1199 United Health Care Workers East
(Union).
WE WILL NOT promise you better working conditions
and terms of employment if you vote to get rid of the Un-
ion.
WE WILL NOT promise increased staffing and retroactive
pay increases in order to discourage your support for the
Union.
WE WILL NOT promise to discharge a disliked supervi-
sor, train a supervisor, increase wages, and change man-
agement to discourage you from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell you that a pay increase could not be
made because of the Union.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about your un-
ion sympathies.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that your union ac-
tivities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change our agreement with
the Union concerning the Union’s access to our facility.

statements to Morton regarding the Union and his unlawful solicitation
of Morton to sign a decertification petition during the same brief conver-
sation.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Un-
ion by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with re-
quested information that is relevant and necessary to the
Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL comply with the terms of the access agreement
with the Union of May 2014.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages,
hours, or other terms of employment, notify and, on re-
quest, bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit:
All full-time, regular part-time and per diem Certified
Nursing Assistants (CNAs), Unit Clerks and Licensed
Practical Nurses (LPNs) employed by CPL at its 210
New Road and Central Road, Linwood, New Jersey fa-
cility, but excluding all other employees, guards and su-
pervisors as defined by the Act.
CPL (LINWOOD) LLC D/B/A LINWOOD CARE
CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD CARE
CENTER
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-146362 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 9
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
Henry R. Protas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Louis J. Capozzi, Jr., Esq., and Brandon S. Williams, Esq.
(Capozzi Adler P.C.), of Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent.
Jay Jaffe, Esq. (1199 SEIU, United Healthcare Workers East),
of New York, New York for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arthur J. Amchan, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between February 8 and 10,
2016. 1199 SEIU (the Union) filed the initial charges between
February 12, 2015 and November 30, 2015. The General Coun-
sel issued an amended consolidated complaint covering all 4
charges on February 2, 2016.
The Union has represented the Certified Nursing Assistants,
Unit Clerks and Licensed Practical Nurses at Respondent’s nurs-
ing facility in Linwood, New Jersey since December 13, 2013.
The Union and representatives of Revera Health Systems, which
owned the Linwood facility through November 30, 2015, met in
collective bargaining negotiations on about 3 occasions in 2014
and 8-10 occasions in 2015. The Union and Respondent never
reached agreement on a collective-bargaining agreement.
In January 2015 a decertification petition was circulated. One
allegation in this case is that labor consultants, alleged to be
agents of Respondent, solicited employees to sign the decertifi-
cation petition. Linwood filed an RM petition (04-RM-145463)
on January 30, 2015 which was dismissed by the Regional Di-
rector. The Board on February 17, 2016 declined to reverse that
decision.
On December 1, 2015, Genesis Healthcare Systems took over
ownership of the Linwood Care Center from Revera Health Sys-
tems. There is no dispute that Genesis, which operates the facil-
ity through its subsidiary 201 New Road Operations, LLC, is a
successor employer of the bargaining unit employees.
The substantive unfair labor practice allegations in this case
are as follows:
Respondent, by its human resource director, Rose Przycho-
dzki told an employee that Respondent could not make schedule
changes because employees had chosen the Union as their col-
lective bargaining representative.
Respondent, by its alleged agents, labor consultants Jon Bu-
ress and Dan Bryan, violated Section 8(a)(1) in a variety of ways,
including soliciting employee complaints and grievances, mak-
ing promises that conditions would improve if employees decer-
tified the Union and soliciting an employee to sign the decertifi-
cation petition. The General Counsel also alleges that Buress
and Bryan on several occasions created the impression that em-
ployees’ protected activities were under surveillance.
The General Counsel also alleges that Respondent, by Valerie
Lowman, then its Director of Nursing, violated Section 8(a)(1)
in several respects.
In May 2014, Linwood and the Union reached an agreement
on a protocol for the Union to access the Linwood facility. The
General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) in imposing new conditions on this agreement
and then revoking it entirely.
Further, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated
the Act in discharging and/or suspending unit employees without
prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union prior
notice and an opportunity to bargain over the discharges and sus-
pensions before they were implemented. The General Counsel
relies on the rationale in Alan Ritchey, 359 NLRB 396 (2012), a
decision invalided by the Supreme Court due to the composition
of the Board at the time.
Finally, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unreasonably delaying the furnish-
ing of certain information requested by the Union regarding
wages increases, bonuses and disciplinary measures.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by
the General Counsel, Respondent and the Charging Party Union
I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent CPL, a Delaware limited liability company,
owned by Revera Health Systems, operated a skilled nursing fa-
cility in Linwood, New Jersey until November 30, 2015. In
2015, it received gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and pur-
chased and received goods at the Linwood facility valued in ex-
cess of $5,000 directly from points outside the State of New Jer-
sey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it was an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act at all material times and that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent 201 New Road, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Genesis Healthcare, Inc., is a limited liability company which
has operated the same facility since December 1, 2015. It is pro-
jected to receive annual gross revenues in excess of $100,000
and to purchase and receive goods at the Linwood facility valued
in excess of $5,000 directly from points outside the State of New
Jersey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act at all material times. 201 New Road has continued
to operate the facility in an unchanged form. 201 New Road was
put on notice of CPL’s potential liability in the instant cases and
is a successor employer to CPL.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Complaint Paragraph 6, alleged unfair labor practice
by Rose Pryzchodzki
Prior to the Union’s certification in December 2013, a unit
employee seeking to have his or her schedule changed, submitted
a request to the human resources department in writing. In De-
cember 2014, unit employee Mary Jo Halpin took a written re-
quest for a schedule change to Respondent’s human resources
director, Rose Pryzchodzki. Several days later, Pryzchodzki told
Halpin that she could not change Halpin’s schedule because Re-
spondent was in negotiations with the Union. Further, she told
Halpin that there could be no such changes at least until
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent and the Union met in contract negotiations in Feb-
ruary 2015.1
Complaint paragraphs 7 and 8, alleged unfair practices by La-
bor Management Consultants as agent of CPL
Shortly after the expiration of the Union’s certification year,
Respondent CPL’s parent company, Rivera Health Systems,
hired Labor Management Consultants (LMC) to survey and in-
terview unit employees at the Linwood facility. Two employees
of LMC, Jon Buress and Dan Bryan, were at Linwood from Jan-
uary 21, to February 12, 2015. They walked the halls of the fa-
cility freely, talking to employees one-on-one and in group meet-
ings. I infer from this record that CPL retained LMC to promote
decertification of the Union.
Several unit employees testified as to their interaction with
Buress and Bryan. Since none of this testimony is contradicted,
it is credited in its entirety.2
Dan Bryan approached Mary Jo Halpin on several occasions.
She agreed to meet Bryan in a storage area. Halpin asked Bryan
what he was doing at the facility. He responded that Respondent
had received an unfavorable employee survey and that Respond-
ent hired LMC to find out what problems existed.
Bryan told Halpin that he had spoken to 60 employees and that
virtually all complained about the Director of Nursing, Valerie
Lowman. He told Halpin that Respondent would be getting rid
of Lowman.3 Halpin said she didn’t have any problem with
Lowman, but complained about another manager. Bryan re-
sponded that possibly Respondent could give the manager more
training. Then:
He asked me, he said as a sign of good faith, would I be
willing to sign a paper saying that I didn’t want the union,
that way they could get rid of the people that were the problem
and get on with the raises. He had said that he already had a
bunch of signatures; that mine really wasn’t going to matter.
And I ended up, I did sign a paper.
Q. Did he say how many signatures he had?
A. He said he had like 60 signatures.
Tr. 33–34.
Bryan presented Halpin with a sheet of lined paper which she
signed. The paper may not have had any writing on the top. If
so, language was added after she signed indicating that she was
an employee who no longer wanted union representation, G.C.
4.4
At about this time, two employees, Christine Howell and
Linda Adams, were also circulating a decertification petition.
Some unit employees were not aware of this.

1 Rose Pryzchodzki did not directly contradict Halpin’s testimony,
which I credit. Pryzchodzki testified that she did not recall Halpin com-
ing to her about a schedule change. If she had done so, Rose Pryzchodzki
testified that she would have referred Halpin to the Director of Nursing,
Valerie Lowman. Had she sent Halpin to Lowman, the result would not
have been different. Halpin testified that Rose Pryzchodzki told her in
December 2014 that her information came from Lowman.
2 Respondent suggests that several witnesses are not credible because
they were “paid” by the Union. The record shows that Respondent re-
quired unit employees who attended bargaining sessions to use personal
Dan Bryan also met with unit employee Cassandra Morton.
He told Morton that Respondent’s corporate office had sent him
to find out what the problems were at the facility. Bryan solicited
Morton to sign a decertification petition. She told Bryan she was
not interested. He told Morton that the 1199 SEIU was a bad
union and that employees could select a different union to repre-
sent them.
Unit employee Harry Waugh was approached by Buress on
the night of January 28, 2015.5 Buress told Waugh that Revera
could do things for the employees if they voted the Union out.
He said that Respondent could not give employees raises until
the “union thing” was taken care of. Further, Buress said that
there would be no raises until Respondent and the Union agreed
on a collective bargaining agreement—which could be a very
long time. On the other hand, Buress told Waugh that after the
Union was voted out, Respondent would grant employees retro-
active raises.
Buress told Waugh that that Respondent would increase its
staff once the Union was gone and he solicited complaints about
Nursing Director Valerie Lowman. He showed Waugh a decer-
tification petition and told Waugh that 60% of the employees had
already signed it. Buress also told Waugh that most of the em-
ployees who had supported the Union no longer worked at the
facility. He encouraged Waugh to sign a decertification petition;
Waugh declined.6
Creating the impression of surveillance by LMC
Both Buress and Bryan told employees approximately how
many employees had signed a decertification petition. The Gen-
eral Counsel alleges that by doing so they created the impression
that employees’ protected activities were under surveillance.
Complaint paragraph 9 (interrogation of new employees by Va-
lerie Lowman; creating an impression of surveillance)
Unit employee Cassandra Morton attended a meeting with 9-
10 other employees in January or February 2015. Diane
Delaney, the Director of the facility, and Valerie Lowman, the
Director of Nursing, conducted the meeting. Lowman told the
employees that Respondent was hiring new employees to relieve
its staffing problems. Lowman also told the employees at the
meeting that Respondent was telling new employees about a de-
certification petition and was asking them if they wanted a union
or not, Tr. 67–69.7 Lowman told the employees at the meeting
that 50 percent of the new hires said they wanted a Union and
that 50 percent said they did not.
time or vacation time to do so. The Union compensated them for lost
wages if they did neither, Tr. 439–440.
3 Lowman’s employment with Respondent ended several months
later. The reasons do not appear in this record.
4 Unit employee Harry Waugh also did not recall any writing at the
top of the paper he was asked to sign.
5 Waugh’s testimony is also uncontradicted and therefore credited.
6 Like the paper given to Mary Jo Halpin, the sheet that Buress wanted
Waugh to sign did not have any printed material on it.
7 Morton’s testimony on this issue is also uncontradicted and therefore
credited.
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 11
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
Complaint paragraph 10: restricting and denying the Union
access to the facility
In March 2014, the Union assigned administrative organizer
Roz Waddell to the Linwood bargaining unit. In May 2014, Re-
spondent agreed to allow the Union access to the Linwood facil-
ity to meet with unit members under the following conditions:
1. A union representative should request access in advance,
at least 24 hours but preferably 48 hours to visit unit employees
at the facility
2. The Union would request specific dates and times for such
visits, which would be mutually agreed upon.
3. The Union representative would remain in the employee
break area by the West Wing.
On March 9, 2015, Roz Waddell emailed Diane Delaney, the
facility administrator/executive director. Waddell advised
Delaney that she was planning to come to Linwood on the fol-
lowing weekdays: March 10, 11, 17, and 18 and on weekend
days March 14 and 22.
Delaney responded the same day that Waddell could come
during certain time periods on March 11 and 17, but not March
14 and 22 because Delaney would not be available. Instead she
offered Waddell a four-hour time block on either March 28 or
29. Delaney complained about the fact that she had authorized a
visit on March 6, but that Waddell did not show up or advise
Delaney that she was not coming.
Waddell arrived at Linwood at 0630 on March 11 at Respond-
ent’s parking lot. Cheryl Holmes, the Assistant Administrator,
told Waddell that she had to leave. On March 13, Delaney sent
a letter to Union Vice-President Rhina Molina stating that union
representatives were not allowed in the Linwood parking lot and
advising her that union representatives would be allowed at the
facility only under the following conditions that were additional
to those agreed upon in March 2014:
1. One representative would be allowed at the facility at a
time.
2. Union representatives were not to speak to any employees
who requested that they not speak to them.
3. The Union would notify Delaney in advance if the repre-
sentative was not coming as scheduled.
4. No Linwood property or materials were to be removed
from the employee break area or any other part of the facility.
Delaney inferred that Roz Waddell had removed 2 memos,
from her to employees, from an employee lounge. She warned
that noncompliance with these conditions would cause her to re-
voke the Union’s access to the facility.
Waddell also came to the facility on March 14 and March 17.
On March 17, Lisa McConnell, Revera’s regional human re-
sources director, told Waddell that she was not allowed in the
parking lot. McConnell allowed Waddell to meet with employ-
ees in the breakroom.
The next day, March 18, Waddell and organizer Diego San-
telices arrived at the facility. Assistant Administrator Cheryl
Holmes told them that if they did not leave, she would call the
police.
In April, Respondent took the position that the Union would
not be allowed access to the Linwood facility until the Union’s
unfair labor practice charges were resolved. Respondent and the
Union discussed the access issue at collective bargaining ses-
sions on June 2 and 3, 2015; no agreement was reached. Union
organizers have not been to the Linwood facility since March 18,
2015 other than on two occasions to discuss disciplinary
measures.
Complaint paragraph 11: “The Alan Ritchey issue”
Respondent discharged unit employees Dawn Apella on Jan-
uary 19, 2015; Rose Brewer on October 14, 2014; Anthony
Barker on September 15, 2014, Laurel Bertonazzi on June 9,
2015 and Theresa Reilly on August 19, 2015. It suspended Harry
Waugh on March 30, 2015 and Theresa Reilly on November 3,
2015 (after agreeing with the Union to allow Reilly to return to
work after her August discharge). In none of these instances did
Respondent notify the Union beforehand and offer the Union the
opportunity to bargain over these disciplinary measures before
they were implemented. Moreover, Respondent, at least with re-
spect to Apella and Barker, did not promptly notify the Union of
the discipline/discharge after the fact. The Union first learned of
Apella and Barker’s discharges months after the fact when Lin-
wood responded to the Union’s information request.
Respondent, when owned by Revera, had a progressive disci-
pline policy, Jt. Exh. 2 pp. 8–9. That policy had a 4-step proce-
dure leading to termination. However, Respondent retained the
right to skip steps and the right to terminate on a first offense.
Thus, the disciplinary measures in this case were “discretionary”
within the meaning of the Allen Ritchey decision. Revera also
had an internal grievance procedure. The Union availed itself of
this process only with regard to Theresa Reilly’s August 2015
termination.
Complaint paragraph 14: The Union Information Requests
On February 6, 2015, Union attorney Jay Jaffe sent a 4-page
letter to Peter Tsoporis, Revera’s Vice President of Labor Rela-
tions, requesting 12 categories of information by February 13.
The parties met in collective bargaining negotiations on Febru-
ary 17 and 18. Tsoporis provided some of this information on
February 19. Jaffe wrote Tsoporis on March 3, requesting the
balance of the requested information by March 13. Tsoporis re-
sponded on March 12, indicating that certain information had
been provided previously, but declining to provide certain infor-
mation on the grounds that the Union had not demonstrated its
relevance to collective bargaining. That information was con-
tained in paragraph 9 of Jaffe’s February 6 letter, which is set
forth below:
A list of all bargaining unit employees who have been for-
mally reprimanded, warned, suspended or discharged (including
resignation in lieu of discharge) from December 1, 2013 through
the present, as well as the following:
(a) the complete personnel and departmental files for each such
employee, including prior disciplinary action and employee
evaluations;
(b) the notice of reprimand, warning, suspension or dismissal
in connection with each employee;
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) A detailed explanation of the reason each employee was
reprimanded, warned suspended or discharged;
(d) All notes, policies, statements, reports, witness statements,
video, audio or electronic evidence, and any other documenta-
tion that the Company referred to or relied on in its decision to
reprimand, warn, suspend or discharge each employee.
In his March 12, letter, Tsoporis, in response to paragraph 2(f)
of the Union’s request, provided the names of 4 employees who
had received wage increases, the date of the increase, the reason
for the increase, but not the amount of the increases.
On March 23, 2015, Respondent provided the amount of the
wage increases for the 4 employees and a list of some, but not all
employees who had been disciplined since December 1, 2013.
Tsoporis did not provide items 9(a)-(d) listed above regarding
any disciplined employees.
On March 27, Tsoporis advised the Union that it was cancel-
ling collective bargaining negotiating sessions scheduled for
March 30 and 31, because Respondent deemed the Union’s re-
sponse to its information request inadequate. He asked Jaffe for
information regarding additional disciplined employees that the
Union was aware of.
Jaffe provided Tsoporis the names of 3 other employees
whom the Union believed had been disciplined and 4 additional
employees who it believed had received wage increases on
March 30. On April 2, Tsoporis provided additional information
regarding employees who received wage increases and a log of
employees who had been received reprimands and another of
employees who had been suspended or discharged. For the first
time, Tsoporis raised confidentiality concerns regarding some of
the information the Union had requested regarding disciplined
employees, such as their employee evaluations. Respondent re-
ceived requests that their personnel files be kept confidential
from about 7 employees between March 24 and 27, 2015.
By May 14, 2015, Respondent complied with all of the Un-
ion’s February 6, 2015 information requests.
Analysis
Respondent, by Rose Pryzchodzki, violated Section 8(a)(1) by
telling Mary Jo Halpin that her schedule could not be changed
because Respondent was in negotiations with the Union.
An employer’s obligation while bargaining with the certified
bargaining representative of its employees for an initial contract
is to maintain the status quo, Daily News of Los Angeles, 315
NLRB 1236 (1994). In this instance the status quo was that em-
ployees could request that their schedules be changed by submit-
ting a written request to the human resources department. By
refusing to process Halpin’s request, Respondent altered the sta-
tus quo and violated Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act. By telling Hal-
pin that it would not process it, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1).
Respondent, by its agents, labor consultants Jon Buress and
Dan Bryan, violated Section 8(a)1) of the Act by 1) soliciting
employees to sign a decertification petition; 2) soliciting em-
ployee grievances and promising to remedy them if employees

8 The language of Section 2(13) defining “agent” states that actual
authorization or subsequent ratification of specific acts are not control-
ling in determining whether a person is an “agent.”
decertified the Union; 3) telling employees that no changes in
working conditions could be made unless either employees got
rid of the Union or a collective bargaining agreement was
signed; 4) interrogating employees concerning support for the
Union.
First of all, Respondent’s contention that labor consultants Jon
Buress and Dan Bryan were not its agents pursuant to Section
2(13) of the Act, is wholly without merit. The Board applies
common law agency principles in determining who is an agent
under the Act. When applied to labor relations, agency princi-
ples must also be broadly construed in light of the legislative pol-
icies embedded in the Act. A party may be bound by the conduct
of those it holds out to speak and act for it, even though there is
no proof that specific acts were actually authorized, or subse-
quently ratified. Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty,
361 NLRB 966, 1001 (2014). Braun Electric Co., 324 NLRB 1,
2 (1997), Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 279 NLRB 1298, 1299
(1986).8 Statements of a supervisor or agent may be imputed to
an employer even if that employer was not aware that the state-
ments were made, Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 438 (7th
Cir. 1978).
Common law principles incorporate the principles of implied
and apparent authority. Apparent authority is created through a
manifestation by the principal to a third party that supplies a rea-
sonable basis for the latter to believe that the principal has au-
thorized the agent to do the act in question, Shen Automotive
Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 593 (1996). Another way
the Board has stated this principle is “whether under all the cir-
cumstances the employees would reasonably believe that [a per-
son] was reflecting company policy and speaking and acting for
management,” Community Cash Stores, 238 NLRB 265 (1978).
In the instant case, employees could not have believed that
Buress and Bryan were not speaking and acting for management.
Why else would the two labor consultants be freely walking
around the Linwood facility, even after hours, asking them ques-
tions, encouraging them to sign decertification petitions and
promising to remedy grievances if they would only get rid of the
Union? It would have been unreasonable for employees to have
believed that the two individuals were not speaking and acting
on behalf of management. Strangers, with no connection to the
owners of the facility, would not have any reason to engage in
such activities.
Many of things said and done by Buress and Bryan violated
the Act. These include soliciting employees to sign a decertifi-
cation petition, Beaird Industries, Inc., 311 NLRB 768 (1993);
and soliciting employee grievances and explicitly promising to
remedy them if employees abandon their support for the Union,
Amptech, Inc., 342 NLRB 1131, 1136–1137 (2004). I also find
that Buress and Bryan, in asking employees to sign a decertifi-
cation petition in the context a decertification campaign, con-
ducted an unlawful interrogation, Hercules Automotive, 285
NLRB 944, 949 (1987). An employee responding to these con-
sultants would necessarily have to reveal their union sympathies
if they declined to sign the petition, as did Harry Waugh.9
9 There is no evidence that Waugh was an open union supporter in
January 2015.
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 13
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
On the other hand, I find that Buress’ statement to Harry
Waugh that 60 percent of employees had signed a decertification
petition would not reasonably lead Waugh to conclude that em-
ployees’ protected activities were under surveillance. Grand
Canyon Mining Company, 318 NLRB 748, 752–752 (1995),
cited by the General Counsel, is distinguishable. In that case the
employee asked the supervisor how he knew the number of em-
ployees at a union meeting. The supervisor told him that another
agent of the employer had seen 16 employees at the meeting. In
the instant case, there is no evidence regarding the basis for Bu-
ress’ claim. It is possible that 1) he knew the number who signed
a decertification petition because he and Bryan had collected the
signatures; 2) he was making the number up out of thin air; or 3)
anti-Union employees had reported this number to him.
An employer’s statement that contract negotiations could go
on a very long time, is not per se a violation of the Act. However,
in the context of this case, in which Respondent’s consultants
also promised to remedy grievances and expedite wage increases
if employees abandoned the Union, such statements suggest fu-
tility in continuing to support the Union and violate Section
8(a)(1), Airtex, 308 NLRB 1135 fn. 2 (1992).
Respondent, by Valerie Lowman, violated the Act in interro-
gating new employees about their union sympathies and giving
employees the impression that their Union activities were under
surveillance.
Director of Nursing, Valerie Lowman, violated Section
8(a)(1) by interrogating new employees about their union sym-
pathies in the context of a decertification drive. She also, by in-
dicating to other employees, the results of her inquiry, gave these
employees the impression that Respondent was keeping track of
which employees were pro-Union and which were not. This
would reasonably give employees the impression that their Un-
ion activities, in general, were under surveillance by Respondent,
Flexsteel Industries, Inc., 311 NLRB 257 (1993).
The Access Issue
Board law is clear that when an employer and a union have an
agreement allowing the union access to its property to carry out
its representational activities, or the employer has an established
past practice of allowing access, the employer cannot unilaterally
alter that agreement or practice, Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB
848 (1992). The employer’s right to bar union representatives
from its property differs in this situation from one in which there
is no such agreement or practice, Turtle Bay Resorts, 355 NLRB
706 (2010) affirming 353 NLRB 1242, 1274–1275 (2009).
In the instant case, Respondent unilaterally changed the par-
ties’ agreement by restricting access to one representative at a
time; requiring union representatives to eschew speaking to any
employees who requested that they not speak to them and requir-
ing that the Union notify facility administrator Delaney in ad-
vance if the representative was not coming. 10 In adding these
conditions in March 2015, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
A closer question is whether Respondent violated the Act by

10 The fourth condition that the union representatives not remove em-
ployer property or materials need not be discussed since under no cir-
cumstances would the Union have a right to do so.
barring union representatives from its parking lot. The 2014
agreement did not specifically address union access to the park-
ing lot. However, Organizer Waddell testified that she talked to
employees in the parking lot on about 10 occasions between Sep-
tember 2014 and March 2014. She also testified that Diane
Delaney saw her there a couple of times and greeted her, Tr. 210–
211. Delaney did not directly contradict Waddell by testifying
that she never saw Waddell in the parking lot prior to March
2015. She testified that she observed Waddell on the sidewalk,
which is public property. On those occasions, Delaney testified
she would greet her. The complaint did not allege that Respond-
ent violated the Act by barring union representatives from its
parking lot. Further, I conclude that whether Respondent had a
past practice of allowing union representatives in the parking lot
was not fairly and fully litigated. Thus, I decline to address this
issue.
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in failing to
promptly notify the Union of the discharge or discipline
of unit employees
I decline the General Counsel’s invitation to apply the ra-
tionale of the Alan Ritchey decision until the Board adopts that
rationale; I am bound by existing precedent. Moreover, even if
the Board were to reaffirm its holding in Alan Ritchey, it must
decide whether it will apply that rationale only prospectively, as
it did in the 2012 decision or retrospectively.
However, even under existing Board precedent, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) the Act. An employer has an
obligation to bargain with the Union, upon request, concerning
disciplinary matters, even if it has no obligation to notify and
bargain to impasse with the Union before imposing discipline,
Fresno Bee, 337 NLRB 1161, 1186–1187 (2002); Ryder Distri-
bution Resources, 302 NLRB 76, 90 (1991).
That obligation presumes that an employer will promptly in-
form its employees’ bargaining representative of all discipline or
discharges so that the Union can decide whether or not to request
bargaining. Here there is no evidence that Respondent promptly
notified the Union of any discipline or discharge with the possi-
ble exception of the November suspension of Theresa Reilly.
With regard to Brewer and Barker, the Union was not aware that
they had been discharged for months until Linwood responded
to the Union’s information request.
Delay in Providing Requested Information
A delay in providing the Union requested information which
is relevant to its role of collective bargaining representative of
the employer’s employees may, in some circumstances, consti-
tute a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, Postal Ser-
vice, 332 NLRB 635 (2000). However, that does not mean that
every failure by an employer to respond within the time frame
requested by a union constitutes a statutory violation.
In the instant case, Respondent began responding to the Un-
ion’s request 13 days after it was made and 6 days after the date
by which the Union asked for the information. Respondent
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
continued to provide the requested information in March and
early April. The company refused to comply with the request
regarding the personnel files of employees of disciplined em-
ployees, first on the grounds of relevance, then on the grounds of
confidentiality. By May 14, 2015, 3 months after the date by
which the Union asked for the information, Respondent had sat-
isfied the information request.
I find the Respondent did not violate the Act except in making
meritless objections to the personnel files. These files were
clearly relevant and Respondent’s belated claims of confidenti-
ality were likewise meritless. For one thing, Respondent made
no attempt to seek an accommodation with the Union for what-
ever confidentiality concerns it had. I thus find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) in failing to provide the disciplinary files
more promptly.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondents, CPL Linwood. d/b/a Linwood Care Center,
and 201 New Road Operations, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Making unilateral changes while collective bargaining ne-
gotiations are ongoing, such as changing its procedures for re-
questing schedule changes;
(b) Soliciting employees to sign a decertification petition;
(c) Soliciting employee grievances and promising to remedy
them if employees got rid of the Union;
(d) Telling employees that no changes to working conditions
would be made unless either employees got rid of the Union or a
collective-bargaining agreement was signed;
(e) Interrogating employees concerning their support for the
Union;
(f) Creating the impression that employees’ union or other
protected activities were under surveillance;
(g) Unilaterally altering its agreement with the Union regard-
ing the Union’s access to its property;
(h) Failing to promptly notify the Union of any discipline or
any discharge of any bargaining unit employee;
(i) Unreasonably delaying providing information requested
by the Union for meritless reasons.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Comply with the terms of the access agreement with the
Union of May 2014;

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Or-
der shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(b) Promptly notify the Union of any disciplinary action taken
against any unit employee;
(c) Maintain the status quo regarding wages, hours and other
working conditions until a collective-bargaining agreement has
been signed or a legal impasse has been reached;
(d) Bargain in good faith with the Union until a collective
bargaining agreement has been signed or a legal impasse has
been reached;
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Lin-
wood, New Jersey facility copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its em-
ployees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that during the pen-
dency of these proceedings the Respondent has gone out of busi-
ness or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since January 21, 2015.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2016.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes while collective
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National
Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
CPL (LINWOOD) D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD CARE CENTER 15
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A LINWOOD
bargaining negotiations are ongoing, such as changing our pro-
cedures for requesting schedule changes.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to sign a decertification peti-
tion.
WE WILL NOT T solicit employee grievances and promise to
remedy these grievances if employees get rid of the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that no changes to working con-
ditions can be made unless employees either get rid of the Union
or a collective-bargaining agreement is signed.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees, including applicants for
employment, about the support or lack of support for a union.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that employees’ union or
other protected activities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally alter any agreements we have made
with the Union regarding access to our property.
WE WILL NOT fail to notify the Union promptly of any disci-
plinary action taken against any bargaining unit employee.
WE WILL NOT unreasonably delay providing the Union with
information it has requested which is relevant to the Union’s role
as collective bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL comply with the terms of our access agreement with
the Union of May 2014.
WE WILL promptly notify the Union of any disciplinary action
taken against any unit employee.
WE WILL maintain the status quo regarding wages, hours and
other working conditions until a collective bargaining agreement
has been signed or a legal impasse has been reached.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with the Union, SEIU 1199
United Health Care Workers East, until a collective bargaining
agreement has been signed or a legal impasse has been reached.
CPL (LINWOOD) LLC D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER
AND ITS SUCCESSOR 201NEW ROAD OPERATIONS, LLC
D/B/A LINWOOD CARE CENTER
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-146362 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from
the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015
Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202)
273–1940.