County Concrete Corporation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 20, 2018

366 NLRB No. 64 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 64
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
County Concrete Corporation and Local 863, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters. Case 22–
CA–171328
April 20, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, KAPLAN, AND EMANUEL
On April 18, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Mindy
E. Landow issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and the Charging Party Union each filed an an-
swering brief, and the Respondent filed reply briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that employee Dean Walgren’s tes-
timony was not credible, we correct the judge’s statement that it was
unclear whether Walgren’s conversation with the Respondent’s Vice
President, John Scully, occurred in 2016 or 2017. As both the Re-
spondent and the General Counsel correctly observe, the record evi-
dence establishes that this conversation occurred in 2016.
We adopt the judge’s separate findings that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by modifying the dues-checkoff provi-
sions of its collective-bargaining agreements with the Union and by
refusing to deduct and remit dues to the Union in January and February
2016 in accordance with those agreements. See Shen-Mar Food Prod-
ucts, Inc., 221 NLRB 1329, 1329 (1976) (finding that, where an em-
ployer fails to deduct and remit dues in derogation of an existing con-
tract, it is in effect “unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of
employment . . . and thus violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.”), enfd. in
relevant part 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977); Hearst Corp. Capital
Newspaper, 343 NLRB 689, 693 (2004) (“It is well established that an
employer violates Section 8(a)(5) by ceasing to deduct and remit dues
in derogation of an existing contract.”). In adopting the former finding,
we do not rely on the judge’s statement that neither party was privi-
leged to modify any term of the collective-bargaining agreements “once
these agreements were signed and returned to the Employer.” The
agreements were signed and returned to the Respondent in January
2016. However, the parties reached a meeting of minds on all substan-
tive issues and material terms in November 2015. “Once an agreement
is reached by the parties, they are obligated to abide by the terms of the
agreement even though those terms have not been reduced to writing.”
Sunrise Nursing Home, 325 NLRB 380, 389 (1998) (citing H. J. Heinz
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941)).
In adopting the latter finding, we have considered the merits of the
Respondent’s affirmative defense that its failure to deduct dues was

justified because the Union had not advised employees of their rights
under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), and Com-
munications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). The
judge found, incorrectly, that the issue was not properly presented
because no party filed an unfair labor practice charge asserting a Beck
violation. Contrary to the judge’s finding, a respondent may raise an
alleged unfair labor practice as an affirmative defense even if no charge
was filed if “proof of such defense could affect the judge’s unfair labor
practice findings” or “defeat essential elements of the General Coun-
sel’s prima facie case.” Chicago Tribune Co., 304 NLRB 259, 260
(1991).
Having considered the Respondent’s affirmative defense, we reject it
on the merits. In support of its defense, the Respondent relies on cases
pertaining to union-security clauses. However, this case involves em-
ployees’ voluntary decision to authorize dues checkoff, not the en-
forcement of a mandatory union-security provision. As the judge cor-
rectly noted, the Board has held that an employee’s decision to author-
ize the deduction of moneys to be remitted to a union is separate and
distinct from the issue of union membership. See Shen-Mar Food
Products, Inc., supra at 1330 (“[T]he dues checkoff herein does not, in
and of itself, impose union membership or support as a condition re-
quired for continued employment, and . . . matters concerning dues-
checkoff authorization and labor agreements implementing such au-
thorizations are exclusively within the domain of Federal law, having
been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and removed from
the provision of Section 14(b) by the operation of Section 302.”); see
also Electrical Workers IBEW Local 2088 (Lockheed Space Opera-
tions), 302 NLRB 322, 328 (1991) (“We recognize that paying dues
and remaining a union member can be two distinct actions.”).
Here, the Respondent and the Union reached an agreement in No-
vember 2015 that deductions of dues for employees who authorized
checkoffs would begin January 1, 2016. Under this agreement, once
the Respondent received an employee’s written dues-checkoff authori-
zation, it was obligated to begin deducting the employee’s dues. In
accordance with their agreement, the Union began collecting dues-
checkoff authorizations from unit employees in December 2015 and
sending them to the Respondent in January 2016. By the end of Janu-
ary, the Respondent had received 125 signed dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions. However, upon receipt of these authorizations, the Respondent
refused to deduct dues for any employees for the months of January and
February. Although the Union’s failure to provide employees with a
General Motors and Beck notice may affect the amounts it was entitled
to receive (see, e.g., Paperworkers Local 987 (Sun Chemical Corp. of
Michigan), 327 NLRB 1011, 1012 (1999)), we find that it does not
justify the Respondent’s failure to comply with the agreed-upon con-
tract term to deduct dues. Moreover, even assuming the Respondent
was genuinely concerned about deducting dues in these circumstances
or was uncertain as to the correct amounts to deduct, it could have
addressed such concerns while making a good-faith effort to honor its
contractual obligation. For instance, it could have sought the Union’s
consent to change the start date for dues checkoff, bargained for in-
demnification from the Union, or placed the dues in escrow pending
resolution of its concerns. See generally Nathan’s Famous of Yonkers,
Inc., 186 NLRB 131, 133 (1970) (no violation, where an employer’s
good-faith uncertainty as to which of two unions it was required to
remit checked-off dues was demonstrated by placing the dues in es-
crow). The Respondent, however, made no attempt to honor its con-
tractual obligation. Accordingly, we find the Respondent’s refusal to
comply with its agreement to deduct dues was unlawful. See, e.g.,
Shen-Mar Food Products, Inc., supra. Finally, as the judge correctly
found, to the extent questions exist about whether certain employees
selected financial-core as opposed to full membership, or about the
particular date that certain employees authorized dues checkoff, these
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, County Concrete Corporation, East Orange,
Kenvil, Landi, Morristown, Oxford, and Sussex, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Making mid-term modifications to the dues-
checkoff provisions of its collective-bargaining agree-
ments with Local 863, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (the Union) without the Union’s consent.
(b) Failing and refusing to deduct properly authorized
dues from the paychecks of bargaining unit employees
and failing to remit these dues to the Union, as required
under its collective-bargaining agreements with the Un-
ion.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Reimburse the Union for the losses resulting from
the Respondent’s failure to deduct and remit union dues
in January and February 2016, as set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities in East Orange, Kenvil, Landi, Morristown,
Oxford, and Sussex, New Jersey, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 22,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-

questions can be resolved in the compliance stage of this proceeding.
See Williams Pipeline Co., 315 NLRB 630, 632 fn. 8 (1994).
We note that the judge mistakenly stated that the Union sent 122
signed authorization forms to the Respondent on January 20, rather
than 102 forms. We correct the judge’s inadvertent error.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language and the violations found, and we
shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees
and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since January 1, 2016.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 22 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 20, 2018
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT make mid-term modifications to the
dues-checkoff provisions of our collective-bargaining
agreements with Local 863, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (the Union) without the Union’s consent.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to deduct properly au-
thorized dues from your paychecks and fail to remit these
COUNTY CONCRETE CORP. 3
dues to the Union, as required under our collective-
bargaining agreements with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL reimburse the Union for the losses resulting
from our failure to deduct and remit dues in January and
February 2016.
COUNTY CONCRETE CORPORATION
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CA-171328 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Michael P. Silverstein, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Brian P. Shire, Esq. Jennifer S. Abrams, Esq. (Sussanin, Wid-
man & Brennan, P.C. Wayne, PA), for the Respondent.
Kenneth I. Nowak, Esq. (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak Kleinbaum &
Friedman, P.C.), of Newark, New Jersey, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MINDY E. LANDOW, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon
charges filed by Local 863, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters (Union), on July 22, 2016, complaint and notice of hearing
(complaint) issued in this matter alleging that County Concrete
Corporation (Respondent or the Employer) violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by making a unilateral change in the
dates for the payment of union dues under a collective-
bargaining agreement entered into by Respondent and the Un-
ion, and failing and refusing to remit certain dues payments. In
its answer to the complaint, Respondent denied the material
allegations of the complaint and has raised certain affirmative
defenses, as will be discussed below.
A hearing in this matter was held before me on October 28,
2016 in Newark, New Jersey.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Union and the Respondent, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent has been a corporation
with an office and place of business in Kenvil, New Jersey,
where it is engaged in the provision, sale and transport of
ready-mix concrete and other construction materials from fa-
cilities located in Kenvil, Morristown, Oxford, Sussex, East
Orange and Flemington, New Jersey.
During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the
complaint, Respondent has purchased and received at its facili-
ties listed above goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from suppliers located outside the State of New Jersey.
Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times, Re-
spondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Respondent further admits and I find that at all material
times, the Union has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
The Employer’s corporate officers are majority stockholder
and President John Crimi and Vice-President John Scully. Kurt
Peters has been, at material times, the Employer’s in-house
counsel.
On May 12, 2009, based upon a card check, the Employer
voluntarily recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative for its drivers, mechanics, laborers
and heavy equipment operators employed at facilities located in
Oxford, East Orange, Sussex, Kenvil, Morristown, and Landi,
New Jersey.
The parties commenced negotiations for an initial collective-
bargaining agreement in June 2009. The parties agreed that
they would use, as a template, a prior contract with IBT Local
408, which had previously represented the employees of the
Employer. This agreement resolved a number of issues, one of
which was a dues check-off clause. Bargaining focused on
economic issues about which there was disagreement such as
wages, pensions and health insurance. Eventually it was agreed
that each of the Employer’s facilities would have its own con-
tract, with most of the provisions as set forth in the template
being the same, and any differences based upon the nature of
the work performed at each facility, would be reflected therein.
In addition, each facility would have its own wage rates.
The template had a dues deduction provision which provid-
ed, in pertinent part, that: “during the life of this agreement the
employer agrees to deduct once each month from the employ-
ees’ wages and remit to the Union monthly dues.” This lan-
guage was identical in all the template agreements for each
facility.
At various times throughout the bargaining process, the Em-
ployer presented the Union with so-called final offers, which
the Union rejected. After each of these occasions bargaining
resumed.
The 2015 Collective-Bargaining Agreement(s)
In May 2015, the Employer communicated another “final of-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
fer” to the Union. This offer was submitted to employees and
on November 8, 2015, the membership voted to ratify this final
offer. The offer itself did not contain any reference to dues
check-off language.
Shortly after the ratification vote, Union Secretary-Treasurer
Alphonse Rispoli (who had represented the Union during bar-
gaining) telephoned Employer counsel Desmond Massey to
inform him that the contract proposal had been ratified. There
was agreement that the effective dates of each of the collective
bargaining agreements that had been agreed upon would be
November 8, 2015.
Rispoli testified that he spoke with Massey about distributing
dues check off authorization applications to employees to allow
for dues deductions to commence. Massey said that if Rispoli
would bring the applications to his office, he would see to it
that the Employer received and distributed them.
Rispoli further testified he spoke with Crimi at some point
during the week of November 9. Rispoli testified that Crimi
agreed to use November 8 as the effective date of the agree-
ments and that Massey would draft the contracts. The parties
agreed that the date when dues deductions would begin would
be January 1, 2016, because of the holidays and the fact that
certain employees were then on layoff status.
On December 22, 2015, Peters sent the following communi-
cation to Rispoli:
Enclosed please find two execution copies of each of the col-
lective bargaining agreements for County Concrete’s five
bargaining units.
These agreements are substantially the same as the CBA’s
that had previously been provided to you. As you requested
we have deleted the section that had been labeled “intentional-
ly delete.” We have also added the effective date of Novem-
ber 8, 2015 (which you have told us is the date the members
ratified the CBAs) and set January 1, 2016 as the start date for
dues. Exhibit B, which sets forth the co-pays, has also been
updated to reflect the current co-pay amounts.
Please execute both copies and return them to me so I can
have John Crimi sign them when he returns from his vacation.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.
Rispoli signed the contracts sent to him by the Employer and
returned them by express mail to Peters on January 13, 2016.
The Distribution and Collection of Dues Authorization Forms
and Related Communications to Employees
Rispoli then asked for the Employer’s assistance in getting
dues check off applications signed by employees. Crimi told
Rispoli to send the applications to Peters, the Employer’s in-
house counsel, which he did, noting in an accompanying letter
that dues deductions would begin in January 2016.
Crimi testified that following the ratification vote a number
of employees spoke with him and stated that they didn’t know
what they needed a union for and did not want to pay union
dues.
After consultation with counsel, the following memorandum
(the SWB Memorandum) was distributed to employees by the
Employer:
Teamsters Local 863 and County Concrete recently entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement governing the terms
and conditions of employment for County’s bargaining unit
employees. One of the provisions contained in the CBA is a
“Union Security” clause that requires all employees to be
members of the Union as a condition of employment. Coun-
ty’s bargaining unit employees can satisfy this requirement by
becoming a:
(1) FULL TIME MEMBER of the Union, or
(2) FINANCIAL CORE MEMBER (otherwise called a
“dues paying only, nonmember.”)
Teamsters Local 863 must represent the employees whether
they are a Full-Member or a Financial Core Member.
Full Members pay all periodic dues and fees assessed by
Teamsters Local 863.
Financial Core Members only pay the periodic dues and
fees that relate to negotiating and administering the collective
bargaining agreement. Financial Core Members cannot attend
union meetings, hold union office or vote in a union election.
If County’s employees would like more information regard-
ing their obligation to pay union dues under the “Union Secu-
rity” clause of the CBA and/or whether Teamsters Local 863
is charging the employees the correct amount for dues, you
should direct your employees to contact the following United
States Government Agency:
[contact information for Region 22 provided]
In early December, Peters called Rispoli and advised him
that upon advice of counsel the Employer would not be distrib-
uting dues check off applications. This telephone call was fol-
lowed by a confirmatory letter dated December 4, 2015. In this
letter Peters returned the dues check off applications and told
Rispoli that he would, if necessary, provide the Union with
contact information for the unit employees.
The Union then requested an updated seniority list from Pe-
ters, which he furnished on December 16, 2015. The Union
then sent two of its business agents, Chuck O’Mara and Lou
Sanchez, to the Employer’s various facilities to distribute dues
check off authorizations to the shop stewards at each facility.
Rispoli began receiving reports that the employee census pro-
vided by Peters contained names of supervisors and those no
longer working at the facility.
Rispoli questioned Peters about the accuracy of the employ-
ee list and Peters agreed to send to the Union a more accurate
list of unit employees. The Union still had difficulties with the
list provided by the Employer but nevertheless collected ap-
proximately 100 signed applications from employees during the
month of December 2015. The Union continued to collect cards
in January 2016 as well.
The form distributed by the Union to Respondent’s employ-
ees is comprised of two sections. The first is entitled “Applica-
tion for Membership” and states:
Desiring to become a member of the above Local of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, I hereby make
application for admission to membership so that the duly
elected officers of said Union may represent me for the pur-
COUNTY CONCRETE CORP. 5
poses of collective bargaining with my employer in reference
to working conditions, hours of labor, rates of pay and other
terms and conditions of employment.
I hereby authorize my employer to deduct my dues from my
wages and pay them to Local 863 in accordance with any
agreement made between my employer and the Union and
this authorization shall be my warrant to my employer for said
purposes and shall be irrevocable for the period of time per-
mitted by law.
I further agree that upon acceptance of this application for
membership I will pay the regularly required dues and as-
sessments and will abide by the rules, regulations, constitution
and by laws of Local 863 and The International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
There is another, separate, section to the document distribut-
ed to employees entitled “Checkoff Authorization and Assign-
ment” which provides as follows:
I _______ [Print Name], hereby authorize my employer to
deduct from my wages each and every month an amount
equal to the monthly dues, initiation fees, and uniform as-
sessments of Local union 863,and direct such amounts so de-
ducted to be turned over each month to the Secretary-
Treasurer of such Local Union for and on my behalf.
This authorization is voluntary and is not conditioned on my
present or future membership in the Union.
This authorization and assignment shall be irrevocable for the
term of the applicable contract between the Union or for one
year, whichever is the lesser, and shall automatically renew it-
self for successive yearly or applicable contract periods there-
after, whichever is lesser, unless I give written notice to the
company and the union at least sixty (60) days, but not more
than seventy-five (75) days before any periodic renewal date
of this authorization and assignment of my desire to revoke
same.1
There is evidence that the foregoing dues check off authori-
zation forms were also distributed to employees by shop stew-
ards John Hutchings, Jr. and Vinnie Modafferi. Bargaining unit
employee Dean Walgren testified that Modafferi (who is now
deceased) provided the form and spoke with him about it.
Walgren testified as follows:
He gave me an application and he said that I needed to fill it
out or I couldn’t work at County Concrete because it’s now
unionized. And I needed to actually fill that out. And when I
took that I was under the impression that we’s – we would be
core members. And I had talked to him about that. And he
says that really was not an option, because it wasn’t. That core
members weren’t really a member.
When Walgren was asked whether he approached County
Concrete management that he wanted to be, or was electing to
be a financial core member, Walgren stated that these conversa-
tions occurred later –”quite a ways down the road.” He stated

1 As Respondent notes, this document does not provide employees
with their right to elect financial-core status.
that such discussions might have occurred in January of Febru-
ary of “this year.” Walgren also testified that he had discussions
with Scully about core or membership dues. All in all, it’s not
entirely clear from the record whether his discussions regarding
this matter took place in January or February of 2016 or 2017.
Relevant Contract Terms
On December 22, 2015, Peters mailed to Rispoli copies of 5
collective-bargaining agreements for his signature. In a cover
letter Peters wrote: “these agreements are substantially the
same as the CBA’s that had previously been provided to you.
We have also added the effective date of November 8, 2015
(which you have told us is the date the members ratified the
CBAs) and set January 1, 2016 as the start date for dues.
Please execute both copies and return them to me so I can have
John Crimi sign them when he returns from his vacation.”
Article 2 of the proposed collective-bargaining agreements
each contain an identical “union security clause” as follows:
Any present or future employee who is or hereafter becomes a
member of the Union shall remain a member of the Union
during the terms of this Agreement as a condition of his em-
ployment and condition of his employment and continued
employment. New employees may be hired by the Employer
on the open labor market, but each new employee shall be re-
quired to join and remain a member of the Union upon the
expiration of the Probationary Period (as defined in Article
20).2 Such employees shall be acceptable as members in good
standing upon payment of the customary initiation fee and
current monthly dues to the Union. Customary initiation fees
shall be waived for all covered employees that were employed
by County Concrete as of the date of this Agreement. The
Employer agrees that it will not discriminate in any manner
against any employee because of his membership or activity
in or on behalf of the Union.
Article 3 of each CBA contains the dues check off language,
and provides as follows:
This Article 3 is effective January 1, 2016. Thereafter and
during the remainder of the life of this Agreement (commenc-
ing after the Probationary Period set forth in Article 20) the
Employer agrees to deduct once each month from the em-
ployees’ wages and remit to the proper officers of the Union
monthly dues and initiation fees as membership dues uni-
formly levied by the International Union or by the Local Un-
ion in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws of the
Union, of such members of the Union as individually and
voluntarily certifying in writing, in form required by law, that
they authorize such deductions. An abstract of such deduc-
tions showing the name and amounts deducted from each
employee will accompany the monthly remittance to the Sec-
retary-Treasurer of the Union or a duly designated representa-
tive.

2 The “probationary period’ is defined as: “the first ninety (90) days
of employment for all new employees, excluding absences on work
days, and as may be otherwise be mutually extended.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
The Alleged Failure to Remit Dues
The Employer failed to remit dues money to the Union for
the month of January 2016. In a telephone discussion held
among Rispoli, Peters and Scully, the Respondent said they
wanted to get the seniority list straightened out first. Peters and
Scully stated that the Employer would collect dues authoriza-
tion forms from employees. There was also a discussion of the
dues amount. Rispoli informed Employer representatives that
the applicable formula was 2.5 percent of the employee’s hour-
ly rate plus $1. Rispoli later spoke with Crimi later in January
2016. At this time, Crimi suggested that it would be a good idea
to waive the January 2016 dues. In this regard, Crimi testified
as follows:
Q: [by Respondent’s counsel]: Okay. Did you have any con-
versations with Al Rispoli in January 2016 regarding the dues
obligations of County’s employees?
A: A number of conversations.
Q: Can you please tell us what those conversations entailed?
A: Well, Al was concerned about collecting his dues and I
told him we don’t know what dues to take out, because we
don’t know what’s going on. There -- did not have a proper
census. There were no dues signed. And the financial core
membership had thrown everything lopsided, where they
didn’t know what to do, the men. In the meantime the Union
hadn’t given us the information of what dues to take out.
Q: When you say the Union didn’t give you the information
as to what dues to take out, what do you mean by that?
A: Well, the Union sends you a schedule to take the dues out.
So we had no ability to take anything out. We didn’t know
what they were to be paid or who we were to take the dues
from.
Q: And that was in January –
A; It was –
Q: 2016?
A: In January, that’s correct.
Q: Okay. Did you have any other conversations with Mr.
Rispoli?
A: That’s the same situation that came about in February.
Q: Let’s stick with January 2016.
A: Stick with January. Al had said to me that he’s wave [sic]
the January dues.
Q: When did he say this to you?
A: Sometime in January. I don’t remember the date.
Q: Did he say why he was waiving the January dues?
A: Well, everything was in flux. We didn’t even know what
dues to take out. So how could you take dues out of a mem-
ber’s thing if you don’t know what to take or who – or if
they’re financial core or they [are a ] full member.
Crimi then went on to testify that he could not recall whether
the conversation where Rispoli said he would be waiving dues
took place before or after Respondent received signed authori-
zation cards from the Union. As he stated: “I don’t recall. It
was in the course of oura number of conversations Al and I
had.”
Rispoli, who was in the courtroom when Crimi offered the
foregoing testimony testified on rebuttal and acknowledged that
Crimi had suggested waiving the dues for January 2016. Ac-
cording to Rispoli, his response was, “No fucking way.”
On January 20, 2016, Lorraine Graziano, one of the Union’s
administrative assistants, sent via email copies of the approxi-
mately 122 cards the Union had collected by that point. On
January 26, Scully responded requesting information about how
many workers were full-time members and how many were
financial core members. He also asked for the dues calculation
for each category.
On February 3, Graziano wrote to Scully that she would be
sending the monthly dues check off for February 2016, which
would list the amount of member dues and asked for the social
security numbers of certain employees.
Additional cards were sent by the Union and on or about
February 3, 2016, the Employer acknowledged in writing that it
had received 125 cards, but since there were 146 employees at
the time, they could not deduct dues for the remaining 21 em-
ployees. Peters, writing on behalf of the Employer requested
the names of employees who had selected financial member
status and the amount of the dues to be collected from these
employees. The Union received this communication on Febru-
ary 8.
On February 6, 2016, the Union sent to the Employer a com-
plete remittance form for dues, listing each person for whom
they had a card, their wage rate and the dues owed. By mid-
February 2016, the Employer had not yet provided the Union
with a signed copy of the collective-bargaining agreements, nor
had it remitted any dues payments to the Union. Rispoli called
Peters and asked where the contracts were and Peters replied he
was working on it. Rispoli asked when the Union would be
receiving the dues payments and Peters replied that he was
attempting to get the rest of the applications and Scully was
working on it.
Crimi testified that he had a number of conversations with
Rispoli during the month of February regarding the dues pay-
ment obligations:
The most particular one is I talked to Al about the fact that
again, God rest his soul, Vinnie was going around to all the
employees in the sand plant at Kenvil telling them that if
they’re a financial core member that they’re not going to be
represented by the Union. They can’t go on Union jobs, they
can’t do this, they can’t do that. And now the whole company
in the area is up in flame again. And I talked to Al.
I said you have to have Vinnie stop that. He can’t keep
doing that, because first of all it’s untrue. And so that’s the
conversation I had with him. And Al said I’ll have him
stop it.
I then took the paper we received from your law firm and had
John Scully sit down with every single employee with that
form in front of him with their rights and declare what they
wanted. Yes, full member or financial core member. So now
there was no question in anyone’s mind because they had to
sign.
They read it, they signed it and we submit it to Al. And now
we knew exactly what it was without [coercion] No one push-
ing them one way or the other and that’s how it happened.
COUNTY CONCRETE CORP. 7
The Alleged Unilateral Change
On February 26, 2016, Peters sent a letter to Rispoli as fol-
lows:
As discussed, John Scully of County Concrete is collecting
the signatures of your members on the Check Off Authoriza-
tion and Assignment cards to enable us to withhold monthly
union dues. We are expecting to have all of your members
sign by the end of February 2016.
Given this fact, the date in Article III (the date dues will be in-
itially collected) of the Collective Bargaining Agreements
must be changed in all of the CBA’s to March 1, 2016. Mr.
Crimi will initial this change in the CBA’s and we ask you to
do the same.
Many of your members have questioned us as to the amount
of the monthly dues paid by a Full-Member versus a Financial
Member. You had previously provided us with the monthly
amount for a Full Member of two times the hourly rate plus
$1.00,3 and for a Financial Member the rate is unknown.
After receiving this letter, Rispoli called Peters. As Rispoli
testified, Peters told him he had not been able to get ready for
February 2016 and would change the dues deduction to start in
March 2016. Rispoli testified that he challenged Respondent’s
authority to change the contract and maintained that the agree-
ment was for dues to be taken out and remitted as of January 1
and that the Union would not agree to any change in the date.
Rispoli then called Crimi, who expressed surprise that the
Union had not yet received the contracts because he had signed
them. Shortly thereafter Rispoli did receive the contracts. The
version submitted to the Union by Respondent had the January
date crossed out in article 3 and in its place there was a hand-
written notation: “March.” In the cover letter accompanying
the signed contracts, Scully wrote that, “[a] small change has
been made on page Two (2) Article 3. Mr. Crimi has changed
the dues check off date from January 1, 2016 to March 1, 2016
to reflect the date of the initial execution of the CBAs by both
parties. Mr. Crimi has initialed next to the hand written chang-
es. Please initial the changes in your set of the CBAs and for-
ward us a copy of page two (2) so that we can update our cop-
ies of the CBAs.”
Rispoli returned the contracts to Respondent but had his as-
sistant write the word “January” back into article 3.
On March 9, 2016, the Union emailed Scully its check off
spreadsheet outlining dues payments owed for March 2016.
This spreadsheet contained separate ledgers for those employ-
ees who selected financial core status and those employees who
selected full member status. Financial core status employees
paid anywhere between $37 and $42 per month for dues where-
as full members paid between $46 and $52 per month in dues.
It is undisputed that by the end of January 2016, Respondent
had in its possession 125 dues authorization check off cards and
did not remit dues for any employee for either January or Feb-
ruary 2016. Dues for the month of March were remitted in
April.

3 The applicable wage rate as cited by the Employer in its letter was
apparently incorrect.
Crimi testified that he directed Scully to show every bargain-
ing unit employee the SWB memorandum and have them con-
firm on their check off authorization card whether he or she
elected full membership or financial-core status.
Crimi further testified that he did not execute the collective-
bargaining agreement until the end of February 2016 for the
following reasons:
I was very upset that I’m the one who brought my company
back home to 863 and we couldn’t get to the point to agree on
the dues thing. And it got really upsetting to me and I wasn’t
going to go forward with this Local in a peaceful manner. It
wasn’t fair to my men and women.
Contentions of the Parties
As an initial matter, counsel for the General Counsel argues
that a collective-bargaining agreement is formed where there is
a meeting of the minds on all substantive issues and material
terms of the contract, and the General Counsel bears this bur-
den of proof. Counsel argued that the Union and Employer
reached a meeting of the minds on the dues check-off clause
(Article 3) and the remaining elements of the CBA where both
parties agreed the effective date of contract was November 8,
2015, the Employer drafted 5 CBAs in accordance with the
agreed-upon terms, forwarded the contracts to the Union for
execution, and the cover letter specified that the Employer in-
serted January 1, 2016, into the dues check-off clause as the
start date for dues collection (reflecting the agreement of the
parties, as set forth above). Thus, General Counsel argues that
the drafts reflected agreement on all substantive issues and the
Employer was not authorized to change any agreed upon terms
without first obtaining approval of the Union.
General Counsel further argues that the Employer should
have retroactively remitted requested dues to the Union because
by the beginning of February 2016, the Employer already re-
ceived 125 dues deduction authorization cards. Counsel for the
General Counsel relies upon two Board cases4 where the Board
held employers “were obligated to remit dues even when the
union did not timely present dues cards,” and argued that in the
present case the Union did timely present the cards. Thus, this
unilateral refusal to remit dues violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
General Counsel additionally contends that, for the remain-
ing unit employees, it was the Employer’s tactics that delayed
the authorization card collection. These involved: refusing to
assist in the collection of cards where they first agreed to dis-
tribute them, purposely providing an inaccurate seniority list,
and deciding at last that it will, in fact, collect authorization
forms from all employees.
Finally, Counsel for the General Counsel has anticipated that
the Employer will argue that Section 302(c)(4) of the Act privi-
leged its refusal to remit the January 2016 and February 2016
dues. Although Section 302(c)(4) requires a written authoriza-
tion before dues are deducted, the Board in Gadsden Tool, su-
pra, has stated that this section of the Act “cannot be used as a
shield when the Employer’s 8(a)(5) violations necessitate a

4 See, e.g., Gadsden Tool, Inc., 340 NLRB 29 (2003); Williams
Pipeline Co., 315 NLRB 630 (1994).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
remedy for this unlawful conduct.” General Counsel has argued
even it were to be found that Section 302(c)(4) is persuasive,
“the record is clear that the Employer received in January ap-
proximately 100 applications that were signed in December
2015,” thus the January 2016 and February 2016 dues should
have been deducted as had been previously authorized by these
employees. General Counsel contends that, just as the Employ-
er retroactively made payments for March 2016 in April 2016,
they could have made the January 2016 and February 2016
dues payments. For the 82 employees who signed applications
in December 2015, the Union’s March 6, 2016 dues spread-
sheet quoted the exact amount of monthly dues owed as initial-
ly requested in the February 6, 2016 spreadsheet for these re-
spective employees.
The Union has argued that dues deductions are a mandatory
subject of bargaining and an employer may not make a unilat-
eral change in the contract, during the term thereof, without
first negotiating with the union representing its employees and
obtaining its consent. It is argued that such consent was never
given to changing the applicable term of the agreement. In
particular, the Union argues, contrary to the testimony of Crimi,
that Rispoli never waived the collection and remittance of dues
for January. No such written evidence of any such waiver was
presented and even in the February 26, 2017 letter when Re-
spondent informed the Union in writing that it was making a
change, it did not refer to any purported waiver of dues in Janu-
ary. In support of their argument, Respondent relies upon cases
which stand for the proposition that, “a waiver will not readily
be inferred and there must be a ‘clear and unmistakable show-
ing that the waiver occurred.”5
Further, the Union points out that an employer violates sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) by ceasing to deduct and remit dues during
an existing contract.6 As a remedy, the Board in Bulkmatic
Transport Co.7 found, prospectively, the company is to deduct
dues from the employee; however, for the period of the viola-
tion the company must reimburse the union for its failure to do
so with interest.
The Union further points to Shen-Mar Food Products, Inc.,8
where the Board found a violation of the Act where a “compa-
ny improperly injected itself into the relationship between the
employees and the [u]nion” and wrongly “threw its weight”
against the union, thereby undermining the union. There the
Board found, unilaterally refusing to cease to deduct and remit
dues to the union during the term of the contract even where
there is confusion about employees’ union or dues status, vio-
lates the Act. Thus, the Union has argued that the Employer
here has improperly injected itself and threw its weight behind
one choice, where they issued memos about core dues and met
with employees to advise them of their choices, which is an
issue between a union and its bargaining unit employees.
Respondent argues, as an initial matter, that the collective-
bargaining agreement was not executed between the parties

5 See e.g., Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 NLRB 955,
956 (1958); Metropolitan Edison Co. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
6 See e.g., Shen-Mar Food Products, 221 NLRB 1329 (1976).
7 See e.g., Bulkmatic Transport Co., 340 NLRB 621 (2003).
8 Shen-Mar Food Products, 221 NLRB 1329 (1976).
until February 26, 2016. Respondent maintains that the Board
has long held that the date of the contract’s execution and not
any previous effective dates govern the union security clause.9
Therefore, the Union would be entitled to assess and collect
dues in March 2016, which would be the first paycheck follow-
ing February 26, 2016.
Respondent has also argued that the Union never provided
the employees with notice of their rights under General Mo-
tors10 and Beck11 until March 2016. The Supreme Court in Beck
and General Motors found, prior to collecting union fees and
dues, a union must notify the employee that he or she has the
right to be or remain a nonmember, and notify them of their
rights as a nonmember.12 The Respondent further argued that
nowhere on the application for membership or on the authoriza-
tion cards did the Union notify the employees of their right to
elect financial-core status or challenge their dues under this
status, or provide any other rights under Beck. Moreover, Re-
spondent has argued that the Board has repeatedly held absent
notice of his or her Beck rights “an employee’s decision to elect
full membership status with the union is not knowing or volun-
tary and the union is prohibited from assessing and collecting
dues form such employees.”
Respondent has argued that an employer is justified in refus-
ing to deduct dues where check-off authorizations that are not
freely and voluntarily obtained are unenforceable, and main-
tains this was the case for January and February 2016. Authori-
zations are not free and voluntary where a union threatens em-
ployees with discharge if they refuse to sign dues check off
authorization cards. The Respondent further argues that the
Union violated the Act where agents of the Union told the em-
ployees while handing out the Union’s membership applica-
tions that the “employees could not pay financial-core dues and
could only be full members of the union or else they couldn’t
work.” Therefore, the Respondent argued that they were justi-
fied in waiting until the cards were freely and voluntarily ob-
tained, which was not until February 26, 2016.
Respondent has also argued it genuinely believed some (if
not all) of the check off cards it received from the Union were
not freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made by its employees.
Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to withhold dues deduc-
tions until they knew which authorization cards were unen-
forceable and or valid was justified. In their reasoning, the Re-
spondent argued that the employee list that was submitted by
the Union stated all employees elected full-membership status,
however, the Respondent personally knew of a few employees
who expressed interest in being financial-core members. There-
fore, the Employer conducted its own investigation and con-
firmed with each employee of their desired status, and rectified
18 misclassified check off authorizations. Thus, pursuant to

9 See e.g., M.J. Santulli Mail Services, Inc., 281 NLRB 1288, 1294
(1986).
10 NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
11 Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
12 Rights include: (1) to object to paying for union activities not
germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduc-
tion in fees for such activities; (2) to be given sufficient information to
enable the employee to intelligibly decide whether to object; and (3) to
be appraised of any internal union procedures for filing objections.
COUNTY CONCRETE CORP. 9
Section 302(c)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Respondent
could not deduct dues until February 26, 2016, where they re-
ceived valid and accurate express authorization cards.
Finally, the Respondent argues with respect to whether the
Union verbally waived any dues obligation that may have ex-
isted for the employees in January 2016, Crimi’s testimony
should be credited and Rispoli’s testimony should be rejected.
The Respondent further argues that Crimi’s testimony is cor-
roborated by direct evidence: (1) the absence of a remittance
spreadsheet submitted by the Union for January 2016 strongly
suggests that the union did not intend to collect dues for that
month, where it is their practice to send the spreadsheet to the
employer; and (2) the February 2016 spreadsheet contains three
separate categories of data: “LAST PYMT” “MONTHS
OWED” and “PAID THROUGH.” The box under “PAID
THROUGH,” states “2016-01” and when asked what the num-
bers referred to, Rispoli testified that the notation “2016-01”
meant that the employee had satisfied his or her dues obligation
for January 2016.13
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
There are certain undisputed facts here:
The parties agreed that the effective date of the collective-
bargaining agreements would be November 8, 2015, but that
under Article 3 of the contracts, dues deductions would com-
mence on January 1, 2016. In December 2015, the Employer
prepared, and sent to the Union for signature, five collective-
bargaining agreements. All contained the agreed-upon date of
January 1 for the commencement of dues deductions and the
Union signed these contracts and returned the contracts with
that provision.
By the beginning of February, the Union had provided the
Employer with dual purpose membership and dues authoriza-
tion cards for 125 employees, many of which had been collect-
ed and forwarded to the Employer in January. Cards for an
additional 21 employees remained outstanding.
The Employer failed to sign its counterpart to the agreements
until the end of February, at which time it notified the Union
stating that it was changing the commencement date for the
deduction of dues to March.
In early March 2016, the Employer sent to the Union a
signed contract with a handwritten change in the date for dues
from January to March 1, 2016. The Union did not agree and
reinstated the January 1 date and returned the collective-
bargaining agreements to the Employer.
It is also undisputed that the Employer failed to deduct and
remit dues until sometime in April.
It is well-established that a collective bargaining agreement
is formed after a meeting of minds on substantive issues and
material terms. See Sunrise Nursing Home, Inc., 325 NLRB
380, 389 (1998). This is measured “not by parties’ subjective
inclinations, but by their intent as objectively manifested in
what whey said to each other.” Crittendon Hospital, 343 NLRB

13 The transcript reflects that although, Mr. Rispoli initially stated
“right” with respect to the question of whether 2016-01 meant the
member paid through January 2016, he then corrected himself and
stated “No, I’m sorry. It’s says owed or through.”
717, 718 (2004). Under Section 8(d) of the Act, either party to
a collective-bargaining agreement is obligated to execute, or
assist in executing, a memorialized version of the agreement, if
requested to do so by the other party. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514 (1941).
Here, there is no doubt that such a meeting of the minds re-
garding the terms and conditions of a collective-bargaining
agreement had been reached. The Employer cannot reasonably
dispute this, as they agreed to draft the agreements with an
effective date of November 8, 2015 and a date for dues deduc-
tions and remittances to commence on January 1, 2016. These
agreements were sent to the Union in December 2015 and
thereafter, in January 2016, executed and returned to the Em-
ployer by the Union.
I agree with the General Counsel and the Union that once
these agreements were signed and returned to the Employer,
neither party was privileged to change any of the agreed-upon
terms without the consent of the other party.
I do not credit Crimi’s testimony to the effect that Rispoli
agreed to waive the January dues. In this regard, I find Crimi’s
testimony on this issue to be vague and otherwise unsubstanti-
ated. If this was such a critical issue, I conclude that he would
have a more concrete recollection of how and when this con-
versation took place, and would have memorialized it in some
fashion. Further, I note that in its February letter to the Union,
Respondent failed to mention any such agreement, which it
surely would have done had such an amendment to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement been reached. Moreover, any pur-
ported agreement for January fails to take into account Re-
spondent’s failure to remit dues for the month of February (or
those of March until April).
Respondent attempts to defend its actions by asserting coer-
cion on the part of the Union in obtaining the membership and
dues authorization forms. The evidence regarding this is una-
vailing. The record, as discussed above, demonstrates that sev-
eral shop stewards were involved in obtaining signed authoriza-
tions from employees. One employee offered testimony that a
shop steward told him that he would not be able to become a
financial core member. However, he also offered contradictory
testimony that the issue did not come up until the following
year. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the
Respondent, I cannot find this to be sufficient evidence of em-
ployee coercion to invalidate the well over 100 dues authoriza-
tion cards obtained by the Union in January 2016. Moreover, I
note that there was no unfair labor charge filed against the Un-
ion relating to any such conduct and cannot appropriately make
such a finding here.
Respondent further attempts to defend its conduct by raising
the Beck issue. While it is the case generally that the Board has
found that notice to employee nonmembers of a union must be
given at the time the union first seeks to collect dues and fees,14
again, no such charge was filed and the issue of any unfair la-
bor practice on the part of the Union here is not properly before

14 Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhauser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB
349 (1995), rev’d on other grounds, Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788
(6th Cir 1997), vacated, United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Buzenius,
119 S. Ct. 442 (1998).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
me. Moreover in this instance the record reflects that employ-
ees were advised of their option to become core rather than full
members of the Union. Further, it is worth noting that an em-
ployee’s right with regard to union membership, full or other-
wise, is separate and distinct as to whether they authorize the
deduction of moneys owed to a union, regardless of status,
through their payroll, as is reflected in the dual purpose cards
which were distributed to employees.
Respondent further defends its conduct by referring to cer-
tain cases which assert that any dues obligation under a union
security clause starts to accrue from the date of contract execu-
tion and not the date to which the contract was retroactively
made. In Peoria Newspaper Guild, Local 86, 248 NLRB 88, 91
(1980), the Board noted that the Act does not sanction the ret-
roactive application of a union security clause. There the union
was found to have unlawfully threatened with discharge and
sought the discharge of an employee who had resigned his
membership in the union at a time when a contract binding him
to continued membership was not in force.
In that case, where the differences in factual circumstances to
those here are apparent, the Board made note of looking to the
language of the union security clause in question which did not
support the contention made by the respondent therein that the
contract’s retroactive date, rather than its execution date, was
controlling. Here, there is no evidence to support the conclusion
that Respondent could properly rely upon the contract’s execu-
tion date (which was in its exclusive control), rather than its
agreed-to effective date to give the clause effect. The language
at issue in the union security clause here refers to membership
during the “terms of this Agreement.” It is apparent from the
letter sent by Peters to the Union that there was a meeting of the
minds regarding such terms.
Respondent further relies upon Local 32B-J, SEIU, 266
NLRB 137 (1983), where it was found that the respondent un-
ion violated the Act by causing the employer to deduct and
transmit dues of employees for a period prior to 30 days after
the execution of their collective-bargaining agreement. In that
case, after a certification of representative, there was a negoti-
ated agreement between the employer and the union, which was
finalized in a letter of acceptance on March 27, 1981. During
the months of March and April, most of the employees in the
bargaining unit signed dual purpose cards for the union. The
employer maintained that pursuant to an agreement with the
union, dues deductions were to commence on March 1, 1981;
however, the union alleged that dues were to commence retro-
actively to July 1, 1980. In finding an unfair labor practice, the
Board noted that while an employee may voluntarily pay dues
for a period prior to the execution of a collective-bargaining
agreement, such freedom of choice had not been afforded to the
employees in that instance. Inasmuch as no contract had existed
prior to March 27, 1981, when the employer and the union
executed the agreement, no obligation to pay or remit dues
existed.
Here, however, whatever limited support such authority
might offer to Respondent is obviated by the fact that it was the
Respondent’s dilatory tactics which delayed the execution of
the collective-bargaining agreement at issue. After all, it was
Respondent who sent the contracts at issue to the Union in De-
cember 2015 for executionwith the jointly agreed upon date of
January 1, 2016, for the commencement of properly authorized
employee dues deduction and transmission. The Employer then
delayed its own execution of the agreement and incorporated a
unilateral change. And, it is the unilateral change of the agreed-
upon contract term which is the sole issue in these proceedings.
Respondent’s unlawful unilateral change is not condoned by
the fact that certain employees may not have submitted proper-
ly executed dues check off forms by the date the relevant con-
tract term was to have taken effect or by other conduct as has
been alleged. See e.g. Gadsen Tool, Inc., 340 NLRB 29, 30
(2003). Rather, the only question goes to the scope of the finan-
cial remedy: i.e. when the dues authorization forms were exe-
cuted and submitted, thereby triggering Respondent’s obliga-
tions under the collective-bargaining agreement.15
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent has violated the
Act, as alleged in the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By making a unilateral change to agreed-upon collective
bargaining agreements covering bargaining unit employees in
its Oxford, East Orange, Sussex, Kenvil, Morristown and Lan-
di, New Jersey facilities, by modifying the effective date of a
dues check off authorization provisions contained therein, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. By, for the period from January 1, 2016, through March 1,
2016, failing and refusing to collect properly authorized dues
from employees in the bargaining units represented by the Un-
ion in the facilities noted above and by failing to remit such
dues to the Union, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
3. The unfair labor practices described above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. I recommend that Respondent be
ordered to reimburse the Union, with interest as prescribed in
New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), for dues that the Re-
spondent was required to but failed to collect and remit under
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements for each fa-
cility at issue herein.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended16

15 It is apparent from the record that such forms were submitted to
Respondent on a rolling basis. To the extent certain employees had not
authorized payroll deductions in January and February (or not at all);
such matters regarding Respondent’s financial obligations to the Union
are appropriately left to the compliance stage of these proceedings.
Similarly, I find that any issue regarding Respondent’s financial obliga-
tions relating to employee choice of financial core status is appropriate-
ly deferred to that stage of these proceedings as well.
16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
COUNTY CONCRETE CORP. 11
ORDER
The Respondent, County Concrete Corporation, Kenvil, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Making unilateral changes to agreed-upon collective-
bargaining agreements covering bargaining unit employees in
its Oxford, East Orange, Sussex, Kenvil, Morristown, and Lan-
di, New Jersey facilities,
(b) Failing and refusing to collect properly authorized dues
from employees in the bargaining units represented by the Un-
ion in the facilities noted above and by failing to remit such
dues to the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Reimburse the Union, with interest as prescribed in the
remedy portion of this decision for dues that the Respondent
was required to but failed to collect and remit under the terms
of the collective-bargaining agreements for each facility at
issue herein.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
facilities in Oxford, East Orange, Sussex, Kenvil, Morristown
and Landi, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”17 Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 22, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to the posting of paper no-
tices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the respondent customarily communicates
with their employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since January 1, 2016.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the

17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 18, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes to agreed-upon collec-
tive bargaining agreements covering bargaining unit employees
in our Oxford, East Orange, Sussex, Kenvil, Morristown, and
Landi, New Jersey facilities,
WE WILL NOT fail and refusing to collect properly authorized
dues from employees in the bargaining units represented by the
Union in the facilities noted above and WE WILL NOT fail to
remit such dues to the Union,
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL reimburse the Union, with interest, for properly au-
thorized dues that we were required to but failed to collect and
remit under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements
for each facility as described above.
COUNTY CONCRETE CORPORATION
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CA-171328 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.