Columbia Typographical Union No. 101

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 11, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 88 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

88 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, International
Typographical Union of North America , AFL-CIO
(Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc.) and William H.
Culpepper. Case 5-CB-1210
July 11, 1975
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING,
JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
ther consideration, that the case should be decided
on the merits. Accordingly, we hereby reinstate the
complaint herein.
The Board has considered the record, the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, the Charging Party's motions for reconsidera-
tion and Respondent's replies thereto, and the vari-
ous communications submitted to the Board by the
parties, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,4 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
On December 12, 1973, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issued its Decision in the above-cap-
tioned proceeding' wherein it dismissed the com-
plaint and deferred to the parties' contractual
grievance-arbitration machinery in accordance with
the principle of Collyer 2 and related cases, subject to
reservation of appropriate jurisdiction. On January
11, 1974, the Charging Party moved the Board to
vacate its Decision and Order and to render a deci-
sion on the merits favorable to it, contending, inter
alia, that Respondent violated the substantive provi-
sions of our Decision and Order because it failed to
initiate the grievance-arbitration action required by
that Decision and Order. By Order dated March 10,
1974,3 the Board denied the aforesaid motion, find-
ing that the responsibility for initiating grievance ac-
tion rests on the aggrieved party; i.e., the Charging
Party. Eight days later, the Charging Party and his
employer, Byron S. Adams, Printing, Inc., filed griev-
ances against Respondent covering the dispute which
had been in controversy before the Board.
On January 16, 1975, 2 months later, the Charging
Party again moved the Board to consider the case on
the merits and to adopt the Decision and Order of
the Administrative Law Judge because Respondent
"has consistently resisted efforts of the charging par-
ty to process the grievance-and has failed to agree
to submit the matter to arbitration." By letter dated
January 17, 1975, Respondent notified the Board
that "it is agreeable to arbitrate the dispute." Despite
this and other assurances from Respondent, howev-
er, the dispute has yet to reach the arbitral forum
because of Respondent's repeated cancellations of
agreed-to, and scheduled, times for arbitration.
These numerous postponements are not commensu-
rate with Respondent's obligation to arbitrate the
dispute with reasonable promptness. We find, there-
fore, that Respondent has not complied with either
the meaning or the intent of the "reasonable prompt-
ness" provision of our Order. We further find, in
agreement with the Charging Party's motion for fur-
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent , Columbia Typographi-
cal Union No . 101, International Typographical
Union of North America , AFL-CIO, Washington,
D.C., its officers, agents , and representatives, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
CHAIRMAN MURPHY , concurring:
Like all of my colleagues I would reach the merits
at this time and join in finding the violations alleged.
'207 NLRB 850.
2
Collyer Insulated Wire, a Gulf and Western Systems Co, 192 NLRB 837
(1971).
3214 NLRB No. 13.
4 Members Fanning and Jenkins would not have deferred to arbitration
but would have decided the case on the merits on the Board's initial consid-
eration of the case , for the reasons set forth in their dissenting opinions in
Collyer, supra, and related cases, as well as for the reasons set forth by
Member Jenkins in the decisions and orders previously issued in this pro-
ceeding.
DECISION
THOMAs A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in the above-entitled proceeding was held on September
11, 12, and 13, 1972, at Washington, D.C., on complaint of
the General Counsel against Columbia Typographical
Union No. 101, International Typographical Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent
or the Union. The charge was filed on January 19, 1972,
and amended on March 1, 1972, by William Culpepper,
and the complaint issued on March 21, 1972. The issue of
the case is whether the Respondent restrained and coerced
Byron S. Adams Printing Inc., of Washington, D.C., in
violation of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act. Briefs were filed
by all parties.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following:
219 NLRB No. 18
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 89
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., is a wholly owned subsid-
iary of Publishers Company, Inc., a District of Columbia
Corporation engaged in the business of commercial print-
ing. During the 12 months preceding issuance of the com-
plaint, a representative period, Adams purchased and re-
ceived materials and supplies in its District of Columbia
place of business valued in excess of $50,000, and per-
formed services for and shipped printed materials to per-
sons and corporations valued in excess of $50,000. I find
that Adams is an employer within the meaning of the Act
and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2 of the statute.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, In-
ternational Typographical Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On February 22, 1972, the Respondent Union called a
strike by all the employees in the composing room of Ad-
ams Printing Company to force it to remove William Cul-
pepper, the general foreman, from his position as manage-
ment representative, and to replace him with another union
member . It's reason for doing this was because Culpepper
had placed a limitation on the length of time the Union's
steward could discuss union matters with the employees
inside the composing room, while they were at work, and
while they were being paid to work. I find that by imposing
a fine on Culpepper, himself a union member, by expelling
him from union membership, and by so striking the Com-
pany, the Respondent coerced the employer in the selec-
tion of its representative in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.
The pertinent facts are plain and not really disputed. For
some years the Union has been the bargaining agent, under
successive written contracts, for the 15 or 20 employees in
the composing room. Its steward, here called chapel chair-
man, at the time of the event was Jesse Mambeck. He was
discharged in an economic reduction in force on December
17, 1971.1 He continued thereafter with great frequency to
come to the plant, stayed both before and during the work
shift, and talked to the employees while they were at work.
Again and again Culpepper , the general foreman , told him
to leave, but Mambeck refused; Hurbert Jacobs, the man-
1 Among the distracting colorations placed into the record by the Respon-
dent was the question whether the steward retained employee status after
December 17. The question is irrelevant to the issues raised by the com-
plaint; it would therefore be pointless to discuss here the evidence indicating
that he worked occasionally, as a substitute proofreader , beginning at the
earliest during March 1972. In insisting on a reasonable limit to the
steward 's time for carrying on union activities in the shop during working
hours the employer never predicated its position on any assertion that
Mambeck was not an employee.
ager of the entire company, told him the same thing, but
was similarly rebuffed. Finally, by letter dated January 7,
1972, the Company limited the steward's time in the shop
to 15 minutes before each of the two shifts then in opera-
tion, plus 20 minutes after the start of each shift, with an-
other 30 minutes during the lunch of each shift. The latter
read as follows:
As Vice President and Chapel Chairman you are enti-
tled to enter our plant, but your presence here for an
unreasonable period of time is an unwarranted inter-
ference with production. We feel it would be reason-
able for you to be here 15 minutes before the start of
the work shift and to remain a reasonable time past
the start of the shift. We believe 20 minutes would be
a reasonable time.
You are not to interfere with the work flow or produc-
tion in any way, if there are any complaints or griev-
ances, these should not be discussed on company time.
The next day Mambeck answered the Company, in writ-
ing, saying he would refuse to abide by the direction.
Among other grounds he based his refusal on the assertion
that the collective-bargaining agreement in effect con-
tained no "restrictive language" in this respect, that he
would "be the judge of my own duties as a union official,"
and that he would be governed by "union laws" in the
matter and not by "unilateral edict of management offi-
cials."
On January 11 Mambeck was back in the composing
room, talking to the employees, and stayed beyond the
now alloted 20 minutes after the shift had started working.
Culpepper told him to leave and he refused. The Company
called the police, the police asked him to leave, he refused
again , and he was arrested?
The next thing that happened is that Mambeck, and the
president of Local 101-Raymond Hall, filed internal
union charges against the foreman. The charge was pro-
cessed in regular fashion, Culpepper was found guilty, and
the membership voted, on February 20, to fine him $5,000
and to expell him from the Union. As stated in the Union's
report to its members, Culpepper was fined and expelled
"for causing the arrest of the chapel chairman for alleged
`trespassing.' " The Company and Culpepper were advised
and on the next workday, February 22, Mambeck came to
the plant to give effect to the expulsion. He gathered all the
employees of the composing room and instructed them to
refuse to accept any work orders from Culpepper because
he was no longer a union member. The foreman then or-
dered the men to work, they refused and he discharged
2 The general foreman and the steward disagreed at the hearing as to the
words they exchanged that morning Culpepper said he simply ordered the
man to leave; Mambeck testified he was on his way out and the foreman
dared him to remain . Here again a question totally irrelevant to the case was
raised, for it is clear on Mambeck 's own story that by the time the police
arrived he had deliberately sat down again and in fact refused their request
to depart . He conceded his indifference to the foreman by testifying he then
told him ; "I'm not working for you today. I'll come back when I please and
take care of union business ." As he would have it by that time it had
become a test of wills between him and the foreman . I credit Culpepper 's
version , but all that matters is that the 20 minutes after starting time had
elapsed and Mambeck did refuse to leave Indeed it was with reluctance
that the police had to handcuff him, for he is 76 years old and a gentleman.
90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
every one of them then and there. At the hearing Mambeck
testified he told Culpepper that day, in the presence of all
the employees; ". . . if you will leave the room we will go
to work. If you don't, then we are not going to work." With
this statement by the steward, the Respondent's conten-
tion, that the work stoppage resulted from the Company's
discharge of the men, merits no comment . It was a strike to
force the employer to replace Culpepper with a union
member more amenable to the Union's view of how the
Company should conduct its labor relations.
Later in the day the employer contracted out the work in
progress, apparently to other shops run by other companies
owned by the same parent organization , Publisher's Com-
pany, Inc. The Union's officers then advised the parent
Company that the subcontracting would not be permitted,
that it would picket the other plants if necessary,3 and the
strike was settled that night . The basis of settlement was
that the Company capitulated completely to the Union's
demands . The men returned the next morning; in
Culpepper's place the Company designated one of the low-
er foremen , Lawrenson , as acting general foreman . The ar-
rangement was that Culpepper would articulate work or-
ders to Lawrenson, who then, because he was a member of
the Union in good standing, passed on the orders to the
men. With this, work was resumed , and it has continued in
this fashion to this day. Some time in April Lawrenson
returned to another job and another union member-
Charles Shaugruie-took his place as acting general fore-
man and has since been passing Culpepper's orders on to
the men. Culpepper never paid the union fine and was nev-
er reinstated into the union.
Analysis
The law is clear. Section 8(bXl)(B) of the Act reads as
follows: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agent-to restrain or coerce . . . an em-
ployer in the selection of his representatives for the purpos-
es of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances ." Culpepper is concededly a supervisor ; it is no less
clear that he speaks for management in the "adjustment of
grievances." Apart from other evidence that he represents,
and has represented the Company in specific disputes with
union agents , the very act by him which the Union found
anathema and for which it punished him went to the heart
of labor relations. Mambeck said all he did in the shop was
check to see if the employees had things to complain about,
whether they were being paid properly, whether work as-
signments conformed with the contract provisions, etc.
This was purely a concern with the grievance procedure.
3 The Respondent's threat to picket other companies , albeit seemingly
primary employers, appears in the testimony of two witnesses Robert Orth,
president of Type , Incorporated , a subsidiary of Publisher's Company, said
Mambeck called to tell him "that Type, Incorporated , and Merkle Press
would be involved in a picket line operation " According to Mambeck
he told Orth ". we are doing Merkle work down here , and we are having
trouble. It may eventuate in having pickets around this place." I find, as
alleged in the complaint , that by threatening to picket the premises of Type,
Incorporated , and of Merkle Press, in furtherance of its object of forcing the
removal of Culpepper from the employ of the Adams Printing Co., the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act
Further, no question here of direct as distinguished from
indirect coercion of the employer. See San Francisco-Oak-
land Mailers' Union No. 18, International Typographical
Union (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 NLRB 2173
(1968). There can be no more direct force exerted by a
union on an employer than pure strike action to win a
demand-legal or illegal.
A number of arguments are advanced in defense and all
ultimately rest upon the fact that the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Union and this company requires
union membership by the general foreman; the Respon-
dent calls this one phrase "the heart of the whole case."
None of the contentions suffices to defeat the complaint.
There is no legal precedent for the proposition that a con-
tract clause requiring union membership by supervisors as
a condition of employment is not in itself an unfair labor
practice. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, and Local 134 [Bell Supervisors Protective Asso-
ciation ] v. N.L.R.B., 487 F.2d 1113 (C.A.D.C., 1972), fn. 69.
And in Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P and 272 of the Lithogra-
phers and Photoengravers International Union, AFL-CIO
(Toledo Blade Co.), 175 NLRB 1072 (1969), involving an-
other local of the parent organization of the Respondent
Union here, the Board adopted the following language of
the Trial Examiner: ". . . such discipline by a union, even
though the employer may have consented to the compulso-
ry union membership of the supervisor under a union-se-
curity clause, is an unwarranted `interference with the
employer's control over its own representatives,' and de-
prives the employer of the undivided loyalty of the supervi-
sor to which it is entitled ." Accord: Bell Supervisors Protec-
tive Association, supra.
The Union reads its contract as limiting the Company so
that any and every member of management may engage in
only those mangerial acts specified in haec verba in the
agreement . An extension of this argument is that because
the contract does not specify how much time the steward
or the employees may devote, during working hours, to
discussion of union affairs, they all may do so without lim-
it. From this it follows, according to the Respondent, that
it may force the removal of any foreman doing anything
not conceded to him by the Union, or from imposing any
limitation upon union activities during working hours, and
never mind Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the statute. Thus, accord-
ing to Vitto, a witness for the Respondent, when asked by
Culpepper to leave the composing room, Mambeck an-
swered "I'll leave when I get through . . . he would leave
when he got through with his Union business." Earisman
also called by the Respondent, testified Mambeck told
Culpepper on the composing room floor "he [Culpepper] is
not supposed to be out on the floor formanizing [sic]."
There is nothing in the contract that limits the right of
the employer to run its business, to expect people to work
during the time for which they are being paid, or to take
any action in the interest of the Company. Indeed this is
the very area, external to union affairs, of which the rele-
vant cases speak. "The supervisor-employer relationship
is impermissably affected in an adverse manner , through
the union's subversion of the undivided loyalty owed by
the supervisor to his employer when he is properly acting
to further the interests of his employer." Bell Supervisors,
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 91
supra. This statutory protection from union coercion af-
forded the employer by the statute cannot be denied by
any innuendo or strained reading of its collective-bargain-
ing agreement. For the argument that the Adams Company
waived its legal rights under Section 8(b)(1)(B) the Respon-
dent relies entirely on a contract clause which reads the
foreman "shall not be subject to fine, discipline, or expul-
sion by the Union for any act in the performance of his
duties as foreman, when such act is authorized by this
Agreement." This is hardly that "clear and unmistakable
language" requisite under the law for depriving unions of
their statutory prerogatives. Timken Roller Bearing Compa-
ny, 138 NLRB 15 (1962). The employer's rights merit no
less protection. To the contrary, what is written into the
contract, albeit not in so many words, is that the employees
will work for their pay, and that the employer may see to it
at any time that they do so. Such reading of the contract is
dictated of necessity from the fact it provides the employ-
ees will be paid so much or so much. Republic Aviation
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, fn. 10. In Timken
Roller Bearing the Board considered statutory rights en-
joyed by unions, and said that every such right "exists by
virtue of the statute apart from any contract concession by
the employer." No less do the rights of employers under
this statute have validity apart from union concessions. But
even assuming there was any disagreement between Main-
beck and Culpepper over the import of the existing con-
tract, the Company was still entitled to the supervisor's
"undivided loyalty." Meat Cutters Union Local 81 [Safeway
Stores] v. N.L.R.B. 458 F.2d 794 (C.A.D.C., 1972).
Both parties to the underlying dispute-the Union and
the Company-offered evidence to prove an ancient per-
sonal animosity between the steward and the general fore-
man. It is all beside the point; neither is obligated to like
the other, so long as each keeps his activities within the
ambit alloted him by the scheme of the statute. Compare:
Signal Manufacturing Company, 150 NLRB 1162 (1965),
enfd. 351 F.2d 471 (C.A. 1, 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 985
(1966).
A final argument is that because this Company, and
others in the immediate geographical area, permitted the
Respondent's agents to engage in union activities during
working hours with the employees without limitation, the
Respondent has forever surrendered the right to impose
any limitation on the conduct. The short answer to this is
that no party-union or employer-surrenders any statuto-
ry right "simply because it was unsuccessful in obtaining a
provision in the contract requiring" the other party to
abide by rules of law.
One day, while Mambeck was in the plant as usual, the
foreman invited him to his office to discuss a number of
issues in dispute between them. The two sat and conferred
for about 30 minutes. Culpepper's recollection was that
they talked about the justification or absence of justifica-
tion for the December layoff, the proper method for the
steward to obtain payroll information for union purposes,
the kind of work orders the employees were required to
accept from the foreman, etc. ". . . I told him that as far as
I was concerned, he could make a grievance on any issue
he would like to. I would like the disruption of the compos-
ing room to stop, and we would argue the grievance down
at the Printing Industry of Washington." Mambeck testi-
fied Culpepper wanted to talk to him "about union mat-
ters, as a chairman, not as an individual employee .... .
He added they discussed "the layoff, which I considered
illegal, and how we could settle this thing? . . . it was a
conference of the Union representative and the foreman."
At the end of the meeting Mambeck first became aware
that there was a recording machine on the desk and that it
had been functioning during the conference. He accused
Culpepper of infringing on his constitutional rights. Some
words were exchanged, and the upshot of this incident was
that when charges were filed against Culpepper later, after
Mambeck had been arrested, an added charge was based
on this hidden use of the recording device. The union trial
committee found Culpepper guilty as charged and he was
fined an additional $1,000 for the offense.
I find that by imposing this additional fine on the gener-
al foreman as punishment for the manner in which he
chose to carry on his negotiations with the union represen-
tative the Respondent committed a further unfair labor
practice in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. The
conference with which the Union found fault was strictly
part of the collective-bargaining procedure, a discussion of
the merits of grievance matters. The general foreman chose
to do it his way, to look after the interests of management
by recording the steward's words with precision and with
the steward off guard. He did not thereby inhibit Main-
beck; he did nothing to interfere with the union
representative's freedom in his functioning as the spokes-
man of the majority agent. It would not be conducive to
the entire precess of collective bargaining if one party
could dictate the exact manner in which the other must
conduct itself in negotiations, or in grievance handling.
Free collective bargaining means that neither party coerces
the other. The apparent difficulty here arises from the same
anomaly that underlay the basic disagreement between
these two men and which lead to Culpepper's expulsion
and the strike. The foreman wears two hats; under the
scheme of the statute, and particularly Section (8)(b)(lXB),
the management figure-like his counterpart, the union-
man-must be free to act independently of any improper
force exerted by the other.4
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom,
and from like or related conduct, and that it take certain
affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act. The Respondent must rescind its action
fining William Culpepper and expunge all records of those
fines from its files, as well as any record of the expulsion of
Culpepper from union membership. Part of the Union's
On November 9, 1972, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint , citing Houston Mailers Union No 36 (Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co.), 199 NLRB 804 (1972), as authority. The motion is denied as in
my opinion the cited case is distinguishable. In any event in a field of
developing law it is best for the Board to enunciate principles in the first
instance.
92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unlawful coercion upon the Company was to compel it to
hire two union members through whom the general fore-
man must convey his work orders or directions to the rank-
and-file employees. The evidence shows that throughout
the time these two men, first Lawrenson and then Shau-
gruie , functioned in this manner, one half of their time was
devoted to regular production work and one half merely to
passing the general foreman's orders on to the employees.
That situation is still prevailing. The Respondent must be
ordered to reimburse the Company therefore for one half
the amount these two men have been paid since the time of
the strike in February 1972, and until such time as the use
of these men or anyone like them is no longer compelled
upon the Company.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By fining William Culpepper $1,000 for the use of a tape
recording machine in a grievance meeting and $5,000 for
imposing a time limitation on the Union steward 's privilege
to conduct union activities during working hours in the
shop, by expelling William Culpepper from the Union, by
striking the Adams Printing Company to force the removal
of its general foreman , and by threatening to picket the
premises of Type Incorporated, and Merkle Press, in fur-
therance of this unlawful pressure upon the Adams Com-
pany, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(b)(I)(B) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record , I issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, International
Typographical Union of North America, AFL-CIO, the
Respondent herein , its officers , agents , and representatives,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Fining, expelling, or otherwise disciplining supervi-
sors of Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., for the purpose of
restraining and coercing that Company in the selection of
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or
adjustment of grievances.
(b) Engaging in a strike against that Company or threat-
ening to picket related companies for the same purpose.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., in the selection of represen-
tatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the ad-
justment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Rescind and expunge from its files all records of the
fines levied against William Culpepper and advise him in
writing that the said fines have been rescinded and that the
records of such fine have been expunged.
(b) Reimburse Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., in the
manner set forth under the section entitled "The Remedy,"
for moneys paid to members of the Respondent Union for
functioning as substitute general foremen forced on that
Company by the Respondent.
(c) Post at its office and meeting hall and at any bulletin
boards maintained by it at the Byron S. Adams Printing,
Inc., Company Plant, copies of the attached notice, marked
"Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to members
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Furnish the Regional Director signed copies of said
notice for posting by Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., if
willing, in places where notices to its composing room em-
ployees are customarily posted.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
5In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
6In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgement of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fine, expell or otherwise discipline Wil-
liam Culpepper or any other supervisor of Byron S.
Adams Printing, Inc. who is a member of this labor
organization, for mechanically recording a grievance
procedure conversation with representatives of our
Union or for imposing a time limitation on any of our
representatives for purposes of carrying on union busi-
ness in that Company's composing room during work-
ing hours.
WE WILL NOT engage in a strike against the Byron S.
Adams Printing, Inc. or threaten to picket the prem-
ises of Type, Incorporated, or Merkle Press, for pur-
poses of forcing the Adams Company to remove its
general foreman.
WE WILL rescind and expunge from our files all re-
cords of the fines levied against William Culpepper
and of his expulsion from our organization.
WE WILL reimburse the Byron S. Adams Printing,
Inc., for monies paid to any of our members for func-
tioning as substitute general foremen in the
Company's composing room.
BYRON S . ADAMS PRINTING, INC.