City Disposal Systems, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 9, 1981

256 N.L.R.B. 451 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC. 451
City Disposal Systems, Inc. and James Brown. Case
7-CA- 16792
June 9, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 15, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief. The Board has
considered the record and the attached Decision in
light of the exceptions and brief' and has decided
to affirm the rulings, findings, 2 and conclusions of
the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his
recommended Order. 4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, City Disposal
Systems, Inc., Detroit, Michigan, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except
that the attached notice is substituted for that of
the Administrative Law Judge. 5
' Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby
denied as the record, the exceptions, and the brief adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
a We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that
Brown's refusal to drive a vehicle which he honestly believed to be
unsafe constituted concerted protected activity. Although the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Board in similar circum-
stances in Aro, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 596 F2d 713 (1979), denying enforce-
ment to 227 NLRB 243 (1976), we respectfully decline to follow the
Sixth Circuit's opinion, and we shall continue to adhere to our decision in
that case until such time as the Supreme Court may determine the issue.
4 Member Jenkins would provide interest on the backpay award in ac-
cordance with his partial dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation, 250
NLRB 146 (1980).
5 We have substituted a new notice which contains language conform-
ing to par. I(a) of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise disci-
pline employees for refusing to drive vehicles
which they honestly believe to be unsafe to
256 NLRB No. 73
operate, a right afforded them under the col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in exercising their rights under the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL offer James Brown immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed, and WE WILL make him whole for any
loss of earnings since his discharge on May 14,
1979, with interest.
CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge:
Upon a charge filed by James Brown, an Individual; the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
by the Regional Director for Region 7, issued the com-
plaint herein on October 19, 1979,' alleging that Re-
spondent, City Disposal Systems, Inc., had violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 29 U.S.C., §151, et seq., herein called the Act,
by discharging employee James Brown because he exer-
cised his right under Section 7 of the Act2 and the col-
lective-bargaining agreement between Respondent and
Local 247, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America to
operate a truck which he honestly believed to be unsafe.
I heard this case at Detroit, Michigan, on April 11, 16,
and 17, 1980. Respondent, by its answer to the com-
plaint, denied the commission of the alleged unfair labor
practice. For the reasons stated hereafter, I find, in
agreement with the General Counsel, that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of
the witnesses as they testified, and after consideration of
the briefs filed by Respondent and counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
At all times material to this case, Respondent City Dis-
posal Systems, Inc., a Michigan corporation, with its
only office and place of business situated in Detroit,
Michigan, has been engaged in the hauling and disposal
of waste and rubbish. During the calendar year 1978, Re-
spondent, in the course and conduct of its business oper-
I Unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 1979.
2 In pertinent part, Sec. 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join. or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
City Disposal Systems, Inc. and James Brown. Case
C IT Y D IS P O SA L S Y S T E M S , I N C ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~. .
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ations, enjoyed gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
provided rubbish removal services valued in excess of
$50,000 for the city of Detroit, which annually purchases
goods valued at more than $100,000, of which goods
valued in excess of $50,000 are shipped to it directly
from points outside the State of Michigan. Respondent
concedes, and I find from the foregoing data, that Re-
spondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Facts
At the time of his discharge on May 14, truckdriver
James Brown3 had been in Respondent's employ since
November 3, 1975. Brown's normal assignment was to
operate a tractor-trailer combination designated as truck
number 245, which he drove between Respondent's De-
troit facility and a landfill located at Belleville, Michigan,
approximately 37 miles distant, hauling refuse in connec-
tion with Respondent's service to the city of Detroit.
The immediate cause of Brown's discharge was his re-
fusal to drive a tractor-trailer combination designated as
truck number 244 on May 14. The General Counsel con-
tends that, in refusing to drive truck number 244, Brown
was asserting a right which Respondent's collective-bar-
gaining agreement with Local Union No. 247 provided
as follows:
ARTICLE XXI
EQUIPMENT, ACCIDENTS AND REPORTS
Section 1. The Employer shall not require employ-
ees to take out on the streets or highways any vehi-
cle that is not in safe operating condition or
equipped with the safety appliances prescribed by
law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement
where employees refuse to operate such equipment
unless such refusal is unjustified.
On May 12, as Brown drove truck 245 onto the land-
fill with his fourth load of refuse, he noticed fellow em-
ployee Frank Hamilton driving Respondent's truck 244
immediately behind him. As Brown maneuvered to dump
his cargo, he saw that Hamilton was having difficulty
stopping his vehicle. To avoid being hit, Brown pulled
his truck out of the way.
After Hamilton had stopped, Brown got out of his
truck and asked for an explanation. Hamilton explained
that when he put his foot on the brake pedal to stop his
3 Respondent sought to impeach Brown's credibility by introducing
evidence of his conviction on April 30, 1970, of the crime of uttering and
publishing for which he was sentenced to incarceration for 2-1/2 to 14
years. As this conviction involved dishonesty and occurred less than 10
years prior to this hearing, I received the proffered evidence under Rule
609(a) and (b) of the Rules and Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates. In light of that conviction and his evasiveness during cross-
examination, I find Brown to be an unreliable witness. Accordingly, I
credited his material testimony only to the extent it was corroborated in
significant respects and by the circumstances generally. Phillihps Industrial
Components, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Phillips Industries, Inc., 216
NLRB 885, 889, fn. 8 (1975).
vehicle, he found his brakes were not working. Hamilton
stated that he "almost hit" Brown and then declared "I
don't got a sign of brakes on this truck, and especially
here in the landfill pulling up hill like this." Hamilton
also said he intended to drive the vehicle "back and get
it fixed." 4
After completing their tasks at the landfill, the two re-
turned to Respondent's Detroit facility, where Hamilton
approached Francis Castelono, a mechanic employed by
Respondent at its Detroit facility. In the presence of Re-
spondent's mechanic, David Ammerman and driver
Brown, Hamilton requested Castelono to check or fix the
brakes on truck 244. Castelono responded: "Leave it out
the back and we'll get it on the weekend." Ammerman
joined, saying, "Yes, we'll take care of it.",
On Monday, May 14, Brown reported for work at 4
a.m. He checked the oil, water, and tires on truck 245
and then proceeded to the landfill. Later that morning,
Brown had difficulty with truck 245, returned to Re-
spondent's garage, and advised mechanic Ammerman
that 245 was defective. I find from Ammerman's testimo-
ny that he told Brown: "The garage is full. I've got
trucks backed up. I'm not gone be [gonna] able to get to
it today. The truck is gonna be down. So you might as
well go home or see Otto [Jasmund] and see if there's
another truck."
Brown went to the drivers' dispatch room, where he
came upon his supervisor, Otto Jasmund. Brown told
him that truck 245 was in disrepair and that Ammerman
had told him to go home. Brown told Jasmund that
"they were supposed to have fixed [245] but it still
wasn't fixed." Jasmund responded: "I'll go out and
check." Jasmund soon returned and advised Brown that
he "might as well punch out and go home because
they're not going to do anything for you now." After
further discussion, Brown punched out.
However, before Brown could leave, Jasmund asked
him to remain and drive 244. Brown answered, "No,
there's something wrong with that truck." In the ex-
change that followed, Brown explained that "something
was wrong with the brakes on the truck . . . there was a
grease seal or something leaking causing it to be effect-
ing the brakes." At this, Jasmund told Brown to go
home. Jasmund's suggestion provoked Brown and an ar-
gument ensued between Jasmund and Brown. 6
4 My findings of fact regarding the landfill incident are based on Ham-
ilton's and Brown's testimony.
5 I have credited Brown's and Hamilton's testimony regarding Hamil-
ton's encounters with Castelono and Ammerman on May 12.
6 Employee Walter Davis, who at the time of the hearing was in Re-
spondent's employ, testified candidly regarding Brown's confrontation
with Jasmund. In contrast., Supervisor Jasmund, who in substance testi-
fied that Brown refused to drive truck 244 because it was Hamilton's
truck seemed reluctant to testify on cross-examination. This apparent re-
luctance gave way to unmitigated hostility under cross-examination about
the absence of a repair order for truck 244, dated May 12, and the asser-
tion in Respondent's answer to Brown's unfair labor practice charge that
the same truck had been repaired and inspected on that date. When thus
confronted, Jasmund glared at counsel for the General Counsel and
asked, "Who gave you that information?" This outburst persuaded me
that Jasmund was more interested in shielding Respondent than in shed-
ding light on the circumstances surrounding Brown's refusal to drive
truck 244. Accordingly, I have credited Davis' testimony whenever it
Continued
CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC. 453
Hearing the altercation, a second supervisor, Robert
Madary, intervened. Madary asked Brown to take truck
244. Brown declined, stating that the truck "has got
problems and I don't want to drive it." Madary persist-
ed, pointing out that half of Respondent's trucks "have
problems," and that if Respondent attempted to deal
with each of those trucks it would be unable to perform
its services. Madary complained, "We've got all this gar-
bage out here to haul and you tell me about you don't
want to drive." Brown responded, "Bob, what you going
to do, put the garbage ahead of the safety of the men?"
Madary scorned Brown's last remark and returned to the
supervisor's office. 7 Following his exchange with
Madary, Brown went home.
Later that same day, Local 247's recording secretary,
John Calandra, received word that Respondent had dis-
charged Brown. Calandra relayed that information to
Brown. That same afternoon, Calandra and Brown went
to Respondent's Detroit facility where they met with Su-
pervisors Jasmund and Madary, who refused to reinstate
Brown.8 On the following day, Respondent issued a
notice to Brown asserting that he had voluntarily quit on
May 14. The notice also stated that Brown's misconduct
on that date consisted of "Disobeying of orders (refused
to drive #244)."
On May 15, Brown filed a grievance against Respond-
ent concerning the previous day's discharge. The current
collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent
and Local 247 contained provisions for a three-step
grievance procedure terminating in reference to a board
of arbitration. However, Brown did not receive the
benefit of that procedure. The Union found no merit in
Brown's grievance and refused to invoke the contractual
grievance procedure. Finally, on September 7, Brown
filed the unfair labor practice charge which led to the in-
stant proceeding.
conflicted with Jasmund's testimony, except as to the date of the confron-
tation. On cross-examination, Davis testified that it occurred on May 12.
However, the testimony of Brown, Jasmund, and Robert Madary estab-
lished May 14 as the date of the confrontation.
I Madary testified on direct examination that he heard a heated argu-
ment between Jasmund and Brown in which, at first, Brown refused to
drive truck 245. In the remainder of his version of the Brown-Jasmund
encounter, Madary testified that Brown refused to drive truck 244 be-
cause driver Hamilton was coming to work.
In rejecting Madary's version and accepting Brown's account of their
conversation, I have taken note of the latter's conviction for uttering an
publishing. However, there is cause for doubting the reliability of Ma-
dary's testimony. Thus, Madary's version of the initial discussion between
Jasmund and Brown contradicts Jasmund's corroborated testimony show-
ing that there was no disagreement regarding 245. Further. Madary's tes-
timony contradicts the credited testimony of employee Davis regarding
the balance of the exchange between Brown and Jasmund. Unlike Davis
who gave his testimony in a full and forthright manner both on cross-
and direct examination, Madary's responses during cross-examination
were frequently evasive. I also noted that in large part Madary's testimo-
ny on direct examination was in response to leading questions. Further, in
light of Brown's experience at the landfill on May 12, and given Davis'
credited version of Brown's exchange with Jasmund regarding the prob-
lem with truck 244, 1 find it likely that when confronted with a similar
request by Madary, Brown responded, as he had previously, that truck
244 had problems with its brakes.
8 I based my findings regarding Calandra's knowledge of Brown's dis-
charge, Calandra's imparting of that information to Brown, and their sub-
sequent visit to Respondent's facility upon Calandra's testimony and
Brown's corroborated testimony.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
Respondent contends that the complaint herein must
be dismissed because Brown did not exhaust his internal
union remedies. In support of this contention, Respond-
ent set out in its brief what it represented to be article
XIX, section 12(a), (b), (c), and section 13 of the consti-
tution of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, which is enti-
tled "Exhaustion of Remedies. " However, this proffered
evidence is not part of the record of this case. Accord-
ingly, it lends no support to Respondent's contention.
Even if the quoted language were extracted from the
International's constitution those provisions have no ap-
plication in the instant case. For clearly, they govern
only internal union disputes, and not Brown's grievance.
Finally, if Respondent is suggesting that Brown was
required to exhaust his remedy under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement's arbitration and grievance procedure,
such contention is wholly without merit. Under Section
10(a) of the Act, the power of the Board with respect to
unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
maybe established by agreement, law or otherwise
.... " Consistent with the quoted statutory language,
"the Board has never shunned jurisdiction merely be-
cause a party had the contractual right to go to arbitra-
tion but has never exercised the option. [Citations omit-
ted.]" Aerodex, Inc., 149 NLRB 192, 199 (1964). It fol-
lows that Brown's failure to seek relief under the arbitra-
tion and grievance procedure after the Union had reject-
ed his grievance did not oust the Board from its jurisdic-
9 The article reads as follows:
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
Section 12 (a). Every member. officer, elected Business Agent,
Local Union, Joint Council or other subordinate body against whom
charges have been preferred and disciplinary action taken as a result
thereof, or against whom adverse rulings or decisions have been ren-
dered or who claims to be aggrieved, shall be obliged to exhaust all
remedies provided for in this Constitution and by the International
Union before resorting to any court, tribunal or agency against the
International Union, any subordinate body or any officer or employ-
ee thereof (b) Where a member, officer, elected Business Agent.
Local Union. Joint Council or other subordinate body, before or fol-
lowing exhaustion of all remedies provided for within the Interna-
tional Union, resorts to a court of law and loses his or its cause
therein, all costs and expenses incurred by the International Union
may be assessed against such individual, Local Union, Joint Council
or other subordinate body, in the nature of a fine, subject to all pen-
alties, applicable where fines remain unpaid. Where such court
action is by an individual or by a Local Union, Joint Council or
other subordinate body against a Local Union, Joint Council or
other subordinate body the foregoing provision in respect to the pay-
ment of costs and expenses shall be applicable in favor of the Local
Union, Joint Council or other surbordinate body proceed against in
court. (c) The appeals procedure provided herein is also available to
and must be followed by any member who is aggrieved by any deci-
sion, ruling, opinion or action of the Local Union, membership, offi-
cers or Executive Board, excluding collective bargaining matters.
Section 13. All decisions following trials or hearings should be
made and rendered within sixty (60) days of the date the hearing or
trial commenced, unless otherwise ordered by the General Executive
Board This time requirement shall not be mandatory but is only di-
rectory.
CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS INC.
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion to process the alleged unfair labor practices in this
case.
Respondent's reliance upon United Steelworkers of
America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960), and United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960), all of which involved actions under
Section 301 of the Act to compel arbitration under a
contract is misplaced. For none of these cases involved
attempts to deprive the Board of its authority under Sec-
tion 10 of the Act. Aerodex, Inc., supra at 199.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging driver
James Brown because of his protected concerted activity
in refusing to drive truck 244, which Brown believed to
be unsafe, and because he attempted to "exercise his con-
tractual right to refuse to operate a vehicle not in safe
operating condition." (G.C. br. p.3.) Respondent denies
the alleged violation, contending instead that Brown's re-
fusal to drive truck 244 was unprotected because the
equipment was "in good operating condition" and fur-
ther that Brown "voluntarily punched out and was given
a voluntary quit notice." Contrary to Respondent, I find
that Brown was discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
At the outset, I reject Respondent's assertion that
Brown quit his employment. There is no showing that
Brown ever said he was quitting his employment. Instead
the record shows that Brown refused to drive truck 244
after he had punched his timecard and then left Re-
spondent's premises. There is no showing that Brown
said anything about terminating his employment with
Respondent. That same day, shortly after his departure
from Respondent's premises, Brown received notification
from John Calandra that Respondent had discharged him
for refusing to drive truck 244. Calandra also suggested
that Brown seek reinstatement to retrieve his job. The
same day, Brown, in company with Calandra asked Re-
spondent for reinstatement. Respondent rejected the re-
quest. Far from supporting the assertion that Brown vol-
untarily quit, these facts strongly suggest that Brown
wanted his job and that Respondent discharged him on
May 14, and I so find.
In Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278, 279 (1975),
the Board declared:
We have held in the past that when an employee
makes complaints concerning safety matters which
are embodied in a contract, he is acting not only in
his own interest, but is attempting to enforce such
contract provisions in the interest of all the employ-
ees covered under that contract. Such activity we
have found to be concerted and protected under the
Act, and the discharge of an individual for engaging
in such activity to be in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
[Footnotes omitted.]
In that case, the Board, found a violation of Section
8(a)(l) after finding that the discharge of a driver "was
caused by his refusal to drive what he believed to be an
unsafe tractor, and that such refusal was an attempt to
compel adherence to the provisions of the contract
.... " Roadway Express, Inc., supra at 279-280.
Operation of the Board's policy as set forth in Road-
way Express is not dependant on the merits of the assert-
ed contract claim or whether the employee expressly re-
ferred to the applicable contract in support of his action
or was even aware of the existence of the agreement.
John Sexton & Co., a Division of Beatrice Food Co., 217
NLRB 80 (1975). The Board does require, however, that
the claimed belief be "honestly held." United Parcel Serv-
ice, 241 NLRB 1074 (1979). See also McLean Trucking
Company, 252 NLRB 728 (1980).
In refusing to operate what he claimed to be an unsafe
vehicle, Brown was asserting a right under article XXI
of the existing collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and Local Union No. 247. Further, the as-
sertion of this right was based on Brown's honest belief
that the brakes on truck 244 were inadequate. The
record shows that truck 244 came to Brown's attention
on May 12 while operating truck 245, when he took eva-
sive action to avoid being hit by 244; that driver Frank
Hamilton told Brown on that occasion that he was
unable to stop truck 244 because it did not have "a sign
of brakes"; and, that upon their return to their Detroit
facility Brown heard Hamilton complain about truck
244's brakes and request that they be checked. In these
circumstances, Brown's complaint 2 days later regarding
truck 244's brakes was warranted. Respondent's failure
to show Brown that his complaint was unfounded, by
e:ther word or demonstration, provided further basis for
Brown's claim that truck 244's brakes were unsound.
That another driver subsequently drove truck 244
without incident or that Respondent's record show that
truck 244 may have been in good repair are not material
to the outcome of this case. For under the principles
stated above, I need not decide whether truck 244 was in
fact safe at the time of Brown's complaint. I therefore
conclude that by discharging Brown for his refusal to
operate truck 244, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. United Parcel Service, supra at 1077.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By discharging James Brown on May 14, 1979, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, and
such violation affects commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action,
including reinstating and making whole employee James
Brown. In order to effectuate the policies of the Act,
backpay computation shall be in accordance with the
formula in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950). Payroll and other records in possession of Re-
spondent are to be made available to the Board, or its
agents, to assist in such computation. Interest on backpay
CITY DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC. 455
shall be computed in accordance with Florida Steel Cor-
poration, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).'10
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 1"
The Respondent, City Disposal Systems, Inc., Detroit,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise disciplining its employees
because they refuse to drive vehicles which they honest-
ly believe to be unsafe to operate, a right afforded them
under the collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to James Brown reinstatement to his former
job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
c See, generally, Isis Plumbing d Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
'' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order, herein shall as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
other rights and privileges, and make him whole as set
forth in The Remedy section, above, for any loss of
earnings suffered as a result of his discharge.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at its facility at Detroit, Michigan, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."'2 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent,
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
CITY DISPOSAL YSTEMS, INC.