01996465
12-28-2001
Ciria Sanchez-Baca, Complainant, v. Roderick R. Paige, Secretary, Department of Education, Agency.
Ciria Sanchez-Baca v. Department of Education
01996465
12-28-01
.
Ciria Sanchez-Baca,
Complainant,
v.
Roderick R. Paige,
Secretary,
Department of Education,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01996465
Agency No. ED-9507000
Hearing No. 100-98-7164X
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29
U.S.C. � 621 et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal
is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established by
preponderant evidence that the agency discriminated against her on the
bases of race (Caucasian), color (brown), sex (female), national origin
(Hispanic), religion (Catholic), age (52 years old at the time of the
alleged discrimination), disability (rheumatoid arthritis), and reprisal
(prior EEO activity)<1> when the agency did not grant her requested
accommodations on July 29, 1994.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that complainant was an Education Program Specialist
at the agency's headquarters. Complainant has had rheumatoid arthritis
which was exacerbated after an accident in the office in October 1992.
Complainant was in Leave of Absence Without Pay status for over a year.
On October 8, 1993, complainant submitted a request for a reasonable
accommodation with medical documentation. Her request included the
following: participation in Flexiplace allowing her to work from home;
exclusion from travel for site visits; modification of her position;
and appropriate equipment for her use at home. While the agency was
considering her request, it provided her with temporary and permanent
accommodations. Complainant returned to the office in November 1993
and was placed on a �No Travel� work schedule and was provided with
equipment to assist her work. On May 2, 1994, her supervisor (the
Supervisor) notified her that the agency's initial decision was to deny
her specific request for a reasonable accommodation. On July 29, 1994,
complainant received the agency's final determination that her request
would not be granted because her position could not be modified, however
that the agency was continuing its search for an alternative position.
In November 1994, complainant was transferred to a temporary position
within the agency as an EEO Counselor which became her permanent position
in March 1995. The record indicates that complainant's new position
was at the same pay rate as her Education Program Specialist position
and would allow her to work from home.
Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant filed a
formal EEO complaint with the agency on October 25, 1994, alleging
that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced above.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ determined that complainant failed to establish her prima facie
cases of discrimination based on age, sex, race, national origin, and
color in that she failed to produce any evidence that any individual
outside of her protected classes was treated more favorably or different.
The AJ then concluded that complainant demonstrated that she is an
individual with a disability who is substantially limited in the major
life activities of walking and performing manual tasks and, therefore,
covered by the Rehabilitation Act. The AJ found that complainant was
not qualified with respect to her Education Program Specialist position.
Complainant's job duties included: managing information relating to
assigned states; reviewing and approving plans submitted by states to
receive eligible funds; participating in pre-site, on-site, and post-site
monitoring activities for each state for which complainant was assigned
responsibility; managing complaints alleging violations of certain
provisions; and assisting staff in policy development and interpretation
in the area of special populations. Specifically, the AJ determined
that her position's essential functions included significant travel
to team gatherings; interaction with teammates for work; and travel to
on-site inspections. Based on complainant's condition, she is unable to
perform these functions. The AJ also noted that there was no evidence
that any reasonable accommodation would have permitted complainant
to perform her essential functions of her position. Furthermore, the
agency argued that any accommodation allowing complainant to work from
home without travel requirements in her Education Program Specialist
position would impose an undue hardship on the agency. Accordingly,
the AJ concluded that complainant was not qualified for her position.
Next, the AJ turned to the issue of reassignment. The AJ found,
assuming arguendo that complainant established her prima facie cases
of discrimination based on disability and retaliation, the agency
transferred her to another position within the agency which allowed
her to work within her limitations. Therefore, the AJ concluded that
the agency made a reasonable accommodation. The agency's final decision
implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant submits, without comment, a copy of The Digest
of EEO Law addressing the Commission's decision in Hupka v. Department
of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 02960003 (August 13, 1997). Presumably,
complainant is claiming that the facts in her case are parallel to the
Hupka case. Further, we infer that she is asking the Commission to
conclude that the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation
as we did in the Hupka decision. The agency requests that we affirm
its final decision adopting the AJ's decision.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Summary Judgment
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to
affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.
An AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ correctly
determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that
a decision without a hearing was appropriate.
Disparate Treatment
The AJ found that complainant failed to establish her prima facie cases
of discrimination based on age, race, sex, color and religion because she
failed to provide evidence that others outside of her protected classes
were treated differently. We note that to establish a prima facie case,
complainant must only present evidence which, if unrebutted, would support
an inference that the agency's actions resulted from discrimination.
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). It is not
necessary for the complainant to rely strictly on comparative evidence in
order to establish an inference of discriminatory motivation necessary to
support a prima facie case. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996); Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, n.4 (September 18, 1996).
However, upon review of the record, we find that complainant has failed to
establish an inference of discriminatory motivation necessary to make her
prima facie cases of discrimination based on age, race, national origin,
color, sex, and religion.
Contention on Appeal
Complainant enclosed an article on the Commission's decision in Hupka
v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 02960003 (August 13, 1997).
Initially, we note that complainant failed to include any statements
or explanation as to how the case in Hupka is similar to her own
situation. Furthermore, the central issue in the Hupka case was
whether the agency had sufficient information to rule on a request
for reasonable accommodation. In Hupka, the Department of Defense
found the medical documentation insufficient to justify the request
to work at home or an alternative work site. We find that the case
before us is not similar. Here, the agency is not arguing that the
medical documentation supporting complainant's request for a reasonable
accommodation was insufficient. Rather, the agency accepted complainant's
medical documentation establishing that she was restricted from travel
and that she needed to be able to work from home. Finding that the Hupka
case is distinguishable from the case at hand, we find complainant's
contention on appeal not persuasive.
Reasonable Accommodation
After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb
the AJ's finding of no discrimination as to the issue of reasonable
accommodation raised by complainant. Assuming for the purposes of
analysis that complainant is an individual with a disability, we agree
with the AJ's determination that she is not qualified as to her Education
Program Specialist position. We also note that the findings of fact
are supported by evidence within the record and that the AJ correctly
applied the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's
final decision adopting the AJ's decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____12-28-01______________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1 The record indicates that complainant filed a previous EEO complaint
on March 28, 1991 alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII,
the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act.