Chicago Typographical Union

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 28, 1949

86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 16 AND INTER-
NATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION and CHICAGO NEWSPAPER PUB-
LISHERS ASSOCIATION ON BEHALF OF THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, INC.,
ILLINOIS PUBLISHING AND PRINTING COMPANY, THE JOURNAL OF
COMMERCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, SUN AND TIMES CO., AND TRIBUNE
COMPANY
Case No. 13-CB-6.-Decided October 08, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On August 6, 1948, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report finding that the Respondents: (1) had engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) and 8
(b) (3) of the Act, and recommending that the Respondents and each
of them cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action ;
and (2) had not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, and recommending that the com-
plaint be dismissed as to that portion alleging the violation of Section
8 (b) (1) (A). Thereafter, all parties to these proceedings filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. ,
On May 24, 1949, the Board heard oral argument at Washington,
D. C., in which all parties participated.
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions, briefs, the oral argument, and the en-
tire record in the case and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner, to the extent that they are
consistent with our Decision and Order herewith.
The complaint in this proceeding is one of a series framed to ex-
plore and remedy the effect of the application at particular locales of
the "Collective Bargaining Policy," as adopted at the 1947 ITU con-
vention and as construed thereafter by the officers of the Respondent,
ITU. This proceeding is specifically focused on the activities of the
86 N. L . R. B., No. 116.
1041
1042 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent ITU and its subordinate Local in Chicago, Illinois, during
the course of the negotiations they conducted on and after August 22,
1947, with employer members of the newspaper-publishing industry
in the Chicago, Illinois, area.
Insofar as the pertinent facts are concerned, we need do no more
here than to state that we are fully satisfied that the Trial Examiner's.
narration of what took place in the Chicago area during the period
here in question accurately reflects the record to the extent here ma-
terial. Such facts disclose, as the Trial Examiner found, that the
Respondents actually applied and followed the terms of the "Collec-
tive Bargaining Policy" I in "negotiating" with the newspaper pub-
lishers.2 Accordingly, and for the reasons stated in our decision in
the ANPA case we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that by applying
the Policy in the negotiations with the Chicago newspaper publishers,
the Respondents were attempting to cause these publishers to dis-
criminate against nonunion employees, thereby violating Section S.
(b) (2) of the Act.
We also agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions that by the-
application of the ITU 1917 "Collective Bargaining Policy" in the-
course of the Chicago negotiations, the Respondents engaged in con-
duct proscribed by Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act.. The record over-
whelmingly establishes, as is more fully set forth in the Intermediate-
Report, that, on the union side, negotiations between August 23 and.
October 21, 1947, were deliberately conducted under the "Policy""
scheme so as to avoid the making of tiny bilateral agreement, written
or oral, with respect to any matters properly the subject of negotia-
tion and agreement. As the Trial Examiner indicates,- and we ex-
pressly affirm his reasoning in this respect, such a deliberate frustra--
tion of the operation of the bargaining process violates the Act, in
that it reflects a complete negation of that duty to bargain which the
amended Act imposes upon statutory representatives of employees .3-
I Sometimes referred to herein as the "Policy." The nature and effect of the "Policy"
.is fully treated in our decision in Matter of American Newspaper Publishers Association,
at al., 86 N. L. R. B. 951. This case is hereinafter referred to as the "ANPA case.-
2 As found hereinafter, both Respondents (i. e., the ITU and the Local Union) were
jointly designated as bargaining representatives by the employees forming the appropriate-
unit.
3 Our decisions in National Maritime Union of America, et al., 78 N. L. R. B. 971, enforced.
175 F. 2d 686 (C. A. 2) ; American Radio Association, et al., 82 N. L. R. B.
1344, and The Great Atlantic and Pacific Co., et al., 81 N. L. R. B. 1052, indicate that we,
like the Trial Examiner, believe that Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act imposes upon labor-
organizations a duty to bargain coextensive with the duty long-since imposed upon
employers by Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, and that the provisions of Section 8 (d) defining
the standard of good-faith bargaining restate in statutory form, the principles established
under Section 8 (5). As noted by the Trial Examiner, the statutory obligation to bargain
includes the duty to reduce any agreement arrived at to writing, Heinz Co. v. N.. L. R. B.,
311 U. S. 514, 523-526. It is likewise free from doubt that an announcement at the outset
of conferences of an unwillingness to reduce a contract to writing is per se violative of the-
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1043
The events succeeding the formulation of the "P-6A" bargaining
strategy, reflected here in the negotiations taking place after October
21, 1947, do not, in our view, disclose any abandonment by the
Respondents of their initial plan to block the making of any bilateral
contract. For, as noted in the ANPA case, the "P-6A" contract form,
as Respondent ITU explained to its membership, was designed to
"make the `Conditions of Employment' form more desirable to the
employers," while at the same time reflecting an ostensible willingness
on the part of Respondents to abide by the statutory requirement of
"good faith" execution of the duty to bargain. It is thus apparent
that the proffer of "P-6A" as an alternate method of establishing
an employer-employee working arrangement did not reflect a good-
faith attempt to negotiate a mutually satisfactory contract, but was
designed to cause the Employers to capitulate to the Respondents'
unlawful demand for a noncontractual relationship-viz, to operate
under unilaterally promulgated conditions of employment.
Iii any event, we are satisfied than, as the Trial Examiner found,
the insistence of the Respondents upon the 60-day cancellation clause
in the "P-6A" contract form,` independently establishes a continuing
disregard on and after October 21 of the good-faith standards of
bargaining required by the Act. As set forth in the Intermediate
Report, the primary objective of collective bargaining is to stabilize
labor relations for periods of reasonable duration. To this end the
parties had, before 1947, traditionally bargained for and executed
contracts for a fixed duration of 1 year. The Respondents' unwilling-
ness to consider the traditional term, evidenced by their refusal to bind
themselves contractually for more than 60 clays, raises in and of itself
a presumption that the Respondents were not bargaining in good
faith.5 The record shows no lawful or reasonable economic justifica-
tion for such a refusal. Indeed, as we have already noted, it establishes
that the 60-day cancellation clause was deliberately designed, and was
adamantly insisted upon, to effect the exclusion of nonunion men,
squarely in conflict with the provisions of the amended Act. As
found in the ANPA case, under this arrangement the Respondents
intended to place themselves in a position whereby they could with
contractual impunity call a strike, ostensibly with regard to economic
matters otherwise settled in the cancellable agreement, in order to
force the Employer noncontractually to maintain closed-shop
conditions.
Act. See in addition to cases cited by Trial Examiner at page 1.062, footnote 6, N. L. R. B.
v. Todd, 1 78 F. (2d) 705 (C. A. 2).
Even in those cases where there was a willingness to deviate slightly.
See the cases cited by the Trial Examiner at page 1062, footnote 8 of the Intermediate
Report.
1044 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It further appears from the Intermediate Report that in evaluating
the conduct of the Chicago negotiations on and after August 22, 1947,
for the purposes of determining the 8 (b) (3) aspects of the complaint,
the Trial Examiner also considered the "struck-work" provision of
the "P-6A" contract form. He concluded that the position of the
Respondents on this provision, as reflected by the record, did not
constitute additional evidence of the alleged violation of Section 8 (b)
(3) of the Act. For various reasons he did not consider whether or
not the bargaining position of the Respondents with respect to the
inclusion in the proffered contract of the other "miscellaneous"
clauses of "P-6A" constituted additional support for a finding of
8 (b) (3) violations.
Proponents of the complaint have excepted to the Trial Examiner's
legal and factual findings with respect to the struck work clause and
to his failure to pass upon the Respondents' bargaining position with
respect to matters embodied in other "miscellaneous" clauses of "P-
CA." It is our conclusion that, irrespective of the meaning or legal
effect of the "miscellaneous" clauses in the Respondents' contract pro-
posals, the record plainly establishes, as previously found, the Re-
spondents' lack of "good faith" generally in proffering Form "P-6A."
It therefore is unnecessary for us at this time to pass upon the sub-
stantive terms of the "miscellaneous" clauses of "P-6A" or to resolve
highly conflicting and delicate contentions of the parties as to their
legality.6 This is particularly true here, where the resolution of the
questions we are asked to pass upon could neither add to, nor detract
from, the scope of our remedial order which we will issue herein.
As was recently pointed out by Judge Learned Hand, "it is never de-
sirable for a court to go beyond what a decision demands" in disposing
of a particular case. Douds v. Local No. 12,50 et al, 173 F. 2d 772
(C. A. 2). Here we are performing the same sort of judicial function
that is performed by a court, and shall follow the same sound principle.
Remaining for consideration, insofar as the 8 (b) (3) aspects of
the case are concerned, are the issues posed by : (1) the Respondents'
exceptions to the scope of unit found; and (2) Respondent ITU's
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's finding that it, as well as the Local
Respondent, is jointly responsible with the Local Respondent for the
violations of Section 8 (b) (3).
We are satisfied from our independent examination of the record
relating to the unit issues that, as found by the Trial Examiner, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining is one
° For the reasons set forth in his separate opinion attached hereto, Member Reynolds
does not join in the majority decision not to pass upon the legality of these clauses.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1045
extending, in scope, to the employees' of all Employers who were at
the times here material, members of the Chicago Newspaper Pub-
lishers' Association."
We turn next to the Trial Examiner's conclusion that liability for
the unlawful conduct of the negotiations, in which both Local and
International officials participated, must be assessed under Section 8
(b) (3) of the Act, against both the International and the Local Re-
spondent organizations. Respondents' exceptions to this conclusion
go wholly to the attribution of responsibility to the International. It
is the Respondents' position here that only the Local was empowered
by the employees to act in the capacity of a bargaining agent. We
believe, however, for reasons more fully set forth in the Intermediate
Report, that this record established the employees' designation of
both Respondent organizations for the purposes of collective
bargaining s
There is no serious question but that, as traditionally practiced in
portions of the industry organized by the ITU or its affiliates, col-
lective bargaining has not been (and was not here) conducted by
the Local without the aid, and often, the physical participation of
International officials. Although the Respondents claim that such
participation reflected, in the words of our dissenting colleagues, the
performance of "the ordinary functions of any parent group in
advising its Locals," we are convinced that in this instance it reflected
both the exercise by the International of a specific grant of bargaining
authority and affirmation by the Local and its members of the exist-
ence of such authority. In our opinion, analysis of the terms of the
intra-union membership arrangement relating to the scope of the In-
ternational's authority, as specifically expanded, in some respects, by
the membership's adoption of the "1947 Collective Bargaining Pol-
icy," fails to establish the essential indicia of complete Local auton-
omy-freedom in the Local to disregard the "advice" of the Inter-
national and to conclude negotiations independently.10 Thus, the
T In the categories set forth in the Intermediate Report.
8 See, in addition to the cases cited by the Trial Examiner at footnotes 3 and 4 of the
Report as supporting the unit contentions of the proponents of the complaint, our recent
decision in Hatter of Associated Shoe Industries, Inc., 81 N. L. R. B. 224.
e Members Houston and Murdock, who have signed this opinion because of their agree-
ment with the disposition of all other issues in this case, disagree with the finding that the
International was also a statutory bargaining representative and refused to bargain in
violation of Section 8 (b) (3). They have filed a separate dissent on this point.
10 We see no merit to the Respondents' suggestion that we refuse, on policy grounds, to
examine the conditions of the union-membership arrangement in a situation of this type.
Contrary to the implication of the dissent on this specific point, the Board has historically
recognized , with the approval of the Courts, that resort to study of the intra-union member-
ship conditions as a means of determining the representative status of a union, does not con-
stitute the kind of "intrusion upon the internal affairs of unions" conflicting with the
legislative scheme. See e. g., N. L. P. B. v. Bradford Dyeiny Assn., 310 U. S. 318, 338-40
867351-50-vol. 86-67
1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
intra-union rules governing the relationship between the members,
the Local and the International provide, as the. Trial Examiner found,
not only that the Local be "guided" by all decisions of the Interna-
tional in its relations with employers, but that it be "controlled"
by such decisions. The scope of the International's decision-making
power, as described in its constitution, extends to the conditions under
which members may accept employment and the general "relation
of subordinate unions and individual members to their employers.""'
The specific requirements of such decisions as already have become
effective, set forth in the "General Laws," cover almost every aspect
of the employment relation. They impose stringent limitations on the
power of the Local either to shape the terms of the collective con-
tract," or to decide whether any terms and conditions of employment
should be stabilized through the traditional channels of collective
bargaining]' Although, Tinder the "Laws," the Local is the imme-
diate party with whom employers contract and deal in the first in-
stance, and the physical presence of International officials is not coln-
N. L. R. B. V. McKesson 5 Robbins. 121 F. (2d) 84, 95 (C. A. D. C.) : N. L. R. B. v. Art
Metals Construction Co., 110 F. (2) 148, 149 (C. A. 2).
Compare the principles by which the majority of the Board, as presently constituted,
resolved in favor of an International Union its right to seek certified representative status,
even though, under the International rules it appeared that bargaining would eventually
he conducted through the Local- union medium . Matter of bane-Wells and Co., 79
N. L. R. B. 252. Members Houston and Murdock dissenting here, joined Chairman Herzog
in the majority decision in the Lane-Wells case. See also Matter of United States Gypsum
Co., 77 N. L. It. B. 1098; Matter of Beth lehena Steel Co., 79 N. L. R. B. 1271, where the
internal relation of the International-Local unions was similarly considered by this Board
in representation cases.
Nor do we agree with the implication of the dissent that a holding that a Local union
is it party-in-interest in a representation case is in effect a holding that an International
has no interest in the proceeding, or could not, if it so desired, seek representative status
individually or with its local.
11 It is admitted by the Respondent that all of the employees who were entitled to repre-
sentation at the times here material were members of both the Local and the International.
It is therefore clear that, as the Trial Examiner found, they were, by such affiliation, at
all such times subject to the provisions of the legislated rules of both organizations. The
pertinent portions of such rules, summarized above, are set forth in some detail by the
Trial Examiner as part of the Intermediate Report in the ANPA case, Case No. 9-CB-5,
at Section 2 of the Report.
12 Even such matters as wage rates and modes of paying the same, matters of normal
concern only to the members comprising a particular Local, are not left to the unre-
stricted oper,ition of Local-Employer negotiations ; for the ITTJ "Laws" provide minimum
bases which cannot be bargained away without impairing the existence of the membership
contract.
In an argument addressed to us by the Respondent International, to justify, for other
purposes of this case, these stringent limitations of bargaining in ITU "Laws," the Inter-
national implicitly conceded that its participation is more than "advisory." This argu-
ment was that, because of the mobile nature of the craft represented by the ITU, it was
imperative that certain minimum uniform conditions obtain throughout the country and
that the requirements of the "Laws" were in recognition of that economic need.
' The "1947 ITU Collective Bargaining Policy" incorporated in the "General Laws"
effective on and after August 22, 1947, the effective date of the amendments to the Act,
withdrew authority from the Local unions to guarantee to employers that negotiated
employment terms would be formalized by a bilateral contract.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 104
pulsory until an impasse in bargaining is reached 14 there is no stage
of negotiations in which the International does not actively partici-
pate, even though its officials may not physically be present. As is
undisputed, tentative contract proposals formulated in the first in-
stance by the Local, must be (and here were) cleared by the Interna-
tional before submission to the Employers : and negotiated contracts,
awaiting only the usual formalities of ratification by the membership,
must be approved by the International before the contract is submitted
to the procedures attendant to formalization.15
We find, therefore, as did the Trial Examiner, that both the In-
ternational and the Local were, at all times here material, under the
statutory duty to bargain collectively imposed upon employee repre-
sentatives by Section 8 (b) (3) of the amended Act. In so finding,
we need not definitively decide whether, under the intro-union mem-
bership scheme, both organizations are so functionally integrated that
designation of the Local alone must automatically be deemed to con-
stitute also designation of the International, or whether both organi-
zations possess certain independent powers, so that separate desigila-
Lion of each organization as a representative within each of the
respective areas of authority resulted. Suffice it to say that, on this
record, either of the above inferences is permitted to us, and that either
is legally operative to impose upon the International, as well as the
Local, liability for the unfair practices in question.
We conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondents and
each of them, have at all times since August 22, 1947, failed and re-
fused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Association and
its member companies. We shall. therefore order the Respondents to
bargain collectively upon request by the complainants, so long as
1' There is nothing in either the ITU "Laws" or the Local rules which precludes the
physical participation of ITU officials at any stage of negotiations. But their physical
participation is mandatory whenever disagreement between enmployer-union representa-
tives at the conferences reaches the critical stage which renders further conferences between
the immediate negotiators apparently impossible.
15 Inter atia, the failure of a Local Union to obtain ITU approval of a proposed contract
or consummated agreement has the immediate result of depriving the Local members of a
right, otherwise existing under the intra-union legislative scheme, to draw upon the
International strike defense funds as it means of supporting strike action undertaken to
enforce either the unapproved bargaining demand or the terms of the unapproved agree-
ment. Such failure may. at the discretion of the International, also result in loss of all
membership rights.
Although the International has argued to us that the International has, in certain
instances, failed to penalize Local unions which did not observe the "Laws" strictly, we do
not consider that argument, or the facts alleged therein, as having any materiality here.
There is no claim that the Respondent Local did not follow the "Laws" strictly. More-
over, it Is not our function to decide the wisdom of internal rules, or to police their observ-
ance. All we need decide and do decide here is what powers the membership contract
vests in the organization.
1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they are the representatives of the employees subject to the provisions
of Section 9 (a) of the Act.18
Finally, we must determine the validity of the Trial Examiner's
dismissal of the 8 (b) (1) (A) allegations of the complaint. None
of the conduct specifically relied upon here by the proponents of the
complaint in support of the 8 (b) (1) (A) allegations differs in
character from that relied upon by the proponents of the complaint
in the ANPA case, decided this day.17 As we said in that case, such
conduct cannot properly be reached by invocation of Section 8 (b)
(1) (A) of the Act. We therefore adopt the Trial Examiner's recom-
mendation that the 8 (b) (1) (A) allegations of the complaint be
dismissed in their entirety, and will so order.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that :
1. Respondents International Typographical Union, and Chicago
Typographical Union, No. 16, and their officers, agents, and represent-
atives, shall :
(a) Cease and desist from:
(1) Threatening to take strike action, or directing, instigating, or
encouraging employees to engage in or to threaten to engage in, strike
action, or approving or ratifying strike action, taken by employees,
for the purpose of requiring employers, either noncontractually or
as a matter of contractual obligation, to violate Section 8 (a) (3) by
discriminating with respect to the employment or conditions of em-
ployment of any employee;
(2) In any other manner causing or attempting to cause employers
to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act;
(3) Refusing by specific refusal, or insistence upon a 60-day can-
cellable contract, by any other means, to bargain collectively as the
exclusive representatives of the employees in the unit herein found to
be appropriate, so long as they are the representatives of the em-
ployees of the unit herein found to be appropriate.
(b) Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(1) Upon request, bargain collectively as the exclusive representa-
tives of the employees in the unit herein found to be appropriate with
"Noncompliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) is not available to bar an order to
bargain. Matter of National Maritime Union, supra, at page 988.
11 86 N. L. R. B. 951.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 ' 1049
the Employers or their representatives and if an understanding is
reached embody such understanding in a signed agreement having a
reasonable duration ;
(2) Post immediately at conspicuous places at the business office
of the Respondent Local, and at all other places where notices or com-
munications to members of Respondent Local are customarily posted,
and publish in the Typographical Journal, official paper of the Re-
spondent International Typographical Union, a copy of the notice
attached hereto and marked Appendix A. This notice shall be
signed by a duly authorized officer of the International Typographical
Union and by a duly authorized officer of the Chicago Typographical
Union No. 16, and shall remain so posted and maintained for a period
of 60 days ;
(3) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re-
spondent have taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondents coerced and re-
strained employees in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
MEMBER REYNOLDS, concurring specially :
Although I concur in the findings that, as charged in the complaints
here and in the ANPA case, the respective Respondents violated Sec-
tion 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (3) of the Act, I cannot accept the refusal of
my colleagues in either of the two cases, to exercise the full decisional
powers the litigation of these cases appropriately invoked. I object,
more specifically, to the deliberate passing of the serious questions
(raised by allegations of the complaints in both cases) concerning the
validity and scope in operation of the "miscellaneous" clauses appear-
ing originally in Form "P-6A."
In broad terms, the evidence adduced in both cases established the
existence of a dispute between management and labor as to the impact
of a new statutory scheme on the prior, and largely collectively agreed
upon, methods of conducting labor relations in the newspaper indus-
try. The dispute was comprehensive in the sense that it involved not
one, but substantially each and all of the established methods and rules
by which labor relations were being conducted at the time the new
statutory scheme became effective. More specifically, the bargaining
position of the parties on the "P-6A" clauses represented an attempt
by the Respondents to insure by a variety of contractual provisions the
prestatute methods of conducting labor relations, and a resistance by
management to the acceptance of the obligation contractually, or other-
wise, to continue such methods. Duration was but one phase of the
1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dispute; for, as the record shows, in addition to the disagreement by
the parties as to legal sufficiency of a 60-day cancellation clause, the
parties were hopelessly deadlocked not only on questions as to the legal
propriety of carrying over into the post-Act period the obligation to
maintain employment regulations and terms theretofore accepted, but
also as to whether the substance of the miscellaneous "P-6A" clauses
would, in operation, necessarily achieve that result in fact. There is
no question but that in such a situation this Board constitutes a proper,
if not the only, forum for the presentation of such issues.15 It is
equally clear that none of the elements necessary to permit our resolu-
tion of these issues is lacking here. The record shows that all parties
desire the Board to render a definitive decision disposing of all mat-
ters included in the complaints upon which issue has been joined, an(l
that the questions concerning the legality of the clauses were
thoroughly litigated, exhaustively briefed, and also argued orally be-
fore the Board. What the majority approach accomplishes, so far
as the parties are concerned therefore, is to deprive them of their
present right to our judgment on important subjects litigated here
at tremendous cost to both. But more, this approach does a disservice
to the public at least to the extent that it leaves problems unsettled
which are demonstrably pregnant with the possibilities of industrial
strife.
There may be cases in which evasion of issues of the type here
presented might possibly be justified. But this is not one of them.
Here we do not have a situation where we can reasonably anticipate
that good faith efforts by the parties to comply with our decision,
18 In the past we have considered many cases where, as here, a refusal-to-bargain com-
plaint was utilized as a means of resolving a deadlock in negotiations resulting in whole
or in part from it dispute as to the legality of the undertakings one side wishes to secure
from the other, or because of differences as to whether the subject matter sought to be
bargained about is proper subject matter for bargaining under the Act. See e. g., Matter
of National Maritime Union, 7S N. L. R. B. 971; enforced 175 P. (2d) 686 (C. A.
2) ; Matter of American Radio Association, 82 N. L. Ti. B. 1344; Matter of Inland
Steel Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 1, enforced 170 F. (2d) 247 (C. A. 7) ; Matter of 111. TV. Cross Co.,
Inc., 78 N. L. It. B. 149, enforced 174 F. (2d) 875 (C. A. 1). Such cases have also
demonstrated that it is not unusual for a dispute between negotiating parties to extend,
as the dispute here does, beyond one aspect of a proferred or desired contract and for a
complaint to embrace all phases of the dispute. We have not refused in such cases to
determine all of the legal questions giving rise to the complaint, although a finding of
illegality on one would have been sufficient for the purpose of issuing an order. Thus,
for example, in the National Maritime Union case cited above, we did not stop with a
determination of the meaning and legal effect of the "hiring-liall" clause, but also deter-
mined the meaning and legal effect of the "laying up and fitting-out" clause. Instead, as
a. means of serving the public interest in resolving doubt as to what is proper collective
bargaining in the statutory sense, we have, on occasion, gone out of our way to analyze and
resolve contentions of the parties not essential to the ultimate conclusion or theory we
adopted. See for example, Matter of Times Publishing Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 672, where we
specifically indicated agreement with the Employer's contention that a union's had faith
may preclude our test of employer "good faith," although disposition of that issue was
unnecessary to a determination of the case.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1051
and to bargain for a contract of a reasonable duration, would neces-
sarily include an abandonment by the union of these clauses or an
acceptance of them by the Employers. The course of litigation of
the ITU cases both here and in the Federal court has left us no room
for speculation that, absent specific rulings on the clauses, neither of
these contingencies will occur. , Thus, our decision in this case does
no more than to restore the uncertliin situation to what it was after
the Federal court issued its injunction decree. That decree like the
order we are issuing here, merely required bargaining in good faith
for a contract of fixed duration and gave no clue as to which of the
substantive undertakings sought to be secured from Employer under
the "P-6A" miscellaneous clauses, could or could not be legally cov-
ered by a collective contract under this Act. As we are all aware,
the absence of specificity in the Court's decision and decree permitted
the continuation of the same controversy which had theretofore con-
stituted a stumbling block to the consummation of a contract and to
the achievement of industrial peace. For, subsequent to the decree,
and until contempt proceedings were initiated, the unions still insisted
that contracts, irrespective of their duration, contain what they con-
sidered to be the protective features of the "P-6A" miscellaneous
clauses; and the Employers, because of continuing doubts as to legal-
ity, resisted entering into any agreements containing such features.1°
Our present failure to dissipate this source of controversy, does
not, of course, bar the parties from litigating the issues in future
proceedings. But this does not excuse our disregarding the issues
now that they are here before us. To deprive the parties, pending the
initiation and conclusion of such future proceedings, of their present
right to our judgment, is to subject both them and the public to unnec-
essary injury which can Bever be retroactively repaired. Absent some
definitive guidance by a duly constituted public agency, both the
Employers and the unions are faced with unhappy alternatives. Thus,
the Employers must either bear the burden of industrial warfare, or
capitulate to demands they believe to be unlawful. Similarly, the
unions must either sacrifice their interest in obtaining the best bar-
gain they believe to be legally permissible by capitulating to the
Employers' viewpoint, or else bear the heavy toll of financing strike
action until the validity of their position be judicially declared.
So far as the public interest is concerned, the undesirable social impli-
18 I am aware that in the subsequent contempt proceedings the decree was in effect made
more specific with respect to the legality of some of the clauses now before us. Evans v.
International Typographical Union, et al., 81 P. Supp. 675 (D. C. Ind.). But, pursuant to
the legislative design that our decision and order would finally settle all questions in con-
nection with an unfair labor practice charge, the Court's decree will automatically dissolve
upon issuance of our decision herein.
1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cations of any of the above alternative private-party courses of action
cannot but have harmful effect.
That the majority has chosen to render nugatory the efforts of
the parties to obtain our aid in their dilemma is serious enough. But
it is a far more serious consideration that it has abdicated its respon-
sibility to the public in the course. of administering an Act which
commands that Board procedures shall be available "to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both employers and employees in their relations
affecting commerce," to prevent "interference by either with the legiti-
mate rights of the other, to protect the rights of employees in their
relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce
and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor dis-
putes affecting commerce." 20
MEMBERS HOUSTON and MURDOCK, dissenting in part :
We cannot join in the decision of the majority insofar as it concludes
that the International, in addition to the Chicago Local, refused to
bargain collectively with the Association and its member companies,
in violation of Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act.21 In our opinion, the
record, appraised as it must be in the light of the traditional relation-
ship between this Local and its International, and between locals and
internationals in the labor movement generally, demonstrates that
only the Chicago Local Constituted the statutory representatives of
the employees concerned, and therefore, that it alone was liable under
the Act for the unlawful refusal to bargain.
Our difference with the majority stems from our inability to adopt,
as do they, the rationale advanced by the Trial Examiner, namely,
that the functional organization of the International and its Locals,
particularly as expanded after the August 1947 convention, served to
integrate each Local with the International as a single bargaining
entity, or, in any event, to render the International and each Local
corepresentatives for collective bargaining purposes.
It is clear that, before the 1947 convention, the International and
its Locals operated as separate autonomous organizations, and that the
Chicago Local alone functioned as the statutory representative of the
employees of the Association's member companies. This was con-
sistent both with the Board's unmistakable recognition that locals, as
generally constituted, were entities separate and apart from inter-
20 The quotations are from Section 1 of the Act.
21 Under Section 8 (b) (3), it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization, or' its
agents , "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer , provided it is the representative
of his employees subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a)." Section 9 (a) provides, in
pertinent part, that "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining. .. .
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1053
nationals,22 and more particularly with the Board's acknowledgment of
the autonomy of the Locals of this International by certifying its
Locals, including the Chicago Local, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives of employees of employers in the printing industry 23
It is equally clear that the events of the convention left this relation-
ship undisturbed. For in adopting a broad "Collective Bargaining
Policy" and providing for its implementation through the required
approval of all contracts by the International's president and the
possible expulsion by the executive council of any dissident Local, the
Locals were neither abdicating their traditional autonomy, nor were
their members thereby selecting or designating the International as a
joint bargaining representative.
The Local's apparent willingness to vest the International with
additional authority to protect their mutually desired program must
be measured against their equal diligence in preserving their long
established independence. Thus, for example, they continued to re-
tain both their right to initiate and conduct negotiations, and their
power to bargain almost unrestrictedly as to wages and other related
economic matters. Moreover, they reserved to themselves alone the
ultimate power to approve or disapprove any collective bargaining
agreement, to sign contracts, and to enter upon strike action. The
retention of such pivotal rights in the locals is hardly consistent with
a determination that these organizations became "integrated" with
the International as a bargaining entity.
It is likewise difficult to perceive how the delegation of additional
"veto" powers to the International at the 1947 convention, with pos-
sible attendant penalties for failure by a local to adhere thereto, can
be construed as an affirmative designation or selection of the Inter-
nat:ional as a joint bargaining representative. Certainly there is no
evidence that the members or their representatives in the Locals, by
thus strengthening the ability of the International to perform its
traditional function of coordinating the policies of the entire organi-
zation, specifically intended to displace the locals as the exclusive
bargaining representatives. And in view of the powers reserved to
"Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, our holding on the facts in this case
does not necessarily or by intention imply that an international union could not, if it desired,
seek representative status either individually or jointly with its local.
21 See, e. g., Matter of LaSalle-Crittenden Press, Inc., Case No. 13-R-3784 (certification
issued April ].947), and Matter of Excello Press, Inc., Case No. 13-R-3934 (certification
issued November 1946), in which the Board certified the Chicago Local as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees there concerned. See also Matter of Register
Publishing Co., Ltd., 44 N. L. it. B. 834, enfd. as mod., 141 F. (2d) 156 (C. A. 9) where the
Board ordered the Employer to bargain with the Santa Ana, California, local as the
exclusive representative of employees of the Employer.
Clearly, membership in the International is not the touchstone of the employees' desig-
nation. See N. L. it. B. v. Electric Vacuum, 315 U. S. 685, 691 . See also, Pueblo Gas d
Fuel Co. v. N. L. it. B. 118 F. (2d) 304, 308 (C. A. 10).
1054 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Locals, including, as already mentioned, the right to conduct
negotiations and to determine final action on contracts and strikes,
any inference of such intention is completely without justification.24
We note that the majority also adverts to the appearance of officials
of the International at collective bargaining negotiations as indicative
of the integrated or joint nature of the bargaining relationship. The
record shows, however, that this activity by the International's offi-
cials, which occurred even before the August 1947 convention, re-
sulted only when an impasse was reached in negotiations between an
employer and the Local, and then only upon the specific request of
the Local concerned. The record further reveals that this activity
had, as its main purposes, aiding the Local in reaching an advan-
tageous settlement and, at the same time, protecting the funds of the
International from depletion by unnecessary strikes.25 In our. view,
the International's officials, by such appearance at bargaining con-
ferences, and by the fulfillment of their other duties in connection
with the bargaining activities of the Locals, were merely performing
a part of the ordinary functions of any parent group in advising its
Locals, furnishing them with assistance, and conserving the strength
and coordinating the program of all the Locals. These actions served
to enhance, rather than to alter, the traditional relationship between
the Locals and the International.
We would therefore direct our bargaining order against the Chicago
'Local alone. By thus excluding the International,-we clearly would
not be impairing in any respect the effectiveness of our order. In the
first place, there is no evidence whatsoever that the International
would attempt to encourage its Local to disregard a lawful Board
direction. Moreover, the law is well settled that such action by the
International, in the face of a court mandate enforcing our order,
24 The logical extension of the majority's position would require the Board, in all cases
in which it designates the statutory representatives, to analyze in detail the internal
structure and operations of all the participating unions. Not only will this create a
serious evidentiary burden, which we do not believe was contemplated under the Act, but
such result is also directly contrary to our recognition that we should not "intrude too
deeply into the [internal] affairs of labor organizations." Matter of Lane Wells Company,
79 N. L. R. B. 252. The principal cases relied upon by the majority on the issue of
intrusion, namely N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., N. L. R. B. V. McKesson & Robbins,
and N. L. R. B. V. Art Metals Construction Co., footnote 7, supra, are clearly inapposite.
In those decisions, the courts countenanced a mere surface examination mainly of such
records as membership cards, lists, or ledgers to ascertain the majority status of the unions
concerned.
25 When the International's officials were called into negotiations by the locals, the
employers were apprised that such appearance was by reason of the following provision
in the union's bylaws :
In the event of a disagreement between a subordinate union and an employer, which,
in the opinion of the local union , may result in a strike , such union shall notify the
President, who shall in person or by proxy investigate the cause of the disagreement
and endeavor to adjust the difficulty.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1055
would be proscribed, regardless of the fact that the International was
not specifically mentioned in the order .16
Accordingly, we perceive no Warrant in policy or law for finding
that the International has also violated Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act.
We would, therefore, dismiss the allegations in the complaint to the
extent that they charge the International with an unlawful refusal to
bargain.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL OFFICERS, REPRESENTATIVES, AGENTS, AND MEMBERS or
TIE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHIC AL UNION
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT threaten to take strike action, or direct, instigate,
or encourage employees to engage in or to threaten to engage in,
strike action, or ratify strike action taken by employees, for the
purpose of requiring employers either noncontractually or as a
matter of contractual obligation to violate Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act by discriminating with respect to the employment or con-
ditions of employment of any employee.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner cause or attempt to cause
employers to discriminate against employees in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith in our
capacity as exclusive representatives of all employees in the
bargaining unit described below, With Chicago Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association, as the representative of its member-companies,
with respect to rates of pay, Wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment having a, reasonable duration:
The bargaining unit is:
All employees of the composing rooms of the member-companies
of Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association (Chicago Daily
News, Inc., Illinois Publishing and Printing Company, the Jour-
nal of Commerce Publishing Company, Stuff and Times Co., and
Tribune Company) who perform work pertaining to printing,
"See N. L. R. B. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 150 F. (2d) 895 (C. A. 2), enfg.
61 N. L. R. B. 161; ahd Neptune Meter Company v. N. L. R. B., 158 F. (2d) 448 (C. A. 2),
enfg. as mod. 58 N. L. R. B. 1240 and 66 N. L. R. B. 292, cert. den. 333 U. S. 826. See also
decisions collated in 17 C. J. S., par. 12, p. 16.
1056 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
including proof-press operators, but excluding office boys, metal
men, advertising dispatch boys, clerical and other employees, and
all supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act as
amended.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 16,
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION.
Dated---------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the dates
hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Messrs. Allen Sinsheimer, Jr., and Carroll L. Alartin, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for
the General Counsel.
Messrs. Gerhard Van Arkel and Henry Kaiser (Van Arkel and Kaiser), of
Washington, D. C., and Mr. Clarence R. Martin, of Indianapolis, Ind., for the
Respondents.
Mr. Andrew C. Hamilton (Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis), of
Chicago, Ill., for Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association.
Messrs. Elisha Hanson, William K. Van Allen, and Miss Letitia Armistead, all
of Washington, D. C., for American Newspaper Publishers Association.
Messrs. Thurman Arnold and Norman Diamond (Arnold, Fortas & Porter), of
Washington, D. C., for Southern Newspaper Publishers Association.
Messrs. Gerard R. Reilly and Charles E. Rhetts, of Washington, D. C., for In-
land Daily Press Association.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed by Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, herein
called the Association, on behalf of the following employers : The Chicago Daily
News, Inc., Illinois Publishing and Printing Company, The Journal of Commerce
Publishing Company, Sun and Times Co., and Tribune Company, herein called
the Companies, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by
the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region (Chicago, Illinois ), issued his
complaint dated January 13, 1948, against Chicago Typographical Union No. 16,
herein called Local No. 16, and International Typographical Union, herein
called ITU, alleging that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b)
(1) (A), (2), and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act as amended (June 23, 1947, Public Law 101, 80th Cong., Chapter 120, 1st
Sess. ), herein called the Act.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended at the
hearing, alleged that since August 22, 1947, Respondents and each of them :
1. In violation of Section 8 (b) (2), caused and attempted to cause the Com-
panies to discriminate against their employees, (a) by attempting to impose
upon the Companies and their employees " conditions of employment" requiring
membership in Respondents as a condition of employment, and (b) by refusing,
since on or about October 21, 1947, to negotiate and enter into any collective
agreement unless the agreement required in effect membership in Respondents as
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1057
a condition of employment, and, in addition, provided that the Companies
would not require their employees to handle and/or process nonunion products ;
2. In violation of Section 8 (b) (3), refused to bargain collectively in good
faith with the Association in an appropriate bargaining unit of all nonsuper-
visory and nonclerical employees of the Companies composing rooms performing
work pertaining to printing, (a) by insisting on imposing upon the Companies
and their employees certain "conditions of employment" unilaterally promulgated
by the Respondents, (b) refusing from August 22, 1947, to October 21, 1947, to
negotiate and enter into any collective agreement with the Association, and (c)
by refusing thereafter to negotiate and enter into any collective agreement with
the Association except upon the conditions referred to in 1 (b) above, along with
the further condition that the agreement must be terminable by either party at
any time upon 60 days' notice ;
3. In violation of Section 8 (b) (1), restrained and coerced employees of the
Companies in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
(a) by engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, and (b)
by ordering, requiring, causing, and inspiring employees of the Companies in the
described unit to engage in slow-downs in support of other unfair labor practices'
Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing thereon, were duly
served upon the Respondents. On January 14, 1948, prior to the date set for
hearing, the General Counsel of the Board entered an order pursuant to Section
203.3; of the Board's Rules and Regulations-Series 5, consolidating, for the
purposes of hearing only, the above-entitled proceeding with Matter of Inter-
national Typographical Union, Case No. 9-CB-5. On January 14, 1948, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondents stipulated in substance that all relevant evi-
dence theretofore received, as well as all proceedings theretofore had, in Case No.
9-CB-5, including without limitation all special appearances, pleas to the jurisdic-
tion of the Board, and motions to dismiss, together with all rulings thereon and
exceptions to such rulings, should be considered applicable to the complaint in
the instant proceeding with the same force and effect as if the consolidation had
been effected prior to the commencement of the hearing in Case No. 9-CB-5.
On January 15, 1948, Respondents in the instant proceeding orally answered
the complaint, denying generally that they had engaged in the unfair labor
practices therein alleged.
Thereafter, the hearing in the consolidated proceedings was held at various
dates and places until May 15, 1948, all as set out in the Intermediate Report in
Case No. 9-CB-5, before the undersigned, Arthur Leff, the Trial Examiner duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. All parties were represented by coun-
sel, participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on
the issues. At the conclusion of the hearing, an unopposed motion of the Gen-
eral Counsel was granted to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to
minor variances not going to the substance of the complaint. Decision was
reserved at that time upon Respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint for
insufficiency of proof. That motion is disposed of as hereinafter indicated. All
parties were afforded opportunity to file briefs and/or proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and to argue the issues orally upon the record. The
' In the original complaint, the slow-downs were also alleged to have constituted illegal
occupancy of the Companies' premises. Upon motion of the General Counsel, made at the
conclusion of the hearing, this was ordered deleted from the complaint.
1058 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
briefs submitted in Case No. 9-CB-5 have been considered as applicable to the
issues of this case.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE ASSOCIATION ; THE BUSINESS OF THE COaIPANIES
Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association; a voluntary association with of-
fices in the City of Chicago, Illinois , exists for the purposes, among others, of
bargaining collectively with labor organizations representing employees of its
members. The Chicago Daily News, Inc., Illinois Publishing and Printing Com-
pany, The Journal of Commerce Publishing Company, Sun and Times Co.,
and Tribune Company are members of the Association. At all times herein
mentioned the Association has been designated agent of the Companies for
the purpose of bargaining collectively with Respondents and other labor organi-
zations with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment of the Companies' employees.
Each of the Companies is engaged in the business of publishing a daily news-
paper in Chicago, Illinois. Each in the course and conduct of its business pur-
chases from sources outside the State of Illinois substantial quantities of sup-
plies, consisting principally of newsprint and matrix paper ; receives for publica-
tion in its newspaper substantial amounts of national advertising, national
press service news, and national feature articles ; and causes substantial quan-
tities of its published newspapers to be sold and transported in interstate com-
merce from its aforesaid place of business in and through the several States
of the United States other than the State of Illinois."
It is found that the Companies are engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, and its parent organization, Interna-
tional Typographical Union, are labor organizations within the meaning of the
Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The facts upon which the allegations of unfair labor practices are based
The pertinent facts upon which the allegations of unfair labor practices are
based have been fully set out in the Intermediate Report issued in the companion
case, Case No. 9-CB-5, with which this proceeding was consolidated. All find-
ings of fact made in the Intermediate Report in Case No. 9-CB-5, and particu-
larly those contained in Section III-A, B, C, and D-2, are incorporated by refer-
ence and made part of this report, with the same force and effect as if they had
again and at length been set out here.
2 Appendix A, attached to the Intermediate Report in Case No. 9-CB-5, and incorporated
herein by reference, contains a tabulation showing with respect to each newspaper involved
in this proceeding, its approximate daily circulation, the percentage of such circulation
that is transported in interstate commerce, the approximate dollar value of its out-of-State
purchases, and the percentage of its total advertising volume coming to it from out-of-State
agencies or advertisers.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1059
B. Violation of Section 8 (b) (2)
In Case No. 9-CB-5, it was found that Respondent ITU, by its application
of the "collective bargaining policy" adopted by the ITU at its 1947 convention,
and by its entire course of conduct on a national level, from August 22, 1947,
to March 27, 1948, attempted to cause employers to discriminate against em-
ployees in violation of. Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The record shows that
Local No. 16, as well as the ITU, applied the same "policy" and engaged in the
same course of conduct with particular reference to the Companies involved in
this case. Accordingly, and for the reasoiis set forth in Section D (1) of the
Intermediate Report in Case No. 9-CB-5, it is found that Respondents by their
entire course of conduct from August 22, 1947, to March 27, 1948, attempted to
cause the Companies to discriminate against employees in violation of Section
8 (a) (3).
The complaint in this case also alleges that Respondents violated Section 8 (b)
(2), by refusing to enter into any agreement which did not contain a provision
that the Companies' employees should not be required to handle and/or process
nonunion products. For the reasons set forth in Section E (2) of the Inter-
mediate Report in Case No. 9-CB-5, it is found that this allegation does not
support a violation of Section 8 (b) (2), and it will accordingly be recommended
that the allegation be dismissed.
C. Violation of Section 8 (b) (3)
1. The appropriate bargaining unit
The complaint alleges in substance that all employees of the member com-
panies of the Association performing work pertaining to printing, excluding
clerical and supervisory employees, constitute a single appropriate bargaining
unit. Respondents' unit position as expressed at the hearing was equivocal.
While specifically denying that the alleged unit was an appropriate one, Re-
spondents declined to state expressly what unit or units they contended were
appropriate, except that their counsel at one point did assert that lie considered
the alleged unit to be inappropriate because it did not include the composing
room employees of all Chicago newspapers.
It has been the practice of the Association since 1904 to negotiate contracts
on behalf of its members with Local No. 16. At least since 1937, the Association
has been a party and signatory to all contracts that have been negotiated.
Under its bylaws, the Association may not bind a member without the member's
concurrence. But an agreement once made by the Association as agent for a
member and with its concurrence becomes binding upon that member. Although
it has been the fairly uniform practice for nonmember newspaper publishers
informally to adopt the terms and conditions of the Association negotiated news-
paper contracts, the Association does not act as the designated agent for such
nonmembers and has no authority legally to bind them. During the 1947 nego-
tiations here in question, Local No. 16 at no time raised any question as to the
appropriateness of an Association-wide unit. Under all the circumstances, and
on the authority of the Advance Tanning 3 and Bercut Richards ° cases, it is
3Matter of Advance Tanning Company, et al ., 60 N. L. R. B. 923.
4Matter of Bercut Richards Packing Company, et at ., 64 N. L. R. B. 133.
1060 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concluded that the composing room employees of only such companies as are
members of the Association are appropriately part of the multiple-employer unit.
The last contract between the Association and Local No. 16 did not spell out
specific job classifications in the unit's composition. It provided merely that
only union members in good standing were to be employed to perform work in
the composing rooms. Some question arose during the hearing as to the inclusion
or exclusion of certain specific categories of employees who perform work in or
about the composing rooms. It was finally agreed that proof-press operators,
who perform work pertaining to printing, are members of the Union and the
unit ; but that office boys, metal men, and advertising dispatch boys, whose work
does not pertain to printing, are not. In past contracts supervisory employees
in the composing rooms had been regarded as within the unit. Since, however,
they are now no longer "employees" within the meaning of the Act, as amended,
they may no longer appropriately form part of the unit. Matter of Marshall
Bruce Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 90.
Accordingly, it is found that all employees of the Companies' composing rooms
performing work pertaining to printing, including proof-press operators, but
excluding office boys, metal men, advertising dispatch boys, clerical and other
employees, and all supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute, and at all times
material herein did constitute, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
2. Representation by Respondents of the employees in the appropriate unit
The complaint alleges, Respondents' answer admits, and it is found, that all
the employees of the Companies in the above-described unit designated Re-
spondents, and each of them, as their representatives for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining, and that Respondents, and each of them, are, and at all times
material herein have been, the exclusive representatives of all the employees of
the Companies in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.'
r The admission made in Respondents' oral answer, that the ITU along with Local No.
16 was the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the local unit, appears
inconsistent with the general position taken by the ITU in Case No. 9-CB-5, as well as in
other recent cases in which the ITU was joined as a party respondent. However, even if it
were assumed that the ITU admission in this case was inadvertent, I would nevertheless,
find, on the record of this case, that the ITU was in fact and in law a corepresentative
with local No. 16 of the employees in the unit.
As Randolph's testimony shows, no formal bargaining designations are signed by ITU
members, and the extent to which they designate the ITU and/or a subordinate local to
represent them may be determined only by reference to the constitution, bylaws, and general
laws of the ITU, as well as the Local laws, to all of which members subscribe by their act
of affiliation. It is evident from these "laws"-the pertinent provisions of which were
reviewed in Case No. 9-CB-5-that the distribution of functions between the ITU and
its locals under its complex organizational system is such as to integrate each local with
the International as a bargaining entity. Locals are vested with a limited area of bar-
gaining autonomy (confined for the most part to issues of wages and certain other economic
terms), while control of a large range of bargainable matters is governed by ITU general
laws and policy as interpreted by the ITU Executive Council. The power of the ITU to
shape and control local bargaining actions was vastly extended by the adoption at the
1947 "collective bargaining policy" under which the membership designated the ITU
Executive Council to "interpret, construe and enforce" the bargaining policy applicable to
all locals. Although, under the "laws," locals alone are authorized to sign contracts,
locals may not, without risking invocation of ITU sanctions, submit any contract proposal
to employers, or any tentative agreement to their membership for ratification, unless they
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1061
3. The refusal to bargain
In its negotiations with the Association from August 22, 1947, to October 21,
1947, Local No. 16, adhering scrupulously to the 1947 ITU convention policy, as
interpreted and construed by the ITU Executive Council, made it clear that, while
it was prepared to negotiate wages and certain other economic conditions, it
could not, and would not, commit itself to any contract, written, verbal or other-
wise. This fixed determination not to enter into a binding contract with the
Association clearly failed to fulfill the obligation of good faith bargaining required
by the Act. Section S (d) of the Act defines the process of collective bargaining
to include "the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party." It thus restates in statutory form the
principle previously established by court and Board decision under Section 8 (5)
of the Wagner Act. H. J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 514. Contrary to
the assertion of Respondents, the question of whether or not a contract should
be signed is not a bargainable issue. Matter of The Todd Company, 71 N. L. R. B.
192. Nor is that question prematurely raised where no agreement has yet been
reached on substantive terms. The law is clear that where a party to collective
bargaining negotiations takes the position, even in advance of a meeting of
minds on substantive terms, that it will not sign a contract, its conduct is no
less unlawful than it would have been had it refused to sign a contract after all
substantive terms had been agreed upon. In the H. J. Heinz case, the Supreme
Court stated that one "could hardly be thought to have bargained in good faith"
when he entered into bargaining negotiations for an agreement "with the
reservation that he would not reduce it to writing or sign it." The Circuit Court
of Appeals, in enforcing bargaining orders of the Board, has held that a demon-
strated unwillingness to sign a collective bargaining agreement supplies ample
first submit it to the ITU and secure the latter's approval. Nor are locals free effectively
to negotiate any variations from policy specifications laid down by the ITU. Where an
impasse is reached in local negotiations, often as in this case because of the inability of
the local to make concessions on policy lines formulated by the ITU, the ITU must be
called into the local negotiations. When, as here, the ITU enters upon local negotiations.
it in fact, although perhaps not in form, acts as the bargaining representative for the local
membership, although it may also have the interests of all locals in mind. It is thus clear
that at least for certain purposes and as to certain matters, the ITU does not merely assist
and advise its locals, but, pursuant to the prior consent and authorization of the member-
ship, actually shapes and controls bargaining on behalf of local members. As is evident
from the Chicago situation, where the publishers asked that Randolph be brought into
the negotiations, employers as well as union members fully understand that bargaining is
hot merely with the local scale committee, but with the local scale committee and the ITU
within the framework of ITU laws.
It is not illegal for an international to control the bargaining of its locals. The alloca-
tion of authority between an international and its locals is a matter of internal union
organization, for the members to decide and not for the Board to approve or condemn.
But where, as here, union members vest in an international authority alone to act for
them under certain circumstances and to control on their behalf certain aspects of their
bargaining relationship with employers, and the international actually assumes such
delegated authority and acts thereunder, the international must accept the obligation to
bargain that is a necessary concomitant to the authority to bargain (cf. N. L. R. B. v.
Swift and Neuhajf Packing Co., 127 F (2d) 30 (C. A. 6)). To hold otherwise, would
be to leave a void in the obligation imposed upon unions to bargain, an obligation which
the Act contemplates is to be a comprehensive one, covering all bargainable matters. As
has been said, the law, like nature, abhors a vacuum.
867351-50-vol. 86-68
1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
basis for finding a refusal to bargain "despite the fact that at the time of the
refusal, no agreement had been reached." 6
Beginning on October 21, the Local, in accordance with the "change of strategy"
announced by the ITU, altered its bargaining positions by offering 1'-6A as an
alternative to no contract at all. The complaint alleges that Respondents bar-
gained in bad faith from that date forward by refusing to negotiate any agree-
ment which did not contain provisions, (1) in effect requiring membership in
Respondents as a condition of employment, (2) permitting the agreement to be
terminated upon 60-day notices, and (3) calling upon the Companies not to require
employees to handle and/or process nonunion products.'
As was found in Case No. 9-CB-5, Form P-GA was not designed as a legally
enforceable closed-shop contract; nor was it represented as such or so under-
stood at the Chicago negotiations. But in presenting P-6A at Chicago, no effort
was made to conceal from the publishers-indeed, it was openly declared-that
a principal objective of the 60-day clause was to enable the Union to cancel the
contract and then to strike, ostensibly for legal objectives, in the event, among
others, that nonunion men were hired. There was thus implicit in P-6A, as a
practical matter, the requirement that publishers would be obliged to maintain
in effect closed-shop hiring practices if they desired to continue uninterrupted
operations. It was clear from the bargaining position of the Union that its
intransigent determination to condition agreement upon the inclusion of the
minimum cancelation period which the law allows was unconnected with any
reluctance on its part to freeze economic terms, such as wages, for any greater
period.
The question of the length of a contract term is ordinarily one for negotiation
between the parties. A refs al to agree to a term of 1. year, or of any other
particular duration, does not per se constitute a refusal to bargain in the same
absolute sense that a refusal to agree to a contract in writing constitutes such
refusal. But since a primary objective of a collective bargaining contract is
to stabilize labor relations for periods of reasonable duration, insistence, in the
absence of special circumstances, by an employer or a union upon a contract of
indefinite duration terminable upon relatively short notice may evidence a bad
faith approach to the collective bargaining process.' In the instant case no
special circumstances were advanced by the Union for departing from the tradi-
tional practice of signing contracts for a fixed duration term of a year, other
than a desire to protect the "rights" of its members not to work with nonunion
men, or on nonunion goods, or where its jurisdiction was interfered with.
ON. L. R. B. v. Register Publishing Company, 141 F. (2d) 150, 160 (C. A. 9). See
also , Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. it. B., 110 P. (2d) 148, 150 (C. A. 2).
N. L. R. B. v. Brozen, 100 F. (2d) 812. N. L. It. It. v. National Seal Corp., 127 F. (2d)
776, 779.
' Consideration of the refusal to bargain aspect of this case will be limited to the issues
specifically framed by the complaint. Although the General Counsel in his brief covering
this case and Case No. 9-CB-5 asserts that the Union's insistence upon other provisions
contained in P-GA-such as the clauses relating to ITU General Laws, jurisdiction, picket
line, and liability limitation-also evidenced bad faith bargaining, the record is clear that
no issue was raised by the publishers in the Chicago negotiations with regard to these
clauses. For that reason, and because they fall outside the scope of this complaint, these
clauses need not, and will not, be considered here.
8 See Matter of Armour & Co. of Delaware, 48 N. L. R. B. 1412, 1413-1414, 1425, where the
Board held that a "refusal to enter into a contract for a fixed term constitutes a refusal
to bargain collectively." In so holding the Board observed that "no showing is made by
the respondent of any special circumstances making such a short term (30 days) reason-
able ." See also Matter of Stonewall Cotton Mills, 36 N. L. R. B. 241, 262-264.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1063
Respondents made it clear that the primary purpose of the 60-day cancellation
clause was to circumvent the statutory restrictions of Section 8 (b) (2), 8
(b) (4) (A), and 8 (b) (4) (D), by placing the Union in a position after a 60-day
waiting period, where it could cancel the contract and then strike ostensibly for
legal objectives in the event any of these "rights" were infringed. Under the
circumstances it cannot be said that Respondents' insistence upon the 60-day
clause had a legitimate economic justification. For these-reasons and because,
as found in Case No. 9-CB-5, the Union's stand on the 60-day clause was, under
the particular facts of this case, part of a course of conduct violative of Section
8 (b) (2), it is found that Respondents, by insisting on that clause, failed to
bargain in good faith.
Nor, in the circumstances of this case, was Respondents' failure to bargain
excused by the publishers' steadfast refusal to negotiate wages until, as had been
the, practice in the past, a contract framework was first agreed upon. For
purposes of decision in this case it is unnecessary to decide whether the pub-
lishers' adamant refusal to discuss wages or to submit a complete counterproposal
throughout the negotiations was violative of their duty to bargain under the
Act. A separable obligation to bargain is imposed by the Act upon employer
and union alike. The public policy underlying that obligation is no less
thwarted where both sides refuse to bargain. To be sure, one party's "refusal
to bargain in good faith may remove the possibility of negotiation and thus
preclude the existence of a situation in which the [other party's] own good faith
can be tested. If it cannot be tested, its absence can hardly be found." Matter
of Times Publishing Company, 72 N. L. R. B. 676, 683. That, however, is not
the situation here. In this case, the Union's good faith can be tested quite in-
dependently of the position taken by the publishers in the negotiations. The
record is clear that Respondents' refusal prior to October 21 to enter into any
contract at all, and its alternate position thereafter for a contract terminable
within the minimum period allowed by law, was neither provoked by nor related
to the refusal of the publishers to discuss wages or to submit a complete counter-
proposal. It was traceable directly to the bargaining policy adopted at the
1947 ITU Convention, as that policy was interpreted, construed, and applied by
the ITU Executive Council.
It is found that Respondents, as the exclusive bargaining representatives of
the employees in the appropriate unit, failed and refused, on and after August
23, 1947, to bargain collectively in good faith with the Association. and its
member-companies.
There remains for consideration, then, the question of whether the Union's
position with regard to clause (g) of P-6A-the "struck-work" clause-consti-
tuted a refusal to bargain.9 This clause, as the record shows, was not a major
issue in the Chicago negotiations, where only passing reference was made to it.
Together with the other provisions contained in paragraphs (a) through (i) of
P-6A, it was, however, presented to the publishers as one of the clauses, which
the Union stated it must have in substance in order to protect its interests. The
Union indicated that it was willing to have the language of the clause altered
so long as the substance of it was retained. The publishers, however, declining
to suggest any revisions to the clause, simply took the position that any under-
taking on their part, in whatever form, not to process struck or substandard
B The issue of whether a demand for such a clause constitutes an independent violation
of Section 8 (b) (1) and 8 ( b) (2) has been separately treated in Case No. 9-CB-5. The
conclusions there made are incorporated in this report.
1064 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
material was illegal.10 Thus, it was solely on the question of the legality of
any struck-work clause that the parties joined issue.
The General Counsel does not dispute that an employer, without violating
the Act, may of his own volition deal or refuse to deal with such firms, union
or nonunion, as he chooses. He contends, however, that a Union's demand that
an employer join with it in a contractual undertaking not to handle certain
products is a demand for an illegal condition, constituting per so bad faith bar-
gaining. More specifically, it is argued that such an undertaking would nullify
the public policy expressed in Sections 8 (b) (4) and 303 of the Act; that it
would constitute inducement and encouragement to employees to engage in
activities in contravention of Section 8 (b) (4) ; and that it would illegally
require an employer to waive the right granted him by statute to file charges
against a labor organization that engaged in activity proscribed by Section 8
(b) (4). It is further argued that the reservation by the Union in clause (g) of
the right unilaterally to determine what goods are produced under "substandard"
conditions is repugnant to the principle that one does not bargain in good faith
when he insists upon reserving to himself the right to unilateral action affecting
conditions of employment. A final argument is that an agreement between a
union and a multiple-employer group of publishers not to use the products of
certain printing shops would be violative of the Federal Anti-Trust Acts."
I find these arguments unpersuasive.
The only conduct made illegal by ;,atnte_ and the o,iy,' co_uluct t:'clarcd,
therefore, contrary to public policy is for a labor organization, in support of
certain stated objectives, "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of
their employment to use etc." The statute does not prohibit an employer and
a union from entering into an agreement under which the employer under-
takes not to use certain products ; nor does it prohibit collective bargaining
with respect to that subject. The statute leaves it open for an employer,
whether voluntarily or through a collective bargaining agreement, to assist
a union in the protection of its working standards by refusing to buy goods
produced under nonunion conditions. It is difficult to perceive how such an
agreement would encourage employees to engage in strikes or concerted re-
fusals to work. It would appear that an agreement not to handle "substandard"
goods, if faithfully complied with by an employer, as it must be presumed it
would be, would tend rather to remove the possibility of a situation arising
where employees would engage in a strike- or concerted refusal to work for the
purpose of forcing their employer to cease using products of another employer.
Nor does insistence upon a "struck work" clause illegally condition bargaining
upon an employer waiving his right to file charges against a labor organization
engaging in conduct proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4). A right to file charges
does not mature until a situation has arisen where it is believed a violation of
the Act has already occurred. The Union's collective bargaining demand was
10 As the terms are used by unions , it is generally understood that "substandard ma-
terials" means goods produced under nonunion conditions ; "struck work" means work
produced by men on strike ; and "unfair goods" includes both struck and substandard work.
It is clear from the record that the Union contemplated clause (g) to cover all these
categories.
11 This argument is advanced in the briefs filed by Inland Daily Press Association and
the ANPA in Case No. 9-CB-5. It is not made in the General Counsel's brief.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1065
therefore not conditioned upon the withdrawal by the employers of any. right,
previously matured, to file charges.' While an agreement not to file charges
in appropriate situations would undoubtedly be illegal, the "struck work"
clause cannot be construed as requiling such an undertaking. All it calls for
is an agreement by the employer that he will so conduct his operations as to
avoid the development of a situation where occasion for filing 8 (b) (4)
charges or a suit under Section 303 may arise.
An agreement which reserves to one party the right to engage in unilateral
action with respect to matters that may more appropriately be the subject
of collective bargaining is not per se illegal, although insistence upon such a
reservation may, under certain circumstances, evidence an unwillingness to
bargain in good faith. Previous agreements between the Union and the Associa-
tion allowed the Union in effect to refuse to work on "struck" or "unfair"
goods. In the 1947 negotiations, no point was raised by the publishers con-
cerning the language of clause (g) under which the Union reserved the right
of unilateral definition. The only issue was whether any "struck work" clause
was legal. On the record of this case, therefore, it cannot be concluded that
the Union "insisted" on unilateral action or that its position in that regard
evidenced bad faith.
The point that a "struck work" clause may lead employers to violate Federal
Anti-Trust lows was fleetingly raised during the Chicago negotiations. Past
contracts between the Union and the Chicago publishers had contained sub-
stantially similar provisions, but had apparently not been regarded by the
publishers as subjecting them to the legal hazards of such laws. From my
examination of the authorities, I am not satisfied that, under the circumstances
of this case, the inclusion of a struck work proyision in a bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Chicago Publishers Association would have sub-
jected the employer members of the Association to liability under the Anti-Trust
Laws ; indeed, the authorities appear to point to a contrary conclusion 13 In
12 The cases relied upon the General Counsel, holding that an employer may not condi-
tion bargaining on the withdrawal of charges, are inapposite. In those cases alleged
violations of the Act had already occurred at the time of the bargaining conference, and
the Unions were being asked to give up rights which had already matured.
^ See Apex fIosicry Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 502-504; United States v. llutcheson,
312 U. S. 219 ; Allen-Bradley v. Local No. 3, 325 U. S. 797. Ih the Allen-Bradley case, where
the Supreme Court held that a union (and presumably employers as well) could be enjoined
under the Sherman Act from making a contract with employers under which the parties
agreed to boycott and ban from the New York City area equipment (both union and non-
union produced ) manufactured outside its boundaries, the Court emphasized that the vice
of the agreement in that case was that it looked not merely to terms and conditions of
employment , but that it was part of a larger program which was aimed at achieving
monopoly and market control by employers. The Court said in part (at p. 809) :
Since union members can without violating the Sherman Act strike to enforce a union
boycott of goods , it is said they may settle the strike by getting their employers to
refuse to buy the goods. . . . We may assume that such an agreement standing
alone would not have violated the Sherman Act. But it did not stand alone. It was
but one element in a far larger program in which contractors and manufacturers united
with one another to bar all other business men from the area and to charge the public
prices above a competitive level.
In the Apex case, the Court stated (at pp. 503-4)
Since in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate competition
from non-union goods . . . an elimination of price competition based on differences
in labor standards is the objective of any nationallabor organization . But this.effect
on competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of price
competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.
1066 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR. RELATIONS BOARD
any event, the question of legality under the Anti-Trust Laws of such a clause
in the situation here presented may, at most, be regarded as a doubtful one
that admittedly has never been squarely determined. Under the circumstances,
the Union had as much right to insist that it was not illegal as the publishers
had to insist that it was, rid,-particularly since similar clauses had been
part of past contracts and nothing had in the meantime intervened to infringe
on the legality of this clause under the Anti-Trust Laws-it cannot be said that
the Union's refusal to concede the point evidenced bad faith bargaining.
It is found, on the record of this case, that the Union's bargaining position
on the "struck work" clause did not constitute a refusal to bargain.
D. Alleged violation, of Section S (b) (1) (A)
It is alleged that; Respondents restrained and coerced the Companies' em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act, by, (1)
refusing to bargain, (2) attempting to impose "conditions of employment"
requiring membership in Respondents as a condition of employment, and (3)
causing employees of the Companies to engage in slow-downs.
For the reasons set out in Case No. 9-CB-5, I find that Respondents, by
refusing to bargain, (lid not illegally restrain and coerce the Companies' em-
ployees. For similar reasons, I am led to the conclusion that Respondents (lid
not violate Section S (b) (1) (A), by attempting to cause the Companies
to require membership in the Union as a condition of employment. In pursuing
their attempt, Respondents acted in a representative capacity on behalf of and
with the prior consent and approval of the Companies' employees, all of whom
were union members. To hold that Respondents under these circumstances re-
strained and coerced their own members is to indulge in an assumption unsup-
ported in fact and unwarranted in law. Had the Companies acquiesced in
Respondents', attempt to cause the Companies to accept the Union's conditions
of employment, it is true that this would have established employment conditions
under which employees would have been restrained to acquire and retain union
membership as a condition of employment. But as the record shows, Respond-
ents' attempt failed. An abortive attempt, not itself coercive as to employees,
to achieve a condition which if established would tend to restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7, does not itself con-
stitute restraint and coercion." An adequate remedy for this situation is pro-
vided for by Section 8 (b) (2), which has been here found to have been violated,
and there is no need, and certainly no justification, to stretch the application
of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) beyond what the legislative history reflects was intended
by Congress, to achieve the same result.
In Case No. 9-CB-5, it was found that the record failed sufficiently to establish
responsibility on the part of the ITU for the slow-downs at Chicago. While
there is some evidence from which an inference may be,drawn of responsibility
on the part of Local No. 16 for at least certain phases of the slow-down, such
as the extended chapel meetings, I am, nevertheless, not persuaded that a
violation of Section (b) (1) (A) has been established. Slow-downs, standing
alone, are not made unfair labor practices under the Act. A slow down may
constitute it violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) only if it forms an integral part
of a course of conduct which in totality violates that section. The only discern-
"E. g., an unsuccessful attempt by an employer to induce a union to permit him to insert
in employment application forms a question calling for a statement of an applicant' s union
affiliation.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 1067
ible objective of the slow-down at Chicago was to impose pressure upon the
Companies to submit to the Union's bargaining demands and to enter into
negotiations on the subject of wages. The means employed were undoubtedly
coercive as to the employers. But-particularly since, as found above, Re-
spondents' over-all conduct does not establish a violation of Section 8 (b) (1)
(A)-I am unable to conclude that the slow-downs constituted part of a course
of conduct coercive as to the Companies' employees, or that the self-organiza-
tional rights of such employees were thereby otherwise invaded.
I shall, accordingly, recommend dismissal of the 8 (b) (1) (A) allegations of
the complaint.
IV. THE E SFEC'r OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondents set forth in Section III above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Companies described in Section I above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and, insofar as they have been found to constitute unfair
labor practices, tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
v. TILE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents', and each of them, have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that they, and each of them,
cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labor practices, and also take
certain affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act.
For reasons indicated in Case No. 9-CB-5, it will be recommended that the cease
and desist order remedying Respondents' violation of Section 8 (b) (2) cover
not only activities of the specific kind herein found illegal, but activities which
in any manner cause or attempt to cause employers to violate Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act. It will also be recommended that the order remedying Respondents'
violation of Section S (b) (3), include a provision requiring Respondents to
bargain for a bilateral collective bargaining contract for a definite term of fixed
duration in conformity with the practice and custom established by past bargain-
ing with the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association. Although as found
above, the question of the length of a contract term is ordinarily one for negotia-
tion between the parties, and a contract for indefinite duration does not, standing
alone, evidence bad faith bargaining, it is established by the facts of this case that
Respondents' insistence upon a contract of indefinite duration, with a 60-day
cancellation clause, was motivated not by legitimate economic considerations, but,
rather, was designed to achieve objectives at variance with the policies of the Act.
Consequently, the recommended order has been framed in the manner indicated
in order to guard against a repetition of such conduct. The record discloses that
the refusal to bargain at Chicago stemmed directly from the interpretation,
construction and enforcement of the "collective bargaining policy" which was
adopted by the 1TU at the Cleveland convention of August 1947. The record
further discloses that the ITU "collective bargaining policy," as so interpreted
and construed, was applied not only at Chicago, but by ITU locals throughout
the country. It will, therefore, be recommended that Respondent ITU be ordered
to rescind all instructions, post-card bulletins, forms, and other documents by
which it has given effect to, construed, and enforced such policy, and that it notify
all persons to whom such documents were sent, that the advice, instructions,
and directions contained therein should be wholly disregarded. It will also he
IONS DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recommended that Respondent ITU be required to publish a notice to that effect in
its official publication. This notice shall be in addition to that required.by the
recommended order in Case No. 9-CB-5.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record of the
case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS of LAW
1. Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, at all times material herein, has
been, and is, a voluntary organization existing for the purpose of bargaining
collectively with labor organizations representing employees of its members.
The employer Companies named in the caption of this case at all times material
have been, and are, members of the Association, and the Association has been,
and is, the agent of said employers for the purposes of bargaining collectively
with Chicago Typographical Local No. 16 and the International Typographical
Union, and other labor organizations, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment.
2. Each of the employer Companies named in the caption of this case is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sccticn 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
3. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and International Typographical
Union are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
4. All employees of the employer Companies' composing rooms performing
work pertaining to printing, including proof-press operators, but excluding office
boys, metal men, advertising dispatch boys, clerical and other employees, and all
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute, and at all times herein referred
to constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
5. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and International Typographical
Union were on August 23, 1947, and at all times thereafter have been, and now
are, the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees in the aforesaid
unit for purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a)
of the Act.
6. By attempting to cause the employer Companies named in the caption
of this case to employ in their composing rooms only members of Chicago Typo-
graphical Union No. 16 and the International Typographical Union, Respondents,
and each of them, attempted to cause said Companies to discriminate against
their employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, and thereby engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
7. By refusing on August 23, 1947, and thereafter, to bargain collectively in
their capacity as exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit, with the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion, in its capacity as.the representative of its employer members, Respondents,
and each of them, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
9. Respondents have not restrained or coerced employees in the aforesaid unit
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and have not en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of
the Act.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16
RECOMMENDATIONS
1069
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
recommended that Respondents, Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and
International Typographical Union, and their officers and agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) In any manner promulgating, pursuing, observing, or in anywise giving
effect to any policy, practice, or course of conduct, including without limitation
conditions of employment and contracts containing provisions for cancellation
of an entire agreement on 60 days' notice, an object of which is to cause, or
which in any manner, causes or attempts to cause, the employer members of
the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, or any other employer, to dis-
criminate against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, because of nonmembership in Chicago Typo-
graphical Union No. 16 and/or International Typographical Union, except
in accordance with the provisos to Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act;
(b) In any other manner, causing or attempting to cause employer members
of Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, or any other employer, to dis-
criminate against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment,
because of nonmembership in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and/or
International Typographical Union, except in accordance with the provisos to
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act;
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith, in their capacity as ex-
clusive bargaining representatives of all employees of the Chicago Newspaper
Publishers Association member-companies"' composing rooms who perform work
pertaining to printing (including proof-press operators, but excluding office boys,
metal men, advertising dispatch boys, clerical and other employees, and all
supervisors as defined in the Act), with the Chicago Newspaper Publishers
Association, in its capacity as the representative of its member-companies, with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment, and with respect to the negotiation of a bilateral collective bar-
gaining contract for a definite term of reasonable duration in conformity with
the practice and custom established by past bargaining with the Chicago News-
paper Publishers Association.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively in good faith, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in the unit set out in paragraph 1 (c), with Chicago
Newspaper Publishers Association, as the representative of its member-com-
panies, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment, and with respect to the negotiation of a bilateral
collective bargaining contract for a definite term of reasonable duration in
conformity with the practice and custom established by past bargaining with
the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, and, if an agreement is reached,
embody such agreement in a written contract to be signed by Chicago Typo-
graphical Union No. 16 and approved by International Typographical Union ;
(b) Post immediately at conspicuous places at the business office of Chicago
Typographical Union, and at such other places where notices or communications
15 The Chicago Daily News Inc., Illinois Publishing and Printing Company, The Journal
of Commerce Publishing Company, Sun and Times Co., and Tribune Company.
1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to members are customarily posted, and maintain for a period of at least sixty
(60) days, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked Appendix A :
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region in writing within
twenty (20) clays from the receipt of this Intermediate Report what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that the International Typographical Union, its
officers, representatives, and agents take the following affirmative action which
it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Rescind the instructions, post-card bulletins, forms, and other documents
by which its Executive Council has given effect to, construed, and enforced the
collective bargaining policy adopted at its Cleveland convention of August 1947,
now embodied in Section i, Article III, of the I .U General Laws, and notify all
officers, agents, and members of Respondent ITU, or its subordinate unions, to
whom such documents were sent, that the advice, instructions, and directions
contained therein should be wholly disregarded;
(b) Publish in the Typographical Journal, official paper of the International
Typographical Union, in addition to the notice appended to the Intermediate
Report in Case No. 9-CB-5, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked Ap-
pendix B ;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region in writing within
twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report what steps it
has taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that unless Respondents shall within twenty (20)
days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report notify the said Regional
Director in writing that they will comply with the foregoing recommendations,
the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring Respondents to
take the action aforesaid.
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to
all such allegations thereof as allege that Respondents restrained and coerced
employees of the Companies in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 5, effective August 22, 1.947, any party may, within
twenty (20) clays from the date of service of the order transferring the case to
the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with
the Board, Roehrunbean Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six copies
of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report
or to any other party of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all
motions or objections) as he relies on, together with the original and six copies
of a brief in support thereof; and any party may, within the same period, file
an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
Immediately upon the filing of.such statement of exceptions and/or briefs. the
party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties.
Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be
promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section
203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board,
request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) clays
from the (late of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16 " 1071
and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections and exceptions thereto shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
ARTHUR LEFF,
Dated August 0. 1948. Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO 1\11:MBERS Or CHICAGO 'TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 16
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby give notice that:
IVE WILL NOT in any manner promulgate, pursue, observe, or in anywise
give effect to any policy, practice, or course of conduct, including without
limitation conditions of employment and contracts containing provisions for
cancelation of an entire agreement upon 60 clays' notice, an object of which
is to cause, or which in tiny manner causes or attempts to cause, the employer
members of the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, or any other
employer, to discriminate against employees in regard to hire or tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment, because of non-
membership in Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and/or International
`.Typographical hnion, except in accordance with the provisos to Section 8
(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner cause or attempt to cause employer
members of Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, or any other em-
ployer, to discriminate against employees in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment, because of nonmembership in Chicago Typographical Union
No. 16 and/or International Typographical Union. except in accordance with
the provisos to Section S (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
WI; WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith in our capacity
as exclusive representatives of all employees in the bargaining unit described,
with Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association, as the representative of
its member-companies, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment; and other conditions of employment, and with respect to the negotia-
tion of a bilateral collective bargaining contract for a definite term of
reasonable duration in conformity with the practice and custom established
by past: bargaining with the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association,
and, if au agreement is reached. we will embody such agreement in a written
contract to be signed by Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and approved
by International Typographical Union.
The bargaining unit is :
All employees of the composing rooms of the member-companies of Chicago
Newspaper Publishers Association (Chicago Daily News, Inc., Illinois Pub-
lishing and Printing Company, The Journal of Commerce Publishing Com-
pany, Sun and Times Co., and Tribune Company) who perform work per-
taining to printing, including proof-press operators, but excluding office boys,
metal men, advertising dispatch boys, clerical and other employees, and
all supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act as amended.
CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION No. 16
By ---------------------------------------
(Title)
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION
By ---------------------------------------
( Title)
Dated --------------------
1072 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the dates hereof, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 , we hereby notify our members that:
WE HEREBY RESCIND all instructions , post-card bulletins , forms, and other
documents giving effect to, interpreting , and construing the collective bar-
gaining policy adopted at our Cleveland convention of August 1947 and
now embodied in Section 1, Article III of our General Laws. All advice,
instructions , and/or directions contained therein shall be wholly disregarded.
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION.
By ---------------------------------------
( Title)
For the Executive Council.
Dated------------------------