Cheryl L. Long, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 9, 1999
01970559 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 9, 1999)

01970559

09-09-1999

Cheryl L. Long, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region Agency.


Cheryl L. Long, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01970559

v. ) Agency No. 1C-441-1067-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region )

Agency. )

)

)

DECISION

Cheryl Long (hereinafter appellant) filed a timely appeal from a final

agency decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination on the basis of reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when: (1)

her supervisor subjected her to rude looks and unnecessary comments;

and (2) she was issued a letter of warning for failure to follow

instructions and for being absent without leave (AWOL) on February 12,

1996. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as an Optical Character Reader (OCR) Clerk at the agency's Cleveland,

Ohio facility.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on April 19,

1996. At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant was informed

of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency.

When appellant failed to respond within the time period specified in

our Regulations, the agency issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation when she failed to present evidence

that she had engaged in protected activity, when she failed to show

that her supervisor knew of her protected activity and because the

complaint in which she was a witness was settled during the counseling

stage on February 5, 1996. In addition, the agency concluded that

it had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for giving her a letter

of warning, namely that she had required more supervision because

she left her assignments without authorization, extended her breaks

and excessively engaged in conversations with her fellow employees.

The agency claimed that Appellant was informed about her deficiencies

but did not improve. Finally on February 15, 1996, she was absent from

her assignment without authorization for 45 minutes.

On appeal, appellant contends that on the day in question she was not

absent from her assignment because she and her co-workers had not been

on their regular assignment, the bar code sorter (BCS) all day due to

the lack of mail. As a result Supervisor 2 sent them to the "primary."

Appellant contends that she went to lunch late that day because the

employee who relieved her was late returning from her lunch. This was

the reason she was in the cafeteria later in the day.

The agency still contends that appellant did not refute its legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for giving her a letter of warning which,

it points out, was corroborated by another supervisor.

Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation

v. Green, 411, U.S. 792 (1973), Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S.248 (1981), United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,(1983) and Hochstadt v. Worcester

Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324

(D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell

Douglas to reprisal cases), we find that contrary to the agency's

conclusion, appellant did establish a prima facie case of reprisal

discrimination because she established that by giving a statement in a

co-worker's EEO complaint, she had engaged in protected EEO activity;

she established that her supervisor (Supervisor 1) most likely knew

about her involvement because she was the responsible management official

against whom the complaint had been filed; and lastly, Supervisor 1 was

also responsible for settling the co-worker's complaint which indicates

her probable knowledge of the statements given by witnesses.

We also find, contrary to the agency's conclusion, that the agency's

reasons are a pretext for discriminatory animus toward the appellant

because of her prior EEO activity. In reaching this conclusion, we note

that the agency did not directly address the appellant's specific details

about her whereabouts that she gives on appeal which were corroborated by

another employee. Instead, the agency merely restates, unconvincingly,

that appellant failed to dispute its non-discriminatory reasons for giving

appellant a letter of warning. The agency also failed to produce any

credible evidence that appellant had a history of recalcitrant behavior

or poor work performance.

Two employee witnesses stated that Supervisor 1 singled out appellant and

treated her differently from the other employees. One witness concluded

that appellant was singled out because she was a friend of the employee

who had filed an EEO complaint against her. In addition, not only did

appellant give testimony against Supervisor 1 but she sent copies of

her statement to two other management officials, the plant manager, the

postal Inspector and the Postmaster, thereby heightening the visibility

of her complaint and perhaps further angering Supervisor 1. Finally,

we are persuaded of the connection between appellant's EEO activity

and the harsher discipline she received because Supervisor 1 testified

that she has not given similar discipline to anyone else for the same

behavior, and other employees she had only had verbal discussions with

"had not filed any EEO's."

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including appellant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we REVERSE the agency's final

decision and REMAND this case to the agency to take remedial actions in

accordance with this decision and order below.

ORDER (D1092)

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

1. The agency shall rescind the letter of warning given to appellant

on or about February 15, 1996 and shall expunge all agency records which

make reference to the letter of warning or references to any disciplinary

actions in general taken against appellant related to the incident on

February 15, 1996.

2. The agency is directed to conduct at least eight hours training

for the appellant's supervisor (Supervisor 1) who was found to have

discriminated against appellant by taking actions of reprisal against

her for engaging in protected EEO activity.

3. The agency shall take appropriate preventative steps to ensure

that no employee is subjected to reprisal at its General Mail Facility,

Cleveland, Ohio;

4. The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's corrective actions.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its General Mail Facility, Cleveland,

Ohio, copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the appellant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the appellant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408,

1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the appellant has the right to

file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the

paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action

on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42

U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil

action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any

petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.410.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

9/09/99

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director,

Office of Federal Operations