Carlos S. Alvarez-Ali, Complainant,v.Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 24, 2011
0120102029 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 24, 2011)

0120102029

06-24-2011

Carlos S. Alvarez-Ali, Complainant, v. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Agency.




Carlos S. Alvarez-Ali,

Complainant,

v.

Janet Napolitano,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security

(Immigration and Customs Enforcement),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120102029

Agency No. HS-09-ICE-006664

DECISION

On April 14, 2010, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s March

15, 2010, final decision dismissing his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission

accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are whether the Agency properly dismissed

Complainant’s claims for untimely EEO Counselor contact and for failure

to state a claim.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was

offered a position as an Immigration Enforcement Agent (IEA) at the

Agency’s Office of Deportation Removal Operations in New York, New

York. Complainant was transferring to Immigration and Customs Enforcement

from Customs and Border Protection.

On April 13, 2009, Complainant failed to report for his first day at the

IEA position. The record reflects that Complainant had been arrested

by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police on the morning of

April 13, 2009. That same day, Complainant sought and received a letter

from the local District Attorney (DA) dismissing his arrest prior to

criminal court arraignment. On April 14, 2009, Complainant called a Human

Resource Specialist (HRS) at the Agency’s Dallas Service Center. HRS

stated that the Agency no longer wanted him and instructed him to fax

the letter from the DA’s office to the Dallas Service Center.

On April 17 2009, Complainant received a letter dated April 13,

2009, notifying him of the Agency’s decision to rescind his offer

of employment for his failure to report to duty. On April 21, 2009,

Complainant contacted an Employee and Relations Specialist (ERS) to

inquire as to whether the Agency had cleared him for work. On April 22,

2009, ERS responded that the case was under review by the Office of

Professional Responsibility (OPR). On May 3, 2009, Complainant again

inquired about the status of his rescission. In an e-mail dated May

4, 2009, Complainant received another response from ERS that his case

was still under OPR review. Complainant initiated contact with an EEO

Counselor on June 15, 2009.

On September 8, 2009, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that

the Agency subjected him to discrimination on the bases of religion

(Muslim), national origin (perceived Middle Eastern), and color (Not

Specified) when:

1. On April 17, 2009, he became aware that the Agency rescinded its

offer of employment for the position of IEA; and

2. On May 4, 2009, he became aware that OPR was still investigating the

Agency’s decision to rescind his employment offer.

In its March 15, 2010 final decision, the Agency dismissed Complainant’s

claims for untimeliness pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2) and for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1). The

Agency found that Complainant identified April 17, 2009 as the date when

he learned of the offer rescission, yet he did not initiate EEO Counselor

contact until June 15, 2009 which was 14 days beyond the required 45

day period for contact an EEO Counselor. The Agency further found that

Complainant’s assertion that the Agency discriminated against him by

continuing an investigation into his offer rescission failed to state a

claim, framing this second contention as a collateral attack on another

department’s investigative proceedings.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contended that the discriminatory event did

not occur with his receipt of the letter of rescission on April 17,

2009. Rather, Complainant asserted that the discrimination was ongoing as

a result of the OPR investigation. Thus, when Complainant was informed

on May 4, 2009 of OPR’s investigation, he concluded that the Agency

might be slowing the process and he developed a reasonable suspicion of

the Agency’s discriminatory animus. Complainant contended that he was

not untimely in contacting the EEO Counselor.

In response, the Agency maintained that Complainant’s receipt of

the April 17, 2009 letter should have given rise to any reasonable

suspicion of discrimination. The Agency further maintained that even

if the Commission were to reject the April 17, 2009 date as the trigger

of reasonable suspicion, Complainant had notice that his case was under

OPR investigation on April 22, 2009, yet still failed to initiate timely

contact after this occurrence. Therefore, the Agency urged the Commission

to find Complainant’s EEO Counselor contact untimely. The Agency further

addressed Complainant’s second claim by again framing the matter as

a collateral attack on the OPR investigation. The Agency concluded that

claim 2 failed to state a claim and urged the Commission to concur.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Claim 1

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2) states, in

pertinent part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint which fails to

comply with the applicable time limits contained in

29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1), which in turn, requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the EEO Counselor

within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or,

in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date

of the action. The Commission has adopted a “reasonable suspicion”

standard (as opposed to a “supportive facts” standard) to determine

when the 45 day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Dep’t

of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (Feb. 11, 1999). Thus, the time

limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects

discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge of

discrimination have become apparent.

Upon review, we find that the Agency properly dismissed claim 1 on the

grounds of untimely EEO Counselor contact. The record reflects that

Complainant learned of the alleged discriminatory event on April 17,

2009, but did not initiate contact with an EEO Counselor until June

15, 2009, which is beyond the 45 day limitation period. On appeal,

Complainant asserted that the Agency’s actions did not arouse a

reasonable suspicion until he learned on May 4, 2009, that he was the

subject of an ongoing investigation by OPR. Complainant has failed to

establish how the Agency’s May 4, 2009 response created any more of

a reasonable suspicion of discrimination regarding his rescission than

his April 17, 2009 receipt of the rescission letter or his April 22,

2009 receipt of HRS’s e-mail notifying him of the OPR investigation.

Accordingly, we affirm the Agency’s dismissal of claim 1 on the grounds

of untimely EEO Counselor contact pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2).

Claim 2

We find that the Agency also properly dismissed Complainant’s second

claim for failure to state a claim. The regulation set forth at 29

C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that an agency

shall dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim. An agency

shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or applicant for

employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated against

by that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,

age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.103, .106(a).

The Commission’s federal sector case precedent has long defined an

“aggrieved employee” as one who suffers a present harm or loss with

respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there

is a remedy. Diaz v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049

(Apr. 21, 1994). The Commission has held that an employee cannot use the

EEO complaint process to lodge a collateral attack on another proceeding.

See Wills v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Request No. 05970596 (July 30, 1998);

Kleinman v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940585 (Sept. 22, 1994);

Lingad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05930106 (June 25, 1993).

Here, the proper forum for Complainant to have raised his challenges

to actions which occurred during the OPR investigation was in that

investigative proceeding itself. It is inappropriate to now attempt

to use the EEO process to collaterally attack actions which occurred

during the OPR process. Furthermore, the Commission has held that

merely conducting an investigation into purported improper or illegal

conduct does not cause any injury without more, for example, resulting

disciplinary action. Shelly v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal

No. 01996655 (Oct. 27, 2000). It has also applied this rule to the

initiation of an internal investigation. Martin v. Dep't of Justice

(Federal Bureau of Prisons), EEOC Appeal No. 01A32934 (Sept. 17, 2003).

Accordingly, we affirm the Agency’s dismissal of claim 2 for failure

to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission AFFIRMS

the Agency’s final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___6/24/11_______________

Date

2

0120102029

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120102029