Campbell Soup Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 1645 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1645
It is further recommended that all allegations of the complaint not specifically
found to be violations of the Act be dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF GEM OF ST. PAUL AND OF
ROGER CLOTHING CO. OF ST. PAUL
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT fire any employee to discourage membership in Retail Clerks
Union Local 789, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL offer Timothy Dowd his job back and pay him for any wages he lost
since he was fired.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
any of our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist Retail Cleiks Union Local 789, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection
as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all activity,
except to the extent such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of any labor organization.
GEM OF ST. PAUL and ROGER CLOTHING CO. OF ST. PAUL,
Employers.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative of Gem of St. Paul)
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative of Roger Clothing Co. of St. Paul)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Boaid's Regional Office, 316
Federal Building, 110 South 4th Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Telephone No. 334-
2611, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Campbell Soup Company and Madeline Ritchey
Butchers Union Local No. 127, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO) and Madeline
Ritchey. Cases Nos. 2O-CA-.780 and 2O-CB-1116. June 16,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 3, 1964, Trial Examiner David F. Doyle issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, recommending dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that the evidence established that the
charges of Madeline Ritchey were settled by the General Counsel and
counsel for the Union and the Company by informal settlement agree-
ments prior to the issuance of the complaint herein and that further
proceedings in these companion cases would not effectuate the pur-
poses of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Trial
152 NLRB No. 165.
1646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner's Decision is attached hereto. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with a sup-
porting brief, and the Respondent Company and Respondent Union
each filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations
Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a
three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in these cases, and does not adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusions and
recommendations for the reasons stated hereinafter.'
Since 1956, Respondent Company and Respondent Union have been
parties to a series of collective-bargaining agreements which contained
a lawful 30-day union-security clause. Until the practice was changed
as a result of the filing of the present unfair labor practice charges, an
individual newly hired was asked by a company clerk if he was a mem-
ber of the Union. If the answer was in the negative, the clerk would
tell the employee that he had to join and handed him a union applica-
tion for membership and a dues checkoff authorization form and told
him he had to sign these forms, that the initiation fee was $25 and the
monthly dues $4, and that the Company would deduct $14.50 from the
employees' third and fourth weekly paychecks to pay this sum to the
Union. Employees invariably sign these forms on being hired and
had their initiation fees and monthly dues checked off effective as of
the date of hiring. This hiring practice was initiated by agreement
between Respondent Company and Respondent Union and was fol-
lowed with the full knowledge and consent of the Union.
'At the bearing, Respondents requested that the General Counsel's attorney furnish
them with copies of the proposed settlement agreements which they had signed and sub-
mitted to the Regional Office during settlement discussions. The General Counsel's
attorney refused on the ground that Section 102 118 of the Board's Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended, prohibits disclosure of documents in the Regional Office file without
prior approval of the General Counsel. The Trial Examiner directed disclosure of the
documents, but, at counsel for the General Counsel's request, continued the case pending
receipt of instructions by General Counsel's representative from the General Counsel's
office in Washington. The General Counsel affirmed the attorney's refusal to disclose
the information requested. Thereafter, the Respondents submitted their request to the
General Counsel pursuant to Rule 102 118 and were granted permission to review the
d,)cu rents in question. In the absence of any showing of prejudice to Respondents, this
matt,- would ordinarily be closed However, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner's
anp"ent conclusion that the proposed settlement papers did not fall within the scope
of that section of the Rules and Regulations These Rules were designed to facilitate
proceedings before the Board by introducing uniformity in practice and procedure Rule
102118 prohibits disclosure of all documents in the Regional Office file without prior
approval of the General Counsel We do not doubt that there will be occasional situations,
as here, where the application of the rule will appear to be unduly restrictive, but in
the absence of any showing that a litigant will be prejudiced or denied substantive rights,
there is no warrant for creating an exception to the Rules in this instance.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1647
From the above facts it is clear, and we find, that the Respondent
Company's conduct, telling applicants for employment that they had
to join the Respondent Union, and further submitting to these prospec-
tive employees at the time of their hire application forms for member-
ship in the Union and authorizations for dues deductions, constitutes
assistance to the Respondent Union in violation of Section 8(a) (2)
and (1) of the Act. We further find that all of the participants in the
hiring process,2 particularly the applicants, understood that the imme-
diate signing of the union card was one of the conditions of employ-
ment. In so finding, we are cognizant not only of the complete success
achieved by the parties in obtaining signatures from the new hires
immediately prior to their actually entering into the status of employ-
ees, but also of the fact that the Respondent Union was fully aware
that these cards were being signed prior to actual employment and that
moneys were being deducted for dues and initiation fees and forwarded
to the Union prior to the 30th day after hiring. The Respondent Union
had been notified in writing several years earlier that this was the
method that the Respondent Employer would adopt. As the hiring
arrangement in practice required new employees to join the Union
prior to the expiration of the 30-day statutory period, we find that the
parties to the practice thereby violated Sections 8(a) (1), (2), and (3)
and 8 (b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act, respectively 3
Having concluded that the conduct of both Respondents violated
the Act, we now consider the Trial Examiner's conclusion that an
informal settlement had been effectuated. From the record, it is clear
that the parties and the field examiner representing the Regional Office
had reached a tentative agreement. However, it is also clear that this
tentative agreement was still to be submitted to the Regional Director
for approval. On September 20, 1963, the field examiner wrote the
parties that "additional matters relating to the above cases have been
brought to our attention. The settlement proposal previously sub-
mitted is withdrawn and further investigation will be made." In a
letter dated October 1, 19631 the union attorney wrote the field examiner
advising that it would not agree to a revised settlement and concluded
by stating :
Accordingly, unless we can have a reconsideration of the original
settlement agreement already agreed to by our principals, we can
see no choice but to proceed with litigation in this case.
Thus it is clear that even the Respondent Union recognized that the
original proposed settlement had not been approved by the Regional
Director. In these circumstances, we reject the Trial Examiner's con-
clusion that a settlement had been effectuated.
2 One of the clerks in the personnel office testified that she had no instructions on what
to do if one of the applicants refused to sign the card prior to hire.
3 See Cadillac Wire Corp, 128 NLRB 1002, enfd. 290 F. 2d 261 (C.A. 2).
1648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We also reject the Trial Examiner's conclusion that there are "any
number of ways" in which the Regional Director can give his approval
to a settlement agreement. In our opinion, it is necessary that the
Regional Director expressly approve in writing the offered settlement
in its totality after all disputed issues are resolved. Anything short of
this position opens the door to possible confusion and misunderstand-
ing as to whether or not a settlement has been effectuated, as in the
instant case. Moreover, we do not interpret Section 101.7 of the Rules
as requiring that the Regional Director reject an offered settlement
within any period of time or be estopped to deny the settlement. In
order to fully carry out his responsibility after a charge has been filed,
the Regional Director has a duty to review each proposed settlement
with a view toward assuring that the public interest as well as the pri-
vate rights of the immediate litigants are served. We note that the
offer of settlement here involved refunding but 1 month's dues to 1
individual while the record shows that possibly as many as 250 to 300
employees were illegally required to pay 1 month's dues under identi-
cal circumstances. Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Exam-
iner, that there has been no settlement of the unfair labor practices
referred to in the charge and found to exist herein.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent Company, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
We have found that the Respondent Company unlawfully assisted
the Respondent Union by obtaining employee signatures to union mem-
bership and dues checkoff authorizations, by which employees were
required to join the Union and pay dues sooner than they would have
been lawfully required to do so. As the extent of the discrimination
against employees was only in the amount they were forced to pay in
dues for the first month of their employment, we shall only order the
Respondents, jointly and severally, to reimburse to employees their
first month's dues for employees hired from 6 months prior to the filing
of the charges herein, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum.
We shall also direct that any membership-dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions unlawfully obtained from employees prior to the 30-day statutory
period are not to be honored in the future. The record also shows that
during the first month of each employment the Respondent Company
deducted, in installments, either all or a part of the $25 initiation fee
required by the Respondent Union, and forwarded such moneys to the
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1649
Union. As all employees who worked more than 30 days would have
paid such fees pursuant to the lawful union-security clause, we shall not
order the Respondents to reimburse the aforementioned employees for
such initiation fees. However, if there are any employees who, during
the applicable period, paid these initiation fees but worked less than
30 days, the Respondents shall jointly and severally reimburse such
employees for the initiation fees so deducted.
CONCLUSIONS or LAW
1. Campbell Soup Company is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the Act.
2. Butchers Union Local No. 127 , Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO), is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By its practice of informing prospective and/or newly hired
employees of the requirement that they must join the Union immedi-
ately and by furnishing new employees with union cards and deduct-
ing from the employees' pay union dues and the initiation fees during
the first 30 days of employment and forwarding the said deductions
to the Union, thereby assisting the Union, the Respondent Company
has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By jointly engaging in a practice whereby prospective and/or
newly hired employees were required to execute union membership-
dues-checkoff authorization cards prior to the expiration of the statu-
tory 30-day period, the Respondent Company and the Respondent
Union have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1), (2), and (3) and 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act,
respectively.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that:
A. The Respondent , Campbell Soup Company , Modesto, California,
its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Contributing support to Butchers Union Local No. 127, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America
(AFL-CIO ), or any other labor organization , by its practice of
informing prospective and/or newly hired employees of the require-
ment that employees must join the Union immediately, furnishing
prospective employees with application for membership cards and
initiation fees and dues checkoff authorizations, and deducting the said
dues and initiation fees and paying the same over to the said Union,
prior to the 30-day statutory grace period following employment.
789-730--66-vol . 152-105
1650 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Requiring prospective or newly hired employees to execute
membership-dues-checkoff authorization cards for the aforementioned
Union, or any other labor organization, prior to the expiration of the
30-day grace period provided for in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
(c) Checking off union dues for employees pursuant to member-
ship-dues-checkoff authorizations unlawfully obtained from employees
prior to the 30-day statutory period.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist the aforesaid Union, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and to refrain from
any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Union, reimburse all
employees for moneys illegally exacted from them, in the manner and
to the extent set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to determine the amount of the moneys illegally
exacted from the employees involved.
(c) Post at its plant in Modesto, California, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix A." 4 Copies of such notice, to
be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 20, shall, after being
duly signed by its authorized representative, be posted by the Respond-
ent Company immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Post at the same places and under the same conditions as set
forth in (c) above, and as soon as they are forwarded by the Regional
4In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order "
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1651
Director, copies of the Respondent Union's notice herein marked
"Appendix B."
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent Com-
pany has taken to comply herewith.
B. The Respondent, Butchers Union Local No. 127, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO),
its officers, agents, and representatives, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Causing or attempting to cause the Respondent Company to
discriminate against prospective and/or newly hired employees by
requiring them to execute membership -dues-checkoff authorizations
for the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, prior to
the expiration of the 30-day grace period provided for in Section
8(a) (3) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except
to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of continued
employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Company, reimburse
all employees for moneys illegally exacted from them, in the manner
and to the extent set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all membership, dues, and other
records necessary to compute the moneys illegally exacted from the
employees involved.
(c) Post at its business offices and meeting Balls in Stockton, Cali-
fornia, copies of the attached not ice marked "Appendix B." 5 Copies
of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 20,
shall, after being duly signed by the Union's representative, be posted
by the Union immediately upon receipt, thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Union to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Mail to the Regional Director signed copies of Appendix B for
posting by Respondent Company at its Modesto, California, plant, as
provided above. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the said
5 See footnote 4. supra
1652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Regional Director, shall, after being signed by Respondent Union's
representative, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for dis-
position by him.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within
10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply
herewith.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE 'ro ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WAVE WILL NOT contribute support to Butchers Union Local No.
127, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America (AFL-CIO), or to any other labor organization, by our
practice of informing prospective and/or newly hired employees
of the requirement that employees must join the Union immedi-
ately by furnishing prospective employees with appl icatioit-for-
rnembership cards and initiation fees and dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions, and by deducting the said clues and initiation fees and paying
the same to the Union, prior to the 30-day statutory period fol-
lowing employment.
WE WILL NOT require that prospective or newly hired employees
execute membership-dues-checkoff authorization cards for the
aforementioned Union, or any other labor organization, prior to
the expiration of the 30-day grace period provided for in Section
8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT check off union dues for employees pursuant, to
membership-dues-checkoff authorizations unlawfully obtained
from employees prior to the 30-day statutory period.
Wr: wrl,r, No'r in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to sel (-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the
aforementioned Uniou, or auy other labor organization, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, and to refrain from any and a]1 such activ-
ities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act,
as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1653
WE WILL jointly and severally with the aforementioned Union
reimburse our employees for moneys illegally exacted from them.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining, members of the above-named labor organiza-
tion, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this
right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section
8(a) (3) of the amended Act.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY,
Emplo yer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California,
Telephone No. 556-3197, if they have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS OF B UTCIIERS U NIoN LOCAL No. 127, AMAL-
GAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCFIER WORKMEN Or NORTIt AMERICA
(AFL-CIO), AND To ALL EMPLOYEES OF CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY,
MODESTO, CALIFORNIA
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Campbell Soup Com-
pany, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, to discriminate
against prospective and newly hired employees by requiring them
to execute membership-dues-checkoff authorizations for us, or for
any other labor organization, prior to the expiration of the 30-
day grace period provided for in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
1654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above-named Company
reimburse the employees of Campbell Soup Company for moneys
illegally exacted from them.
BUTCHERS UNION LOCAL No. 127, AMALGAMATED
MEAT CU7 rtr s AND I3UTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH
AMERICA (AFL-CIO),
Labor Orgaan.ization.
Dated ---------------- By---------------- --------------
(Representati ve) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
date of posting , and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional
Office, 4-50 Golden Gate Avenue , Box 36047 , San Francisco , California,
Telephone No. 556-3197 , if they have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard by Trial Examiner David
F. Doyle at Modesto, California, on December 3 and 4, 1963, and at San Francisco,
California, on January 7, 1964, on complaint of the General Counsel and answers
of the Respondents. The issues litigated were whether (1) Campbell Soup Company,
herein called the Respondent Company, had violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3)
of the Act; (2) Butchers Union Local No. 127, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO), herein called the Respondent
Union, had violated Section 8(b)(1) (A) and (2) of the Act by certain concerted
conduct, hereinafter described; and (3) the parties by certain documents and conduct
had effected a settlement of the charges herein prior to the issuance of the complaint
in this proceeding.1
At the hearing, counsel for the parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce relevant evidence. At the
close of the hearing the parties were given an opportunity to argue orally and to file
briefs. All parties have filed briefs which have been considered.
Upon the entire record, and from my obseivation of the witnesses, I hereby make
the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
It is not disputed, and I find, that the Company is a New Jersey corporation with
its main office and principal place of business located at Camden, New Jersey. It
owns and operates a plant at Modesto, California, where it is engaged in the business
of processing food products. In the 12-month period, prior to the issuance of the
complaint, the Company in the course of its business operations shipped products
In this Decision, the National Labor Relations Board is referred to as the Board; the
General Counsel of the Board and his representatives at the hearing as the General
Counsel, and the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, as the Act
The original charges in the above-captioned cases were filed by Madeline Ritchey with
the Regional Office of the Board (Region 20) on July 22, 1963 A "First Amendment
Charge against labor organization or its agents" was executed by Madeline Ritchey on
October 31, 1963, and filed at the aforesaid Regional Office of the Board on November 1,
1963 An order consolidating cases, the complaint, and the notice of hearing were issued
by the same Regional Director on November 5, 1963
It should be noted that all dates in this report are in the year 1963 unless specified
otherwise
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1655
valued in excess of $50,000 from its Modesto plant to places located outside the State
of California. The Company is, and at all times material to this proceeding has been,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is not disputed, and I find, that the Union is, and at all times material has been,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
The complaint in substance alleges that pursuant to a lawful union-security provi-
sion in a labor agreement between the Company and the Union, by joint action, the
Respondents established and enforced a practice whereby new employees, at the
approximate time of their hire, were required to join the Union and to pay initiation
fees and dues. Thus, these employees were not given the full 30 days' grace period
granted them under the Act before joining the Union. The General Counsel contends
that by this conduct the Company violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and the
Union violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act.
On this point, the Union and the Company contend that the conduct of the new
employees in joining the Union and in paying dues prior to the expiration of the 30-
day grace period was "voluntary" and that the General Counsel has failed to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that either Respondent is guilty of
the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
The Company and the Union also contend that after his investigation, the General
Counsel and counsel for the Company and the Union agreed upon terms of settlement
of the charges of Madeline Ritchey, and that these settlement agreements, evidenced
by documents and conduct, act as a bar to this proceeding The General Counsel
contends that the settlement agreements executed by the Respondents were not
approved by the Regional Diiector, and for that reason the settlement agreements
never became effective.
B. Piefatoiy,tatement; background, the care of Madeline Ritchey
To put this proceeding in proper perspective, and to avoid repetition in the nar-
rative of events, the Trial Examiner has decided to chronicle the events comprising
this controversy in the sequence in which they occurred The events of this con-
troversy fell into two natural periods of time, the first period of time followed immedi-
ately upon the filing of the charges herein by Madeline Ritchey on July 22, 1963, and
came to an end on approximately September 20, 1963, when the Geneial Counsel
notified counsel for the Company and the Union that a certain "settlement proposal"
previously submitted was withdrawn The second period of time began on Septem-
ber 20, 1963, and may be considered as concluded with the filing of briefs after the
hearing.
As noted previously, Madeline Ritchey executed and on July 22, 1963, filed the
original charges herein against the Company and the Union The original charge
against labor organization or its agents reads as follows:
On or about April 17, 1963, and thereafter, the above-named labor organiza-
tion, by its officers, agents or representatives, caused Madeline Ritchey, and
others, to become a member of said labor organization, as a condition of employ-
ment with Campbell Soup Company, Modesto, California, and further required
Madeline Ritchey and others to execute a fee and dues "checkoff" as a condition
of employment. Similarly after such dues and fees were fully paid, Madeline
Ritchey and others were discharged and the above-named labor organization
has refused and continues to refuse to return such fees previously paid by them.
By these and other acts, the above named labor organization by its officers,
agents or representatives has interfered with, coerced, or restrained employees
in violation of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The original charge against the Company reads as follows:
On or about April 17, 1963, and thereafter, the above-named Employer, by
its officers, agents and representatives required Madeline Ritchey, and others,
1656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to become a member of Butchers Union No. 127 as a condition of employment,
and further required Madeline Ritchey, and others, to execute a dues and initia-
tion fee "checkoff" authorization as a condition of employment. Similarly
after such dues and fees weie fully paid Madeline Ritchey and others were dis-
charged without refund of initiation fees previously extracted by the Employer.
By these and other acts the Employer has interfered with, coerced, or
restrained its employees, and is continuing to do so in violation of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
On July 22, 1963, the Regional Director (Region 20) by separate letters to the
Union and the Company notified each that a charge of unfair labor practices had
been filed and that the investigation of the case had been assigned to Board Agent
Dean Francis. Each letter contained an appropriate copy of the charge.
It is conceded by all parties that thereafter Francis investigated the charges filed
by Ritchey and that later discussions of settlement occurred between Francis for the
General Counsel and the counsel for the Union and the Company.
In order to explain the nature of the practice of the Union and the Company, the
Trial Examiner deems it advisable to state the substance of Ritchey's testimony at
the hearing at this place in this Decision. Madeline Ritchey testified credibly that
she applied for employment at the Company's Modesto plant on approximately
April 18, 1963. She said that on that day she went to the personnel department and
was directed from that office to the nurse's office where she and other applicants for
employment received a physical examination. They were then referred back to the
peisonnel office and were given ceitain papers to sign. The lady clerk in charge of
this processing said there was a union in the plant. Ritchey said that the forms were
all completed and that she was merely told to sign her name. One of these forms may
be described as a two-pai t form which is (1) an application for membership in the
Union, and (2) "Employee's Voluntary Declaration"-a checkoff authorization. The
application for membership states the name, addiess, date of birth, and social security
number of the applicant and states that the applicant will be loyal to the Union, etc
On the application for membership there is a place for the insertion of the amount of
initiation fee and dues, and a place for the signature of the applicant.
The "Employee's Voluntary Declaration" of Ritchey reads as follows:
EMPLOYEE'S VOLUNTARY DECLARATION
Date 4-18-63
I voluntarily declare to Campbell Soup Co , its successors and assigns, my
intentions to belong to the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, Union Local No. 127, A. F. of L. Union, and direct the Com-
pany to deduct $25.00 and the regular monthly union dues for each month of
my employment therealter This amount is to be paid to the Union for my
convenience for the life of the agreement in effect at this date, or unless I cancel
this declaration within one year or prior to any anniversary date of said Union
Agreements.
Madeline E. Ritchey
EMPLOYEE
1025 Conejo
ADDRESS-STREET AND CITY
---------------------------------------
WITNESS
After signing up all the forms in the personnel department, Ritchey was told to
report for work at 7 o'clock the next morning, April 19, 1963.
On June 3, 1963, Ritchey was discharged for reasons unconnected with union activi-
ties. At that time she was instructed to go to the personnel office to pick up her checks.
Teresa Scates, a clerk, was in the personnel office. Ritchey asked her what she should
do about the money that she had paid into the Union since she was no longer
employed by the Company. Scates told her that she didn't know anything about the
money that Ritchey had paid but she gave Ritchey the address of the Union's office.
Ritchey went home and telephoned the Union. A man answered and she explained
the situation to him. She asked, "What about initiation fees and the Union dues?"
The man on the phone asked how long she had worked for the Company. Ritchey
told him. He then told Ritchey that as she had worked over 30 days none of the
money was returnable, so Ritchey hung up. After thinking it over, she phoned
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1657
again and was informed to the same effect by the same man. Counsel for the parties
stipulated that a dues book was issued by the Union to Ritchey and that the first
payment of dues of $4 was credited for the month of April.
The testimony of Teresa Scates, clerk in the personnel department, and of Helen
Love, stenographer in the same department, which is undisputed, establishes that the
hiring procedure of the Company was rather simple. Each new employee was
processed by the Company's personnel department. The processing included- (1) a
physical examination; (2) the completion of certain forms giving personal informa-
tion as to the applicant; (3) the signing of a W-4 form for the Internal Revenue
Service for the withholding of taxes; (4) signing a receipt for locker key, badge, and
uniform; and (5) presentation of a two-part form which was an application for
membership in the Union and an authorization to the Company to check off the
initiation fees and dues of the applicant. Both Scates and Love testified that in the
processing they would ask the applicants if they were members of the Union. If the
applicant replied in the affirmative the processor would then ask the applicant to fill
out only the "Employee's Voluntary Declaration." If the applicant replied in the
negative then the processor would tell the applicant that he or she had to become a
member of the Union, and that the initiation fee was $25 and the monthly dues $4,
and that the Company would deduct $14.50 from the employee's third and fourth
weekly paycheck to pay this sum to the Union.
Both of these witnesses testified that they had no instructions as to what to do if
an applicant refused to sign the application for membership and checkoff authoriza-
tion . They said any instructions on that subject were not needed, for in their experi-
ence of some years no applicant for employment had ever refused to sign the proffered
papers.
Two intra-company memorandums which were introduced into evidence by the
General Counsel established that the hiring practice here involved was initiated by
agreement of the representatives of the Company and the Union in the year 1956.
The above exposition of evidence is intended to afford an understanding of the
hiring practices of the Respondents and of Ritchey's charge in order that the reader
may understand the settlement negotiations which next occurred in point of time.
C. The settlement negotiations
As stated previously, on July 22, 1963, the Regional Director for Region 20 sent
form letters to each of the Respondents informing each of the filing of Ritchey's
charges. These letters stated that "The investigation of this case has been assigned to
Board Agent Dean Francis, who will communicate with you promptly." This letter
also stated, "Your cooperation in the investigation of this matter is requested. I will
appreciate receiving from you promptly a full and complete written account of the
facts and a statement of your position in respect to the allegations set forth in the
charge. Very truly yours," etc.
It is obvious that between July 22 and August 23, Francis investigated the merits
of the charges, for on August 23, Field Examiner Dean Francis addressed the follow-
ing letter to Charles P. Scully, Esq, counsel for the Union.
Charles P. Scully, Esq.
Suite 1108-1120 David Hewes Bldg.
995 Market Street
San Francisco 3, California
Re. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local
127 Case No. 20-CB-1116 (Campbell Soup Company 20-CA-2780)
Dear Sir: In accordance with telephone conversations this date with the
parties, I am enclosing copies of the proposed Settlement Agreement and Notice
for your perusal and signature. I want to note that the proposed Settlement
Agreement is based upon my opinion and is being recommended by me subject
to the approval of the Regional Director.
The Charging Party, Mrs. Ritchey, worked more than 30 days (4-18 to
6-3-63) and therefore, in accordance with Cadillac Wire Corp., et al. 128 NLRB
1002, where there is a lawful union-security clause, would not be entitled to a
refund of her initiation fee, but is entitled to a refund of the amount of her first
month's dues-$4.00-which was deducted on 5-5-63.
789-730-66-vol. 152-106
1658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Although there is some evidence indicating that there may be other employees
or former employees who- might be entitled to participate in the remedy called
for in this case, please note that the Settlement Agreement , as proposed, when
agreed to contemplates extension of the remedy only to the Charging Party.
Please sign and date the original and one copy and mail them to this office by
Tuesday, September 3, 1963. A self-addressed, postage paid, envelope is
enclosed for your convenience. Absent a Settlement Agreement in this case, I
will recommend on 9-4-63 that a complaint issue.
Thank you for your cooperation . If you have any questions concerning this
matter, please contact me immediately.
Very truly yours,
Dean H. Francis,
Encl. Field Examiner.
DHF/ds
[Emphasis supplied.]
Enclosed with this letter was the settlement agreement and the notice mentioned. For
the sake of clarity herein, a reproduction of the Union's settlement agreement is
attached hereto as Appendix A; a reproduction of the accompanying notice is attached
hereto as Appendix B. Similarly, a reproduction of the Company's settlement agree-
ment is attached hereto as Appendix C and the accompanying notice is attached
hereto as Appendix D. In connection with these documents, certain features should
be noted. (1) In the settlement agreement which is on a printed form the following
sentence has been inserted by typewriter, "By entering into the Settlement Agreement
the Undersigned Union does not admit any violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act." (2) In the notice, the following paragraph appears: "We will jointly
and severally with the above named Company reimburse the employees of Campbell
Soup Company for monies illegally exacted from them." (3) The notice contains an
obvious typographical error for it refers to a 3-day grace period instead of a 30-day
grace period.
These features, and one other, obviously caught the eye of Scully, counsel for the
Union, for on August 26, 1963, he wrote the following letter to Francis
Mr Dean H. Francis
Field Examiner
National Labor Relations Board
830 Market Street
San Francisco 2, California
Re: Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
Local 127 Case No. 20-CB-1116 (Campbell Soup Company 20-CA-2780)
Dear Mr. Francis: This will acknowledge your letter of August 23, 1963 and
the enclosed Settlement Agreement with respect to the above matter.
In your letter you indicate the possibility of other employees being involved,
but do not disclose their identity by name. As far as I am concerned, however,
I believe this is immaterial because it is my understanding that upon the execu-
tion of this Settlement Agreement , there will be no claimed violation with respect
to any employees employed up to the time of the execution of the settlement.
If I am in error in this respect , I would appreciate being advised since, as you
know, it is our position that the Union in no way caused or required the form
to be signed by the employees and the form was presented to them by the
employer but not as the agent of the Union.
I have forwarded the documents to my clients for their consideration and if
satisfactory , I assume they will sign and return them to me in the immediate
future, at which time I will then forward them to you.
I do, however, have some concern with the third paragraph of the notice
which would indicate an admission of illegal conduct in contradiction of the
disclaimer in the Settlement Agreement itself. It would be my suggestion that
you would consider the rewording of that, so as to remove any concept of
admitted illegality. In addition, it would appear that the reference to the 3-day
in the last line of the first paragraph may be a typographical error also.
Very truly yours,
CHARLES P. SCULLY
[Emphasis supplied ]
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1659
At this point Scully initiated steps to have R. Lautermilch , secretary of the Union,
sign the settlement agreement and the notice . Springer , counsel for the Company,
also initiated steps to have W. C. Patton , manager of the Modesto plant of the Com-
pany, sign its settlement agreement and notice.
On August 27, 1963, Francis , of the General Counsel's office , wrote to Scully and
the Company as follows:
Charles P Scully, Esq.
Suite 1108-1120 David Hewes Bldg.
995 Market Street
San Francisco 3, California
Re: Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local
127 Case No 20-CB-1116 (Campbell Soup Company 20-CA-2780)
Dear Sir: Enclosed you will find a copy of Form NLRB 4031 , Notice to all
Members. Please substitute this Notice for the one sent to you on August 23,
1963. You will note that the typographical error in the last line of the first para-
graph referring to a "3-day" grace period is corrected to read "30-day." Thank
you for your letter of August 26, 1963 noting the error.
In connection with the suggestion in your August 26, 1963 letter, concerning
the possibility of rewording the last paragraph of the Notice to remove the infer-
ence of illegality , I do not feel the Regional Director will object to dropping the
word "illegal ." You will note, therefore , that the paragraph has been reworded
and the offending word "illegal " deleted.
Your understanding , as expressed in your letter of August 26, that upon the
execution of this Settlement Agreement there will be no, claimed violation with
respect to any employees employed up to the time of the expiration of the settle-
nment is correct
Very truly yours,
(S) Dean H. Francis,
DEAN H. FRANCIS,
Field Examiner.
[Emphasis supplied.]
On August 28, 1963, Scully directed Lautermilch, secretary of the Union, to sign
and return the revised notice to him, and to correct the first paragraph to read "30
days" instead of "3 days." By letter on the same date, Scully also notified Francis
that he was sending the settlement agreement and notice to Lautermilch for signature.
On August 30 Scully, having received the revised notice signed by Lautermilch,
forwarded it to Francis with the following letter.
Mr. Dean H. Francis
National Labor Relations Board
830 Market Street
San Francisco 8, California
Re: Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local
127 Case No. 20-CB-1116 (Campbell Soup Company 20-CA-2780)
Dear Mr. Francis Enclosed you will find the executed copy of Notice in the
above matter, which is being transmitted in accordance with the understanding
contained in your letter of August 23, 1963.
You will note that we have made the corrections in the first paragraph and
assume this is satisfactory.
If there is anything further to be done, please advise.
Very truly yours,
Charles P. Scully.
cc- Messrs Lautermilch, SF & Stockton Osslo
[Emphasis supplied.]
A reproduction of the revised notice is attached hereto as Appendix E.
Also on August 30, 1963, Scully directed Lautermilch to arrange with the Com-
pany to reimburse Ritchey for her dues for April 1963 by paying her the sum of $4.
He also sent a carbon copy of this letter to Francis at the Board's Regional Office.
It is undisputed that by a check dated September 6, 1963, the Company reimbursed
Ritchey. She cashed the check on September 16, 1963.
1660 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Meanwhile the Company, by W. C. Patton , manager of the Modesto plant, executed
its copies of the revised notice and settlement agreement and forwarded them to the
Regional Office . These documents are reproduced and attached hereto as Appendixes
C and D
The "received" time stamp of the Regional Office on the original of these docu-
ments is as follows.
The settlement agreement of the Union-August 29 , 1963, 8:59 a.m.
The revised notice of the Union-September 3, 1963, 9.04 a m.
The settlement agreement of the Company-September 3, 1963, 9:07 a.m.
The revised notice of the Company-September 4, 1963, 12.17 p in
It is apparent that at this point the negotiations of counsel for the Respondents and
Francis came to an end, but only temporarily . The record does not disclose any ver-
bal exchanges in ensuing weeks but on September 20, 1963, Francis wrote the follow-
ing letter to the addressees:
Mrs Madeline Ritchey
1025 Conejo
Modesto, California
Campbell Soup Company
375 Memorial Avenue
Camden , New Jersey
Attn .- D. H. Springer
Charles P. Scully, Esq.
Suite 1108-1120
David Hewes Building
995 Market
San Francisco 3, California
Attn: Victor Van Bourg, Esq.
Re: Campbell Soup Company Case No. 20-CA-2780 Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America , Local 127 Case No. 20-
CB-1116
Dear Madame and Gentlemen : Additional matters relating to the above cases
have been brought to our attention . The settlement proposal previously sub-
mitted is withdrawn and further investigation will be made.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please call or write.
Very truly yours,
Dean H . Francis,
Field Examiner.
On October 1, 1963, Scully replied as follows:
National Labor Relations Board
Twentieth Region
830 Market Street
San Francisco , California
Attention : Mr. Dean H. Francis , Field Examiner
Re: Campbell Soup Company-No . 20-CA-2780-and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America , Local 127-No. 20-
CB-1116
Dear Mr. Francis : This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated Septem-
ber 26, 1963, enclosing a revised settlement agreement and notice.
As we have previously indicated to you in rather certain terms, we will not
recommend such a settlement to our clients , and believe that any settlement
should run only towards the charging party and towards no other person, par-
ticularly since we are dealing with the question of a subjective state of mind on
the issue of voluntariness
Accordingly , unless we can have a reconsideration of the original settlement
agreement already agreed to by our principals, we can see no choice but to pro-
ceed with litigation in this case.
Very truly yours,
CHARLES P . SCULLY
By Victor Van Bourg
One might expect that Scully 's letter would have precipitated the litigation referred
to, but one further act occurred before litigation-on November 1, 1963, Madeline
Ritchey presented for filing, and the Regional Office filed a document entitled "First
Amendment Charge Against Labor Organization ." This document, labeled "amend-
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1661
ment," is word for word, identical with the charge against labor organization, filed by
Ritchey on July 22, 1963, and in settlement of which she had been paid $4 on Septem-
ber 6, 1963. The final act in this unusual sequence occurred a few days later when,
on November 5, 1963, the Regional Director of the Board issued the instant complaint.
D. The refusal of the General Counsel at the Bearing to produce the
settlement agreements
At the hearing when counsel for the Union opened his case he requested the Gen-
eral Counsel to produce for the purpose of the hearing the settlement agreement
signed by Lautermilch, secretary of the Union, on August 27, 1963, and transmitted
to Francis, of the Board, on August 29, 1963.
A copy of this document, which later was produced by the General Counsel, is
Appendix A attached hereto.
Counsel for the Company for a similar purpose made a similar request for the
settlement agreement executed by W. C. Patton on behalf of the Company on Au-
gust 30, 1963, and transmitted to the General Counsel thereafter. This document
which was also produced subsequently is attached hereto as Appendix C.
However, at the hearing, the General Counsel took the position that Section 102 118
of the Board's Rules and Regulations forbade his production of the settlement agree-
ment at the hearing without the written consent of the General Counsel. Section
102.118 reads as follows:
Sec 102 118 Same, Board employees piolnbited from producing files, records,
etc , pursuant to subpoena ad testificandtun or subpoena duces tecuni; prohibited
from testifying in regard thereto.-No regional director, field examiner, trial
examiner, attorney, specially designated agent, general counsel, member of the
Board, or other officer or employee of the Board shall produce or present any
files, docunientr, reports, memoranda, or records of the Board or testify in
behalf of any party to any cause pending in any court or before the
Board, or any other board, commission, or other administrative agency of the
United States, or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia with i espect
to and, information, facts, or other matter coming to his knowledge in his official
capacity or with respect to the contents of any files, documents, reports, memo-
randa, or records of the Board, whether in answer to a subpena, subpoena duces
tecuni, or otherwise, without the ia'iitteii consent of the Board or the chairman
of the Board if the official or document is subject to the supervision or control
of the Board; of the general counsel if the official of document is subject to the
supervision or control of the general counsel Whenever any subpoena ad tes-
tifioandum or subpoena daces tecuni, the purpose of which is to adduce testimony
or require the production of records as described hereinabove, shall have been
served on any such persons or other officer or employee of the Board, he will,
unless otherwise expressly directed by the Board or the chairman of the Board
or the general counsel, as the case may be, move pursuant to the applicable pro-
cedure, whether by petition to revoke, motion to quash, or otherwise, to have
such subpena invalidated on the ground that the evidence sought is privileged
against disclosure by this rule: Provided, That after a witness called by the gen-
eral counsel has testified in a hearing upon a complaint under section 10(c) of
the act, the respondent may move for the production of any statement of such
witness in possession of the general counsel, if such statement has been reduced
to writing and signed or otherwise approved or adopted by the witness Such
motion shall be' granted by the trial examiner. If the general counsel declines
to furnish the statement, the testimony of the witness shall be stricken- Provided
further, That after any witness has testified in any postelection hearing pursuant
to section 102 69(d), any party may move for the production of any statement
of such witness in possession of any agent of the Board, if such statement has
been reduced to writing and signed or otherwise approved by the witness. Such
motion shall be granted by the hearing officer. [Emphasis supplied.]
The Trial Examiner then stated that in his judgment Section 102 118 had no
relevancy to the production by the General Counsel of the specific settlement agree-
ments at the hearing. He pointed out that. (1) production of these settlement agree-
ments was not a disclosure of a confidential nature; (2) the settlement agreements
executed by the Union and the Company were the property of the Union and the
Company, whether the General Counsel had approved the settlement agreements or
not; and (3) the settlement agreements had come into the hands of the General Coun-
sel in the course of settlement negotiations with the counsel for the Union and the
1662 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company, and that anything less than a forthright production of the documents at the
hearing upon request, would not be in keeping with the canons of ethics observed by
reputable lawyers 2
The General Counsel then stated that he did not disagree with the last stated
remarks of the Trial Examiner but that he interpreted Section 102.118 as being "all-
inclusive" and not restricted to documents of a confidential nature; and that the rule
referred to all documents "in the General Counsel 's files." He stated further that
the rules of internal operating procedure of the General Counsel's office also reen-
forced his interpretation.
The Trial Examiner then asked the General Counsel , if he intended to ask the
General Counsel , Washington , D.C., for his written consent to produce the settlement
agreements . The General Counsel replied in the negative , saying that such a request
had to be made by counsel for Respondents . The Trial Examiner stated that he
disagreed with the General Counsel again, that he saw no legal basis for burdening
counsel for the Union or the Company with that chore in order to bring to the hear-
ing documents of this nature which reached the General Counsel's files in the course
of settlement negotiations . The Trial Examiner then directed the General Counsel
to take the steps necessary to produce the documents and to consult with the office
of the General Counsel , Washington , D.C. To give the General Counsel sufficient
time to do this , the hearing was then adjourned indefinitely on December 4, 1963.
Thereafter the General Counsel's representative consulted with the General Coun-
sel's office , Washington , D C., which evidently agreed wholeheartedly with his posi-
tion. While the General Counsel at the hearing had conducted himself with correct-
ness, his next action had a different tenor. On December 14, 1963, the Trial Exam-
iner received the following bumptious letter from the General Counsel:
Mr. David F. Doyle, Trial Examiner
Division of Trial Examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board
Humboldt Bank Building, Room 1201
785 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94103
December 13, 1963
Re: Campbell Soup Company and Madeline Ritchey, an Individual , Case No.
20-CA-2780
Butchers Union Local No. 127, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO and Madeline Ritchey, an Indi-
vidual, Case No. 20-CB-1116
Dear Sir: After your recess of the hearing in the above -entitled matter, we
communicated with the Office of the General Counsel concerning the production
of a document from the Agency files.
It is our position that the Board's Rules and Regulations have been promul-
gated to assist in the efficacious administration of the National Labor Relations
Act. In meeting our obligations to the public and in fulfilling our functions
under the Act, it is essential that our processes be conducted in an orderly and
consistent manner. In short, it is the position of the General Counsel that the
Board's Rules have been promulgated with the intent that they be followed.
Accordingly, in the instant matter, as in others of like nature , when a party
requests that General Counsel 's representative produce a document from the
2 This statement of the Trial Examiner is garbled in the transcript . In fact the tran-
script is deficient in many respects, but the office of the contract reporter should not be
blamed for these deficiencies, because the Regional Office forgot to notify the official
reporter that a hearing was scheduled for Modesto , California When the official reporter
was notified by phone at San Francisco at approximately 10 30 a in on December 3, 1963,
of this oversight , the official reporter hired the first reporter available and put him on
the bus for Modesto Upon request of the General Counsel and without objection by
counsel for the Union or the Company, the Trial Examiner granted a continuance until
2 p m., same date , to await the arrival of the reporter This footnote should not be
construed as criticism of the General Counsel for the transcript will disclose that the
Trial Examiner stated at the hearing that this type misadventure was the first to occur
in his long experience However, the transcript in many places requires explanation, but
one familiar with labor relations terms can discern, usually, what was said in
the rather garbled transcript ; e g , "canons of ethics" In the transcript comes out
"cannons of evidence."
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1663
Agency's files, the requesting party must follow the procedure indicated in Rule
102.118 of the Board's Rules. Thus, the requesting party is to direct a request
to the General Counsel seeking his written consent permitting us to make avail-
able the document sought.
It is respectfully noted that the procedure which the Trial Examiner sought
to pursue in this matter, of directing the General Counsel's representative to
produce a document from the Agency's files and make it available to requesting
Union, was not in conformity with the Board's Rules. If, however, the Respond-
ent Union submits a request to the General Counsel pursuant to Rule 102 118
for production of the document from the agency files, the General Counsel will
give the matter his prompt attention. In these circumstances the Trial Exam-
iner is requested either to issue an order reconvening the hearing in this matter,
or to utilize some other means within his discretion so that the Respondent
Union will be given the opportunity to make a request to the General Counsel
in compliance with Rule 102.118.
The Trial Examiner is asked to advise the undersigned as to his intentions in
this matter so that an appropriate course of action can be planned. It is our
desire to complete the hearing in this matter as soon as possible. If the Trial
Examiner does not reopen the hearing or take other action permitting resolution
of the production problem, Counsel for the General Counsel will be constrained
to file with the Board a request for special permission to appeal from the Trial
Examiner's ruling in adjourning the hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
(S) Harvey Letter,
HARVEY LETTER,
Counsel for the General Counsel.
(S) Kenneth Hecht,
KENNETH HECHT,
Counsel for the General Counsel.
cc: Campbell Soup Company
Attn: Mr. Douglas H. Springer,
Assistant Counsel
375 Memorial Avenue
Camden, New Jersey
Charles P. Scully,
Attn: Victor Van Bourg, Esq.
995 Market Street
San Francisco, California
The Trial Examiner, upon a consideration of the contents of the letter, the demands
upon the time of all counsel and litigants, and the Board's caseload, decided that
engagement in a procedural dispute with the General Counsel at that point would
be profitless. He suggested to counsel for the Respondents that they write the
General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for the consent outlined in his letter. They
complied with the Trial Examiner's suggestion and Arnold Ordman, the General
Counsel, on December 24, 1963, wrote the following letter:
Charles P. Scully
Suite 1108-1120, David Hewes Building
995 Market Street
San Francisco 3, California
Attention Victor Van Bourg, Esq.
Re: Campbell Soup Company (Butchers Union Local No. 127) Cases Nos.
20-CA-2780 and 20-CB-1116
Dear Mr. Scully This is in response to your letter of December 18, 1963,
requesting the production of a settlement agreement signed by Butchers Union
Local No. 127, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO. Your request, made pursuant to Section 102.118 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, has been duly considered and is hereby granted.
Very truly yours,
Arnold Ordman,
General Counsel.
Pursuant to telegraphic notice sent by the Trial Examiner, the hearing convened
at San Francisco on January 7, 1964, and at that time the General Counsel produced
the documents requested.
1664 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. Other evidence adduced at the herring
Russell A. White testified without contradiction that he started to work for the
Company on April 15, 1963. Before he was hired he had a talk with Kelly, manager
of personnel, who informed him that he did not have to join the Union until after
the expiration of the 30-day period. At the time he signed up his paper for employ-
ment, White asked the personnel clerk if he could pay his dues directly to the Union
or whether it would have to be done by way of signing the authorization. The clerk
told him it was customary to sign the authorization. The personnel clerk told him
that $14.50 would be taken out of his third and fourth paychecks. White said that
$16.50 was deducted from his third paycheck and $16 50 from his fourth paycheck.
White went to the office of the Company and asked the personnel clerk why $16.50
had been deducted from his check instead of $14.50. She said that he had to pay
dues for the month of April. Apparently White's complaint was transmitted to Kelly,
who arranged for White to meet Weborg, business agent of the Union, at Kelly's
office. Weborg said that he had learned that White had a complaint about the money
being deducted from his check. White told him he had read over the contract and
had 30 days in which to join the Union and that $33 had been deducted from his pay.
White said he was not getting 30 days. Weborg said that when a man started on or
before the 15th of the month he had to pay that month's dues. White insisted that
he should not be charged for the dues for the first month and that he wanted his
$4 back. At that point Weborg reached in his pocket and presented White with a
check which was already typed out to his name and for the amount of $4
Billie Sue Young testified that she began work on April 1, 1963, and that she was
fired on May 3, 1963. She signed the usual forms and the initiation and checkoff
authorization On her third payday, $14 50 was deducted. When she was fired there
was no deduction from her fourth pay. Later in May she went to the union hall and
told the man in charge that she wanted a refund of $14.50. He inquired why she was
fired and she explained the reason for her discharge. Later the Union sent her a
check for $14.50.
Martha J. Duarte testified that she began work on April 16, 1963, and was
employed until June 14, 1963 She signed all forms when they were presented to
her in the hiring procedure and from her third and fourth pay $16.50 was deducted.
Helen Brink testified that she began work on April 18, 1963. She did not remem-
ber who talked to her in the processing. She signed the papers handed to her and
$14.50 was taken out of her third and fourth paychecks. These amounts were labeled
union dues.
Salah Alami started work on March 8, 1963, and was still working at the time of
the hearing. He testified that in the processing the girls handed him some forms and
his understanding was that he had to join the Butchers Union. He agreed and signed
the forms presented to him. Alami testified that $29 was deducted from his pay but
he did not remember when the deductions were made.
Michael Runnels, Annette M. Lee, and Julio Strazi testified that they signed the
forms which were presented to them.
In addition to the testimony of the above-named employees, the General Counsel
placed in evidence a compilation of the facts of employment for each employee as
gathered from the records of the Company. This compilation has 11 columns
across the page. The first column is "badge number"; second-"employee's name";
third-"had previous Butchers Union affiliation?"; fourth-"hiring date"; fifth-"ter-
minated within 30 days and last date worked"; sixth-"terminated after 30 days and
last date worked"; and seventh-"still employed with Company." The eighth col-
umn shows the date of the end of the first weekly pay period in which a union deduc-
tion was made from the employee's paycheck. The ninth column shows the amount
of the deduction. The 10th and 11th columns repeated this information in respect
to the second union deduction.
In his brief the General Counsel gives an illustration of the use of this compilation.
Martha Duarte, one of General Counsel's witnesses, is listed on page 3. By referring
to columns 4 and 8 to 11, it is shown that within less than 30 days following the date
of her hire, union deductions in the amount of $33 had been taken from her pay.
The General Counsel concludes that inasmuch as the initiation fee was $25 and dues
were $4 per month, it is apparent that by May 12, 1963, dues were deducted from
Duarte's pay for both April and May. His brief also illustrates a further use of the
compilation By comparing columns 4, 8, and 10, it is demonstrated that union
deductions were always made from the paychecks of the third and fourth weeks. By
comparing columns 4, 9, and 11, it is demonstrated that unless an employee worked
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1665
only one payweek in the month hired, he was charged, in the third and fourth pay-
checks, with the initiation fee and with dues for the first and sceond month of his
employment.
This compilation, by chart, has the employment history and deduction history of
approximately 418 employees In his concluding remarks at the hearing the Trial
Examiner stated that he would like the General Counsel in his brief to explain in
general terms the use of the chart which he submitted and to conclude with the names
of the persons to whom he claimed reimbursement should be made and the claimed
amount of the refund. This was no idle question, for the Trial Examiner was not
clear at that point, or even now, as to the extent of the remedy desired by the Gen-
eral Counsel. It is still not clear whether the General Counsel herein seeks reim-
bursement of each employee's premature dues payment only, or whether in some
instances he also seeks a reimbursement of premature initiation fees.
In his brief the General Counsel stated his inability to supply the information
requested and explains it in the following, which is in a footnote in his brief.
At the hearing, the Trial Examiner requested that Counsel for the General Coun-
sel inform him as to the extent of the remuneration and as to the utilization of
General Counsel's Exhibit [No ] 2 in determining the scope of the remedial order
(Tr. 311-312). Exhibit [No.] 2 was intended to show the mechanics of the
unlawful practice herein and is not suited to the determination of the proper
scope of the remedial order. Unfortunately the tabulations in Exhibit [No.] 2
include only those employees hired since February 7, 1963, thus employees hired
at the beginning of the 10(b) period, January 23, 1963, to February 7, 1963, to
whom reimbursement is due, are omitted. It is respectfully suggested that the
Trial Examiner's duties may be satisfied by application of the more general
order to be found in Cadillac Wire Coip, supra, and that specification of the
names of employees to whom reimbursement is due, and the amounts owing,
can be accomplished best in the compliance stage of the proceedings.
Concluding Findings
The above recital of procedural as well as substantive problems is of greater length
than the usual exposition of this Trial Examiner, for one reason only-this proceed-
ing presents issues between litigants but also presents some procedural problems that
warrant careful examination by the Board.
This proceeding began with the charge of Madeline Ritchey that she was required
to pay dues for the first month of her employment because of a practice of the Com-
pany and the Union to require such payment. The union-security provision contained
in the labor agreement between the Company and the Union is admittedly lawful.
What then was her complaint9 It was, that instead of giving her a full 30 days
before requiring her to join the Union, the Company and the Union required her to
join the Union at hiring and deducted dues for her first month of employment
Obviously, Ritchey had a charge of some merit-she should not have been charged
dues for the first month of her employment, and she was entitled to a refund of the
$4 charged her prematurely.
From that point, this premature deduction of $4 from one employee escalates into
a cause celebre before the Board, requiring the scrutiny of the employment facts of
some 418 employees and involving uncomputed and unknown sums of money.
The remarkable features of this escalation are two: first, of all 418 employees,
the only one to file a charge was Madeline Ritchey; and second, all counsel, even
the General Counsel, agree that Ritchey was reimbursed to the extent of $4. How
then did this case, simple in origin, develop into a proceeding to which at this point
the General Counsel cannot assign even probable limits in terms of a remedial
order. This is an interesting question.
It is clear that at first blush the Regional Office, represented by Mr. Francis, con-
sidered this to be what it was, a routine case involving a lady who was overcharged
$4. He proposed that the case be settled, or in the terminology of contract law,
lie offered to settle the case on the following basis, which is the conventional form
of informal settlement: (1) to cease and desist from the unlawful practice, (2) to
post appropriate notices to employees and members, and (3) to reimburse the
Charging Party, Ritchey, for dues illegally exacted from her.
It is clear from all the evidence that Ritchey, in her charge, and Francis, in the
proposed settlement agreement, knew that other employees might have been deprived
of similar dues, but no one, except Ritchey, had enough interest in the matter either
1666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
then or to date, to file a charge. In that situation, Francis proposed settlement and
assured Scully, counsel for the Union, that "Although, there is some evidence indi-
cating that there may be other employees or former employees who might be entitled
to panticnpate in the remedy called for in this case, please note that the Settlement
Agreement, as proposed, when agreed to contemplates extension of the remedy only
to the Charging Party."
It is undisputed that the Union and the Company thereafter accepted and fully
performed all the conditions of Francis' offer. It should be noted that the following
facts are undisputed in this record-(1) The Respondents executed the settlement
agreements drawn and submitted to them by the Regional Office; (2) the Respond-
ents executed and returned to the Regional Office the notice to employees and the
notice to members drawn and submitted to them by the Regional Office (3) the
Union had gone so far as to post its copy of the notice to members; (4) with notice
of the Regional Office, the Company paid Ritchey $4 and received reimbursement of
half of this sum from the Union; and (5) to make sure the settlement agreement
was fully executed on the Respondents' part, on August 30, 1963, Scully wrote, "If
there is anything further to be done, please advise." There being no further word
from the Regional Office, on September 6, 1963, Ritchey was paid her $4.
It should also be noted that at the hearing the General Counsel by uncontra-
dicted testimony established that the Respondents stopped the unlawful practice
prior to August 12, 1963.
On those facts and the documents themselves, the Company and the Union claim
that in good faith they entered into and have performed the terms of a settlement
agreement which settled the charge of Madeline Ritchey, and that in consequence
the instant complaint is improperly issued because it is not based on an outstanding,
vital charge.
Thus, we reach the crux of the paramount issue in this proceeding. When is a
settlement , not a settlement? The General Counsel has a simple answer to that
question . He contends that no settlement agreement is effective, even in circum-
stances such as these, until the Regional Director has put his signature of approval
on the settlement agreement. As the basis for his contention the General Counsel
cites Section 101.7 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board. This section reads
as follows:
Sec. 101.7 Settlements.-Before any complaint is issued or other formal
action taken, the regional director affords an opportunity to all parties for the
submission and consideration of facts, argument, offers of settlement, or pro-
posals of adjustment, except where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the
public interest do not permit. Normally prehearing conferences are held, the
principal purpose of which is to discuss and explore such submissions and pro-
posals of adjustment. The regional office provides Board-prepared forms for
such settlement agreements , as well as printed notices for posting by the
respondent . These agreements, which are subject to the approval of the regional
director, provide for an appeal to the general counsel, as described in section
101.6, by a complainant who will not join in a settlement or adjustment deemed
adequate by the regional director. Proof of compliance is obtained by the
regional director before the case is closed . If the respondent fails to perform
his obligations under the informal agreement, the regional director may deter-
mine to institute formal proceedings. [Emphasis supplied.]
He also points out that in the letter of Francis to Scully, dated August 23, 1963,
the following sentence appears, "I want to note that the prepared Settlement Agree-
ment is based upon my opinion and is being recommended by me subject to the
approval of the Regional Director."
On the other hand the Respondents argue that after this first reference to the
approval of the Regional Director, Francis' letters were couched in unconditional
terms. Furthermore, all notices transmitted for posting, and the posted notice, read
in large letters, "Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional
Director of the Twentieth Region," etc.
Upon a consideration of all the evidence I find that on September 4, 1963, the
General Counsel and the parties entered into two settlement agreements , which are
in evidence in this proceeding, of which all the terms have been performed by the
Respondents to the extent permitted by the General Counsel. Apparently, the
General Counsel did not return a completed notice to employees to the Company
for posting, so that term only of the settlement agreements has not been fully
performed.
In reaching the conclusion above, I reject the narrow interpretation placed on
Section 101.7 of the Board's Rules and Regulations by the General Counsel. I
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1667
cannot believe that approval of the Regional Director means that until the Regional
Director actually places his signature on a settlement agreement, none exists. I
think this approval can be given in any number of ways. Certainly the Regional
Director is in touch with his staff on a daily basis and knows what negotiations are
occurring and how negotiations are proceeding. Here, counsel for the Respondents
dealt with Francis in all good faith, signed the agreements, and performed their
part of the settlement agreements. From the initiation of negotiations, on or about
July 22, 1-963, until the letters of Francis "withdrawing the proposed settlement" on
September 20, 1963, the Regional Director authorized Francis to iepresent himself
and the Regional Office in negotiations with the Respondents. From this long
period of quiescence, counsel for Respondents formed the belief that the Regional
Director approved of what Francis was doing, and had done.
Not until the Respondents had performed all conditions within their power in
compliance with the settlement agreements, some 17 to 18 days after the execution
of the settlement agreements, was there any indication that the statement on the
notice, "which has been approved by the Regional Director," etc., was false. In my
judgment, this long silence of the Regional Director, during, at the time of, and after
the execution of the settlement agreements, constitutes approval of the Regional
Director.
I reject the General Counsel's contention that settlement agreements made between
duly authorized attorneys and field examiners and prospective respondents do not
become effective or binding until manually signed by the Regional Director. Such a
construction surrounds all settlement negotiations conducted by the Regional Office
with an air of uncertainty, and withdraws from settlement agreements, the finality
which makes them desirable. If it is bruited among the members of the labor bar,
that the Regional Director has a period of weeks, in which to approve or repudiate
final settlement agreements negotiated by his subordinates, it will not be long before
members of the bar will negotiate only with the Regional Directors and the General
Counsel and the Board will have only cases for litigation.
Also, the further litigation of this case seems pointless. Here, one aggrieved
employee has been reimbursed, the Respondents have ceased the illegal practice,
posted notices, etc. What is to be gained further to effectuate the purposes of the Act9
It seems patent to me that after the settlement agreements, further investigation of
the practices of Respondents was based on the General Counsel's own initiative,
without a vital, basic charge and the General Counsel has no power to so act The
Act provides that, "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engag-
ing in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent, ... shall have power
to issue and cause to be served on such person a complaint,..." For years the
Board and the courts have interpreted this section to mean that the General Counsel
has to have a charge filed with the Board by someone other than himself, before he
can undertake to investigate unfair labor practices.3
As bearing on this question, the first "amendment" to the charge filed by Ritchey
has no validity here. Besides being the identical charge, which was settled when it
was filed on November 1, 1963, alleging unfair labor practices which occurred on
April 17, 1963, it was defective on its face, as alleging an unfair labor practice out-
lawed by the 6-month statute of limitation expressed in Section 10(b) of the Act.
The only effectiveness of this so-called amendment is that it shows an awareness
on the part of Ritchey and someone in the Regional Office, that the first charge had
been settled and that a new charge had to be filed, if the General Counsel was to
proceed further.
In Sherry & Gordon Company, Inc, 107 NLRB 113, the Board had before it a
somewhat similar situation. In that case, the charges were filed in May 1952.
"Shortly thereafter the charging party requested that they be withdrawn. At that
time the Board's filed examiner informed the respondent union's counsel that the
Regional Director had approved the withdrawal of charges which, had it been so,
would have closed the case. In fact, the Regional Director's consent to the with-
drawal was never signified in writing. Nevertheless, acting upon the field examiner's
assurance, the respondent union paid the Charging Party a sum of money to cony
pensate him for his lost wages and granted him union membership, in consideration
of the withdrawal action. On March 18, 1953, this complaint issued " The Board
found that the complaint had to be dismissed, "because of the improper procedure
involved in its issuance." The Trial Examiner in that case found also that failure to
dismiss the complaint under the circumstances would "diminish public confidence in
the administration of the Act." 4
a N.L R B. v National Licorice Company. 104 F 2d 655 (C A 2), affil 309 US 850
'See also Mid-States Steel and Wire Company, 112 NLRB 800; New York Shipping
Association, et at., 112 NLRB 1047
1668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Trial Examiner also deems it appropriate to write a few words on the pro-
cedural question as to whether the General Counsel should have produced the settle-
ment agreements at the hearing at the request of counsel for the Respondents, or upon
the order of the Trial Examiner I believe the point is so fundamental, that it does
not require laboring here, that the settlement agreements executed by the Company
and the Union could not by any stretch of the imagination be classified or classed as
"any files, documents, reports, memoranda or records of the General Counsel,"
within the meaning of Section 102.118. 1 would not be too disturbed by the error
of the General Counsel's representative at the hearing, except that his letter of
December 13, 1963, besides being contemptuous in tenor, states that his position as to
the production of the documents is the considered position taken by the General
Counsel's Office, Washington, D.C. If that is true this presents a change of operating
procedure, because for many years, the General Counsel's representatives have uni-
formly produced at hearings, upon request, documents and correspondence trans-
mitted to the Regional Offices in the ordinary course of business, and which were not
"confidential" in nature or "work products."
In my judgment, the position taken by the General Counsel, as to the production of
the settlement agreements, in his letter of December 13, 1963, is completely wrong,
and I respectfully urge the Board to set the General Counsel aright in this matter in
the course of its decision herein In the judgment of the Trial Examiner, this is an
important feature of this case, which is of interest to Trial Examiners, the General
Counsel's attorneys, and to members of the labor bar in general. To demonstrate this
practical importance, let me point out- (1) These were documents executed by the
Respondents and submitted to the Regional Office for the purpose of signature by the
Regional Director As far as we know, he did not sign them; (2) they were not
returned to counsel for Respondents when Francis purportedly, on behalf of the
Regional Office, repudiated the agreements, so there was no copy or secondary evi-
dence in the hands of Respondents' counsel; and (3) the documents were in the
hearing room in the file of the General Counsel's representative.
Ordinary courtroom ethics required that the General Counsel return to the counsel
for Respondents, upon demand, their own documents, which constituted one of their
principal defenses in this hearing. He refused to comply with their perfectly proper
request. The Trial Examiner then directed him to produce them and when he
expressed extreme caution that he was not permitted by the rules to comply, the
Trial Examiner suggested that he phone the General Counsel in Washington, D.C.,
and obtain his advice or consent. It was late in the afternoon in California at that
point, and the General Counsel explained that the offices in Washington, D.C , would
be closed. The Trial Examiner, who wished to finish the Board's business expedi-
tiously, was faced with the alternative of continuing the case to an indefinite date, of
effectively depriving the Respondents of their defense by requiring Respondents to
continue without their settlement agreements. The Trial Examiner refused to follow
the latter course, so he continued the hearing to an indefinite date. The hearing
resumed on January 7, 1964, after counsel for Respondents had made the written
request required by the General Counsel's erroneous interpretation of the Board's
Rules and Regulations This erroneous slavery to "housekeeping procedure" sacri-
ficed better than a month in time to all concerned, and increased the expenses of all
counsel by adding to their travel expenses.
It is worthy of note that after producing the settlement agreements, the General
Counsel then introduced some companion documents from "the files of the General
Counsel " Production of these documents caused no delay, for apparently the
General Counsel's representative has authority to disclose such documents in his file
as may help his cause.
The Trial Examiner respectfully asks the Board to rule upon this question in a
definitive manner for the guidance of the Trial Examiner, the General Counsel and
his subordinates, members of the bar, in general, and for those committees of the
American and State bar associations which have displayed an interest in establishing
workable and practical rules and procedures in administrative proceedings.3
5 The General Counsel's errors as to Section 102 11 have been corrected on several
occasions by the courts It must be said, however, that in the cases hereafter cited, there
appears to have been a modicum of meat in his position Here, I regard the Geneial
Counsel's position as being capricious and frivolous Of general interest as to the
"housekeeping" chores of the General Counsel, and collation of all the cases on the sub-
ject, see the following: (1) AT L R B v Capitol Fish Company, 294 F 2d 868 (C A 5) ;
(2) Francis Sperandeo, Acting Reg Dir v Mills Drivers and Dairy Employees Local
Union No 537 (Sealtest Foods, Div. of NOV Dairy Pioducts), 334 F 2d 381 (CA 10) ;
(3) Harvey Aluminum (Inc ), General Engineering, Inc. and Wallace A. Unimei, dlbla
Wallace Detective and Security Agency v N L R B , 335 F. 2d 749 (CA 9).
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1669
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is, and has been, at all times material to the issues in this proceed-
ing, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The evidence establishes that the charges of Madeline Ritchey were settled by
the General Counsel and counsel for the Union and counsel for the Company by
informal settlement agreements prior to the issuance of the complaint herein. There-
fore, the complaint must be dismissed because of the improper procedure involved
in its issuance.
4. It is also found that further proceedings in these companion cases would not
effectuate the purposes of the Act, and would diminish public confidence in the
administration of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint should be, and hereby is, dismissed.
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America Local No. 127, AFL-CIO 20-CB- 1116 (c-20-CA-2780)
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The undersigned labor organization (herein called the Union ) and the undersigned
charging party ( herein called the Charging Party ), in settlement of the above matter,
and subject to the approval of the Regional Director for the National Laboi Relations
Board ( herein called the Regional Director ), HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
POSTING OF NOTICE-Upon approval of this Agreement , the Union will post
immediately in conspicuous places in and about its offices , including all places where
notices to members are customarily posted, and maintain for a period of at least
sixty ( 60) consecutive days from the date of posting , copies of the Notice to All
Members attached hereto and made a part heieof . The Union will submit forthwith
signed copies of said Notice to the Regional Director who will forward them to the
employer whose employees are involved herein, for posting , the employer willing, in
conspicuous places in and about the employer's plant where they will be maintained
for a period of at least sixty ( 60) consecutive days from the date of posting.
COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE-The Union will comply with all the terms
and provisions of said Notice.
By entering into this Settlement Agreement the undersigned Union does not admit any
violation of the National Labor Relations Act.
REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT-In the event the Charging Party fails or
refuses to become a party to this Agreement , then, if the Regional Director in his
discretion believes it will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act,
he shall decline to issue a Complaint herein and this Agieement shall be between
the Union and the undersigned Regional Director . A review of such action may
be obtained pursuant to Section 102.19 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board if
a request for same is filed within ten (10 ) days thereof . This Agreement is con-
tingent upon the General Counsel sustaining the Regional Director 's action in the
event of a review.
PERFORMANCE-Performance by the Union with the terms and provisions of
this Agreement shall commence immediately after the Agreement is approved by the
Regional Director, or, in the event the Charging Party does not enter into this Agree-
ment, performance shall commence immediately upon receipt by the Union of advice
that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sustained the
Regional Director
NOTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE-The undersigned parties to this Agree-
ment will each notify the Regional Director in writing what steps the Union has taken
to comply herewith Such notification shall be made within five ( 5) days, and again
after sixty ( 60) days , from the date of the approval of this Agreement , or, in the
event the Charging Party does not enter into this Agreement , after the receipt of
1670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
advice that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sustained
the Regional Director. Contingent upon compliance with the terms and provisions
hereof, no further action shall be taken in the above case.
BUTCHERS UNION LOCAL 127
(Union) (Charging Party)
By: (S) R. Lautermilch Secty By:
Date: 8/27/63 Date:
Recommended: Approved:
(Date) ( Date)
By: By:
(Board Agent ) ( Regional Director)
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional Director of Region
20 in Case No. 20-CB-1116 National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectu-
ate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act we hereby notify our members
that
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Campbell Soup Company, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, to discriminate against newly hired employees
by requiring them to execute membership applications and/or dues checkoff
authorizations for us, or for any other labor organization, prior to the expiration
of the 3-day grace period provided for in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)
(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above named Company reimburse the
employees of Campbell Soup Company for moneys illegally exacted from them.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF
NORTH AMERICA, UNION LOCAL No. 127, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated 8/27/63 By (S) R. Lautermilch, Secty.
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material
If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provi-
sions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 830 Market
Street, San Francisco, California, Telephone No. YU 6-3500, Extension 3191.
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the matter of Campbell Soup Company Case No 20-CA-2780 and (20-CB-1116)
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The undersigned employer (herein called the Employer) and the undersigned
charging party (herein called the Charging Party), in settlement of the above matter,
and subject to the approval of the Regional Director for the National Labor Relations
Board (herein called the Regional Director), HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS
POSTING OF NOTICE-Upon approval of this Agreement, the Employer will
post immediately in conspicuous places in and about its plant, and maintain for a
period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, copies of the
Notice to All Employees attached hereto and made a part hereof.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 1671
COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE-The Employer will comply with all the terms
and provisions of said Notice.
By entering into this Settlement Agreement the undersigned Employer does
not admit any violation of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above named Union reimburse employ-
ees of Campbell Soup Company for any dues and/or initiation fees obtained in
contravention of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT-In the event the Charging Party fails or
refuses to become a party to this Agreement, then, if the Regional Director in his
discretion believes it will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act,
he shall decline to issue a Complaint herein and this Agreement shall be between the
Employer and the undersigned Regional Director. A review of such action may be
obtained pursuant to Section 102.19 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board if a
request for same is filed within ten (10) days thereof. This Agreement is contingent
upon the General Counsel sustaining the Regional Director's action in the event of
a review.
PERFORMANCE-Performance by the Employer with the terms and provisions
of this Agreement shall commence immediately after the Agreement is approved by
the Regional Director, or, in the event the Charging Party does not enter into this
Agreement, performance shall commence immediately upon receipt by the Employer
of advice that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sustained
the Regional Director.
NOTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE-The undersigned parties to this Agree-
ment will each notify the Regional Director in writing what steps the Employer has
taken to comply herewith. Such notification shall be made within five (5) days, and
again after sixty (60) days, from the date of the approval of this Agreement, or, in
the event the Charging Party does not enter into this Agreement, after the receipt of
advice that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sustained
the Regional Director. Contingent upon compliance with the terms and provisions
hereof, no further action shall be taken in the above case.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY
(Employer) (Charging Party)
By: (S) W. C. Patton By:
(Name and Title)
W. C PATTON, Plant Manager-Modesto
Date: August 30, 1963 Date
(Name and Title)
Recommended: Approved:
(Date) (Date)
(Board Agent) (Regional Director)
NATION sr. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional Director of Region 20
in Case No. 20-CA-2780 National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT require newly hired employees to execute membership applica-
tions and dues checkoff authorization forms for the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen of North America, Union Local No. 127, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, prior to the expiration of the 30-day grace period
provided for in Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL NOT check off union dues and/or initiation fees for employees pur-
suant to membership-dues-checkoff authorizations unlawfully obtained from
employees prior to the 30-day statutory period.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, as guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, and we will refrain from any and all such activities, except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
1672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Sec-
tion 8 (a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY,
Dated August 30, 1963 By (S) W. C. Patton,
W. C. PATTON, Plant Manager, Modesto
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 830 Mar-
ket Street, San Francisco, California, Telephone No. YU 6-3500, Extension 3191.
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional Director of Region
20 in Case No. 20-CB-1116 National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectu-
ate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act we hereby notify our members
that:
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Campbell Soup Company, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, to discriminate against newly hired employees by
requiring them to execute membership applications and/or dues checkoff author-
izations for us, or for any other labor organization, prior to the expiration of the
30-day grace period provided for in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above named Company reimburse
employees of Campbell Soup Company for any dues and/or initiation fees
obtained in contravention of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN
OF NORTH AMERICA, UNION LOCAL 127, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated 8/29/63 By (S) R. Lautermilch, Secty.
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 830 Market
Street, San Francisco, California, Telephone No. YU 6-3500, Extension 3191.
Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada,
AFL-CIO and Its Business Agent, Martin F. Joyce and The
Carvel Co.
Local 217, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of
the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the U.S. and Canada,
AFL-CIO and The Carvel Co. Cases Nos. 1-CC-425 and 1-CE-16.
June 16, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
This proceeding is brought under Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. On July 10 and August 26, 1964,
152 NLRB No. 166.