C2G Ltd. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 26, 2018

19-CA-163444 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 26, 2018)

JD(SF)–21–18
Fairbanks, Alaska
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
C2G LTD. CO.
and Cases 19–CA–163444
19–CA–169910
GENERAL TEAMSTERS Local 959,
STATE OF ALASKA,
AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS.
Elizabeth DeVleming
for the General Counsel.
Charles M. Poplstein, Esq.,
Timothy J. Sarsfield, Esq.,
Thompson Coburn LLP
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELEANOR LAWS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Fairbanks, Alaska,
on April 24, 2018. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, General Teamsters Local 959
(the Charging Party or Union) filed the charge in case 29–CA-163444 on November 4, 2015, and
filed the charge in case 19–CA–169910 on February 8, 2016. The General Counsel issued the
amended consolidated complaint before me on March 8, 2018.
The complaint alleges that C2G Ltd. Co. (the Respondent or C2G) violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when it bypassed the Union and
issued offer letters to bargaining-unit employees stating: (1) their employment was at will, (2)
they had no contract or guarantee of employment or employment terms, (3) the terms and
conditions of their employment would be set by C2G, and (4) C2G could alter or amend in its
sole discretion the terms and conditions of employment and its employment policies and
JD(SF)–21–18
2
procedures. The complaint alleges further violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) when the
Respondent’s owner took away employees’ first year of accrued vacation leave and later asserted
that all employees hired since October 1, 2012, were part-time employees and recalculated their
accrued vacation at the part-time seasonal rate. Finally, the complaint alleges the actions in
asserting the employees hired since October 1, 2012, were part time was taken in retaliation for 5
the Union filing a collective grievance, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Two arbitration hearings regarding matters related to the instant complaint were held
before Arbitrator Richard Ahearn on September 1 and 2, 2016, and before Arbitrator Marshall
Snider on November 9 and 10, 2016. The factual record before me was largely developed at the 10
arbitrations. Neither arbitrator, however, addressed the unfair labor practice issues in this
complaint. Any findings by the arbitrators pertinent to this decision are discussed in context
below.
I have considered the entire record and the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the 15
Respondent.
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a South Carolina corporation, provides air terminal and ground handling 20
services at Eielson Air Force Base in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Respondent admits, and I find, that
it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES25
A. Background and the Respondent’s Operations
C2G contracts with the United States Air Force to provide air terminal and ground
handling services at Eielson Air Force Base (Eielson or the base) in Fairbanks, Alaska. As the 30
Respondent describes it, “In essence, C2G operates the equivalent of an airport at the base.” (R
Br. 9.) 1 During the relevant time period, C2G had roughly 55 employees, with about 10 working
at the base in Fairbanks.2 C2G won the bid for the Air Force contract at Eielson in 2012, and
took over operations on October 1, 212. CAV International had the Eielson contact prior to C2G.
35
The employees at Eielson primarily work either as air cargo specialists, air terminal
operations controllers (ATOCs), or customer service agents. Air cargo specialists load, unload,
and inspect air cargo. ATOCs manage air traffic coming in and out of the base. Customer
service employees work as gate agents servicing passengers.
40

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “Jt. Exh.” for joint exhibit;
“GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and “R Br.” for the Respondents’ brief. Although I have
included several citations to the record to highlight particular testimony or exhibits, I emphasize that my
findings and conclusions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited, but rather are based on
my review and consideration of the entire record.
2 C2G has other contracts with the Federal Government but they are not relevant here.
JD(SF)–21–18
3
To work at Eielson, employees must obtain “secret” security clearance from the Federal
Government. Employees must also be available on a 24/7 basis during all times of the year due
to the sporadic nature of operations at the base. To accommodate this, C2G maintains a regular
staff for all positions.
5
At all relevant times, the Respondent’s owner has been Tom Copeland, and the
accounting manager has been Carol Huggins.3 David Emig was the station manager.4
B. The Union
10
Since October 1, 2012, the Respondent has recognized the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the following bargaining unit:
All full-time and part-time employees, including Leads, employed by Respondent under
Contract HTC711-12-C-R001, and any other successor work performed at Eielson Air 15
Force Base, Alaska, under the aforementioned contract.
The parties entered into a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) on October 4, effective
October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2016.5 During the relevant time period, Ken Johnson
was the union steward. Jeremy Holan, the Union’s Business Agent, handled the C2G CBA for 20
the Union.
The following provision of the CBA governs work hours:
Section 9.01 Workweek and Workday. Each full time regular employee's work week 25
will consist of no less than thirty-two (32) paid hours. A work period is defined as the
time an employee reports to work and terminates twenty-four (24) hours later, where
upon a new work period would begin. The Company will rotate personnel equally
through shifts and workweeks if there is a need for seven (7) days per week coverage.
30
a. During the exercise season the Company may hire part time seasonal
employees who will not be subject to the thirty-two (32) hour work week
requirement. The Company will not use this language In Article 9, Section 9.01(a)
to layoff any full time regular employees.
35
C. Vacation Accrual and Employment Status
Complaint paragraphs 7 and 10 allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act first by unilaterally rescinding vacation time employees had accrued during their
first year of employment on August 18, 2015, and then by asserting on September 21, 2015, that 40
employees hired since October 1, 2012, were part time and recalculating their accrued vacation

3 As Copeland testified at arbitration, “Carol Huggins who is our accounting manager. She's the only
accounting person we got so she took the title as manager.” (Jt. Exh. 2 at 349.)
4 Emig stopped working for C2G in the fall of 2015.
5 The CBA can be found at Jt. Exh. 3, within that exhibit at Jt. Exh. 1, among other places.
JD(SF)–21–18
4
leave. Complaint subparagraphs 7(c)-(e) and paragraph 9 further allege a violation of Section
8(a)(3) by virtue of the September conduct.
1. Facts
5
Vacation accrues at different rates for “bargaining unit employees on the active payroll of
the Company” and “part time seasonal employees”6 as set forth in the following CBA provisions:
Section 18.01 Vacation. Employees will earn vacation based on a bimonthly payroll
period with twenty-four (24) pay periods per year. Vacation selection will be based on 10
contract seniority. Employees will be allowed to make up to three (3) choices per year.
The vacation selection process will begin In November for the next calendar year. The
senior person will make his or her first choice and then the next senior person will make
his or her choice and It will continue until everyone has made their first choice for
vacation. This process will be used for all three (3) selections. The Company will identify 15
how many employees may be off at any one time, prior to the vacation selection process.
Any open time available, after the vacation selection process has been completed, may be
taken on a first come, first served basis.
Part time seasonal employees vacation will be paid out annually on their anniversary date 20
and will accrue pro-rata based on the following:
a. On date of hire, .038461 per hour.
b. Beginning with an employee's fifth (5th) year of employment, 0.057692.
c. Beginning with an employee's tenth (10th) year of employment 0.076923.
d. Beginning with an employee's fifteenth (15th) year of employment, 0.0961538.25
Section 18.02 Vacation Amounts for Employees. Vacation benefits for bargaining unit
employees on the active payroll of the Company are as follows:
a. Eighty hours (80) after one (1) year of employment, accrued at 3.33 hours per pay
period.30
b. One hundred twenty hours (120) beginning with an employee's fifth (5th) year of
employment, accrued at 5.00 hours per pay period.
c. One hundred sixty (160) hours beginning with an employee's tenth (10th) year of
employment, accrued at 6.67 hours per pay period.
d. Two hundred (200) hours beginning with an employee's fifteenth (15th) year of 35
employment, accrued at 8.33 hours per pay period.
On about September 28, 2012, prior to entering into the collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union, the Respondent had offered employment to the air cargo, ATOC, and customer
service employees who had been working for CAV International. The offer letters stated in 40
pertinent part:
All positions will be part time but do not preclude any or all employees from working 32-
40 hours per week, or in excess of 40 hours per week depending on contract workload.

6 The provision regarding holiday pay, Article 12, references these same two categories of employees.
JD(SF)–21–18
5
The Company will in its discretion attempt to normalize work schedules within the
constraints of a flexible and changing workload.
(Jt. Exh. 6.) The letter further stated, “Your signature on the enclosed Employee Handbook will
signify your acceptance of this job offer.” The former CAV International employees signed the 5
handbook and accepted the offers.7 Although the language stated the position was part time, the
employees were “grandfathered” into their former positions and their vacation continued to
accrue uninterrupted at the Section 18.02 rate.
As the Respondent hired new employees who had not worked for CAV International or 10
any previous employer at the base, these employees were given offer letters with substantially
the same language as the grandfathered employees, and they signed the employee handbook in
acceptance of these offers. From October 2012 through mid-July 2015, all of the bargaining-unit
employees were paid for at least 32 hours per week on a regular basis and accrued vacation at the
Section 18.02 rate starting the first year of their employment. The bargaining-unit employees 15
hired in 2014, Glenda Evans and Allen Matthews, were assured they would work at least 32
hours and 40 hours per week, respectively. When grandfathered employee Richard Tuiletufuga
received a new offer letter with this language upon transferring to a different position at C2G, the
site manager assured him nothing regarding his employment would change.
20
In mid-July 2015, Copeland discovered Huggins had been granting all bargaining-unit
employees leave accrual during their first years under Section 18.02. This came to light because
employee Michael Smith left his employment before serving a full year and he sought payout of
his accrued vacation. Copeland determined that allowing vacation to accrue under Section 18.02
in the first year was a mistake.8 The Respondent therefore took away vacation leave employees 25
had earned during their first year of employment without notice to or an opportunity to bargain
with the Union. On August 15, 2015, the Union filed a grievance seeking vacation pay for
Smith’s first year of pay, but this grievance was subsequently withdrawn.9 The Union filed a
collective grievance on behalf of the bargaining unit employees affected by this change on
August 24, 2105.10 30
Copeland looked into Smith’s file in response to the grievance filed on his behalf, saw
Smith’s offer letter was for part-time employment, and determined that his vacation should have
been calculated under Section 18.01, the rate for part-time seasonal employees. Realizing that
other employees’ offer letters had the same part-time language, Copeland determined they also 35
should have accrued vacation at the Section 18.01 rate.
On September 21, 2015, the same day the parties were scheduled for a Step-3 meeting
about the collective grievance, Copeland stated that most of the bargaining-unit employees who

7 Military regulations require the Respondent to issue a written offer letter that the employee must
sign.
8 I do not find the precise details of the mistake to be material, as detailed in my analysis. To be clear,
I am omitting the reasons not because I did not consider them, but because the applicable legal framework
renders them immaterial.
9 This grievance was settled after Smith was paid out for accrued vacation.
10 These employees are Chris Jones, Allen Matthews, Richard Tuiletufuga, Phillip Finney, and
Glenda Evans. This grievance resulted in the Ahearn arbitration.
JD(SF)–21–18
6
had not been grandfathered in were “part-time” employees, subject to the vacation accrual rate
negotiated for “part-time seasonal” employees in Section 18.01.11 Without notice to the Union
or an opportunity to bargain, the Respondent credited these employees with the vacation they
would have accrued their first year under Section 18.01, and recalculated the vacation they
accrued in later years at the Section 18.01 rate. 5
2. Analysis
a. Deferral to Arbitrator
10
The Respondent argues that I should defer to Arbitrator Ahearn’s interpretation of
Section 18.02, and find that the CBA clearly and unequivocally does not permit vacation accrual
for bargaining-unit employees until after one year of employment.
Under Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1955), the Board will defer, as a 15
matter of discretion, in cases where the arbitral proceedings appear to have been fair and regular,
all parties agreed to be bound, and the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the Act. In
Raytheon Co., 140 NLRB 883, 884-885 (1963), enf. denied 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964), the
Board added the requirement that the arbitrator must have considered the unfair labor practice
issue. Under Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984), this is satisfied if the contractual and statutory 20
issues are factually parallel and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice. The burden of proof is on the party opposing deferral to the
arbitration award. Airborne Freight Corp., 343 NLRB 580, 581 (2004).
Arbitrator Ahearn framed the pertinent issue before him as follows: 25
Whether the Employer violated the CBA by interpreting Section 18.02 to deny
employees vacation accrual during their first year of employment? If so, what is the
proper remedy?
30
(Jt. Exh. 4.) He decided that Section 18.02 of the CBA clearly and unambiguously states
employees will not accrue vacation in their first year of employment. Accordingly, he held that
C2G did not violate the CBA when it recalculated employees’ vacation accrual to exclude their
first year of employment.
35
Importantly, Arbitrator Ahearn did not consider unilateral change, and the NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736 (1962), paradigm that forms the foundation of this decision, as analyzed below.
Notably, Arbitrator Ahearn stated:
I further recognize that the CBA contains no provision imposing obligations under the 40
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under such circumstances, I am persuaded that
well-established principles of contract interpretation preclude my consideration of the

11 Copeland considered a couple of the previously-grandfathered employees, Finney and Tuiletufuga,
to no longer be grandfathered because they had since bid into different positions and signed offer letters
stating their employment was part time. Finney, for example, transferred into a different position in
August 2015, and his first paycheck for pay date September 4 reflected vacation accrual at the 18.01 rate.
JD(SF)–21–18
7
Employer’s obligations to bargain in good faith or to avoid making unilateral changes
under Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the NLRA.
. . .
In light of the foregoing I am persuaded that I lack the authority to consider the unilateral 5
changes issues as posed by the Union as their resolution requires application of the
“positive law” of the NLRA that is being addressed through the NLRB’s administrative
hearing process.
(Jt. Exh. 4.) Arbitrator Ahearn therefore did not consider any factual issues with regard 10
unilateral change and the duty to bargain with the Union.
In addition, Arbitrator Ahearn’s analysis did not positively factor in evidence of past
practice, instead applying the law applicable to arbitrators interpreting a contract i.e., when a
contractual phrase’s plain meaning is clear on its face, arbitrators will refuse to consider 15
evidence of a consistent past practice. However, this strict contract interpretation, rejecting all
other evidence, directly betrays an important body of well-settled law under the Act. “When
parties by their uniform conduct over a period of time have given a contract a particular
construction, such construction will be adopted by the courts.” Pekar v. Brewery Workers Local
181, 311 F.2d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 912 (1963); see also Merrill & 20
Ring, Inc., 262 NLRB 392 (1982), enforced, 731 F.2d 605 (9th Cir.1984).
The fact that a particular working condition or benefit is not expressly embodied in the
governing collective agreement is immaterial where satisfactorily established by practice or
custom. See Citizens Hotel Company d/b/a Hotel Texas, 138 NLRB 706, 712–713 (1962), enfd. 25
326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964); Frontier Homes Corporation, 153 NLRB 1070, 1072–1073
(1965); Central Illinois Public Service Company, 139 NLRB 1407, 1415 (1962), enfd. 324 F.2d
916 (7th Cir. 1963). An employer may establish a past practice by bestowing an extra benefit
not embodied in the contract. Central Illinois Public Service Company, supra. See also
Dearborn Country Club, 298 NRLB 915 (1990) (longstanding practice had become an 30
extracontractual condition of employment).
The law on past practice is fleshed out in more detail in the discussion of the merits of the
unilateral change allegations directly below. Based on this law, it is clear that by the eschewing
all evidence of past-practice, important protections and expectations of bargaining-unit 35
employees under the Act were not protected through the arbitration process alone.12
For the foregoing reasons, I find that contractual and statutory issues are not factually
parallel to the alleged unilateral change before me. In addition, because the arbitrator declined to
factor in evidence of clear and longstanding past practice, his interpretation of Section 8.02 is 40
“not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.” Olin, supra. at 574.

12 I am not saying the arbitrator erred by applying the law applicable to arbitrations and declining to
consider the Board’s law, as he clearly stated he was not passing on any unfair labor practice issues,
explicitly reserving them for the Board’s administrative process.
It is important to note that the Respondent did not agree to defer the unfair labor practice charges to
the parties’ grievance-arbitration procedure. This precluded the arbitrator from considering the issues in
this complaint.
JD(SF)–21–18
8
b. 8(a)(5) and (1) allegations
Under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the 5
Act. The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection . . .” Under Section 8(a)(5), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees.” It is the General Counsel’s 10
burden to prove a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by preponderant evidence.
Well-settled law provides that an employer may not change the terms and conditions of
employment of represented employees without providing their representative with prior notice
and an opportunity to bargain over such changes. See NLRB v. Katz, supra 747. Vacation accrual 15
is clearly encompassed as a mandatory bargaining subject.
Regular and longstanding practices that are neither random nor intermittent become terms
and conditions of employment. As such, these past practices cannot be changed without offering
the unit employees’ collective-bargaining representative notice and an opportunity to bargain, 20
absent clear and unequivocal waiver of this right. Sunoco, Inc., 349 NLRB 240, 244 (2007),
citing Granite City Steele Co., 167 NLRB 310, 315 (1967); Queen Mary Rest. Corp. v. NLRB,
560 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1977); Exxon Shipping Co., 291 NLRB 489, 493 (1988); DMI
Distribution of Delaware, 334 NLRB 409, 411 (2001). A past practice must occur with such
regularity and frequency that employees could reasonably expect the “practice” to continue or 25
reoccur on a regular and consistent basis. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 340 NLRB 349,
353-354 (2003); Eugene Iovine. Inc., 328 NLRB 294, 297 (1999).
Given that the accrual of vacation benefits occurred each pay period for nearly three
years, I find this practice occurred with such regularly and frequency that Respondent's 30
employees would have reasonably expected the “practice to continue or reoccur on a regular and
consistent basis” See Garden Grove Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 357 NLRB 653 (2011) (Nine months’
accrual of a reserve sick leave benefit due to a clerical error established past practice).13
The Respondent argues that the General Counsel did not meet her burden because she did 35
not prove that C2G was aware of the past practice, relying on Regency Heritage Nursing &
Rehab Ctr., 353 NLRB 1027, 1028 (2009), citing BSAF Wyandotte Corp., 278 NLRB 173, 180
(1986).14 The Respondent is correct that the Board in Regency Heritage, quoting BSAF

13 The General Counsel also cites to Prime Healthcare Services-Encino, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 128
(2016), but in that case, the individual who made the alleged error, Mary K. Schottmiller, was the
Respondent’s attorney admitted agent.
14 I find BASF Wyandotte distinguishable. In that case, the General Counsel alleged that the employer
modified the practice of allowing two employee union representatives to have unrestricted access to other
employees and supervisors for the purpose of handling grievances. In finding the General Counsel had
not established a past practice, the administrative law judge, whose opinion the Board adopted, found that
the testimony of the two employees was vague and unresponsive regarding the specifics of meeting with
any supervisors while on “union time.” In addition it was undisputed that the employer was never aware
JD(SF)–21–18
9
Wyandotte Corp stated, “’[i]t is implicit in establishing a past practice that the party which is
being asked to honor it’— here, the Respondent—‘be aware of its existence.’” Id. In Garden
Grove Hosp., however, the fact that the error was clerical, and not knowingly committed by a
manager, supervisor, or agent, did not take it outside the realm of past practice. The clerical
error in that case was discovered when two nonsupervisory employees in the accounting 5
department reviewed the employer’s balance sheets with the CFO who, upon discovery,
corrected the error. Even though the CFO promptly corrected the error once he knew about it, a
past practice was still established based on the length of time the error persisted.15
While Regency Heritage and Garden Grove Hosp., cases are somewhat at odds, they are 10
not irreconcilable. This is because Huggins’ actions in independently and permissibly exercising
control over payroll had the appearance of being C2G’s actions. When determining employer
liability for the acts of employees, “the crucial question is whether, under all the circumstances,
the employees could reasonably believe that [the nonsupervisor] was reflecting company policy,
and speaking and acting for management . . . ” Regal Shoe Shops, 249 NLRB 1210, 1215 (1980), 15
quoting Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., 213 NLRB 664 (1974). Though she is not alleged as an
agent or supervisor, Huggins clearly had the authority to manage payroll with little to no
oversight. As nobody other than Huggins effectively oversaw payroll, and she was the person
C2G left in charge of calculating and inputting employees’ vacation accrual, I find it reasonable
for employees to believe her actions were taken in line with management’s wishes.16 Indeed, an 20
August 27, 2015, letter from Station Manager Emig to Holan regarding the collective grievance
states:
As discussed in our meeting, submitting the employees’ timecards is my only direct
involvement regarding pay matters. The actual processing of pay and vacation matters are 25
processed by the company Accounting Manager, Carol Huggins.
(Jt. Exh. 3.) In short, the practice of calculating vacation accrual in the employees’ first year was
originally initiated by the employer’s action, without the Union’s involvement. The
discontinuance of this practice was likewise initiated by the employer’s decision, not the 30
Union’s.
Here, the fact that employees accrued vacation during the first year of employment under
18.02 unabated for nearly three years is telling. I find that in light of this longstanding practice,

of the employees’ activities while they were on “union time,” including any discussions with supervisors.
Id. at 180. The situation in BASF Wyandotte concerned union members and their employee union
representatives, and did not involve any seeming action by the employer of implementing, taking action
in accordance with, and/or perpetuating the union representatives’ actions of meeting with supervisors in
unrestricted fashion. Here, Huggins, with zero involvement from union members or union
representatives, did all of these things with regard to vacation accrual. The same rationale holds true for
Regency Heritage.
15 In its brief in support of its exceptions in Garden Grove Hosp., counsel for the Respondent argued,
to no avail, that no past practice was established because the Respondent was not aware the reserve sick
leave was accruing until discovered by the CFO. The brief is available on the Board’s website at
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-039031.
16 As the record makes clear, Huggins was the point of contact for employees with questions about
payroll. (Jt. Exhs. 2, 3, 6.)
JD(SF)–21–18
10
the Union’s interpretation is eminently reasonable. “Where past practice has established a
meaning for language that is used by the parties [in their agreement], the language will be
presumed to have the meaning given it by past practice.” Pan-Adobe, 222 NLRB 313, 325
(1976), quoting Pekar v. Local 181, Brewery Workers, supra.
5
The relevant provision of Section 18.02 states:
Vacation benefits for bargaining unit employees on the active payroll of the Company are
as follows:
a. Eighty hours (80) after one (1) year of employment, accrued at 3.33 hours per pay 10
period.
Do employees get to take two weeks of vacation, which has accrued at 3.33 hours per pay period,
after a year of employment? This seems easily plausible. After all, per the language of the
provision, “[v]acation benefits for bargaining unit employees are . . . Eighty hours (80) after one 15
(1) year of employment . . . ” followed by the method by which this benefit is accrued. In other
words, the employees receive 80 hours of accrued vacation benefits after one year at the
prescribed accrual rate.17 I find this construction is reasonable and it is the only construction
consistent with past practice.
20
Even if a reviewing authority finds I erred by not deferring to Arbitrator Ahearn’s
determination that the CBA clearly states that no vacation even accrues under Section 18.02 until
after a year, this does not change the outcome. Under the legal principles I am bound to apply,
the Respondent plainly provided an extra-contractual benefit in the form of an additional year of
accrued vacation for nearly three years, and thus established a past practice of so doing.1825
It is undisputed that most of the employees’ vacation accrual was recalculated again
under the Section 18.01 rate for part-time seasonal employees in or around September 2015, with
no notice to the Union or opportunity to bargain.19 This recalculation was based on the language
in the employees’ offer letters stating their employment was part time.30

17 Section 8.01, by contrast, states precisely when vacation starts accruing.
18 The General Counsel asserts that the Respondent violated the Act by changing its “new hires’”
employment status from full-time to part-time in September 2015. (GC Br. 31.) Arbitrator Snider,
however, determined that nothing precluded the Respondent from hiring part-time employees (as opposed
to part-time seasonal employees) even if they essentially worked full-time hours. I defer to this ruling
under the Spielberg/Olin standards articulated above, finding the General Counsel has not proved his
decision, as applied here, runs afoul of those standards. The General Counsel has not established past-
practice of formally labeling new employees, including the grandfathered employees who bid for and
transferred into new positions, as full-time, only a past practice of promising and giving the employees at
least 32 (or in some cases more) hours per week and granting them vacation accrual at the 18.02 rate
applicable to all bargaining-unit members from the start of their employment.
19 The Union filed a grievance on September 28, 2015, regarding whether employees could be
classified as part-time under the CBA. This resulted in the Snider arbitration.
With regard to whether the employees should accrue vacation under Section 18.01 or Section 18.02,
this requires little analysis. As Arbitrator Snider determined, Section 18.02 by its terms applies to
bargaining-unit employees regardless of full-time or part-time status. This is consistent with C2G’s
practice until September 21, 2015. Neither arbitrator made findings inconsistent with this, so the issue of
deferral does not arise with regard to the September 21, 2015 unilateral change.
JD(SF)–21–18
11
The Respondent asserts that the changes to the employees’ vacation accrual were not
material. The duty to bargain only arises if the changes are “material, substantial and
significant.” Alamo Cement Co., 281 NLRB 737, 738 (1986); Flambeau Airmold Corp., 334
NLRB 165, 171 (2001). The General Counsel bears the burden of establishing this. North Star 5
Steel Co., 347 NLRB 1364, 1367 (2006).20 The Board has held that the manner in which leave
accrues is a term and condition of employment that may not be unilaterally changed. See Rosdev
Hospitality, Secaucus, 349 NLRB 202 (2007). I therefore find any argument by the Respondent
that such a change was not material, substantial, or significant lacks merit.
10
Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel has met her burden to prove the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally rescinding the first year of
employees’ vacation accrual, and then by recalculating employees’ vacation accrual at a different
rate.21
15
c. The 8(a)(3) allegation
The complaint further alleges, at sub-paragraphs 7(d) and (e), that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, asserting the September 2015 changes to the vacation
accrual rates for employees hired after October 2012, were taken in retaliation for the Union’s 20
class-action grievance.
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act states it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.” Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 25
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), governs mixed-motive cases where
discriminatory intent is alleged. To prove a violation under Wright Line, the General Counsel
must make an initial showing “sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a
‘motivating factor’ in the employer's decision.” 251 NLRB at 1089. The elements commonly
required to support this showing are union activity, employer knowledge of that activity, and 30
antiunion animus by the employer. Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 NLRB 935, 936 (2001). If
this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the employer “to demonstrate that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. The employer cannot
carry this burden merely by showing that it also had a legitimate reason for the action, but must
persuade, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the action would have taken place absent the 35
protected activity. Dentech Corp., 294 NLRB 924, 956 (1989).
It is undisputed that the Union filed a collective grievance and Copeland knew about it by
September 2015. Thus the only remaining element for the General Counsel’s initial showing is
proof of unlawful motivation based on antiunion animus. 40

20 I agree with the Respondent’s assertion that, particularly in light of Arbitrator Ahearn’s ruling,
labeling employees as part time (as opposed to part time seasonal) rather than full time, with no change at
all to the number of hours they worked, was not a material change.
21 The parties referenced various employees’ individual circumstances. I am deciding whether there
was a unilateral change. How any remedy will apply to different individual employees is a matter for
compliance if necessary.
JD(SF)–21–18
12
Unlawful employer motivation may be established by circumstantial evidence, including
among other things: (1) the timing of the employer’s adverse action in relationship to the
employee’s protected activity; (2) the presence of other unfair labor practices, (3) statements and
actions showing the employer’s general and specific animus; (4) the disparate treatment of the
discriminatees; (5) departure from past practice; and (6) evidence that an employer’s proffered 5
explanation for the adverse action is a pretext. See Golden Day Schools v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834,
838 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Rain-Ware, Inc., 732 F.2d 1349, 1354 (7th Cir. 1984) (timing);
Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 NLRB 251, 260 (2000), enfd. mem. 169 LRRM 2448 (4th Cir.
2001); Richardson Bros. South, 312 NLRB 534 (1993) (other unfair labor practices); NLRB v.
Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468, 1473–1474 (6th Cir. 1993); Affiliated Foods, Inc., 328 NLRB 1107 10
(1999)(statements); Naomi Knitting Plant, 328 NLRB 1279, 1283 (1999)(disparate treatment);
JAMCO, 294 NLRB 896, 905 (1989), affd. mem. 927 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502
U.S. 814 (1991) (departure from past practice); Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1089; Roadway
Express, 327 NLRB 25, 26 (1998) (disparate treatment).
15
I find the General Counsel has not met her burden to prove Copeland acted out of anti-
union motivation in retaliation for the class-action grievance. The General Counsel primarily
relies on timing, pointing out that Copeland’s announcement of this change came the same day
the parties were to have a Step 3 meeting on the class-action grievance. Specifically, the General
Counsel stated, “After all, after more than a month of clinging to its position that its new hires 20
were full-time employees subject to vacation accrual under § 18.02 of the CBA (just not within
their first years of employment), Respondent did an outright about-face after the collective
grievance was filed.” (R Br. 33.) It is abundantly clear, however, that both parties were
confused about how vacation accrual should be calculated under the CBA.
25
Moreover, the timing argument cuts both ways. Yes, Copeland changed his position
while the collective grievance was very active. But, he also changed his position on the heels of
a whirlwind of activity causing him to take a closer look at how employees were classified and
paid than he had done in the past. Specifically, as the Respondent notes, Copeland looked into
Smith’s file in response to his grievance, saw his offer letter was for part-time employment, and 30
determined (albeit erroneously in the end) that his vacation should have been calculated under
Section 18.01. This set in motion his discovery that other employees were in the same position.
The General Counsel also points to the fact that Copeland changed his position “despite
the extensive evidence in the record that its new hires had been treated as full-time employees 35
under the CBA for all intents and purposes throughout their entire tenure of employment to that
point.” Arbitrator Snider, however, determined:
[T]he collective bargaining agreement does not prohibit the Company from hiring part-
time employees who are not part-time seasonal employees. The fact that the Company 40
may schedule a part-time employee for 32 or more hours per week to meet its staffing
needs does not convert an employee hired as part-time to a full-time employee.
(Jt. Exh. 7.) I do not hold Copeland to the standard of knowing the Board’s law on past practice,
and I therefore do not find he acted with unlawful intent in this regard.22 While he erroneously 45

22 In response to a question about his familiarity with the Board processes and the Act, Copeland
JD(SF)–21–18
13
conflated “part-time” and “part-time seasonal” employees, I do not find this to be evidence of
discriminatory intent.23
The General Counsel also observes that Copeland’s revised determination negatively
impacted two grandfathered employees who had since re-bid to new positions and had therefore 5
signed new offer letters with the “part-time” language. The General Counsel argues,
“Respondent’s expansion of its first unilateral change to also impact two longtime bargaining
Unit members demonstrated its animus against Unit employees’ protected activities in protesting
the first change through their collective bargaining representative.” (R Br. 34.) I find this
argument unpersuasive. There is no evidence whatsoever, nor is there an allegation in the 10
complaint, that Copeland “targeted” any particular employees. The previously-grandfathered
employees were impacted in the same manner as the other bargaining-unit employees who had
not been grandfathered. Moreover, it is not clear that employees were disadvantaged by
Copeland’s actions. It is undisputed that employees classified as part time sometimes worked
more than 32 hours per week, which could result in accrual under Section 18.01 being greater 15
than accrual under Section 18.02. Also, at the time, Copeland was operating under his belief that
employees did not accrue vacation until after a year of employment under Section 18.02. As
such, classification of employees under Section 18.01 did not result in a windfall for the
Respondent.24
20
I agree with the Respondent that the General Counsel’s evidence of animus is
speculative. My impression is that Copeland was doing his best to sort out how his employees
should accrue vacation in light of their employment status per their offer letters and a collective-
bargaining agreement that proved less than clear.
25
I further credit Copeland’s testimony about his motivation. As he testified, “We're just
trying to give them what they -- what the collective bargaining agreement says they should have
gotten. We had a dispute as to what that language meant.” (Tr. 76.) Copeland also credibly
testified that Smith was one of the best employees he’d ever had, and he had tried to promote
him to management, and he did promote bargaining-unit employee Jones to manager. Finally, as 30
the Respondent notes, Copeland hired the former CAV employees, who had been represented by
the Union, and promptly worked to enter into a new 4-year CBA with the Union. There is no
evidence of any general animus toward unions, and other than timing which is addressed above,
there is no persuasive evidence of animus stemming from the collective grievance specifically.
35
As the General Counsel has not satisfied her initial Wright Line burden, I recommend
dismissal of the Section 8(a)(3) allegations.25

testified, “It's fair to say I am very unfamiliar.” (Tr. 86.)
23 As Copeland testified, “I honestly believe they were part-time seasonal. And I still believe that,
even though I was overruled by the arbitrator.” (Tr. 76.)
24 As settlement of the Smith grievance makes clear, the amounts under Section 18.01 and Section
18.02 in the end may be substantially similar. The Union claimed the Smith grievance settlement figure
was calculated at the § 18.02 rate, while Respondent claimed it was calculated at the § 18.01 rate. In
Smith’s case, “either approach resulted in the roughly same number of vacation hours.” (R Br. 10 at fn.
8.)
25 Because I have determined the General Counsel’s Wright Line burden has not been met, I find it
unnecessary to determine whether the Section 8(a)(3) allegations should be dismissed pursuant to Dubo
JD(SF)–21–18
14
D. Offer Letters
Complaint paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 allege the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act when Copeland issued offer letters to bargaining-unit employees stating: 5
 The employee’s employment is “at-will;”
 The employee has no “contract or other guarantee of employment or employment terms;”
 “[T]he terms and conditions of your employment will be set by C2G Ltd. Co.” and
 The Respondent can “alter or amend at its sole discretion their terms and conditions of 10
employment and its employment policies and procedures.”
1. Facts
Since April 2014, bargaining-unit employees have signed offer letters with the following 15
language:
While your employment will be at will, and neither this letter nor, the previous signed
Employee Guidelines are intended to create a contract or other guarantee of employment
or employment terms, this letter and the Employee Guidelines are intended to provide 20
you with a general overview of the initial terms and conditions of employment offered to
you.
. . .
Except where otherwise stated or required by law, the terms and conditions of your 25
employment will be set by C2G Ltd. Co. Thus, while C2G Ltd. Co will continue to
provide economic terms included in the CBA [sic]. Any initial terms and conditions of
employment not already mandated by law or addressed in this letter or the enclosed
Employee Guidelines will be in accordance with C2G Ltd. Co. standard policies,
procedures and/or practices. Of course, the Company reserves the right to the maximum 30
extent permitted by law to alter or amend in its sole discretion the terms and conditions of
employment and its employment policies and procedures.
(See, e.g. Jt. Exh. 3 at Union exhibits 5, 26, 31.)
35
As noted above, the letters also stated, “Your signature on the enclosed Employee
Handbook will signify your acceptance of this job offer.” The handbook, in turn, stated “In the
event employees are covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), those provisions
contained in the CBA take precedence over this employee handbook.”
40
The letter was the essentially the same as the one CAV had used when hiring its
employees. As Copeland testified, “We just took the letter and copied it almost verbatim.” (Tr.
65.)

Manufacturing Corp., 142 NLRB 431 (1963), as argued by the Respondent.
JD(SF)–21–18
15
The collective-bargaining agreement, at Section 10.01, provides in pertinent part, “The
Company shall not discharge nor suspend any employee without just cause.” Section 5.02 of the
CBA, entitled “Extra Contract Agreements” states, “The Company agrees not to enter into any
agreement or contract with employees covered by this Agreement, individually or collectively,
which in any way conflicts with the terms and provisions of this Agreement. Any such 5
agreement shall be null and void.”
2. Timeliness
The Respondent argues that this allegation is untimely. Under Section 10(b) of the Act, 10
an unfair labor practice charge must be filed within 6 months of the alleged unfair labor practice.
The Board charge was filed on November 4, 2015. The Respondent correctly asserts that the
Union knew about the language in the offer letters since 2012 for the grandfathered employees
and since at least May 2014 for other employees.
15
The Board, however, has consistently held that the 10(b) period does not begin to run
until the charging party has “clear and unequivocal notice” of the violation. See, e.g., A&L
Underground, 302 NLRB 467, 469 (1991). I agree with the General Counsel that the Union did
not become aware that the letters were potentially being used to impact the employees’ terms and
conditions of employment until September 2015. Until that point, the employees had been 20
assured, both through practice and by conversations with management, that the language in the
offer letters was not important, and they were merely form letters carried over from CAV.
Specifically, until September 4, 2015, when Smith discovered he had accrued vacation at the
Section 18.01 part-time seasonal rate, the Union understood that the bargaining-unit employees
were accruing vacation under Section 18.02, and were not considered to be or treated as “part 25
time seasonal” employees. As discussed at length above, this understanding was borne out of a
longstanding past practice. As of September 4, the Respondent had begun treating most of the
bargaining-unit employees as “part time seasonal” employees, basing its rationale for doing so
on the offer letters.26 Only at this point in time did the Union reasonably suspect the Respondent
was using the language of the offer letters to impact bargaining-unit employees’ terms of 30
employment in a manner it deemed inconsistent with the CBA and the law.
The Board in A&L Underground, supra., also held that if the employer does not fully
repudiate a contract, but only breaches its provisions, each successive breach is a separate unfair
labor practice unrelated to previous breaches. That one or more of the breaches occurred outside 35
the 10(b) period does not bar a complaint alleging contract violations within the 10(b) period.
There is no dispute that some of the offer letters were within the statutory time limit.27 Based on
the foregoing, the Respondent’s timeliness arguments fail.
40

26 Arbitrator Ahearn ordered reclassification of the employees named in the collective grievance to
full time status. Arbitrator Snider, though finding that the Respondent could hire part-time employees
under the CBA, determined that none of the bargaining-unit employees were offered “part time seasonal”
work.
27 For example, Phillip Finney’s offer letter was on August 14, 2015. (Jt. Exh. 3 at U Exh. 5.)
JD(SF)–21–18
16
3. 8(a)(1) Allegation
The basic test for a violation of Section 8(a)(1) is whether under all the circumstances the
employer’s conduct would reasonably tend to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ rights 5
guaranteed by the Section 7 of the Act. Mediplex of Danbury, 314 NLRB 470, 472, (1994);
Sunnyside Home Care Project, Inc., 308 NLRB 346 fn. 1 (1992), citing American Freightways
Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147(1959). Further, “It is well settled that the test of interference, restraint,
and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on the employer’s motive or on
whether the coercion succeeded or failed.” American. Tissue Corp., 336 NLRB 435, 441 (2001) 10
(citing NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946)).
It is the General Counsel's burden to prove Section 8(a)(1) allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
15
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, I find that until September 2015, the offer
letters did not violate Section 8(a)(1), in light of the context surrounding their initial presentation.
The grandfathered employees had been assured that nothing about their employment would
change, and the employees hired later had been assured they would receive at least 32 or 40
hours of employment despite the language in the offer letters. The employees and the Union both 20
acquiesced to this practice beginning in 2012. It is also clear that up to that point the Union
viewed the offer letters as non-binding, as illustrated by Holand’s testimony about Tuiletufuga’s
May 2014 offer letter:
In my line of work, I see letters like this. A lot of the companies that have numerous areas 25
that are union and nonunion, it’s a standard form letter. And with the manager telling him
that nothing was going to change, it didn’t raise any red flags for me, because the contract
would prevail at that point.
. . .
30
I mean, you see them in the back of employee handbooks, also, that say you’re at will, but it
–it is also signed saying that a - - the CBA prevails. So there would have been no issue,
because he was being paid at that time as full-time.
(Jt. Exh. 3 at Tr. 254-255.) 35
Once Smith’s offer letter was relied upon to assert that he, and then later most of the
bargaining-unit employees, should accrue vacation at the part-time seasonal rate, however, I find
the employees would reasonably be coerced by the terms of the offer letters identified above.
Smith discovered this on his paycheck ending September 4, 2015. At this point, from the 40
employees’ perspective, what they believed was their bargained-for right to vacation accrual
under the terms of the CBA was now being trumped by the part-time language in their offer
letters. That language was utilized to change a term and condition of their employment. It
would be reasonable, and quite logical, for the employees to believe the offer letters had taken on
new and heightened significance and that the letters’ terms could, notwithstanding the handbook45
JD(SF)–21–18
17
and contract language that the CBA prevails, be used by the Respondent to circumvent the
CBA.28
Based on the foregoing, I find that the General Counsel has met her burden to reliance on
the maintained offer letters violated Section 8(a)(1) as of September 4, 2015.5
4. 8(a)(5) and (1) Allegations
The General counsel asserts that by relying on the offer letters to justify its unilateral
change to bargaining-unit employees’ vacation accrual rates, the Respondent violated Section 10
8(a)(5). This is essentially the same allegation set forth in complaint paragraph 7, discussed
above, so I will not re-analyze it here.29
The General Counsel also asserts that by offering bargaining-unit employees employment
terms that were contrary to the CBA and its past practice, Respondent engaged in direct dealing.15
To establish that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by engaging in
direct dealing, the General Counsel must show: (1) that the employer was communicating
directly with union-represented employees; (2) the discussion was for the purpose of establishing
or changing wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment or undercutting the Union's 20
role in bargaining; and (3) such communication was made to the exclusion of the Union.
Permanente Medical Group, 332 NLRB 1143, 1144 (2000) (citing Southern California Gas Co.,
316 NLRB 979 (1995)).
The employer communicated directly with at least two bargaining-unit employees—25
Tuiletufuga and Finney—by sending them offer letters for positions they sought transfers into
through the Respondent’s bidding process. Once the other non-employee applicants signed the
handbook signifying acceptance of their offers, the letter constituted a communication with them.
The letters were clearly at least in part intended to establish wages and other working conditions,
as the wages, part-time employment status, and some other employment terms appear on their 30
faces. Moreover, as discussed above, the letters were the basis for the Respondent determining
employees should accrue vacation at the part-time seasonal rate. This announcement and change
to the employees’ vacation accrual was done without notice to the Union. Finally, the offer
letters were addressed directly to the employees, and the decision to utilize the letters to change
the vacation accrual status of the employees was done to the Union’s exclusion. 35
Based on the foregoing, I find the General Counsel has met her burden to prove the
Respondent engaged in direct dealing.
40

28As the General Counsel notes, by specifically referencing the CBA’s economic terms while
reserving the right to unilaterally change any other employment terms, a reasonable employee reading the
offer letter would be left with the impression that the Respondent could and might violate the CBA’s non-
economic provisions.
29 This argument, at R Br. 40–41, strays from the allegations in complaint paragraph 6, which does
not reference full-time/part-time status or vacation accrual.
JD(SF)–21–18
18
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by making unilateral
changes to bargaining-unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment and by engaging in
direct dealing with bargaining-unit employees. 5
2. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by sending offer letters that
coerced bargaining-unit employees in their Section 7 rights.
3. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the 10
meaning of Section 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent did not otherwise engage in any other unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint.
15
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.20
Having found that the Respondent implemented unilateral changes to the manner in
which employees’ vacation accrued, I shall order the Respondent to rescind any such change that
has not already been rescinded.30 Restoration to the status quo ante is presumptively appropriate
to remedy unlawful unilateral changes. Southwest Forest Industries, 278 NLRB 228–228 (1986), 25
enfd. 841 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, I shall order recalculation of bargaining-unit
employees’ vacation at the rate set forth in Section 18.02 of the collective-bargaining agreement,
accruing during the employees’ first year of employment, to the extent this has not already
occurred.
30
Having found that the Respondent engaged in direct dealing with employees and coerced
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights by issuing letters that, in connection with the
Respondent’s actions of changing employees’ vacation accrual rates to those applicable to part-
time seasonal employees would reasonably cause employees to believe interfered with their
Section 7 rights, I shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from this action and to rescind 35
the coercive language from the offer letters.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended31

30 Certain actions have already been taken pursuant to the arbitrators’ awards.
31 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–21–18
19
ORDER
The Respondent, C2G Ltd. Co., South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and 5
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
a. interfering with represented employees’ exercise of Section 7 rights by issuing 10
offer letters requiring them to acknowledge that their employment is "at-will,”
that they have “no contract or other guarantee of employment,” and that their
terms and conditions of employment will be “set solely by” Respondent,
despite the fact that they are represented by the Union and their employment
is subject to a collective-bargaining agreement Respondent has negotiated 15
with the Union;
b. treating bargaining-unit employees as “part time seasonal” employees and
changing represented employees’ vacation accrual rate from the amount
accrued under Section 18.02 of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement 20
with the Union for represented employees to the amount accrued under
Section 18.01 of that collective-bargaining agreement for part-time seasonal
employees without first notifying and bargaining with the Union;
c. breaching its past practice of awarding represented employees vacation leave 25
accrual at the Section 18.02 rate during their first year of employment, without
first notifying and bargaining with the Union;
d. dealing directly with represented employees over changes to their
employment status and/or vacation accrual rates, to the exclusion of the 30
Union;
e. refusing to meet and discuss in good faith with the Union any proposed
changes to represented employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions
before putting such changes into effect; and35
f. in any like or related manner interfering with employee rights under Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the 40
Act:
a. rescind and revise the employment offer letters Respondent has issued to its
represented employees since 2014 regarding the provisions referred to in
paragraph 1(a), above; 45
JD(SF)–21–18
20
b. restore all of its represented employees’ accrued vacation leave, including any
vacation leave employees accrued at the § 18.02 rate during their first years of
employment, to what it was before Respondent changed it first in August
2015 and then again in September 2015, without first notifying and bargaining
with the Union.5
c. remove from its files and destroy all employment offer letters Respondent has
issued to its represented employees since 2014 containing the language
referred to in paragraph 1(a) above, and inform all affected Unit employees
that this has been done and that their signatures accepting such offer letters 10
will not be used against them in any way.
d. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the facility where it
operates in Fairbanks, Alaska, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.” 32 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional 15
Director for Region 19, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, 20
posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of 25
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent
shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 18, 2015.
30
e. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of 35
the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 26, 2018
40
____________________
Eleanor Laws
Administrative Law Judge

32 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the above rights.
WE WILL recognize and bargain with General Teamsters Local 959, State of Alaska, affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Union”), as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of our employees in the following unit regarding their terms and
conditions of employment:
All full-time and part-time employees, including Leads, employed by us under Contract
HTC711-12-C-R001, and any other successor work performed at Eielson Air Force Base,
Alaska, under the aforementioned contract.
WE WILL NOT interfere with your exercise of the above rights by requiring you to acknowledge
that you work for us as an “at-will” employee who has “no contract or other guarantee of
employment” or that your terms and conditions of employment will be “set solely by the
Employer” despite that you are represented by a Union and your employment is subject to a
collective bargaining agreement we have negotiated with your Union, and WE WILL remove and
destroy any offer letter you signed containing those terms and inform you that this has been done
and that your signatures on such offer letters will not be used against you in any way.
WE WILL NOT, without first bargaining with your Union, change your vacation accrual rate from
the amount accrued under Section 18.02 of the collective bargaining agreement we have with
your Union to the amount accrued under Section 18.01 of that collective bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT breach our past practice of awarding you vacation leave accrual at the Section
18.02 rate during your first year of employment without first notifying and bargaining with your
Union.
WE WILL NOT deal directly with you over changes to your employment status and/or vacation
accrual rate without the involvement of your Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and discuss in good faith with your Union any proposed changes to
your wages, hours, and working conditions before putting such changes into effect.
WE WILL restore all of your accrued vacation leave, including any vacation leave you accrued at
the Section 18.02 rate during your first year of employment, to what it was before we changed it
during the pay period ending on August 6, 2015, and then changed it again on September 4,
2015, without first notifying and bargaining with your Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
C2G LTD. CO.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
915 2nd Avenue, Room 2948, Seattle, WA 98174-1078
(206) 220-6300, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/19–CA–163444 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (206) 220-6284.