Bridgeport Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 17, 1982

265 N.L.R.B. 421 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL
Bridgeport Hospital and Federation of Special
Police and Law Enforcement Officers. Case 39-
CA-162
November 17, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 18, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Almira Abbot Stevenson issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and Respondent filed an answering brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, and to adopt her recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge recommended
the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. She
found no merit to the complaint's allegations that
Respondent violated the principles of Weingarten'
by issuing "first and final" disciplinary warnings to
employees Eugene Hul, Robin Lashley, and John
Klaff for refusing to participate in an alleged inves-
tigatory interview without their union representa-
tive; that walking out of the interview was, in any
event, protected concerted activity for which they
could not lawfully be disciplined; and that the
reason given for their discipline was a pretext to
conceal Respondent's antiunion motivation for dis-
ciplining these three union adherents. The General
Counsel excepts only to the Administrative Law
Judge's failure to find that even if the employees
were not entitled to the presence of a union repre-
sentative under Weingarten, they nonetheless en-
gaged in protected concerted activity when they
jointly walked out of the meeting after Respondent
denied their request for such a representative and
proceeded with the meeting. We find no merit to
the General Counsel's exceptions.
The essential facts regarding the meeting are not
in dispute. Respondent, a nonprofit hospital, em-
ploys 34 guards and maintains three shifts. Each
shift is headed by a lieutenant responsible to
George Bood, captain and chief of security. On
July 25, 1979, the Union was certified as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of a unit of all Re-
spondent's security guards, but at the time of the
hearing no collective-bargaining agreement had
been reached.
In March 1980,2 Bood became concerned about
increasing acts of vandalism being committed
against hospital property, and decided to hold
meetings with the guard shifts "to call this to the
' N.LR.B. v. J. Weinganen, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
* All dates herein are in 1980 unless otherwise indicated.
265 NLRB No. 54
attention of the personnel, and see if there were
ways we could probably find out who was respon-
sible for the acts or get ideas or suggestions as to
what step [sic] we could take." Bood testified that
there was some suspicion by others that the guards
themselves may have been responsible for some of
the vandalism and that he wished to alert his staff
to the importance of regaining the confidence of
hospital personnel who had expressed a lack of
trust in them.
On March 5, Bood convened the second-shift
guards and read a statement which essentially ex-
pressed his above-stated concerns and his hope that
employee suspicions regarding involvement of se-
curity personnel were invalid, admonished them to
take pride in their jobs, and sought their opinions,
ideas, or comments on the subject problems.
During the ensuing discussion, Bood, who asked no
direct question of anyone at the meeting, elaborat-
ed on the incidents of vandalism, and assured the
guards that no one was accusing anyone and that
he was not conducting a disciplinary investigation.
At the instruction of the shift lieutenant, the four
night-shift guards assembled in the conference
room next to Bood's office at 8 a.m. on March 6.3
Soon after Bood began reading the statements he
had read to the second shift, employee Hul inter-
rupted by asking whether this was the same kind of
meeting Bood had held with the second shift. Bood
responded that it was. Hul said in that case he
wanted his union representative present. Bood re-
plied that it was not a disciplinary interview and
there was no need for a union representative. Bood
then resumed reading the statement. Hul again in-
terrupted, saying they had been instructed by their
union representative to leave if they were not per-
mitted to have a steward present. Bood stated that
he felt they should remain and hear what he had to
say, but Hul along with employees Lashley and
Klaff left the meeting. 4 Following the meeting,
none of the security guards was disciplined for
vandalism. However, the next day, Bood issued
"first and final" disciplinary warnings for insubor-
dination to the three guards who had walked out
of the meeting.
3 According to credited testimony, it was Bood's standard practice to
call shift meetings in this fashion once or twice a month.
4 It is clear that there was no prearrangement among the three who
left the meeting to leave if the request for a representative was denied.
Hul had been told by Abe Ferrara, a part-time guard and negotiating
committee member, not to attend any disciplinary meetings without his
union representative. Lashley and Klaff left because they agreed with
Hul. Lashley, who had heard about the second-shift meeting from one of
the guards on that shift, had sometime earlier been similarly instructed by
Ferrara. Klaff regarded Hul as a firm supporter of the Union and his
spokesman on this occasion. All three were paid for the time they spent
at the meeting; however, Hul and Klaff returned the money.
421
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Based on the above facts, the Administrative
Law Judge found inter alia, that the walkout of the
three employees was concerted, but unprotected.
In this regard, the Administrative Law Judge rea-
soned that since the employees were not entitled to
have their union representative present, it was their
duty to remain as requested by their supervisor and
hear his discussion of a matter of legitimate con-
cern to Respondent; and that by refusing to do so
they gave Respondent grounds for regarding them
as insubordinate. The Administrative Law Judge
therefore concluded that the Act does not shield
Hul, Lashley, and Klaff from the discipline meted
out to them. We agree.
In his exceptions, counsel for the General Coun-
sel argues that since the subject matter of the meet-
ing concerned the employees' terms and conditions
of employment, their walkout was protected irre-
spective of their entitlement to the presence of a
union representative. Such reasoning, however,
wholly ignores the operative fact of this case-that
the employees walked out of the meeting solely in
protest of Respondent's lawful denial of their
demand for a union representative.
The record is devoid of evidence that during
their brief stay at the meeting (which they were as-
sured was not a disciplinary investigation) the three
employees in question ever addressed the subject
matter of the meeting, i.e., vandalism against Re-
spondent's property, let alone the issue of whether
they were properly carrying out their duties. The
only concerns expressed were stated by Hul, the
group's spokesman, and in each instance his re-
marks were limited to demanding the presence of a
union representative. When these demands were
not met, and despite Supervisor George Bood's
suggestion that they remain and hear what he had
to say, Hul, Lashley, and Klaff left the meeting.
Clearly, from these facts-which are the sum and
substance of what occurred-there is no indication
that the three employees walked out in protest of a
term and condition of their employment. Thus,
there was no mention of work performance by any
of the three, or any indication that such was their
concern. 5 To the contrary, the employees' sole ex-
pressed concern was Respondent's compliance with
their demand to have a union representative
present. Since, as found, they were not entitled to
the presence of such a representative at the meet-
ing, their walkout in furtherance of that demand
was unprotected by the Act.
Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint.
' That the subject matter of vandalism tangentially touches upon a
term of employment-employee performance-is insufficient to convert
the walkout into a protected concerted activity.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and orders
that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
MEMBERS FANNING and JENKINS, dissenting:
We cannot agree with our colleagues' conclusion
that employees Hul, Lashley, and Klaff engaged in
activity unprotected by the Act when they walked
out of an after-hours meeting with Respondent's
chief of security, George Bood, in protest of
Bood's refusal to allow their union representative
to be present. Our colleagues reach this conclusion
by reasoning that because Bood's action was
lawful, the employees' protest, per se, was unpro-
tected.6 With this analysis, our colleagues have si-
destepped the precise issue raised by the General
Counsel's exceptions herein; i.e., whether the em-
ployees' protest was protected notwithstanding the
fact that the subject of their protest was Respondent's
lawful action.
Any reasoned anylasis of whether a particular
employee protest is protected must begin not with
the lawfulness of the subject of the protest, nor
with the employees' "entitlement" to that which
they seek, but rather with Section 7 of the Act
which provides, inter alia, that "[e]mployees shall
have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted ac-
tivities for ... mutual aid or protection .... "
Since there can be no doubt that the employees'
protest herein was concerted, the sole issue to be
resolved is whether such protest was for "mutual
aid or protection" as that term is used in Section 7
of the Act. 7
s Understandably, our colleagues cite no support for this curious prop-
osition, for the cases are legion where it has been held that employees
protesting unwelcomed, but lawful actions of their employer are engaged
in activity protected by the Act. See, e.g., W C Electrical Co., Inc, 262
NLRB 557 (1982) (protest of lawful sick leave policy); Douglas Aircraft
Company. Component of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 260 NLRB 1354
(1982) (protest of lawful rules regarding use of vending machines); S L
Industries Inc, 252 NLRB 1058 (1980), and J. P. Hamer Lumber Compa-
ny, Division of Gamble Brothers Inc., 241 NLRB 613 (1979) (protest of
lawful mandatory overtime); Standard Motor Products Inc., 246 NLRB
331 (1979) (protest of lawful personnel policies); Silvercrest Industris.
Inc., 234 NLRB 1182 (1978), and L C Cassidy & Son, Inc., 206 NLRB
486 (1973) (protest of lawful method of calculating pay); and GAC Prop-
erties; Inc., 205 NLRB 1150 (1973) (protest of lawful policy regarding
hours of work). Indeed, our colleagues' analysis herein seriously under-
mines the protection traditionally accorded economic strikers who, by
definition, are protesting their employer's lawful refusal to accede to their
bargaining demands.
I Although employees may lose the protection of the Act because of
the manner in which they choose to act for "mutual aid or protection,"
this issue is not presented herein; in finding the employees' protest herein
unprotected, our colleagues rely upon the subject of the protest, not the
manner in which it was carried out.
422
BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL
Although it is true that not all employee activity
falls within the term "mutual aid or protection,"
that term is sufficiently broad to encompass a spec-
trum of activities ranging from simple protests of
particular working conditions to the utilization of
administrative and judicial forums and appeals to
legislative bodies.8 The common thread which runs
throughout all activities falling within this spec-
trum is that each activity bears some relationship to
"employees' interests as employees." 9 Thus, the
question herein is whether the employees' protest
bears any relationship to their "interests as employ-
ees"; this question, in turn, can be answered by
evaluating the subject of the employees' protest.
As our colleagues have observed, employees
Hul, Lashley, and Klaff walked out of the meeting
in question in protest of Respondent's refusal to
allow their union representative to be present;
however, a more complete statement of the subject
of the protest is that they were protesting Re-
spondent's holding of the meeting without acceding
to their request that their union representative be
allowed to attend. Clearly, the circumstances under
which employees can be required to attend an
after-hours meeting bears some relationship to their
"interests as employees"; moreover, it would seem
to make little difference that the dispute was over
the identity of the invitees rather than the time or
place of the meeting. This is particularly true when
the purpose of the meeting is to criticize the em-
ployees' job performance, question their profession-
al integrity, and imply that they had committed the
very acts of vandalism which it was their duty to
prevent.
In short, we are not willing to conclude that the
employees' protest herein was unrelated to their
"interests as employees"; apparently, our col-
leagues are prepared to do so. Accordingly, we
dissent.
* Eastex Inc. v. N.LR.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
g Id. at 566, 567.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALMIRA ABBOT STEVENSON, Administrative Law
Judge: This case was heard in Hartford, Connecticut,
November 5, 1980. The charge was served on the Re-
spondent March 19, 1980. The complaint was issued May
22, 1980, and was duly answered by the Respondent.
The issue is whether or not the Respondent violated
Section 8(aXl) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, by issuing warning notices to three em-
ployees because they walked out of a meeting called by
their supervisor after the supervisor denied the request of
one of the employees for a union representative to be
present.' For the reasons given below I conclude that
the complaint must be dismissed.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the demea-
nor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Facts
The Respondent is a nonprofit hospital located in
Bridgeport, Connecticut. It employs 34 guards who
work in 3 shifts, each headed by a lieutenant responsible
to George Bood, captain and chief of security, whom I
find is a supervisor and agent of the Respondent.
As indicated, the Union was certified on July 25, 1979,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of an appropri-
ate unit of all the Respondent's security guards. Al-
though a number of negotiating sessions have been held
and the guards conducted a short strike, no collective-
bargaining agreement has been reached.
In March 1980, Bood became concerned about increas-
ing acts of vandalism being committed against hospital
property, and decided to hold meetings with the guard
shifts "to call this to the attention of the personnel, and
see if there were ways we could probably find out who
was causing the acts or get ideas or suggestions as to
what steps we could take." Bood testified that there was
some suspicion that the guards themselves may have
been responsible for some of the vandalism because it oc-
curred in areas to which only the security forces had
access; and he wished to alert his staff to the importance
of regaining the confidence of hospital personnel who
had expressed a lack of trust in them.2
Bood convened the second-shift guards on March 5
and read them the following statement:
There are a number of incidents that have been hap-
pening, they might even be termed, harassing inci-
dents, why and by who is a question. I have made a
list but I am sure you are unaware of some if not
most of them. Some of the incidents include Secu-
rity Dept. equipment. I feel it necessary to discuss
this problem for several reasons.
A number of hospital personnel have expressed
their views reflecting suspicion on Security Depart-
ment personnel. Why? The simple fact that due to
past circumstances, the Security Department has
lost the trust of many of the hospital personnel.
No issue is raised with regard to jurisdiction. Based on the allegations
of the complaint and the admissions of the answer, I find that the Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Sec. 2(2). (6), and (7) of the Act and a health care institution within the
meaning of Sec. 2(14) of the Act. Based on a stipulation of the parties
that the Charging Party Union was certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in Case 2-RC-18380 as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of all security guards employed by the Respondent, on July 25, 1979,
I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec.
2(5) of the Act.
2 Bood described the vandalism as watchmen's key stations being
pulled from the wall or their chains cut; the tape in one portable watch-
clock being destroyed by pouring water in it; and another watchclock
being found hidden in the guard locker room.
423
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I had hoped we could regain this trust over a
period of time, and for a while, I felt we were suc-
ceeding, until the start of these incidents.
I've defended the personnel of the Security Depart-
ment.
The recent happenings, though, throw much suspi-
cion on Security Personnel. In particular, damage to
Security Department equipment which is used only
by Security personnel.
What are my feelings now? Truthfully, I am begin-
ning to wonder, are there a few Security personnel,
who for some reason, feel that these harassing inci-
dents may solve some problem?
If Security personnel are involved, they are only
hurting themselves as well as their fellow workers
and MORE, the Security Departments ability to
function, to provide security for Bpt. Hospital.
I honestly hope these suspicions are not true. Only
YOU can prove that all suspicions are unwarranted
by doing all you can to reveal those who are re-
sponsible.
You must all be more conscious and alert to all that
is happening around you when on post or patrol
duty.
If you have any feelings of respect for YOURSELF
then you must consider that the position of a Secu-
rity Officer is one you should take pride in. It is an
extremely responsible position of TRUST. Trust by
hospital Administrators that the Security Personnel
are diplomatic ambassadors who will provide effi-
cient Security for the facility, personnel, patients
and visitors. Trust by hospital personnel, visitors
and patients, that Security will provide numerous
forms of assistance.
I felt we had quality personnel to perform our Se-
curity functions, but, do we?
I take pride in my job, do you?
Do any of you have any opinions, ideas or sugges-
tions as to who may be responsible for these inci-
dents or what can be done to control or prevent
them.
When his statement was finished, Bood asked for dis-
cussion. Some guards questioned bim about the specific
vandalism he had in mind and he told them. One guard
said he felt that the hospital employees who expressed
distrust of security were accusing them and that they
had a right to be confronted by their accusers. Bood re-
sponded that no one had accused anyone, and he assured
the guards he was not conducting a disciplinary investi-
gation. He asked no direct questions of any individual at
the meeting.
And now we come to the meeting with the night shift,
at which the critical incidents occurred.
Bood summoned the night shift in accord with his
standard practice in calling shift meetings once or twice
a month whenever he had information to discuss with
them3 by leaving instructions with the shift lieutenant to
ask his guards to assemble in the conference room next
to Bood's office at the end of the shift, 8 a.m. on Thurs-
day, March 6. The entire shift complement of four
guards and the lieutenant appeared at the appointed time.
Bood began to read the same statement he had read to
the second shift, but, before he got very far, Officer
Eugen Hul interrupted by asking whether this was the
same kind of meeting he had held with he second shift.
Bood responded that it was. Hul said in that case he
wanted his union representative present. Bood replied it
was not a disciplinary interview and there was no need
for the presence of a union representative, and he began
again to read the statement, Hul interrupted again and
said they had been instructed by their union steward to
leave the meeting if they were not allowed to have the
steward present. Bood stated he felt they should remain
and hear what he had to say, but Hul, Lashley, and Klaff
left the meeting. 4
The next day Bood issued "first and final" disciplinary
warnings to the three guards for insubordination: disobe-
dience of a proper and lawful direction from their super-
visor, meaning, Bood explained, walking out of an
informative meeting scheduled by supervision.
Hul's request for his union representative was intend-
ed, and understood by all, to refer to a part-time guard,
Abe Ferrara. Ferrara was a member of the five-employee
negotiating committee who had come to the hospital a
few times on weekdays to act as an employee representa-
tive, but who worked only Saturdays and Sundays, and,
as known to all, was not on the premises at 8.a.m.,
Thursday, March 6.
The record shows there was no prearrangement
among the three who left the meeting. Hul was not a
member of the negotiating committee but had attended
several sessions. Hul testified that his conduct at the
meeting was based on instructions received by telephone
from Ferrara after Hul discussed the previous meeting
with most of the second-shift guards. Lashley and Klaff
testified they left because they agreed with Hul, Lashley
having been instructed by Ferrara when he took the job
in August 1979 not to attend any disciplinary meetings
without his union representative present and having
heard about the second-shift meeting from one of the
guards on that shift, and Klaff regarding Hul as a firm
supporter of the Union and his spokesman on this occa-
sion.
Hul, Lashley, and Klaff were paid for the time spent
at the meeting, but Hul and Klaff turned the money
back. None of the security guards has been disciplined
for vandalism.
Contentions and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent (a)
violated the Weingarten5 rule by disciplining these three
3 Based on the credited testimony of Bood and Officer John Klaff. I
do not credit Officers Eugen Hul and Rubin Lashley that this was the
first meeting ever called by Bood with the night shift.
· Based on an amalgamation of the testimony of all witnesses as to
what occurred at the meeting, their accounts varying in only minor re-
spects.
' N.LR.B. v. J. Weingarten. Inc. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
424
BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL
employees for refusing to participate in an investigatory
interview without their union representative; (b) that the
walkout of the three employees was, in any event, pro-
tected concerted activity for which they could not law-
fully be disciplined; and (c) that the reason given for the
discipline was a pretext to conceal the Respondent's real
motive to discriminate against three adherents of the
Union.
As to (a) I find that this case does not contain one of
the essential ingredients spelled out by the Supreme
Court for triggering the Weingarten rule, that:
[T]he employee's right to request representation as
a condition for participation in an interview is limit-
ed to situations where the employee reasonably be-
lieves the investigation will result in disciplinary
action.
Thus it is undisputed that it is Bood's practice to conduct
disciplinary interviews in his office and not in the confer-
ence room where the night shift was assembled. More-
over, Bood credibly testified that he did not contemplate
taking disciplinary action against any of the guards as a
result of these meetings. And the evidence is clear that
Bood so informed the group, and that no disciplinary
action has been taken against any security guard for van-
dalism as a result of these meetings or otherwise. In
these circumstances, and in view of the rhetorical nature
of the questions posed in Bood's statement, and the fact
that he singled out no individual for questioning about
responsibility for the vandalism, assuring them that no
one was accusing anyone, I find that Hul, Lashley, and
Klaff did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
participation in the night-shift meeting would result in
disciplinary action against them. 6
Accordingly, I conclude that the Weingarten, supra, al-
legation has not been sustained, and recommend that it
be dismissed.7
As to (b) it is conceded that, although not planned in
advance, the walkout by the three employees was con-
certed. However, I cannot agree with the General Coun-
sel that the walkout over the refusal of their demand for
· Stewart-Warner Corpoation, 253 NLRB 136 (1980); General Electric
Company, 240 NLRB 479 (1979); Amoco Chemical Corporation, 237
NLRB 394 (1978). See also Spartan Stores, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 628 F.2d 953
(6th Cir. 1980), and AAA Equipment Service Company v. N.LR.B., 598
F.2d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1979). Evidence of the subject motivations of
the three employees has not been considered. See N.LR.B. v. J. Weingar-
ten, Inc., supra, fn. 5.
I 1 find it unnecessary to deal with additional grounds advanced by the
Respondent for dismissing this allegation-that this case does not involve
"a lone employee" subjected to an interview by his employer, as referred
to by the Supreme Court (N.LR.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., supra, 260 and
263), and the Board (Good Samaritan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 NLRB 207
(1980), but the entire night shift; and that the Respondent was not re-
quired to postpone the meeting in view of the fact that Abe Ferrara, the
union representative requested, was not available whereas Hul, who him-
self had attended several negotiating meetings, was regarded as a firm
union supporter and as their spokesman by the two other employees who
walked out, was available to act as a representative of all (see Roadway
Express Inc.. 246 NLRB 1127 (1979); Crown Zellerbach Inc.. Flexible
Packaging Division, 239 NLRB 1124, 1127 (1978); and Coca Cola Bottling
Ca of Los Angeles, 227 NLRB 1276 (1977).
their union representative s was protected because it oc-
curred on the employees' own time and did not cause a
disturbance or disruption of the Respondent's operations.
Whether or not the conduct occurred during regular
shift hours is irrelevant, 9 and the subsequent return by
two of them of the money paid for time attending the
meeting did not change their employment status. Similar-
ly irrelevant to the issue posed is the peaceful nature of
the employees conduct. That issue is, does the Act pro-
tect the refusal of a group of employees to remain at the
meeting because their supervisor would not grant their
demand for the presence of their union representative?
The answer is, it does not. As the employees were not
entitled to have their union representative present, it was
their duty to remain as requested by their supervisor and
hear his discussion of a matter of legitimate concern to
their Employer. By refusing to do so, the employees
gave the Respondent grounds for regarding them as in-
subordinate and the Act does not shield them from the
consequences.I o
As to (c) the General Counsel's discriminatory motiva-
tion contention appears to be based on a statement in the
Respondent's answer to the complaint describing the
three named employees as union adherents. There is,
however, no evidence of union animus or disparate treat-
ment; moreover, the timing of the warning notice fol-
lowed immediately after the three walked out of the
meeting and I cannot find that the reasons advanced in
the warnings were not descriptive of that conduct. Ac-
cordingly, I find that a preponderance of the evidence
fails to support this allegation, and I conclude that it
should be dismissed.
Summarizing, I find that Hul, Lashley, and Klaff were
given first and final warning notices because of their in-
subordination in walking out over their supervisor's pro-
test, and, for a reason unprotected by the Act, of a legiti-
mate meeting of employees called by their Employer for
business purposes. I conclude that the complaint must be
dismissed entirely.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER"
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
* There is no contention that this was a strike in protest against the
Respondent's investigation of the vandalism. Cf. Woonrocket Health
Centre, 245 NLRB 652 (1979).
· See Chevron Chemical Company, 191 NLRB 292 (1971).
10 See Southwest Detroit Hospital, 249 NLRB 449 (1980); Bechtel Incor-
porated, 248 NLRB 1222 (1980); Addessograph-Multigraph Corporation, 228
NLRB 6 (1977); Chevron Chemical Company, supra, Riviera Manufactur-
ing Co, 167 NLRB 772 (1967); J. P. Steens Ca v. N.LR.B., 547 F.2d
792 (4th Cir. 1976), Prescott Industrial Products Ca, 205 NLRB 51(1973);
and Polytech. Inc., 195 NLRB 695 (1972), relied on by the General Coun-
sel, are distinguishable on their facts.
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
425