Bolivar Tee's Mfg. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 17, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 1145 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1145
Bolivar Tee’s Manufacturing Company and Sheet
Metal Workers’ International Association Local
Union #146, affiliated with Sheet Metal Work-
ers’ International Association, AFL–CIO. Cases
17–CA–19569 and 17–CA–19632
August 17, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND WALSH
On September 24, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
Albert A. Metz issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge’s
decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.
1. The judge found that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) by the manner in which it distributed donuts
to employees on March 2, 1998. On that day, Plant
Manager Irene Justet announced to employees that there
were donuts in the breakroom, but she could not say why
because she did not want another lawsuit. During the
break, while passing out antiunion T-shirts, employee
Charlene Scott said that the donuts were for nonunion
employees only. According to the judge, the Respondent
violated the Act because it provided donuts under cir-
cumstances that suggested to employees that the donuts
were only for antiunion employees.
The Respondent excepts, arguing that Justet routinely
gives donuts to employees, and that her statement to em-
ployees—that she could not say why she was providing
the donuts—is meaningless. The Respondent said the
judge erred by failing to consider pertinent evidence.
Furthermore, the Respondent stated that Scott’s comment
cannot be attributed to the Company since she is a non-
supervisory employee.
We find merit in the Respondent’s exceptions. Justet’s
comment that she could not say why she was providing
the donuts for fear of another lawsuit, is not violative of
any provision of the Act. Furthermore, the judge found
that Scott was not an agent of the Respondent, and there
were no exceptions to that finding. On that basis, Scott’s
comment cannot be attributed to the Respondent. There-
fore, contrary to the judge, we find no violation.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we agree with
the judge that employee Geraldine Housel was construc-
tively discharged on March 6, 1998, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3). To establish a constructive discharge, two
elements must be proven: (1) the burden imposed upon
[the employee] must cause, and be intended to cause, a
change in working conditions so difficult or unpleasant
as to force the employee to resign; and (2) it must be
shown that those burdens were imposed because of the
employee’s union activities. Crystal Princeton Refining
Co., 222 NLRB 1068, 1069 (1976).
Our dissenting colleague greatly understates the bur-
dens imposed on Housel. As more fully described below
and by the judge, in the 48 hours leading up to her dis-
charge, Housel was faced with: (1) the Respondent’s
clear condonation of her harassment by antiunion em-
ployee Scott; and (2) the Respondent’s unlawful, dispa-
rate imposition of a stringent production quota with vir-
tually no notice and with a harsh prospective penalty
(immediate discharge for Housel at the end of her shift, if
she was unable to meet the quota).
On March 4, 2 days before Housel’s employment
ended, the Respondent assigned Scott to work in Hou-
sel’s work area, right next to Housel. Scott told Housel
that if Housel was not a union supporter, she might be
able to meet her production quota. Scott also told her
that Scott was one of Plant Manager Justet’s “people you
are scared to death of.” Housel asked Scott to leave her
alone, and then complained to Justet about Scott’s har-
assment. Justet told Housel that she would check into
the matter, but later that day Scott approached Housel
and told her that Housel had gotten her in trouble and
that “now it was on.” Scott continued to make comments
to Housel, who again asked Scott to leave her alone.
Scott told Housel that she was not going to leave her
alone.
The next day, March 5, shortly after she arrived at
work, Housel gave Floor Supervisor Dianne Jones (an
agent of the Respondent) a letter from Housel to Justet
complaining about Scott’s harassment. Later that morn-
ing, Justet ran up to Housel on the work floor, pointed
her finger in Housel’s face, and told Housel never to look
at Justet while Justet was present on the work floor.
Later that day, Justet summoned Housel to a meeting
in which Justet questioned Housel about her husband’s
union activity, and his complaint to a local newspaper
that it was only telling part of the story about union sup-
port within the Company. Housel again complained to
334 NLRB No. 140
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1146
Justet that Scott was harassing her. Later in this conver-
sation, Justet told Housel that she could fire Housel if she
wanted to, because “after eight weeks of being here, the
company does not have to keep you if you do not make
your piece rate.” At the end of this conversation, Justet
announced to Housel that she had 1 day to bring her pro-
duction up: “One day. That’s it.” Justet told Housel that
if she did not do so, “you don’t have a job here. One
day.”2 Justet then repeated this threat of discharge. The
conversation ended with Housel again telling Justet that
Scott had been harassing her, and Justet replying that
Scott “ain’t going to bother you.”
The harassment did not cease, however. The next day,
March 6—what turned out to be Housel’s final day of
employment with the Respondent,—Scott greeted Housel
by telling her that she was a “fat ugly pig.” Scott subse-
quently became enraged when she found out that Housel
had drafted a letter to Justet, with the help of the Union,
complaining about Scott’s harassment and Justet’s failure
to intervene. Later that day, following a series of em-
ployee meetings conducted by Justet to address the Un-
ion’s claims that Floor Supervisor Jones and Scott were
both agents of the Respondent, Scott again harangued
Housel at her work station, telling Housel that she was
going to kick her ass. Graphically and forcefully empha-
sizing that threat, Scott kicked a box on the floor next to
Housel’s work station. Indeed, Scott challenged Housel,
saying, “[L]et’s take this outside right now.” Housel
declined. Scott said, “You get outside right now.” Hou-
sel said, “Leave me alone.” Scott said, “I will not leave
you alone.”
After this confrontation, Housel wrote another note to
Justet, again complaining about Scott’s harassment, and
claiming that Scott was an agent of the Respondent.
Justet called Housel into her office and told her that the
Respondent did not have agents, that Housel was respon-
sible for herself, and that the Respondent was not her
protector. When Housel told Justet that Scott had threat-
ened to kick Housel’s ass, Justet replied that the Respon-
dent was not a babysitter, and was not responsible for
Scott. Instead, Justet suggested that Housel fight Scott
outside the plant. In any event, Justet said she did not
believe Housel’s statements about Scott, and she re-
minded Housel that unless she made her production
quota by the end of the day, “you’re automatically termi-
nated.”

2 At the hearing, Justet admitted that until then the Respondent had
been very tolerant of Housel’s substandard production. The judge
found, and we agree, that Justet’s change in attitude was caused by
Housel’s union activity and that Justet’s conduct violated Sec. 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act.
As to the production deadline, during her 6 months of
employment with the Respondent, Housel had consis-
tently failed to make the minimum required production
rate. The Respondent never warned Housel to raise her
rate until it became clear that Housel supported the Un-
ion.3 There is no record evidence that the Respondent
had ever imposed such a stringent production ultimatum.
Given that Housel never before made the production rate,
it is highly improbable that she could have done so in 24
hours, particularly under the pressure of a discharge
threat, as well as the distraction caused by Scott’s inces-
sant harassment.
Justet’s refusal to intervene when Housel complained
about Scott’s harassment created a coercive work envi-
ronment that not only undermined Housel’s ability to
work at her highest level of productivity, but also caused
her to fear for her physical safety. Not only did Justet
fail to end Scott’s harassment of Housel, she facilitated it
by moving Scott to a work area next to Housel. On
March 6, after being physically threatened by Scott while
attempting to work, and on realizing that she could not
meet the new production quota, Housel finally quit.
In these circumstances, we agree with the judge that it
was reasonably foreseeable that Scott’s continued har-
assment, as well as imposition of the production dead-
line, would cause Housel to quit. Accordingly, we also
conclude that Housel was constructively discharged in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Our dissenting colleague asserts that there is no show-
ing that the Respondent instigated Scott’s conduct. The
record is crystal clear, however, that the Respondent
condoned Scott’s conduct. Our colleague disputes this
conclusion, arguing that while the Respondent may have
failed to deal adequately with Scott’s conduct, it did not
forgive her for engaging in it. The cases4 relied on by the
dissent are inapposite here. They involve the issues of
whether employers condoned—i.e., forgave or “clearly
and convincingly . . . ‘wipe[d] the slate clean’” of—the
strike misconduct (White Oak) or arguably unprotected
strike participation (General Electric) of striking em-
ployees, and whether the employers thus were required
to reinstate those strikers. The behavior arguably con-
doned in those cases was conduct adverse to the em-
ployer’s interest. Thus, evidence that the employer “for-
gave” the behavior would be necessary to deprive the
employer of its defense to the duty to reinstate the strik-
3 On January 25, Housel was observed at a union meeting by a co-
worker who did not support the Union. The next day, during a meeting
with employees, Justet stated that she knew which five employees
attended the union meeting.
4 White Oak Coal Co., 295 NLRB 567 (1989); General Electric Co.,
292 NLRB 843 (1989).
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1147
ers. In contrast, the issue here is whether the Respondent
should be held accountable for misconduct that is consis-
tent with the Respondent’s antiunion animus, Scott’s
harassment of Housel. The standard invoked by the dis-
sent does not apply here, and liability is appropriate even
if the Respondent did not explicitly forgive Scott.5 The
two situations are in no way parallel. While the word
“condone” may be used in both contexts, the forgiveness
element of the strike-related condonation doctrine just
does not come into play in this case.
Finally, we disagree with our colleague’s assertion that
there is no showing that the Respondent’s inaction in the
face of Scott’s misconduct was discriminatorily moti-
vated. There is, in fact, copious record evidence, again
as summarized above, that the Respondent’s refusal to
intervene against Scott’s harassment of Geraldine Housel
was motivated by antiunion animus.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Bolivar
Tee’s Manufacturing Co., Bolivar, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified below.
1. Delete paragraph 1(k) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
I agree with my colleagues in all respects except with
regard to their finding that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) by constructively discharging employee
Geraldine Housel. As my colleagues acknowledge, the
General Counsel must establish the following elements
in this case:

(1) the burdens imposed . . . must cause, and be
intended to cause, a change in [her] working condi-
tions so difficult or unpleasant as to force [her] to re-
sign.

5 There is no shortage of Board decisions holding employers respon-
sible in similar circumstances for harassment of prounion employees by
antiunion employees. See, e.g., Taylor Machine Products, 317 NLRB
1187, 1209 (1995), enfd. in relevant part 136 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1998);
Champagne Color, Inc., 234 NLRB 82 (1978); Becton-Dickinson Co.,
189 NLRB 787, 787–788 (1971) (constructive discharge). Our dissent-
ing colleague would distinguish these cases on their facts, but we see
no meaningful distinction. In none of the cited decisions, moreover,
did the Board apply the “forgiveness” test advanced by the dissent.
The dissent cites no cases involving employer responsibility for har-
assment in which its proposed test was applied.
(2) it must be shown that [the employer imposed
burdens on the employee] because of [her] union ac-
tivities.

Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 NLRB 1068, 1069
(1976).
The “burdens” imposed on Housel were as follows:

(1) harassment by employee Charlene Scott; (2)
the imposition of a production quota. Thus, the
General Counsel must prove that these burdens were
imposed for antiunion reasons, and that they were of
such a character as to force Housel to resign.

As to (1) above, the harassment was by employee
Scott, not by the Respondent. My colleagues recite an
extensive description of Scott’s alleged mistreatment of
Housel. However, it is clear that Scott is not an agent of
the Respondent, and there is no evidence that the Re-
spondent instigated Scott’s conduct. Nor does the Gen-
eral Counsel allege that the Respondent is responsible for
Scott’s conduct through the principle of ratification.
My colleagues then say that the Respondent “con-
doned” Scott’s conduct. As Board cases make clear, a
finding of condonation requires a clear showing of for-
giveness. There is no showing that the Respondent for-
gave Scott for her conduct.1 At most, the Respondent
failed to deal adequately with it. (Respondent suggested
that Scott and Housel settle their differences “outside.”)
While it may have been more prudent for management to
react differently, there is no showing that the Respon-
dent’s inaction was discriminatorily motivated. That is,
there is no showing that the Respondent has taken differ-
ent steps when confronted with prior situations of “em-
ployee vs. employee” harassment. Similarly, although
the Respondent assigned Scott to work near Housel after
Housel’s complaint about Scott, the General Counsel
does not allege that this assignment was unlawfully mo-
tivated.
My colleagues seek to distinguish the “condonation”
cases on the ground that they involve strike misconduct.
However, this distinction is without legal significance.
In both strike situations and here, an employee has en-
gaged in unprotected misconduct, whether it be threaten-
ing an employee who crosses a picket line during a strike
or threatening an employee in a work context. The issue
in both cases is whether the employer forgave the mis-
conduct.
My colleagues argue that the two situations are differ-
ent. They say that strike misconduct is contrary to the
employer’s interest, and that (absent condonation) an
1 See generally White Oak Coal Co., 295 NLRB 567, 570 (1989);
General Electric Co., 292 NLRB 843, 844 (1989).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1148
employer would not be required to reinstate the striker.
The argument has no merit. The salient point is not that
the misconduct is not contrary to the employer’s interest.
The salient point is that the misconduct is not protected
by Section 7.
Further, to the extent that there is a difference in the
two situations, the difference cuts against the position of
my colleagues. That is, in the strike situation, condona-
tion means only that the employer must reinstate the
striker notwithstanding the misconduct. In the instant
case, my colleagues say that condonation means that the
Employer approves of the misconduct and is thus respon-
sible for it. Significantly, not even the General Counsel
contends that the Respondent was responsible for Scott’s
misconduct, i.e., that it approved and ratified it. In sum,
the cases relied on by my colleagues are clearly distin-
guishable.
The cases relied on by my colleagues are distinguish-
able in other respects as well. In Taylor Machine Prod-
ucts,2 management made light of antiunion employees’
harassment of union supporters, going as far to congratu-
late the antiunion employees for their conduct, in plain
view of the employees that complained of harassment.
In Becton-Dickinson Co.,3 employee Ralph Kinsell, who
supported the union, was harassed by fellow employees
after the union lost the election. Management was unre-
sponsive to his complaints. When his machine broke
down, knowing he had a bad back, management assigned
him to a job which required him to do heavy lifting. Af-
ter sustaining a back injury, Kinsell was assigned to work
in the chemical department, even though the respondent
knew he had severe allergies. After suffering an allergic
reaction, and continued harassment by his coworkers,
Kinsell walked off the job. Finally, in Champagne
Color, Inc.,4 the administrative law judge and the Board
found that the Respondent’s explicit antiunion attitude,
its enforcement of rules prohibiting union solicitation
and discussion, and its inaction in response to an anti-
union employee’s harassment of a union supporter
“could not but [have left] the employees with the impres-
sion that Respondent welcomed and encouraged em-
ployee efforts to defeat the Union . . . .” Id. In that case,
the supervisor stood no more than 10 feet away when
antiunion employee Carl McKinney told union supporter
Brian Gilmartin that “[s]omebody ought to kick your
ass” and “[y]ou’re too chicken to fight your own battles.
You have to get the Union to do it for you.”5 Although

2 317 NLRB 1187, 1193–1196 (1995), enfd. in relevant part 136
F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998).
3 189 NLRB 787 (re Kinsell) (1971).
4 234 NLRB 82 (1978).
5 Id.
he heard the threatening words and the harassing tone,
and was physically present, the supervisor did nothing to
stop the conduct.
By contrast, I stated earlier, the Respondent here at
most failed to deal adequately with the harassment of
Housel by Scott. There is no evidence that Plant Man-
ager Irene Justet witnessed any of the harassment, and
insufficient evidence that she condoned it.
As to (2) above, I assume arguendo that the production
quota was imposed on Housel for antiunion reasons.
Thus, if she had failed to meet that unlawful quota, and
had been discharged therefor, the discharge would likely
have been unlawful. However, she did not even try to
meet the quota. Instead, she abruptly quit. Accordingly,
this is a “constructive discharge” allegation, rather than
“actual discharge” allegation. The issue is whether the
production quota was so difficult or unpleasant as to
force a reasonable employee to resign. I do not believe
that the quota was so unreasonably high as to meet that
standard. For example, there is no showing that other
employees have been unable to meet that quota. Thus, it
cannot be said that it was virtually impossible for Housel
to achieve, even within 24 hours, what others regularly
achieved every day.
Accordingly, I would dismiss the constructive dis-
charge allegation in this case.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT suspend or discharge Donna Pitts,
Angela Carneal, Darla Reaves, Nona Box, and Geraldine
Housel, or any other employee because they engage in
union activity on behalf of the Sheet Metal Workers’
International Association Local Union #146, affiliated
with Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association,
AFL–CIO; the United Food and Commercial Workers
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1149
International Union, AFL–CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from engaging in
union solicitation and activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the loss of
pay and benefits if they engage in union activity or if a
union represents the employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that the Respon-
dent’s plant will close if a union represents them.
WE WILL NOT tell employees they should quit their
jobs if they do not like the Respondent’s unlawfully
threatened antiunion actions.
WE WILL NOT have our agents circulate antiunion pe-
titions for employees to sign.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about union ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are sur-
veilling our employees’ union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that union repre-
sentation, collective bargaining, or other protected con-
certed activity would be futile.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with physical vio-
lence or other retaliation because they file charges with
the Board or engage in other union or protected con-
certed activity.
WE WILL NOT send employees home early or reduce
their incentive wages because they engage in union or
other protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT issue production warnings or im-
provement deadlines to employees because they engage
in union or other protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT condone harassment of employees be-
cause of their union or other protected concerted activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Donna Pitts, Angela Carneal, Darla Reaves,
Nona Box, and Geraldine Housel full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL make Donna Pitts, Angela Carneal, Darla
Reaves, Nona Box, and Geraldine Housel whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from our
unlawful discrimination against them, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful suspensions and discharges of Donna Pitts, Angela
Carneal, Darla Reaves, Nona Box, and Geraldine Housel,
and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify each of
them in writing that this has been done and that their
suspension and discharges will not be used against them
in any way.

BOLIVAR TEE’S MANUFACTURING
COMPANY

Naomi L. Stuart, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Terry L. Potter, Esq. and Randall Thompson, Esq., for the Re-
spondent.
Mike Krasovec, for the Charging Party Union.
DECISION1
ALBERT A. METZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
involves numerous issues of whether the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act).2 On the entire record, including my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the
briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Respondent admits that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and that the Charging Party Union, the Sheet Metal
Workers’ International Association Local Union #146, affili-
ated with Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association,
AFL–CIO (the Union); and the United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO (the UFCW), are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
The Respondent operates a nonunion T-shirt manufacturing
plant in Bolivar, Missouri. Irene Justet (Justet) is the plant
manager. Justet’s husband, Jerry Justet, is the office manager;
Gerald Fisher is the shipping supervisor; and Dianne Jones is
the floor supervisor.
III. PITTS’ UNION AUTHORIZATION CARD
On January 8, employee Donna Pitts and Floor Supervisor
Dianne Jones had a dispute about whether Pitts could have a
water bottle at her workstation. Pitts told Jones if she could not
have the bottle she would have to give 4 weeks notice. Pitts was
subsequently permitted to have the water bottle. Shortly after
the matter was settled, Justet came to Pitts, hugged her, and
said she knew Pitts had not intended to resign. Justet said, “I
wouldn’t accept it anyway because it wasn’t in writing.” Pitts
testified that Justet had told her on several other occasions that
resignations of employment should be in writing.
In January, the Union was engaged in an organizing cam-
paign at Tracker Marine Company, also located in Bolivar,
Missouri. On the evening of January 8, Pitts attended a union

1 This case was heard at Bolivar, Missouri, on June 2–5, 1998. All
dates refer to 1998 unless otherwise stated.
2 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) and (3).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1150
organizational meeting for the Tracker Marine employees. Pitts
had a discussion with Union Agent Mike Krasovec about the
Union conducting an organizational campaign at the Respon-
dent’s plant. Krasovec gave Pitts some union authorization
cards and she said she would talk to her fellow employees
about joining the Union.
On January 9, Pitts was in the Respondent’s restroom and
left a blank union authorization card on the sink. After the first
break, Justet came to Pitts with the card. Justet asked Pitts if the
authorization card belonged to her. Before Pitts could answer,
Justet handed the card to her and said in an angry voice, “If it
does, keep it to yourself.” Justet denied this event ever took
place. Considering the demeanor of the witnesses I found Pitts
to be the more convincing witness. I credit Pitts’ version that
Justet gave her back the union authorization card and warned
her to keep it to herself.
When Pitts sought support from fellow employees by leaving
the card in the restroom she was engaged in protected union
activity. Justet’s order that Pitts keep the union card to herself
was an unlawful prohibition against union solicitation. Such a
warning would reasonably tend to coerce Pitts in the exercise of
her rights under Section 7 of the Act. I find Justet’s statement is
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
During the January 9 lunchbreak, Pitts talked to employees
Darla Reaves, Jackie Greenlee, and Angie Carneal about the
Union. Pitts continued to discuss union organization with other
employees thereafter. On January 15 Pitts attended another
union organizing meeting where she signed an authorization
card. Pitts received additional cards to distribute to Respon-
dent’s employees. She gave some of these cards to Reaves and
Carneal.
IV. PITTS’ PRODUCTION WARNING
On the morning of January 19, Justet told Pitts that her pro-
duction rate needed to increase. Pitts said that she was making
$6 an hour, which is over the minimum production rate of
$5.15. Justet retorted that Pitts’ production was not good
enough. Justet’s warning to Pitts about her production did not
have a foundation in fact as shown by Pitts’ production records.
I infer from the record as a whole that the warning was based
on Pitts’ union activities. I find that the unjustified warning was
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Justet then allegedly had Pitts assigned to work exclusively
on extra large-sized T-shirts. Some employees consider this
work to be less desirable because it may be more difficult to
achieve rates on the larger sized shirts. The Government alleges
that this assignment was due to Pitts’ union activity and thus a
violation of the Act. The Respondent’s records show, however,
that it is unlikely that Pitts worked exclusively on one size T-
shirt. I find the Government has failed to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Pitts was discriminated against by her
work assignments. I find that the Respondent did not assign
Pitts more onerous work in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act.
V. PITTS’ SUSPENSION AND DISCHARGE
On January 26, Pitts had problems with her car and could not
get to work. She telephoned Justet, explained her problem and
said she would not be to work that day. Pitts said she would
make up her lost time on Saturday. On January 27, when Pitts
arrived for work her timecard was missing. She then met with
Justet and Jones in the office. Justet confronted Pitts about tak-
ing all day to get her car repaired. Pitts responded that the car
was still not fixed. Justet told Pitts that her absenteeism was
going to have to stop. Pitts retorted that she only missed a sin-
gle day’s work since she had returned to work from medical
leave and questioned whether absenteeism rules were being
fairly applied to her. Justet told Pitts to get out of her face and
said that Pitts made her sick. Justet then suspended Pitts for 3
days.
On January 29, Jones telephoned Pitts and told her she did
not need to return to work. Jones explained that Justet had de-
cided to accept Pitts’ January 8 resignation. Pitts told Jones that
she had only given notice when Justet had removed a water
bottle from Pitts’ workstation, and that after that decision was
changed nothing more had been said about the matter. Justet
who had been listening to the conversation on a speakerphone
joined the discussion. Justet said that she knew Pitts had not
intended to resign but she was accepting the resignation. Pitts
told Justet that it was a shame that Justet had Jones do her dirty
work, and the conversation ended.
On January 30, Pitts telephoned Justet. Union Agent
Krasovec listened to the conversation unbeknown to Justet.
Pitts told Justet that she did not understand what went on with
her job the day before. Justet said that Pitts was a “lowlife
mother fucking son of a bitch” and she did not want to talk to
her. Pitts started to explain that she had only offered her resig-
nation when she was denied the water bottle on the work floor.
Justet responded that she knew Pitts did not intend to resign,
but that she was accepting the resignation regardless.
After the telephone call, Pitts and Krasovec immediately sent
Justet a letter requesting either reinstatement or a termination
letter pursuant to the Missouri State statutes. The letter also
states Pitts’ intention to pursue organizing Respondent’s em-
ployees regardless of whether she was reinstated to employ-
ment.
On January 31, Justet wrote a response to Pitts’ letter.
Justet’s letter states that Pitts had been warned several times
about her attitude, and that Pitts had been told that she would
have to leave if her attitude did not change. Justet, Floor Super-
visor Dianne Jones, Shipping Supervisor Gerald Fisher, and
Office Manager Jerry Justet, signed the letter. Pitts denied ever
receiving such warnings and the Respondent offered no evi-
dence to substantiate the letter’s assertions.
The General Counsel has the initial burden of establishing
that union or other protected activity was a motivating factor in
Respondent’s action alleged to constitute discrimination in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). The elements commonly required
to support such a showing of discriminatory motivation are
union activity, employer knowledge, timing, and employer
animus. Once such unlawful motivation is shown, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the Respondent to prove its affirmative
defense that the alleged discriminatory conduct would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected activity. Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); approved in NLRB v.
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1151
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). The
test applies regardless of whether the case involves pretextual
reasons or dual motivation. Frank Black Mechanical Services,
271 NLRB 1302 fn. 2 (1984). “A finding of pretext necessarily
means that the reasons advanced by the employer either did not
exist or were not in fact relied upon, thereby leaving intact the
inference of wrongful motive established by the General Coun-
sel.” Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981), enfd.
705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Respondent had knowledge of Pitts’ union activities
commencing January 9 when Justet confronted her with the
union authorization card. The timing of Pitts’ suspension and
discharge closely followed this encounter. The Respondent’s
union animus is shown initially by Justet telling Pitts to keep
the union card to herself. Moreover, as set forth below, the
Respondent’s additional violations of the Act further demon-
strate the element of animus. Justet’s unlawful and pretextual
production warning is another element of animus. Thus, I find
that the Government has established the necessary initial show-
ing of illegal motivation regarding Pitts’ suspension and dis-
charge.
The Respondent’s defense does not overcome that showing.
The Respondent asserts at one point that Pitts in effect was not
discharged but her resignation was accepted early. This I find
disingenuous. The credited testimony shows that the resigna-
tion was a forgotten issue when Pitts was allowed to keep her
water bottle on January 8. The next day, however, Justet dis-
covered Pitts had a union card and illegally told Pitts to keep it
to herself. On January 19, Pitts received another illegal warning
for production problems that did not exist. In both the January
29 and 30 telephone conversations, Justet acknowledged she
knew Pitts had not intended to resign. The fact Pitts was absent
from work January 26 is not relied upon by Respondent for her
suspension and discharge. Moreover, the fact Pitts questioned
whether Justet was fairly applying the absentee rules to her
does not adequately explain Justet’s reaction of suspending
Pitts for raising the question. The Respondent’s attempts to
shift its basis for discharging Pitts from an acceptance of her
resignation to various asserted infractions by Pitts’ does not
withstand scrutiny. I do not credit the asserted reasons for Pitts’
discharge and find that the reasons advanced for that discharge
are a pretext. I infer that because of the false reasons given for
the termination that there was another motive, which the Re-
spondent wished to conceal. I conclude that reason was Pitts’
support for the Union. TLC Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 461,
464 (8th Cir. 1983); Shattuck Denn Mining v. NLRB, 362 F.2d
466 (9th Cir. 1966); and Holo-Krome Co., 302 NLRB 452, 453
(1991). I find that Pitts’ discriminatory termination is a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
VI. EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 2
A. Employee Meetings
Justet held a series of employee meetings at the start of the
February 2 workday to discuss Pitts’ January 30 letter. Justet
showed Pitts’ letter to the employees and said it “scared the shit
out of her.” Justet proclaimed that she was not going to go
through this union “stuff” again. Justet said that Respondent’s
owner, Alan Heller, had spent $75,000 opposing a prior union
campaign and he was not going to do it again. Justet said that it
only took 5 days to move a company, and that there was a
company that shut down just 7 miles from her farm in Ken-
tucky. Justet stated that if the Union came in she would leave
and that without her there would be no Bolivar Tee’s. Justet
warned the employees that “the Union will come in and lower
your rates.” Justet told the employees she did not want to hear
anything more about the Union, that she was tired “of this un-
ion shit” and that it would not be brought up again. Justet con-
cluded by saying if employees did not like the way things were,
they could get another job.
Justet’s statements to employees at the February 2 meetings
included threats that the Respondent’s Bolivar facility would
close if the Union represented the employees. She also made
threats that their wages would be reduced, that they should not
discuss union representation, and they should quit their jobs if
they did not like conditions as they were. These statements had
the tendency to restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of
rights granted them under the Act. NLRB v. Noll Motors, Inc.,
433 F.2d 853, 855–856 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
906 (1971); Temp-Rite Air Conditioning Corp., 322 NLRB 767
(1996). I find that Justet’s February 2 statements are violations
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Antiunion Petition
Shortly after the February 2 employee meetings, Floor Su-
pervisor Jones openly circulated an antiunion petition to em-
ployees during worktime. Jones continued to distribute the
antiunion petition until lunchbreak began at 11:30 a.m. Justet
was on the work floor when Jones was distributing the anti-
union petition.
Jones asked employee Darla Reaves to sign the petition.
Reaves asked if there was a “happy medium petition” for peo-
ple who were neither for nor against the Union. Jones replied
there was no “happy medium petition.” Reaves declined to sign
the petition. Geraldine Housel testified that Jones asked her to
sign the petition, but she declined to sign. Nona Box testified
that Jones told her that Justet was upset and Jones wanted em-
ployees to sign the petition so Justet would feel better. Box
signed the petition.
Jones, as the floor supervisor, was Justet’s contact with the
employees working in the plant. She participated in disciplinary
interviews conducted by Justet; Jones told Pitts of her dis-
charge, and Jones acts as the conduit of information and job
direction between Justet and employees. Justet was on the work
floor during part of the time Jones distributed the antiunion
petition. The petition was consistent with the message that
Justet had just given the employees that she did not want to
hear anything more about the Union. Under circumstances
where employees reasonably believe that a nonstatutory super-
visor is reflecting company policy and speaking and acting for
management, the employee is an agent of Respondent within
the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. Southern Bag Corp.,
315 NLRB 725 (1994); Dentech Corp., 294 NLRB 924 (1989).
Respondent’s employees could have reasonably believed that
Jones was acting on behalf on Respondent in distributing the
antiunion petition. I find that Jones was acting as the Respon-
dent’s agent in distributing the petition. I further find that the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1152
Respondent did violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Jones
solicitation of employee signatures on the antiunion petition.
VII. DISCHARGE OF ANGIE CARNEAL
Donna Pitts’ daughter, Angie Carneal, was also employed by
the Respondent. Carneal shared her mother’s support for the
Union and signed an authorization card on January 16. Carneal
also voiced her union sympathies to other employees. During
lunchbreak on February 2, Carneal told several employees that
Pitts, was going to try to get a union to represent the employ-
ees.
Carneal was not invited to Justet’s February 2 employee
meetings, nor did Jones ask her to sign the antiunion petition.
Immediately after lunch on February 2 Carneal was summoned
to Justet’s office. Justet told Carneal that she wanted an expla-
nation about a conversation that Carneal had with Jones before
work on January 30. (Carneal and Jones had argued on that date
about the role Jones played in Pitts’ discharge.) Carneal ini-
tially said that the conversation was not Justet’s business be-
cause the conversation took place before work. Justet re-
sponded it was her business because Carneal had talked about
Justet during the conversation. Justet then stated that Carneal
had told Jones she was even “lower than Irene” (Justet).
Carneal acknowledged that she made such a statement to Jones
because of her participation in Pitts’ discharge. Justet then told
Carneal if she wanted to see sorry, she should look in the mir-
ror.
At this point Carneal noticed that Justet was holding Pitts’
January 30 letter that stated her intent to organize Respondent’s
employees. Justet was looking through the letter as she talked
to Carneal. Justet said that Carneal’s mother had been pushed
down in the parking lot before. Carneal responded, “[S]o.”
Justet said that it could happen again. Carneal responded that
she did not think Justet could do it, but if she wanted to try, to
go ahead. Justet then told Carneal that no one wanted Carneal
at Respondent’s facility. Carneal responded that she was not
going to quit, that if Justet wanted her out, Justet was going to
have to fire her. Justet pointed her finger at Carneal and
screamed “push me and I will.” Carneal said, “[G]o ahead and
fire me and I’ll draw unemployment.” Justet responded Carneal
was a welfare case. Justet then said, “I think that I will fire you,
you’re fired.” Carneal called Justet a bitch and left.
Justet testified she summoned Carneal to the office to discuss
Jones’ complaint that Carneal had abused her in their conversa-
tion that morning. It is undisputed nothing was mentioned in
the meeting about any abuse that took place that morning. I find
that Justet was in error and that the record shows the conversa-
tion occurred before work on January 30. It was unexplained
why Carneal was not called to any of the antiunion employee
meetings on the morning of her discharge. As noted, she was
not asked by Jones to sign the antiunion petition. As already
found, Carneal’s mother was fired by the Respondent for being
a union supporter. From these facts I infer that the Respondent
viewed Carneal as a union sympathizer.
The tone of the February 2 meeting was hostile. Justet in-
voked the fact that Carneal’s mother had been pushed down in
the parking lot before and it could happen again. This was said
at a time Justet held Pitt’s union organizing letter in her hand.
There was no explanation why the veiled threat regarding Pitts
being pushed down was invoked during a meeting allegedly to
investigate Carneal’s conversation with Jones. I find that Justet
was looking for an excuse to discharge Carneal because of her
own, as well as her mother’s, union sympathies. Carneal had
voiced her displeasure at Jones for her role in her mother’s
unlawful discharge. Justet provoked Carneal by telling her that
no one wanted her working at the plant, saying she was “sorry”
and insulting her about being a welfare case. The fact that
Carneal called Justet a bitch is not to be condoned, but under
the circumstances does not insulate the pretextual discharge of
an employee because of her statutorily protected rights. I find
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
when Justet discharged Carneal. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
VIII. FEBRUARY 19 EMPLOYEE MEETINGS
On February 12, the UFCW filed unfair labor practice
charges regarding the discharges of Pitts and Carneal. On Feb-
ruary 19, Justet held a series of meetings with employees to
discuss these charges. Justet told employees that there seemed
to be a pipeline going out of the plant regarding what happened
in the plant and she knew who the pipeline was. Justet said that
she did not know there were any union activities at the facility
on January 15 and asked if any employees knew about union
activities at that time. Justet said she and Jones would probably
have to go to Kansas City to testify about the unfair labor prac-
tice charges, and that they might have to kick Pitts’ and
Carneal’s asses in the parking lot.
Justet denied saying at the February 2 employee meetings
that the facility would close if the Union came in. Justet stated
that what she had said in the earlier meeting was that she would
not work for the Union. Justet also denied that she had fired
Pitts or Carneal for improper reasons. Justet explained that Pitts
had given 4 weeks notice and Justet had accepted Pitts’ resigna-
tion. Justet also told employees that Pitts was a “fucking bitch,”
and asked employees to submit letters regarding how Pitts had
verbally abused Jones. Justet also asked the employees to write
letters to her to support Respondent’s position in the unfair
labor practice cases.
Justet told the employees that she had fired Carneal because
Carneal had refused to discuss the January 30 conversation with
her. Justet related that Carneal had said, “[W]ell, fire me bitch.”
Justet told employees, “[S]o, I fired the bitch.”
Justet told employees that Respondent’s owner already gave
all of the money Respondent made back to the employees, so
there was nothing to negotiate. Justet said that companies did
not sign contracts with unions anymore so the Union could
picket for 10 years and it would not make a difference because
the Respondent would just hire new people. Justet stated the
Union would charge employees dues, and charge Respondent
money and give the money to the Mafia.
Justet’s comments during the February 19 employee meet-
ings were incautious. She interrogated employees about their
knowledge of union activity. This questioning was conducted
by the highest level management official in the plant, it was not
for any proper purpose, and occurred without assurances
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1153
against reprisals in a context of other coercive statements. I find
Justet’s interrogation of employees is a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Dealers Mfg. Co., 320 NLRB 947, 948
(1996).
Justet created the impression of surveillance by stating she
knew who was communicating with the Union. I find that this
statement reasonably conveyed to employees that their union
activities were under surveillance by the Respondent. I find that
this statement is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Elec-
tro-Voice, Inc., 320 NLRB 1094 (1996).
Justet made clear to the employees in the February 19 meet-
ing that union representation and collective bargaining were
futile acts. Statements indicating the futility of bargaining, and
suggesting the inevitability of a strike with employee replace-
ments if employees selected union representation, are violative
of the Act. Pyramid Management Group, Inc., 318 NLRB 607,
608 (1995); Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB 470, 512
(1995). I find that Justet violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
her statements regarding the futility of union representation and
bargaining.
Justet stated she might have to kick Carneal and Pitts’ asses
when she went to Kansas City regarding the unfair labor prac-
tice charges. This threat of physical harm to Pitts and Carneal
for having filed charges with the Board is found to be a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IX. FEBRUARY 20 EMPLOYEE MEETING
On February 20 Justet held additional employee meetings.
Justet read from a union handbill that had been distributed at
Tracker Marine. She then told employees that she and Jones
were sticking together; that they were in the process of suing
Pitts and Carneal for lying; and that Pitts and Carneal could go
to prison because it was against the law to lie about an em-
ployer.
Justet’s February 20 comments about suing Pitts and Carneal
and their going to jail referred to their protected activity of
filing unfair labor practice charges with the Government. I find
such comments reasonably tended to coerce employees in the
exercise of their protected activities. I find that Justet’s com-
ments violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
X. FEBRUARY 23 DRESS CODE MEETING
On February 23, Justet held another meeting and reminded
the employees of the Respondent’s dress code. Justet said that
they could not wear halter tops, short shorts, or open-toed
shoes. Employees were told they could be terminated if they
did not follow the dress code. Prior to this meeting some em-
ployees were not aware that there was a dress code. The record
as a whole does not show that the dress code was linked to the
union organizational activity at the plant. I find that the Gov-
ernment has failed to prove by the required preponderance of
the evidence that the dress code reminder is a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
XI. REDUCTION IN REAVES’ WAGES
On February 2, employee Darla Reaves declined to sign the
antiunion petition distributed by Jones. Thereafter Reaves
signed union authorization cards in both the Union and the
UFCW. She also solicited fellow employees to attend union
meetings. Reaves was not asked to sign a second antiunion
petition that was distributed by employees on February 25.
On February 25 Jones informed Reaves that she was being
assigned to work on a new batch of shirts. The piece rate for
such work was approximately $1 to $2 per hour in pay less than
Reaves had previously received.
XII. FEBRUARY 25 UNION MEETING
The Union held an employee meeting on February 25. Five
employees attended this meeting: Donna Pitts, Angie Carneal,
Darla Reaves, Geraldine Housel, and Kathy Housel. Employee
Janet Raines came to the meeting and handed an antiunion
petition to Union Agent Krasovec. Raines observed the five
employees who were in attendance.
Reaves reported to Krasovec at the meeting that her incen-
tive rate had been cut. He and Reaves composed a letter dated
February 26 protesting the cut. The letter was to be hand deliv-
ered to Justet the next day. The letter was signed by Reaves,
and showed that copies were sent to Krasovec and Gary Comer
(an organizer for the Union).
XIII. FEBRUARY 26 EMPLOYEE MEETINGS
On February 26, Reaves appeared at work wearing a union
hat, T-shirt, and button. She was the only employee wearing
prounion items. At about 8 a.m. Reaves gave Justet the letter
that she had prepared regarding the cut in her incentive rate.
Justet conducted several employee meetings on the morning
of February 26. Geraldine Housel testified that at the meeting
she attended Justet stated the union had their meeting yesterday
and now “I’m going to have mine.” Justet then began to cry and
said that this work was how she supported her family, that she
cared about the employees, that she helped people when they
needed it. Justet said that she was going to fight for the 95 per-
cent of the people who did not want a union, that “they can’t
force us to have one.” Justet said that if the union came in, Re-
spondent would have to pay $2700 a month to the Union. Justet
said she would “love” for the Union to come in because then
she would not be allowed to work on the floor, the Respondent
would have to hire more employees, and the Respondent would
then go broke. Justet said she did not want that to happen for
the 95 percent of the employees because she loved them.
Justet said that she had been able to get improvements at the
plant like air-conditioning, that she had written personal checks
for employees when they needed help, and rehired people who
quit. Justet continued that she had done things for employees,
but she guessed that she could go back to the old ways with no
air-conditioning, only 4 days vacation, and she would not rein-
state employees after they quit. Justet said that the Respondent
had not made any profit in the past year. Justet stated that she
was not sure exactly what she had said in the prior meetings,
but denied that she had previously threatened to close the plant
because of the union. Justet repeated that she would never work
for the Union.
Justet told the employees that just because they had a family
member working at Tracker Marine, “don’t bring that over
here.” (Geraldine Housel’s son worked for Tracker Marine at
the time.) Justet then said that she was going to have employee
Charlene Scott talk about the Union. Scott then discussed why
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1154
she opposed the Union. At the end of the meeting, Justet stated
she knew who the five people were that attended the union
meeting on February 25, and that two of them were Pitts and
Carneal. Justet then nudged Janet Raines, the employee who
had delivered the antiunion petition to the January 25 union
meeting.
Reaves attended the last employee meeting on February 26
and she secretly tape recorded what was said. At this meeting
Justet stated that she had done a lot for the employees: that she
had rehired people “which I shouldn’t of never done, which I
will never do again.” Justet referred to several improvements
that had been made including air-conditioning, health insur-
ance, holiday and vacation pay, and she said, “[W]e should go
back,” “[W]e should just take this and just wipe it out,” and
“[G]o back to what we was six years ago. Everyone like that?”
Justet claimed that Respondent did not make much profit; that a
union would cost Respondent $2700 a month and Respondent
could not afford it. Reaves challenged Justet regarding the
$2700 figure. Justet referred to the unfair labor practice charges
and stated that she would never take Pitts or Carneal back, that
she would fight, “to the president of the United States”; that
lawsuits were expensive; but the cost “doesn’t matter to me. . . .
It’s just profit out of your pocket.”
Justet made statements to the employees about how much
money the Respondent would lose if the Union represented
them and how the Respondent would go broke. I find that when
Justet implied to the employees that unionization would cause
the Respondent to close the plant that this statement violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB
at 490–491.
Justet proclaimed that fighting the Union would cost money,
which would be profit out of the employees’ pocket. Justet also
threatened to take away improvements such as air-conditioning,
insurance, and holiday and vacation benefits if the employees
selected a union. Additionally, Justet threatened to change her
policy on rehiring employees in retaliation for union activities.
Threats to reduce benefits because of employees’ union activi-
ties are coercive of employees’ protected rights. I find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Justet
threatened employees with reduced benefits because of the
Union.
Justet said that she knew that the Union had a meeting the
day before, and that she knew who the five people who went to
the meeting were. I find that Justet’s statement of her knowl-
edge of the union meeting and who attended unlawfully creates
the impression of surveillance of employee’s union activities.
Electro-Voice, Inc., 320 NLRB 1094 (1996). I find that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when Justet made these
statements.
Justet also said that the Respondent did not want a union and
that no one could force the Respondent to have a union. Justet’s
statements that “they can’t force us to have a union,” indicate
the futility of union organization. Additionally, Justet indicated
the futility of union and protected activity of filing board
charges by stating she would fight the unfair labor practice
charges and never take Pitts or Carneal back. I find these state-
ments of the futility of activity protected under the Act are vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
XIV. REAVES SENT HOME
At midmorning on February 26, Jones told Reaves that there
was no work for her and sent her home. Reaves was the only
employee sent home that day. Reaves testified that she knew of
no prior occasion when a single employee was sent home for
lack of work. Rather, a whole line was sent home, or other
work is found for employees to perform. Kathy Housel testified
that she was never sent home when her machine broke or her
line was out of work.
After Reaves left work she spoke to Union Agent Krasovec
who told her he was planning to handbill at the plant the fol-
lowing day. Krasovec asked Reaves to park on the public street
in front of the building the next day so they could handbill from
the car if the sidewalk was private property. Krasovec and
Reaves then drafted a letter to Justet dated February 27 protest-
ing Reaves being sent home early.
XV. REAVES’ FEBRUARY 27 SUSPENSION
Again on February 27 Reaves arrived at work wearing her
union T-shirt, hat, and button. She parked on the public street in
front of the plant in the area the Respondent had posted as “no
parking.” (Krasovec had checked with the local police the day
before and been told the street was public in front of Respon-
dent’s “no parking” sign.) Several employees, including Scott,
told Reaves she should move her car. Reaves told Scott that it
was a public street, anyone could park there, and if Justet
wanted her to move her car, Justet would have to tell her to
move it. Reaves said that Justet’s husband frequently parked
there and had not been towed.
Shortly after Reaves entered the plant Justet called her to the
office. Reaves started up the stairs to the office when Justet
appeared at the top of the stairs. Reaves had a secreted tape
recorder going at the time. Justet told Reaves to move her car.
Reaves asked why. Justet said, “The company says to move
your car.” Reaves replied, “[O]kay.” Justet then said don’t
push me anymore, “cause you think I won’t fire you? I will.”
Reaves said, “Go ahead, fire me if you want.” Justet responded
that she did not “give a shit if your union sues me.” Justet said,
“[D]on’t push me . . . do not park there again, if you want to see
how tough you are, I’ll show you how tough I am.” Justet told
Reaves to go home and to not come back until Justet called her.
Justet then asked Reaves “why don’t we just step outside?”
Reaves replied, “It’s up to you.” Justet’s husband intervened by
yelling “Irene,” and Justet told Reaves to go home and not re-
turn until Justet called her. Reaves then left. Reaves had not had
the chance to give Justet the letter dated February 27 she and
Krasovec had prepared the previous evening.
Reaves immediately contacted Krasovec and they faxed
Justet the February 27 letter. They also faxed her another letter
on union stationary and signed by Reaves regarding Reaves’
suspension. In this letter Reaves asserted that she had been
suspended because of her union activities. Justet faxed a re-
sponse to the Union dated February 27 regarding the reduction
in Reaves’ incentive rate, and Reaves’ suspension.
At approximately 11 a.m., Justet telephoned Krasovec and
accused him of harassing her. Reaves and Pitts handbilled at
about 2:30 p.m. on the sidewalk outside the entrance to the
facility. The handbilling continued for 20–30 minutes. Justet
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1155
observed Reaves handbilling. The handbill referred to the pend-
ing unfair labor practice charges and was titled “Aren’t You A
Little Tired Of Being Bullied, Manipulated, Ridiculed and Lied
To By Irene!! Is Your Job at Bolivar Tee’s and Your Fear of
Irene Worth Possible Perjury Charges for Lying to the Federal
Government.”
XVI. DISCHARGE OF REAVES
On March 4 Reaves received a termination letter dated
March 2 signed by Justet, Dianne Jones as “plant supervisor”
and by Jerry Justet as “office manager.” Justet’s letter charac-
terizes the February 27 conversation where Reaves was sus-
pended. Justet’s letter states that in response to Justet’s direc-
tion to move her car, Reaves replied that she was union. The
tape recorded conversation does not disclose this is what was
said. I credit the tape recorded version as being accurate.
Reaves denied other assertions made in the letter including the
claim Reaves dropped a cigarette butt on the sidewalk, and that
she flipped Justet off during the conversation. I credit Reaves’
denials.
The “no parking” area of the public street was a creation of
the Respondent. It was not recognized by the city as a legiti-
mate prohibition against parking. The record shows that Justet’s
husband parked there without repercussion. Other employees
who violated Respondent’s no parking rules were verbally
warned. The only employee, other than Reaves, who was disci-
plined for violation of no parking rules, was Heidi Shannon.
Shannon was issued a written warning and sent home for a day
after she repeatedly parked in a no parking area. Reaves had no
disciplinary record while working for the Respondent.
XVII. ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS INVOLVING DARLA
REAVES
A. Reduction in Incentive Rate
Reaves was assigned to a lesser paying piece rate without
satisfactory explanation. This occurred shortly after Reaves
refused to sign two antiunion petitions and solicited fellow
employees to attend union meetings. As set forth below this
action was a precursor to additional adverse action against
Reaves that quickly followed. I infer from the record as a whole
that the unexplained reduction in piecework pay was the result
of Reaves’ protected concerted activities. I find that such con-
duct by the Respondent is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
B. Being Sent Home
Reaves was singled out on February 26 as the only person
sent home for lack of work. Reaves was singular for another
reason that day—she was the only employee wearing a union
hat, button, and T-shirt. Moreover, Reaves questioned Justet’s
statement at the employee meeting that day that the Union
would cost the Respondent $2700 a month if it represented the
employees. Reaves was sent home for alleged lack of work.
Respondent did not satisfactorily explain why only Reaves was
sent home or the exact cause that required this unusual action. I
find from the record as a whole that the reason Reaves was
removed from work on February 26 was her protected union
activities. I find this action was a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act. Wright Line, supra.
C. Suspension
Reaves suspension allegedly for parking in the front of the
Respondent’s self-constructed “no parking” sign on a public
street was shown to be a pretext. Others who violated a com-
pany parking policy were verbally warned. Only a repeated
offender had ever been sent home. There was no legal prohibi-
tion to parking in that area. Finally, as the tape reveals, Reaves
immediately acquiesced to Justet’s command to move her car.
Justet’s rage at Reaves nonetheless continued and Justet said
she did not care if the Union sued her. Justet then challenged
Reaves to fight. I find that Reaves’ suspension was a direct
result of her union activities and that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) when it suspended Reaves on February
27.
D. Discharge
Reaves credibly denied that she flipped off Justet at the point
of her being suspended. Based on the demeanor of the respec-
tive witnesses, and the record as a whole, I do not credit Justet
and Jones’ testimony to the contrary. The tape reveals that de-
spite Reaves immediately agreeing to move her car, Justet
raged at her. Respondent’s widespread union animus, Reaves’
status as a visible union advocate, and Respondent’s lack of a
credible, nondiscriminatory basis to support its termination of
Reaves, I find, establish Reaves was discharged in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Wright Line, supra.
XVIII. INCIDENTS OF MARCH 2
On the morning of March 2, Justet announced there were
doughnuts for employees at breaktime. Justet added she could
not say why she was providing doughnuts to employees, be-
cause she did not want another lawsuit filed against her. At the
break, Charlene Scott passed out antiunion T-shirts and told
employees that the doughnuts were for antiunion people only,
that the union people could get their own doughnuts.
The Respondent provided doughnuts to employees under cir-
cumstances that suggested to employees that the doughnuts
were provided only for antiunion employees. I find this dispa-
rate treatment of employees because of their union sympathies
is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
XIX. GERALDINE HOUSEL
Employee Geraldine Housel (Housel) and her daughter-in-
law Kathy Housel worked for the Respondent. Housel’s son
works at Tracker Marine where the noted union organizational
campaign was occurring. Housel refused to sign the February 2
antiunion petition that Jones was circulating to employees. In
declining to sign, Housel told Jones she thought that it was
illegal for Jones to be distributing the petition. Housel attended
union meetings conducted by the UFCW and the Union. She
signed union authorization cards for both organizations. Housel
also declined to sign a second antiunion petition on February
25. Housel was one of the five employees who attended the
February 25 union meeting where employee Janet Raines de-
livered an antiunion petition to Krasovec. Raines observed
Housel’s presence at that meeting. Justet stated at the February
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1156
26 employee meetings that she knew who the five employees
were who had attended the union meeting the night before. On
March 2 Scott asked Housel if she would like an antiunion T-
shirt. Housel responded that she would put a big button over the
no and it would work fine.
Immediately after Justet’s February 26 employee meeting,
Housel told Floor Supervisor Jones that it was hard to work in
an environment “where you feel threatened and harassed.”
Housel was soon summoned to see Justet in the lunchroom.
Also present were Jones and employee Charlene Scott. Justet
told Housel that she never threatened Housel. Housel responded
that she felt threatened. Justet repeatedly asked Housel why she
felt threatened and Housel responded that it was the statements
made at the meetings. Justet wanted to know what she had said
that caused Housel to feel threatened. Housel said that the ref-
erences about union dues going to the Mafia made her feel
threatened. Justet responded that Housel should have her head
examined and demanded Housel to repeat specifically what she
had said about the Mafia. Housel attempted to do so, but Justet
and Scott met her efforts with laughter. Scott told Housel that
she did not know what she was talking about. Justet demanded
that Housel give additional examples and Housel did so. Scott
heatedly denied that the examples cited by Housel had oc-
curred. Scott angrily came physically close to Housel and asked
if she “was accusing her of being a liar.” Justet pushed Scott
away from Housel.
Justet stated that she had never threatened Housel when
Housel did not make her production rate, that she had only
made notes for her to come up to standards. At the end of the
meeting, Justet turned to Jones and said that Housel felt threat-
ened because Housel had attended the union meeting the night
before. After the meeting, Jones came to Housel’s work area.
Jones changed Housel’s work assignment from small sleeves to
large size sleeves. According to Housel this made it more diffi-
cult for her to achieve her production rate.
The Government alleges that during this meeting Scott, act-
ing as the agent of the Respondent, interrogated Housel con-
cerning her union activity and physically threatened Housel.
While I found Housel to be a forthright witness as a whole, her
account of this meeting was confused and she exhibited poor
recollection of what was said. I do not find that her testimony
was persuasive that Scott was acting as the Respondent’s agent
at this meeting. I conclude that what Scott said and did on this
occasion has not been proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
XX. EVENTS OF MARCH 3
On March 3, Housel arrived at work to find that her work
chair seat had been soaked with oil. The matter was reported to
Justet, who obtained another chair for Housel. At midmorning
Justet called Housel into the office and gave her a written warn-
ing for low production. The warning stated that Housel should
have made rate at $5.15 an hour by the end of her 8th week of
employment. Housel typically did not make production during
her 6 months of employment with the Respondent. She had
never before received a written warning concerning her produc-
tion.
Before 11:30 a.m. Justet announced over the public address
system that employees with antiunion T-shirts should go or
report to the lunchroom. The antiunion employees met with
Justet for awhile and then went outside. A crew from a local
TV station was outside the plant and filmed the employees
conducting an antiunion demonstration. Antiunion banners
were hung on the side of the building, and the banners re-
mained posted the rest of the week.
A few employees did not join in the demonstration and re-
mained inside the facility working until the beginning of the
lunch break at 11:30 a.m. The employees who remained at
work included Housel, Kathy Housel, and Nona Box. As the
antiunion employees left, Housel asked Jones what was going
on. Jones responded that Housel would not be interested be-
cause the employees were engaged in antiunion activities. Dur-
ing the antiunion demonstration, Justet commented to Housel
that there were not many employees left inside working.
XXI. DISCHARGE OF NONA BOX
Employee Nona Box signed the first antiunion petition on
February 2 but declined to sign the second petition circulated
on February 25. Box accepted a handbill when the Union hand-
billed at the plant on February 27. On March 2, Box declined
an employee’s offer of an antiunion T-shirt. On Box’s refusal to
accept the shirt, the employee told Box, “Why don’t you work
somewhere else then.” When Box reported for work on March
3, employee Charlene Scott asked her where her antiunion T-
shirt was.
Later in the morning of March 3, Box asked Justet if she
could do anything about all the antiunion activity in the plant.
Justet responded that she could not help how her employees
felt. Box then said if the employees were so strong in their
nonunion beliefs, there should be a vote to “get this all over
with.” Justet responded that she could not do that.
Box remained at work during the antiunion demonstration
outside the facility on the morning on March 3. During the
demonstration, Box told Justet that her father had been a union
man for 31 years and that there was no way that Box could
wear an antiunion T-shirt.
At about 1 p.m., Charlene Scott accused Box of stabbing her
nippers at Scott that morning. Box denied having done such an
act. Scott stood immediately behind where Box was seated at
her workstation and made a derogatory statement about Box’s
boyfriend. Scott worked about 20 feet from Box’s station. Sub-
sequently Box went to Justet’s office to complain about Scott’s
harassment. Scott was already in the office with Justet. Box
commented to Scott that what happened between her and her
boyfriend was none of Scott’s business. Box told Scott that Box
did not have to wear an antiunion T-shirt if she did not want to.
Scott “got into Box’s face” and yelled that Box was not as bad
as Box thought she was. Box responded that she had a temper
and it was her right not to wear an antiunion T-shirt. Box asked
Justet if she was going to do anything about the matter. Justet
shrugged her shoulders but did not reply verbally. Box said she
could not work under those conditions and that she was giving
her 2 weeks notice. Justet did not say anything. Box then re-
turned to work and completed her shift.
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1157
Box discovered her timecard was missing when she reported
to work on March 4. Justet called Box into the office and, in the
presence of Floor Supervisor Jones, told Box that she was ter-
minating Box. Justet said Box had not been making quota. Box
said that she was going to ask Justet to withdraw her 2 weeks
notice because everyone had been angry the day before. Justet
responded that she could not permit that. Box had never re-
ceived any written warnings regarding her production but on
one occasion had been told by Jones that she needed to speed
up her production.
Box had made clear that she was not antiunion. She refused
to sign the second antiunion petition and declined offers of
antiunion T-shirts. Box asked Justet to stop the antiunion activ-
ity at the plant. Box did not join in the March 3 antiunion dem-
onstration and told Justet on that date that she could never wear
an antiunion shirt because her father had been union for 30
years. When Box complained to Justet about harassment from
antiunion employee Scott Justet answered with silence. The
Respondent’s brief asserts that Box was not discharged but
rather her resignation was accepted. I find the record supports
the conclusion that Box was indeed terminated before she could
rescind her hasty resignation. Box’s discharge was timed with
her refusal to engage in antiunion activity and requests that
Justet end such activity. The Respondent did not satisfactorily
explain why Box’s alleged production problems were a factor
in accepting her “accepting her resignation.” She had received
little criticism about such problems. The record confirms that
production standards were routinely overlooked for other em-
ployees. I find that the discharge of Box was not shown by the
Respondent to be legitimately tied to any work problems. I
conclude from the record as a whole that at least part of the
motivation for the termination was Box’s protected activity of
refusing to engage in antiunion conduct with other employees. I
find that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act by terminating Nona Box. Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied
455 U.S. 989 (1982).
XXII. HOUSEL’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHARLENE
SCOTT
On March 4 the Respondent reassigned Scott to a new work-
station that was immediately between Housel and her daughter-
in-law. Scott had not previously worked in Housel’s work area.
As of this date the Housels were the only persons still em-
ployed by the Respondent that had attended the February 25
union meeting.3 Following the reassignment Scott made sev-
eral comments to Housel including that if Housel was not a
union supporter, she might be able to make production; and that
Scott was “one of Irene’s people you are scared to death of.”
Housel told Scott to leave her alone. Later in the afternoon
Housel complained to Justet about Scott’s harassment. Justet
said she would check into the matter. Subsequently Scott ap-
proached Housel and said Housel had gotten her in trouble,
now “it was on,” and that she would continue to talk to Housel.
Scott continued to make comments to Housel and again Housel

3 Kathy Housel voluntarily quit her employment with the Respon-
dent on March 5.
told Scott to leave her alone. Scott responded that she was not
going to leave Housel alone.
On the evening of March 4 the Union held an employee
meeting. In attendance were Pitts, Carneal, Reaves, Geraldine,
Housel, and Kathy Housel. At the meeting Krasovec helped
Housel write a letter to Justet dated March 5 regarding Scott’s
harassment of Housel.
XXIII. 24-HOUR DEADLINE FOR HOUSEL
When Housel arrived at work on March 5 Scott told her, “I
see you’re still here.” Early the same morning Housel gave
Jones the letter she and Krasovec had prepared the night before.
Later in the morning while Housel was working, Justet ran up
to her, pointed her finger in Housel’s face and told her never to
look at Justet while Justet was on the floor.
Justet subsequently called Housel to the lunchroom. Housel
secretly tape recorded their conversation. Justet angrily ques-
tioned Housel about the fact Housel’s husband (who does not
work for the Respondent) had complained to the local newspa-
per about its coverage of the March 3 antiunion demonstration.
Housel denied having any knowledge regarding her husband’s
actions. Justet told Housel that Justet was going to confront
Housel’s husband in the parking lot that night about the matter.
Justet continued:

[T]his is a bunch of bullshit. I gave you a job here. You don’t
even earn your money that we pay you, but you continue to
stay here. And the company allows you to. But you go on and
on and on with this bullshit.

Housel complained that Scott was harassing her. Justet re-
sponded, “[W]ell then, why are you calling the newspaper
about me?” Justet objected to Housel talking to her husband
about what went on at work; and said, “If your husband knows
anything about me it came from you.” Housel responded that
her husband knew that she was stressed “because of all this
union stuff.” Justet denied that she had ever talked to Housel
about the Union. Housel pointed out that Justet talked about the
Union at the employee meetings. Housel again denied that she
had anything to do with her husband talking to the newspaper.
Justet angrily replied:

Yes, you do. Yes, you do. You have everything to do with it.
Because you’re the only one that can tell him, because that
man don’t know me.

Justet told Housel if she wanted to fire Housel she could be-
cause “after eight weeks of being here, the company does not
have to keep you if you do not make your piece rate.” Justet
said, “I have every grounds to fire you, if I wanted to fire you.”
Housel pointed out that employee Jolene Moore had been em-
ployed 3 years and Moore did not make rate. Justet responded
that Moore made her rate “off and on.” At the end of the meet-
ing Justet said: “I’m going to give you . . . one day to bring
your production up. One day. That’s it.” Housel asked what
would happen if she didn’t bring her production up. Justet re-
sponded, “Then you don’t have a job here. One day.” Housel
asked why the Respondent had kept her 6 months. Justet re-
sponded, “[B]ecause I was hoping you’d come up.” Justet re-
peated for the third time that Housel had 1 day to bring her
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1158
production rate up, and if she did not make the production rate,
“you’re not gonna work here.” The meeting concluded with
Housel saying that Scott had been harassing her. Justet re-
sponded that Scott “ain’t going to bother you.”
That evening Justet confronted Housel’s husband in the
parking lot after work. Again Housel taped this conversation.
Justet angrily accosted Clyde Housel by saying, “Well, let me
tell you what, you son-of-a-bitch, you don’t work for me. So
why did you go down to the newspaper.” During the conversa-
tion Justet told Clyde Housel to “get out of that car and I’ll
show you, you don’t scare me.”
Justet’s questioning of Housel on March 5 centered on Clyde
Housel’s union activity and Geraldine Housel’s role in that
activity. Justet blamed Housel for her husband’s actions. Justet
admitted that the Respondent had been very tolerant of Hou-
sel’s substandard production. Justet, however, was angry at the
Housels’ support for the Union and changed her tolerance to a
24-hour deadline, which if not met, would lead to Geraldine’s
discharge. Justet’s sudden imposition of a stringent production
requirement and the accompanying threat of discharge were the
result of Housel’s protected concerted union activity. I find that
this conduct was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
XXIV. GERALDINE HOUSEL’S MARCH 6
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
A. Scott’s Threats
On March 6 after Housel arrived at work Scott came up to
her. Scott told Housel she was “a fat ugly pig.” Shortly thereaf-
ter Justet conducted a series of employee meetings to discuss
two letters the Union had sent the Respondent. The subject
matter of the letters included the issue of whether Floor Super-
visor Jones and antiunion employee Charlene Scott were agents
of Respondent. After the meeting both Jones and Scott wore
buttons that said “agent.”
After the employee meetings Scott again harangued Housel
at her workstation. Scott told Housel that she was going to kick
Housel’s ass. Scott then kicked a box on the floor by Housel’s
workstation. Housel tape recorded part of this conversation.
Scott said, “Let’s take this outside, right now.” Housel re-
sponded, “I’m just sitting here sewing.” Scott said, “You get
outside right now.” Housel said, “Leave me alone.” Scott re-
sponded, “I will not leave you alone.”
B. Justet’s Refusal to Intervene
After Scott’s provocations Housel wrote a note to Justet
complaining about Scott’s conduct:

Right after that meeting Charlene Scott said that she was go-
ing to kick my butt she also stated to me she was an agent of
the company and was wearing a sticker saying she was. If she
attacks me when I go outside I consider the company is also
responsible.

Justet then called Housel into the office. Housel tape re-
corded this conversation. Justet told Housel that Respondent
did not have agents; and that Housel was responsible for her-
self; Respondent was not her protector. Housel stated Scott was
threatening to kick her butt. Justet responded that the Respon-
dent was not a babysitter. Justet said, “If a woman was harass-
ing me, I’d step outside with her. And I’d say okay, let’s han-
dle it. Let’s settle it right now. We can’t settle it in the factory,
let’s settle it outside.” Housel repeated that Scott would not
leave her alone. Justet stated, “The company is not responsible
for another machine operator.” Justet drew the analogy that
Respondent was not responsible for damage to an employee’s
car while the employee was working. Justet said that she was
not a protector or a babysitter. Justet said that she did not be-
lieve Housel’s statements about Scott because Justet knew
Housel “made up lies on me.” Housel asked what lies, but
Justet declined to explain. Justet reiterated that unless Housel
made her production rate by the end of the day, “you’re auto-
matically terminated.”
Housel was convinced that she was going to be terminated
that day. Housel testified that she could not have made her
production rate even if she had stayed and worked until the end
of the shift. After the lunchbreak Housel told Jones that she
knew that she would be terminated at the end of the day and
asked for her check so she could leave before the shift ended.
Jones obtained Housel’s check and Housel left.
There are two elements that must be proven to establish a
constructive discharge. First, the burden imposed on the em-
ployee must cause, and be intended to cause, a change in his
working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to
resign. Second, it must be shown that those burdens were im-
posed because of the employee’s union activities. Crystal
Princeton Refining Co., 222 NLRB 1068, 1069 (1976).
The record supports the Government’s showing of illegal
motivation by the Respondent in causing the constructive dis-
charge of Housel. The timing of her termination was contempo-
raneous with her union activity of attending union meetings,
signing authorization cards, and her declining to participate in
antiunion activity at the plant. Justet knew that Housel attended
the February 25 union meeting. Housel and her husband had
incurred Justet’s wrath for his complaint that the local newspa-
per was telling only part of the story about union support at the
plant. Justet blamed Geraldine Housel for her role in her hus-
band’s union activities. I find that the Respondent had knowl-
edge of Housel’s union activities. The record as set forth herein
amply demonstrates Respondent’s union animus. Wright Line,
251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
Although Housel had worked for the Respondent for some 6
months she did not consistently make her production rate. This
had never resulted in any discipline. Yet when Housel and her
husband’s union activities became an issue, Justet imposed a
24-hour deadline for improvement. There is no evidence that
other employees had ever been given such a deadline for im-
provement. To the contrary the record shows that the Respon-
dent was tolerant of low production by employees.
The Respondent ignored Scott’s harassment of Housel. This
despite the fact the conduct was occurring on the plant premises
and was of obvious serious concern to Housel. The Respondent
does not satisfactorily explain Justet’s condonation of Scott’s
conduct. On March 6, Scott threatened physical violence to
Housel but Justet continued to ignore this workplace threat to
an employee. The solution Justet suggested was for Housel to
BOLIVAR TEE’S MFG. CO. 1159
invite Scott “outside” so they could settle their differences.
Justet then again warned Housel that if she did not make pro-
duction that day she was terminated.
The record shows that Housel was harassed because of her
union sympathies and the Respondent condoned this activity.
Additionally, the Respondent imposed an immediate disparate
production improvement deadline on Housel for reasons I find
were based on her and her husband’s union activities. I con-
clude that when Housel resigned in the face of this ill treatment
she was constructively discharged. I find that Housel’s con-
structive discharge is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Bolivar Tee’s Manufacturing Company is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association Local Un-
ion #146, affiliated with Sheet Metal Workers’ International
Association, AFL–CIO, and United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not violated the Act except as herein
specified.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, Bolivar Tee’s Manufacturing Company,
Bolivar, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Prohibiting union solicitation and activities.
(b) Threatening employees with the loss of pay and benefits
if they engage in union activity or if a union represents the
employees.
(c) Threatening employees that the Respondent’s plant will
close if a union represents the employees.
(d) Telling employees they should quit their jobs if they do
not like the Respondent’s unlawfully threatened antiunion ac-
tions.
(e) Having Respondent’s agents circulate antiunion petitions
for employees to sign.
(f) Interrogating employees about union activities.
(g) Creating the impression that the Respondent is sur-
veilling its employees’ union activities.

4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(h) Threatening employees that union representation, collec-
tive bargaining, or other protected concerted activity would be
futile.
(i) Threatening employees with physical violence or other re-
taliation because they file charges with the National Labor Re-
lations Board or engage in other union or protected concerted
activity.
(j) Sending employees home early or reducing employees’
incentive wages because they engage in union or other pro-
tected concerted activities.
(k) Disparately providing benefits to employees based on
their antiunion activities.
(l) Issuing production warnings or improvement deadlines to
employees because they engaged in union or other protected
concerted activity.
(m) Condoning harassment of employees because of their
union or other protected concerted activities.
(n) Suspending or discharging Donna Pitts, Angela Carneal,
Darla Reaves, Nona Box, and Geraldine Housel for engaging in
union or other concerted protected activities.
(o) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Donna
Pitts, Angela Carneal, Darla Reaves, Nona Box, and Geraldine
Housel full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Donna Pitts, Angela Carneal, Darla Reaves, Nona
Box, and Geraldine Housel whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them, computed on a quarterly basis, less any net interim earn-
ings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289
(1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful suspensions and dis-
charges of Donna Pitts, Angela Carneal, Darla Reaves, Nona
Box, and Geraldine Housel, and within 3 days thereafter notify
the employees in writing that this has been done and that their
suspensions and discharges will not be used against them in any
way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Bolivar, Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1160
Regional Director for Region 17, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since January 9, 1998. Excel Corp., 325 NLRB 17
(1997).
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.