Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 27, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 1069 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

BIG THREE INDUSTRIAL GAS & EQUIPMENT CO.
Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment
Company and Oil , Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union. Case
23-CA-2479
June 27, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN
AND JENKINS
On March 21, 1967, Trial Examiner Robert Cohn
issued his Decision in the above-entitled case,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire
record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner. i
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Big Three
Industrial Gas & Equipment Company, Beaumont,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
' The Trial Examiner, in finding that Respondent discharged
Chance in violation of Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act, relied in part on
Respondent 's hostility "to the unionization of its employees as
indicated by its violent reaction to organizational activities in the
past ," citing Big Three Welding Equipment Company, 145 NLRB
1685 In adopting his findings in this regard , we take notice of the
fact that in December 1963, Big Three Welding Equipment
Company merged with various affiliates and, in November 1964,
adopted its present title of Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment
Company ( 1966 Moody ' s Industrial Manual , pp. 718-719;
Standard & Poor's Standard Corporation Descriptions,
April-May, Vols A-B, p. 7463 (1967 )) We further note that both
cases arise in Respondent 's Sabine, Texas, district
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1069
ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner: This case was heard
before me at Beaumont, Texas, on December 16, 1966,'
pursuant to a charge filed August 22, by Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union (herein the Union),
and a complaint issued November 1, by the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. Big Three
Industrial Gas and Equipment Company (herein the
Respondent or Company), by its duly filed answer,
admitted the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint but
generally denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices. The issues presented for decision are:
(1) whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein
the Act), by discharging, on or about February 24, its
employee Dewey Chance, and thereafter failing and
refusing to reinstate him; and (2) whether the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, on or about March 10,
by interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, membership, and desires.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
All waived oral argument at the conclusion of the case. A
posthearing brief was received from counsel for the
General Counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS2
1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Discriminatory Discharge of Dewey
Chance
Respondent, a corporation engaged in the manufacture
and sale of oxygen, nitrogen, and argon, maintains plants
and related facilities at several different locations in the
State of Texas, as well as elsewhere. However, we are here
concerned only with its Sabine district, which includes the
operations at Beaumont, Orange, and Port Arthur, Texas.
One Harold R. Johnston is the manager of the Sabine
district.
Dewey Chance was first employed by the Company as a
truckdriver at the Orange plant in the fall of 1962. He
worked at that location until approximately March 1964
when he became an office clerk at the Respondent's newly
established office in Beaumont. In addition to Chance,
there was another office clerk, Richard Resch, and an
office manager, Shannon. Also on the same acreage as the
Beaumont office, but detached from it, was a
Unless otherwise noted, all dates herein refer to the year 1966
z There is no issue as to the Board's jurisdiction or labor
organization The complaint alleges sufficient facts, which are
admitted by answer, upon which I may, and do hereby, find that
the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization, within the meaning of the Act. The
Board has asserted junsdiction over this Employer in the past.
See Big Three Welding Equipment Company, 145 NLRB 1685. (1
am advised by posthearing telegram from the General Counsel
that the Respondent is a successor to Big Three Welding
Equipment Company Such telegram has been marked as TX's
Exh 1, and placed in the file.)
165 NLRB No. 113
1070 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
manufacturing plant . The total operation in Beaumont
involved approximately 25 employees.
The primary duties of an office clerk were those of an
inside salesman . That is, sales were made by telephone
and over the counter. The responsibilities of Chance and
Resch were identical, as were their rates of pay.
In approximately November 1965, Resch and Chance,
believing their wages to be substandard,3 commenced
discussions on how best to deal with the problem. In
addition to discussions while at work, there was a meeting
that month at Resch's house during the evening hours. In
attendance, in addition to Chance and Resch, were
employees Donnelly and O'Grady. The discussion -
centered around the alternatives of whether to attempt to
achieve a raise in wages by going directly to the
Company's president or by organizing a labor union. It
seemed that Resch favored the former alternative while
Chance was more inclined to the latter. However, no
definite action was agreed upon at that time.
On or about January 19, Chance and Resch asked
Shannon to set up a meeting for them with District
Manager Johnston to discuss their complaints. The four of
them met in Johnston's office after working hours that
afternoon. In addition to the matter of wages, they
complained about the Respondent's hiring new persons for
the better jobs (such as outside salesmen) instead of
upgrading incumbent employees.4 Johnston replied that
he would contact his superiors at the Company's Houston
headquarters to see what could be done about raising the
wage scale, and that he would consider the complainants
for any sales openings in his area.
In a matter of a couple weeks following the January 19
meeting, Chance received a 5-cent-per-hour wage
increase.5 Johnston also reported to the complainants that
Harry Smith (Respondent's board chairman) had advised
that if any sales positions arose in the Houston area,
Chance and Resch would be considered because they had
seniority.
Chance, being dissatisfied with these results, contacted
the Union and subsequently met with its representative,
Harry Burk, on February 18, at a cafe in Port Arthur,
Texas. They decided to call an organizational meeting
among the Beaumont employees to be held at the union
hall in Port Arthur on February 21. It was Chance's
responsibility to contact employees and notify them of the
meeting.
Only three employees attended the union meeting on
February 21: Chance, Donnelly, and Caudillo. Resch
accompanied Chance to the hall but did not attend the
meeting because, as he testified, he thought they ought to
give the president of the Company the first opportunity to
remedy the grievances.
While at the union hall, Chance telephoned several
more employees in an attempt to get them to come to the
meeting; however, none came. During the meeting, the
three who attended signed union cards.
' Their wage rate was approximately $ 1 per hour less than the
prevailing rate for the operators in the plant.
' Although the office clerks were considered salesmen to the
extent that they performed that function by telephone in the
office, the outside salesmen's jobs were apparently more
desirable from the standpoint of pay and possibility of
advancement with the Company
5 Resch also received a similar increase but could not recall
whether it was in January or February It may be reasonably
assumed that he received his increase at the same time as
Chance Shannon did not testify
The following day, at the plant, Chance solicited several
of the employees on behalf of the Union.
On February 24, Chance walked into Johnston's office
to advise him of a telephone call. The latter requested that
Chance remain in the office as he had something to tell
him. When Johnston completed the telephone call, he
advised Chance that he had just talked with Board
Chairman Smith, who directed that there would have to be
one office clerk in the Beaumont office laid off, and that it
would have to be Chance because he had less seniority
than Resch.6 Chance reminded Johnston that he had
previous experience as a truckdriver and possessed
seniority over one truckdriver who had been with the
Company only 5 weeks. However, Johnston testified that
company policy was not to "bump down" in seniority
because an employee is usually unhappy if he returns to a
lower paying job.
Chance raised with Johnston the question of a letter,
posted on the bulletin board, in which the Company was
soliciting operator-trainees to be utilized in new plants
which the Company planned in California. Johnston
replied that it would be 4 or 5 months before such
operators were needed and that there were no present
openings there.
Finally, Chance advised that he would transfer to any
other plant of the Company, at his own expense, and take
any job. Johnston replied that he would "check with
Houston" to see if there were any openings and would let
Chance know the following day. In a telephone
conversation the next day, Johnston advised Chance that
he had conferred with the Houston office but there were
no openings at that time at any of the Company's facilities.
At the end of the discussion, Johnston promised Chance a
letter of recommendation which was subsequently
delivered to him (see G.C. Exh. 3).7 This telephone
conversation was the last contact between the two men.
Chance was never recalled to work, nor did he ever solicit
employment from the Company again. Several weeks later
Chance obtained employment from another company in
Beaumont, which circumstance became known to the
Respondent shortly thereafter.
B. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
About 2 weeks following Chance's termination,
Johnston called John Donnelly into his office to discuss a
complaint about his work. After that discussion was
concluded, Johnston asked Donnelly if he had signed a
union card, to which the latter replied, "No, sir."8
Johnston then inquired if he had received any sort of union
literature in the mail, and Donnelly again replied, "No."
As Donnelly was preparing to leave, Johnston asserted
that he had heard that three men had signed union cards;
however, he did not mention the name of the Union or the
names of the three individuals. Donnelly did not respond
to this last statement of Johnston.'
6 Johnston testified that it was his (Johnston's) decision to lay
off Chance rather than Resch because of the seniority factor, and
that Smith "didn't mention any names "
° The foregoing findings respecting the exit interview, and
subsequent events, are based upon the testimony of Chance
which is either undemed or is essentially corroborated by
Johnston
' The fact is, of course, that he actually had signed a card at the
union hall on February 21
9 The foregoing findings are based upon the credited testimony
of Donnelly, who impressed me as a candid and forthright
witness.
BIG THREE INDUSTRIAL GAS & EQUIPMENT CO.
Concluding Findings
A. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violation
It is well established that in order to prevail in this type
of an 8(a)(3) case, the burden of proof is upon the General
Counsel to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the "true purpose" or "real motive" for the termination of
Dewey Chance was to discourage union membership.1°
General Counsel established a prima facie case of
violation by proving that Chance was the investigator and
leading union adherent in the Respondent's Beaumont
facility; that the circumstances were such as to bring this
fact to the attention of Respondent's officials; that the
Respondent was hostile to the unionization of its
employees as indicated by its violent reaction to
organizational activities in the past" and by continuing to
engage in coercive conduct as reflected by Johnston's
statements to Donnelly; that Chance was terminated
abruptly after the union activities commenced; and that
such a layoff was contrary to an established company
policy which provided that an alternative job would be
found for any employee who was subject to being laid off
because of a contraction or elimination of his job
classification.
The Respondent's position on this issue, as reflected by
the testimony of Johnston at the hearing,'2 is that Chance
was laid off on the stated date because of a necessity to
diminish the office force at Beaumont (something which
the executive officers of Respondent had assertedly been
pressuring Johnston to do for a period of over a year), and
that, in any event, Johnston was not aware of Chance's
union activities at the time of layoff.
It is true that there is no direct evidence of company
knowledge of Chance's union activities prior to the
termination. However, "[i]t has been well established that
direct evidence is not necessary to support a finding of
knowledge but that such knowledge may be inferred by
the Board from the record as a whole." 13 From the small
size of the Respondent's operation in Beaumont, plus the
credited testimony of Donnelly that Johnston told him
subsequent to the events that he had heard that three men
had signed union cards (which was, of course, the fact, and
Chance was one of the three). I would find that such
evidence provides the basis for a reasonable inference that
Johnston knew of Chance' s union activities at the time of
the layoff.14
Of course, engagement in union activities does not
immunize an employee from layoff if, in fact, economic
necessity was the "real reason" which prompted the
Employer's action. In this case, however, Respondent's
defense does not, in my opinion, withstand close scrutiny.
In the first place, it appears contradictory that if, in fact,
Respondent had been contemplating a reduction in the
office force for over a year assertedly because of economic
10 Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union
v. N L R B, 347 U S 17, NLRB. v Brown, d/bla Brown Food
Store, 380 US 278
11 Big Three Welding Equipment Company, 145 NLRB 1685,
enforcement granted in part and denied in part 359 F 2d 77
(C A 5).
12 This, along with the Respondent' s answer, is the only source
which I had to glean the Respondent's position since I was not
favored with a brief
13 Texas Industries , Inc , 156 NLRB 423,424
"See Malone Knitting Company, 152 NLRB 643, and cases
cited at page 647, enfd. 358 F 2d 880 (C A 1)
15 Although this testimony was undenied-indeed, it was
1071
reasons, it would have granted a wage increase to the
office clerks in January (less than a month prior to the
layoff); secondly, it seems more than coincidental that the
layoff occurred only 3 days following the first union
meeting even though, as previously noted, Johnston
testified that he had been pressured for over a year to
shorten the office force.15 This sort of timing has often
been held to be an indicia of discriminatory motivation.1'
In this connection, I note that once the decision was made,
Respondent made no effort to give any advance warning,
but effected the termination immediately, in the middle of
a pay period. Such precipitate action, without economic
justification, clearly reflects adversely upon the
Respondent's asserted reason.
Thirdly, attention is called to a statement of Chairman
of the Board (then President) Harry Smith who, in 1962,
told a group of employees that there had never been a
layoff in his Company and that before he would have a
layoff he would find a place to transfer an employee. While
the probative weight of such statement is somewhat
diminished because of remoteness, it remains unqualified
and uncontradicted. Thus I have considered it in viewing
the failure of Johnston to give to Chance, at the exit
interview, the slightest ray of hope of securing future
employment with Respondent even though Chance offered
to take any job and transfer to any other location at his own
expense.
Finally, I have considered that, in July, when an opening
in the Beaumont office did occur due to Resch's transfer,
Respondent upgraded a truckdriver to fill the position
rather than attempt to contact Chance, contrary to
Johnston's promise during the last telephone conversation
between the two men. Johnston also conceded that, at
about this time, the Company employed some new
truckdrivers (a job for which Chance was admittedly
qualified) without attempted notification of Chance.
I am aware that Respondent would argue, in support of
its position of economic necessity, that it did not fill
Chance's post following the layoff. It may well be that
Respondent could have operated, and did operate, the
Beaumont office with one less office clerk (although I note
Resch's testimony that after Chance left, the Company's
dispatcher would fill in from time to time to catch tele-
phone calls), this does not detract from my conviction,
based upon the evidence in the record as a whole, that
Respondent effected the termination, at the time it did,
because of the inception of the union activities and with
a deliberate purpose "to scotch the lawful measures of
the employees before they had progressed too far toward
friction." "
I, therefore, find and conclude that by terminating
Dewey Chance on February 24, and thereafter failing and
refusing to reinstate him, Respondent discriminated
against an employee in order to discourage union
corroborated by Resch-I am not convinced of its truthfulness
Johnston (Respondent's only witness) impressed me more as one
who was primarily interested in testifying consistently with the
Respondent 's theory of the case instead of adhering strictly to the
truth Resch, although appearing as a witness for the General
Counsel, was obviously reluctant , and was referred to by
Respondent 's counsel as his client.
1s N.L R B v Edward F Tepper, d/b/a Shoenberg Farms, 297
F 2d 280 (C A 10), Martin Sprocket & Gear Co., Inc v. N L.R.B ,
329 F 2d 417 (C A 5), N L R.B v. Council Manufacturing Corp ,
334 F.2d 161 (C.A 8), and cases cited therein
17 N L R B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp , 211 F 2d 725, 726
(C A. 2)
1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
membership, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the THE REMEDY
Act, and I will recommend an appropriate remedy.
B. Respecting the Alleged 8(a)(1) Violation
I have heretofore found, based upon the credited
testimony of John Donnelly, that several weeks following
Chance's termination, Johnston interrogated Donnelly
concerning whether the latter had signed a union card, and
also advised that he knew that three employees had signed
union cards. It is now well established that this kind of
interrogation, occurring in the solemnity of a district
manager's private office, without legitimate purpose or
qualified by assurances against recrimination, constitutes
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.18 I so find.
H. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section I,
above, occurring in connection with the interstate
operations of Respondent, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the record as a whole, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Big Three Industrial Gas and Equipment Company,
Respondent herein, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By engaging in certain described conduct referred to
hereinabove in section I, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By engaging in certain described conduct referred to
hereinabove in section I, Respondent discriminated
against an employee in regard to his hire and tenure of
employment, and terms and conditions thereof, in order to
discourage membership in the Union, and thereby
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
is Blue Flash Express, Inc, 109 NLRB 591, N.L R.B v Camco,
Inc, 340 F.2d 803 (C.A. 5), cert denied 382 US 926, and
authorities cited therein The fact that Donnelly untruthfully
replied that he had not signed suggests that he interpreted the
inquiry as coercive.
i9 Respondent , at the hearing, objected to any remedy
requiring an offer of reinstatement since "even though you
discharge a man for a discriminatory purpose, if he is a thief . .
you don't have to reinstate him nonetheless ," relying on the court
of appeals decision in the prior case involving this Respondent
(359 F 2d 77 (C A. 5)) Respondent's contention was based upon
testimony of Resch that in January he observed Chance pilfering
an employee 's list from Resch 's desk. The list contained the
names, addresses , and telephone numbers of employees. Resch
further testified that Chance told him that the reason for taking
the list was to turn it over to the Labor Board, and Resch advised
that Chance shouldn't do that because the list was supposed to be
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Because the clearly coercive and discriminatory
treatment of Chance by Respondent goes to the very heart
of the Act and indicates a purpose to defeat the exercise
by employees of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
I am convinced that a cease-and-desist order coextensive
with the guarantees of Section 7 is warranted and
necessary in this case to prevent other unfair labor
practices potentially related to those found herein. I shall
therefore recommend that Respondent be required to
cease and desist from in any other manner infringing on
employees' Section 7 rights.
My Recommended Order will require that Respondent
offer Chance immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges,
and that he be made whole for any and all losses he may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him.
Any backpay found to be due Chance shall be computed in
accordance with the formulas set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716.19
Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact,
and the conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Respondent, Big Three Industrial Gas and
Equipment Company, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union membership, activities, or desires.
(b) Discouraging membership in Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, by laying off,
discharging, refusing to reinstate, or in any other manner
discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment of employees, or any term or condition of
employment.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
kept secret However, according to Resch, Chance did not return
the list to the Company
Chance testified that he did not recall taking such a list from
Reach's desk since he (Chance) possessed two such lists himself,
one at the office and another at home He kept the latter because
on occasion he needed to get in touch with other employees
during nonworking hours on company business
I do not deem it necessary to resolve the particular credibility
issue here since, even if Chance engaged in the conduct
attributed to him, such pilferage is not of the type nor does it rise
to the magnitude of that involving Gentry and Gripon in the prior
case, moreover, in view of the fact that this contention was first
raised by the Respondent at the hearing herein, I "question[ed]
whether the company's objection to reinstating the employee [is]
genuine. . " (359 F 2d 77, 83, referring to N.I. R.B. v Anchor
Rome Mills, 228 F 2d 775 (C.A 5)
BIG THREE INDUSTRIAL GAS & EQUIPMENT CO.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effecutate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Dewey Von Chance immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make him whole for all losses he may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him
in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify Dewey Von Chance if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records useful and necessary to enable the Board to
determine the amount of backpay due Chance and the
right to reinstatement under the terms of this
Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Houston, Texas, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."20 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 23 of the Board (Houston, Texas), after being duly
signed by authorized representative of Respondent, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23 of the
Board, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.21
20 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
21 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
1073
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
concerning their membership in or activities on behalf
of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,
or any other labor organization, by discharging, laying
off, refusing to reinstate or in any other manner
discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment of employees, or any term or condition of
employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL offer Dewey Von Chance immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges and make him whole for
all losses he may have suffered by reason of our
discrimination against him.
All our employees are free to become or remain or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
above-named Union.
BIG THREE INDUSTRIAL GAS
AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify Dewey Von Chance if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended , after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 6617 Federal
Office Building , 515 Rusk Avenue , Houston , Texas 77002,
Telephone 228-4722.