Beverly Health & Rehabilitation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 8, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 960 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 960
Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., its
Operating Regional Offices, wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries and individual facilities and each of
them and/or its wholly-owned subsidiary Bev-
erly Enterprises-Pennsylvania, Inc. and Penn-
sylvania Social Services Union Local 668, affili-
ated with Service Employees International Un-
ion, AFL–CIO, CLC and District 1199P, Service
Employees International Union, AFL–CIO,
CLC and Service Employees International Un-
ion, Local 585, AFL–CIO, CLC. Cases 6–CA–
28130–1, 6–CA–28130–2, and 6–CA–28130–3
August 8, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On May 19, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Martin J.
Linsky issued the attached decision. The General Coun-
sel and the Charging Parties filed exceptions and
supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed cross-
exceptions, a supporting brief, and an answering brief.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
modified and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied and set forth in full below.
1. Factual background
The complaint in this case alleges that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by filing and main-
taining a defamation lawsuit against Locals 668 and 585
and District 1199P of the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO, CLC (the Unions) and District
1199P President Thomas DeBruin. An amendment to the
complaint further alleges that the Respondent failed to
stay its lawsuit within 7 days of the complaint’s issuance,
which the complaint alleges it was required to do, be-
cause issuance of the complaint preempted state court
jurisdiction.
The defamation lawsuit at issue, which the Respondent
filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Crawford
County, Pennsylvania, on March 29, 1996,1 concerned
statements made in two handbills and a union-sponsored
radio “spot.” The two handbills were distributed and the
radio spot broadcast in the context of an ongoing labor
dispute between the Unions and the Respondent, focused
on 20 nursing homes operated by the Respondent in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Unions distributed
the first handbill outside of 20 of the Respondent’s Penn-
sylvania nursing homes on about March 23 and 24 and
distributed the second handbill outside of the Respon-
dent’s Camp Hill Care Center nursing home on March
28. The union-sponsored radio spot was broadcast on
various Pennsylvania and Maryland radio stations during
the week beginning March 25.

1 All dates are in 1996, unless otherwise indicated.
The first handbill, headed “Must We Strike To Make
Beverly Obey the Law” (Appendix A), contained a num-
ber of statements that the Respondent alleged as defama-
tory.2 It stated that the “federal government is prosecut-
ing Beverly for illegally imposing work rules designed to
stop us from speaking out publicly about patient care and
other concerns.” It also stated that “[i]n the last ten years
Beverly has engaged in hundreds of illegal firings,
threats, harassment, intimidation, bribes and other coer-
cive acts.” Further, the handbill stated that “[i]n 1993 and
1994, Beverly was cited by OSHA for forcing nursing
home employees to work in unsafe and hazardous condi-
tions.” Additionally, it stated that “[i]n 1996, Beverly
was sued by a family member for the wrongful death of a
resident. The resident was given a lethal overdose of
morphine sulfate.” Four lines below this statement, the
handbill declared: “Family members, residents and the
public deserve to know the truth about the quality of
care.”
The second handbill, headed “Family Alert” (Appen-
dix C), concerned health and safety problems that it said
were identified in an employee survey at the Respon-
dent’s Camp Hill Care Center. It included the following
statement:
One of the most dangerous problems we have is that
the hot water in the kitchen and laundry is not hot
enough to sterilize and sanitize the dishes, linens and
clothes. The water is not warm enough to give the resi-
dents a hot bath or shower.
The radio spot (Appendix B) included several state-
ments alleged to be defamatory. It stated that “Beverly’s
attempt to impose a gag order on its workers was re-
cently declared illegal by government officials.” It also
stated that “last month, 250 more unfair labor practice
violations were filed against Beverly.” Additionally, it
stated that “workers’ concerns about improving staffing
and patient care and other working conditions have fallen
on deaf ears.” Finally, it stated that “Beverly refuses to
bargain in good faith and instead is forcing its workers to
strike.”
As set forth by the judge, DeBruin testified concerning
the Unions’ basis for the statements in the handbills and
radio spots. Bradley Shiverick, director of information
services of the American Health Care Association, was
the sole witness called by the Respondent. He gave tes-
timony to show that, according to data collected by the
Health Care Finance Administration, the Respondent’s
nursing homes receive fewer citations for deficiencies
than do those of its competitors.
2 The judge set forth the full text of both handbills and the radio spot
as attachments to his decision (Appendixes A, B, and C).
331 NLRB No. 121
BEVERLY HEALTH & REHABILITATION SERVICES 961
2. The judge’s decision
As the judge noted, under Bill Johnson’s Restaurants
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), the Board may not enjoin
as an unfair labor practice the filing and prosecution of a
pending lawsuit unless the lawsuit lacks a reasonable
basis in law or fact and is filed or maintained to retaliate
against the exercise of Section 7 rights. Examining the
evidence in this case, the judge concluded that there was
a reasonable basis for the Respondent’s lawsuit. In sec-
tion III, C of his decision, he found that “much of the
objected to flyers (particularly Appendix C, the flyer
distributed at Camp Hill Care Center) and the radio spot
allege that substandard patient and resident care is being
provided by Respondent.” He also noted a decision of the
Pennsylvania court in the Respondent’s defamation law-
suit finding that the Respondent’s defamation action was
well pleaded consistent with the requirements of Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).3 The judge
concluded that there were “genuine material factual and
state law disputes to be decided in the state court action.”
The judge further observed that, to be actionable under
Linn, labor speech must be defamatory, false, and pub-
lished with malice. The judge then stated that “[v]irtually
none of the statements in the [first] handbill . . . or the
statements in the radio spot . . . appear to be false. The
statements in the handbill distributed at Camp Hill Care
Center . . . on the other hand could meet the test of de-
famatory, false, and published with malice.” The judge
therefore found that there was a “genuine issue of fact
and law to be decided in state court” regarding the Camp
Hill Care Center handbill. The judge noted that the con-
tents of the first handbill and the radio spot were “rele-
vant to the issue of malice even if . . . not separately ac-
tionable for defamation.”
As the judge found that the Respondent’s lawsuit had a
reasonable basis in law and fact, he recommended that
the complaint in the present case be held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the lawsuit. He declined to pass
on the issue of retaliatory motive, finding that it would
be better addressed after conclusion of the lawsuit.
3. The parties’ exceptions
In their exceptions, the General Counsel and the Un-
ions contend that, contrary to the judge, the Respondent’s
lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis in law and fact. The
General Counsel argues that, at worst, the Unions’ alleg-
edly defamatory statements were merely hyperbole and
expressions of opinion. The General Counsel and the
Unions also except to the judge’s failure to find that the
Respondent’s lawsuit was filed and maintained with a
retaliatory motive and his failure to enjoin the lawsuit as
preempted by the issuance of the complaint.

3 Linn held that, where a party to a labor dispute circulates false and
defamatory statements, a state court defamation lawsuit is not pre-
empted by the Act “if the complainant pleads and proves that the state-
ments were made with malice and injured him.” 383 U.S. at 55.
In its exceptions, the Respondent contends that the
judge erred in concluding that virtually none of the
statements in the first handbill and the radio spot appear
to be false. Additionally, the Respondent contends that
the judge erred in concluding that DeBruin was a credi-
ble witness and that Shiverick’s testimony did not add
much evidence.
4. Analysis
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, we
cannot say that the General Counsel has conclusively
proven that the Respondent’s state court defamation law-
suit lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact. Accordingly,
we must allow the suit to proceed in state court, but we
will hold the unfair labor practice proceeding in abey-
ance pending the state court resolution of the suit. In
making this determination, we are mindful of the scope
of inquiry that the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson’s per-
mits the Board in evaluating whether a state-court suit
lacks the requisite reasonable basis for it to be main-
tained. In that case, the Court stated:
Although the Board’s reasonable basis inquiry need not
be limited to the bare pleadings, if there is a genuine is-
sue of material fact that turns on the credibility of wit-
nesses or on the proper inferences to be drawn from
undisputed facts, it cannot, in our view, be concluded
that the suit should be enjoined. When a suit presents
genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff’s First
Amendment interest in petitioning the state court for
redress of his grievance, his interest in having the fac-
tual dispute resolved by a jury, and the State’s interest
in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, lead
us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to
usurp the traditional factfinding function of the state-
court jury or judge. Hence, we conclude that if a state
plaintiff is able to present the Board with evidence that
shows his lawsuit raises genuine issues of material fact,
the Board should proceed no further with the §8(a)(1)–
§8(a)(4) unfair labor practice proceedings but should
stay those proceedings until the state-court suit has
been concluded.
In the present case, the only disputed issues in
the state lawsuit appear to be factual in nature. There
will be cases, however, in which the state plaintiff’s
case turns on issues of state law or upon a mixed
question of fact and law. Just as the Board must re-
frain from deciding genuinely disputed material fac-
tual issues with respect to a state suit, it likewise
must not deprive a litigant of his right to have genu-
ine state-law legal questions decided by the state ju-
diciary. While the Board need not stay its hand if the
plaintiff’s position is plainly foreclosed as a matter
of law or is otherwise frivolous, the Board should al-
low such issues to be decided by the state tribunals if
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 962
there is any realistic chance that the plaintiff’s legal
theory might be adopted.4

Thus, the Court made clear that, with regard to a state
court lawsuit, the Board is to refrain from either deciding
genuinely disputed material factual issues or depriving a
litigant of his first amendment right to have genuine
state-law legal questions decided by the state judiciary.
Given both the strong first amendment and state interests
involved, as described by the court, the Board may not
enjoin a state court suit if there is a “genuine issue of
material fact that turns on the credibility of witnesses or
on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed
facts.” Id. We agree with the judge that the Respon-
dent’s state court defamation lawsuit raises a “genuine
issue of material fact” as defined in Bill Johnson’s.
At trial, the General Counsel and the Respondent each
put on one witness, DeBruin and Shiverick, respectively.
DeBruin testified about the basis for the statements made
by the Union in the two handbills and the radio spot.
Shiverick testified that, according to data collected by the
Health Care Financing Administration, the Respondent’s
nursing homes receive fewer citations for deficiencies
than those of its competitors. No actual credibility con-
flicts were created by their testimony. We nonetheless
find that a genuine issue of material fact exists by virtue,
at the least, of the “proper inferences to be drawn from
undisputed facts” about the Unions’ statements, viewed
in their entirety. We cannot summarily reject the infer-
ences which the Respondent seeks to draw as “plainly
unsupportable.” Id. at 746 fn. 11. To do so here would,
in our view, usurp the role that Bill Johnson’s assigns to
the state court, not the Board.5
At a minimum, there is a factual issue as to certain as-
sertions in the Camp Hill Care Center handbill. The
handbill stated that the Union had conducted an em-
ployee survey of health and safety matters at the nursing
home and that “one of the most dangerous problems we
have is that the hot water in the kitchen and laundry is
not hot enough to sterilize and sanitize the dishes, linens
and clothes. The water is not warm enough to give the
residents a hot bath or shower.” The Respondent argues
that these assertions may constitute charges of substan-
dard patient care, and it introduced Shiverick’s testimony
to put this claim in dispute. To substantiate its assertions,

4 461 U.S. at 744–747 (footnotes omitted).
5 Having so concluded, we do not adopt the judge’s finding that
“[v]irtually none of the statements in the [first] handbill . . . or the
statements in the radio spot . . . appear to be false.” Rather than leaving
to the state tribunal the determination of the truth or falsity of the
statements in the handbill or radio spot, the judge decided this issue
himself. Such a determination appears to exceed the permissible scope
of inquiry allowed the Board under Bill Johnson’s. Likewise, we find it
unnecessary to pass at this point on the judge’s crediting of DeBruin’s
testimony. Should this case be reopened following completion of the
state court proceedings, the Respondent may raise the arguments it
makes in its exceptions regarding DeBruin’s credibility to the judge,
who should consider them at that time.
the Charging Party introduced at the unfair labor practice
trial an exhibit which showed that one unidentified em-
ployee had written on a survey questionnaire that the
“hot water in Dietary is not hot enough to kill germs and
in Laundry it is not hot enough to kill bacteria and resi-
dent [sic] have take warm bath water!” In our view,
while there may be no actual factual dispute turning on
the credibility of witnesses, there is a question of what, if
any, inferences may be drawn from the evidence about
this handbill. Under Bill Johnson’s, a state court judge
or jury is entitled to evaluate those asserted “inferences
with respect to mixed questions of fact and law.” Id.6
In declining to enjoin the prosecution of this suit, we
emphasize, as the Pennsylvania court has already recog-
nized in finding that the complaint was well-pleaded un-
der Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, that for
the plaintiff to prevail it cannot just prove defamation
under Pennsylvania state law. Rather, it must also prove
the Federal overlay of actual malice, as pleaded in the
state suit complaint. Bill Johnson’s makes clear that state
libel suits are “of course, not governed entirely by state
law, since federal law superimposes a malice require-
ment.” Id. at 746 fn. 13, citing Linn. Under Linn, if the
defamation plaintiff cannot prove both actual malice and
injury allegations, then its case will lack merit.7
6 There are also such questions about some of the assertions in the
first handbill and radio spot, as the judge discussed. As the Unions
acknowledge, DeBruin’s own testimony reveals that the publications
contained what they call several “technical errors,” “technical mis-
statements,” “technical misuse” of terms, “typographical errors,” or
“imprecision in language.” For example, in the radio spot, the Unions
stated that “Beverly’s attempt to impose a gag order on its workers was
recently declared illegal by government officials.” DeBruin testified
that this statement was based on the General Counsel’s issuance of a
complaint alleging as unlawful the Respondent’s promulgation of a rule
subjecting employees to discipline for “[m]aking false or misleading
work-related statements concerning the Company, the facility or fellow
associates.” As another example, in the first handbill, the Unions stated
that in 1993 and 1994, the Respondent “was cited by OSHA for forcing
nursing home employees to work in unsafe and hazardous conditions.”
In his testimony, DeBruin admitted that the OSHA citations actually
occurred in 1991 and 1992, but that the error was typographical, and
that the OSHA citation had been dismissed by an Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission administrative law judge, although it
was pending review by the Commission.
Whether or not these errors rise to the level of the reckless disregard
for truth or falsity that is required to prove actual malice necessary for
actionable defamation in a labor dispute (see discussion, infra), we
believe that Bill Johnson’s does not permit the Board to make that
mixed determination of fact and law. We recognize the difference
between the issuance of a complaint and an adjudication of illegality,
but we leave it to the state court to decide what, if any, inferences may
be drawn from this “imprecision of language.” Likewise, we leave it to
the state tribunal to decide whether the Respondent can establish that
the Unions falsely or recklessly termed the disciplinary rule a “gag
order.” The judge apparently credited DeBruin’s explanation that the
discrepancy in the OSHA citation dates was a typographical error, but
as Bill Johnson’s makes clear, the Board should not weigh the credibil-
ity of witnesses. In short, we must refrain from usurping the role of the
state court in making these determinations.
7 The Respondent has alleged various theories of defamation. It con-
tends that, not only are statements in the Unions’ handbills and radio
BEVERLY HEALTH & REHABILITATION SERVICES 963
We further emphasize that the necessary malice re-
quirement is a heavy burden in defamation cases arising
out of labor disputes. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has recently explained that burden in a decision
which the Supreme Court declined to review. Dunn v.
Air Line Pilots Assn., 193 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 2197 (2000). To show ac-
tual malice, a plaintiff must establish that the speaker
made the challenged statements with knowledge of their
falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether they were
true or false. Id. at 1192. See also Linn, 383 U.S. at 61,
65. Malice must be shown by “clear and convincing
proof.” Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 193 F.3d at 1192,
citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280,
285–286 (1964). “In addition, ‘[b]efore the test of reck-
less or knowing falsity can be met, there must be a false
statement of fact.’” Dunn, 193 F.3d at 1192, citing Let-
ter Carriers Branch 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284
(1974). “Thus, a defamation claim escapes labor-law
preemption only if (1) there is a false statement of fact;
and (2) the plaintiff proves actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence.” Dunn, 193 F.3d at 1192.
The Respondent has alleged actual malice in its suit.
The Unions correctly state that the Respondent did not
introduce evidence of actual malice at the unfair labor
practice hearing. Nonetheless, we cannot agree, as the
Unions argue, that “the General Counsel proved that [the
Respondent] cannot carry the Linn burden of proving
actual malice in the publication of th[ese] statement[s].”
We leave to state court adjudication whether the Respon-
dent can establish that the Unions “acted with a ‘high
degree of awareness of probable falsity of’ factual state-
ments or in fact ‘entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of [its] publication.’” Id. at 1197–1198. Whether the
Respondent can meet this burden will determine whether
its defamation suit is actionable under Linn.
Given the genuine issues of material fact and law, and
the circumscribed role defined for us by the Supreme
Court, we are unable to conclude at this stage that the
Respondent’s lawsuit is wholly ill-founded or without
any reasonable basis in fact or law. Accordingly, we
adopt the judge’s recommendation that this unfair labor
practice case be held in abeyance pending the outcome of
the state court lawsuit.8

spot false, but that, even if true, they imply other facts that are false.
Specifically, the Respondent contends that the handbills and radio spot,
by implication, if not by express statement, convey the message that the
Respondent provides substandard patient and resident care. Further, the
Respondent contends that, under Pennsylvania law, false implications
of true statements may be found defamatory. The Respondent cites
Pennsylvania case law supporting its proposition. We do not pass on
the merits of any of these contentions, but rather leave them for state
court adjudication.
8 As we find that this case should be held in abeyance pending the
state court lawsuit, we decline to adopt the judge’s Conclusion of Law
3, which states that the Respondent did not violate the Act when it filed
and subsequently maintained the lawsuit. Given our finding that this
case should be held in abeyance, resolution of the ultimate issue that it
As mentioned above, the General Counsel amended
the complaint in this case to allege that the Respondent’s
lawsuit was preempted by issuance of the complaint and
that the Respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to stay
the lawsuit within 7 days after the complaint’s issuance.
While it is not clear whether the General Counsel in-
tended this amendment to allege a separate, additional
8(a)(1) violation, the General Counsel and the Unions
excepted to the judge’s failure to enjoin the Respondent’s
lawsuit as preempted by the issuance of the complaint.
The General Counsel and the Unions premise their ex-
ceptions principally on the basis of the Board’s decision
in Loehmann’s Plaza, 305 NLRB 663 (1991), which
found that a state court lawsuit seeking to enjoin peaceful
union picketing or handbilling on private property be-
comes preempted when the General Counsel issues a
complaint alleging that the lawsuit violates the Act.
Defamation lawsuits, however, such as the one at issue
here, are not governed by the preemption analysis that
Loehmann’s Plaza set forth. Rather, the Supreme Court
set forth specific rules governing the preemption of
defamation lawsuits in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,
supra. As noted above, the Court there held that, where a
party to a labor dispute circulates false and defamatory
statements, a state court defamation lawsuit is not pre-
empted by the Act “if the complainant pleads and proves
that the statements were made with malice and injured
him.”9 Moreover, Linn rejected the argument that permit-
ting state action in such cases would impinge on national
labor policy. Rather, the Court expressly countenanced
the possibility of simultaneous court and Board proceed-
ings in such cases.10 Consequently, we shall dismiss the
amended complaint to the extent that it alleges that the
Respondent violated the Act by failing to stay its state
court lawsuit after the General Counsel issued his com-
plaint in this case.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and orders that the complaint allegations in
Cases 6–CA–28130–1, 6–CA–28130–2, and 6–CA–
28130–3 that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by filing and maintaining a defamation lawsuit in
the Court of Common Pleas for Crawford County, Penn-
sylvania, against the Unions and District 1199P President
Thomas DeBruin are remanded to the administrative law
judge. The judge is directed to hold those allegations in
abeyance until he receives notification that the state court
has resolved the matter pending before it. At that point,
the judge can determine, based on the state court’s ac-

presents, i.e., whether the Respondent’s filing and maintaining the
lawsuit violated the Act, is not appropriate at this juncture.
9 383 U.S. at 55.
10 Id. at 66.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 964
tion, whether the state court suit lacked merit and, if so,
whether it was filed for a retaliatory motive.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended complaint is
dismissed to the extent that it alleges that the Respondent
violated the Act by failing to stay its state court lawsuit
after the General Counsel issued his complaint in this
case.

MEMBER HURTGEN, concurring.
I agree with the majority on all points, including the
rejection of the General Counsel’s argument concerning
preemption. However, I have a separate view concerning
the preemption issue.
In Loehmann’s Plaza, 305 NLRB 663 (1991), the
General Counsel alleged that an employer’s trespass law-
suit against a union’s picketing was preempted and un-
lawful. Under Sears v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978),
the court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit so long as
there was no NLRB involvement. However, once the
Board entered the fray, i.e., upon the General Counsel’s
issuance of complaint alleging that the picketing was
protected, the lawsuit was preempted. Since the em-
ployer continued to prosecute the suit after this time, that
prosecution was condemned as unlawful.
The General Counsel argues that a similar result
should obtain with respect to libel lawsuits. That is, once
the Board enters the fray, i.e., when the General Counsel
issues complaint alleging that the Union’s conduct was
protected, the court loses jurisdiction. However, there is
nothing in Sears or in Loehmann’s which requires that
result. To the contrary, the Court in Linn expressly indi-
cated the contrary, i.e., that there could be concurrent
Board and court jurisdiction.1 In addition, I note that the
courts have traditionally and competently handled libel
suits. And, by employing Linn standards, they can take
into account Federal labor policy. For these reasons, I
agree that Loehmann’s should not be extended to cases
involving libel lawsuits.

Barton A. Meyers, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael T. McMenamin and Frederick W. Whatley, Esqs., of
Cleveland, Ohio, for the Respondent.
Claudia Davidson, Esq., of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the
Charging Parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARTIN J. LINSKY, Administrative Law Judge. On April 30
and October 3, 1996, a charge and amended charge in Case 6–
CA–28130–1 was filed by Local 668, SEIU. On April 30 and
October 3, 1996, a charge and amended charge in Case 6–CA–
28130–2 were filed by District 1199P, SEIU. On April 30 and
October 3, 1996, a charge and amended charge in Case 6–CA–
28130–3 were filed by Local 585, SEIU. All charges and
amended charges were filed against Beverly Enterprises, Re-
spondent herein.

1 Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966).
On November 29, 1996, the National Labor Relations Board,
by the Regional Director for Region 6, issued a consolidated
complaint (the complaint), alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act),
when on March 29, 1996, it filed and has since maintained a
lawsuit for defamation against Local 668, District 1199P, Local
585, and Thomas DeBruin, president of District 1199P and
trustee ad litem of all three Unions. The lawsuit was filed in
the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County for the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania. The alleged defamation is that
false and defamatory statements published with malice accused
Respondent of providing substandard care to the patients and
residents in its nursing homes.
Respondent filed an answer in which it denied that it violated
the Act in any way.
A hearing was held before me in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
on February 25 and March 10, 1997. Only two witnesses testi-
fied, i.e., Thomas DeBruin for the General Counsel and Bradley
Shiverick for Respondent. Both DeBruin and Shiverick im-
pressed me as very credible witnesses. DeBruin testified as to
why certain statements were contained in the allegedly defama-
tory flyer and radio spot and Shiverick testified that, according
to certain records maintained by the Federal Government, Re-
spondent has been cited less for deficiencies than other nursing
homes.
On the entire record in the case, to include posthearing briefs
submitted on behalf of the General Counsel, the Respondent,
and the Charging Parties, and on my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses I issue the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, more specifically the entities that are the plain-
tiffs in the lawsuit filed in state court in Pennsylvania, i.e., Bev-
erly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc. and Beverly En-
terprises Pennsylvania, Inc., is in the business of operating
nursing homes. Hereinafter these two entities will be referred
to as Respondent.
Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times material it has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find, that at all material times Lo-
cal 668, District 1199P, and Local 585 have been labor organi-
zations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview
Respondent and the Unions have been involved in labor dis-
putes going back over many years.
Three very long cases involving numerous unfair labor prac-
tice allegations against Respondent have been litigated. They
were referred to in this litigation as Beverly I, Beverly II, and
Beverly III.1
1 Beverly I, 310 NLRB 222 (1993), enforcement granted in part and
denied in part sub. nom. Torrington Extend-a-Care Employees Assn. v.
NLRB, 17 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. 1994). I was the administrative law judge
who heard this case over 78 days in 1988 and 1989. Administrative
law judge decisions have issued in Beverly II (JD 119–94) and Beverly
III (JD (Atl–22–95). Beverly II and III are awaiting decision by the
BEVERLY HEALTH & REHABILITATION SERVICES 965
Currently, Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Wallace of
the Board is conducting hearings in a case generally known by
the attorneys involved in this litigation as Beverly IV. In con-
nection with Beverly IV Judge D. Brooks Smith, U.S. district
judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania on April 4,
1997, issued an injunction under Section 10(j) of the Act
which, among other things, ordered reinstatement of hundreds
of Respondent’s employees who had engaged in a 3-day strike
in the beginning of April 1996.
In the spring of 1996 the Unions, in connection with their la-
bor dispute with Respondent, which was focusing on 20 nurs-
ing homes Respondent operates in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, caused two handbills to be distributed and a radio spot
to be broadcast over the air. This was done just prior to the 3-
day April strike. The Unions had prior to the strike and prior to
the publication of the allegedly defamatory handbills and radio
spot filed numerous charges against Respondent, which charges
along with numerous other charges filed after the 3-day strike
resulted in the complaint in Beverly IV.
The first of the two handbills was distributed to the general
public by the Unions outside the 20 Pennsylvania nursing home
facilities on or about March 23 and 24, 1996. A copy of that
handbill is attached to this decision as Appendix A.
During the week beginning March 25, 1996, the Unions dis-
seminated by paid radio broadcast through various radio sta-
tions in Pennsylvania and Maryland a statement concerning
Respondent. A copy of that statement is attached to this deci-
sion as Appendix B.
A second flyer was distributed by the Unions to the general
public on March 28, 1996, outside of one of Respondent’s
Pennsylvania nursing homes, i.e., Camp Hill Care Center. A
copy of that handbill is attached to this decision as Appendix C.
On March 29, 1996, Respondent filed and has since main-
tained a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas for Crawford
County, Pennsylvania, against the three Unions and Thomas
DeBruin.
The lawsuit alleges that the Unions and Thomas DeBruin de-
famed Respondent by publishing the two handbills and radio
spot which Respondent maintains untruthfully conveys the
message that Respondent delivers substandard care to residents
and patients in its nursing homes.
It is alleged in the complaint before me which issued on No-
vember 29, 1996, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by filing and maintaining this lawsuit. In addition, in
an amendment to the complaint issued on December 23, 1996,
the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director
for Region 6, alleges that when the complaint issued on No-
vember 29, 1996, state court jurisdiction was preempted under
the principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and
Respondent had a duty within 7 days of the issuance of the
November 29, 1996 complaint to stay the state court action.
Respondent did not move to stay the state court action and,
in fact, opposed the Unions’ motion to stay proceedings in state
court. The Court of Common Pleas for Crawford County on
January 9, 1997, denied the Union’s motion to stay proceedings
and stated that the state court lawsuit, in its opinion, was not
preempted by San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
supra. I agree for the reasons set forth below.

ion.
Board. The administrative law judges in Beverly II and III found that
Respondent committed numerous violations of the Act.
On April 30, 1997, the National Labor Relations Board, by
the Regional Director for Region 6 filed a petition for an in-
junction under Section 10(j) of the Act in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania petitioning the
court to enjoin Respondent from going forward with its
defamation lawsuit. That petition is pending before the Court
as of the date of this decis
B. Analysis
The result in this case will require the balancing of two
rights, one is the right of a person, to include a corporate entity,
to seek redress in state court for tortious conduct and the right
of employees and their collective-bargaining representatives to
be free to engage in the rough and tumble of a labor dispute
without fear of being sued and having to incur huge legal bills.
The key case authority in deciding whether or not Respon-
dent violated the Act when it filed and continues to violate the
Act by maintaining this defamation lawsuit against the Unions
and a union official are Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S.
53 (1966), and Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
731 (1983).
Under Linn the Supreme Court made it clear that a lawsuit
sounding in defamation could be filed and maintained for pub-
lished libel occurring in the context of a labor dispute if what is
published is false and the publication of the falsehood is done
with malice. And this is so even though coarse or intemperate
language may be okay and be permissible labor speech but
deliberate malicious lies are not permissible labor speech.
Under Bill Johnson’s Restaurants the Supreme Court held
that the filing and maintaining of a lawsuit in a non-preemption
case will be an unfair labor practice and enjoinable if, and only
if, (1) the lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis in law or fact, and (2)
the lawsuit was filed and/or maintained to retaliate for the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
1. Appendix A
Appendix A to this decision is the flyer distributed at all 20
nursing homes on or about March 23 and 24, 1996.
In its complaint and amended complaint in the defamation
suit filed in state court Respondent maintains that what is stated
in this flyer is defamatory, false, and was published with mal-
ice, i.e., the Unions and DeBruin knew it was false or recklessly
published the statements without verifying their truth or falsity.
The handbill is headed, “Must We Strike to Make Beverly
Obey the Law?” It contains a number of statements, several of
which Respondent singled out as being false and defamatory in
its amended complaint in state court. The first states that the
Federal Government is prosecuting Beverly for “illegally im-
posing work rules designed to stop us from speaking out pub-
licly about patient care and other concerns.” In support of this
statement DeBruin cites the NLRB complaint issued in Case 6–
CA–27453 at page 4, paragraph 6(b), headed, “Rule 1.6” which
contains the so-called gag rule unilaterally implemented by
Respondent which reads that employees, “Making false or mis-
leading work-related statements concerning the Company, the
facility or fellow associates” would be subject to discipline up
to and including discharge.
The next statement from this handbill which is specifically
cited by Respondent as defamatory reads “In the last ten years
Beverly has engaged in hundreds of illegal firings, threats, har-
assment, intimidation, bribes and other coercive acts” and con-
tinues, that the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report
singling out Beverly as having “a history of labor law viola-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 966
tions.” This statement, of course, is based primarily on the
litigation record in the cases generally known as Beverly I, II,
and III which encompass violations dating back to 1986 and
covering all of the sorts of violative activity set forth in the
handbill. In addition, in evidence before me as General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 12 is a portion of a General Accounting Office
report concerning violations of Federal labor law by various
Federal contractors, including Beverly, which is also referred to
in the handbill.
Beverly, in its amended complaint, also cites the following
statement from the handbill as being defamatory “In 1993 and
1994, Beverly was cited by OSHA for forcing nursing home
employees to work in unsafe and hazardous conditions.”
While, as DeBruin explained, the handbill contains a typo-
graphical error in that the OSHA activity referred to occurred in
1991 and 1992 rather than 1993 and 1994, in evidence as Gen-
eral Counsel’s Exhibit 11(a) through (e) are the OSHA citations
referred to therein. DeBruin further related that although an
OSHRC administrative law judge had found against the
Agency in a trial of these citations, the Agency and the Union
had appealed the judge’s decision to the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) itself for final deci-
sion and that is where the matter rests at present.
DeBruin was also questioned about an additional statement
in the handbill that “In 1996 Beverly was sued by a family
member for the wrongful death of a resident. The resident was
given a lethal overdose of morphine sulfate.” That assertion
was based on the filing of a wrongful death action in Venango
County, Pennsylvania, on behalf of patient Adella Foster. The
Union had obtained a copy of the actual complaint (GC Exh.
13) as well as researched other suits filed against Beverly in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
Also in the handbill is the statement “Family members, resi-
dents and the public deserve to know the truth about the qualify
of care.”
The juxtaposition in the handbill of a reference to the death
of a resident and the statement that the public deserves to know
the truth about the quality of care certainly suggests substan-
dard care being provided by Respondent.
2. Appendix B
The second publication alleged by Respondent to be defama-
tory and false consists of radio spot announcements which were
broadcasted during the week of March 25, 1996, in Pennsyl-
vania and parts of Maryland. Respondent, in its amended com-
plaint in state court, focuses on certain specific statements in
the transcript of the spot announcement as allegedly libelous
and defamatory. First, the statement “Beverly’s attempt to
impose a gag order on its workers was recently declared illegal
by government officials.” This, as DeBruin testified, was, of
course based on the issuance by the Regional Director of the
complaint in Case 6–CA–27453 which alleges that the so-
called “gag rule” unilaterally implemented by Respondent was
violative of the Act.
The next allegedly defamatory statement reads, “And last
month, 250 more unfair labor practice violations were filed
against Beverly.” This statement, according to DeBruin was
based on a calculation of the charges filed by the Union at that
time concerning violations occurring at the Pennsylvania facili-
ties and counting each violation at each facility as a separate
instance, which is in keeping with the Board’s practice in alleg-
ing violations in a complaint, and this yielded at least 250 such
instances.
The next statement singled out by Respondents reads,
“Workers concerns about improving staffing and patient care
and other working conditions have fallen on deaf ears.” Here,
DeBruin pointed out that in the course of contract negotiations
the Union had raised and was raising a number of issues related
to health and safety and patient care issues including proposals
for a joint union-management patient care committee to be
established and that management’s response to these efforts had
been a complete refusal to discuss such issues on the ground
that they were exclusively the concerns of management. Simi-
larly, the final statement targeted by Respondent from the radio
broadcasts reading, “Beverly refuses to bargain in good faith
and instead is forcing its workers to strike,” stems both from
the Union’s opinion, as supported by numerous unfair labor
practice complaints that Respondent was engaging in unilateral
changes in terms and conditions of employment without bar-
gaining and also to its opinion that Respondent was not bar-
gaining in good faith in the current contract negotiations and
was thus in effect provoking a strike. Many of the allegations
against Respondent resulted in the consolidated complaint be-
ing tried before Judge Wallace, which case has been referred to
as Beverly IV. Interestingly enough the Union was claiming the
3-day strike in April 1996 was an unfair labor practice strike.
Federal District Court Judge Smith ordered Respondent to rein-
state all the strikers who Respondent had claimed were eco-
nomic strikers and whom they had permanently replaced.
3. Appendix C
The third publication alleged to be defamatory is a handbill
headed “Family Alert” distributed on or about March 28, 1996,
at the Camp Hill Care Center nursing home facility. DeBruin
testified that this handbill was developed as part of a process
involving all of Respondents’ facilities concerning health and
safety issues. The Union sought to involve their member em-
ployees in the process in various ways. They surveyed em-
ployees at the facilities regarding what health and safety issues
existed which they considered were not being addressed by
management. Union and employee representatives complied a
list of the 10 most important of these concerns at each facility
and from those lists prepared a letter which was supposed to be
submitted to the administration at each facility identifying these
concerns. In addition, the Union prepared a form leaflet to be
used in connection with these lists. The form leaflet was de-
signed to be tailored to each facility by entering the main con-
cerns at the specified facility. The Camp Hill leaflet was simi-
lar to several others which were developed for and distributed
at other facilities. DeBruin also testified that at some facilities
where the local administration adequately responded to the list
of health and safety concerns, the Union composed no similar
leaflet because none was necessary. Appendix C was handed
out to the general public only at the Camp Hill Care Center.
In the case of Camp Hill the lack of hot water was apparently
the principal concern and that is why it was singled out for
mention in the handbill which was ultimately prepared and
distributed at that location. If the procedure worked according
to the way DeBruin claimed it should have worked the informa-
tion and statements contained in this handbill should have been
based on a survey of employees and data collected as a result of
that survey as to the most pressing health and safety concerns at
the Camp Hill Care Center.
However, the only evidence presented at the hearing before
me directly relevant to the issue of lack of hot water at Camp
Hill Care Center was Charging Party’s Exhibit 2, which was
BEVERLY HEALTH & REHABILITATION SERVICES 967
filled out apparently by an employee at Camp Hill. Charging
Party’s Exhibit 2 is attached to this decision as Appendix D.
This is the only evidence presented to support the allegations in
the handbill distributed at Camp Hill Care Center (Appendix
C). DeBruin testified that he did not know the identity of the
employee who filled out Appendix D nor had he even seen the
exhibit prior to the day he first testified before me. Further
neither the Union nor the General Counsel represented to me
that they knew the identity of the person who prepared Appen-
dix D but did not want to disclose that person’s identity for one
reason or another.
The lack of water hot enough to sterilize and sanitize the
dishes, linens and clothes or even warn enough to give residents
a hot bath or shower certainly allege substandard patient care at
this facility and a jury based on evidence at trial may conclude
it was published with actual malice. I also note the bold print
on Appendix C which states “Beware––You may be entering a
hazardous area.”
4. Respondent’s case
Respondent called but one witness. The witness was Brad-
ley Shiverick and he was a credible witness but he did not add
much by way of evidence. He testified that he reviewed data
collected by the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA),
which is a Federal agency and part of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). Shiverick presented charts he
prepared from HCFA data which support the proposition that
with respect to citations issued for deficiencies that Respondent
both nationally and in Pennsylvania receives less citations than
their competitors. The charts do not reflect the type, kind, or
severity of the violations leading to the citations. And, in any
event, the Unions in the two flyers and radio spot never claimed
the Respondent received more citations than its competitors.
C. Conclusion and Remedy
It is my conclusion that there is a reasonable basis for the
defamation lawsuit to be filed and maintained. It seems clear to
me that much of the objected to flyers (particularly Appendix
C, the flyer distributed at Camp Hill Care Center) and the radio
spot allege that substandard patient and resident care is being
provided by Respondent. I note from Joint Exhibit 1(n) that
Judge Anthony A. Vardaro of the court of Common Pleas is of
the opinion that the defamation action is well pleaded consis-
tent with the requirements of Linn, supra. Accordingly, I con-
clude there are genuine material factual and state law disputes
to be decided in the state court action. Since I conclude that the
Respondent has filed and is maintaining a lawsuit that has a
reasonable basis in law or fact I will recommend that this unfair
labor practice case be held in abeyance pending the outcome of
the defamation lawsuit and will not address the issue of
whether or not the lawsuit was filed to retaliate for the exercise
of Section 7 rights at this time.
The General Counsel and the Unions maintain that the
statements in the two handbills and radio spot are all permissi-
ble labor speech and expressions of opinion protected under
Section 7 of the Act.
Respondent maintains that the “gist” or “sting” of the state-
ments in the two handbills and radio spot are defamatory and
published with malice.
It seems to me that under Linn, supra, and Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), to be actionable labor speech must
be defamatory, false, and published with malice.
Virtually none of the statements in the handbill distributed at
all 20 Pennsylvania nursing homes (Appendix A) or the state-
ments in the radio spot (Appendix C) appears to be false. The
statements in the handbill distributed at Camp Hill Care Center
(Appendix C) on the other hand could meet the test of defama-
tory, false, and published with malice. That is for a jury to
decide and not me. I find that based on the state court plead-
ings wherein Respondent denies the accuracy of the statements
in Appendix C and the evidence that the Unions published Ap-
pendix C that there is a genuine issue of fact and law to be de-
cided in state court. It would not assist me in deciding the case
if the Administrator at Camp Hill Care Center testified and
claimed that there was no shortage of hot water at the Camp
Hill Care Center.
The defamation lawsuit will be in the hands of a Pennsyl-
vania state court judge who no doubt will be competent in state
defamation law and versed in labor law thanks, in part, to the
attorneys for the Unions and DeBruin in the defamation lawsuit
who have cited the state court to applicable labor law as can be
seen by an examination of the state court pleadings in the
defamation case. See Joint Exhibits 1(a–t).
The state court trial judge will be in the best position in in-
structing the jury in the defamation action to accommodate
state defamation law and the special rules involving labor
speech.
The contents of Appendixes A and B certainly are relevant
on the issue of malice even if they are not separately actionable
for defamation.
After the defamation lawsuit concludes any of the parties
may petition to reopen the record in this case. It could be that
Respondent will prevail in the defamation suit and that will be
the end of this case and I would entertain a motion by Respon-
dent to dismiss the complaint or it could be that the Respondent
loses the defamation suit in which event the General Counsel or
one or all of the Charging Parties will petition to reopen the
record for a decision on the issue of retaliatory motive and an
appropriate remedy.
If I had concluded that the defamation suit lacked a reason-
able basis in law or fact, I would address at this juncture the
issue of retaliatory motive but I feel it best to address retaliatory
motive after the conclusion of the defamation suit because the
strength or weakness of Respondent’s case in the defamation
action could impact on the issue of retaliatory motive.
In reaching the decision I reach, I am not unmindful of the
impact this defamation action will have on the Charging Par-
ties. Indeed as of the time of the hearing before me the Unions
had spent no less than $15,000 in defense of the defamation
lawsuit. On the other hand I must be conscious of the rights of
parties to seek redress in state court in appropriate cases.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Ser-
vices, Inc., and Beverly Enterprises Pennsylvania, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Charging Parties Local 668, District 1199P, and Local
585, SEIU, are labor organizations within the meaning of the
Act.
3. Respondent did not violate the Act when it filed and has
since maintained a defamation lawsuit against the Unions and
Union Official Thomas DeBruin in the Court of Common
Pleas, Crawford County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 968
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The complaint is held in abeyance until the conclusion of the
defamation case in state court in Pennsylvania at which time
any of the parties may petition me for such relief as they deem
appropriate.

APPENDIX A
Must We Strike to Make Beverly
OBEY THE LAW?
For over 10 years, we have been fighting for dignity, rights
and respect for nursing home residents and workers. The resi-
dents deserve the best quality of care with sufficient personal
attention to live in dignity.
Rather than work together to improve the quality of care,
Beverly has cut our hours, threatened and harassed us, and
retaliated against us for speaking out. They have threatened to
replace us if we strike, which shows just how little Beverly
really cares about the residents or their employees.
In fact, the federal government is prosecuting Beverly for il-
legally imposing work rules designed to stop us from speaking
out publicly about patient care and other concerns. Government
agents are also investigating over 250 allegations that Beverly
violated federal labor laws in its efforts to harass, intimidate
and silence its employees.
YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT BEVERLY HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH
FLAGRANT ABUSES OF THE LAW
The federal government has prosecuted Beverly four times
for massive violations of federal labor law. In the last 10 years
Beverly has engaged in hundreds of illegal firings, threats, har-
assment, intimidation, bribes and other coercive acts. The U.S.
General Accounting Office issued a report singling out Beverly
has [sic] having a “history of labor law violations.”
In 1993 and 1994, Beverly was cited by OSHA for forcing
nursing home employees to work in unsafe and hazardous con-
ditions.
In 1996, Beverly was sued by a family member for the
wrongful death of a resident. The resident was given a lethal
overdose of morphine sulfate. This is only one of a number of
lawsuits by family members alleging wrongful death or neglect
by Beverly management in Pennsylvania.
despite the lawbreaking, harassment and intimidation
WE WILL NOT BE SILENCED
Family members, residents and the public deserve to know
the truth about the quality of care. We, the hard-working em-
ployees of Beverly Enterprises who provide the direct care, are
the best source of truthful and accurate information, not corpo-
rate spin doctors. We want to provide the highest quality care,
but we will not allow Beverly to trample our rights in the name
of corporate profits.
Thousands of nursing home workers employed by Beverly in
Pennsylvania may be forced on strike on March 29. We are

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
outraged by an unprecedented level of federal law breaking by
Beverly, one of the richest national nursing home chains.
You can help get Beverly to obey the law by calling their
corporate headquarters at 1–800–571–9981 and telling them to
stop breaking the law.
SEIU Locals 585, 668 & District 1199P * 1–800–797–8890
APPENDIX B
What does Beverly Enterprises care about? People or prof-
its? Beverly Enterprises, the nation[’]s largest nursing home
chain, operates 42 nursing homes in Pennsylvania. In 1994
alone, Beverly made almost $115,000,000 in pre-tax profits.
But even with all that money, Beverly continues to violate labor
laws and harass its workers. Beverly’s attempt to impose a gag
order on its workers was recently declared illegal by govern-
ment officials. And last month, 250 more unfair labor practice
violations were filed against Beverly. Workers’ concerns about
improving staffing and patient care and other working condi-
tions have fallen on deaf ears. Beverly refuses to bargain in
good faith and instead is forcing its workers to strike. Begin-
ning March 29th, workers will be on strike at Beverly homes
throughout Pennsylvania. For information, or to support our
strike, call the Dignity Campaign Hotline at 1–800–797–8890.
We’re the Service Employees’ Union. We care for your loved
ones everyday and we won’t be silenced.

APPENDIX C
FAMILY ALERT
We, the employees of Camp Hill Care Center nursing home
have been working to make this nursing home safer for your
family members.
Recently we surveyed the nursing home for things we be-
lieve may endanger the health and safety of you family member
and the employees. After the survey we delivered a letter to the
administrator listing the 10 biggest health and safety concerns
we have. Unfortunately the management has not corrected all
the problems, so we want to let you know about them.
One of the most dangerous problems we have is that the hot
water in the kitchen and laundry is not hot enough to sterilize
and sanitize the dishes, linens and clothes. The water is not
warm enough to give the residents a hot bath or shower.
BEWARE—YOU MAY BE ENTERING A HAZARDOUS AREA
Please report any things you believe may be hazardous to the
administrator of this facility or call the Beverly Family In
Touch Line at 1–800–572–9981.
Please feel free to contact us also so we can help make sure
the nursing home is as safe as possible.
SEIU Locals 585, 668 & District 1199P * 1–800–797–8890
SEIU Union Labor

APPENDIX D
FAMILY ALERT
We, the employees of CHCC [Camp Hill Care Center] nurs-
ing home have been working to make this nursing home safer
for your family members.
Recently we surveyed the nursing home for things we be-
lieve may endanger the health and safety of you family member
and the employees. After the survey we delivered a letter to the
administrator listing the 10 biggest health and safety concerns
BEVERLY HEALTH & REHABILITATION SERVICES 969
we have. Unfortunately the management has not corrected all
the problems, so we want to let you know about them.
[T]he hot water in Dietary is not hot enough to kill germs,
and in laundry it is not hot enough to kill bacteria and resident
have take warm bath water! [Sic.]
BEWARE –YOU MAY BE ENTERING A HAZARDOUS AREA
Please report any things you believe may be hazardous to the
administrator of this facility or call the Beverly Family in
Touch Line at 1–800–572–9981.
Please feel free to contact us also so we can help make sure
the nursing home is as safe as possible.
SEIU Locals 585, 668 & District 1199P * 1–800–797–8890
SEIU Union Labor