Bel-Air Bowl, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 2, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 6 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABIOR RELATIONS BOARI)
Bel-Air Bowl, Inc. and District No. 9, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Case 14-CA- 12366
January 2, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MMBIRS
PENII.O AND TRUISDAIE
On August 13, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
David P. McDonald issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Bel-Air Bowl, Inc.,
Belleville, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, except that the attached notice
is substituted for that of the Administrative Law
Judge.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's resolution of Reslpondent's
contentions concerning the alleged invalidity of the Union's authorization
cards. We also note that even if. as Respondent alleges, the Union represented
to employee card signers that any time prior to the execution of a contract
they could renounce union representation by a simple majority vote, here
Respondent by its unlawful conduct procured the employees' March 1979
vote to "drop the Union."
' We have modified the Administrative Law Judge's notice to conform with
his recommended Order.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Following a hearing at which all parties had an
opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
247 NLRB No. 3
Act and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend
to abide by the fiollowing:
The National Labor Relations Act gives all
employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain as a group through a representa-
tive they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all such activity
except to the extent that the employees' bar-
gaining representative and employer have a
collective-bargaining agreement which imposes
a lawful requirement that employees become
union members.
WE WiI. NOT announce and grant pay in-
creases or refer to other possible future economic
benefits to induce you to give up your support for
District No. 9, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
WI WIl.l. NOT force you to vote or otherwise
choose between receiving a pay raise and contin-
ued union representation.
WE WILl. NOT bypass the above-named Union
as your exclusive collective-bargaining represen-
tative by dealing directly with you as to rates of
pay and possible future economic benefits.
WE WIll.. NOT withdraw recognition or refuse
to bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of all our employees in the appropriate unit
described below with respect to wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment. The appropriate unit is:
All full time and regular part-time mechanics,
pin chasers and desk clerks employed by the
Respondent at its Belleville facility, excluding
janitors, babysitters and supervisors, as defined
in the Act, and excluding all other employees
not included in the above-described unit.
WE WILl. NOT refuse to furnish the necessary
information for collective bargaining to the
above-named labor organization.
WE WII.L NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of
rights guaranteed you under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WI.l. recognize and, upon request, bargain
with the above-named labor organization as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment and, if an understanding is
6
HEL-AIR BOWL. INC.
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
WtI wiI. furnish to the above-named labor
organization the information which was request-
ed by Roy B. Hawkins in his letter of February 1,
1979.
BEI.-AIR Bowl ,INC.
DECISION
STtMrlMINT 01: TH. CASI.
DAVIDI P. McDoN.XI ). Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me in St. Louis, Missouri. on Ma 7.
1979.' The charge was filed on March 14 by District No. 9.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. The com-
plaint. issued on April 4 alleged that el-Air Bowl. Inc..
herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a)( ) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act. as amended. Respon-
dent's answer to the complaint denies the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
The parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard: to
call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
relevant evidence. Post-hearing briefs hase been filed on
behalf of General Counsel and Respondent.'
Upon the basis of the entire record, my observations of the
testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, and the briefs of the
parties. I make the following:
FIN)IN(;S 01: FACI
I. rTHI BUSINISS O- RSPONI)ENT
At all times material herein, Respondent has been a
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois,
with an office and principal place of business located in
Belleville, Illinois, where it is engaged in the bowling and
rest.urant business, providing recreational services, food.
alcoholic beverages, and other related services. During the
past 12 months Respondent, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, performed services and sold goods
valued in excess of $500,000 and during the same period
purchased and received goods or services valued in excess of
$10,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of
Illinois.
Respondent admits, and I find upon the basis of the
foregoing, that at all times material herein Respondent has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE I.ABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent concedes, and I find, that at all times material
herein the Union has been a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
iI. ISSIS
The issues to be decided herein are:
I. Whether Respondent violated Section X(a)( I) of the Act
through granting wage increases deliberately timed to
discourage employees from forming or remaining in the
Union and by soliciting employees to vote against represen-
tation by the Union.
2. Whether the mechanic. pin chasers, and desk clerks
represented an appropriate unit
3. Whether the signed union authorization cards were
valid.
4. Whether the Union represented a majority of the
mechanic pin chasers. and desk clerks employed hb Respon-
dent and whether Respondent violated Section X(a)(5) and
I 1) of the Act bh failing and refusing to recognize the Union,
provide requested infolrmation needed for hargaining, and
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive repre-
sentalive of all employees in that unit.
IX. IH Xl 1.1(1il) 'Nt SIR I \1OR PR \t. It I.S
Respondent operates a howling alley in Ielleville. Illinois.
which is open to the public 7 days a week, until 1 am.
Sunday through Thursday and until 2 a.m. on Fridas and
Saturday In addition to facilities for bowling. Respondent
maintains a restaurant. a bar. and babysitting facilities for its
customers. Approximately 60 employees, who are represent-
ed by the Restaurant Employees Union. work in the
restaurant and bar. The four janitors and three babysitters
are not represented by a union. Respondent also employs the
unit sought to be represented by the Union. which consists
of one mechanic, four pin chasers. and three desk clerks.
James J. Cange testified that he has been employed by
Respondent for 3 years as a mechanic and 2 years as a pin
chaser. As a mechanic his present duties require him to
perform all major repairs and general maintenance of lane
and pinsetting equipment from 4 to II a.m. His primary
work station is behind the pinsetting equipment. where he
works with the pin chasers. The basic difference between a
mechanic and a pin chaser is the degree of complexity in
their mechanical skills and work. In addition to minor
repairs, the pin chasers adjust automatic pinsetters. dust and
oil the lanes, and answer calls. The working hours of a pin
chaser vary, but generally coincide with the period when the
bowling alley is open to customers. Both the mechanic and
the pin chasers are notified of any alley problems by the desk
clerk through a public address system with the use of a
special code.
The position of desk clerk was described by William
Lehman. who has worked in that position for 6 years. The
desk clerks are located at the front of the building and work
during bowling hours. They act as cashier. assign lanes, rent
shoes, sell candy, clean the telescores, empty trash into waste
cans, and prepare for league play.
The janitors clean up. empty waste cans and ashtrays
wash windows. and perform other cleanup functions from
midnight to 8 a.m. throughout the building.
All dates herein refer to 1979 unilesIs otherwe indicated
7
Frror,\ ill the transcript haw been intend nd clrrected.
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The babysitters work in an annex in the bowling alley's
basement, caring for customer's children. They never per-
form other tasks and only rarely come in contact with other
employees.
The mechanic, pin chasers, desk clerks, janitors, and
babysitters are supervised by John Daubach, the plant
manager. At the time the employees signed the union
authorization cards, the janitors were under the supervision
of Rick Stauder.
On January 18 the union business representative, Roy B.
Hawkins, distributed union authorization cards to employ-
ees Jeffrey Loesche, William Lehman, Peggy Goedelman,
Ricky Pierce, and Randy Rau during a meeting at his home.
On the following day he received in the mail five of these
cards which were properly signed. The sixth card arrived on
January 20.'
At that initial meeting Hawkins was asked by the
employees if they could get out of union representation in
the event they signed the authorization cards and later
changed their minds. Jeffrey Loesche testified that Hawkins
responded that "we could back out of the union any time up
until the signing of the contract. He said that all that it took
was a simple majority vote of the employees." On the
following morning Loesche conveyed this information to
James Cange and John Loesche. William Lehman asked "if
we were bound in any way by the Union." Hawkins
responded, "You are not bound in any way of any such sort
.... [I]t just takes a simple majority of the vote to
withdraw." He also explained that he would send a letter to
Respondent asking to recognize him as the bargaining agent.
On January 19 Hawkins sent a letter to Bel-Air Bowl,
Inc., to the attention of George Reissen, notifying them that
the Union represented the majority as their bargaining
representative in all matters regarding wages, hours of work,
working conditions, and other conditions of employment in
a unit described as alley maintenance and desk clerk
employees. The letter also offered Respondent an opportuni-
ty to verify the Union's majority status. On January 25
Respondent's former counsel, Robert Jennings, informed
Hawkins that he represented Bel-Air Bowl and inquired as
to whether the Union had a majority of the people involved.
When he was told the Union had all of those involved,
Jennings replied that "if that was the case it didn't look like
it should go to a hearing."
On January 30 Respondent's secretary-treasurer, Fred
Ruff, Jr., informed Harold Lorenz, representative of the
Union, that Respondent was ready to sign a recognition
letter. Apparently, the letter was dictated by Lorenz and
signed by Ruff and Hawkins. All parties agree that the
signatures are true and correct. The letter simply states:
This is to advise that Bel-Air Bowl, Inc. will recognize
and bargain collectively with District 9 International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace workers to
' The cards state:
YES, I WANT THE AM
I, the undersigned employee of (Name of Company)
authorize District 9, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) to act as my collective bargaining representa-
tive for wages, hours and working conditions.
Hawkins' letter requested the following information:
negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement regarding
wages, hours of work, working conditions, and other
conditions of employment for the alley maintenance
and desk clerk employees of Bel-Air Bowl, Inc.
The representatives of Bel-Air Bowl, Inc. will meet with
the Union Representative at a mutually agreed time and
date.
On February I, by letter, the Union requested from
Respondent information which it felt was necessary for it to
properly perform its duties as bargaining representative.'
Mr. Ruff, in a letter dated February 6, refused to provide the
information, since he felt it should come from the employ-
ees. Respondent concluded the letter, "[W]e will meet with
you at any mutually agreed time and date."
The Union then forwarded a contract proposal on
February 14 and later agreed to a negotiation session for
March 7, 1979. Respondent's new attorney, Lawrence P.
Kaplan, notified the Union that his client was unable to
negotiate during the week of March 5 due to "certain
questions concerning the status of your representation of
certain employees of Bel-Air Bowl, Inc."
On March 12 Hawkins sent a second letter to Respondent,
repeating his request for information concerning employee
benefits. Respondent neither answered this letter nor provid-
ed the information.
Ruff testified that he signed the union authorization letter
upon the advice of Respondent's former attorney, Jennings.
Mr. Ruff also admitted that he met with Hawkins early in
march and had told him that Respondent could not bargain
because they could not live with the contract and they would
take some other route.
James J. Cange testified that he was approached by John
Daubach on March I while he was working in the room
behind the pin setters. At that time Daubach explained that
there was a possibility that he might buy Bel-Air Bowl and
that he was willing to offer a raise of 50 cents an hour and
time and half on holidays if the employees could get out of
the Union. Cange agreed to disseminate the offer on the
following day. Later that week John Daubach wanted to
know the results of the employees' discussion. Cange
explained that a decision had not been made, but he felt they
would drop the Union if Daubach purchased Bel-Air. On
another occasion Daubach handed Cange a slip of paper
which repeated the offer of a pay raise and a guaranteed paid
vacation. Daubach then repeated the offer to another
employee, Bill Lehman. Eventually, Cange and Lehman
disseminated the offer to Rick Pierce, Margaret Goldman,
Jeffrey Loesche, and Marilyn Lehman. The group unani-
mously voted to drop the Union and accept Daubach's offer
during the second or third week of March. After they voted
to drop the Union, Respondent, early in April, raised the
1. Names of all employees in the bargaining unit, including dates of
hire, rates of pay, ages and sex.
2. Classifications and job description of such employees.
3. A list and description of all fringe benefits and how they are
computed. Include copies of all benefit plans and cost per hour per
employee for each benefit and benefit plan.
4. Shift schedules and hours of work.
5. Information regarding free bowling, meals, relief times. etc.
8
BEL-AIR BOWL, INC.
hourly wage 50 cents for all of the employees in the proposed
unit.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Respondent's Recognition of the Union and Refusal
To Bargain
The General Counsel correctly contends that Respondent
granted voluntary recognition to the Union as the bargaining
representative of the unit employees as of January 30, 1979.
On that date Fred Ruff, Jr., executed a letter which
recognized the Union in clear, concise, unqualified, and
explicit language. Although all parties agree that Ruff signed
the January 30 letter, Respondent denies that recognition
was ever afforded. It should be noted that Ruff signed this
recognition letter after he conferred with Jennings, Respon-
dent's attorney. Jennings had previously spoken to Hawkins,
who had indicated that the Union had authorization cards
from all the employees in question. Respondent never
inspected these cards, although the Union offered it the
opportunity to verify their validity. In addition to signing the
recognition letter Respondent agreed several times to com-
mence bargaining during the week of March 5, 1979.
The recognition of the Union was never an issue until
after a proposed 12-page labor agreement was mailed to
George Reissen on February 14. Thereafter, Kaplan in-
formed Hawkins by letter that he represented Respondent
and that it would be unable to negotiate during the week of
March 5, since he was exploring certain questions concern-
ing the status of the Union representation. In response to
this letter Hawkins contacted Kaplan and Ruff, seeking
clarification. At the time Ruff simply stated that he and the
board of directors had reviewed the contract, they were of
the opinion that they could not live with the contract the
way it was, and they were going in some other route. During
Ruffs testimony he admitted that he did make the above
statement.
The action of Respondent was a voluntary recognition of
the Union and an agreement to commence bargaining. When
it later refused to meet or arrange for a future bargaining
meeting, it in essence reneged on its commitments to
recognize the Union before a reasonable time for bargaining
had elapsed, thus violating the Employer's bargaining
obligation. The Board in a similar case, Capitol Temptrol
Corporation,' held that once the respondent therein granted
the union's request for recognition, it became the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees. In
Jerr-Dan Corp.' the Board quoted with approval the follow-
ing passage from the Decision in the analogous case of
Brown & Connolly, Inc:'
Once voluntary recognition has been granted to a
majority union, the Union becomes the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees,
and withdrawal or reneging from the commitment to
recognize before a reasonable time for bargaining has
elapsed violates the employer's bargaining obligation.
'243 NLRB 575 (1979).
237 NLRB 302 (1978).
'237 NLRB 271, 275 (1978).
'Fn. 3, supra.
Evidence that an employer has commenced bargaining
or has taken other affirmative action consistent with its
recognition of the Union aids in resolving the evidenti-
ary question as to whether recognition was granted.
However, once the fact of recognition is established,
such additional evidence is not required, for the
bargaining obligation arises upon voluntary recognition
and continues until there has been a reasonable oppor-
tunity for bargaining to succeed.
Therefore, after considering the foregoing statement of
law and the credited evidence, I find that Respondent's
action was a withdrawal of recognition from the Union and
a refusal to bargain, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
B. The Validity of the Authorization Cards
Respondent correctly states that a valid bargaining re-
quest or demand must be made before an employer is
obligated to recognize the requesting union, and to be
effective, the request must be made when the union, in fact,
possesses signed authorization cards from a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit. Respondent admits that
all employees of the proposed unit signed the authorization
cards, but argues the cards are invalid due to statements
made by Hawkins.
James Cange, William Lehman, and Jeffrey Loesche
testified that Mr. Hawkins told them that by a simple
majority vote, they could withdraw from the Union up until
the time a collective-bargaining agreement was signed.
During the hearing Mr. Loesche also answered, "That's
correct," to the following question: "Mr. Loesche, isn't it
true that at the meeting of January 18, that Roy Hawkins
told you by signing the card you were recognizing the Union
as your collective-bargaining representative?"
On cross-examination Hawkins denied he ever told any of
the employees that they could withdraw from the Union by a
simple majority, nor did he discuss their obligations to the
Union. He pointed out that most of the conversation dealt
with how to join.
In order to clarify this alleged ambiguity, it is necessary to
review the authorization cards. At the top of the card in
large bold type appears: "YES, I WANT THE IAM."' The
text itself is couched in explicit language denoting the IAM
as the signatory's collective-bargaining representative for
wages, hours, and working conditions. In Levi Strauss & Co.,
172 NLRB 732 (1968), the Board addressed itself to the
solicitor's representation that signing "didn't mean that we
were joining the Union, that we had our choice when the
election came up."9 The Board, finding the cards to be valid,
stated:
(T]hat employees are told in the course of solicitation
that an election is contemplated, or that a purpose of
the card is to make an election possible, provides in our
view insufficient basis in itself for vitiating unambigu-
ously worded authorization cards on the theory of
misrepresentation.
'Other cases in the same genre include: Cumberlond Shoe Corporation. 144
NLRB 1268 (1963); N.L.R.B. v. Randall P. Kane. Inc. d/b/a The Catalyst,
581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978).
9
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Supreme Court stated in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Co.. Inc. 395 U.S. 575, 606 (1969):
[E]mployees should be bound by the clear language of
what they sign unless that language is deliberately and
clearly canceled by a union adherent with words
calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget
the language above his signature.
Based upon these principles, I find that the authorization
cards were valid. The language is clear and concise. The
testimony of Loesche reinforces the language found on the
cards, in that he acknowledged that Hawkins told the
employees their signatures designated the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative. When the employees
signed the cards they fully intended for the Union to act as
their collective-bargaining representative.
C. The Appropriate Unit
The General Counsel alleges that a unit consisting of the
mechanic, pin chasers, and desk clerks constitutes an
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Respondent contends that approximately 60 employees are
already members of another union, and if the above unit is
found appropriate, an unrepresented residual unit will be
created consisting of babysitters and janitors. Respondent
further argues that the babysitters and janitors have as much
similarity in their job functions to the proposed unit as the
mechanic, pin chasers, and desk clerks to each other. Even if
the babysitters were considered inappropriate, Respondent
contends they should be included under the application of
the residual unit concept.
In determining the appropriate unit, the community of
interest of the various employees must be taken into
consideration. The babysitters are part-time hourly employ-
ees who work in an isolated area in the basement of the
building. They rarely come in contact with other employees.
Their job skills, training, and qualifications are totally
dissimilar to the proposed unit.
Although the janitors move throughout the building, their
work and job skills are also dissimilar to the proposed unit.
Their work schedule, from midnight to 8 a.m., prevents
them from coming in contact with the desk clerks and pin
chasers. The single mechanic works from 4 to II a.m., but
the dissimilarity of his job function usually prevents the
janitors and mechanic from coming in contact with each
other.
The mechanic, pin chasers, and desk clerks represent a
cohesive unit whose members are required to coordinate
their efforts for the common purpose of directly serving the
bowling patrons. Neither the janitors nor the babysitters
ever perform the duties of the mechanic, pin chasers, or desk
clerks; however, the members within the proposed unit have
on several occasions performed each other's tasks.
In light of the above, I find that the janitors and
babysitters do not have a community of interest similar to
that of the mechanic, pin chasers, and desk clerks.
"' N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co.. 375 U.S. 405 (1964); Frio-Lay. Inc. v.
N.L.R.B. 585 F.2d 62 (1978); N.LR.B. v. Eagle Material Handling. Inc.. 558
F.2d 160 (1977); Pride Refining Inc.. 224 NLRB 1353 (1976); Capitol
Tempirol Corporation, supra.
Respondent argues if the unit sought is found appropriate,
then the janitors and babysitters should also be included as a
residual unit. I do not agree. There are approximately three
or four babysitters and three janitors. Their exclusion from
the proposed unit will not produce a residual unit problem.
In Horn & Hardarl Co.. 173 NLRB 1077 (1968), the Board
stated:
It also appears that these employees in this residual unit
possess sufficient community of interest with the
employees presently represented by the Intervenor to
warrant inclusion in a single overall unit.
In the present case the janitors and babysitters do not
possess sufficient community of interest to be included in the
proposed unit.
In view of the foregoing, I find that the unit sought by the
Union is an appropriate one for purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act,
and it consists of:
All mechanics, pin chasers and desk clerks employed by
the Respondent at its Belleville facility, excluding all
other employees and spervisors as defined in the Act.
D. The Unilateral Pay Raise
The evidence concerning the pay raise is not in dispute.
After the Union notified Respondent of its representation,
John Daubach offered the employees a raise of 50 cents per
hour, a paid vacation, and time and a half on holidays if the
employees would get out of the Union. Initially, this offer
was presented as if it were coming from Daubach based on
his assertion that he wanted to buy the Bel-Air, but not if
there were a union. The employees then voted to leave the
Union, and shortly thereafter Respondent, not Mr. Dau-
bach, in fact gave the employees a 50-cent raise. Daubach
did not purchase the Bel-Air.
I find that Respondent's conduct in granting a 50-cent,
across-the-board raise to the unit employees, without notice
to or consultation with the Union, was in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.'"
In reviewing the sequence of events, it is obvious that after
Respondent determined it could not live with the proposed
union contract, it decided to take "some other route." That
"other route" was manifested in Respondent's implementa-
tion of a wage increase to influence the employees' vote, in
violation of the Act. Such conduct impinged upon the
employees' freedom of choice for or against unionization and
resulted in undermining the Union's majority support and
thus interfered with the lawful collective-bargaining rights
which are protected by Section 7 of the Act.
E. The Refusal To Provide Requested Information
After Respondent, by letter, recognized the Union on
January 30, Hawkins twice, on February I and March 12,
requested information regarding, in general, employee work
status." On February 6 Respondent refused to provide the
requested information, since it felt the information was
" Fn. 4, supro.
10
BEL-AIR BOWL, INC.
within the knowledge of the employees and should come
from them.
It is a well-established principle that an employer has an
obligation, as part of its duty to bargain in good faith, to
provide information needed by a bargaining representative
for the proper performance of its duties.'2 The information
requested by the Union was rlevant and necessary to the
Union's performance of its representative obligations. Ab-
sent special circumstances, a union's right to information is
not defeated merely because the union may acquire the
needed information through an independent course of
investigation." Respondent has an obligation, which it did
not meet in its letter of February 6, to supply the Union with
the requested information. Therefore, I find that Respon-
dent, by failing and refusing to provide the information
requested by the Union, violated and is violating Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Vl. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Bel-Air Bowl. Inc.. set forth above.
occurring in connection with Respondent's operalion de-
scrihbed in Sccion I. above, he a close, intimate, and
suhsllntial relationship to trade. traffic, and commerce
among the ses cral Stalct, and tend to lead, and have led to.
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Bel-Air Bowl, Inc., is an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce and in a
business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full time and regular part-time mechanics, pin
chasers and desk clerks employed by the Respondent at
its Belleville facility, excluding janitors, babysitters and
supervisors as defined in the Act, and excluding all
other employees not included in the above-described
unit.
4. Since January 30, 1979, and at all times thereafter to
date, the Union was, and is now, the exclusive representative
of the above-described appropriate unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
5. By withdrawing recognition from the Union on January
30, 1979, and since that date refusing to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
above-described appropriate unit; by unilaterally granting
pay increases to employees; by inducing employees to
abandon their support for the Union, and by refusing to
N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co.. 351 U.S. 149 (1956); East Coast Equipment
Corp.. 229 NLRB 825 (1977); Doubarn Sheet Metal. Inc.. 243 NLRB 821
(1979).
' American Beef Packerr. Inc.. 193 NLRB 1117. 1120 (1971). The Kroger
Company. 226 NLRB 512 (1976).
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
provide requested information needed for bargaining, Re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The unfair labor practices enumerated above are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
As Respondent has been found to have engaged in certain
unfair abor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative actions
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent has been obligated since
January 30, 1979, to bargain with the Union, I shall
recommend that it be required to recognize and, upon
request, bargain with the Union.
Respondent's unlawful activities make appropriate an
Order requiring Respondent to cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the statutory rights of employees.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this proceeding,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Bel-Air Bowl, Inc., Belleville, Illinois, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Announcing and granting pay increases and referring
to other possible future economic benefits, including addi-
tional pay raises, or other plans to induce employees to
revoke their support for the Union or otherwise compelling
employees to choose between accepting a pay raise or
supporting the Union.
(b) Bypassing the Union as their employees' exclusive
collective-bargaining representative by negotiating directly
with employees as to rates of pay and possible economic
benefits.
(c) Withdrawing recognition and refusing to recognize the
Union, to provide requested information needed for bargain-
ing, and to bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all its
employees in the appropriate unit described below with
respect to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment. The appropriate unit is:
All full time and regular part-time mechanics, pin
chasers and desk clerks employed by the Respondent at
its Belleville facility, excluding janitors, babysitters and
supervisors, as defined in the Act, and excluding all
other employees not included in the above-described
unit.
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
Il
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Recognize and, upon request, bargain with the above-
named labor organization as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Furnish to the Union the information which was
requested by Roy B. Hawkins in his letter of February 1,
1979.
" Fn. 4, supra.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
(c) Post at its Belleville, Illinois, place of business copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's autho-
rized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
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