Auto Workers Local 95 (Electric Boat)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 20, 2001

337 N.L.R.B. 237 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 237
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer­
ica and its Local Lodges Nos. 95 (Unit #9), 148,
376, 509, 699, 723, 887, 1609, and 172 (Various
Employers) and Various Individuals Marine
Draftsmen Association (MDA) UAW Local 571
(Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics Cor­
poration) and Various Individuals. Cases 31–
CB–7841, 31–CB–8183, 31–CB–8259, 31–CB–
8641–(1–8), 31–CB–8641–(12,13,15–18, 21, 24,
25), and 31–CB–8641–(26–28)
December 20, 2001
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On August 16, 1999, the National Labor Relations
Board issued its decision and order in Auto Workers Lo­
cal 95 (Various Employers) .1 On June 9, 2000, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Dis trict of Co­
lumbia Circuit issued its opinion denying enforcement in
part of the Board’s decision and order.2 The court held,
in pertinent part, that the Respondents International Un­
ion and Local 376 (Respondents) violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by causing the Employer, Colt Indus­
tries, to discharge nonmember employee George Gally
for nonpayment of dues without first informing him of
the amount by which his union fees would be reduced if
he became a Beck 3 objector. The court remanded that
portion of the case to the Board to determine an appro­
priate remedy for the Respondents’ violation of the Act.
On September 26, 2000, the Board accepted the court’s
remand. On May 4, 2001, the Board invited the parties to
file statements of position. Thereafter, the General Coun­
sel, the Charging Party, and the Respondents filed state­
ments of position.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the court’s remand in light of the record and the parties’
statements of position. For the reasons that follow, we
shall order the Respondents to cease and desist from their
unfair labor practices, to make Gally whole for any loss
of wages or other benefits suffered by him as a result of
the Respondents’ causing his discharge without first pro­
viding him with the information required by the court of
appeals’ decision, and to notify the Employer that they
1 328 NLRB 1215.
2 Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651.
3 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (unions
may not, over the objection of dues-paying nonmember employees,
expend funds collected under a union-security agreement on activities
unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance
adjustment).
have no objection to Gally’s reinstatement and affirma­
tively request his reemployment. However, for the rea­
sons set forth below, we shall allow the parties to litigate
at the compliance stage of this proceeding the question of
whether Gally is entitled to any backpay.
Facts
Charging Party George Gally, an employee of Colt In­
dustries at its Hartford, Connecticut facility, was a mem­
ber of Respondent International Union, United Automo­
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) and its Local 376 from 1963 until July
1985, when he resigned his memberships. At all material
times since July 1985, Gally has been a nonmember of
the Respondents. While employed by Colt, Gally was
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that in­
cluded a union-security clause.
In October 1990, Gally ceased paying any dues or fees
to the Respondents. There is no complaint allegation, nor
is it asserted, that Gally had at any time exercised his
right under Beck to object to the payment of his dues and
fees for nonrepresentational purposes. By letters dated
February 7 and March 18, 1991, Respondent Local 376
notified Gally of the amount of his dues arrearages, rep­
resenting amounts equivalent to full union dues. The
letters further stated that if the specified amount was not
paid, the Respondent Local would seek Gally’s discharge
pursuant to the union-security clause of the then-current
collective-bargaining agreement between Colt and the
Respondent Local. On April 1, 1991, the Respondent
Local notified Colt that Gally had failed to pay his dues
and that the parties’ agreement required Gally’s dis­
charge under those circumstances. Colt discharged Gally
on April 10, 1991, pursuant to the Respondent Local
376’s demand.4
In August 1989 and June 1990, the Respondents sent
Gally its magazine Solidarity, which contained articles
notifying employees of their right under the Supreme
Court’s Beck decision to object to the payment of union
dues and fees for nonrepresentational purposes. These
notices did not state the amount by which Gally’s fees
would be reduced if he were to become a Beck objector.
The notices did state that nonmembers who pay dues to
the Respondents pursuant to a union-security clause
could file objections to the payment of dues for nonrep­
resentational purposes and that objectors would receive a
report of expenditures, which provided the basis for the
amount charged for the relevant period of time.
4 It apparently is undisputed that Gally was reinstated by Colt on Oc­
tober 6, 1992.
337 NLRB No. 36
238 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board’s Decision
The Board held that “the duty of fair representation
does not require that initial Beck notices must contain the
percentage of union funds spent in the last accounting
year on nonrepresentational activities.”5 Because Gally
had resigned his union membership but had not exercised
his right under Beck to object to the payment of his dues
and fees for nonrepresentational purposes, the Board held
that the failure to provide him with this information did
not violate the duty of fair representation as embodied in
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.6 The Board also held that,
because the Respondents had fully complied with their
obligations under Beck, their actions in causing Gally’s
discharge for nonpayment of dues did not violate Section
8(b)(2).7
The Court of Appeals’ Decision
The court held, in pertinent part, that pursuant to its
decision in Penrod v. NLRB,8 “potential objectors like
Mr. Gally are entitled to be informed of the amount by
which their fees would be reduced were they to become
Beck objectors.”9 The court further observed that
[i]t is unclear, however, whether Mr. Gally is entitled to
the remedy he seeks, given the Supreme Court’s hold­
ing that objecting nonmembers are not excused from
paying disputed agency fees until a final judgment is
rendered in their favor. See Railway Clerks v. Allen,
373 U.S. 113, 120, 83 S.Ct. 1158, 10 L.Ed. 2d 235
(1963). Accordingly, we grant Mr. Gally’s petition for
review and remand the case to the Board to determine
an appropriate remedy for the Union’s statutory viola-
tion.10
The court had previously characterized “the remedy that he
[Gally] seeks” as “reinstatement and backpay.”11
Positions of the Parties
The General Counsel asserts that the appropriate rem­
edy for the violation identified by the court of appeals is
5 Auto Workers Local 95 (Various Employers) , supra, 328 NLRB at
1218.
The Board also held that the use of a “local presumption” to deter-
mine the amount of its each locals’ chargeable expenses did not violate
Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 1216–1218.
6 Id. at 1218–1219.

7 Id. at 1219.

8 203 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000), denying enf. to 327 NLRB 950

(1999). Penrod issued after the petition for review had been filed in this
case.
9 Thomas v. NLRB, supra, 213 F.3d at 655–656.
The court also affirmed the Board’s determination that the Respon­
dents’ use of a “local presumption” was not unlawful. Id. at 660.
10 Id. at 656.
11 Id. at 654.
an order requiring the Respondents to notify the Em­
ployer that they do not object to Gally’s reinstatement
and to make him whole for any loss of wages or benefits
from the date of his discharge until the date of his rein-
statement. Citing to Teamsters (Ryder Student Transpor­
tation),12 Production Workers Local 707 (Mavo Leas­
ing),13 and Monson Trucking,14 the General Counsel con-
tends that a union may not lawfully seek an employee’s
discharge for failing to pay dues under a union-security
clause when it has not provided the employee with notice
of his or her Beck rights. In light of the court’s remand,
the General Counsel asserts that the Respondents’ failure
to provide Gally with the percentage reduction in fees
that would be applicable to objectors is tantamount to a
failure to provide any Beck notice and should be reme­
died in the same manner that such violations are reme­
died. The General Counsel asserts that Brotherhood of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen,15 cited by the court of appeals
in its remand, is factually distinguishable and does not
preclude an award of backpay under the circumstances of
this case.
The Charging Party likewise asserts that Gally is enti­
tled to full backpay. According to the Charging Party,
when a union fails to provide an employee with an ade­
quate Beck notice, the employee is privileged to use self-
help by withholding dues from the union, and any effort
by the union to seek an employee’s discharge for non-
payment of dues under these circumstances is unlawful.
Citing Rochester Mfg. Co.,16 the Charging Party asserts
that the Board should also order nationwide nunc pro
tunc relief, including notice postings, opportunities for
employees to resign and object retroactively to the 6
months prior to the filing of Gally’s charge, and backpay
in the form of dues collected from those who object after
receiving a lawful notice.
The Respondents assert that Gally is not entitled to any
backpay. Citing Railway & S.S. Clerks v. Allen,17 the
Respondents contend that objecting employees must con­
tinue to pay full dues while their challenge to the union’s
use of their fee payments is pending. The Respondents
suggest that this principle is especially applicable in this
case, because Gally, despite notice of the Respondents’
fee objection system, failed to make any objection
known but instead ceased to pay dues without explana-
12 333 NLRB 1009, 111 fn. 3 (2001).
13 322 NLRB 35 (1996), enfd. 161 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1998).
14 324 NLRB 933, 935 (1997), enfd. 204 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2000).
15 Supra, 373 U.S. 113.
16 323 NLRB 260, 262–264 (1997), affd. 194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir.
1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066 (2000).
17 Supra, 373 U.S. 113.
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 239
tion.18 With respect to requests for broader relief, the
Respondents assert that their Beck procedures have
changed substantially since 1992 and that any question
concerning whether their current notice procedures are
sufficient to satisfy the duty of fair representation should
be left to future litigation. In particular, the Respondents
assert that all members and nonmembers now receive
notice of their Beck rights both when they are hired and
annually thereafter, and that the annual notices since
1992 have included the percentage of nonrepresenta­
tional expenditures from its annual fee report for the
prior year.
Analysis
In Communications Workers v. Beck,19 the Supreme
Court held that unions may not, over the objection of
dues-paying nonmember employees, expend funds col­
lected under a union-security agreement on activities
unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administra­
tion, or grievance adjustment. In Chicago Teachers Un­
ion v. Hudson,20 the Supreme Court described procedures
unions are required to adopt in order to protect the rights
of objectors. As pertinent to this proceeding, the Su­
preme Court in Hudson stated that
[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for
the First Amendment rights at stake, als o dictate that
the potential objectors be given sufficient information
to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee. Leaving the
nonunion employees in the dark about the source of the
figure for the agency fee–and requiring them to object
in order to receive information–does not adequately
protect [the nonunion employees’ rights].21
Although Hudson involved public sector employment and,
hence, constitutional concerns, the D.C. Circuit has applied
the basic protections of Hudson in Beck cases involving
private sector employees.22
In Penrod, the D.C. Circuit summarized what it held
were the relevant legal principles in the following terms:
Unlike full union members and financial core
payors, employees who object to funding nonrepre­
sentational activities, called “Beck objectors,” pay
reduced dues. Beck objectors are also known as ‘po­
tential challengers’ because they have a right to chal-
18 The Respondents cite Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774
(1961), for the proposition that “dissent is not to be presumed—it must
affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.”
19 Supra, 487 U.S. at 745.
20 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
21 Id. at 306.
22 Thomas v. NLRB, supra, 213 F.3d at 658 (citing Abrams v. Com­
munications Workers of America, 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 fn. 7 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
lenge the union’s calculation of the reduced dues; in
response to such challenges, the union bears the bur-
den of justifying its calculation.
. . . .
In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that “[b]asic
considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the
First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the
potential objectors be given sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.” Abrams ex­
pressly applies Hudson’s requirements to new em­
ployees and financial core payors. Since Hudson re-
quires that potential objectors be told the percentage
of union dues chargeable to them–for how else could
they “gauge the propriety of the union’s fee”–and
since Abrams applies Hudson to new employees and
financial core payors, they too must be told the per­
centage of union dues that would be chargeable were
they to become Beck objectors.23
Applying Penrod, the court of appeals found in this
case that the Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by
causing Gally’s discharge for nonpayment of dues with-
out first providing him with a Beck notice that included
the amount by which his fees would be reduced if he
became a Beck objector. The court of appeals has thus, in
effect, found that the Respondents’ failure to notify Gally
of the amount by which his dues would be reduced if he
became a Beck objector prevented him from exercising
his right to decide whether to become an objector. We
accept the court’s findings as the law of the case. The
remaining question, as the court of appeals has recog­
nized, is whether “Gally is entitled to the remedy he
seeks.”24
The principal area of dispute between the parties is
whether Gally is entitled to backpay for the period fol­
lowing his discharge by Colt, at the Respondents’ re-
quest. In cases where a union has caused an employer to
discharge an employee without providing the employee
with any notice of his or her Beck rights, in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), the Board will remedy the
violation by ordering the respondent union inter alia, to
make whole the employee for any loss of wages and
benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful conduct until
the employee is either reinstated by the employer to his
or her former or a substantially equivalent position, or
until he or she obtains substantially equivalent employ­
ment elsewhere, less net interim earnings.25 We hold
23 Penrod, supra, 203 F.3d at 44, 47 (citations omitted).
24 Thomas v. NLRB, supra, 213 F.3d at 654.
25 See, e.g., Teamsters Local (Ryder Student Transportation), 333
NLRB 1009, 1009–1010 (2001); Monson Trucking, supra, 324 NLRB
at 936–938; Production Workers Local 707 (Mavo Leasing), supra, 322
NLRB at 36. The Board will also order the respondent union to: cease
240 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provisionally that Gally is entitled to a make whole order
in order to remedy the violation found by the court of
appeals. In the particular circumstances of this case,
however, we shall afford the Respondents an opportunity
to establish, at the compliance stage of this proceeding,
that Gally was a “free rider,” i.e., that he “willfully and
deliberately sought to evade his union-security obliga­
tions.”26 If the Respondents make this showing, Gally
will not be entitled to any backpay.
The Board has long held that, prior to seeking the dis­
charge of an employee for failure to pay dues or fees, a
union must inform the employee of the amount owed, the
method used to compute that amount, when such pay­
ments are to be made, and the fact that discharge will
result from failure to pay.27 In California Saw & Knife,28
the Board held that a union has an obligation, when or
before it seeks to obligate an employee to pay fees and
dues under a union-security provision, to inform the em­
ployee of his Beck and General Motors rights to be and
remain a nonmember; and, if nonmember status is cho­
sen, to object to paying for nonrepresentational activities,
to be given sufficient information to intelligently decide
whether to object, and to be apprised of internal union
procedures for filing objections. It follows that, in the
absence of the required notice of Beck rights, a union
may “not seek to enforce the union-security provision by
causing or seeking to cause the discharge of [nonmember
employees] in order to obligate them to pay dues and
fees under that provision.”29
However, even if it is established that a union has not
fully complied with its fiduciary obligations with respect
to enforcement of a union-security clause, the Board has
and desist; notify the employer that it has no objection to the discrimi­
natee’s reemployment and that it affirmatively requests his or her re-
employment; notify the employee of the employee’s rights under NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (employees have right to
become and remain nonmembers) and Beck; remove from its files, and
request the employer to remove from its files, any reference to the
discharge; and post an appropriate notice to employees and members.
No party disputes the appropriateness of these remedies in light of the
violation found by the cour t of appeals. Although Gally was reinstated
in 1992, we find that requiring the Respondents to notify Colt that they
have no objection to Gally’s reinstatement and affirmatively request his
reemployment, is necessary in order to fully neutralize the effects of the
Respondents’ unlawful actions.
26 Teamsters Local 630 (Ralph’s Grocery), 209 NLRB 117, 125
(1974).
27 I.B.I. Security, 292 NLRB 648, 649 (1989). See also Philadelphia
Sheraton Corp., 136 NLRB 888 (1962), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Hotel
Employees Local 568, 320 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1963).
28 320 NLRB 224, 233 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB,
133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB,
525 U.S. 813 (1998).
29 Production Workers Local 707 (Mavo Leasing Co.), supra, 322
NLRB at 35. See also L.D. Kichler Co., 335 NLRB 1427, 131 fn. 18
(2001); Monson Trucking, supra, 324 NLRB at 936.
consistently stated that it will not apply those require­
ments so rigidly “as to permit a recalcitrant employee to
profit from his own dereliction in complying with his
obligations as a union member.”30 Thus, the Board will
excuse a union’s failure to fully comply with the notice
requirements when it is shown that the employee in­
volved was a “free rider,” who “willfully and deliberately
sought to evade his union-security obligations.”31
The Board has not previously addressed the issue of
whether Gally was a free rider. The case was presented to
the Board on the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. There is, accordingly, no record evidence
bearing on the circumstances under which Gally stopped
paying dues, i.e., whether or not Gally would have paid
any dues or fees even if he had been fully informed of his
Beck rights. The Board did not address this issue in its
prior decision in this case in light of its finding, on other
grounds, that the Respondents’ actions in causing Gally’s
discharge were not unlawful. Under the unique circum­
stances of this case, we shall afford the Respondents an
opportunity to litigate Gally’s alleged free rider status at
the compliance stage of this proceeding.32 We recognize
that the Respondents did not explicitly raise the free rider
issue as a defense to the allegation of a violation, and are
now foreclosed from doing so. However, the free rider
issue is als o relevant to that portion of the remedy which
requires the payment of backpay. If the Respondents can
show in compliance that Gally would not have paid dues
and fees even if he had been given a full Beck notice, that
showing will relieve the Respondents from backpay li­
ability.
Our decision to leave to compliance the determination
of whether Gally is entitled to any backpay is consistent
with the terms of the court’s remand in this case. The
court of appeals remanded the proceeding to the Board to
consider whether Gally is entitled to backpay in light of
the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, supra. In
our view, the court’s remand encompasses consideration
of the free rider issue in the manner set forth herein.
In Allen, a Railway Labor Act case, railroad employ­
ees filed suit in State court against their union after the
union sought to collect from them full dues, some of
which was spent on nonrepresentational expenditures,
even though the emp loyees were not members of the
30 Teamsters Local 630 (Ralph’s Grocery), supra, 209 NLRB at 124.
31 Id. See also Ryder Student Transportation, supra, 333 NLRB 1009
fn. 3; I.B.I. Security, supra, 292 NLRB at 649.
32 See Berkshire Farm Center, 333 NLRB 367 (2001) (Board leaves
to compliance stage employer’s contention that employee’s right to
backpay was forfeited when employee engaged in misconduct, in light
of judge’s failure to apply proper standard in considering issue at liabil­
ity stage of proceeding).
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 241
union at the time. The court enjoined the union from
requiring the employees to pay any money to the union,
with the provision that the injunction would be modified
appropriately if the union showed the proportion of its
expenditures from dues that was reasonably necessary
and related to collective bargaining.33
The Supreme Court held that the State court injunction
was improper insofar as it relieved the employees of any
obligation to pay dues, even though the injunction was
subject to modification if the union came forward and
proved the proportion of exacted funds required for pur­
poses germane to collective bargaining.34 The Supreme
Court cited its prior holding in Machinists v. Street35 that
dissenting employees
remain obliged, as a condition of continued employ­
ment, to make the payments to their respective unions
called for by the agreement. Their . . . grievance stems
from the spending of their funds for purposes not au­
thorized by the [Railway Labor] Act in the face of their
objection, not from the enforcement of the union-shop
agreement by the mere collection of funds.36
The Supreme Court stressed that an injunction precluding
the future collection of dues by the union “sweeps too
broadly . . . [and] might well interfere with the . . . unions’
performance of those functions and duties which the Rail-
way Labor Act places upon them to attain its goal of stabil­
ity in the industry.”37 The Supreme Court also stated that no
employee could be entitled to relief absent proof that the
employee objected to the use of his or her dues for political
purposes.38 In support of this holding, the Supreme Court
cited its observation in Street that “dissent is not to be pre­
sumed—it must affirmatively be made known to the union
by the dissenting employee.”39
Our decision to leave to the compliance stage of this
proceeding the issue of whether Gally should be denied
backpay as a free rider is consistent with the issues dis­
cussed in Allen. Allen addresses the obligation of object­
ing employees to pay union dues and fees while their
challenge to the union’s use of their fee payments is
pending, and the requirement, previously articulated by
the Supreme Court in Street, that employees are not enti­
tled to relief from the obligation to pay full dues unless
they have affirmatively made known their objections to
the union. These considerations are relevant to the free
33 Id. at 116–117.

34 Id. at 120.

35 Supra, 367 U.S. at 740.

36 Id. at 771.

37 Allen, supra at 120 (quoting Street, supra at 771).

38 Id. at 118–119.

39 Street, supra at 774.

rider analysis set forth above, which similarly calls for a
consideration of the circumstances under which Gally
stopped paying dues. Having accepted the court’s re­
mand, we shall afford the Respondents an opportunity to
litigate this issue.
The Respondents appear to contend that Allen and
Street preclude a make whole order in this case regard-
less of the circumstances under which Gally ceased pay­
ing dues. We reject that contention. In Allen, the Su­
preme Court expressed its concern that the injunction
before it, which broadly prohibited the collection of any
dues from the plaintiff employees, would interfere with
the unions’ ability to carry out their representative func­
tions. Our order, in contrast, requires the Respondents to
cease and desist from failing to notify employees of their
rights under General Motors and Beck, when it seeks to
obligate them to pay fees and dues under a union-
security clause, and prohibits the Respondents from caus­
ing the discharge of an employee, for nonpayment of
dues, unless that notice requirement has been satisfied.
Our order does not prohibit the Respondents from col­
lecting dues from unit employees, and therefore does not
violate the principles set forth in Allen.
Our order also does not violate the rule, set forth in
Street, that “dissent is not to be presumed—it must af­
firmatively be made known to the union by the dissent­
ing employee.”40 For the reasons set forth above, the
Respondents could not lawfully cause Gally’s discharge
for nonpayment of dues without first providing him with
adequate notice of his Beck rights. Our order only re-
quires the Respondents to make Gally whole for any loss
of wages or benefits suffered as a result of their causing
his discharge without having first satisfied their obliga­
tion to provide him with that notice, subject to the Re­
spondents’ right to litigate Gally’s alleged free rider
status at the compliance stage. Nothing in our order re-
quires the Respondents to treat Gally, or any other em­
ployee, as a Beck objector, for purposes of determining
the amount of dues they owe, unless the employee prop­
erly asserts objector status. Accordingly, our order is
consistent with the principle that dissent is not to be pre­
sumed. In sum, we do not presume dissent on Gally’s
part. Rather, we find unlawful the Respondents’ failure
to inform him of his rights regarding dissent. And, we
deal with the consequences of that failure.
Finally, we reject the Charging Party’s request that
broader relief, such as that provided in Rochester Mfg.
Co.,41 be directed in this case. In Rochester, the General
Counsel alleged, and the Board found, that the respon-
40 Id.

41 Supra, 323 NLRB 260.

242 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent unions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by failing to no­
tify all unit employees of their rights under General Mo­
tors and Beck, including current members of the respon­
dent union who had paid union dues without having re­
ceived notice of their right to become a Beck objector. In
order to restore the status quo ante as to those individu­
als, the Board’s remedial order included nunc pro tunc
relief in the form of opportunities for employees to re-
sign and object retroactively to the 6 months prior to the
filing of the charge in that case, and reimbursement of
dues previously collected from those who object. The
complaint allegation remanded by the court of appeals in
this case, in contrast, is limited to the Respondents’ re-
questing the discharge of Gally, a nonmember employee
at all times material to this case, without first providing
him with proper notice of his Beck rights. The complaint
allegation before us does not allege a failure to inform
unit employees generally of their General Motors or
Beck rights. The remedy therefore addresses the violation
alleged and found.42
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order them to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondents unlawfully caused
the Employer to discharge George Gally, we shall order
the Respondents to notify the Employer in writing, with a
copy to the discriminatee, that they have no objection to
his employment and that they affirmatively request his
reinstatement. We shall also order the Respondents to
notify Gally of his rights under NLRB v. General Motors
Corp. and Beck and to inform him that he is not subject
to discharge for nonpayment of union dues in the ab­
sence of such notification. In light of the court’s remand,
the notice must include the amount by which Gally’s fees
would be reduced were he to become a Beck objector.
We shall further order the Respondents, jointly and sev­
erally, to make Gally whole for any loss of wages and
benefits he may have suffered as a result of its unlawful
conduct, less interim earnings, from the date of his dis­
charge until the date of his reinstatement by the Em­
ployer. All amounts of make-whole relief shall be com­
puted with interest as provided for in New Horizons for
the Retarded.43 Finally, as discussed fully above, the
Respondents shall be afforded the opportunity to prove,
at the compliance stage of this proceeding, that Gally
was a free rider who willfully and deliberately sought to
42 Teamsters Local 251 (Ryder Student Transportation), supra, 333
NLRB 1009,1010 fn. 6; Mavo Leasing, supra, 322 NLRB at 36 fn. 2.
43 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
evade his union-security obligations and is therefore not
entitled to an award of backpay.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, and its Local 376, West Hartford, Connecticut,
their officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to notify bargaining unit employees, when
they first seek to obligate them to pay fees and dues un­
der a union-security clause, of their right under NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and
remain a nonmember and of the rights of nonmembers
under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988), to object to paying for union activities not ger­
mane to the Respondents’ duties as bargaining agent and
to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities.
(b) Causing or attempting to cause Colt Industries to
discharge George Gally, or any other employee, for fail­
ing to pay union dues pursuant to a union-security clause
without first notifying them of their General Motors and
Beck rights, advising them of the amount of their dues
delinquency, and affording them a reasonable opportu­
nity to pay the amounts owed.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc­
ing employees in the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify George Gally in writing of his rights under
General Motors to be and remain a nonmember and of
the rights of nonmembers under Beck to object to paying
for union activities not germane to the Respondents’ du­
ties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in dues
and fees for such activities. The notice must include suf­
ficient information to enable Gally to intelligently decide
whether to object, including the amount by which his
fees would be reduced were he to become a Beck objec­
tor, as well as a description of any internal union proce­
dures for filing objections.
(b) Jointly and severally, make whole George Gally for
any loss of wages or other rights and benefits he may
have suffered, as a result of their unlawful conduct, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Notify Colt Industries, in writing, with a copy to
Gally, that it has no objection to Gally’s employment and
that it requests that Gally be reinstated.
(d) Notify Gally that it will not cause or attempt to
cause Colt Industries to discharge him for nonpayment of
dues without first notifying him of his General Motors
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 243
and Beck rights and affording him a reasonable opportu­
nity to pay the amounts owed.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files, and ask Colt Industries to remove from its
files, any reference to the discharge of Gally, and within
3 days thereafter notify Gally in writing that this has
been done and that the discharge will not be used against
him in any way.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
Respondent Local 376’s business office and meeting hall
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”44
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Re­
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent Local 376 and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees and members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
Local 376 to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver
to the Regional Director for Region 31 signed copies of
the notice in sufficient numbers to be posted by Colt In­
dustries in all places where notices to employees are cus­
tomarily posted, if it is willing.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re­
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondents have taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio­
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
44 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg­
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT fail to notify bargaining unit employees,
when we first seek to obligate them to pay fees and dues
under a union-security clause, of their right under NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and
remain a nonmember and of the rights of nonmembers
under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988), to object to paying for union activities not ger­
mane to our duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a
reduction in dues and fees for such activities.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Colt Industries
to discharge George Gally, or any other employee, for
failing to pay union dues pursuant to a union-security
clause without first notifying them of their General Mo­
tors and Beck rights, advising them of the amount of
their dues delinquency, and affording them a reasonable
opportunity to pay the amounts owed.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL notify George Gally in writing of his rights
under General Motors to be and remain a nonmember
and of the rights of nonmembers under Beck to object to
paying for union activities not germane to our duties as
bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and
fees for such activities. The notice will include sufficient
information to enable Gally to intelligently decide
whether to object, including the amount by which his
fees would be reduced were he to become a Beck objec­
tor, as well as a description of any internal union proce­
dures for filing objections.
WE WILL, jointly and severally, make whole George
Gally for any loss of wages or other rights and benefits
he may have suffered, with interest, as a result of our
unlawful conduct.
WE WILL notify Colt Industries, in writing, with a copy
to Gally, that we have no objection to Gally’s employ­
ment and that we request that Gally be reinstated.
WE WILL notify Gally that we will not cause or attempt
to cause Colt Industries to discharge him for nonpayment
of dues without first notifying him of his General Motors
and Beck rights and affording him a reasonable opportu­
nity to pay the amounts owed.
244 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
remove from our files, and ask Colt Industries to remove AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
from its files, any reference to the discharge of Gally, WORKERS OF AMERICA AND ITS LOCAL LODGES
and within 3 days thereafter notify Gally in writing that NOS. 95 (UNIT #9), 148, 376, 509, 699, 723,
this has been done and that the discharge will not be used 887, 1609, AND 172 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS)
against him in any way.