Auto Workers Local 95

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 16, 1999

328 N.L.R.B. 1215 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 1215
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica and its Local Lodges Nos. 95 (Unit #9), 148,
376, 509, 699, 723, 887, 1609, and 172 (Various
Employers) and Various Individuals.

Marine Draftsmen Association (MDA) UAW Local
571 (Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics
Corporation) and Various Individuals. Cases 31–
CB–7841, 31–CB–8183, 31–CB–8259, 31–CB–
8641–(1-8), 31–CB–8641–(12, 13, 15–18, 21, 24,
25) and 31–CB–8641–(26-28)
August 16, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
Upon a series of charges filed by various individuals
on various dates, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board issued an order consolidating
cases, consolidated complaint and notice of hearing dated
October 26, 1992. The consolidated complaint alleges
that the Respondents, International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, and various of its Local Unions, have en-
gaged in and are engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the National Labor Relations Act. On November 9, 1992,
the Respondents filed an answer, admitting in part and
denying in part the allegations of the complaint, and re-
questing that the complaint be dismissed.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Interna-
tional Union has been the Section 9(a) representative of
appropriate units of employees of various employers
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and
that the various Respondent Locals have acted as the
International’s agents. The named Charging Parties in
this case have been employed in these units, and at vari-
ous specified dates each of them was, or became, a non-
member of the Respondent International. The complaint
further alleges that the Respondent International and the
various employers have maintained and enforced collec-
tive-bargaining agreements containing union-security
clauses. The complaint additionally alleges that each of
the Local Unions has collected dues and fees from its
respective bargaining unit employees pursuant to the
applicable union-security clause. The complaint also
alleges that both the Respondent Local Unions and the
Respondent International spend a certain percentage of
their dues-based income on representational activities
and a certain percentage on non-representational activi-
ties. These allegations are not in dispute.
The complaint further alleges that beginning in June,
1992, the Respondent International distributed a 1991
Expenditure Report to all nonmember unit employees of
the various employers who, at the time, had on file with
the International a current objection to the payment of
dues or fees for nonrepresentational activities, and that
the report contained no information regarding the expen-
ditures of the locals other than a discussion of the appli-
cation of the International’s allocation between charge-
able and nonchargeable expenditures to that portion of
dues and fees retained by the various locals involved.
The Respondents admit these allegations, but deny the
further allegation that the failure to provide objecting
nonmembers any other information regarding the expen-
ditures of the various locals constitutes a factually un-
supported “local presumption” in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The complaint also alleges that on about April 9, 1991,
Respondent Local Union 376 caused Colt, in West Hart-
ford, Connecticut, one of the above-described employers,
to discharge Charging Party George Gally, a nonmember
employee. The complaint alleges in this regard that, other
than providing Gally with notices in the Respondent In-
ternational’s magazine in August 1989 and June 1990,
neither the Respondent International nor Respondent
Local 376 provided Gally with information related to
matters such as the percentage of union funds spent for
nonrepresentational purposes in the International’s last
accounting year, and the process by which nonmembers
can object to having their payments pursuant to the con-
tractual union-security clause spent on such activities.
Although admitting these allegations, the Respondents
deny the conclusionary allegations that, by engaging in
this conduct, the International and Local Respondents
engaged in unfair labor practices within Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
On June 10, 1993, the General Counsel filed with the
Board a Motion to Transfer Case to and Continue Pro-
ceedings Before the Board and for Summary Judgment,
with exhibits attached. On June 16, 1993, the Board is-
sued an Order Transferring Proceeding to the Board and
Notice to Show Cause why the Motion for Summary
Judgment should not be granted. The General Counsel
and various Charging Parties filed briefs in response to
the Notice to Show Cause. The Respondents filed a brief
in response to the Board’s notice, a Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, and a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment
1. Admitted or undisputed facts
The undisputed complaint allegations establish that the
Respondent International’s 1991 Report of Expenditures
Incurred in Providing Collective Bargaining Related Ser-
vices did not attempt separately to analyze the expendi-
tures of each of the Respondent Locals in which union-
represented employees participate, but stated that each
local affiliate retains a portion of dues and fees collected
by that local affiliate. Because of the accounting and re-
328 NLRB No. 175
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1216
porting difficulties in attempting to separately analyze
the expenditures of the locals, the report analyzed only
the expenditures of the Respondent International, and
then applied the same pro rata allocation between
chargeable and remaining expenses determined for the
International’s expenditures to that portion of fees and
dues retained by the various locals. The report justified
use of this procedure by noting that the vast majority of
nonchargeable activities (referred to in the Report as
“Remaining Expenditures”) are conducted by the Re-
spondent International. Thus, the report stated that by
applying the same allocation to the local unions as ap-
plied to the International, nonmember objectors would be
required to pay a smaller amount than if each local’s ex-
penditures were separately analyzed.
It is undisputed that this 1991 Expenditure Report was
distributed in June 1992, to all nonmember unit employ-
ees who had filed an objection to expending fees and
dues collected from them under a union-security agree-
ment for activities unrelated to collective bargaining,
contract administration, or grievance adjustment within
the meaning of Communication Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988).1 The report was accompanied by a
cover letter from the Respondent International notifying
the nonmember objectors of the charged amount to be
payable by them calculated pursuant to the report.
The undisputed complaint allegations further establish
that George Gally, an employee in a unit of all employ-
ees (with certain exceptions) employed by Colt, at its
facility in Hartford, Connecticut, and covered by a union-
security agreement, was a member of the Respondent
International and Respondent Local 376 from about 1963
until July, 1985, when he resigned his memberships. At
all material times since then, Gally has been a nonmem-
ber. There is no complaint allegation, nor is it asserted,
that Gally had at any time exercised his right under Beck
to object to the payment of his dues and fees on nonrep-
resentational activities. In letters dated February 7 and
March 18, 1991, Local 376 notified Gally regarding the
extent of his dues arrearages, representing amounts
equivalent to full union dues. The letters further stated
that, if the amount were not paid, the Local would re-
quest that Gally be discharged pursuant to the union-
security clause of the current collective-bargaining
agreement between Colt and the Respondent Local. On
April 1, 1991, the Respondent Local notified Colt that
Gally had failed to pay his dues and that the parties’
agreement required Gally’s discharge under those cir-
cumstances. Colt terminated Gally on April 10, 1991,
pursuant to the Respondent Local’s demand.
2. Positions of the parties
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent In-
ternational breached its duty of fair representation within

1 The complaint does not identify any Charging Party or other indi-
vidual as an objecting nonmember.
the meaning of Beck by using in its 1991 report “a factu-
ally unsupported ‘local presumption’” in determining the
chargeable amount of dues for objecting nonmember
employees. The General Counsel further asserts that the
Respondent International and Local 376 unlawfully de-
manded that Colt discharge Gally for nonpayment of full
union dues because they had failed to provide Gally with
sufficient Beck information, particularly including the
percentage of the prior year’s funds spent for nonrepre-
sentational expenses, as well as explicit notification that
nonmembers can object to having dues and fees spent on
such activities, that if they object they will be charged
only for representational activities, and that if they object
they will be provided with a detailed breakdown between
chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures. The General
Counsel thus asserts that because Gally was never given
the accurate amounts of dues and fees he would be re-
quired to pay as a nonmember objector, and was not af-
forded an opportunity to make a reasoned decision
whether to object, the actions taken against him breached
the duty of fair representation and violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2).
The Respondents argue that the Respondent Interna-
tional’s objection procedures are consistent with its duty
of fair representation. They further assert that the Interna-
tional’s Report, in all respects specifically including its
use of a “local presumption,” fulfills its obligation to
nonmember objectors under Beck. The Respondents also
argue that both the Respondent International and Re-
spondent Local 376 provided Gally with sufficient notice
of his statutory rights and contractual obligations under
the union-security agreement prior to seeking his dis-
charge. They thus contend that neither of the Respon-
dents violated the Act by causing Gally’s discharge.
3. Analysis
The first issue presented by this case is whether the
Respondent International’s use of the “local presump-
tion” in its 1991 Report provided to nonmember objec-
tors satisfied its duty of fair representation. In Beck, the
Court held that expenditures of nonmembers’ dues and
fees, over their objection, on activities outside a union’s
role as collective-bargaining representative violates the
union’s duty of fair representation. In California Saw &
Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. In-
ternational Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 119 S.Ct. 47 (1998),
the Board addressed the ramifications of the Beck deci-
sion, specifically including a union’s duty to notify non-
member employees of their Beck rights and the informa-
tion a union must provide nonmembers who had exer-
cised their right under that lead Supreme Court decision
to object to the use of their fees and dues for nonrepre-
sentational activities. The Board held that a union that
represents employees subject to a union-security clause
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 1217
violates its duty of fair representation if it fails to inform
nonmembers of their Beck rights when or before the un-
ion seeks to obligate those employees to pay fees and
dues under the union-security clause.2
In the context of discussing information to be provided
to objectors, California Saw and a subsequently decided
case, American Federation of Television & Recording
Artists (KGW Radio), 327 NLRB 474 (1999), approved
the use of the “local presumption” in providing objecting
nonmembers with sufficient information to calculate the
fees related to representational activities they must pay.3
Both California Saw and KGW relied on Price v. Inter-
national Union UAW, 927 F.2d 88, 93 (1991), cert. de-
nied 502 U.S. 905 (1991), in which the Second Circuit
endorsed the use of the local presumption by the same
Respondent International and one of its local unions that
are involved here. In KGW, the Board specifically held
that information supported by a local presumption, rather
than audited expenditure information concerning a local
union’s expenditures, could be provided by an exclusive
representative to nonmember objectors without violating
the exclusive representative’s duty of fair representation
if the parent organization’s major categories of expendi-
tures, verified supporting expenditure information, and
allocation between chargeable and nonchargeable expen-
ditures is provided to the objectors.4 In so holding, the
Board in KGW emphasized that an objector who doubted
the accuracy of the information provided was not without
recourse. Quoting California Saw, which relied on
Price, the Board in KGW concluded that, to the extent a
nonmember at the objecting stage has doubts as to the
accuracy of the financial information on which the lo-
cally presumed allocation of chargeable dues and fees is
based, the objector may at a later stage challenge the
figures used in computing the dues reduction, and the
union bears the burden of proving that expenditures of

2 California Saw, supra, 320 NLRB at 233.
3 Id. at 242 and KGW, supra at 477 fn. 15.
4 A “local presumption” presumes that the percentage of the local’s
expenditures that are chargeable is at least as great as the percentage of
the parent union’s chargeable expenditures. When a union utilizes such
a presumption, it provides no separate information concerning the
allocation of the local union’s expenditures, but instead bases its com-
putation of the amount of dues owed by an objector on the parent un-
ion’s expenditure information, which is provided to the objector.
KGW, supra at 477 fn. 15. The Board in KGW discussed the use of the
local presumption in the context of the facts of that case, i.e., where the
local union was the exclusive representative and the information pro-
vided objectors was that of the parent organization. In this case, in
contrast, the Respondent International Union is the designated exclu-
sive representative and thus the information provided concerning the
International’s expenditures satisfies the exclusive representative’s duty
to provide expenditure information without resort to any presumption
except with respect to that portion of dues collected, retained and used
by the various locals. Thus, it is analogous to Finerty v. NLRB, 113
F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 558 (1997), enfg.
Communications Workers Local 9403 (Pacific Bell), 322 NLRB 142
(1996), in which the circuit court endorsed the use of the local pre-
sumption under similar facts.
the challenger’s specific local are chargeable to the de-
gree asserted. KGW, supra at 477 fn. 15, citing Califor-
nia Saw, 320 NLRB at 242, relying on Price, 927 F.2d at
93.
The General Counsel acknowledges that absolute pre-
cision in the calculation of the dues reduction is not re-
quired at the objector stage, and does not assert that the
use of the local presumption is per se violative of the
duty of fair representation. Instead, the General Counsel
argues that the local presumption is unlawful in the ab-
sence of factual support justifying its use. The General
Counsel argues that there is insufficient support in the
Respondent International’s report here. We disagree.
The Board’s discussion of the “local presumption” in
California Saw and KGW did not address the degree of
support necessary for a union to use locally presumed
figures without violating the duty of fair representation.
In California Saw, however, the Board held that “[t]he
fundamental purpose of providing objectors with infor-
mation regarding the allocation of chargeable and non-
chargeable union expenditures is to allow an employee to
decide whether there is any reason to mount a challenge
to the union’s dues reduction calculations.”5 We agree
with the General Counsel that the use of a totally unrea-
soned or unsupported local presumption would not meet
a union’s duty of fair representation, because it would
not provide objectors with sufficient information to en-
able them to decide whether or not to challenge the un-
ion’s figures.
Contrary to the General Counsel, however, we find
that the Respondents provided adequate support for their
use of the local presumption in this case. As noted above,
the Respondent International’s report detailing its ac-
counting methodology explains why the use of the local
presumption is justified under the circumstances, i.e.,
because the vast majority of nonchargeable activities are
conducted by the International and thus, invariably, the
local unions expend a greater portion of their resources
performing chargeable activities. The report concludes
that the application of the same allocation between
chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures to the por-
tion of dues and fees retained by the locals as determined
applicable to the International would result in objectors
being required to pay a smaller amount than if local ex-
penditures were separately analyzed. Phrased differently,
because the Local bases its computation on the Interna-
tional’s allocation of chargeable and nonchargeable ex-
penditures, rather than the Local’s basing its computation
on its own allocation, the objecting employees will likely
pay less in dues and fees. If the employees think other-
wise, they can lodge a challenge, and the Local will be
put to its proof. Simply put, the report states that the use
of the presumption is supported by the particular facts
concerning how the International and its locals spend
5 320 NLRB at 240 (citations omitted).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1218
their funds. The Report also provides a reason for the
adoption of this procedure, i.e., the reduction of account-
ing and reporting tasks, which we recognize can be ex-
pensive and time-consuming undertakings. Teamsters
Local 166 (Dyncorp Support Services), 327 NLRB 950,
952 (1999). Under these circumstances, we conclude that
the use of the local presumption in the instant case was
not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, and there-
fore does not violate the Respondent International’s duty
of fair representation.6 Accordingly, we deny the General
Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue
and grant the Respondents’ cross-motion in this respect.
The second issue concerning the sufficiency of the Re-
spondents’ initial Beck notice is also addressed in and
resolved by the Board’s decision in California Saw, al-
though in that case the General Counsel did not allege
that the content of the international union’s Beck notice
was unlawful or otherwise deficient.7 As stated above,
the General Counsel contends that the Respondent Inter-
national and Respondent Local 376 did not provide
Gally, as a nonmember employee under a union-security
clause, with sufficient notice of his Beck rights before
seeking his discharge. Specifically, the General Counsel
asserts that Gally was not provided with the following
information: (1) that a stated percentage of Respondents’
prior year’s funds were spent for nonrepresentational
activities, (2) that nonmembers can object to having their
union-security payments spent on such activities, (3) that
those who object will be charged only for representa-
tional activities, and (4) that if a unit employee objects,
the International will provide detailed information con-
cerning the breakdown between representational and
nonrepresentational expenditures.8 The General Counsel
asserts that the Respondents admitted that Gally was
provided with none of this information.
The General Counsel’s representation of the Respon-
dents’ position is clearly in error. The Respondents admit
the complaint allegation at paragraph E. 18, which states
that “other than by providing Gally with the notices at-
tached hereto . . . as part of the International’s magazine
Solidarity in August, 1989 and June, 1990 respectively,”
neither Respondent provided Gally with the above-
described information prior to his discharge. Thus, con-
trary to the General Counsel, the Respondents did not

6 See Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). The Board has held that when (as in
this case) a union’s conduct is being evaluated under the duty of fair
representation standard, the union must be allowed a “wide range of
reasonableness” in serving the employees it represents. Dyncorp, supra
at 952, citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
See also Price, supra at 92, in which the circuit court explained the
distinction between a duty of fair representation analysis and that em-
ployed in public sector cases, such as are relied on by the General
Counsel and the Charging Parties in this case.
7 320 NLRB at 234 fn. 53 and accompanying text.
8 In California Saw, the Respondent International’s notice contained
this information. Id. at 234.
admit that they failed to provide the information de-
scribed. Moreover, as to the latter three items of informa-
tion allegedly not provided, contrary to the General
Counsel’s assertions, the initial Beck notices referenced
in the above-described complaint allegation clearly pro-
vided the subject information. Specifically, with respect
to item 2 regarding the information that nonmembers can
object to having their dues and fees spent on nonrepre-
sentational activities, the notices stated that under Beck,
nonunion members who pay money to unions under a
union-security clause may file objections to certain union
expenditures and that objecting nonmembers’ money so
collected can be expended only for activities concerning
collective bargaining and related matters. With respect to
item 3, in addition to the above information concerning
the restricted use of an objecting nonmember’s fees and
dues, the notices state that to comply with Beck, the Re-
spondent International will honor objections and provide
specific information concerning the time and place for
filing objections. Finally, as to item 4, concerning the
information to be provided objectors, the Solidarity no-
tices state that all objectors will receive the Report of
Expenditures that provided the basis for the amount
charged for the relevant period, with a detailed analysis
that distinguishes expenditures related to representational
activities from those which are not.
With regard to item 1, the Respondents concede that
information that a stated percentage of funds was spent
in the last accounting year for nonrepresentational activi-
ties was not contained in the Respondent International’s
initial Beck notices contained in the August 1989 and
June 1990 issues of Solidarity. However, the Respon-
dents assert that the absence of such information in the
initial Beck notice does not violate their duty of fair rep-
resentation.
In agreement with the Respondent, we conclude that
the duty of fair representation does not require that initial
Beck notice must contain the percentage of union funds
spent in the last accounting year on nonrepresentational
activities. In California Saw, the Board held that a union
is required to provide such information only to nonmem-
bers who choose to object to paying for union activities
not germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent,
i.e., after an objection has been filed. At that stage, the
objector must be apprised of the percentage of the reduc-
tion, as well as the basis for the calculation, and the right
to challenge these figures.9 Specifically, in Dyncorp
Support Services, the Board held that a union’s duty of
fair representation does not require it to inform nonmem-
bers, prior to objection, of the percentage by which dues
and fees are reduced for objectors.10 The record is clear
9 Id. at 233, cited in Paperworkers Local 987 (Sun Chemical Corp.
of Michigan), 327 NLRB 1011 fn. 1 (1999).
10 Dyncorp, supra at 952. In that case, the Board found not control-
ling public sector cases holding that such information is to be provided
to potential as well as actual objectors. Id. at fn. 10.
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 95 (VARIOUS EMPLOYERS) 1219
that Gally had resigned his union membership but had
not exercised his right under Beck to object to the pay-
ment of his dues and fees on nonrepresentational activi-
ties.11 Thus, the failure to provide Gally with this infor-
mation did not violate the Respondents’ duty of fair rep-
resentation as embodied in Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Accordingly, we deny the General Counsel’s Motion
for Summary Judgment and grant the Respondents’
cross-motion on this issue as well.
On the entire record, the Board makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the various Employers here, Ford
Motor Company, General Motors, Douglas Aircraft
Company (a component of McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion), Eaton, Janesville Medical Center, Rockwell, ITT
Gilfillan (a component of ITT Corporation), Colt, Elec-
tric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, and
Schweitzer Aircraft Corp., have offices and places of
business in various cities, and, in the course and conduct
of their business operations more fully described in the
complaint, annually sell and receive or ship products,
goods, and/or materials valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly to points located outside the states in which their
offices and places of business are located. We find that
the Employers are employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and
that the Respondents International and Local Unions are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
At all material times, the Respondent International has
been the Section 9(a) representative of employees of the
various employers set forth above in appropriate units,
the various Respondent Locals have acted as the Re-
spondent International’s agents, the Respondent Interna-
tional has maintained and enforced collective-bargaining
agreements containing union-security clauses covering
the respective employers’ employees, and the Charging
Parties are employees covered under these agreements,
who have either resigned from, or chosen not to become
members of, the Respondents.
In about June 1992, the Respondent International is-
sued a Report on Expenditures Incurred in Providing

11 The nonmember’s affirmative burden of raising his objection is
not disputed. See Chicago Teachers Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
306 fn. 16 (1986), and cases cited therein.
Collective Bargaining Related Services for Fiscal Year
1991. That report was distributed to all bargaining unit
employees of the various employers described above
who were not members of the Respondents and who had
on file with the International at that time a current objec-
tion to the payment of dues or fees for nonrepresenta-
tional activities within the meaning of Beck. That report
contained no information regarding the expenditures of
the specific Respondent Locals other than a statement
that the report applied the Respondent International’s
allocation between chargeable and nonchargeable expen-
ditures to that portion of dues and fees retained by the
Respondent Locals, as detailed above. Based on the
precedent discussed above, we find that the Respondent
International’s failure to provide objecting nonmembers
with further information concerning the expenditures of
the Respondent Locals and its use of this “local presump-
tion” in its report did not breach its duty of fair represen-
tation.
In August 1989 and June 1990, the Respondent Inter-
national provided George Gally, a nonmember employee
of Colt, with Beck notices included in its Solidarity
magazine containing certain information. Subsequently,
the Respondent requested Gally to pay monetary
amounts equivalent to full union dues. When Gally did
not comply, the Respondents requested that Colt dis-
charge him under the terms of the union-security clause
in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. For the
reasons discussed above, we find that Respondent Inter-
national’s initial Beck notices satisfy its duty of fair rep-
resentation, and that the Respondent International and
Respondent Local 376 did not act unlawfully by failing
to provide Gally with additional information concerning
dues and fees before seeking his discharge.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Respondents’ conduct with respect to the 1991
Expenditure Report did not breach their duty of fair rep-
resentation or otherwise restrain or coerce employees in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Respon-
dent International and Respondent Local 376 did not act
in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and(2) or breach their
duty of fair representation in providing George Gally
with notice regarding his Beck rights prior to seeking his
discharge.
ORDER
The consolidated complaint is dismissed in its entirety.