Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 22, 2004

342 N.L.R.B. 560 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
342 NLRB No. 49
560
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and Brewers and Maltsters,
Local Union No. 6, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. Case 14–CA–
25299
July 22, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER
AND WALSH
On October 1, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Bruce
D. Rosenstein issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent each
filed exceptions and supporting briefs. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs to
the Respondent’s exceptions and the General Counsel
filed a reply brief to the Respondent’s answering brief.
The Respondent filed separate answering briefs to the
General Counsel’s and Union’s exceptions, and separate
reply briefs to the General Counsel’s and the Charging
Party’s answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
The panel unanimously agrees with the judge’s find-
ings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by failing timely to respond to the Union’s
October 5, 1998 request, for relevant information and
that it did not violate the Act by failing to respond to the
July 2, 1998 oral information request. A majority of the
panel agrees with the judge’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to notify and
bargain with the Union prior to the installation and use of
surveillance cameras in the workplace.3 A different ma-

1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. We deny the request
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and
positions of the parties.
2 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order and notice to
conform to his findings.
3 Chairman Battista and Member Walsh. Member Schaumber would
find, based on the specific facts of this case, that the Respondent’s
unilateral installation and use of surveillance cameras did not violate
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1). Cf. Quazite Corp., 315 NLRB 1068, 1076–1077
(1994) (the judge found employer’s use of surveillance camera to moni-
tor fire alarm wiring in restroom ceiling without notice to the union did
not violate Sec. 8(a)(5)). (Member Schaumber relies on the judge’s
unreviewed finding on this point solely for its persuasive value in ad-
dressing facts analogous to those presented here.) Specifically, the
Respondent here installed the cameras to detect suspected, illegal drug-
related activity. The cameras were trained inside of and at the staircase
leading to an isolated elevator motor’s room located on the roof of a
building, and clearly posted with warnings and the words “Danger,
jority agrees with the judge’s decision not to revoke the
discipline imposed on 16 employees whose misconduct
was recorded by the surveillance cameras.4
1. The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
give notice to and bargain with the Union prior to the
installation and use of surveillance cameras. The Re-
spondent installed hidden surveillance cameras in work
and break areas of its facility. For approximately 6
weeks it observed 18 unit employees in a stairwell, in an
elevator motors room, and on the rooftop. Sixteen of the
employees were later disciplined for misconduct that the
Respondent observed through use of the cameras.5 We
find, for the reasons set forth by the judge, and recently
articulated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
National Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 324 F.3d 928 (2003),
enfg. 335 NLRB 747 (2001), that the use of hidden sur-
veillance cameras in the workplace is a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining. While the area surveilled
was not a part of the physical plant in which employees
worked frequently, the record shows that employees did
work there regularly, at least once a month, to perform
the lock out and tag out procedure that is used to immo-
bilize the elevators for cleaning. In fact, the surveillance
cameras filmed employees in the elevator motors room
going about their assigned tasks. Additionally, we find,
in agreement with the judge, that the roof area was a des-
ignated break area where employees often took their
breaks without any prohibition from the Respondent, and
that the elevator motors room became an extension of the
roof break area.6 We conclude, contrary to our dissent-

Authorized Personnel Only.” Very few employees were authorized to
enter the motor’s room, and those who were so authorized entered the
room no more than twice a month for specific maintenance functions.
Thus, in Member Schaumber’s view, the Respondent’s limited use of
cameras in a single isolated area distinguishes this case from decisions
such as Colgate Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997), in which the
Board analogized the use of video cameras in areas frequented by em-
ployees to intrusive investigatory tools such as physical examinations,
drug and alcohol tests, and polygraph examinations.
4 Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber (Member Walsh dis-
sents).
5 Five employees were discharged for visiting a remote site, smoking
marijuana and/or being away from their work area for a long period of
time. Seven employees were given last chance agreements and suspen-
sions for visiting a remote work area for lengthy periods of time, sleep-
ing while at work, or urinating on the roof. Four employees were given
suspensions for being away from their work area for a lengthy period of
time.
6 The judge observed that the Respondent never issued written or
oral instructions to its employees prohibiting them from going into the
unlocked elevator motor’s room and never told employees that it could
not be used as a break area. The judge further noted the finding of one
of the three arbitrators who considered grievances in this case, viz., that
the roof area was frequently used by employees for breaks and that the
elevator motor’s room was not an area that was off limits to employees.
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. 561
ing colleague, that the cameras were trained on a work
and break area where employees regularly performed
their assigned duties and were permitted to take breaks,
and therefore the unilateral installation and use of the
cameras violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.7
2. We affirm the judge’s proposed remedy, and reject
the General Counsel’s contention that the Respondent
must rescind the discipline received by the 16 employees
whose misconduct was observed by the cameras. The
judge concluded that the employees’ misconduct was in
violation of plant rules, and such misconduct was the
basis for the suspensions and termination. In these cir-
cumstances, the judge found it inconsistent with the poli-
cies of the Act, and public policy generally, to reward
parties who engaged in unprotected conduct. We agree.
We reject the argument that the discipline must be re-
versed because it is essentially the fruit of unlawful sur-
veillance, i.e., surveillance without opportunity to bar-
gain. In Taracorp, 273 NLRB 221 (1984), the Board
found unlawful an investigatory interview that was con-
ducted after the respondent denied the employee’s re-
quest for union representation.8 The unlawful interview
yielded information of misconduct that was the basis for
a discharge. The Board held that the discharged em-
ployee was not entitled to reinstatement and backpay.
The Board reasoned that there was an insufficient nexus
between the unfair labor practice committed (denial of
representation at an investigatory interview) and the rea-
son for the discharge (perceived misconduct) to justify a
make-whole remedy. Taracorp, supra at 223 fn. 13.
The principle that an employee discharged or disci-
plined for misconduct is not entitled to reinstatement and
backpay even though the misconduct is uncovered in an
unlawful way, is embodied in the remedial restrictions in
Section 10(c) of the Act, which provides:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of
any individual as an employee who has been suspended
or dicharged, or the payment to him of any backpay, if
such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
As in Taracorp, we find an insufficient nexus in the
instant case between the Respondent’s unlawful installa-
tion and use of the cameras and the employees’ miscon-
duct to warrant a make-whole remedy.9 In agreement

7 We do not suggest that an employer, in bargaining, must apprise
the union of the location of the cameras or the time in which they will
be in use. “Effective accommodation is necessarily dependent on the
facts of [each] individual case and the course of bargaining itself.”
National Steel v. NLRB, supra at 933 fn. 3. The employer must apprise
the union of its proposal to use such cameras, and the general reasons
for the proposal.
8 See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
9 Member Schaumber concurs that the discipline imposed on 16 em-
ployees shown on the videotapes should not be rescinded, because the
with the judge, we find that the General Counsel’s re-
quested make-whole relief is contrary to the specific re-
medial restriction contained in Section 10(c) of the Act.10
Our colleague cites cases involving an unlawful unilat-
eral change in a rule regulating employee conduct (e.g.,
attendance rules or production standards) and discipline
of an employee for violating that rule. In such cases, the
Board properly revokes the discipline. See Great West-
ern Produce, 299 NLRB 1004 (1990). These cases are
inapposite, however, as the unilateral change at issue
here did not concern employee conduct rules, and the
rules that the employees violated were unaltered and pre-
existing.
Although our colleague relies in particular on Tocco,
Inc., 323 NLRB 480 (1997), that reliance is misplaced.
In Tocco, the Board revoked the discipline of employees
who were discharged under the employer’s drug use pol-
icy after the employer had unlawfully changed that pol-
icy. Although, as our colleague notes, the change con-
cerned the employer’s interpretation of the term “cause”
under the drug testing policy, the change nonetheless was
to the very policy under which the employees were dis-
charged. By contrast the unilateral change here did not
concern any rule that the employees were disciplined for
violating. Thus, as in Taracorp, supra, there is an insuf-
ficient nexus between the unfair labor practice and the
employee discipline to justify revoking the discipline as a
means to remedy the unfair labor practice.
Finally, our colleague says that there is a “recent trend
toward weakening our remedies.” We perceive no such
trend. The Board approaches each case individually, and
tailors a remedy appropriate to each specific case, consis-
tent with Section 10(c) of the Act. That is all we have
done here.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., St.

employees were disciplined for unprotected conduct that violated estab-
lished plant rules and regulations, and in some instances, state and
Federal law. The employees' improper and illegal misconduct, not the
alleged failure to bargain, was the sole basis for the disciplinary action.
See Taracorp Industries, supra.
10 Although the judge did not order rescission of the discipline im-
posed by the Respondent, the judge suggested that we consider defer-
ring the issue of discipline to the parties’ grievance-arbitration proce-
dure. Neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party seeks defer-
ral of this issue. The Respondent opposes deferral to the extent that
previously arbitrated matters would be redecided, and discipline for
which no grievances were filed would also be deferred to arbitration.
Since all parties oppose deferring to arbitration to at least some degree,
and as we agree with the judge that Respondent’s discipline of its em-
ployees should not be rescinded, we do not find that deferral is appro-
priate here.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 562
Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b).
“1(b) Failing and refusing to respond in a timely fash-
ion to requests for information respecting matters rele-
vant to unit employees.”
3. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
“2(b) On request, bargain collectively with the Union
by timely furnishing it with the information it requests
respecting matters relevant to unit employees.”

MEMBER WALSH, dissenting in part.
I join Chairman Battista in finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally installing
and using surveillance cameras in the workplace without
giving the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain.1
However, I dissent from my colleagues’ failure to re-
scind the discipline imposed on 16 employees for con-
duct discovered solely through use of the unlawfully in-
stalled cameras. In order to remedy its unlawful conduct,
the Respondent must be ordered to rescind the employ-
ees’ discipline, expunge the employees’ files of any ref-
erence to their discipline, make the employees whole,
and offer reinstatement to those employees who were
discharged.
FACTS
The Respondent operates a brewery, and the Union
represents the Respondent’s brewery and draft employ-
ees. In spring 1998,2 during a tour of the Respondent’s
roof and elevator motors room that was part of a routine
inspection, the Respondent found foam pads and card-
board mats, a table, and four chairs. These items led the
Respondent to suspect that the room was being used for
impermissible purposes, possibly drug activity. The Re-
spondent then installed surveillance cameras on the roof
and in the elevator motors room. The Union was not
notified of the inspection, the discovery of the items in
the elevator motors room, the suspicion of drug use, or
the decision to install the cameras.
The camera on the roof became operational on May 17
and remained in place until June 30, when it was re-
moved and surveillance ceased. The camera in the eleva-

1 In addition, I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing timely to respond to the Union’s
October 5, 1998 information request. I further agree with my col-
leagues that the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by
failing to respond to the Union’s July 2, 1998 oral information request.
Finally, I join my colleagues in denying oral argument.
2 All dates are in 1998 unless otherwise specified.
tor motors room was installed in early June and also re-
mained in place until June 30.
On July 1, the Respondent told the Union for the first
time that the Respondent had used the cameras. The
Respondent also told the Union that it had reviewed the
tapes from the cameras and that a number of employees
had been observed engaging in misconduct.
Between July 2 and 7, solely on the basis of informa-
tion it obtained from observing the surveillance tapes, the
Respondent interviewed 18 employees. Prior to the in-
terviews, the Union advised all of these employees that
they had already been observed on tape and should be
truthful when interviewed.
Sixteen of the 18 employees interviewed were disci-
plined for misconduct discovered through the surveil-
lance cameras. Five were discharged, four were sus-
pended, and seven were given last-chance agreements
and suspensions.
Judge’s Decision and Recommended Remedy
The judge found that the Respondent’s installation and
use of hidden surveillance cameras was a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323
NLRB 515 (1997). The judge found that both the roof-
top area and the elevator motors room were break or
work areas in which employees were permitted to be
present. He therefore concluded that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally installing
and using surveillance cameras in those areas. As noted
above, I join Chairman Battista in adopting these find-
ings.
To remedy the violation, the judge recommended that
the Respondent cease and desist from its unlawful con-
duct and bargain with the Union, on request, concerning
the installation and use of surveillance cameras. The
judge denied the General Counsel’s request to restore the
status quo ante, rescind the discipline, and make the 16
employees whole. My colleagues adopt the judge’s rec-
ommended remedy. I dissent.
Reinstatement and Make-Whole
Relief are the Only Remedies that Will Truly Restore the
Status Quo Ante
Section 10(c) of the Act gives the Board broad discre-
tionary power to fashion remedies to effectuate the Act’s
policies. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344, 346 (1953). In exercising its authority under Sec-
tion 10(c), the Board is guided by the principle that re-
medial orders should “restor[e] the situation, as nearly as
possible, to that which would have obtained but for [the
unfair labor practice].” Die Supply Corp., 160 NLRB
1326, 1344 (1966) (quoting Royal Plating and Polishing
Co., 148 NLRB 545, 548–549 (1964), supplemented 152
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. 563
NLRB 619 (1965)); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). When an employer has
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing
terms and conditions of employment, this guiding princi-
ple requires restoring the status quo ante and making
employees whole for losses suffered as a result of the
unlawful unilateral change. See, e.g., Detroit News, Inc.,
319 NLRB 262 fn. 1 (1995) (“it is customary to order
restoration of the status quo to the extent feasible”); Mar-
tin Marietta Energy Systems, 316 NLRB 868 fn. 5 (1995)
(Board’s “traditional remedial requirements” include
making employees whole for losses resulting from re-
spondent’s unlawful unilateral changes). Thus, pursuant
to the Board’s standard remedial principles, employees
who have been discharged or disciplined as a direct re-
sult of an unlawful unilateral change are entitled to be
reinstated and made whole. See, e.g., Great Western
Produce, 299 NLRB 1004, 1006 (1990) (ordering rein-
statement and make-whole relief for employees whose
discharges resulted from unilaterally implemented poli-
cies); see also Delta Tube & Fabricating Corp., 323
NLRB 856, 863 (1997) (ordering respondent to revoke
any warnings or discipline issued to employees pursuant
to unilaterally implemented drug testing policy); Storer
Communications, 297 NLRB 296, 299 (1989) (ordering
reinstatement and backpay for employee discharged pur-
suant to unilaterally implemented drug and alcohol pol-
icy).3 By refusing reinstatement and make-whole relief
in the present case, my colleagues have unnecessarily
denied 16 employees the only truly effective remedy for
the Respondent’s unfair labor practice.
The Board has ordered reinstatement and make-whole
relief under circumstances similar to those present here.
See Tocco, Inc., 323 NLRB 480 (1997). In Tocco, the
employer had a pre-existing drug use policy that allowed
it to test employees for “cause.” The employer unilater-
ally changed the policy by interpreting “cause” in a way
that differed from past practice.4 Applying its new inter-
pretation of “cause,” the employer tested employees it

3 In Great Western, the Board also stated that, as a remedial matter,
“a respondent employer may avoid having to reinstate and pay backpay
to an employee discharged pursuant to an unlawfully instituted rule or
policy if the employer demonstrates that it would have discharged the
employee even absent that rule or policy.” 299 NLRB at 1006. In the
present case, however, the employees were disciplined for conduct that
was discovered only through use of the unilaterally installed surveil-
lance cameras. Therefore, the Respondent cannot show that it would
have disciplined the employees even absent its unlawful unilateral
change.
4 Previously, the employer had determined “cause” based on evi-
dence of possession or use of drugs by a specific employee. The em-
ployer unilaterally changed its interpretation of “cause” by performing
a unit-wide drug test on the basis of a concern that the plant’s overall
safety, efficiency, and production were declining.
ordinarily would not have tested. Three employees who
tested positive were discharged. The judge found, and
the Board affirmed, that the employer violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing the policy. The
Board’s Order required the employer to rescind the uni-
laterally implemented policy, restore the old policy, and
reinstate the discharged employees and make them
whole. See id. at 481 fn. 1. Thus, in Tocco, the unlawful
unilateral change did not alter the respondent’s prohibi-
tion on drug use or the penalties for violating that prohi-
bition. It altered only the means of detecting drug use.
As a result of the unilateral change, the employer discov-
ered drug use that it would not have discovered other-
wise. Similarly, in the present case, 16 employees were
disciplined or discharged for conduct discovered solely
as a result of the Respondent’s unfair labor practice. As
in Tocco, those employees are entitled to reinstatement
and make-whole relief.
My colleagues deny that relief. In doing so, they rely
on Taracorp Industries, 273 NLRB 221 (1984), in which
the Board carved out a narrow exception to its traditional
reinstatement and make-whole remedy. The Board in
Taracorp found such a remedy inappropriate in cases
involving a Section 8(a)(1) violation of an employee’s
right to union representation at an investigatory inter-
view. As explained below, Taracorp is inapplicable here.
In Taracorp, a foreman reported an employee’s insub-
ordination to the plant manager. The plant manager then
interviewed the employee about the incident. The em-
ployee requested union representation during the inter-
view, but the plant manager refused. After the interview,
the employee was discharged for insubordination. Pur-
suant to NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), the
Board found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1)
by denying the employee’s request for union representa-
tion. However, the Board found that a make-whole rem-
edy was inappropriate “for this or any similar Weingar-
ten violation.” 273 NLRB at 221. The Board found that
in Weingarten cases there is “not a sufficient nexus be-
tween the unfair labor practice committed (denial of rep-
resentation at an investigatory interview) and the reason
for the discharge (perceived misconduct) to justify a
make-whole remedy.” Id. at 223. Therefore, the Board
found that a make-whole remedy would contravene Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, which provides that no Board order
shall require reinstatement or backpay to an employee if
that employee was suspended or discharged for cause.
My colleagues find that the reason for the discipline in
the present case, as in Taracorp, was misconduct. There-
fore, they find an insufficient nexus between the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practice and the reason for the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 564
discipline to justify make-whole relief without contra-
vening Section 10(c).5
Concededly, the employees’ activities discovered
through use of the surveillance cameras included mis-
conduct, some of it serious. In the present case, how-
ever, there is a nexus between the unlawful unilateral
change and the discipline imposed on the employees that
was not present in Taracorp. In Taracorp, as in a typical
Weingarten case, the employer had knowledge or suspi-
cion of the disciplined employee’s wrongdoing before
conducting the interview at which the Weingarten viola-
tion occurred.
Here, in contrast, the Respondent learned of the em-
ployees’ conduct solely through its unfair labor practice.
Absent the unlawful installation and use of the cameras,
the Respondent had no basis even to question those 16
employees, let alone to discipline them. Under these
circumstances, the discipline is a direct result of the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practice, and reinstatement and
make-whole relief are appropriate and consistent with
Section 10(c). See Tocco, supra at 481 fn. 1; Great
Western Produce, supra at 1006–1007. Therefore, Tara-
corp’s narrow exception to reinstatement and make-
whole relief does not apply.
Unfortunately, in this case my colleagues have contin-
ued a recent trend toward weakening our remedies for
unlawful conduct, making them much less effective as a
deterrent. See Georgia Power Co., 341 NLRB 577, 578–
579 (2004) (Member Walsh, dissenting) (panel majority
requires respondent to show that individual discriminato-
rily denied a promotion “certainly” would have been
promoted before requiring respondent to offer the pro-
motion to the discriminatee). Like that case, the only
really effective deterrent in this case would be obtained
by applying the fundamental remedial principle that
Board orders should “restor[e] the situation, as nearly as
possible, to that which would have obtained but for [the
unfair labor practice].” Die Supply, supra at 1344. The
16 employees in this case were disciplined and dis-
charged solely as a result of the Respondent’s unlawful
unilateral installation and use of hidden surveillance
cameras. Accordingly, I dissent from my colleagues’
decision not to order reinstatement and make-whole re-
lief.

5 In raising the specter of Sec. 10(c) of the Act, which prohibits the
Board from ordering reinstatement or backpay for any employee who
has been discharged “for cause,” my colleagues have invoked a statu-
tory red herring that has no application to this case. As explained be-
low, because the discharges in this case directly resulted from the Re-
spondent’s unlawful use of the surveillance cameras, it was the Re-
spondent’s unlawful conduct that caused the discharges, and thus, Sec.
10(c) of the Act is not implicated.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Brewers and Maltsers Local Union No. 6, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters over the in-
stallation and use of surveillance cameras within our fa-
cility and other mandatory subjects of bargaining.
WE WILL NOT refuse to respond in a timely fashion to
requests for information respecting matters relevant to
unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Un-
ion as the exclusive bargaining representative of our em-
ployees with respect to the installation and use of surveil-
lance cameras within our facility and other mandatory
subjects of bargaining.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Un-
ion as the exclusive bargaining representative of our em-
ployees by timely providing them with information rele-
vant to unit employees.

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INCORPORATED

Kathy J. Talbott-Schehl Esq., for the General Counsel.
Dennis C. Donnelly Esq., of St. Louis, Missouri, for the Re-
spondent-Employer.
Arthur J. Martin Esq., of St. Louis, Missouri, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BRUCE D. ROSENSTEIN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me on May 25 and 26, 1999, in St. Louis, Mis-
souri, pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing (the com-
plaint) issued by the Regional Director for Region 14 of the
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. 565
National Labor Relations Board on November 23, 1998.1 The
complaint was subsequently amended on May 18, 1999.2 The
complaint, based on an original and amended charge filed by
Brewers and Maltsters Local Union No. 6, affiliated with Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Charging Party or Un-
ion), alleges that Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated (the Respon-
dent or Employer), has engaged in certain violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
The Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint deny-
ing that it had committed any violations of the Act.
Issues
The complaint alleges that the Respondent installed hidden
surveillance cameras in the elevator motors room atop Stock-
house 16 without prior notice to the Union and without afford-
ing the Union an opportunity to bargain with the Respondent
concerning this conduct and the effects of the conduct. Addi-
tionally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent failed and
refused to furnish the Union information requested by it on
June 30 and October 5. Lastly, the complaint alleges that the
Respondent disciplined 16 employees based on information
obtained from the use of the hidden surveillance cameras.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Charging Party, and the Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a corporation engaged in the brewing of
beer, with an office and place of business in St. Louis, Mis-
souri, where it annually purchases and receives goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Mis-
souri and has sold and shipped from its facility goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Mis-
souri. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Since about 1948 and at all material times, the Union has
been designated as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the brewery and draft employees and has been
recognized by Respondent. This recognition has been embod-
ied in successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most
recent of which expired by its terms on February 28. The par-

1 All dates are in 1998 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Over the objection of the Respondent, I permitted the amendment
of the complaint to add the allegation that on June 30, the Union orally
requested information about other hidden cameras, and by letter dated
October 5, the Union requested certain items of information. As the
amendment is closely related to the underlying issues in the case and
the information was needed to properly investigate the grievance and
prepare for arbitration for employee Lowell Puryear, it was just and
proper to permit the General Counsel to amend the complaint.
ties’ mutually agreed to extend the agreement for 1 month
while they continued to negotiate in an effort to reach a new
collective-bargaining agreement. In March 1998, Respondent
proffered a final contract offer to the Union that was initially
rejected by the membership. A number of lengthy clarification
sessions were held between the parties to discuss the agreement
but the union membership ultimately rejected the Respondent’s
final contract offer in July 1998. Accordingly, the Respondent
implemented its final contract offer on September 22.
At all material times Mel Harris held the position of assistant
brewmaster, David Mulherin served as human resource man-
ager, and William Daugherty is captain of security for Respon-
dent.
B. Facts
Respondent anticipated a strike by its employees and began
photographing its facility and equipment in late April and early
May 1998, since it feared that sabotage might occur. During a
routine inspection of the Brewhouse area by one of Respon-
dent’s supervisors that included a tour of the elevator motors
room atop Stockhouse 16,3 several six-foot foam pads, hidden
in the panel doors which house the elevators’ electrical system,
were discovered. Also found, were cardboard mats of a corre-
sponding size, as well as a table and four chairs. The supervi-
sor apprised Assistant Brewmaster Harris of his discovery who
in turn notified Daugherty in security. After a tour of the pent-
house, Daugherty concluded that the presence of these articles
suggested that persons were using the room for reasons incon-
sistent with any work assignment and possibly illegal drug
activity might be ongoing. Thereafter, a decision was made to
install a camera on the roof inorder to determine who was en-
tering and exiting the penthouse. Accordingly, a technical sys-
tem outside consultant was retained to erect a hidden surveil-
lance camera in a metal box that was pointed in the direction of
the penthouse stairwell leading to the entrance of the elevator
motors room. This surveillance camera became operational on
May 17 and remained in place until June 30, when it was re-
moved and the surveillance ceased. The camera ran 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. In early June 1998, a second surveillance
camera was installed in the interior of the elevator motors room
and also remained in place until June 30. Respondent reviewed
30 to 40 hours of tape and determined that 16 employees vio-
lated a number of policies, practices, and plant work rules in-
cluding being at remote areas of the brewery and inhaling or
otherwise consuming unlawful drugs.
On July 1, Harris invited Union Secretary-Treasurer Ed Pol-
ster to meet in his office. During the meeting, Harris apprised
Polster, for the first time, about the installation of the surveil-
lance cameras and that a number of employees were observed
on the tapes engaging in prohibitive conduct. Polster strenu-
ously objected to not being informed in advance of the installa-

3 The elevator motors room or the penthouse is located atop the roof
on the eighth floor of Stockhouse 16, where the brewing and ferment-
ing of beer occurs. To reach the penthouse, an individual exits onto the
roof of the eighth floor and walks to a flight of stairs that leads directly
to the elevator motors room. Inside the penthouse is a small room that
houses the electrical motors and systems that operate the north and
south elevators for Stockhouse 16.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 566
tion of the surveillance cameras and was of the opinion that if
the Union was informed before the installation, that the under-
lying issue could have been worked out. Harris told Polster
that there was no obligation to bargain about this issue and he
planned on scheduling meetings with the 16 employees ob-
served on tape, to which he anticipated that various degrees of
discipline would be forthcoming.4
On July 2, the first employee investigatory meeting was held
in Mulherin’s office. In addition to Mulherin and Harris, alter-
nate steward, Don Furrer and Polster, attended on behalf of the
Union. Polster again asked why the Union was not notified in
advance about the installation of the surveillance cameras and
Mulherin replied, “that it was a matter for corporate security.”
Furrer asked, “whether there were hidden cameras anywhere
else,” and Mulherin replied, “that there are no others that we
were aware of.”
By letter dated October 5, the Union requested 14 items of
information in connection with the scheduled arbitration of
employee Lowell Puryear (GC Exh. 3). By letter dated October
22, the Respondent provided certain information in response to
the Union’s request. In regard to items 11 through 14, the Re-
spondent apprised the Union that it is still in the process of
determining whether there is any additional information re-
sponsive to that request (GC Exh. 4). The Respondent pro-
vided additional information responsive to items 11 through 14
on May 25, 1999, the first day of the subject hearing.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The surveillance cameras
The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 6 of the complaint
that the Respondent installed hidden surveillance cameras in
the elevator motors room atop Stockhouse 16, without prior
notice to the Union and without affording the Union an oppor-
tunity to bargain with respect to the conduct and the effects of
the conduct.
The Respondent argues that the subject of the installation of
hidden surveillance cameras is not a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining as the situs of installation is not a designated work or
break area. Therefore, it opines that there was no obligation to
notify the Union in advance of the surveillance camera installa-
tion or to engage in collective-bargaining negotiations. Re-
spondent further argues that the elevator motors room is a re-

4 Between July 2 and August 1998, 16 employees were disciplined.
Employees’ Don Graul, Elijah Johnson, Keith Kasal, William “Mike”
Koob, and Lowell “Greg” Puryear were discharged. Employees Ray
Reiser, Gary Sabourin, Tim Schnurbusch, and Charlie Zalavdek were
suspended and employees James Ahlemeyer, Fred Bishop, Fred Duing,
Dennis Meyer, Bob Piva, Ed Sabourin, and Gary Wuertz were issued a
last chance agreement (R. Exhs. 19–34). The Union filed individual
grievances on behalf of all the employees and the parties’ proceeded to
arbitration on three of the discharge grievances involving employees
Graul, Johnson, and Puryear. Each of the three arbitrators independ-
ently issued decisions sustaining the discharges (R. Exhs. 19, 20, and
23). It was further agreed by the parties to defer the remaining two-
discharge arbitrations until the completion of the subject unfair labor
practice case. In each of the three cases that proceeded to arbitration,
the refusal to bargain issue was not addressed. Rather, each of the
arbitrators deferred to the Board’s jurisdiction concerning this matter.
mote location atop the roof of Stockhouse 16 and is a restricted
area limited only to employees who are assigned to lock out
and tag out the elevator operating system. Indeed, there is a
sign on the elevator motor operations door that states “Warning
Equipment Inside, Starts Automatically, Danger, Authorized
Personnel Only.”
There is no dispute that two hidden surveillance cameras
were installed without advance notice to the Union and without
an opportunity for the Union to request negotiations. Indeed,
Mulherin testified that he did not notify the Union on or before
May 17, when the first surveillance camera was installed on the
eighth floor roof of Stockhouse 16. The Board in Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997), has addressed this issue
and held that an employer’s installation and use of hidden sur-
veillance cameras is a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is a
matter germane to the working environment and not among
those managerial decisions that lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control. The Board further found that the installation of sur-
veillance cameras is analogous to physical exams, drug/alcohol
testing requirements, and polygraph testing, all of which are
employer investigatory tools or methods to ascertain whether
any employees engaged in misconduct and all of which are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. In that case, the Board held
that since the installation and use of cameras has the potential
to affect employees continued employment whose actions are
being monitored, the use of cameras in a restroom and fitness
center raised privacy concerns that add to the potential effect on
employees working conditions.
The Respondent defends its conduct on the basis that the
roof on the eighth floor atop Stockhouse 16 is not a defined
break area and the elevator motors room is not a work area or a
designated break area. Contrary to this argument, I find for the
following reasons that both the eighth floor roof area atop
Stockhouse 16 and the elevator motors room are break and/or
work areas in which employees are permitted to be present.
The evidence establishes that employees at the Respondent
are not required to take fixed lunches or breaks. Likewise, no
permission is required from a supervisor to take lunch or en-
gage in a break. The parties’ past practice permits that the
lunch break may be taken between the 4th and 5th hour of the
workday. Polster credibly testified that while there are desig-
nated lunch and break areas such as the locker rooms in Build-
ing 174, the picnic area in the alley between Stockhouse 14 and
16 and the breakroom behind the control room on the fifth floor
of Stockhouse 16,5 other areas have routinely been used by
employees for break and lunch areas. In this regard, due to the
cool temperatures on floors one to five and the warm tempera-
tures on floors six to ten of Stockhouse 16, a longtime practice
has developed that employees go out on the fire escapes or the
roofs of the upper floors (roofs on floors six, seven, and eight
of Stockhouse 16) to take a break or smoke a cigarette. Indeed,
employees Kenkel, Furrer, Renderer, Bradshaw, and Wiese all

5 Between May 17 and June 30, the breakroom on the fifth floor was
being remodeled and was not available for employee use. Although the
breakroom is available for all employees working in Stockhouse 16, the
control room employees mainly use it. Smoking is not permitted in the
fifth floor breakroom or in the locker breakroom in Building 174.
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. 567
credibly testified that they have regularly taken their breaks on
the roofs of Stockhouse 16 without any prohibition from Re-
spondent. Likewise, several of these individuals testified that
on occasion, supervisors of Respondent have also used the roof
areas to take their break. The evidence also establishes that the
roofs on Stockhouse 16, including the eighth floor roof, have
been used by employees and their families on the July 4 holiday
to watch local air shows and the fireworks. Moreover, Harris
testified that there is no sign on the doors exiting to the roof
area prohibiting employees from taking their breaks on the
roofs, that employees often use the roofs of Stockhouse 16 to
take breaks and smoke cigarettes and he has never given any
instructions to employees or posted notices that employees
were not to go out on the Stockhouse roofs. Lastly, a number
of employees credibly testified that trash receptacles are pro-
vided on each roof of Stockhouse 16, and they have been as-
signed the job of cleaning the roof top areas.
Under these circumstances, and contrary to Respondent’s ar-
gument, I conclude that the roof areas have become designated
break areas, and when Respondent unilaterally installed a hid-
den surveillance camera on the roof of the eighth floor of
Stockhouse 16, without notifying the Union and giving it an
opportunity to negotiate, Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act has
been violated.6 Indeed, I find that the installation of the hidden
surveillance camera on the eighth floor roof is not unlike the
installation of a camera in the fitness room, as found violative
by the Board in Colgate-Palmolive.
In regard to the installation of the hidden surveillance camera
in the interior of the elevator motors room, I also find that this
was violative of the Act for the following reasons. Kenkel
credibly testified that the lockout and tagout procedure for the
elevator control system in the eighth floor penthouse has been
in effect for at least the last 8 years.7 For this purpose, employ-
ees represented by the Union have regularly been assigned this
job at least once a month for 1-hour per day (GC Exh. 17). On
occasion, employees have been disciplined for failing to com-
plete the procedure. Indeed, the tapes compiled by the two
surveillance cameras, revealed that employees Bradshaw and
Wiese were observed completing this assignment on May 25,
and were not disciplined for their actions. Moreover, the Re-
spondent has issued no instructions, either orally or in writing,
prohibiting employees from going into the unlocked elevator
motors room or ever told employees that the room could not be
used as a break area. Under these circumstances, I conclude

6 Contrary to Respondent’s argument that the first surveillance cam-
era solely was focused on the stairway leading to the penthouse, the
testimony disclosed that the camera filmed employees entering the
stairwell and the area behind and around the stairwell. Indeed, the
camera filmed employee’s Vince Salih and Bobby Arnold while they
were on the roof, but they were not disciplined because Harris did not
believe they had done anything wrong. Thus, contrary to the Respon-
dent’s reliance on the finding by the administrative law judge in
Quazite Corp., 315 NLRB 1068, 1076 (1991), employees in the subject
case were being monitored as they went about their daily tasks in the
workplace.
7 As part of the lockout and tagout procedure, employees shut down
the elevators in order to clean out the basement elevator pits, shafts, and
cabs.
that the elevator motors room is a designated work area used at
least once a month by employees to complete work assign-
ments. Therefore, when Respondent unilaterally installed a
surveillance camera in the interior of the elevator motors room
without negotiating with the Union, it violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act. Likewise, I find that since the Respondent
never issued any instructions to employees that the unlocked
elevator motors room could not be used as a break area, it be-
came an extension of the roof area.8
2. Requests for information
The General Counsel, in paragraph 7(A) of the amendment
to the complaint alleges since about June 30, the Union orally
requested that Respondent furnish the Union with information
about whether other hidden cameras had been or might be in-
stalled throughout the Brewery complex that might surveil
bargaining unit employees.
The evidence establishes that in the July 2 meeting attended
by Harris, Mulherin, Polster, and Furrer, the Union orally asked
whether there were other hidden surveillance cameras. I find
that Mulherin immediately responded to this question by stating
that, “there are no others that we are aware of.”
Under these circumstances, I find that the Respondent did re-
spond orally to the request for information raised by the Union
at the July 2 meeting. Therefore, I conclude that the Respon-
dent did not violate the Act as alleged by the General Counsel
in paragraph 7(A) of the complaint.
The General Counsel further alleges in paragraph 7(B) of the
complaint that since October 5, the Union, by letter requested
that Respondent furnish the Union with information concerning
documents related to or reflecting any monitoring of bargaining
unit employees in the Brewery complex by any electronic, pho-
tographic or remote means, and any documents related to or
reflecting any surveillance of bargaining unit employees in the
St. Louis Brewery complex.
The evidence discloses that in its October 5 letter, the Union
requested 14 items of information in order to carry out its re-
sponsibility under the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement
and to properly prepare a grievance concerning the discipline of
a bargaining unit employee. By letter dated October 22, the
Respondent replied to the Union’s requests for information for
items 1 through 10. In regard to items 11 through 14, while the
Respondent provided certain information, it stated in the letter
that it is still in the process of determining whether there is any
additional information responsive to request numbers 11
through 14. The allegations alleged in paragraph 7(B) of the
complaint parallel items 12 and 13 in the October 5 letter. It
was not until May 25, 1999, on the first day of the hearing, that
the Respondent provided the Union with the information re-
sponsive to items 12 and 13 in the October 5 letter.

8 As found by Arbitrator Malamud, employee Lowell Puryear credi-
bly testified that when he worked on the labor gang and was assigned to
Stockhouse 16, he took breaks in the elevator penthouse (E. Exh. 23,
item E). The arbitrator further found that the roof area is frequently
used by employees who want to take a breather to smoke a cigarette or
to warm up and that the elevator penthouse is not an area that was off
limits to employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 568
The obligation under Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act on
the part of an employer to supply the statutory bargaining agent
with relevant information concerning matters to be negotiated
is well and long established. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149 (1956). Unreasonable delay in furnishing such information
is as much a violation of the Act as a refusal to furnish any
information at all. Bundy Corp. 292 NLRB 671 (1989) (viola-
tion of Act to ignore or delay supplying the Union with neces-
sary information for 2-1/2 months).
In the subject case, the Respondent’s approximately 8-month
delay in providing items 12 and 13 is unreasonable and contra-
venes the principles of collective bargaining. Respondent of-
fered no credible excuse in the record for its delay in providing
the requested information.
Under these circumstances, I find by failing to provide the
Union the information in a timely fashion, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
2. The discipline
The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 8 of the complaint
that since about July 1, Respondent has disciplined 16 employ-
ees, based on information obtained from the use of the hidden
surveillance cameras. As part of the remedy for refusing to
give advance notice to the Union and negotiate over the unilat-
eral installation of the surveillance cameras, the General Coun-
sel seeks to rescind all of the discipline visited on the 16 em-
ployees.
To support this argument, the General Counsel relies on
cases cited in its posthearing brief9 and Tocco, Inc., 323 NLRB
480 (1997), wherein the Board held that by changing its drug
testing policy and testing employees that resulted in the dis-
charge of three unit employees without notifying and bargain-
ing with the Union, the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act. As part of the remedy for the unfair labor prac-
tices, the Board ordered the three employees to be reinstated
and made whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of being discharged pursuant to the unlaw-
fully implemented drug testing policy.
The Respondent initially argues that prior to the filing of the
subject unfair labor practice charges in September 1998, the
Union filed 16 individual grievances under the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement challenging the discipline that was
visited on each of the employees. Three of the 16 grievances
involving employees Graul, Johnson, and Puryear were arbi-
trated and independent decisions were rendered by three sepa-
rate arbitrators (R. Exhs. 19, 20, and 23). The remaining two-
discharge arbitrations have been deferred by agreement of the
parties until the completion of the subject unfair labor practice
case.
Although the Respondent has not specifically requested that
the discipline portion of the subject case be deferred under the
Board’s Dubo and Spielberg policies,10 I am of the opinion that
the Board should consider such a procedure. Here, the three
arbitrators refused to address the refusal to bargain issues con-

9 See pp. 35 and 36 of the General Counsel’s posthearing brief.
10 Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 NLRB 431 (1963), 148 NLRB 1114
(1964), enfd. 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965), and Spielberg Mfg. Corp.,
112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
cerning the installation of the surveillance cameras and the
refusal to provide information allegations, instead deferring to
the Board’s jurisdiction. Rather, the sole issue presented to the
arbitrators was whether the discipline imposed on the three
discharged employees was just and proper under the parties’
agreement and under established plant rules, regulations, and
policies in effect prior to the alleged misconduct. The Charging
Party, herein, made an election prior to the filing of the subject
unfair labor practice charges and should be compelled to pro-
ceed in that forum rather then receiving two bites of the apple.
The Respondent further argues, relying on the Board’s deci-
sion in Taracorp Industries, 273 NLRB 221 (1984), and in
effect based on cases such as Marshall Durbin Poultry Co., 310
NLRB 68 (1993), enfd. in relevant part 39 F.3d 1312 (5th Cir.
1994), and John Cuneo, Inc. 298 NLRB 856, 857 (1990), that if
an employer satisfies its burden of establishing that the dis-
criminatee engaged in unprotected conduct for which the em-
ployer would have discharged any employee, reinstatement is
not ordered and backpay is terminated on the date that the em-
ployer first acquired knowledge of the misconduct. Here, the
Respondent learned of the unprotected conduct between May
17 and June 30, pursuant to the tapes made by the hidden sur-
veillance cameras. Thus, Respondent opines, that not only is
reinstatement inappropriate, but backpay is also not warranted
as knowledge of the unprotected conduct was obtained prior to
the effectuation of the discipline on the 16 employees.
In my opinion, the Respondent’s argument has merit. Thus,
it is not consistent with the policies of the Act or public policy
generally to reward such parties who engage in unprotected
conduct. In the subject case, the Respondent has established
plant rules prohibiting employees to be away from their work
area for extended periods of time and written policies and pro-
hibitions against employees using drugs on the premises.11 In
my view, the conduct engaged in by the 16 employees violated
established plant rules and regulations and should not be un-
done solely because the Respondent did not notify or engage in
negotiations with the Union prior to the installation of the sur-
veillance cameras. In this regard, when an employee brings
drugs to the workplace, the employee expands the problem to
other employees and violates the Employer’s rules and policies
against drug use in the workplace.
The logic of this argument is also not unlike the Board’s
holding in Taracorp, where it held that Section 10(c) of the Act
precludes an order reinstating an employee who was discharged
for insubordination notwithstanding the fact that the employer
violated the employee’s Weingarten rights prior to the dis-
charge. Here, the alleged failure to bargain allegation like the
alleged Weingarten violation, is not itself the basis for the dis-
ciplinary action visited on the employees. Rather, the illegal
misconduct engaged in by the employees caused their termina-
tions or suspensions. Consequently, because the discipline was
based on “just cause,” Section 10(c) of the Act prohibits the

11 In February 1996, Respondent rewrote its drug abuse policy. It
was distributed to all employees and training sessions were held to
explain the policy. Employees were informed that anyone violating the
policy is subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination
(R. Exh. 11).
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. 569
entry of an order requiring reinstatement or backpay regarding
the 16 employees. See also, Postal Service, 314 NLRB 227
(1994), and Page Litho, Inc., 313 NLRB 960, 962 (1994).
Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of this case, I
would not rescind the discipline visited on the 16 employees as
a result of their misconduct uncovered from reviewing the tapes
from the surveillance cameras. As I discussed earlier in the
decision, however, I would recommend that the Board consider
deferring the issue of the discipline to the parties’ established
grievance-arbitration machinery.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent’s use of hidden surveillance cameras is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
4. By failing and refusing to notify and bargain with the Un-
ion prior to the installation of surveillance cameras, the Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
failing and refusing to timely or completely respond to the Un-
ion’s October 5, 1998, request for relevant information.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having unlawfully failed and refused to no-
tify and bargain with the Union over the subject of surveillance
cameras, it shall be ordered to meet and bargain collectively
with the Union in good faith concerning conditions of employ-
ment related to its use of surveillance cameras.
The Respondent shall also be directed to respond to the Un-
ion’s information request in a timely fashion.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated, St. Louis,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with Brewers and Malt-
sters Local Union No. 6, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters with respect to the installation and use of
surveillance cameras and other mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing.
(b) Failing and refusing to respond in a complete and timely
fashion to requests for information respecting matters relevant
to unit employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employ-
ees with respect to the installation and use of surveillance cam-
eras and other mandatory subjects of bargaining.
(b) On request of the Union, respond in a timely and com-
plete fashion to the information it requested on October 5,
1998.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in St. Louis, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since May 17, 1998.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”