Anchor Rome Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 31, 1949

86 N.L.R.B. 1120 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. and TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O.
Case No. 10-CA-84.-Decided October 31, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
. On February 2L„, 1949, Trial Examiner Irving Rogosin issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
-alid take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended dismissal of
these allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent, the Union, and the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and
supporting briefs.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the
hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with
this Decision and Order.
The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the
record, the exceptions, and the briefs, in our opinion, adequately pre-
sent the issues and the positions of the parties.
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent's
purpose in procuring pistol licenses for supervisors and nonstriking
employees shortly before and during the strike was not to provide
protection against the strikers, but to furnish the means of intim-
idating and coercing strikers in the exercise of their right to engage
' Purusuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended , the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this proceeding to a three-member panel [ Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and
Murdock].
86 N. L . R. B., No. 119.
1120
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1121
in concerted activities. We disagree, however, with the Trial Exam-
iner's conclusion that, as the Union and the striking employees were
apparently not aware of the Respondent's part in procuring these
licenses, no finding of interference, restraint, or coercion may be predi-
cated thereon. We have previously held that although "the evidence
fails to establish that . . . employees were affected by or conscious
of any interference, restraint or coercion," from the conduct of an
employer, such conduct may nevertheless be violative of Section 8 (1)
of the Act 2 Experience has demonstrated that the normal conse-
quence of conduct such as that engaged in by the Respondent in obtain-
ing pistol licenses for management officials, supervisors, and non-
strikers, is the abandonment of orderly and peaceful procedures for
the settlement of industrial disputes, and resort to armed conflict such
as did here, in fact, ensue. Such practices are destructive of the rights
guaranteed employees in Section 7 of the Act, and, it is just such
practices which the Act was designed to eliminate.3 We find, there-
fore, that by procuring pistol licenses for management officials, super-
visors, and nonstrikers immediately before and during the strike, for
the purpose of intimidating and coercing strikers, the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
2. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent's letters of April
9, 1948, to three striking employees, stating that they had been re-
placed, and threatening to discharge them if they did not apply for
the jobs which were still available by April 14, 1948, constituted an
attempt to undermine the Union's authority to act as exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees and that the Respondent thereby violated
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. We agree.4 However, we reject the
Trial Examiner's further finding that, by the afore-mentioned con-
duct, the Respondent prolonged the strike, thereby converting it from
an economic to an unfair labor practice strike.
The Union leaders had called the strike for the purpose of obtain-
ing agreement by the Respondent to certain contract provisions which
had stalemated the bargaining negotiations,' and they made it plain,,
after the April 9 letters had been sent, that the strike would continue
until the original purpose had been achieved.' Although the Union
2 Matter of Gamble-Robinson Company; 33 N. L. R. B. 351, 856; see Matter of Ford
Motor Company, 31 N. L. R. B. 994, 1058, in which the Board found that by permitting the
manufacture of weapons in its plant for use in connection with a labor dispute , an employer
interfered with , restrained, and coerced its employees.
3 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Sections 1, 101.
4 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 821 U. S. 678, 683-4; Matter of Cathey Lumber
Company, 86 N. L. R. B. 157 ; Matter of Sami'l Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 1612.
5 The parties differed principally over limitation of the Union's liability for strikes, a
check-off provision, and super-seniority for shop stewards.
6 On March 21, 1948, Pedigo, international representative for the Union, stated : "There
is no good reason why a fair and reasonable contract cannot he agreed upon . . . Until
a contract is arrived at the strike will go on . . . On April 1 . 1, 1948, 2 days after the
1122 DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
met with the Respondent on April 18 and May 17, 1948, for further
contract discussions, it does not appear that there was any discussion
at these meetings of the reinstatement of the strikers who had re-
ceived the letters, nor, in fact, that reinstatement of strikers was at
any time at issue between the Union and the Respondent. Further-
more, it does not appear that the Union knew of the three letters which
the Trial Examiner found prolonged the strike,? that the three strikers
at any time applied for and were denied reinstatement, or that such
application appeared to be futile. It is clear, therefore, that the
disagreement regarding contract terms which caused the strike re-
mained the sole obstacle to its settlement.
As noted by the Trial Examiner with regard to other acts of inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion which he found that the Respondent
had committed, an employer's unfair labor practices during an eco-
nomic strike do not automatically convert it into an unfair labor
practice strike. Such conversion will be found only when there is
proof of a casual relatioliship between the unfair labor practices and
the prolongation of the strike." It is clear in the present case that
the inability of the parties to agree on the terms of a new contract,
.and not the Respondent's letters of April 9, 1948, or its other unfair
labor practices committed during the strike, was responsible for the
prolongation of the strike.' We find, accordingly, contrary to the
Trial Examiner, that the strike was not converted into an unfair labor
practice strike, but that it remained an economic strike. In view of
this finding, we shall not, as recommended by the Trial Examiner,
require that upon application for reinstatement by strikers, the Re-
letters threatening to discharge the three strikers if they did not return to work by April 14,
Pedigo stated : ". . . The people who can operate the mill . . . are on strike for a decent
contract . . . and so help us God, Anchor Rome Mills are going to remain struck until a
decent contract, fair to Management and Labor alike, is signed. . . .
T The only other evidence in this regard was the testimony of union representative Pedigo
that he recalled a letter "to a few employees" stating that the Respondent "had been pretty
patient with them. If they didn't come back that they were going to fire them." The
only employee he named as having received such a letter-Jacobs-was not one of the
three strikers who, the parties stipulated, received the April 9 letters. Neither Jacobs nor
the three recipients of the April 9 letters testified.
8 Matter of Myers Products Corp., 84 N. L. R. B. 32 ; Matter of Cleveland Worsted Mills,
43 N. L. R. B. 545, 568, 576; Matter of American Manufacturing Concern, 7 N. L. R: B. 753,
763. Cf. Matter of Crosby Chemicals, Inc., 85 N. L. R. B. 791 ; Matter of Vogue Wright
Studios, Inc., 76 N. L. R. B. 773, 776; Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N. L. R. B. 1297 ;
Matter of St. Mary's Sewer Pipe Company, 54 N. L. R. B. 1226.
..In concluding that the -letters herein prolonged the strike, the Trial Examiner relied on
the Board's decision in Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, supra. Although the decision
in that case did not spell out the manner in which the employer's tactical discharges of
economic strikers prolonged the strike, the Intermediate Report therein shows that the
employer's notices purportedly discharging the strikers were mailed after the union presi-
dent had advised the employer that the strikers were willing to return as a group. Under
those circumstances, the notices-which the Board found violative of Section 8 (1) of the
Act-were clearly instrumental in prolonging the strike.
9 Cf. Matter of Kansas Milling Company, 86 N. L. R. B. 925.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1123
spondent dismiss replacements hired after April 9, 1948, if necessary,
to provide such reinstatement.
We have found that the Respondent by its illegal acts violated
Section 8 (1) and (5) of the Act as amended. We are of the opinion,
upon the entire record in this case, that the commission in the future
of such acts and of other unfair labor practices may be anticipated
from the Respondent's conduct in the past 10 We shall, therefore,
order that the Respondent cease and desist from such conduct, and
from in any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its
employees in Section 7 of the amended Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Anchor Rome
Mills, Inc., Rome, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Ref using to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit, with respect to its group health and accident
insurance program;
(b) Making any unilateral changes affecting the employees in the
unit represented by the afore-mentioned Union with respect to the
Respondent's group health and accident insurance program, without
prior consultation with the Union;
(c) Procuring pistol licenses for its management officials, super-
visors, or employees, for the purpose of intimidating or coercing
strikers, in connection with any labor dispute with its employees;
(d) Instigating, encouraging, or assisting, physical assaults or
threats of physical assault against employees because of their union
or concerted activity ;
(e) Sending letters to individual strikers soliciting their return
to work, and threatening and purporting to discharge them if they
do not do so;
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
'ON. L. R. B, v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S. 426.
1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act, as
guaranteed in Section 7 thereof.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act as amended :
(a) Notify and instruct its employees that it will not:
(1) Procure pistol licenses for its management officials, supervisors,
or employees, for the purpose of intimidating or coercing strikers, in
connection with any labor dispute with its employees;
(2) Instigate, encourage, or assist, physical assaults or threats of
physical assault against employees because of their union or con-
certed activity ;
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of its employees
in the appropriate unit, with respect to its group health and accident
insurance program, and embody any understanding reached in a signed
agreement ;
(c) Post at its plant at Rome, Georgia, copies of the notice attached
hereto marked "Appendix A." 11 Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained
by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent :
1. Refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union by
refusal to discuss and process grievances as required by its April 17,
1947, contract with the Union;
2. Refused to bargain collectively in good faith with respect to a
new collective bargaining agreement to replace the April 17, 1947,
contract with the Union, except as found above;
3. Caused and prolonged the strike of its employees which occurred.
on March 18, 1948;
11 In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there
shall be inserted in the notice, before the words, "A DECISION AND ORDER" the words,.
"A DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING."
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1125
4. Discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of
Ottie Argo, James F. Allen, John W . Studdard , and H . E. Cook;
5. Discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment of its employees by instituting
eviction proceedings against 59 named striking employees;
6. Interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees by any
acts or conduct other than those found herein.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with TEXTILE
WORKERS UNION of ANITRICA, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in the bargaining unit described below,
with respect to any group health and accident insurance program,
or modification thereof, and embody any understanding reached
in a signed agreement.
WE WILL NoT institute any unilateral changes in any existing
group health and accident insurance program affecting employees
in the appropriate unit, without prior consultation with the
Union. The bargaining unit is :
All employees, including warehousemen and firemen, but ex-
cluding truck drivers, yardmen, watchmen, timekeepers, office
and clerical employees, and all guards, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors.
WE WILL NOT procure pistol licenses for any of our management
officials, supervisors, or employees, for the purpose of intimidat-
ing or coercing strikers, in connection with any labor dispute
with our employees.
WE WILL NOT instigate, encourage, or assist physical assaults or
threats of physical assault against employees because of their
-union or concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT solicit individual strikers. to return to work, or
threaten or purport to discharge them if they do not do so.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations , to join or assist TEXTILE WORK-
ERS UNION of AMERICA, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
867351-50-vol. 86 72
1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act, as guar-
anteed in Section 7 thereof.
All our employees are free to become, remain or refrain from be-
coming members of TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. 0.,
or any other labor organization, except to the extent that the right to
refrain may be affected by a lawful agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC.,
Employer.
By -------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title) .
Dated ---------------------------
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
AND
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Messrs. Clarence D. Musser and Gilbert Cohen, for the General Counsel.
Mr. Frank A. Constangg and Miss Mildred McClelland, of Atlanta, Ga., and
Matthews , Owens & Maddox-, by Mr. Dean Oicens, of Rome, Ga., for Respondent.
Mr. J. D. Pedigo, of Rome, Ga., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge filed on May 14, 1948, by Textile Workers
Union of America, C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, on behalf of the Board, herein called the
General Counsel,' and the Board, respectively, as the context may require, by
the Regional Director of the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued an
amended complaint dated May 18, 1948, against Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., Rome,
Georgia, herein called Respondent, alleging that Respondent had engaged in,
and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act, and Section
8 (a) (1), (3), and (5), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, Title I, (Public Law 101, 80th Congress, Chapter 120, 1st
Session), herein called the Amended Act. Copies of the complaint, the charge
and the amended charge, the amended complaint, and the second amended charge,
together with notices of hearing thereon, were duly served upon Respondent and
the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended, after
an order by a Trial Examiner granting, in part, Respondent's motion for a
' All references to the General Counsel hereinafter , unless otherwise indicated or required
by the context , are to the General Counnsel ' s representative at the hearing.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC . 1127
bill of particulars,' alleged, in substance, that Respondent, (1) on various
specified dates between about April 30, 1947, and May 17, 1948, by (a) refusing
to process grievances as required by the terms of an existing collective bargain-
ing agreement, (b) refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union regard-
ing changes in wages, hours, and working conditions regarding which it had taken
unilateral action, in derogation of its obligations under said agreement, and
the Act, and (c) refusing, upon request, to bargain collectively in good faith
regarding a contract to replace the expiring agreement, has refused and con-
tinues to refuse to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in an appropriate unit, notwithstanding its status
as majority representative; (2) by (a) discharging Ottie Argo, on or about
September 22, 1947, and failing to reinstate him until on or about February 15,
1948, because of his union affiliation, (b) threatening to discharge James F.
.Allen, John W. Studdard, and H. E. Cook, on or about April 9, 1948, and (c)
instituting proceedings in the civil court of Floyd County, Georgia, on or
about May 1, 1948, to evict 59 named employees' from company-owned houses,
because of their union affiliation and concerted activities in engaging in an unfair
labor practice strike, on or about March 18, 1948, has discriminated with regard
to the hire and tenure of employment of said employees, thereby discouraging
membership in a labor organization; (3) on various specified dates, between
April 30, 1947, and May 1, 1948, vilified and disparaged the Union ; urged,
persuaded, and warned its employees to refrain from affiliation with or
assistance to the Union ; and threatened to discharge, discipline, and evict
employees from company-owned houses because of their concerted activities ;
(4) on or about March 23, 1948, while the strike was in progress, aided, encour-
aged, and enlisted groups of persons to threaten with assault, and assault "with
force and arms" certain employees, because of their concerted activities; and (5)
by all the foregoing conduct, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, as
reenacted in the Amended Act in violation of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) of the
Act, and Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Amended Act.
On June 1, 1948, Respondent filed its answer, reserving the right to insist
upon its prior motions for bills of particulars, and to contest the jurisdiction of
the Board, as well as the validity and applicability of the Amended Act. In its
answer, Respondent substantially admitted the allegations concerning its cor-
porate structure, the nature of its business, and its operation in interstate
commerce; the certification of the Union by the Board as exclusive representa-
tive of the employees in an appropriate unit, though neither admitting nor
denying that the unit is "presently" appropriate; and the execution, on March
17, 1947, of a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Respondent gen-
erally denied, however, the commission of any unfair labor practices, and
alleged that the discharge of Ottie Argo arose out of a dispute as to the inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement, later settled by arbitration.
With respect to the eviction proceedings, Respondent asserted that it had
instituted them solely because of nonpayment of rent, and not because of the
union or concerted activities of the employees involved. Further answering,
Respondent alleged that it has at all times fulfilled its obligation to bargain,
and that the strike, on March 18, 1948, was caused and prolonged not by any
unfair labor practices on its part, but by the Union's insistence upon certain
R A later motion for a bill of particulars to the amended complaint was denied by the
same Trial Examiner.
' A list of these employees is annexed hereto as Appendix A.
1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract provisions . Finally, Respondent alleged, in effect, that the threats of
assault, and assaults upon striking employees had been provoked by the conduct
and activities of the Union, its officers, agents, members, and sympathizers,
during the strike, in interfering with ingress and egress at the plant, and the
shipment of goods in interstate commerce, and in threatening and assaulting
employees, conduct which necessitated a restraining order and interlocutory
injunction in the Superior Court of Floyd County, Georgia.
Pursuant to not ce, hearing was held at Rome, Georgia, between June 8, and
June 15, 1948, inclusive, before Irving Rogosin, the undersigned Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and Re-
spondent were represented by counsel ; the Union, by an international repre-
sentative. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all parties.
At the outset of the hearing, the General Counsel moved to strike certain para-
graphs of Respondent's answer as vague, indefinite, and not in conformity with
the board's Rules and Regulations. Counsel for Respondent renewed the motion
for a bill of particulars to the amended complaint. Both motions were denied.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case, Respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of proof. The motion was denied. When renewed
at the conclusion of the hearing, ruling was reserved. It is disposed of by the
findings and conclusions hereinafter. Motion of the General Counsel, at the
close of the evidence, to conform the pleadings to the proof, with respect to
formal matters not affecting the substantive issues of the case, was granted
without objection. All parties were advised of the right to present oral argu-
ment, and to file proposed findings and conclusions, as well as briefs. Counsel
for the General Counsel, and for Respondent, argued orally upon the record.
On July 7, 1948, a brief was received from the General Counsel; a brief on
behalf of Respondent, on August 9, 1948. No proposed findings and conclusions
have been received.
Upon the entire record in the case, from his observation of the witnesses, and
a view, taken with the consent of all parties, of-the plant site and general locale
where the events are alleged to have occurred, the undersigned makes the
following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., a Georgia corporation, with its plant, principal office
and place of business in Rome, Georgia, is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of special fabrics for industrial and decorative purposes. During
the calendar year 1944, representative of all periods involved herein, Respondent
purchased raw materials, consisting principally of cotton, cotton waste, and
rayon staple, valued in excess of $1,000,000, of which approximately 66 percent
was purchased and transported to its plant from points outside the State of
Georgia. During corresponding periods, Respondent manufactured, sold, and
distributed finished products valued in excess of $5,000,000, of which approxi-
mately 90 percent was sold and transported from its plant to points outside the
State of Georgia. Respondent concedes that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act, as amended.4
a These findings are based upon admissions in Respondent ' s answer to the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint , and its concession at the hearing . The record discloses, in
accordance with the reservation in its answer , that production of cotton duck products was
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
1129
Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR. LABOR PRACTICES
A. The allegations of refusal to bargain
1. Introduction
The Union was certified on October 23, 1945, after a Board-conducted election,
as collective bargaining representative of the employees of Anchor Duck Mills,
Respondent's predecessor, in the following unit :
all employees of the Company, including warehousemen, firemen, and the
working supervisor in the respooling department, but excluding truck
drivers, yardmen, watchmen, timekeepers, office and clerical employees, all
supervisory employees of the rank of second hand and above, and all other
supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recom-
mend such action... 5
On March 18, 1946, these parties executed a contract for a term of 1 year, with
provision for automatic renewal annually thereafter in the,absence of specified
notice. The Union gave timely notice of intention to terminate the contract,
and when the parties failed to reach an agreement by the terminal date, they
executed a "supplemental agreement," dated March 18, 1947, extending the
existing contract to April 17, 1947.6 Complying with a State statute, enacted
shortly before, prohibiting maintenance of membership provisions, and irrevoca-
ble check-offs, the parties agreed, subject to the Union's written protest, to
suspension of the maintenance of membership provision, and modification of the
check-off, for the duration of the extension.
At the March 18 conference, International Representative J. D. Pedigo'`
charged that certain of Respondent's supervisors had embarked on a campaign
to induce employees to withdraw from the Union, and refused to continue
negotiations. After a recess, Barry Wright, Respondent's former attorney,
returned with company officials, and announced that his investigation revealed
that no such activity had taken place. He added, however, that he had issued
instructions to discontinue any such activity if it had, in fact, occurred. In
discontinued some time after April 1947, and that Respondent has since been engaged
exclusively in the manufacture of special fabrics for industrial and decorative use.
5 Matter of Anchor Duck Mills, 63 N. L. R. B. 1079.
6 The employer in this supplemental agreement is described as "Anchor Rome Mills, Inc.,
(formerly Anchor Duck Mills)." The change in ownership , according to General Manager
L. H. Rice, occurred on about April 1, 1947, when he succeeded A. A. Hobbs . According to
Rice, the original company had planned to liquidate shortly before that date , but subse-
quently sold the plant to the Crescent Corporation of Boston , Massachusetts, which
resumed operation of the plant as Anchor Rome Mills, Inc. No issue is raised as to the
Union ' s status as collective bargaining representative as a result of this change in ownership.
7In addition to his position as international representative , Pedigo also holds the posi-
tion of manager of the Northwest Georgia Joint Board , which centralizes the work of, and
serves 10 constituent locals in their collective bargaining negotiations . Each of the locals
is represented on the Joint Board by a number of delegates in proportion to membership in
the local . The Joint Board is served , in addition to Pedigo, by 3 business agents.
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
addition, according to Shop Committee Member L. T. Vassar, Personnel Director
Robert Bachman posted a notice to the same effect on the plant bulletin board.&
Negotiations were thereupon resumed, and in April, the parties executed a
new contract, effective retroactively to March 18, 1947, for a term of 1 year,
automatically renewable annually thereafter in the absence of specified written
notice, Under this contract, the parties agreed to include yardmen, excluded
from the unit in the original Board certification, and earlier contract. In all
other respects the unit remained unchanged, and the Union's majority status, un-
challenged.
The provision for maintenance of membership, however, included in the former
contract, was eliminated, and the provision for check-off, modified to comply with
the State statute. Other sections relating to super-seniority for the General
Shop Committee, leaves of absence for union business, work loads and assign-
ments, and routine, technological and other changes thereunder, and the grievance
procedure, included in the earlier contract, were retained. A wage schedule,
retroactive to February 17, 1947, and providing for separate methods of com-
putation of wages for hourly rated and incentive rated jobs, was annexed to
the contracts No express provision was made, however, for change in com-
putation from hourly rated to incentive rated jobs.
2. The alleged refusal to bargain under the 1947 contract concerning:
(a) Processing of grievances at Step No. 3
It is alleged, as to this aspect of the complaint, that during the term of the
1947 contract, Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in good faith by
failing to observe Step No. 3 of the grievance procedure.
The Union on numerous occasions sought to process various grievances, in-
cluding those involving seniority, discipline or discharge, wage rates, changes
in the basis of compensation, and work loads and assignments, especially those
relating to "routine," "technological," and "other" changes, defined in the
contract and discussed hereinafter.10
The contract p:ovided,in the absence of other mutual agreement, for adjust-
ment of grievances at four successive stages, culminating in arbitration. Fail-
ure to observe the time limitation for presentation of grievances, and demand
for arbitration, resulted in waiver and permanent abandonment of the grievance.
Although the Union was extremely critical of Respondent's general attitude in
handling grievances, and cites at least two instances, undisputed in the record,
demonstrating a failure to bargain in good faith concerning grievances," the
8 The record as a whole suggests that the activity complained of related to revocations
of check-off, rather than attempts to induce withdrawals from the Union. In any event,
this conduct is not specifically alleged as interference, restraint, or coercion, nor does the
record warrant such a conclusion, in view of the effective repudiation soon after it was
brought to Respondent's attention. The circumstances are mentioned as background in
connection with the controversy regarding Respondent's refusal to grant the Union's demand
for a check-off in its later negotiations..
0In the wage schedule annexed to the contract, incentive rated jobs are denoted by the
word "base" after the job classification ; all other jobs are hourly rated.
10 The grievance concerning Respondents refusal to grant an indefinite leave of absence
for union business to Ottie Argo, president of the local, and later business agent of the North-
west Georgia Joint Board, is discussed below. under B. Discrimination in regard to hire and
tenure of employment.
n Thus, on about June 10, 1947, when Local President Ottie Argo and General Shop Com-
mitteeman Chairman William Shiflett sought to present the grievance, to be discussed
presently, concerning the change in wage rate in the #1 twisting department from an
hourly to an incentive basis, Personnel Director Bachman crumpled the grievance in his
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1131
Union does not deny that Respondent met with it at the first two stages of the
grievance procedure. Its chief complaint, here, is that, although requested to
do so in writing on numerous occasions , Respondent failed to meet with the
Union at the third step, except for three isolated occasions, on July 24, November
29, 1947, and once in January 1948, during the entire term of the agreement.
This Respondent does not deny. It contends, however, first, that meetings at the
third step were not mandatory under the express terms of the contract ; second,
that specific provision was made for carrying grievances from the second step
to arbitration, without meeting. at the intervening third step; and finally, that,
since the grievances were ultimately filed for arbitration, and later withdrawn,
settled, or eventually determined by arbitrators' awards, with which Respondent
complied, its statutory obligation to bargain concerning grievances has been
fulfilled.
Although the wording of Step No. 3 does not explicitly require a meeting at this
step, which the union representatives concede, the necessity for such a meeting
is fairly implicit, if the objective of settlement of disputes is to be attained"
Moreover, the position that such a meeting was not required, appears to have
been asserted by Respondent for the first time at the hearing. Thus, after
previously ignoring the Union's requests for third step meetings, Respondent,
on July 2, in a reply to the Union's request, referred to an earlier communication
on May 28, addressed to Business Agent C. L. Ross, suggesting an appointment
to discuss grievances at the third step, and renewed its offer to the Union '
Again, on July 19, Respondent wrote the Union of its desire to dispose of the
backlog of enumerated grievances, which the Union had submitted in the third
step, and, mentioning its earlier attempts to set a date for discussion, suggested
an appointment on July 23 or 24. Obviously, therefore, Respondent recognized
its duty to meet with the Union at this step. The contention that no third
step meeting was contemplated by the agreement or by the parties is, therefore,
rejected.
As to the second contention, that the contract makes specific provision for
carrying grievances from the second step to arbitration, without the necessity
of meeting at the intervening third step, there is some basis.'' In determining,
band, and tossed it aside, remarking, "Well, here is what I think about your grievance."
Again, when, during this period, International Representative Pedigo sought to discuss the
discharge of an employee, Bachman refused to meet with him, stating that he was "quite
capable of running the plant without any help from the Union." Pedigo protested to
General Manager Rice, but received no satisfaction. On July 15, 1947, Pedigo wrote
Respondent's President Robert Amory, at Boston, advising of the "deterioration of labor
relations" at the plant, and criticizing the plant officials for their "unmasked hostility,"
and Bachman for his "unbelievably overbearing and disdainful attitude," and failure to
redress even "small routine grievances" and the "most obviously just complaints." Reply-
ing on July 24, Amory, without mentioning whether any investigation had been made of
Pedigo's complaints, merely assured him of his complete confidence in General Manager
Rice and Personnel Director Bachman, and stated that he had forwarded the complaints
to Bachman.
12 The section reads :
Step No. S. If the General Shop Committee and the Company's representative are
unable to reach a satisfactory adjustment on any complaint, the issue(s) shall be
referred to a representative of the Union who, with or without the General Shop Com-
mittee and the persons involved, shall promptly attempt to settle the matter with the
Company' s representatives.
13 Neither the letter of May 28, nor a copy was produced at the hearing. The Union dis-
claimed knowledge of such communication.
I' Reference is apparently to Step No. 4 (c):
If the Company shall fail to make answer within seven (7) calendar days, as provided
in the last sentence under Step No. 2 above,* the Union may without waiting any
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
however, whether Respondent has bargained in good faith at all stages of
the grievance procedure, it is no complete answer to say that other remedies,
such as arbitration, are available, where Respondent has failed to meet with
the Union at some intermediate level. Arbitration was obviously intended only
as a last resort, after the preliminary grievance procedure had been fully and
genuinely exhausted, rather than as an alternative method of settling grievances.
The provision in question was merely intended to eliminate the possibility of
-Respondent's forestalling settlement of grievances by failing to comply with
the grievance procedure.
The final contention, that since the grievances were ultimately filed for arbitra-
tion, and later withdrawn, settled, or decided, is considered in the discussion
of the change in work loads and assignments. It should be noted here, however,
that the parties did meet on July 24 for a discussion of grievances at the third
step, although without success, and that the grievances were eventually sub-
mitted, with other additional unresolved issues, to arbitration, with results
mentioned later.
(b) Work loads and work assignments
The record discloses that on May 7, June 9, July 19, August 5 and 8, 1947,
Respondent notified the Union that it was instituting certain changes in method
of wage computation, and in work loads and assignments.
The first of these, on May 7, involved a change from hourly rate to a "piece
and incentive wage program," covering the jobs of creeling, doffing, and tending
twisters in the #1 twisting department. Respondent notified the Union of
the number of persons which would be required to operate each job per shift,
and informed it that the base rate and expected earnings had been calculated,
and would be posted in the department on May 12, when the change became
effective.
The changes in the notice of June 9, involving the installation of a new
vacuum pump in the carding department, on June 16, resulted in a change in
the duties of the waste machine man and strippers, and the elimination of the
job of stripper's helper.
Respondent notified the Union, on July 1.9, of further changes to be made in
the carding department, effective upon completion of details, with consequent
reduction in force in the picker room and drawing room, elimination of female
employees, and change in rate of compensation.
Finally, on August 5, and August 8, Respondent notified the Union of its inten-
tion to replace certain obsolete machinery as soon as the machines and necessary
supplies became available, and stated that it would notify the Union of job assign-
ments and applicable rates upon completion of each installation, agreeing to
discussion with the Union, if it desired, as soon as details were completed.
The Union, protesting these changes as not in conformity with the contract,
resorted to the grievance procedure, and eventually, arbitration.
The parties met on July 24, to discuss all issues then outstanding, including
third step grievances, and the carding room changes, mentioned above. No
settlement of any issues was reached.
longer present the some in Step 3, and in the event the Company does not make
written answer in Step 3, within seven (7) calendar days after the same has been
presented under Step 3, then the Union may proceed without further delay to Step 4.
[Arbitration]
*The sentence reads :
The Company ' s representative shall endeavor to make prompt decisions on all
complaints and deliver a written copy of same to the General Shop Committee.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1133
On August 1, the Union filed written request for arbitration of the carding
department changes. In its reply next day, Respondent, asserted that the request
was premature, and, on August 4, instituted the proposed changes with the
consequent elimination of the jobs of about 15 female employees. On'August 11,
the Union, protesting these changes and the resultant effect on work loads,
elimination of jobs, and consequent layoffs, which, it maintained, resulted from
"technological" changes, filed further grievances. Replying on August 19, Re-
spondent disputed the Union's contention, insisting that the changes constituted
"other changes," within the meaning of the contract, and that the grievances
were premature.
Meanwhile, on August 14, Respondent wrote the Union requesting that its
demand for a meeting prior to the installation of machinery mentioned in
Respondent's letter of August 5, be deferred until after August 25, due to the
urgency of other matters, and suggested that the Union communicate with
Respondent for a definite appointment after that date. The Union made no
reply, but awaited further word from Respondent.
Additional grievances, arising out of changes in the carding department, and
work assignments, were filed on August 27, and, after written replies by Respond-
ent, the issues were finally submitted to arbitration.
Regarding changes in work loads and assignments, the contract provided:
SECTION 12. WORK LOADS AND WORK ASSIGNMENTS
The Employer shall have the right to change or introduce machines,
processes and methods of manufacture for the purpose of insuring the effi-
cient operation of the mill and utilizing the employees' working time most
productively and without adversely affecting the workers' physical or mental
condition or causing undue fatigue. Scientific job analyses, including time
studies, may be prepared by the Employer as the basis for establishing fair
work assignments.
Changes in work assignments are then described as falling within three categories :
"routine," those resulting from alterations in construction of existing jobs, and
requiring no change in methods, machinery or equipment; "technological," those
resulting from changes in equipment or machines used on the job; arid, finally,
"other changes," those which are neither "routine" nor "technological."
Management was permitted, under this section, to make "routine" changes as
conditions might require, presumably, without prior consultation with the Union,
but agreed, upon request, to discuss the changes with the Union. Any differences
between the parties, not settled by mutual agreement, were to be submitted for
final and binding determination to arbitration.
With respect to "technological" changes, management was required to first
notify the Union of the proposed change, the approximate date of installation,
proposed duties and job assignment, and anticipated earnings. Meeting and
discussion of the proposal at least 1 week before the date of the institution of
the change was required, management agreeing to furnish all information neces-
sary for complete understanding of the change. Permission was granted, how-
ever, to install the proposed change for a trial period of 6 weeks, or longer, if
mutually agreeable, during which employees were to receive no less than their
average hourly earnings for the previous quarter. Within 15 days of the ex-
piration of the trial period, the Union, if dissatisfied, could present a written
grievance, and if not satisfactorily adjusted between the parties within 5 days
after the trial period (sic), the Union could submit the matter to arbitration
for final and binding determination.
1134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As to "other" changes, it was provided that there should be no changes in
established work assignments, except by mutual agreement, or in accordance
with specified procedure, whereby management might advise of its intention to
institute dhanges which were neither "routine" nor "technological," and pro-
ceed with such changes. If within 30 days after negotiation, upon request, the
parties were unable to agree, either party might submit the matter to arbitration
for final and binding determination of the justification of the change and
applicable rates of pay. Finally, it was provided that, whenever requested by
,the Union, discussion of such changes should be had between the Union and
management.
Upon the basis of these provisions, the Union contended that there was no
provision for the change in wage rate from an hourly to an incentive basis,
which Respondent instituted in the #1 twister department pursuant to its notice
of May 7; Respondent, apparently, that this change was within the purview of
"other" changes. As to the remaining changes, the •Union maintained they con-
stituted "technological" changes, and that Respondent had failed to comply
with the applicable provisions of the contract. Respondent insisted that the
changes 'constituted "other" changes, and that the Union's grievances were pre-
mature, since the 30-day period after negotiations had not elapsed at the time
of the filing for arbitration.
In this posture of the case, the parties proceeded to aribtration of these
and other accumulated grievances, including those relating to Respondent's
failure to meet with the Union at the third step of the grievance procedure.
On November 27, 1947, the grievance involving the change in wage rate of em-
ployees in the #1 twisting department from an hourly to an incentive basis,
the grievances of the affected employees, and others pending before another
arbitrator, were settled by mutual consent, and withdrawn from arbitration.
Hearings were held on January 2 and 17, 1948, before an arbitration board,
consisting of C. L. Ross, on behalf of the Union, Mildred McClelland and T. J.
Barrett, Jr., (the latter participating only in the work-load cases), on behalf
of Respondent, and A. R. Marshall, appointed, pursuant to the contract, by the
United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, as the third
arbitrator. Eight issues were presented, including grievances relating to change
in work-load assignments, Respondent's failure to observe Step No. 3 of the
grievance procedure, and the discharge of Ottie Argo, discussed elsewhere. The
arbitrators representing the respective parties were unable to reach agreement
on any of the issues, and, pursuant to agreement of the parties, the issues were
decided by Arbitrator Marshall.
In his opinion and award, issued on February 14, 1947, the arbitrator found
that the grievances relating to the failure to observe Step No. 3 in the grievance
procedure were not arbitrable because of failure to pursue the prescribed griev-
ance procedure ; 16 respecting the grievance involving change in the work-load
assignments, he held that there had been insufficient negotiations regarding
the new work-load assignments, and directed the parties to bargain for 5 weeks
following the date of the award, and in the event no agreement was reached, to
resort to the arbitration procedure of the agreement, unless otherwise agreed.10
15 The grievance concerning Ottie Argo was similarly held not arbitrable. His grievance,
however, was the subject of another arbitration proceeding, heard on December 30, 1947,
which resulted in an award, discussed hereinafter.
16 The contract expired on March 18, 1948, and the issues apparently remained unresolved
as of that date.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC . 1135
All other grievances, excepting the claim of an employee relating to her position
on the seniority list, were disallowed.
It was stipulated that during the period from April 1, 1947, to May 1, 1948,
numerous grievances, as to which the contract required no written record, were
processed and adjusted at the first step of the grievance procedure ; that some 40
grievances, reduced to writing and filed at the second step, and considered at
regular semi-monthly meetings provided for the purpose, were settled, abandoned,
or withdrawn ; that between June 12, 1947, and February 4, 1948, 31 grievances
were processed through the second step and filed for arbitration but settled by
agreement and withdrawn before hearing ; that during the term of the 1947
contract, approximately 50 grievances were submitted before 5 different arbitra-
tors, awards made, and, where adverse to Respondent, complied with. The
record further discloses, that a substantial number of the issues submitted to
arbitration were resolved in favor of Respondent. It is also agreed that Re-
spondent actually met with the Union to discuss grievances at the third step on
July 24, November 29, 1947, and in January 1948, on which dates pending griev-
ances were presumably discussed. The record does not disclose which, if any,
grievances, apart from those settled on November 27, already mentioned, were
adjusted on those dates.
Although the Union contends that Respondent was dilatory in not meeting
sooner and oftener for discussion of grievances at the third step, the record fur-
nishes no substantial support for such a finding. Considering that Respondent
was meeting with the Union twice monthly during this period for discussion of
grievances at the second step ; that it was undergoing a period of conversion in
its manufactured product, entailing installation of new machinery and the insti-
tution of new manufacturing techniques, it cannot be said that its failure to
meet more frequently at the third step was deliberately calculated to forestall
settlement of grievances.
With respect to its failure to meet for discussion of work-load changes and
assignments, also made the subject of grievances, Respondent contends that the
issue arose out of a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of
the pertinent provisions of the contract. Relying on the decision in the Consoli-
dated Aircraft case,17 Respondent urges that the Board as a matter of policy
should refrain here from "policing" the contract by attempting to decide whether
the dispute as to the meaning of the provisions constitutes an unfair labor
practice. Apart from obvious distinctions between the cases, and the fact that
the Board confined its decision to the particular facts of that case," this position
ignores the language in the decision, reaffirming earlier holdings, that "the
interpretation and administration of a contract already made and the settlement
of disputes arising under any such contract are properly regarded within the
sphere of collective bargaining" and that "a refusal by an employer to bargain
collectively within that area might constitute an unfair labor practice."
It is apparent, here, however, that Respondent did not refuse to meet with
the Union for discussion of the changes which it sought to institute. It notified
the Union in advance of the proposed changes and invited discussion. It is
not contended that Respondent did not meet with the Union at the first two
steps of the grievance procedure. The absence of any meeting at the third step
17 Matter of Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 47 N. L. R. B. 694, enfd. 141 F. (2d)
785 (C. A. 9).
18 The Board, tho-e, said, "We therefore do not deem it wise to exercise our jurisdiction,
in such a case, where the parties have not exhausted their rights and remedies under the
contract as to which the dispute has arisen."
1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
has already been generally discussed. Whether or not Respondent was entitled
to institute .the changes before consultation and discussion with the Union turns
upon whether the proposed changes constituted "technological" changes, as
contended by the Union, or "other" changes, as maintained by Respondent. As
to this issue the parties were apparently in irreconcilable conflict. The arbitra-
tor, himself, did not resolve this issue, resting his decision on the failure of the
parties to pursue the grievance procedure. The discussion in his "opinion and
award," however, indicates that the basic issue, whether the changes constituted
"technological" or "other" changes, could not be definitively resolved by reference
to the applicable provisions.
Respondent contends, moreover, that provision in the contract for arbitration,
as the terminal point in the grievance procedure, of which the Union availed
itself, and Respondent's compliance with the awards of the arbitrator, afford
the most persuasive evidence of good faith in bargaining. This, however, fails
to meet the argument of the General Counsel, that availability of arbitration as
the final step in the grievance procedure does not excuse an employer from the
obligation to bargain at each step. For, as he contends, an employer, by con-
stantly compelling a union to resort to arbitration to redress grievances, may
so exhaust the resources of a labor organization, and deplete its treasury, as
to frustrate completely the policy of collective bargaining which the Act is
designed to promote.1B
While the record as a whole suggests that Respondent's plant officials manifested
less than wholehearted cooperation with the Union, and a lack of regard for the
basic techniques of collective bargaining,2° scarcely conducive to successful labor
relations, the undersigned is unable to conclude, upon the state of the record,
that Respondent deliberately engaged in a policy of constantly forcing the
Union to resort to arbitration as a means of forestalling the settlement of dis-
putes and frustrating collective bargaining. The failure of the arbitrator to
resolve the basic dispute, and to remit the matter to the parties for further nego-
tiation, is some indication of the complexity of the issues involved. The case
illustrates that mere existence of a grievance procedure, even if scrupulously
observed, will not settle issues, unless the parties meet, determined to explore
their problems and negotiate fully and completely until agreement is reached.
In view of the agreement attained on many other issues, the record does not
support a finding that Respondent approached these issues with a fixed deter-
mination to avoid settlement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, the undersigned
finds and concludes that the allegation that Respondent refused to bargain by
failing to meet and discuss grievances at the third step, and by failing and re-
fusing to bargain with regard to changes in work loads and work assignments,
have not been sustained by substantial evidence. It will, therefore, be recom-
mended that these allegations of the complaint be dismissed.
]0 Thus, on cross-examination, Union Representative Pedigo testified that, with the excep-
tion of one mill, concerning which he had no information, the Union was required to resort
to arbitration of grievances at Respondent's plant at least twice as often as at the plants
of eight other employers combined, whose collective bargaining contracts with the Union
the Northwest Georgia Joint Board administered . This conclusion , however, standing alone
and in the absence of analysis of the circumstances at each plant, which, even if admissible,
could not feasibly be explored at the hearing, has slight, if any, probative value in establish-
ing that the number of grievances which the Union was required to arbitrate at Respondent's
plant was excessive or unreasonable.
20 See footnote 11.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC.
3. The 1947 wage increase
1137
On September 22, 1947, pursuant to the appropriate provision, ]Emil Rieve,
general president of the Union, wrote Respondent, requesting that the contract
be reopened for wage revision, and indicating that demand would be made for
a 15 cents per hour increase. On October 13, International Representative Pedigo
followed this with a request for a meeting. Respondent re-Lolled, asking that
the meeting be deferred until some general wage pattern had been established
in the industry.
The parties finally met on November 13, State Diretor Kenneth Douty, Pedigo,
and the General Shop Committee, representing the Union ; Attorney Frank A.
Constangy, his associate, Mildred McClelland, and Personnel Director Bachman,
appearing for Respondent. In addition to demanding a general wage increase,
the Union proposed that the existing group insurance program, under which
employees paid premiums of 35 cents weekly, be improved, and the entire premium
be paid by Respondent. In the discussion which followed, Respondent proposed
a wage increase of 9 percent, with a minmum wage of 87 cents an hour, but
refused to consider any proposal concerning insurance. The Union rejected
the offer of a wage increase because of Respondent's refusal to make "some
commitment" on the matter of insurance, and proposed arbitration. Respond-
ent's representative replied that they would await the Union's formal demand
for arbitration, but stated that they did not regard the issue of insurance
arbitrable under the wage reopening provision. The meeting adjourned at
noon, without agreement.21
Later that afternoon, a notice was posted at the plant over the signature of
Personnel Director Bachman, purporting to summarize what had occurred at
the bargaining conference, and stating that the Union had rejected Respondent's
offer and had demanded arbitration of the wage increase, as provided in the
contract. The notice contained no mention of the subject of insurance.
Meanwhile, the union representatives had repaired to the union hall to re-
view the situation. They finally decided to accept Respondent's offer of wage
increase, and to continue their efforts to obtain an "adequate insurance pro-
gram." Douty thereupon telephoned Constangy, at the plant, and notified him
of the Union's decision. The men met at the union office soon afterward, and
drafted a memorandum, by the terms of which the parties agreed upon an 87
cents per hour minimum wage rate, and an increase in the hourly rate of 9
percent, with a corresponding adjustment in all base and piecework rates to
afford a 9 percent increase in earnings, effective with the first shift, November
10, 1947. Douty signed the memorandum on behalf of the Union, and Bachman,
whose signature Constangy procured soon afterward, on behalf of Respondent.
Next morning, Respondent posted at the plant a supplemental notice, announc-
ing that, as a result of the Union's reconsideration of Respondent's wage pro-
posal, agreement had been reached as outlined above.
21 These findings are based on the credited and undisputed testimony of Douty and
Pedigo. None of Respondent ' s representatives at this meeting testified , though present at
the hearing . Respondent ' s attitude at the meeting, with respect to the issue of insurance, is
exemplified in Pedigo ' s testimony , in which he quoted Constangy as saying , "We will sit
here all day and listen to you if you want to talk , but we are not just going to talk insur-
ance . " The subject of insurance is not covered in the contract , but no contention was made
that the subject could not properly have been raised under the wage reopening. In any
event , in view of the Board's holding in Matter of 1V. W. Cross & Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 1162.
(See also Matter of Inland Steel Co., 77 N. L . R. B. 1, Enfd . 170 E. ( 2d) 247 ( C'. A. 7)), the
undersigned finds that the subject of insurance was appropriately raised under the wage
reopening provision of the contract.
1138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel contends that the original notice, posted on November
13, was intended to discredit the Union by attributing to it the responsibility
for the failure to reach agreement on the wage increase n To the extent that
the notice related what had occurred regarding the proposed wage increase,
the facts stated are substantially accurate, and contain nothing to support the
General Counsel's contention. It is asserted, however, according to Pedigo's
uncontradicted testimony, based on reports made to him by employees, that
the notice was posted at about 2: 30 p. in. shortly before the change of shifts,
and after the parties had met and reached agreement on the wage increase at
approximately 1: 30. Since the agreement was actually reached between Con-
stangy and Douty at the union office, and Personnel Director Bachman did not
learn of it until afterward, it is probable that the notice had actually been
posted after agreement had, in fact, been reached, but before Bachman had had
an opportunity to remove or correct the notice. The hours at which the two
meetings were held, and the time of the posting of the notice, were not fixed
with sufficient certainty in the record to warrant an inference that Respondent
deliberately posted the notice after agreement had been reached. Moreover,
Respondent's action in posting a supplemental notice next morning, advising that
agreement had been reached, and furnishing the Union with copies of both
notices, negatives any inference of improper motive. The absence of any refer-
ence in either notice to the insurance issue, however, raises the question of
whether Respondent failed to mention it because of an intention to deprive the
Union of any credit for obtaining an improved insurance program, which Re-
spondent contemplated, or because of its mistaken belief that the subject of
insurance was not a bargainable issue. Inasmuch as the notices reflected the
facts regarding the wage issue with substantial accuracy, and were not couched
in language reasonably calculated to induce or coerce the employees to renounce
their bargaining representatives, the undersigned concludes that it was the
latter consideration which accounted for the omission, rather than the former,
and finds that the posting of the notices was not improper under the circum-
stances 23
On November 20, 1947, however, Respondent announced to-its employees a
new and improved group insurance plan, effective November 28, covering all
participating employees, and their dependents, involving substantial increases
in benefits, at no increased cost to employees. Under the plan, the former
premium rate of 35 cents per week paid by employees remained unchanged, but
the additional cost of 50 cents per week was borne by Respondent. The proposal
had not previously been offered or submitted to the Union, and the Union, conse-
quently, had had no opportunity to accept or reject the plan, or negotiate
concerning it.
It is undisputed that, while some discussion on the matter of insurance had
taken place during the bargaining conference on November 13, Respondent had
remained adamant in its position that the subject of insurance was not a
bargainable issue. This issue has since been decided adversely to Respondent's
contention.24
Upon the basis of the foregoing, it is, therefore, found that, by failing and
refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
22 Reference is apparently to the statements in the notice
We regret that this meeting did not result in an agreement. Therefore the wage
increase to which we feel you are entitled is postponed.
23 Cf. Matter of Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1683; Matter of United Welding
Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 954.
24 See Matter of W. W. Cross f Co., supra.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1139
the employees in an appropriate unit, with respect to the group health and
accident insurance program, and, thereafter unilaterally announcing and es-
tablishing an improved program, without first consulting with, or offering the
same to the Union, Respondent has refused to bargain, in violation of Section 8
(a) (5) of the Amended Act.
B. Discrimination in regard to hire and tenure of employment; refusal to' grant
union representative an indefinite leave of absence
Ottie Argo was first employed by Respondent's predecessor in 1943, as a
dotter. His most recent employment began on July 25, 1938, and continued
without interruption until July 24, 1947. Since June 1945, when he joined the
Union, he participated actively in the affairs of the local, eventually became
its president, and, with General Shop Committee Chairman Shiflett, presented
grievances at the preliminary stages.
On July 22, 1947, he was elected financial secretary-treasurer and business
agent of the Union's Northwest Georgia Joint Board for a term of 1 year. On
July 24, he notified Overseer W. A. Scott of his election, and made written
application for a 30-day leave of absence to decide whether to serve in the
office to which he had been elected. The request was granted and Scott endorsed
his approval on the application.
When, on August 22, Argo applied to Overseer Scott for an indefinite leave of
absence, Scott referred him to Personnel Director Bachman. Argo informed
Bachman of his election for a term of 1 year, and, referring to the contract,
requested an indefinite. leave of absence.25 Bachman refused, but authorized
an additional 30-day leave. On September 19, Argo wrote Bachman, and, re-
ferring to the quoted section of the contract, renewed his request for an
indefinite leave. Bachman replied, on September 22, as follows :
This is to inform you that the company is unable to grant your request for
a leave of absence. The Company feels that the two previous leaves granted
should have been more than adequate for your purposes.
You are hereby notified, that your leave having expired, your employment
is considered terminated upon your action of accepting work elsewhere of
your own choice.
The matter finally reached arbitration through the grievance procedure before
Arbitrator Harold T. Dworet on December 30, 1947. In a preliminary opinion
and award, issued January 20, 1943, the arbitrator sustained the grievance and
25 The pertinent provision reads :
SECTION 7-LEAVES OF ABSENCE
Employees desiring leave of absence shall request the same from their immediate
Supervisor or the Overseer of the department in which they work, and if for more
than one (1) day, the request shall be in writing on agreed upon triplicate forms fur-
nished by the immediate Supervisor or Overseer for that purpose. The Supervisor
or Overseer shall hold one (1) copy of each request available for the Shop Steward
on request. The request shall state for what purpose and to what date the leave
of absence is desired, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days' duration, except as
hereinafter provided.
a. Leaves of absence shall be granted for'the following reasons :
e e a a • e
4. Union business until completion of such business.
5, To represent the National Union.
Application for extension of leave of absence shall be made in the same way as pro-
vided for original application.
1140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ordered Argo reinstated with seniority, but directed the parties to negotiate for
1.5 days a reasonable leave of absence. The parties failed to reach agreement,
and, in accordance with the award, the matter was resubmitted to the arbitrator
for decision. His supplemental award confirmed the order reinstating Argo with
seniority, and extended his leave of absence to March 18, the expiration date of
the contract.
On March 9, 1.948, Argo resigned his office with the Northwest Georgia Joint
Board, and, on the same clay, wrote Bachman, requesting permission to return
to work on March 15, the beginning of the workweek, rather than Marc]) 18.
The request was granted next day, and Argo was reinstated to his former job
without loss of seniority or other privileges2°
Upon these facts, it is contended that Respondent denied Argo an indefinite
leave of absence, and later discharged him because of his union affiliation,
thereby discriminating against him, and discouraging membership in the Union.
The record discloses that the refusal to grant Argo an indefinite leave of
absence was based, not upon any antipathy for his union activity, but rather
upon a dispute as to the interpretation of the leave of absence provision. As
president of the local, Argo had been active not only in its union affairs, but in
the presentation of grievances, without prejudice tb his employment status.
Twice granted temporary leaves of absence, it was only when he requested an
indefinite leave that Respondent rejected the request and sought a determination
of the issue.
Literally interpreted, the provision permitting leaves "until completion of
[union ] business," could require a leave for an indefinite period, extending,
conceivably, beyond the term of the contract. It is doubtful, however, that such
a result was contemplated by the parties when the contract was executed.'?
The arbitrator's award, terminating the leave with the expiration of the contract,
indicates that he construed the pertinent provisions as not requiring Respondent
to grant a leave of absence extending beyond the expiration of the contract.
An employer is not required, in the absence of express agreement or established
custom, to grant an employee, even an active union member, an indefinite leave
of absence, and the failure to do so does not constitute an unfair labor practice E8
Here, however, the parties had agreed upon leaves of absence for union business,
but had failed to fix a time limitation thereon.
It is true that Respondent might have resorted to the grievance machinery,
and ultimately arbitration, to settle the issue without terminating Argo's em-
ployment. This course, however, would necessarily have extended the leave
of absence, in the interim, and this Respondent could not be required to do.
The issue, however, is not whether the Union's interpretation or Respondent's
should prevail, but whether, in refusing to grant the indefinite leave of absence,
and subsequently discharging Argo, Respondent was motivated by considera-
tions of his union affiliation and activity. The record does not support such a
finding. The fact that Respondent consented to arbitration of the dispute,
26 Apparently no issue of back pay or loss of insurance benefits was involved. The
insurance coverage was in the nature of term insurance with no cash value. Unlike new
employees, however, Argo was not required to wait 30 days before becoming entitled to
participate in the insurance plan.
21 Pedigo ' s testimony that, as international representative of the Union , and business
manager of the Northwest Georgia Joint Board , he has been on leave of absence for more
than 9 years, during which he has retained his seniority , and that similar arrangements
exist at some 16 plants with which the Union has contracts , out of more than 200 plants
in the area , is insufficient to establish a prevailing custom in the industry.
28 Matter of Russell Electric Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 769.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1141
abided by the award, and reinstated Argo without loss of seniority or other
privileges, is evidence of its good faith. Moreover, it would not comport with
the policy of the Act, to encourage collective bargaining as a means of settling
disputes, to review de novo issues decided by arbitration, provided in the con-
tract, particularly where the award, complied with by the party against whom
it was made, is not inconsistent with any remedy the Board might order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and the entire record, the undersigned con-
cludes and finds that Respondent has not discriminated in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of Argo, or discouraged membership in the Union
thereby. It will, therefore, be recommended that those allegations be dismissed.
C. The alleged refusal to bargain concerning a new contract
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges that the following described unit is appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the
Act, as amended :
All employees of Respondent, including warehousemen, and firemen, but
excluding truck drivers, yardmen, watchmen, timekeepers, office and clerical
employees and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors within
the meaning of the Act, as amended.
This is substantially the same unit as that certified by the Board on October
23, 1945, except for the elimination, from the description of the unit, of the
phrase "working supervisor in the respooling department," and the deletion,
in the description of the exclusions, of the phrase, "all supervisory employees
of the rank of second hand and above." Other changes are in terminology to
conform to the provisions of the Amended Act.
Under the 1947 contract, the parties had, by mutual agreement, included
yardmen in the unit. In the contract negotiations for 1948, discussed herein-
after, they agreed to include truck drivers. Both truck drivers and yardmen
had been excluded under the certification, and the subsequent contract for 1946.
The parties further agreed, in the 1948 negotiations, to exclude the working
supervisor in the respooling department. These negotiations, however, did not
result in agreement, and no evidence was offered of any change in duties of
the persons affected warranting modification of the unit originally established
by the Board. Except for these minor modifications, no issue was raised at
any time prior to the hearing as to the appropriateness of the unit, or the
Union's majority.
At the hearing, however, Respondent for the first time raised the question of
whether section hands ° should be included in the unit, in view of its contention
that the Board has, in some cases, included, and in others, excluded, section hands.
Such a determination, however, must be based, not on the nomenclature given a
particular job, but on whether the duties involved include supervisory functions
within the definition of the Amended Act. Since no evidence of any change in
the duties of section hands, requiring their exclusion under the Amended Act,
was adduced at the hearing, it will be assumed that their duties have remained
unchanged since the Board's original unit determination. It is undisputed that
second hands constitute the lowest rank of supervision, and since section hands,
who rank immediately below second hands, have consistently been included in
"'Not to be confused with second hands. Second hands rank immediately below over-
seers in supervisory authority; section hands rank immediately below second hands.
867351-5o-vol. 86 73
1142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the unit at Respondent's plant it will be found that they are appropriately within
the unit.
It is, therefore, found that the unit alleged in the complaint is appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the
Amended Act, and that such unit will assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the right guaranteed by the Amended Act.
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
Respondent has at no time contested the Union's majority. It concedes that,
even if section hands are excluded from the numerical computation, the Union
would still have a substantial majority. Moreover, according to the undisputed
testimony of Local President Ottie Argo, of 759 employees in the bargaining unit
on October 26, 1947, 451 were members of the Union, whose dues had been
checked off.3p
It is, therefore, found that, since October 23, 1945, and at all times material
herein, the Union has been, and is now, the duly designated representative of
the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, by virtue of Section 9 (a)
of the Act, as amended, has been, at all times material herein, and is now, the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the said appropriate unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment.
3. The alleged refusal to bargain concerning a new contract; later events; the
causes of the strike 31
On January 17, 1948, Respondent served notice on the Union of intention to
terminate the existing contract on March 18, 1948, and proposed a meeting after
February 9, suggesting that the Union submit its proposals for a new contract
in the meantime. Next day, the Union served Respondent with a similar notice,
and suggested a conference for the week beginning February 2.
The parties finally met on February 18, State Director Douty, Shop Committee
Chairman Shiflett, and members of his committee, appearing for the Union ;
President Paul A. Redmond, Jr., Personnel Director Bachman, Attorney
Constangy and his associate, and other plant officials, for Respondent. Douty
presented the Union's written proposals, enumerating by reference to various
sections of the existing contract, the changes sought. These dealt with the
scope of the unit, to be expanded to include truck drivers and helpers, method
of revocation of check-off, super-seniority for shop stewards and members of
the General Shop Committee, leaves of absence for union business, vacation
80 Figurer for later periods include:
Week ending 1948:
Number of employees
in unit
Number of employees
whose dues were
checked off
January 11 ----------------------------- 881 481
February 8------------------------------ 893 497
March 7-------------------------------- 875 500
June 6--------------------------------- 894 *116
*Number of employees formerly covered by check -off, the contract having
expired on March 18, 1948.
81 The findings in this section are based upon the credible and undisputed testimony of
Pedigo and Douty , and the documents received in evidence . None of Respondent ' s officials
or representatives testified concerning these conferences , and Respondent ' s counsel con-
ceded , in oral argument , that their testimony reflected the negotiations with substantial
accuracy.
ANCIIOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1143
benefits, holiday pay, revision of wage rates and wage differentials, work loads,
time limitations on presentation of grievances, change in method of naming
arbitrators, limited liability for violation of the no-strike provision, and finally,
payment by Respondent of the entire premium under the existing insurance
program.
In the discussion of the Union's proposals, Respondent objected at once to
the proposed limitation of liability for breach of the no-strike provision, ad-
vancing as a ground the Union's pending action against Respondent for breach
of the existing contract. Respondent's representatives agreed to submit writtenz
counterproposals relating to seniority, leaves of absence, vacations, wage scale.
for beginners, grievance and arbitration procedure, including arbitration of
wages, management prerogatives, and check-off.
On February 24, Constangy mailed Douty copies of a proposed new contract
as a "guide and basis" for a meeting at Rome the following Tuesday, March 2,
suggesting informal discussion with Douty at Atlanta in the interim. It does
not appear whether the men met in advance as suggested, but on March 2, the
parties met again at Rome. Substantially the same representatives appeared.
The parties discussed Respondent's draft, as well as the Union's proposals,
analyzing the various provisions and comparing them with the provisions of the
1947 contract. Tentative agreement was reached on relatively minor issues, but
when the conference adjourned most of the substantive provisions remained
unresolved.
The parties met again, on March 10, with substantially the same representa-
tives, excepting Douty. Respondent's proposed new contract was reviewed
and discussed section by section. Agreement was reached on inclusion in the
bargaining unit of truck drivers, excluded under the existing contract, and
the exclusion of working supervisors in the respooling department, formerly
included. On the subject of check-off, super-seniority for shop stewards and
shop committeemen, leaves of absence on union business, omitted from Respond-
ent's draft, as well as a time limitation on leaves for other purposes, included
in the draft, discussion was postponed at Constangy's suggestion. Further
tentative agreement was reached on minor issues; but the parties were still in
disagreement on the substantive provisions of a contract. The parties later
exchanged revised drafts of the sections which each had agreed to prepare. In
addition, Constangy prepared a memorandum recapitulating issues in dispute,
and this, together with the revised drafts of various sections of the contract, was
used as a basis for discussion at the next meeting on March 16.
At this meeting, at which principal representatives of the parties, including
Douty, were present, it became apparent that the provisions dealing with super-
seniority for the shop stewards and General Shop Committee, check-off, and
limitation of union liability for unauthorized strikes were the crucial issues.
The union representatives, therefore, proceeded at once to discussion of these
issues, which consumed substantially the entire meeting. On each, Respondent
was adamant, refusing to make any concession. Before the meeting adjourned,
however, Respondent's representatives requested a recess to reexamine their
position on these issues. Returning shortly, they announced that under no
circumstances would Respondent agree to revocable check-off, leave of absence
for union business, limitation of union liability for breach of no-strike provision,
or super-seniority for the shop stewards and General Shop Committee. The
Union offered to modify its demand for limitation of union liability to provide
that in the event of an unauthorized strike, the Union would endeavor to secure
1144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
termination of the strike, but that, if unsuccessful, no liability should attach to
the Union, the local, or its members. This, as well as variations of such a
provision, was rejected.
When the meeting ended, the union representatives concluded that there was
no prospect of reaching agreement, and, pursuant to authorization voted earlier
by the union membership, agreed on strike action. Douty granted his con-
currence before leaving for Atlanta that day.
Next day, March 17, Respondent distributed to its employees, over the name of
General Manager Rice, printed copies of a letter reviewing the negotiations and
summarizing the issues in dispute.32 The General Counsel contends that the
letter, in the context and circumstances developed in the record, constitutes
interference, restraint, and coercion. The undersigned cannot agree. Analysis
of the letter discloses a substantially accurate summary of negotiations and the
disputed issues. At most, it contains mere expressions of views, arguments, and
opinion, devoid of any promise of benefit or threat of reprisal, not reasonably
calculated to induce employees to renounce the Union. It is, therefore, clearly
privileged as free speech, and protected by the express provision of Section 8 (c)
of the Act, as amended.33
Later that day, Douty telephoned Pedigo that the International had given its
approval for the strike. He informed him, however, that a meeting with the
Conciliation Service was scheduled in Atlanta next day. It was arranged that
Pedigo would remain at the union office until 2: 30, and that unless notified that
agreement appeared likely, Pedigo was to distribute leaflets calling for a strike
at 4 p. in. When no word was forthcoming at the appointed hour, Pedigo began
distribution of the strike leaflets at the plant shortly after 2: 30, in time for
the change of shifts. Several of the second shift committeemen, who had not
gone to the meeting with the Conciliator in Atlanta, went to work as usual.
During the change of shifts, General Manager Rice addressed employees out-
side the office over a public address system previously installed. According to
Pedigo, who was in the general vicinity, the speech followed substantially the
text of the letter distributed the day before. Pedigo testified, however, that
Rice, in the course of his speech, threatened that Respondent would sell the mill.
According to Rice, however, after referring to the strike leaflets, he advised the
employees of the negotiations then in progress at Atlanta, and stated that if the
employees were determined to strike, that was their "God given right," but urged
them to respect the wishes of those desiring to work. He then appealed to them
on the basis that Respondent was attempting to operate and rebuild a mill which
former owners had planned to liquidate. Apparently Pedigo misconstrued these
remarks as an implied threat to sell the plant. On the basis of Rice's testimony,
the contents of the letter distributed a day earlier, and the circumstances regard-
ing the change of ownership of the mill, the undersigned finds that Rice did not
expressly or impliedly threaten.to sell the mill. When he had concluded his
remarks, a union shop committeeman requested that Pedigo be afforded an oppor-
tunity to reply. The request was ignored, and the public address system dis-
connected. Since Respondent was under no duty to provide the Union with a
forum to debate the issues, there was nothing unlawful in Respondent's refusal
to permit Pedigo to reply.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, the undersigned
concludes and finds that Rice's speech did not exceed the permissible bounds of
az The'text of the letter is. annexed hereto as Appendix B.
33 See also Matter of Penokee Veneer Company, supra; Matter of United Welding Com-
pany, supra.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1145
free speech, and that Respondent did not thereby interfere with, restrain, and
coerce its employees.
At the meeting with the Conciliator in'Atlanta, Attorney Constangy, President
Redmond, Personnel Director Bachman, and other plant officials represented
Respondent. Douty and first shift committee members appeared for the Union.
The situation was reviewed, but there was no substantial change in the position
of the parties, and the conference adjourned without success. The strike began
at 4 p. in. on March 18, 1945, and was still in progress at the time of the hearing.
Late in March, toward the end of the second week of the strike, Acting
Governor Al. R. Thompson invited the parties to a conference in Rome. Attorney
Dean Owens, President Redmond, and Personnel Director Bachman appeared
for Respondent; Pedigo, International Representative Garland Brooks, and
L. T. Vassar, member of the General Shop Committee, for the Union. The
Governor endeavored to settle the strike, appealing to the parties to maintain
peace and order, and to avoid violence. Pedigo, however, accused Respondent
of being responsible for such violence as had occurred, and related the incident
in which plant officials had "led [a] mob of people to attack pickets upon the
railroad siding." " So far as the record discloses, Respondent's representatives
(lid not undertake to answer the charge, or justify its conduct" In response
to the Governor's proposal, the Union offered to abandon the strike and submit
all issues to an arbitrator or panel of the Governor's selection. Respondent
declined, Owens stating that he could not take a position without consultation
with Constangy, and the meeting ended.
On April 1S, about a month later, another meeting was held with the Con-
ciliation Service in Atlanta. Constangy, Superintendent Holcomb, and minor
plant officials, appeared for Respondent; Douty, Pedigo, and members of the
shop committee, for the Union. A proposal by the Conciliator for settlement of
the strike, which the Union indicated might be acceptable was rejected by
Respondent. A further meeting with the Conciliation Service, held on May 17,
met with no greater success.
The General Counsel contends that the strike was caused by Respondent's
unfair labor practices in (1) refusing to bargain regarding a new contract,
(2) discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment of Ottie Argo,
already considered, and (3) interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees, by General Manager Rice's letter of March 17, and his speech to em-
ployees next day. It has already been found that Respondent has not engaged
in any unfair labor practices with respect to the two latter issues.
With regard to the alleged refusal to bargain, the evidence discloses that the
parties met, exchanged proposals and counterproposals, reached tentative agree-
ment on some issues, and, after a review and recapitulation of their respective
positions, reached a deadlock on the issues of check-off, limitation of union
liability for breach of contract, and super-seniority for shop stewards. Conflict
on these issues had been evident from the very outset, when the Union submitted
its proposals. Yet, the parties met at three later conferences and reached tenta-
tive agreement on some issues. At the last meeting, before finally rejecting
the Union's demands, Respondent's representatives reexamined their position
on these crucial issues.
34 Discussed hereinafter.
95 The findings are based on the credible and undisputed testimony of Pedigo . None of
Respondent ' s representatives testified regarding this conference . During the conference,
a message was received that windows had been "shot out" at the mill. It later appeared,
according to Pedigo 's undisputed testimony , that whatever damage had been done, was
caused from inside the mill.
1146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Apart from the question of whether check-,off of union dues is an appropriate
subject for collective bargaining, an issue which Respondent contends has been
resolved against the Union's position,38 Respondent, during negotiations, indi-
cated that it refused to grant the check-off, in part, because the Union had
accused Respondent's supervisors of attempts to induce employees to withdraw
from the Union. Consequently, Respondent contended that it rejected this
demand in order to avoid any imputation of knowledge of the identity of union
members, reaching it through the medium of the check-off.
Whatever its reasons for refusing the Union's demands on these issues, it is
clear that the obligations to bargain "does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a_ concession." n The record establishes
that the impasse was reached because of the Union's insistence upon, and Re-
spondent's refusal to grant, certain contract terms. This conclusion is supported
by statements regarding the Union's position, appearing in local newspaper
advertisements, as well as in at least one radio address by International Repre-
sentative Pedigo, on March 21, 3 days after the strike.
It is, therefore, found, on the basis of the foregoing and the entire record,
that Respondent had not refused to bargain in good faith with the Union, as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, regarding
a new contract. It is further. found that the strike was not caused by Respond-
ent's unfair labor practices, but by a bona fide impasse in bargaining negotiations.
In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned has considered the evidence offered
by the General Counsel, and relied on as a contributory cause of the strike,38
of an incident in March 1946 or 1947, when Second Hand John Henry Brock, in a
tavern discussion with L. T. Vassar, shop committee member, stated that the
Union contained "a lot of Communists" from New York. This isolated, un-
coercive, expression of opinion by a minor supervisor, at least a year before the
strike, was hardly relied on by the Union as a cause of the strike. The under-
signed has also considered Respondent's technical refusal to bargain and
unilateral action on the subject of insurance, not specfically urged as a cause
of the strike, but has similarly concluded that the evidence fails to establish
that the Union relied upon this conduct as a cause of the strike. Nor, since
it is not apparent that the Union or its members were aware, at the time the
strike was called, of Respondent's conduct in procuring gun permits, discussed
hereinafter, that this was a factor in the Union's decision.
D. Interference, restraint, and coercion; events preceding and during the strike
1. The applications for pistol permits
On March 12, 1948, while contract negotiations were still under way, and nearly
a week before the strike began, General Manager Rice procured from City Ordi-
nary Carl Griffin licenses for two small firearms 39 Asked at the hearing the
38N. L. R. B. v. Hughes Tool Company , 147 P. ( 2d) 69 (C. A. 5).
37 See Section 8 ( d) of the Act, as amended . See, also , e. g., Matter of Union Manufac-
turing Co ., 76 N. L. R . B. 322 , where an employer ' s conduct in rejecting , without making
any counterproposal , the Union 's offer to withdraw its demand for union security or top
seniority for stewards if the employer would agree to a check -off of dues, was held not to
constitute a refusal to bargain.
38 "The real cause of a strike are to be found 'in the whole sequence of events' preceding
it, and this motivation is to be determined 'in the light of the cumulative effect of [the
employer ' s] prior tainted labor practices .' " Matter of Gordon P. Brown, d/b/a Brown
Radio Service and Laboratory, 70 N. L. R. B. 476, 477, and cases cited.
39 The City Ordinary is a constitutional officer under the laws of the State of Georgia,
combining judicial and ministerial duties comparable to those of Probate or Surrogate
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1147
reason for applying for the permits at the time, Rice replied "because it is my
privilege." Later, however, lie testified that because lie commuted frequently
between his home in Opelika, Alabama,40 and his place of employment in Rome,
Georgia, lie decided to obtain a permit to carry these weapons, which he had
owned for many years. Although he further testified that be had been threat-
ened by employees at the plant, his testimony reveals that the so-called threats,
consisting of the usual strike epithets, occurred after the licenses had been
procured.
Next day, on March 13, a similar license was issued to Plant Engineer J. P.
Brown 41 and Overseer Scott. Altogether, between March 12 and April 6,42 some
41 licenses were procured by management officials, supervisory, and nonstriking
employees, including, in addition to Rice and Scott, President Redmond, Per-
sonnel Director Bachman, and Overseer W. H. Clarke. Sureties on bonds
required for these licenses were furnished by various management officials,
including Bachman and Plant Superintendent T. H. Holcomb." On May 14,
Respondent paid the sum of $82 as fees for these permits. According to Griffin,
the number of licenses issued at Respondent's behest during this period was
20 times that of any comparable period since April 1943. No licenses were
applied for by, or issued to striking employees during the corresponding period,
with the possible exception of one employee, who, according to Griffin, had
surrendered his license before the strike.
Even if Rice's testimony is credited, no explanation was offered for the applica-
tion by Overseer Scott and Plant Engineer Brown. It was not until March 16,
3 days after these licenses had been issued, that it became evident that negotia-
tions had collapsed, and that a strike was imminent. The strike itself did
not begin until 4 p. in. on March 18, 1948. No organized picketing occurred
the first few days, although throngs estimated at upwards of 500 congregated
and milled about the plant entrance. That persons in this crowd engaged in
invective toward those entering the plant, is not seriously disputed. Despite
relatively minor disturbances, there was no showing, however, that persons
desiring to go to work were prevented from doing so'" Although Respondent,
Judge. In addition , he is authorized to issue licenses for small arms , described in the
record as "pistol-toting" licenses . No licenses are required for the possession of arms,
such as rifles and shotguns , which cannot be carried on the person.
4° Rice had formerly managed the Alabama Mill, which , on September 15, 1947 , acquired
the stock ownership of Respondent.
41 Described in the record as Parker Brown.
42 All but . four of these licenses, however, were issued after March 18 , when the strike
began.
4a According to Ordinary Griffin , when Personnel Director Bachman and other plant
officials informed him that they intended to request licenses for a number of their employees,
Griffin , to facilitate his investigation of the applications , requested that Respondent
furnish him with written approval for the issuance of the licenses . In 75 or 80 percent
of the cases , Respondent did so ; in the others, approval was given "in person" or by
telephone . Griffin also testified that, although there had been no discussion between him
and the Respondent ' s officials about a strike , the status of the labor dispute at the plant
was a matter of common knowledge in the community.
44 Apart from evidence of picket -line invective , and the massing of crowds in front of the
plant, during the first few days of the strike , the record reveals only one incident of actual
assault , which occurred on April 9, 1948, as a group of female employees was leaving the
plant after the first shift . On this occasion , the women in the group were jostled, and
one of them had her face slapped, and her glasses broken by a woman in the crowd. In any
event , this conduct could hardly have been relied on by Respondent as justification for the
application for gun permits . Although the petitions for injunctions in the State court
contained allegations of threats , violence , and mass picketing by the Union , its agents, and
members , apart from the incidents just mentioned, and the railroad siding episode, to be
1148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in its answer , alleged that striking employees engaged in acts of violence and
other coercive conduct during the strike, there is no substantial evidence of
such misconduct in this record. At any rate, the evidence fails to establish
any circumstances justifying the application by Respondent for gun permits.
There ivas no showing that the local police and the courts were unable to cope
with such conditions as prevailed. Nor was there any showing that Respondent
had reasonable cause to anticipate that the Union or its adherents would resort
to violence during the course of the strike. Nor, that they later (lid engage in
conduct which would have warranted Respondent in procuring additional pistol
permits for nonstriking employees . As early as March 20, 2 days after the
strike began, Respondent had secure:] an interlocutory injunction, restraining
mass picketing, and, on March 31, obtained further injunctive relief against
picketing at Respondent's railroad siding , to be discussed presently. Although
4 striking , and 4 nonstriking employees were later found in contempt, and given
suspended sentences, the record indicates that the injunctions have since been
generally observed. Nevertheless, all but 4 of the pistol licenses were procured
between March 20 and April 6. This suggests that Respondent's purpose in
procuring the licenses for its nonstriking employees was, not to provide them
with protection against strikers, but to furnish them with the means of intimi-
dating and coercing the strikers in the exercise of their right to engage in
concerted activities.
The record, however, does not sufficiently establish that the Union or the
striking employees were aware, at the time of the actual issuance of the licenses,
of Respondent's part in these activities. No finding of interference, restraint,
or coercion is, therefore, based on these facts. The activities are, however, con-
sidered in evaluating Respondent's conduct with regard to later events.
2. The railroad siding episode
The railroad siding or right of way of the Central of Georgia Railroad Com-
pany, which serves Respondent's plant, and consists of three sets of tracks and
a spur track for switching engines, runs between the mill and one of its ware-
houses. The tracks intersect East 12th Street, a public highway, running east
and west, on which the main office 'and plant gates are located, at about right
angles. Freight cars, loaded with cotton and machinery destined for the mill,
use these tracks to reach the warehouse platform.
According to the undisputed testimony of Freight Conductor H. C. Jones, he
made no attempt to "place cars" at the mill between March 1.8 and March 22,
because of the presence of pickets on the tracks. There was no showing, however,
that, during this period, he or anyone on behalf of the Railroad or Respondent
had requested the pickets to move. Nor that those representatives had concluded
that such request would have been futile.
On Tuesday morning, March 23, the railroad superintendent met Jones in East
Rome, below the mill, and directed him to place some freight cars at the mill.
When Jones informed him of the hazard from the presence of pickets at the
tracks, the superintendent told him that they would be removed by the time he
arrived, and instructed him to carry out his duties, cautioning him to avoid any
controversy with the pickets. Jones then "backed [the engine and freight cars]
into the side track" and proceeded toward the warehouse. Observing pickets on
the track, he left the engine in charge of the two switchmen, with instructions
discussed presently , no substantial evidence was introduced in this record which would
reasonably have justified Respondent in procuring pistol permits for nonstriking employees.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1149
to back into the warehouse as soon as the track was clear, and proceeded to the
East 12th Street crossing in search of his foreman.
There were some 4 or 5 pickets along the railroad siding on the morning in
question. John T. Parris, a shop steward and striking employee, had been on
picket duty at the railroad crossing at East 12th Street some 100 yards from
the switch, and about 5 or 6 feet from the tracks. Nettie Edwards, Mildred Nails,
and Inez McCord, female strikers, had been picketing at or about the same place
since about 10: 30 that morning.
Shortly before noon, as the switch engine reached the switch point, about
75 or 100 employees, led by Personnel Director Bachman, Plant Engineer Parker
Brown, Plant Superintendent T. H. Holcomb, his assistant, Jack Barrett, and
Overseer Walter Clarke, emerged from the mill through the office entrance, armed
with sticks, hammers, wrenches, hatchets, blackjacks, and a variety of other
weapons. Hubert D. Murphy, a striking employee, who, with Ottie Argo, had
been sitting across from the main gate on East 12th Street, followed this group.
Led by the plant officials, the group proceeded to the railroad crossing, and
when it reached the warehouse, Bachman and Holcomb mounted the warehouse
platform, deploying the employees along the railroad siding. Holcomb ordered
the men to "spread out over the track." A number of them surrounded Parris at
his post near the crossing. One, identified by Parris as Miller, "boss of the
carpenter bunch," was armed with a hatchet, while another, unidentified, bran-
dished a hammer. Miller warned that if Parris moved he would "knock him in
the head," and "kill" him. The 3 female employees, Edwards, McCord, and Nails,
took up picket signs, and started up the tracks toward the switch point, Nails
apparently lagging behind. They were followed by Plant Engineer Brown and
Overseer Clarke, accompanied by a group of 20 or 25 men.
Brown motioned for the engine to proceed, and, when the freight conductor
hesitated, Jesse Fountain, a nonstriking employee inquired what was to be done.
Brown ordered, "get them off, knock them off the track," and directed Fountain
to remove the "picket signs" so that the cars could proceed. Carl Knowles, a
plant guard," seized McCord's arms, and called on 3 women in the group to "take
over" and "hold the picket sign down until the engine passed." The women
ordered McCord to "turn [the picket sign] loose," and when she refused, threat-
ened to push her down a steep embankment at the edge of the siding. Simul-
taneously, "Bear" Bates, one of the group, assaulted James Gallahan, a striker
who had arrived on the scene, sending him clown the embankment.
Meanwhile, Frank Haney, another of the group of nonstrikers, approached
Nettie Edwards, who was holding a picket sign, and ordered her off the "railroad
track." When she failed to obey, Haney pushed her toward the embankment.
As he released her momentarily, she stepped to the side of the switch track, but
he seized her arms and knocked her to the ground. Margaret Mills and Dollie
Young, two of the Women who had engaged McCord, then assaulted Edwards,
Mills striking her in the face, Young pulling her hair and kicking her in the
back. Haney, meanwhile, struck Edwards in the eye with his fist.
Edwards started for the railroad crossing, but encountered her brother, J. C.
Maxwell, who had learned of the assault upon his sister, and was hurrying toward
her. The two started back toward the switch, but were met by Carl Knowles,
who challenged, "What in the goddam hell are you going to do about it?" Max-
well countered, "I will do aplenty." Knowles warned, "I will knock your head
15 Knowles, with a local reputation as a professional prize fighter, had been hired about
2 weeks before the strike.
1150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
off with this hammer." Edwards and her brother left. She was later treated
at the hospital.
Daring the melee, Clarence Hart, a striker who had been in the vicinity of
the railroad crossing, though not on picket duty, had joined the group just as
Haney assaulted Edwards in the eye. Fountain struck Hart on the back of
the head with a blackjack.
When Murphy, who had left the plant gate with Argo, reached the switch
point, the engine with two cars of cotton, was at a standstill, and Plant Engineer
Brown and Fountain were motioning the train on, Brown shouting, "Get them
off the damn railroad." Fountain shoved Murphy across the tracks, shouting,
"I will just kill you," and started to push Murphy down the embankment. Elmer
Adams, a second hand in the card room, seized Murphy by the wrists, possibly
to prevent him from going over. Murphy reproached him, "I wouldn't thought you
would have done that." With that, as Adams continued to restrain him, Haney
approached and struck Murphy in the jaw. Fountain and Knowles then boarded
the engine as it proceeded to the warehouse. Fountain, a pistol in his hand,
motioned the group of nonstrikers to return to the mill. The engine continued to
the warehouse without further incident, and the group, joined by Personnel
Director Bachman, returned to the mill as
Although Edwards and McCord, the female pickets, denied that they had been
on the tracks on which the engine had been approaching, their testimony as a
whole does not support this denial. Moreover, it is apparent, from the credible
testimony of Freight Conductor Jones, that they were in fact in the path of the
engine at some time while he was attempting to back into the warehouse. Accord-
ing to Jones, notwithstanding that he was himself a member of the Brotherhood
of Railroad Conductors, he had been advised by the chairman of his local that
their organization did not "take sides" in labor disputes in which they were not
directly involved, and, inferentially, that he was not obliged to respect the picket
line. Hence, he testified, he was not deterred by that consideration from driving
the engine to the warehouse, but solely by a desire to avoid injury to persons
in the path of the engine.
It is contended by the General Counsel that, by the assaults upon the pickets,
and the other conduct in which Respondent's agents engaged, Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in their right to engage in
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection. Respondent, however,
asserts that the pickets or strikers who were on the tracks were trespassers, who,
in preventing the engine from putting in at the warehouse, were in violation of
State statute," and, in effect, engaged in concerted activities not protected by
the Act.
40 The findings regarding this episode are based upon a synthesis of the testimony of
Parris, Edwards, McCord, Hart, Maxwell, and Murphy, who testified as witnesses for
the General Counsel , and Freight Conductor Jones, called as a witness by Respondent.
None of Respondent 's plant officials or nonstriking employees who engaged in the encounter
was called to testify on behalf of Respondent.
av Excerpts from the statutes, of which , upon Respondent ' s motion, the undersigned has
taken judicial notice, are:
Georgia Laws 1947-Interference with employment or work-Bass picketing-Unlawful
Acts . No. 141 ( House Bill No. 73)
An Act to prohibit the use of force , intimidation, violence , or threats thereof, to
restrict or otherwise interfere with the right of any person to work or refrain from
working , or to peaceably conduct his business, or to require the membership or non-
membership of any person in a labor organization ; to make unlawful certain acts of
picketing , and certain assemblies in connection with labor disputes ; to provide
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC . 1151
Assuming, in favor of Respondent, that the quoted sections of the statute are
pertinent and not in conflict with the amended Act, it does not follow that that
respondent was empowered to engage in the extreme degree of self-help to which
it resorted -here. It will be observed, in the first place, that the only sanctions
imposed for violation of these provisions of the State statutes is to render the
persons committing the proscribed acts guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in these
provisions affords persons claiming the protection of these statutes the remedy
of self-help.
Assuming, however, that an owner or person lawfully entitled to the possession
of land,48 may, after demand for the surrender of the land, employ reasonable
force to evict a trespasser, the record establishes that Respondent, by its manage-
ment officials and agents, went far beyond any permissive use of force. Thus, it is
apparent that when the engine first appeared on the scene, there were at most
8 or 10 strikers, 3 of whom were women, in the entire area between the railroad
crossing and the switch point, at least 100 yards away. No demand had been made
either by the engine crew or Respondent's officials on the union representatives,
or the pickets themselves, to move from the tracks, nor was there any showing
that such demand would have been futile. Nor, so far as this record discloses,
was any attempt made by Respondent to enlist the aid of the local police authori-
ties to enforce the provisions of the statutes upon which Respondent now seeks to
rely. No application had been made for a complaint or warrant for the arrest
of the persons whom Respondent now alleges were violating those statutes, nor for
injunctive relief, to implement that which Respondent had procured in the
State court 3 days earlier.49 Admittedly, freight cars had not been "placed" at the
penalties for violations ; to repeal all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith and
for other purposes.
s a a a a a a
Section 5. It shall be unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with
one or more other persons, by the use of force, intimidation, violence, or threats
thereof, to prevent or attempt to prevent any employer from lawfully engaging or
continuing to engage in any proper and lawful business activity, or from the proper,
lawful or peaceable use or enjoyment of his property used or useful in the conduct
of such business, or from acquiring materials or supplies for the purposes of such
business, or from disposing of the goods, wares or products of such business, or to
prevent or attempt to prevent any carrier or other person from supplying or delivering
materials or supplies to any such employer, or from receiving or accepting delivery
on the premises of such business of the goods, wares or products of such business.
Section 6. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided in
Section 27-2506 of the Code of Georgia, 1933.
a a • a a a a
Approved March 27, 1947
x a + a a a a
Section 105-1410. (4478) of the Code of Georgia, 1933 RIGHT OF WAY OR OF
COMMON, INTERFERENCE WITH.-The unlawful interference with a right of way
or of common is a trespass to the party entitled thereto.
a a o a a e a
Section 26-3002. (217 P. C.) of Code of Georgia WILFUL TRESPASS UPON THE
LANDS OF ANOTHER.--Any person who shall wilfully enter, go upon, or pass over
any field, orchard, garden, or other inclosed or cultivated land of another, after being
personally forbidden so to do by the owner or person entitled to the possession for the
time being, or authorized agent thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The record does not establish whether Respondent or the Central of Georgia Railroad
owned the fee in the railroad siding. The undersigned regards it unnecessary to determine
this issue in view of the language of the statutes.
49 The original injunction did not deal with picketing at the railroad siding, although
Respondent contends that picketing had been conducted there for several days before this
episode.
1152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
warehouse since the beginning of the strike on March 18, presumably because
of the presence of pickets, yet no effort was made in the intervening period to
resort to the lawful and orderly remedies provided by law. In view of this
delay, Respondent can hardly contend that irreparable damage would have
resulted from such temporary delay as might be involved in pursuing these
remedies. Not until March 31, more than a week after the episode occurred, did
Respondent apply for injunctive relief against picketing at the railroad siding.
Instead,'without any previous demand for the removal of the pickets, Respond-
ent's officials armed some 7i or 100 employees with a variety of weapons, and
led them in an undertaking to "clear the tracks" of not more than 4 pickets in
the vicinity of the switch.60 There was no showing that before the group of
employees left the mill, Respondent had any reason to apprehend that they would
be met by a refusal to clear the tracks, or by violence or effective resistance
from the handful of pickets. The appearance on the scene of such an over-
whelming, armed force could hardly have been expected to induce the pickets
to abandon their picketing voluntarily. The shocking assaults upon 2 female
pickets, and upon several other male strikers who arrived on the scene, can
scarcely have been required to remove them from the tracks.
It cannot be disputed that Respondent is liable for the acts of the persons
who committed the assaults. Not only was no attempt made by responsible
officials to prevent or restrain the assaults, but at least one official, Plant Engineer
Brown, actually encouraged, if he did not incite, the assaults. Personnel
Director Bachman and Plant Superintendent Holcomb, who had been in the
vanguard of the group, but had remained on the warehouse platform some 100
yards away, a strategic point from which to observe, if not direct, the action,
made no effort to restrain the employees from the use of violence. Furthermore,
in furnishing the group with weapons, when Respondent had no reason to
anticipate any resistance, Respondent, in effect, incited and encouraged the use
of the violence, which, in fact, later occurred.
These considerations suggest that Respondent had engaged in a "punitive
expedition," utilizing the excuse of removing the pickets as a means of reprisal,
not alone for their unprotected activities, but for their protected activities as
well. Even assuming that the pickets were engaged in unprotected concerted
activity when Respondent undertook to remove them from the tracks, it does
not follow that they thereby forfeited every protection under the Act. They
might have been subject to discharge, discipline, or denial of reinstatement
after the strike, at the option of the employer. The Union, or its agents, might
have been subjected to unfair labor practice charges, and possible injunctive
relief, in the discretion of the General Counsel. But they could not be subjected
to aggravated violence and beatings at the hands of the employer under the
guise of an attempt to recover possession of property to which it claimed to be
entitled. By so doing, Respondent demonstrated to all employees, those engaged
in allegedly unprotected concerted activity, as well as strikers engaging in
protected activity, in the immediate vicinity, that Respondent was determined
to prevent employees from exercising their right to engage even in legitimate
concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection, by resort to intimidation,
coercion, and violence. When the facts and circumstances are appraised in the
light of Respondent's earlier action in procuring pistol permits for its plant
60 Although exact details are obscure in the record, the evidence most favorable to Re-
spondent discloses that there were no more than two pickets on each side of the switch,
when the group emerged from the plant.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1153
officials and a number of its nonstriking employees, when it had had no reason-
able ground for apprehending any resistance from the strikers, the conclusions
become quite obvious.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, the undersigned concludes and finds that, by
the threats of assault, assaults, and other acts of violence by its agents upon
pickets and strikers at the railroad siding, on March 23, 1948, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in the amended Act, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the.
Act, as amended.
It is alleged that, by the foregoing conduct, Respondent prolonged the striker
and that, even assuming that the strike was of economic origin, which the General
Counsel denies, the unfair labor practices in which Respondent engaged on
March 23, converted the strike to an unfair labor practice strike. This contention
is apparently based on the premise that any unfair labor practice committed by
an employer during an economic strike, automatically converts the strike to an
unfair labor practice strike. There must, however, be some causal relationship
between the unfair labor practices committed during the strike and the prolonga-
tion of the strike. It may be true that unfair labor practices of the type com-
mitted here, manifesting a determination to intimidate and coerce employees to
abandon their concerted activities, rather than to settle the labor controversy by
peaceful methods, would undoubtedly reinforce employees in their determination
to remain on strike until their demands were met. To this extent, it may be
said that Respondent's activities prolonged the strike. But such prolongation
is at most indirect. In view of the basic dispute which caused the strike, namely,
the failure of the Union to obtain contract terms on which it had insisted, it is
improbable that the duration of the strike was affected materially by the unfair
labor practices committed on March 23. The undersigned concludes, therefore,
that the unfair labor practices were not sufficiently related to the duration of the
strike to warrant a finding that the strike was prolonged by those practices, so
-as to convert it to an unfair labor strike on and after March 23.
3. Alleged discrimination in regard to hire and tenure of employment ;
the tactical discharges
The amended complaint alleges that Respondent discriminated with regard
to the hire and tenure of employment of James P. Allen, John W. Studdard, and
H. E. Cook, by threatening to discharge them because of their union affiliation
and concerted activities, thereby discouraging membership in the Union. The
stipulated facts disclose that, on April 9, 1948, while the strike was in progress,
Personnel Director Bachman mailed identical letters to each of the three named,
striking employees, all members of the Union, as follows
As you know we have been very patient that you have not been at work
since March 18, 1948. Because of your absence from work, and in order to
operate satisfactorily, it has become necessary for us to fill your job.
We-do have, however, a few jobs still open in the mill. If you are
interested in further employment at Anchor Rome Mills, Incorporated, you
may obtain such on or before April 14. If you do not desire such employment
before this time, we will have no other choice but to terminate your employ-
ment at that time.
No explanation was offered as to why these three employees were singled out
from the striking employees . They were , so far as the record discloses , ordinary
1154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rank-and-file strikers, and had not distinguished themselves in any way during
the strike. They did not return to work or make application for any jobs which
Respondent had notified them still remained available. Although Pedigo testified,
without ccatradiction, that a striking quill skinner, not one of the three mentioned
above, applied for, and was refused reinstatement, there was no showing whether
his position had been filled prior to his application, or of the circumstances
surrounding his denial of reinstatement. Nor was it shown that the three striking
employees were even aware that the quill skinner had applied for and been denied
reinstatement. There is, therefore, no basis for concluding that these employees
failed to apply for reinstatement because they had reasonably concluded that
application would have been futile.
Respondent's letter, however, although purporting to notify the three striking
employees that they had been replaced, contained a threat to discharge them
unless they applied for reinstatement within a given period. This thinly veiled
attempt to induce these employees to abandon the strike, and to deal, as in-
dividuals, with the employer, in derogation of their duly designated collective
bargaining representative, constituted an attempt to undermine the Union's
authority to act as exclusive representative of the employees. For, where em-
ployees have properly designated a collective bargaining representative, the
employer is under obligation to deal with that representative, and not with
the employees individually. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights under
the amended Act, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (1) thereof."
It has been held, however, that conduct of the kind in which Respondent
,engaged, here, does not constitute discriminatory discharge, but is to be con-
,strued as it mere tactical discharge or maneuver intended to induce employees
to abandon the strike and return to work.52 Nevertheless, the Board has held
that such conduct constitutes interference with the self-organizational rights
of its employees. Thus, as the Board said in the Rockwood Stove case : 53
The issuance of the discharge notices had no actual effect upon the tenure
of the strikers who received them. By such notices, the respondent intended
not to effectuate a termination of the employer-employee relationship, but
rather, the respondent utilized the discharge slips as a tactical step de-
signed to coerce the employees into resuming work. Inasmuch as the
purpose and effect of the respondent's action in threatening discharge and
purporting to discharge the strikers was to restrain them from engaging
in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, the respondent
thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (1)
thereof. We find that the strike was prolonged by this conduct of the re-
spondent and hence from then on became an unfair labor practice strike.
It Is, therefore, found that, by the threatened and purported discharges of
the three striking employees, under the circumstances disclosed in the record,
Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, in violation
of Section 8 (a) (1), thereby prolonging the strike, and converting it, from and
after April 9, 1948, to an unfair labor practice strike.
61 See Matter of Sam'l Bin.gham 's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 1612.
6' Matter of Pullnsan-Standard Car Manufacturing Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 1254 ;. Matter of
Roanoke Public Warehouse, 72 N. L. It. B. 7.281 ; see also, Matter of Majestic Manufactur-
ing Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 950 ; Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N. L. R. B. 1.297 ; Mat-
ter of American Manufacturing Concern, 7 N. L. R. B. 753.
:' Matter of Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N. L. R. B. 1297, 1298.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1155
4. The alleged "gun threat"
On an evening early in April 1948, Shop Committeeman L. T. Vassar, and Union
Representative Frank Barker, also referred to as W. F. Barker, were standing
at the latter's automobile, in the vicinity of Respondent's warehouse. There
had been "a little disturbance" on the warehouse platform earlier, involving
Elzie Shedd and another nonstriking employee, and Plant Engineer Brown had
driven General Manager Rice to the mill to investigate. They drove Shedd away
in the car, and returned soon afterward. As they approached Vassar and
Barker, the car window on the right was down, and Vassar observed that Rice
"had a gun on [them]." Barker told Rice to "put up" his gun, but Rice ignored
him, and the car drove on.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is contended that Rice threatened or menaced
the men with a gun. Rice did not testify regarding this incident, and Brown
was not called as a witness. Thus, it is undisputed that Rice had a gun in his
possession at the time. Since it appears that Rice had undoubtedly carried his
gun in connection with the investigation of the disturbance at the warehouse, his
possession of the gun when he encountered Vassar and Barker soon afterward
was probably unrelated to the strike activities. On the basis of the meagre
facts disclosed, no sufficient showing has been made that Rice actually threatened
or menaced the two men with a gun, for the purpose of intimidating and coercing
them in connection with their concerted activities. It is, therefore, found that
Respondent did not interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees by the
conduct of these plant officials on the occasion in question.
5. The shooting of Hubert Wilkie
On the afternoon of April 16, 1948, shortly after the change of shifts at 3
o'clock, a group of strikers and sympathizers, including Herman Hyde, Hubert
Wilkie, Donald Pepper, and Frank Battles was congregated in a crowd of
several hundred, near Kessler's Grocery Store, at the corner of Cave Spring Street
and East 12th Street, in the Mill Village, about 150 yards from the mill. Details
of the events leading up to the shooting are obscure, and shed little light upon
the real cause of the shooting. The findings are based on the composite, un-
disputed testimony of Herman Hyde and Henry L. Castleberry. Neither Elmer
Adams, the assailant, nor any of the other witnesses to the shooting, testified.
The wife of Elmer Adams, a second hand in the carding department, had ap-
parently tried to make her way through the crowd to the grocery store entrance
on East 12th Street, "cursing" the female strikers. As she entered the store,
women in the crowd invited her to "do her cursing" outside. Mrs. Battles and
Mrs. Hyde, wives of the men mentioned, and Mrs. Dollie Vincent, walked around
the corner to the store entrance on Cave Spring Street. Soon afterwards, Mrs.
Adams left the store by the Cave Spring Street entrance, accompanied by Mr.
Cook, a mill employee, and his two daughters. Mesdames Battles, Hyde, Pepper,
and Vincent followed some distance behind. Hyde and Castleberry, accompanied
by Pepper and Wilkie, some 10 yards behind them. Mrs. Battles and her com-
panions turned back toward the store, joining Mr. and Mrs. Pepper on the way.
At about this time, Second Hand Elmer Adams, leaving the barber shop
adjoining Kessler's, proceeded down Cave Spring Street, overtaking the group.
As he came abreast of Hyde, Wilkie, and Pepper, Adams attempted to elbow or
shoulder Hyde off the sidewalk. Hyde remonstrated, "Fellow, what is the
matter with you?" According to Hyde, Adams thereupon "backed up and put
his hand in his pocket, and I told him to pull his gun, I knowed he had one,
1156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and he just pulled it out and throwed it on Hubert Wilkie, [and] shot him."
Adams then turned the gun on Hyde, and fired twice, but missed. Wilkie was
struck in the chest and abdomen, and, critically wounded, fell to the ground.
Adams fired at Wilkie again, but the gun jammed, and Adams disappeared into
a house in the vicinity. Wilkie was removed to the hospital. Later Adams
returned with a shotgun, and started for his home. He was apprehended by the
police, and bound over for the grand jury.
On the basis of this evidence, it is alleged that Respondent, through its
supervisors, with force and arms assaulted employees, thereby interfering with,
restraining, and coercing them in their self-organizational activities.
It is not disputed that Adams was a second hand, and, concededly, a minor
supervisor. It does not follow, however, that Respondent is liable for all acts
committed by such minor supervisor under all circumstances. Generally, a
principal is liable for the acts of his agent committed within the scope of his
general authority. In addition, a principal may be liable for acts committed
by the agents which have not been specifically authorized, or may, indeed, have
been forbidden, if the principal actually empowered the agent to represent him
in the general area in which the agent acted "
The undersigned is mindful of the evidence concerning Respondent's conduct in
procuring gun permits for its supervisors and nonstriking employees during
the strike, and has considered whether, by such conduct, Respondent encouraged
the indiscriminate and promiscuous use of firearms during the course of the
strike. The evidence, however, is insufficient to establish that Respondent is
liable for the shooting of a striking employee away from the mill or its imme-
diate vicinity, under circumstances which do not even establish that the shoot-
ing was directly related to the labor dispute. Especially inasmuch as the name
of Elmer ,Adams does not appear in the list of persons for whom Respondent
procured pistol licenses."
Although the circumstances leading up to the shooting indicate that Adams'
animosity and hostility were directed, not to any individual, but rather to
the strikers as a group, as witness the fact that, instead of firing at Hyde, the
more immediate object of his wrath, Adams shot Wilkie, Hyde's companion, the
evidence falls short of attributing responsibility therefor to Respondent. The
incident occurred several hundred yards from the plant, after Adams had gone
off duty, and was on his way home, under circumstances which do not justify
the conclusion that it was reasonably related to the strike.
Shocking and deplorable as the shooting was, the record does not afford
an adequate basis for finding that it was attributable to Respondent under
ordinary principles of agency. It will, therefore, be recommended that these
allegations of the complaint be dismissed.
6. The eviction proceedings
Prior to the strike, various, employees of Respondent had resided in company-
owned houses located in the Mill Village. The rental for such quarters was 50
cents per room per week, deducted from the wages of the employees. On April
29, 1948, Personnel Director Bachman served notices for nonpayment of rent
on 59 striking employees, and instituted eviction proceedings under the State
5' Cf.. Matter of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, C. I. O. Local
6, et at ., 79 N. L. R. B. 1487.
55 The name of Leon B. Adams, appearing on the list, and identified elsewhere in the
record as in charge of the warehouse, is not to be confused with Elmer Adams, second hand
in the carding department.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1157
statutes . In due course , counter-affidavits , denying that the employees were in
default in payment of rent, accompanied by requisite surety bonds , were filed
by the Union on behalf of these tenants . These served to stay the eviction
proceedings , and the tenants remained in possession of the premises as of the
date of the hearing.
It is undisputed that none of these tenants had paid rent for the premises
occupied by them since soon after the commencement of the strike , when they
were last paid wages . Although Union Representative Pedigo testified that
some unspecified tenants had , in fact, tendered rent, which was refused, no
specific evidence was offered as to which if any individuals had clone so, and
the record affords no substantial basis for finding that such a•tender had in fact
been made.
It is - alleged that the eviction proceedings were instituted because the
employees had concertedly gone on strike , and that Respondent has thereby
discriminated against them for the purpose of discouraging their concerted
activities . Although it was stipulated that all 59 named employees , members
of the Union , had gone on strike on March 18, this evidence alone is insufficient
to warrant a finding of discrimination.
The General Counsel ' s contention that the rental to employees of company-
owned houses constituted part of the employees ' wages proves too much. For
if this were so, a fact which the record does not support , employees would not
be entitled to wages while they were on strike , withholding their services from
their employer . Hence, even if the rental of their quarters is to be considered
part of their wages, Respondent would not be required to permit striking
employees to occupy company-owned houses without payment of rent.
There is no contention that Respondent did not comply with the statutory
requirements in attempting to obtain possession of the premises occupied by
these tenants . The only evidence offered by the General Counsel was that
striking employees , occupying premises owned by Respondent , and in default in
payment of rent, were served with eviction proceedings . There was no showing
of any prior practice by Respondent regarding occupancy, without payment of
rent , of company -owned houses by employees whose services had been terminated,
or who had been temporarily laid off, or whose employment had been interrupted
for economic or other reasons . It may be that Respondent was in fact resorting
to this device in an attempt to break the strike , but a finding of discrimination
cannot be based on this speculation . Respondent had imposed no requirement
that its striking employees abandon the strike, or renounce the Union, as a
condition of occupying the houses. All that was required of them was that
they pay rent, as they would have been obliged to do had they resided anywhere
else . In fact, the record establishes that the rent of striking employees occupy-
ing premises other than those owned by Respondent , was actually paid by the
Union during the strike.
Upon the basis of the foregoing , the undersigned concludes that Respondent
(lid not , by instituting the eviction proceedings , discriminate against the striking
employees for the purpose of discouraging membership in the Union and did not
thereby interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees within the meaning of
the amended Act.
Concluding findings
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, the undersigned
concludes and finds that by (1) the refusal, on or about November 13, 1947, to
negotiate with the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of
the employees, regarding a group health and accident insurance program. and
867551-50-v-o1. 86-74
1158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the subsequent unilateral announcement to its employees of an improved program,
without prior consultation with, or first offering the same to the Union, thereby
refusing to bargain with the Union, in violation of Section S (a) (5) of the
amended Act; (2) the threats of assault, assaults, and violence, on March 23,
1948, upon striking employees by its responsible supervisors, officials, and agents,
at the railroad siding, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) ; (3) the purported or threatened
attempt to discharge Allen, Studdard, and Cook, on April 9, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1),
prolonging the strike, and converting it, from on.and after that date, to an unfair
labor practice strike; and (4) all the foregoing conduct, Respondent has inter-
feted with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the amended Act, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
thereof.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in Section III, above occurring in con-
nection with the operations of Respondent set forth in Section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEIIY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, the undersigned will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act,
as amended.
It has been found that Respondent has failed and refused to bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, by refusing
to negotiate concerning a group health and accident insurance program, and
thereafter unilaterally announcing and establishing an improved program, with-
out first consulting with, or offering the same to the Union. It will, therefore, be
recommended that Respondent refrain from taking any action with respect to
such plan or program, affecting any of the employees in the unit represented by
the Union, without prior consultation with it, and, upon request, bargain with
the Union with respect to such insurance plan or modification thereof.
It has further been found that Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees by (1) the threats of assaults, and assaults upon pickets,
during the pendency of the strike, by Respondent's supervisory employees and
other persons for whose conduct Respondent is accountable; and (2) by the
threatened or purported discharges of James F. Allen, John W. Studdard, and
H. E. Cook. It will, therefore, be recommended that Respondent cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
It has also been found that, by Respondent's threatened or purported discharge
of the three named employees on April 9, 1948, the strike which began on March
18, 1948, was prolonged, and thereby converted from an economic to an unfair
labor practice strike. It will therefore be recommended, in order to effectuate
the policies of the Act, that Respondent, upon application, offer reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions,40 without prejudice to their
n See Matter of The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto
Rico, Branch, 65 N. L. R. B. 827.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1159
seniority and other rights and privileges, to all those employees who went on
strike on March 18, 1.948, and who have not already been reinstated to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
and other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any persons hired by
Respondent on or after April 9, 1948, and who were not in the employ of Respond-
ent on that date. It is also recommended that Respondent make whole those
employees who went on strike on March 18, 1948, and who have not previously
been reinstated in the manner provided above, for any loss of pay they may suffer
by reason of Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them as provided above,
by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which such employee
normally would have earned as wages, during the period from five (5) days after
the date on which such employee applies for reinstatement, to the date of
Respondent's offer of reinstatement in the manner provided above, less such
employee's net earnings, if any, during said period."
Since it has been found that Respondent has not engaged in the remaining
unfair labor practices alleged in the amended complaint, if will be recommended
that those allegations be dismissed.
Although some of the unfair labor practices in which respondent has engaged,
such as the refusal to bargain on the subject of insurance, and the tactical dis-
charge of certain strikers, apparently stemmed from a misconception of its
obligations and rights under the Act, the record, as a whole, especially the
evidence upon which it has been found that Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees, by threats.of assaults and assaults upon
strikers by its agents, as well as by the attempted discharges of striking employees,
is indicative of a determination to interfere generally with the rights of the
employees to engage in legitimate concerted activity. The undersigned is of the
opinion that danger of the commission of other unfair labor practices is to be
anticipated from Respondent's conduct in the past. It will, therefore, be recom-
mended that Respondent cease and desist from in any manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in their right to self-organization, and to
engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection 68
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record, the
undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act as amended.
2. All employees of Respondent, including warehousemen, and firemen, but
excluding truck drivers, yardmen, watchmen, timekeepers, office and clerical em-
ployees and all guards, professional employees, and supervisors within the mean-
ing of the Act as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act as amended.
3. Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with Congress of Industrial
Organizations, was, on October 23, 1945, and has, at all times material since,
been the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees in the
unit found to have been appropriate by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act as
amended.
4. By failing and refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the
6' See Matter of Crossett Lumber Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 440, 497-8.
" May Department Stores v. N. L. R. B., 326 U. S. 376.
1160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, with respect
to the group health and accident insurance program and, thereafter, unilaterally
announcing and establishing an improved program, without first consulting with,
or offering the same to the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act as.
amended.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act as amended, Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1.) of said Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act as amended.
7. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
amended complaint of (1) refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees except as found above; (2) discriminating with
regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its employees for the purpose of
discouraging membership in a labor organization by (a) refusing to grant Ottie
Argo an indefinite leave of absence, and thereafter discharging him, on Sep-
tember 22, 1947, and failing to reinstate him until March 15, 1948, and (b) insti-
tuting eviction proceedings against certain named striking employees; (3) inter-
fering with, restraining or coercing its employees, in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in the Amended Act, except by the acts and conduct herein found to,
have been committed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the under-
signed will recommend that Respondent, Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., Rome, Georgia,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America,.
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, with respect to its group,
health and accident insurance program ;
(b) Making any unilateral changes affecting the employees in the unit repre-
sented by said Union with respect to its group health and accident program,
without prior consultation with said Union;
(c) Interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees, by instigating,.
encouraging, or permitting any physical assaults or threats of physical assault
by any group of employees against any other group because of their union or other-
concerted activity, in the plant or on plant property, or in any manner, in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization to form labor organizations, to join
or assist Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,.
as guaranteed in Section 7 of the amended Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act as amended:
(a) Notify and instruct its employees that it will not permit physical assaults
or threats of physical assault by any group of employees upon any other group,
for the purpose of discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of said,
labor organization, in the plant or upon plant property at any time, and take.
effective action to enforce such instructions;
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1161
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organization, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, with respect to its
group health and accident insurance program, and, if agreement is reached,
embody the same in any signed agreement which may be consummated;
(c) Upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, to all those employees who went on strike on March 18,
1948, and who have not already been reinstated to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and.
privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any persons hired by Respondent on or after
.April 9, 1948, and who were not in Respondent's employ on that date;
(d) Make whole the employees specified in paragraph 2 (c) above, for any loss
of pay they may suffer by reason of Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate
them in the manner provided in paragraph 2 (c) above, by payment to each of
them of a sum of money equal to that which each normally would have earned
as wages during the period from five (5) clays after the date on which each
applies for reinstatement to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less
.such employee's net earnings, if any, during said period;
(e) Post at its plant at Rome, Georgia, copies of the notice attached hereto
and marked "Appendix C." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced or covered by any other material;
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing within
twenty (20) days from the date of service of this Intermediate Report of the
steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
It is recommended that unless on or before twenty (20) clays from the date
of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, Respondent notifies said Regional
Director in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations,
the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring Respondent to
take the aforesaid action.
It is further recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed insofar
as it alleges that Respondent:
1. Refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union by its refusal
to discuss and process grievances as required in the existing contract;
2. Refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union regarding
changes in wages, hours, and working conditions regarding which it had taken
unilateral action;
3. Refused to bargain collectively in good faith and respect to a new col-
lective bargaining agreement to replace the expiring agreement, except as found
above;
4. Discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Ottie
Argo, James P. Allen, John W. Studdard, and H . E. Cook ;
5. Instituted eviction proceedings against 59 named striking employees ;
6. Interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees by any acts or conduct
other than those found herein to have been committed.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board-Series 5, as amended August IS, 1948, any party may,
1162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring
the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations,
file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original
and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order or to any other part of the record
or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies
upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ;
and any party may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of
a brief in support of the Intermediate Report and Recommended Order. Im-
mediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties.
Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the por-
tions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed,
and if mimeographed shall be double spaced. Proof of service on the other
parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required
by Section 203.85 As further provided in said Section 203.46 should any party
desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be
made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service of
the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 25th day of February 1949.
IRVINO ROOOSIN,
Trial Examiner.
APPENDIX A
Ottio Argo Guy Owens David S. Hall
Bill Duck Raymond Davenport Farris Allman
Frank Battles Rufus Griffin Willie Collier
W. H. Dorsett Ray Cooley J. Albert Sewell
Morris Mullis Robert Shiflett Elmer Brooks
L. C. Self James Adams Violet Gillham
Charlie Smith C. L. Givens Homer Rittenhouse
Henry Collum Maggie Matheny Teamus Pilgrim
Guy Pate W. P. Cronan Inez McCord
Garland Jones Grady Shedd Hershell Sutherland
Thomas Pate Grady Castleberry Herman Hyde
Edward S. Wright Edgar O'Shelds Burl W. Hart
Robert Pate Harry Daniel J. D. Vanhorn
William Shiflett Flossie Lanning John Spears
Freeman Owens Hirman Cronan Harrison Sullins
Luther Thompson Lonnie Clemmons Wm. G. Burch
Claude Smith William Thompson Mae Sewell
Polly Howard G. L. Baxter R. D. Adams
Sara Cowart Verdie Clark Harrison Pilgrim
Homer Blaylock John Cornwell
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1163
APPENDIX B
To OUR EMPLOYEES :
As you know , the contract between this Company and the Textile Workers
Union of America , CIO, expires on Thursday , March ISth . Representatives of
the Company and representatives of the Union have had a number of meetings
and very full discussion of the terms of a possible new contract . We have been
unable to agree on certain things and it is very likely that the contract will expire
without a new one having been executed . You, as employees of this Company,
are entitled to know the facts as to what has gone on in our negotiations and
where we are. There are a good many rumors and misstatements floating around
the plant as to what the Company ' s position is, and has been , in these negotiations,
and I am taking Unusual step of writing you a letter as to the Company 's position,
so that there will be no misunderstanding.
We have said to the Union that we are anxious, willing, and intend to continue
in effect the provisions of the contract relating to wages, to hours , to vacations,
and to seniority , and that . we are anxious to improve the contract provisions as
to reporting time and as to being eligible for vacations . We have also tried to
make clear to the Union that since we will, from here out, manufacture drapery
fabrics instead of duck, as we formerly did , it will be necessary for us to change
constructions and products often in order to meet competition and keep this mill
running as fully as possible . We have proposed certain technical changes in the
workload clause to meet that problem . While there is dispute between us about
words and phrases in connection with these things, the difference between us
is not too great.
The real difference between us is about these things. Because we have been
accused of doing certain things in connection with the checkoff and each time
someone withdraws from the Union it is blamed on the Company , we have decided
that we would not agree to a checkoff in this contract . We think the Union
should collect its own dues on its own time and off of our property . We think
anyone who wants to pay dues to the Union has a perfect right to do so and
anyone who doesn ' t want to has an equally good right . The Union has insisted
that we agree in the contact not to sue them for damages if they break the
contract or violate it. The law gives each of us a right to sue in the courts for
breach of contract . Some of you know that there is pending at this time in the
United States Court a suit brought by the Union against this Company because
they said we did not handle certain matters in accordance with the contract. All
of these matters have been handled ; they went to arbitration ; we have lived up
to the arbitrator ' s decision . In spite of that , the suit is still pending . It would
be ridiculous for us to agree that we wouldn 't sue the Union when they are
already suing us. The Union officials don 't seem to understand that you can't
have your cake and eat it too.
We do not believe that Union stewards and officers are entitled to any greater
seniority because they hold office in the Union than they would be if they held
office in a Masonic Lodge , a church, or anything else. We think that if the
Union is interested in having stewards who will always be here, that it would
be to their interest to select as stewards older employees with greater seniority.
We do not think that indefinite leaves for Union business and for business not
concerned with the running of our plant are appropriate , and we will not agree
to them.
We also have a strong feeling that in the handling of grievances an individual
employee should have the right, as the law provides , to take his grievance up
1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with his overseer or foreman either with or without the shop steward of the
Union, as that employee sees fit.
We have also stated to the Union that we propose to continue in effect the
present insurance program on the present basis and, moreover, that we expect
to continue in effect the Christmas bonus, if the earnings of this business in any
way permit and warrant it. These are things which you get in a greater degree
and in a greater amount than almost any other textile workers in Georgia.
As you see, the things in dispute have narrowed down to things for the benefit
of the Union itself, rather than for employees.
There has been a good deal of talk about what will happen if the contract
expires. We will live up to the terms and conditions of the present contract
where they are not in conflict with our proposals to the Union set out in this letter.
There is much talk about the possibility that some employees will stop work
because there is no contract, as of the day this one expires. We hope that that
will not happen, but if it does, we propose to make every effort to continue to
try to agree on a contract of the type we are talking about ; to continue to operate
this plant just as we have done before ; to try to make this a better place to work ;
to try to create the kind of relationship between the Company and its employees
where they can, and will, work together peaceably and to their mutual benefit.
We have no antagonism toward the Union; we certainly have no antagonism
toward our employees; we hope that no incidents will occur which will create
hard feelings and create disturbances.
You are entitled to know what the developments are, and I have tried to give
them to you. If you wish to know anything further about this, I have instructed
all overseers and other supervisory employees to answer your questions as full
as they know how, and if they do not know the answer, to refer you to Inc.
L. H. RICE,
General Manager.
March 1948.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with TEXTILE WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA, affiliated with the CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, as
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed herein with respect to any group health and accident insurance pro-
gram, or modification thereof, and embody the same in a signed agreement,
if any collective bargaining agreement is reached.
WE WILL NOT institute any unilateral changes in any existing group health
and accident insurance program affecting employees in the appropriate
unit, without prior consultation with the Union. The bargaining unit is:
All employees, including warehousemen and. firemen, but excluding true]:
drivers, yardmen, watchmen, timekeepers, office and clerical employees, and
all guards, professional employees, and supervisors within the meaning of
the Act as amended.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS UNION or AMERICA. affiliated
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC. 1165
with CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in Section S (a) (3) of the Act as amended.
WE WILL,NOT instigate, encourage, or permit any physical assaults or
threats of physical assault by any group of our employees against any other
group because of their union or other concerted activity, in the plant or on
plant property, and if necessary, we will take disciplinary action to enforce
this rule.
WE WILL, upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority or other rights and privileges, to all those employees who went on
strike on March 18, 1948, and who have not already been reinstated to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority or other rights and privileges, dismissing, if necessary, any persons
hired by us on and after April 9, 1948, and who were not in our employ on
that date ; and make them whole for any loss of pay they may suffer by
reason of our refusal to reinstate them, as provided herein, by payment to
each of a sum of money equal to that which the employee normally would
have earned as wages during the period from five (5) days after the date
on which the employee applies for reinstatement to the date of the offer of
reinstatement , less such employee 's net earnings , if any , during said period.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
Union or any other labor organization.
ANCHOR ROME MILLS, INC.
Employer,
By ----------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------=---
This notice-must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and-must-not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.