American Linen Supply Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 23, 1989297 N.L.R.B. 137 (N.L.R.B. 1989) Copy Citation AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 137 American Linen Supply Company and United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 1116. Case 18-CA-10346 October 23, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY On September 7, 1988, Administrative Law Judge Robert W Leiner issued the attached deci- sion The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief and the General Counsel filed cross- exceptions and a supporting brief The Respondent filed an answering brief The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and bnefs l and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order 1 In finding that the Respondent, through its October 2 distribution of the memorandum to strik- ers, both threatened strikers with discharge ' for striking and thereafter effectively discharged them, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, we do not rely on Chromalloy American Corp, 286 NLRB 868 (1987), enf denied 873 F 2d 1150 (8th Cir 1989), cited by the judge Rather we rely on Mars Sales & Equipment Co, 242 NLRB 1097, 1101, 1102 (1979), enfd in pertinent part 626 F 2d 567, 572-573 (7th Cir 1980), and W C McQuaide, Inc , 237 NLRB 177, 179 (1978), enfd on other grounds 617 F 2d 349 (3d Cir 1980) In each of those cases the Board held, that an employer who informed lawful economic strikers that they had been permanently replaced when in fact the em- ployer had not obtained such replacements, had thereby terminated the strikers in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act Although an em- ployer has the right under NLRB v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co, 304 US 333 (1938), to perma- nently replace economic strikers, this right does not extend to withholding from them the right to return to their unoccupied jobs simply because they have gone out on strike A false statement 'The Respondent's request for oral argument is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the Issues and the positions of the parties 2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are Incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings that permanent replacements have been obtained accomplishes this unlawful end NLRB v Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra, 626 F 2d at 573 In the present case, on October 2, the day the strike began, the Respondent's district manager, Edward L Pajunen, distributed a memorandum to employees (first in a misdated version and then with the date corrected) about 10 minutes or so before 7 a m, the starting time for work The memorandum told the striking employees that they had "until 7 a m" to "return to work" and that if they did not, "you are permanently replaced" Since the memorandum was drafted by Pajunen immediately after a confrontation with the union president over what was, to the Respondent, the unanticipated commencement of a strike on that morning, we find it reasonable to infer, particularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the Respondent in fact made a false statement when it indicated that striking employees would actually be permanently replaced by 7 a m Thus, at the time it was distributed, the memorandum constituted an unlawful termination threat under the principles of McQuaide and Mars When the time specified in the ultimatum arrived without the Respondent's having corrected its erroneous re- placement claim and without the employees' having ,yielded to the threat by abandoning their strike at the outset, the unlawful terminations oc- curred 3 2 The General Counsel has excepted to the judge's failure specifically to conclude that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by its solicitation of employee support and assistance to employees, in their efforts to withdraw from the Union although the judge included a provision in his recommended Order reflecting such a violation We find merit in this exception As the judge found, Personnel Man- ager Gustafson solicited ai least one employee to withdraw from the Union and the Respondent aided employees by furnishing withdrawal forms and notaries during work time to help in the proc- essing of the withdrawal cards Accordingly, we find that the Respondent's aid and support to em- ployees in the filing of the withdrawal cards violat- 3 Because the violations here are predicated on the employer's false- hood concerning permanent replacements, rather than on the theory of Chromalloy American Corp, supra (In which the Board found that the em- ployer acted unlawfully because It chose words, whether intentionally or negligently, that threatened discharge as opposed to replacement), we need not consider the significance of either Production Manager Mlaker's mid-December 1987 statement to striking employees Carpenter and Perry or a banner referring to "striking employees" that the Respondent dis- played on January 8, 1988 The judge Inferred from the former an admis- sion that the Respondent had Intended to terminate strikers on October 2, and the Respondent relied on the latter as evidence that it regarded the strikers as striking employees rather than discharged employees Both are Irrelevant to the analysis on which we rely 297 NLRB No 18 138 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ed Section 8(a)(1) and thus tainted the Respond- ent's withdrawal of recognition on October 6, 1987 Texaco, Inc , 264 NLRB 1132 (1982), enfd 722 F 2d 1226 (5th Cir 1984), and cases cited therein Further, as we find that the Respondent's alleged doubt of majority support was tainted by its unlawful solicitation and support of employees in the filing of their withdrawal cards, as well as by its threatening the strikers with discharge and discharging them on October 2, we conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from the Union on Octo- ber 6 We therefore find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's inference that news of the unlawful dis- charge was disseminated throughout the plant by October 6 in finding that the withdrawal of recog- nition was unlawful 4 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Amencan Linen Supply Company, Hibbing, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order 4 We also find merit in the General Counsel's exception to the judge's failure to find that the Respondent's unlawful discharge of the stnkers on October 2 and its unlawful withdrawal of recognition from the Union on October 6, converted the economic strike into an unfair labor practice strike Though the judge decided that It was unnecessary to make a find- ing on the question of whether the economic strike had converted to an unfair labor practice strike, he did alternatively state that if such a finding were necessary he would find that the stnke had converted For the rea- sons stated by the judge in his alternative analysis, we find that the Re- spondent s unlawful discharge of the strikers on October 2 and its unlaw- ful withdrawal of recognition from the Union on October 6 converted the economic strike Into an unfair labor practice strike See also C-Line Express, 292 NLRB 638 fn 4 (1989) We note, however, that It is unnec- essary to modify the recommended Order in this respect as it already provides for the reinstatement of the strikers and the award of backpay Robert V Johnson, Esq , for the General Counsel Cecil R Hedger, Esq (Nelson & Harding, P C ), of Denver, Colorado, for the Respondent William D Watters, Esq (Halverson, Watters, Bye, Downs & Maki, Ltd), of Duluth, Minnesota, for the Union DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT W LEINER, Administrative Law Judge This matter was heard on several occasions on and between May 18 and June 2, 1988, in Hibbing, Minnesota, upon the General Counsel's complaint' alleging, in substance, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by 1 The complaint is dated April 28, 1988 The Union s underlying unfair labor practice charge was filed and served on January 19, 1988, and a first amended charge was filed and served on March 21, 1988 (a) On October 2, 1987, telling its employees engaged in picketing in support of an economic strike at Respond- ent's Hibbing facility, who had not been permanently re- placed, that they had been permanently replaced, there- by telling the employees that they had been terminated (b) On or about October 5 and 6 unlawfully supported, encouraged, and aided employees in the circulation of a petition seeking to decertify United Food and Commer- cial Workers Union, Local No 1116 (the Union) (c) On or about October 22, 1987, unlawfully interro- gated employees concerning their support for the Union 2 With regard to the violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the complaint alleges that on October 2, 1987, the Respondent discharged seven named employees because of their engaging in a strike and because of their union activities With regard to violation of Section 8(a)(5), the com- plaint alleges that on October 6 and October 23, Re- spondent unlawfully withdrew its recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive of a unit of Respondent's employees and has thereaf- ter failed or refused to bargain with the Union concern- ing employees in that unit, and that Respondent engaged in this violation of Section 8(a)(5) notwithstanding an ab- sence of a good-faith doubt that the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees in the unit and after having engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act Finally, General Counsel alleges that since on or about October 2, the economic strike commencing October 2 was prolonged by unfair labor practices and became an unfair labor practice strike Respondent's timely filed answer admits certain allega- tions of the complaint, denies others, and denies commis- sion of any unfair labor practices At the hearing, all parties were represented by coun- sel, given full opportunity to call and examine witnesses, submit oral and written evidence, and to argue on the record At the close of the hearing, counsel for the par- ties waived final argument and reserved the right to submit postheanng briefs Counsel for the General Coun- sel and counsel for Respondent submitted timely post- hearing briefs 3 , On the entire record, including the briefs, and from my particular observation of the demeanor of the wit- nesses as they testified, I make the following 2 I dismissed the allegation concerning unlawful interrogation at the close of General Counsel's case due to insufficient proof The matter has not been raised further by the General Counsel in his brief 3 Bearing date of August 29, 1988, Respondent submitted a motion for leave to file a reply brief together with a reply brief The motion and reply brief, according to Respondent, are addressed "solely to the claimed misrepresentation of the underlying record' by the General Counsel and resulting misleading arguments Since I do not rely on the briefs of any party for my factual determinations, nor, ordinarily, on the arguments of counsel, based on their factual analyses, for my ultimate conclusions and dispositions, in the exercise of my descretion, Coco-Cola Bottling Works, 186 NLRB 1050 fn 2 (1970), I deny Respondent s motion and reject the proffered reply brief AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 139 FINDINGS OF FACT I RESPONDENT AS STATUTORY EMPLOYER Respondent, a Delaware corporation with places of business in St Paul, St Cloud, Bemidji, Hibbing, and Duluth, Minnesota, at all material times has been en- gaged in the business of the laundering and delivery of linens for restaurants, gas stations, and other commercial customers During the calendar year ending December 31, 1987, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased and received at its Minne- sota facilities products goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Minnesota, and during the same period, performed laundry service at its Minnesota facilities valued in exess of $50,000 which services were performed for and deliv- ered to customers located outside the State of Minnesota Respondent concedes and I find that at all material times Respondent was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act II THE UNION AS STATUTORY LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that the Union, at all material times, has been and is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 4 III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A Background The complaint alleges and Respondent admits that the following employees at its Hibbing, Minnesota facility constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act All driver salesmen, maintenance men, maintenance helpers, washmen, extractor-dry cleaners, rug wash- ers, roof-makeup, general launderers, C R T em- ployees and root foremen employed at its Hibbing, Minnesota facilities, excluding office clerical em- ployees, all other employees, guards and supervi- sors The complaint alleges and Respondent admitted at the hearing that, at all material times through October 6, 1987, the Union, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining rep- resentative of the above unit and has been recognized as such by Respondent Furthermore, the complaint, alleges and Respondent admits that such recognition has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of which was in effect for the period January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1986, which rec- ' Respondent also concedes, as alleged, that Edward Pajunen, district/plant manager (Hibbing), Ruth Gustafson, office and personnel manager, and Frank Mlaker, production manager, at all material times have been, and are, Respondent's supervisors and agents, respectively, within the meaning of Sec 2(11) and (13) of the Act ognition was extended by agreement of the parties through January 31, 1987 . Moreover, the complaint alleges and Respondent admits that on or about October 6, 1987, and again on or about October 23, 1987, Respondent withdrew recogni- tion of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative in the above unit, and since those dates, Respondent has failed and refused to recognize and bar- gain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargain- ing representative in that unit . Lastly, the complaint alleges and Respondent admits that on or about October 2, 1987, certain employees of the Respondent represented by the Union and employed at Respondent's Hibbing, Minnesota facility ceased work concertedly and engaged in a strike The Union has been the collective-bargaining repre- sentative in the Hibbing unit for about 20 years The final 2-year agreement (G C Exh 10) between the par- ties covering this unit expired December 31, 1986 The agreement was executed by Edward Pajunen as general manager, Bert Harstad as union president, Russ Johnson as union business representative, and Respondent's vice president, B M Steiner Collective bargaining for a fur- ther contract reached impasse in January 1987 on the Respondent's final proposal of January 19, the existing contract was extended into February 1987, but following the February 6, 1987 negotiation, impasse was declared again and on February 24 1987, Respondent notified the Union that it was implementing its final offer of January 19, 1987 As early as November 1986, in the face of the ap- proaching termination of the collective-bargaining agree- ment (December 31, 1986), in collective-bargaining nego- tiations with the Union, Respondent was aware of the possibility of a strike to support the Union's bargaining demands On or about February 6, 1987, Pajunen dictated a memorandum (R Exh 10) and had it placed on the em- ployee bulletin board The document was drafted be- cause Pajunen received notice that a strike might com- mence on February 9, 1987 The document recites that the Union notified Respondent that the Respondent's final offer was not acceptable and a strike would take place "soon" The document further observes that Re- spondent intended to continue operation but did not intend to hire permanent replacements for employees who would continue to work The document notifies the employees that Respondent would inquire of them con- cerning which of them would report to work if there was a strike on Febivary 9 Pursuant to Pajunen's memo- randum, Production Manager Frank Mlaker conducted interviews with individual employees and groups of em- ployees, sometimes in the presence of the union shop steward, concerning their intentions with regard to con- tinued working if there were a strike on February 9 He was never asked the meaning of "permanent replace- ment" by any of the employees as the term was used in Pajunen's posted memorandum (Tr 1009) In the month before, on January 18, 1987, Respondent had placed advertisements in the local newspaper declar- ing that Respondent was accepting applications for per- 140 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sons "interested in becoming employees of a progressive linen supply company 5 Respondent spent 2 days inter- viewing the potential replacements and kept files on them As it will be seen hereafter, when the stnke threat was later renewed at the end of September, the applica- tions were apparently reviewed Respondent also com- piled a list of supervisors who would be brought to Hib- bing to train replacements and to assist in production and delivery functions (Tr 1068) A strike vote of January 12 among 30 unit employees showed an overwhelming vote in favor of the stnke (to commence after the expiration of the 1-month contract extension ending February 1987) In spite of the vote, no strike occurred The record demonstrates that commenc- ing in February 1987, there was hostility between Union Business Agent Russ Johnson and unit employee Roger Extrum (a member of the Union's contract negotiating committee) concerning Johnson's fear that Extrum was undermining Johnson's position as the Union's collective- bargaining representative in dealing with Respondent There is also uncontradicted, credited evidence that, in mid-February 1987, Johnson told Extrum, at a union meeting, that he would "bury" both Respondent and "that son-of-a-bitch Ed Pajunen " The record is devoid of evidence concerning relation- ships between Respondent and the Union and, indeed, the Union and the unit employees, in the period Febru- ary through September 1987 Amelia Rootes worked in the Hibbing plant as a tem- porary employee performing bargaining unit work in June 1987 and was laid off immediately after Labor Day for lack of work In August, however, Rootes, having heard employees talk about a union in the plant, spoke to Production Manager Frank Mlaker and Personnel Manger Ruth Gustafson concerning whether there was a union in the plant Both Mlaker and Gustafson, in sepa- rate conversations, told her that there was no union rec- ognized in the plant (Mlaker) and that there was no union in the plant (Gustafson) Although Mlaker denied this element of his conversation with Rootes, I credit Rootes Since Gustafson was never called as a witness for any purpose, Rootes' testimony concerning this con- versation with Gustafson is uncontradicted I credit Rootes On September 30, 1987, the Union called a meeting to take a strike vote Eleven of 17 attending employees (a total of 38 employees in the unit, G C Exhs 1(a), 2) voted in favor of a strike to commence on Friday, Octo- ber 2, 1987 At the September 30 strike meeting, Union President Burt Harstad and Union Business Agent Russ Johnson mentioned to employees what could happen to them if they elected to go on strike (R Exh 23, p 9) One employee recalled that Union President Harstad said that if they struck they could be permanently replaced (Tr 616), other employees heard Johnson and Harstad say that they could be "terminated" (Tr 473, 968) 5 To the extent that General Manager Pajunen testified that the notices in the newspaper were "for applicants for permanent replacement" (Tr 1067), it must be noted that the newspaper advertisements do not refer to permanent replacements A The Strike and Picketing of October Z 1987 1 The picketline conversation Starting time for inside unit employees is 7 a m Pa- junen arrived at the plant about 6 15 a m and by that time observed employees with picket signs at the three entrances to the plant Sometime after about 6 30 a m, Pajunen came out of the front entrance of the plant and saw Union President Harstad with Business Agent John- son standing near the curb in the street There were a total of seven female employees acting as pickets and picketing at the three entrances Linda Carpenter, Ruth Johnson, Marjorie Richards, Betty Judnitsch, Linda L Perry, Roberta Hecimovich, and Mary J Suzick 6 The recollections of several witnesses to conversations between Pajunen, the pickets and Harstad vary Betty Judnitsch recalled that Pajunen asked Harstad "Did you tell these women what would happen to them if they sent out on strike?" She recalls that Harstad answered "yes" and that Pajunen, appearing to be upset and speak- ing in a raised voice, not his normal tone, said to the em- ployees "Did he tell you you would be fired? and the employees answered "yes" Union President Bert Harstad recalled that Pajunen asked him "Have you talked to these people?" When Harstad said, "Yes," Pajunen asked, "Do they know they will be fired?" Harstad said he made no reply Mary Suzick recalls Pajunen asking Harstad "Did you tell the girls what would happen if they didn't go to work?" to which Harstad answered "Yes," adding "I told them if they didn't go to work they would be termi- nated and permanently replaced" She recalls that Pa- junen said nothing Linda Perry recalls that Pajunen asked Harstad "Did you tell these people what would happen if they went out on strike?" After Harstad said "Yes," Pajunen said that "they are fired and permanently replaced" Pajunen recalls that he asked Harstad if he had in- formed the striking employees about the potential of their being permanently replaced and that when Harstad responded that he had, nothing further was said and Pa- junen returned to his office On the basis of the above conflicting testimony con- cerning the October 2 picket-line conversation what was said by Pajunen, Harstad and the employees, I conclude that (1) Pajunen asked Harstad if he had told the em- ployees what would happen if the employees went on strike, (2) Harstad told him that he had, and (3) Pajunen told the seven (or a majority of them) employees and Harstad that they could be permanently replaced Con- trary, for instance, to Linda Perry's and other witnesses testimony, I conclude that Pajunen did not use the words "terminated" or "fired" in that conversation I draw this conclusion notwithstanding that, as noted hereafter, I regard Perry, for instance, as a credible witness for other purposes I do credit Pajunen whose testimony denies use of the words "fired" or "terminated" I fully credit Respondent's argument that the employees' recollection o The complaint alleges that on or about October 2, 1987, Respondent discharged the above-named seven pickets AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 141 of the words "fired" or "terminated" which some of the General Counsel witnesses said they heard Pajunen use, came, rather, from their recollection of the September 30 union meeting where Harstad and Johnson might well have used the words "terminated" or "fired" in describ- ing what "permanently replaced" meant Further, on the October 2 picket line, union agents Hardstad and John- son told the pickets that Pajunen's use of "permanent re- placement" was the equivalent of being "fired" (Tr 939) Pajunen's use of the expression "permanently replaced," however, I find, as noted below, had no benign signifi- cance 2 Pajunen's written communications to the employees, October 2, 1987 After Pajunen returned to his office following, this picket line conversation, he handwrote a notice to strik- ing employees (R Br p 23) 10/2/87 To the Stnking employees of Amencan Linen— Hibbing You have until 7 A M, Fri Sept 2nd to return to work If you have not, you are permanently re- placed You have the right to continue your hospitalization and medical coverage at your expense Those forms will be given to you Edward L Pajunen District Mgr Pajunen photocopied this notice, returned to the street, and distributed copies to all the striking empoyees be- tween 6 30 and 645 a m There was no accompanying conversation between Pajunen, any of the picketing em- ployees, or the union agents When Linda Perry received the document (G C Exh 5) from Pajunen, she noticed that the date was wrong, in particular, that Pajunen had used the month of Septem- ber in specifying the obligation to return to work when it was already October 2 on which they were picketing Perry commented on this to the other pickets who, she recalled, chuckled over the matter A few minutes later, after Pajunen had returned to the office, he emerged again and distributed a second docu- ment (G C Exh 6) This document was the same as the first except that it now read that the employees had until "7 a m Fnday, October 2, to return to work If you have not, you are permanently replaced" By this time it was about 6 50 a m None of the pickets, at that time, or any other time, received any communication from Re- spondent which changed or explained the terms of either of these Pajunen communications which were distributed to them on that morning The seven strikers nevertheless continued to picket Three other unit employees (Pre- bich, Lehman, Mortenson) who appeared on the picket line at or about 7 a m were also served by Pajunen with General Counsel's Exhibit 6 but crossed the picket line (Tr 475, 624-625) B Pre-Christmas Conversations with Production Manager Frank Mlaker at the Shopping Mall About a week before Christmas, striker Linda Carpen- ter went Christmas shopping at the Irongate Mall near Hibbing, Minnesota About 4 p m, she accidently met Production Manager Frank Mlaker in the mall As Car- penter asked him about Respondent's Christmas party which had been held the night before, she saw stnker Linda Perry coming from the other end of the mall Car- penter motioned her to come over Linda Perry then joined Linda Carpenter and Frank Mlaker Carpenter told Mlaker that she had heard that the strikers' Christ- mas present from the Company was to get their jobs back, but Mlaker said that they could not get their jobs back because they had been permanently replaced When Linda Perry asked him why they could not get nd of the replacements—(as Mlaker recalled, "scabs") Mlaker said that Respondent could not do so because it would be against the law Carpenter then asked if the strikers could come back to work if they agreed to accept the Respondent's IRA pension proposal rather than insist on the Union's funded pension plan Mlaker asked if union agent Russ Johnson was going to permit the employees to suggest that Apparently when Carpenter and Perry spoke of getting their jobs back, Mlaker, according to Perry, said "[You] were all done as soon as [you] put [your] signs on" (Tr 610, Perry) Carpenter recalls that he said, at this point "As soon as you put that picket sign on, you were no longer an employee of American Linen" (Tr 662) At the end of the conversation, Mlaker said that he would like to talk to Perry, Carpenter, and the other striking employees over coffee and he would explain to them further why they wouldn't be able to have their jobs back (Tr 662) Mlaker denied telling either of them that they were "done" as soon as they put on the picket signs (Tr 1016) I do not credit his denial C Employee Withdrawal of Support from the Union Commencing Monday, October 5, 1987 On October 5, already dissatisfied with the Union's poor representation, employee Kathryn Extrum over- heard employees talking about getting rid of the Union On the next day, October 6, she asked Personnel Manag- er Ruth Gustafson if there was something she could sign to get the Union out Gustafson said that she would check into the matter Later the same day, Gustafson sought out Extrum and handed her a typed paper (G C Exh 3), which stated as follows i UFCW Local #1116 2002 London Road P0 Box 6388 Duluth, MN 55806 To Whom It May Concern I, Kathy Extrum, no longer desire to have Local #1116 represent me as my bargaining agent, effec- tive 10/6/87 Signed 142 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD When Gustafson gave her the document, Extrum was on the work floor on the way to the lunchroom The document already had her name typed in and Gustafson told her that she did not have to sign it if she did not want to, that the matter was entirely up to Extrum At the same time, however, Gustafson told her that if she did chose to sign the document she should sign it before a Notary Public who was downstairs in the employee lunchroom Extrum then proceeded to the lunchroom where she signed the document before the notary who was sitting at a table She left the document (G C Exh 3) with the notary and noticed that there were similar documents on the table in front of the notary Extrum did not know who arranged for the notary to be present but the notary public, Eugene Myer, is an officer of the Security State Bank in Hibbing During the week of October 5, Personnel Manager Gustafson approached employee Mathew Caroon, the Union's shop steward, while he was on his way to cof- feebreak and handed him a document (whether his name was already typed on it is unclear) similar to the one which Gustafson handed to employee Kathryn Extrum Caroon told Gustafson that he did not want to sign the document and returned it to Gustafson There were no witnesses to the transaction between Caroon and Gustaf- son Employee Jesse Lantz testified that he signed a similar withdrawal notice on October 6, 1987, and first learned of the availability of the withdrawal notice from a coem- ployee He signed his withdrawal notice before a notary public on worktime (Tr 263) There is no dispute that there were 26 such notarized employee statements, each demonstrating a desire not to have the Union represent the employee for collective- bargaining purposes (G C Exhs 4(a)-4(z)), that the doc- uments were completely typed when each of the signers saw them, that the signers did not know who prepared them or where they were prepared There is also no dispute that these documents were no- tarized by three notary publics, that they are all officers of the Security State Bank of Hibbing, and that Respond- ent's plant manager, Edward Pajunen, is a director of that bank None of the notaries testified and there is no evidence concerning their presence at the Respondent's premises to notarize these documents relating to union representation There is also no dispute that each of these 26 documents were sent by certified mail to the Union on and between October 7 and 27, 1987 Similarly un- known is the question of who paid the metered postage for the certified mail When the Union received these 26 documents, they were not honored as withdrawal re- quests Russell Johnson testified that the Union believed the documents to be Respondent-sponsored and not the free expression of the employees who executed them Likewise, there is no record proof concerning the means by which these notarized employee statements were tranferred to Respondent's possession In any event, however, on October 6, 1987, Respondent sent a telegram (R Exh 23, p 14) to the Union by which it withdrew recognition, on the basis of about 23 (of the 26 withdrawal statements ultimately signed) withdrawal statements (R Br p 44) There were 38 unit employees at the time About a week before Christmas, Extrum telephoned the NLRB Regional Office to discover whether the Union had been decertified The NLRB rep- resentative told her that there was no record of any de- certification but that he would send her information re- lating to decertifying the Union She thereafter received a decertification petition from the Regional Office, typed up the petition (G C Exh 2) in Gustafson's office after working hours, got Personnel Manager Gustafson to photocopy the employee withdrawal notices, got infor- mation from Gustafson concerning the various classifica- tions in the bargaining unit so that she could properly type out the decertification petition, found an envelope in the office, placed everything in an envelope and gave it to her husband (Roger Extrum) who mailed the peti- tion and supporting employee withdrawal documents to the NLRB Regional Office The date of the filing of the decertification petition is December 30, 1987 Discussion and Conclusions A The October 2 1987 Occurrences on the Picket Line There is no dispute, and I find, that at the time of the initiation of the strike and the subsequent picketing of 6 30 a m, October 2, 1987, the Union and employees at Hibbing were engaged in a lawful economic strike Within about 15 minutes of 7 a m, Pajunen served on each of the seven striking pickets an ultimatum declaring that they had until 7 a m to report to work, thereby abandoning the picket line The ultimatum was that if they did not do so "you are permanently replaced" As the General Counsel properly points out, Pajunen's written statement, twice served on the seven picketing strikers, does not suggest that the employees might be re- placed, could be or would be replaced, it states that they are permanently replaced I further agree with the Gen- eral Counsel that when, at 6 45 a m, the strike was only about 15 minutes old, Respondent had not been aware of the existence of the strike and picketing prior to that period In that 15 minutes, there was no suggestion, that Respondent, by 7 a m, actually hired any permanent re- placements or reasonably had the opportunity to actually hire permanent replacements Thus, on this record, as Respondent concedes, there is no showing that perma- nent replacements were ever actually hired The discharge of economic strikers violates Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act Mars Sales ci Equipment Go, 242 NLRB 1097 (1979), enfd 626 F 2d 567 (7th Cir 1980), W C McQuaide, Inc , 237 NLRB 177 (1978), Abilities et Goodwill Inc , 241 NLRB 27 (1979), and threatening employees that they will be discharged if they engage in an economic strike is a violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1), Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978) As the General Counsel further ob- serves, falsely informing the strikers that they had been permanently replaced when they have not been perma- nently replaced constitutes evidence of an unlawful ter- mination in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act Mars Sales ci Equipment Go, supra, W C McQuaide, Inc , supra While it is true that an employer, , AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 143 absent an implicit or accompanying threat of reprisal, who truthfully informs employees of the possiblity of being permanently replaced during a strike but fails to explain all of the possible consequences of such replace- ment does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Santa Rosa Blueprint Service, 288 NLRB 762 (1988), Chromalloy American Corp, 286 NLRB 868 (1987), the very fact of telling economic strikers that they "are permanently re- placed" at 7 a m when, in fact, they had not been per- manently replaced (then or at any other time) constitutes not only evidence of the forbidden retaliatory threat under Chromalloy American Corp, supra, but evidence of an unlawful termination of employment, Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra at 1101, W C McQuaide, Inc , supra I agree with Respondent that the record in this case shows no evidence that any of the discharged strikers were permanently replaced Respondent, argues, howev- er, with regard to the allocation of the burden of proof, that the instant case is not a case involving a refusal to reinstate, and only after a striking employee offers to return is the employer obliged to prove permanent re- placement (R Br p 53 ) I regard Respondent's premise, under the instant facts, to be inaccurate Consistent with that position, however, Respondent further argues that this is not "a refusal to reinstate case," but rather a "straight discharge case" In the so-called straight dis- charge case, Respondent argues that since General Coun- sel raised the issue of permanent replacement as an ele- ment of his case, then the General Counsel must establish that essential element as part of the prima facie case of proving an unfair labor practice (R Br p 54) The Board, however, has taken a position contrary to Respondent's argument In Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra, and W C McQuaide, supra, the Board, as here, was faced with statements by employers prior to any offer of return to work In Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra at 1100-1101, the Board held that an employer communication to employees engaged in an economic strike that the employer "hired a permanent replacement for your position, and no longer will need your services, effective immediately," not only was an unlawful termi- nation of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act because the statement was false, but also held that the burden of proof to establish permanent re- placement was on the employer "[because] this assertion is based on matters within Respondent's peculiar knowl- edge, the burden of establishing its truth rests on Re- spondent" The court of appeals agreed NLRB v Mars Sales & Equipment Co, 626 F 2d 567 (7th Cir 1980) In sum, therefore, in the above cases, the Board ruled, with regard to a statement which is false, concerning the per- manent replacement of economic strikers, that it not only constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) as an' unlawful threat, but the burden of proof, even absent a declined employee offer to return to work, remains on the employer to prove the "permanent replacement" of the allegedly unlawfully discharged economic strikers, Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra, W C McQuaide Co, supra Absent such proof the violation of Section 8(a)(3) is fur- ther perfected Ibid In short Pajunen's October 2 ultimatum falsely told the economic strikers and other employees that they will have been permanently replaced at 7 a m if they did not abandon the strike This creates an 8(a)(1) and (3) viola- tion under Chromalloy American Corp, supra, and second, regardless of the falsity of the ultimatum, Re- spondent failed to prove the threatened permanent re- placement—at any time—thus providing a further basis for concluding, as I do, that the General Counsel, prima facie, proved that the seven picketing strikers were un- lawfully discharged on October 2, 1987 B Production Manager Mlaker's Statements at the Shopping Mall in December 1987 (a) If there were any doubt as to what Respondent's October 2 intent was when Plant Manager Pajunen told the employees that they had until 7 a m to report to work or else they "are permanently replaced," Produc- tion Manager Mlaker, in his pre-Christmas shopping mall conversation, eliminated any such doubt I have found that he told striking employees Carpenter and Perry, about a week before Christmas at the Shopping Mall, when they inquired whether they (i e, the strikers) could return to work with the Union if they accepted the em- ployers pension plan, that they were no longer Respond- ent's employees ("done") as soon as they put the picket signs on I infer from this statement that it was Respond- ent's intent on October 2 to discharge any employees as soon as they commenced identifying themselves as sup- porters of the economic strike by wearing picket signs and that when they did so, Respondent terminated them 7 That it was Mlaker, rather than Pajunen who made this statement is not crucial since the Supreme Court has declared, where employees have just cause to believe that an individual was acting for or on behalf of management, that that individual's actions are attributa- ble to the employer NLRB v Mars Saks & Equipment Co, supra, citing Machinists v NLRB, 311 U S 72, 80 (1940) In the instant case, it appears on this record that the second highest employer supervisor under Edward Pajunen (plant manager) was Production Manager Frank Mlaker I conclude that the employees could reasonably believe that his statements were attributable to manage- ment C Respondent's Defenses Respondent defends on various grounds It argues first that Mlaker's denials concerning the pre-Chnstmas shop- ping mall conversations with Linda Perry and Linda Carpenter should be credited over Perry's and Carpen- ter's testimony I credit Perry and Carpenter because of the spontaneity and believability of their testimony upon my observation of each of them, their mutual corrobora- tion and my dissatisfaction with Mlaker's credibility con- cerning his testimony denying parts of his conversation 7 I reach this conclusion because a "reasonable employee, having heard Mlaker s admission of what actually underlay Respondent s motiva- tion, would conclude that permanent replacement meant discharge,' Chromalloy Corp, supra, for having worn the picket signs and refusing to abandon the strike See also Palk Supply Corp, 249 NLRB 674 (1980) 144 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with Amelia Rootes, a former employee and a witness with no financial stake in this litigation I found Rootes to be a credible witness even in those elements which were not fully supported in her written statement given to a Board agent, 8 and I particularly credit that part of her testimony, undefiled by Mlaker, relating to Mlaker's expressed lack of surprise in Rootes' refusal to work under nonunion conditions because of the proumon posi- tion of her uncle This Rootes' testimony, in turn, led me to generally credit her testimony concerning her conver- sations with Mlaker and to discredit Mlaker, including Mlaker's desire to get Rootes employment in a union shop I have already discredited Mlaker's denial in telling Rootes that, in August 1987, there was "no union" in Respondent Supervisor Gustafson, according to Rootes, made the same false remark to Rootes, and Gustafson was not called to deny Rootes' testimony NLRB v Laredo Coca-Cola Bottling Co, 613 F 2d 1338 (5th Cir 1980), cert denied 105 LRRM 2658 (1980) For the above reasons, and because I was impressed by Carpen- ter's corroboration of Perry, I do not credit Mlaker's de- nials that he told Carpenter and Perry that they were "done" or "no longer employees" of Respondent as soon as they put on the picket signs (on October 2, 1987) Respondent also defends on the ground that it consist- ently treated the striking employees as employees (R Br p 69) In particular, it stated that it posted a banner on January 8, 1988 (Tr 1047), showing that the employees who were on strike were still employees of the Company by calling them "striking employees" On the other hand, the evidence is uncontroverted that Mlaker had a sub- stantial hand in the posting of the banner In fact, it was wholly a management idea (Tr 1051) In that situation, the banner becomes self-serving notwithstanding that it was flown before the filing of an unfair labor practice charge Respondent also suggests that there was no union animus in the record (R Br p 69) Since I have credited Perry's and Carpenter's testimony that Mlaker told them that they were "done" and no longer employees of Re- spondent as soon as they put the picket signs on, that is evidence of union animus Mlaker's conversations with Rootes demonstrates further animus Pajunen's October 2 ultimatum to picketing strikers containing a false and un- lawful threat of "permanent replacement" is also evi- dence of union animus Respondent also defends in the citation of the recent Chromalloy American Corp, supra In that case, the em- ployer sent written communications to striking employ- ees on separate dates In the second communication, the employer told the employees not only that they were permanently replaced but that they were no longer em- ployed by the employer Because the second communica- tion referred to "former employment," the Board deter- mined that the employees could reasonably have inter- preted that statement as meaning that they had been dis- charged for refusing to abandon the strike In this 8 The matters on which Respondent would impeach Rootes' testimony were matters not appearing in her Board affidavit rather than testimony contradictory of a prior sworn statement I regard this distraction as mg nificant regard, Respondent concedes only that the Pajunen letter of October 2 was "perhaps infelicitous" (R 'Br p 81) and notes that it was hurriedly written The fact of the matter, however, is that Pajunen is not only the manager of the plant but that he twice issued the threats of per- manent replacement in anger and gave the threatened strikers and three other employees to whom the ultima- tum was delivered substantial time to think over his ulti- matum The record is barren of any suggestion that this ultimatum was ever abandoned or adequately repudiated by Respondent Passavant Memorial Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978) In any event, however, Chromalloy is distinguishable on its facts there was no suggestion in Chromalloy, as here, of the clarity of the meaning of the threat of "per- manent replacement" Here, Mlaker told the employees that they were "done" as soon as they put the picket signs on October 2 Respondent further defends on the ground that there has been a showing of its "commitment" for the use of permanent replacements and that Respondent is not obli- gated to actually show actual arrival on the job of the permanent replacements (R Br p 53) The problem with this defense is that it is factually unsupported There is no suggestion in the record that there was any "commitment" for employee replacement of any kind, permanent or otherwise The most that can be said is that Respondent showed that it interviewed prospective replacements and allegedly kept files on them This does not prove that any prospective employee had received, at any time, "commitment" for employment or that there were any permanent replacements Respondent further argues (Br p 53-54) that "no other inference is warrant- ed" other than that the striking employees were "timely replaced" Since there was no proof of any employment commitment to anyone or other effort to actually employ replacements, there can be no inference that the striking employees were permanently replaced, timely or other- wise Respondent also defends on the ground that the Union and some of the strikers (Suzick,. Johnson, Carpenter, and Richards> appeared at a hearing before the Depart- ment of Jobs and Training of the State of Minnesota in January 1988 As a result of testimony taken in_that pro- ceeding (R Exh 23), the referee determined that the em- ployees were "terminated" within the meaning of the statute (G C Exh 1(g)) On appeal, the decision of the referee was reversed and the employees were disqualified from unemployment benefits Respondent notes (Br p 35) that the reversal included the conclusions that al- though the claimants contended that they were "termi- nated," it was unclear on what evidence the claimants depended to support that position The Minnesota tribu- nal noted that when filing for unemployment benefits, the strikers indicated that they did not report for work because they were on strike, the claimants did not indi- cate that they ,did not report for work because they had been discharged (R Br p 35) In the first place, there can be no question that the em- ployees were engaged in an economic strike and did not report for work because they were on strike The dis- AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 145 charge came later In fact, the' strikers were discharged because they refused to abandon the strike and come to work Thus in interpreting the Minnesota statute con- cerning why the employees did not report for work, it was perfectly proper for the Minnesota tribunal to deter- mine that the employees were engaged in a strike and never did report for work because of that strike Of greater importance, however, is the fact that although strikers, including Carpenter, appeared and testified, there is no suggestion on this record that there was any inquiry made of Carpenter concerning her December shopping mall conversations with Perry and Mlaker con- cerning the fact that the strikers were "done" as soon as they put the picket signs on Thus, although I received in evidence the conclusions and indeed the nonverbatim, partial transcript of the Minnesota proceedings, and have considered such evidence, Serendippitty-Un-Ltd , 263 NLRB 768 (1982), I can give It little weight The Minne- sota tribunal was interpreting its own statute with regard to the lessons why the employees did not report for work, i e, a strike, and, more important, there is no showing that crucial later evidence of Respondent's intent, available to me, was available to that tribunal To sum up, recognizing that, under Chromalloy Ameri- can Corp, supra, an employer stating that an employee on strike has been permanently replaced does not create a discharge, here, as in Chromalloy American Corp and Mars Sales & Equipment Co, supra, Respondent went further The Mlaker conversation at the shopping mall before Christmas clearly evinces that Respondent had discharged employees on the preceeding October 2, 1987 At bottom, what occurred in this case was that Plant Manager Pajunen (and later, Production Manager Mlaker) were using the legalistic term "permanent re- placement" (see Chromalloy American Corp on this point), instead of direct words like "discharged" or "fired," as some sort of magic talisman, the use of which, they apparently thought, would protect them from the workings of the National Labor Relations Act While the Act forbids the discharge of economic strikers, it does not forbid "permanent replacement" Magic words, how- ever, are no defense when the intent, as here, rather clearly shows that Respondent's desire was to discharge the strikers in retaliation for their engaging in lawful union activity "Magic words," as the Board has consist- ently found, cannot be used to obscure motive and intent Lustrelon, Inc , 289 NLRB 378 (1988), Bosk Paint & Sandblast Co, 270 NLRB 514 (1984) I therefore conclude, as alleged, that Respondent on October 2, 1987, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, discharged the seven striking pickets D The Tainted Withdrawal of Recognition on October 6, 1987 The complaint alleges that on October 6, 1987, Re- spondent unlawfully withdrew recognition The evidence shows that on that date, Respondent's attorney, Harding, notified the Union, on the basis of the employee-signed requests of withdrawal from the Union, that Respondent was withdrawing recognition The evidence further shows that on or about December 30, 1987, employee Kathryn Extrum, filed a decertification petition in Case 18-RC-1679 submitting copies of the employee with- drawal requests (G C Exhs 4(a)-4(z)) as support for the decertification petition It is unnecessary here to reach or decide the some- times delicate question whether Respondent's week of October 5 and December activities (in at least one in- stance of Ruth Gustafson personally soliciting an em- ployee to withdraw from the Union and otherwise pro- viding photostatmg and secretarial help in the duplica- tion and notarization of the withdrawal requests and the use of Respondent's equipment in the typing of the de- certification petition) unlawfully promoted the employee withdrawals from the Union and the decertification peti- tion or whether Respondent was merely exercising its right of free speech Texaco, Inc v NLRB, 722 F 2d 1226 (5th Or 1984) For, in the instant case, having found that on October 2, 1987, Respondent, violating Section 8(a)(1), unlawfully threatened seven lawfully striking employees, and at least three other employees, with false, retaliatory threats of "permanent replace- ment" if they failed to cease picketing or, in any case, if they failed to report for work, and then discharged all seven of the picketing economic strikers, thereby violat- ing Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, the October 6, 1987 withdrawal of recognition was tainted as was the subsequent December 30 decertification petition While, in the instant case, Respondent's October 6 withdrawal of recognition was based on 23 of the 26 employee nota- rized statements of withdrawal of support from the Union, those withdrawals were tainted by Respondent's immediately prior unfair labor practices and brings the case within the Board's rules in Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB 764 (1986), and Wallkill Valley General Hospital, 288 NLRB 103 (1988) As stated in Wallkill Valley General Hospital In Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB [764] (Sept 30, 1986), the Board restated its position that a decertfication petition will be valid only if, prior to an employer's reliance on the petition, it is not engaged in conduct "designed to undermine employees' support for, or cause their disaffection with, the Union" If an em- ployer has engaged in such conduct, the decertifiba- lion petition will be found to have been tainted by the unfair labor practices As above noted, Respondent's October 6 withdrawal of recognition was based on 23 employee notarized with drawals from the Union These withdrawals came about only 3 or 4 days after the unlawful threat of "permanent replacement" made to strikers and nonstrikers, and the immediate discharge of all the economic strikers, violat- ing Section 8(a)(3) of the Act I find and conclude that Respondent's October 2 threats, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and its violation of Section 8(a)(3) on the same day in the mass discharge of the strikers were both "de- signed to undermine emplayees' support for or cause their disaffection with, the Union," Hearst Corp, supra This Respondent conduct affected both the employees' withdrawals from the Union and the December decertifi- cation petition In this regard the speed of mass employ- 146 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ee disaffection from the Union (October 6) following the unfair labor prctices (October 2) must be seen as a direct cause thereof As in Tenneco, Inc , 288 NLRB 888 (1988), here, the very speed of the employee disaffection follow- ing the October 2 threat of "permanent replacement" to at least 10 of 38 employees is persuasive evidence that the employees, commencing October 6, were unlawfully coerced into signing the notarized withdrawals of sup- port from the Union In any event, any uncertainty as to causation must be resolved against Respondent which en- gaged in the misconduct and which has the affirmative obligation to establish a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status before withdrawal of recognition An em- ployer who engages in misconduct against lawful em- ployee union support must be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its conduct Tenneco, Inc , supra The rules, generally stated in Hotel & Motel Employees Local 19 v NLRB, 785 F 2d 796 (9th Cir 1986), show that once a Union is recognized, it enjoys a presumption of continued majonty status which is rebuttable An em- ployer may rebut the presumption of continued majority status if it shows by clear, cogent and convincing evi- dence that the Union was in the minority or that the em- ployer had a good-faith reasonable doubt of majority status Brooks v NLRB, 348 U S 96, 104 (1954) The rea- sonable doubt must be asserted in good faith and may not be raised in the context of any employer activities aimed at causing disaffection with the Union NLRB v Carilli, 648 F 2d 1206 (9th Cir 1981), Clear Pine Molding v NLRB, 632 F 2d 721, 730 (9th Cir 1980), cert denied 451 U S 984 (1981) Where the General Counsel, as here, presents evidence that the Union's decline in sup- port was attributable to the employer's misconduct, the employer's claim of good-faith reasonable doubt fails NLRB v Sacramento Clinical Laboratory, 623 F 2d 110 (9th Cir 1980), Dalewood Rehabilitation Hospital v NLRB, 566 F 2d 77, 80 (9th Cir 1977) Thus, a good- faith doubt defense to a refusal-to-bargain allegation re- quires the employer to present clear, cogent, and covinc- ing evidence both of (1) a reasonable good-faith doubt of majority status (2) in a context free of employer activities aimed at causing disaffection Hotel & Motel Employees Local 19 v NLRB, 785 F 2d 796 (9th Cir 1986) Where, as here, Respondent unlawfully and falsely warns 10 employees, including 3 nonstrikers, of dis- charge if they do not report for work and then unlawful- ly discharges 7 of 38 unit employees on the first day of the economic strike, it is highly unlikely that, 4 days later, the remaining employees executed their withdraw- als of support from the Union as a matter of their own free choice In this regard, the dissemination of the news of the October 2 unfair labor practices must be inferred to have spread throughout the unit by October when the withdrawals started Bakers of Paris, Inc , 288 NLRB 991 (1988) E The Alleged Unfair Labor Practice Strike It seems to me unncessary to pass on the question of whether and if the economic strike originating on Octo- ber 2, 1987, was converted into or prolonged by the Re- spondent's unfair labor practices The reason is that the remedy afforded to the seven affected employees is the equivalent to or surpasses any remedy which might be determined with a finding of an unfair labor practice strike Thus, although there would appear to be certain hypothetical situations in which a finding of an unfair labor practice strike would be pertinent, I conclude that it is not in this case since the remedies here afforded to the parties are at least the equivalent thereof and a find- ing of an unfair labor practice strike based upon theoreti- cal considerations should await the happenings of those considerations rather than be made unnecessarily herein In any event, however, were that finding necessary, I would find that the economic strike of October 2 was converted to an unfair labor practice strike no later than on October 6, 1987, when, in response to Respondent's unlawful threat of "permanent replacement," 23 employ- ees withdrew their support for the Union and Respond- ent unlawfully withdrew recognition While I have found, above, that displays of employee disaffection from the Union were based, in substantial part, on Respondent's unlawful conduct of October 2, that does not mean that the object of the October 2 eco- nomic strike was shown to have changed on that date For instance there was no overt manifestation of a pro- test of unfair labor practices until the opening of the in- stant hearing when the picket signs were changed to pro- test unfair labor practices See Burkart Foam, Inc , 283 NLRB 351 (1987) An employer's unfair labor practices convert an eco- nomic strike into an unfair labor practice strike only where there is substantial evidence that the unfair labor practices prolong the strike Burkart Foam, supra, citing Soule Glass & Glazing Co v NLRB, 652 F 2d 1055, 1079-1080 (1st Cir 1981) (other citations omitted) Here, following unlawful threat of discharge, the re- sulting employee withdrawal of union support and Re- spondent's withdrawal of recognition on October 6, per se, prolong the strike because the withdrawal of recogni- tion deprives the employees of their bargaining repre- sentative and thereby precludes the possibility of reach- ing agreement on a contract and impedes the settlement of the erstwhile economic strike Rose Printing Co, 289 NLRB 252 (1988), and Sanderson Farms, 271 NLRB 1481 (1984) 9 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 By discharging its employees Mary Suzick, Linda Perry, Linda Carpenter, Ruth Johnson, Marjorie Rich- ards, Roberta Hecimovich, and Betty Judnitsch because they engaged in a lawful economic strike on October 2, 1987, Respondent thereby unlawfully discriminated against employees engaged in a lawful union activity and 9 Quite independently of the unlawful taint of Respondent s October 2 unfair labor practices on the October 5 et seq employee notarized with- drawals of union support, there is evidence that Supervisor Gustafson s aid to Kathryn Extrum in executing the decertification petition, filed De cember 30, 1987, taints that document Kathyn Extrum, with Gustafson s knowledge, used Gustafson s office and typewriter, got Gustafson s advice on describing the unit, had Gustafson duplicate the October nota- rized employee withdrawals, and used Respondent envelopes to send the document See Rose Printing Co, supra ' AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO 147 engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act 2 By threatening its employees with discharge on Oc- tober 2, 1987, because they engaged in, or refused to cease engaging in, a lawful economic strike, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 3 At all material times, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1116, has been the exclusive col- lective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Respondent in the following appropriate unit All driver salesmen, maintenance men, maintenance helpers, washmen, extractor-dry cleaners, rug wash- ers, roof make-ups, general launderers, C R T em- ployees and roof foremen employed at Respondent's Hibbing, Minnesota facility, excluding office clerical employees, all other employees, guards and supervi- sors within the meaning of the Act 4 On October 6, 1987, by withdrawing recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of Respondent's employees in the above Hib- bing unit and, since that date, by failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the above unit, when Respondent did not then, or at any other ma- terial time, have a good-faith doubt concerning the ma- jority status of the Union in that unit, Respondent violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act 5 By virtue of Respondent's conduct, including that described in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, above, Respondent unlawfully caused employee disaffection from the Union and assisted in the preparation and filing, on December 30, 1987, of the decertification petition in Case 18-RD- 1679, thus violating Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act 6 The unfair labor practices found above affect com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has committed various unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or- dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative achon designed to effectuate the policies of the Act in the manner customary in such cases, Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged the above-named seven employees because they engaged in, or refused to cease engaging in, a lawful economic strike, I shall recommend that they be offered reinstate- ment to their old jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent employment, discharging, if nec- essary, any replacement, together with backpay, Abilities & Goodwill, 241 NLRB 27 (1979), enf denied 612 F 2d 6 (1st Cir 1979), computed on a quarterly basis as de- scribed in F W Woolworth Go, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon to be computed in accordance with New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) I shall also recommend that Respondent be ordered to forthwith recognize and bargain in good faith with the Union and that the decertfication petition in Case 18- RD-1679 be dismissed On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed" ORDER The Respondent, American Linen Supply Co, Hib- bing, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall 1 Cease and desist from (a) Discharging, or otherwise disciplining, any employ- ee because that employee engages in a lawful economic strike or in other activities evincing sympathy for, mem- bership in, or activities on behalf of United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No 1116, or any other labor organization, or because any such employees engage in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the Act (b) Threatening any employee with discharge or other discipline or retaliation because he or they engage in, or refuse to cease engaging in, a lawful strike or other con- certed activities protected by Section 7 of the Act (c) Withdrawing recognition from the above-named Union when,Respondent fails to have a good-faith doubt that the Union is the statutory bargaining agent of its employees in the following appropriate unit or refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the above- named union in the following appropriate bargaining unit All driver salesmen, maintenance men, maintenance helpers, washmen, extractor-dry cleaners, rug wash- ers, roof make-up, general launderers, C R T em- ployees and roof foremen employed at Respondent's Hibbing, Minnesota facility, excluding office clerical employees, all other employees, guards and supervi- sors within the meaning of the Act (d) Assisting and supporting employee withdrawals of support from the Union or the filing of a petition to de- certify the Union (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guarateed in Section 7 of the Act 2 Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act (a) Offer to Roberta Hecimovich, Betty Judnitsch, Ruth Johnson, Marjorie Richards, Mary Suzick, Linda Perry, and Linda Carpenter immediate and full remstat- ment to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to subtantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging if necessary any replacements in said jobs, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision (b) Rescind any and all communications to the Union wherein Respondent withdrew recognition from the 10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 148 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the above appropriate unit (c) Forthwith notify the union in writing that Re- spondent is willing to recognize and bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of Respondent's employees in the above appropralte unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if agreement is reached, to sign a contract (d) Remove from Respondent's personnel records of the employees named in paragraph 2(a) hereof any and all references to their being discharged or replaced and notify each of them, in writing, that this has been done, and that evidence thereof will not be used as a basis for any future disciplinary action (e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board through its agents and for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order (f) Post at Hibbing, Minnesota place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re- spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material (g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decertification peti- tion in Case 18-RD-1679 be dismissed If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading 'Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read 'Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board" APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice WE WILL NOT discharge, or otherwise discipline, any employee because of said employees' sympathy for, membership in, or activities on behalf of United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No 1116 or any other labor organization, or because any such employee engages in concerted activities protected by by Section 7 of the Act WE WILL NOT threaten any employee with dischargp or other discipline or retaliation because he or they en- gaged in, or refused to cease engaging in, a lawful strike or other concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the above- named union when we fail to have a good-faith doubt that the Union is the statutory bargaining agent of our employees in in the following appropriate unit or refus- ing to bargain collectively in good faith with the above- named Union in the following appropnate bargaining unit All driver salesmen, maintenance men, maintenance helpers, washmen, extractor-dry cleaners, rug wash- ers, roof make-ups, general launderers, C R T em- ployees and roof foremen employed at Respondent's Hibbing, Minnesota facility, excluding office clerical employees, all other employees, guards and supervi- sors within the meaning of the Act WE WILL NOT assist and support employee disaffection from the union or the filing of any petition to decertify the Union WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act WE WILL offer to Roberta Hecimovich, Betty Jud- mtsch, Ruth Johnson, Marjorie Richards, Mary Suzick, Linda Perry, and Linda Carpenter immediate and full re- instatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging if necessary and replacements in said jobs, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings WE WILL rescind any and all communications to the Union wherein we withdrew recognition from the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employ- ees in the above appropriate unit WE WILL forthwith notify the Union in writing that we are willing to recognize and bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of Respondent's employees in the above appropriate unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi- tions of employment and sign a contract if agreement is reached WE WILL remove from Respondent's personnel records of the employees named herein any and all refer- ences to their being discharged or replaced and notify each of them, in writing, that this has been done and that evidence thereof will not be used as a basis for any future disciplinary action AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation