Ambulance Services of New Bedford, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 20, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 106 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ambulance Services of New Bedford, Inc. and
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers Local 59, a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America. Case I-CA- 1 1524
April 20, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On January 25, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Sidney J. Barban issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel
filed a brief supporting the Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Ambulance Services of New Bedford, Inc.,
New Bedford, Massachusetts, its officers, agents,
successors, assigns, and any joint employer or party
in interest as defined in the Remedy section of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as
modified below:
1. In paragraph l(b), substitute the word "other"
for the phrase "like or related."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent's
discharge of employee Coelho violated the Act. We note however that the
Administrative Law Judge provided for only a narrow cease-and-desist
order. The discharge of an employee for engaging in protected activities, as
was the situation here, is an unfair labor practice which goes to the very
heart of the Act, and in such cases the Board has traditionally provided
229 NLRB No. 3
broad injunctive language constituting a broad order. Accordingly, we shall
modify the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order to require that
the Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon
the rights guaranteed to its employees by Sec. 7 of the Act. N.LR.B. v.
Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4, 1941); Skrl Die Casting, Inc., 222
NLRB 85 (1976).
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge or refuse reemploy-
ment to employees, or otherwise discriminate in
regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any
terms and conditions of employment, because
they have engaged in concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of their right to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL offer George Coelho immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make whole George Coelho for any
loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him by paying him all
wages lost, together with interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum.
AMBULANCE SERVICES OF
NEW BEDFORD, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SIDNEY J. BARBAN, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard at Boston, Massachusetts, on November
1, 1976 (all dates herein are in 1976, unless otherwise
noted), upon a complaint issued on April 28, based upon
charges filed on March 15 and April 19 by the Charging
Party, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local 59, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
(herein the Union), against Ambulance Services of New
Bedford, Inc. (herein Respondent). The complaint alleges
that on or about February 24 Respondent discharged
George Coelho because of activities on behalf of the Union
or because he engaged in concerted activities protected by
Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(aXI) and
(3) of the Act. Respondent's answer denies the commission
of the unfair labor practices alleged.
106
AMBULANCE SERVICES OF NEW BEDFORD
Motion to Amend Complaint
In her brief, General Counsel requests that "[s]ince on
the basis of the stipulation of the parties, Ambulance
Services of New Bedford, Inc. and Allied Ambulance,
Incorporated are a single Employer within the meaning of
the Act, Counsel for the General Counsel hereby moves to
amend the Complaint to join Allied Ambulance, Incorpo-
rated as a party Respondent and that all remedies found
appropriate be imposed upon both named Respondents."
The record does show that the parties stipulated for the
purposes of this proceeding that the two corporations are
"a joint employer ... within the meaning of the Board's
case law." However, General Counsel did not seek to
amend her complaint at the hearing. In the circumstances,
in the absence of a charge and complaint naming Allied
Ambulance, Incorporated, and without affording that
corporation an opportunity to defend against the com-
plaint, I cannot include it as a party respondent in this
matter or issue an order against it. Indeed, I have no means
of determining that counsel for Respondent was authorized
to speak for Allied Ambulance, Incorporated, in making
the stipulation referred to above. However, this is not to
say that Allied Ambulance may not have a responsibility to
remedy any unfair labor practices which may be found
herein. Cf. N.L.RB. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., Inc., &
Monarch Retinning Co., Inc., 98 F.2d 97 (C.A. 2, 1938), and
104 F.2d 302 (C.A. 2, 1939). This will be further considered
hereinafter.
Upon the entire record in this case, from observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor, and after due consider-
ation of the briefs of the General Counsel and Respondent,
I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find the
following:
Respondent, a corporation organized under the laws of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, engaged at times
material to this matter in the operation of an ambulance
transportation service for the ill in the city of New Bedford,
Massachusetts, in a recent annual period received $250,000
in gross revenues from institutions, commercial enterprises,
and governmental instrumentalities located in the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, each of which meets any of
the Board's dollar volume standards for assertion of
jurisdiction, other than those based solely on indirect
inflow or indirect outflow of goods and services.
At all times material to this matter, Respondent has been
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
I Respondent's general manager, Valvade, disputes the testimony of
General Counsel's witness Coelho that such a meeting occurred. Although
Coelho states that Valvade attended the meeting, Valvade was not employed
by Respondent at the date Coelho places the meeting. However, Valvade
may well have been employed by Allied at that time. I have credited Coelho
as to this meeting because the probabilities are that in these circumstances
the employees would make such a request.
H. THE FACTS
A. The Dishonored Checks
The facts in this matter are largely undisputed. Beginning
prior to December 1973 and continuing at least through
February 1976, Respondent's employees experienced con-
siderable difficulty with their paychecks. These checks
were frequently returned due to insufficient funds to cover
them. Respondent states that it explained to the employees
that this was due to the fact that deposits which it made to
cover the payroll checks would not clear in time because
the checks deposited were on distant banks, and also that
governmental agencies were remiss in making payments
owed Respondent. Respondent also complained that an
official of the bank whom it was compelled to use at the
time was hostile and would not cooperate with Respon-
dent.
The employees frequently discussed this problem among
themselves and at one time, in late 1973, the employees, at
one of their regular meetings with management of
Respondent, requested that they be paid in cash instead of
by check because of the problems they had in cashing
Respondent's checks. Respondent could not agree on a
method of accomplishing what the employees desired at
that point.'
At various times Respondent resorted to several expe-
dients to attempt to rectify the situation in which the
payroll checks it was issuing were so frequently dishon-
ored. Throughout the period involved Respondent suggest-
ed that the employees redeposit their returned checks,
apparently with the idea that Respondent's deposits would
clear by that time and there would be funds to cover the
dishonored checks. However, this was not always true and
a number of such checks would be returned, dishonored, a
second time. Apparently concurrently with this practice,
Respondent, in mid-1975, instituted a practice whereby
employees whose checks had been returned for insufficient
funds, and who made a complaint to Respondent, might be
given another check on another bank in exchange for the
check which had been dishonored.2 By the end of 1975,
Respondent's employees were experiencing difficulty in
having banks in New Bedford cash their checks. In mid-
January 1976, Respondent instituted still another proce-
dure which ran concurrently with those described above.
Respondent made arrangements with a branch of the First
National Bank of New Bedford that it would cash the
employees' paychecks if they were coendorsed by Valvade
or by Kenneth Cline, an assistant manager of Respondent's
New Bedford facility. However, such endorsement was not
automatically made. Employees who desired to cash their
checks at this particular branch bank were required to
request Cline or Valvade to coendorse their checks. It is not
clear to what extent the employees availed themselves of
this procedure, but it is evident that not all of them did so.
2 It is noted that the original paychecks given the employees show the
payor as "A A Services" located in Brockton, Massachusetts, signed by
"Allen H. Davis," a corporate officer of Respondent, and drawn on a
Brockton bank. (See G.C. Exh. 2 and Resp. Exh. 5.) The replacement checks
were also signed by "Allen H. Davis." They show the payor as "Ambulance
Service of New Bedford D.B.A. Allied Ambulance Service" and were drawn
on The First National Bank, New Bedford, Massachusetts (Resp. Exh. 6).
107
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sometime in December 1973, Respondent's employees
were in contact with the Union. In September 1975,
Respondent agreed, in settlement of a complaint issued by
the Regional Office of the Board (without admitting the
commission of the alleged unfair labor practices), that
Respondent would recognize and bargain with the Union
as the representative of the employees in an appropriate
unit. One of the bargaining demands which the employees
requested of the Union was that they be paid in cash rather
than by check. It was later reported to the employees that
the Respondent had refused this demand. 3 Respondent
closed its New Bedford facility in April 1976, before the
Union had secured a collective-bargaining contract with
Respondent.
B. The Discharge of George Coelho
George Coelho was employed by Respondent as an
ambulance driver and attendant at its New Bedford facility
in early December 1973. Coelho was assigned to work out
of one of the police stations in that city. He participated in
the discussions among the employees concerning their
problems with dishonored paychecks received from Re-
spondent and their desire to be paid in cash. He was
present at the meeting when the employees requested that
they be paid in cash, and also at the meetings with the
Union and the employees in which the latter presented
their complaints about their paychecks to the Union.
Prior to January 24, 1976, Coelho had received three or
four paychecks from Respondent which had been dishon-
ored. His paycheck dated January 24, 1976, was likewise
returned. Coelho called Cline, the assistant manager, who
advised him to reprocess the check. Coelho did so, and the
check was returned a second time because of insufficient
funds. Coelho then visited Respondent's New Bedford
office to talk about this. He found both the manager and
Cline busy with other employees who were likewise
complaining about their paychecks, and was unable to
obtain any satisfaction about his situation. He then sought
advice from a police detective, who advised Coelho to file a
complaint against the Respondent. 4 Coelho on the morn-
ing of February 14, 1976, signed a complaint against Allen
H. Davis because of the dishonored check.
Respondent found out about the complaint on February
20, and on February 23 Valvade called Coelho into the
New Bedford office and gave him cash for the dishonored
check. Coelho was told to continue working out of the
central office that day. The next day Coelho went to work
at his regular station until called into the main New
Bedford office about II a.m. At that time he was
discharged by Valvade, who told him that there was no
complaint about his work but that he was being terminated
because he had filed a criminal complaint against the head
3 Valvade testified that at the bargaining negotiations the Union "did
voice complaints that the employees had about bad checks," but "not in the
form of formal notification," and Valvade denied that the Union made "any
requests" concerning this matter. I find this denial very difficult to believe.
4 It is apparent from Coelho's testimony that in his conversation with the
detective there was discussion of the dishonoring of employee paychecks
generally, not merely his own. On direct examination, Coelho stated that as
part of this conversation, he was advised to "go and sign a complaint in the
Court .... They [Respondent knew that they had been coming back." On
cross-examination, he stated that this was not the first check that had been
of the corporation and because Respondent considered
him "imcompatible with management." Valvade said that
he would not put these reasons in writing. When Coelho
returned on Friday for his pay, he was paid in cash, and
was again refused a written explanation for his termination.
Respondent's witnesses assert that Coelho was dis-
charged for filing a criminal complaint against Davis,
which, it is claimed, was in violation of the following
written rules of conduct known to Coelho:
Any employee found to maliciously diseminate [sic]
derogatory remarks or information with reference to
the company will be terminated immediately.
It is fitting and proper that respect be shown to
members of management. Due to past abuses, all
members of management will be addressed as Mr.,
Mrs., or Ms., whichever properly applies followed by
their last name.
Analysis and Conclusions
For more than 2 years Respondent's employees were
concerned with the fact that their paychecks were frequent-
ly returned because of insufficient funds to cover them.
This was a matter discussed among the employees,
including Coelho, during this entire period. When Respon-
dent agreed to recognize the Union as the bargaining agent
of the employees in September 1975, one of the employee
complaints was that they no longer wished to be paid by
check. Respondent was aware of the employee complaints
both by complaints from individual employees and by the
Union's position asserted during the bargaining negotia-
tions.5
Coelho had been paid on three or four occasions, prior to
January 24, 1976, with checks that were dishonored. When
his paycheck dated January 24, 1976, was also dishonored,
he complained to Assistant Manager Cline, who told
Coelho to reprocess the check. Coelho did so. When the
check was again dishonored, Coelho attempted to get some
sort of satisfaction from Respondent's manager and
assistant manager at New Bedford, but was unable to get
the information desired because those managers were busy
with other employees who were also complaining about
dishonored paychecks. Coelho then sought the advice of a
police detective (a reasonable choice since Coelho regularly
worked out of a police station while employed by
Respondent), who recommended that Coelho file a
complaint with the court against Respondent. In discussing
this problem with the detective, as found, Coelho placed
the difficulty in the context of the problems the employees
were having generally in being reimbursed for their
paychecks. When Coelho filed a complaint against Re-
dishonored and that "there were numerous banks of New Bedford who
would not accept their checks."
5 That these complaints continued is evident from the fact that
Respondent instituted a third expedient in January 1976 to cover checks
that were still being dishonored. Contrary to Respondent's argument that
there were no complaints after that, Coelho testified without contradiction
that such complaints were being made to Respondent's New Bedford
manager and assistant manager until just before the day he filed a complaint
against Respondent's president.
108
AMBULANCE SERVICES OF NEW BEDFORD
spondent's president for issuing the dishonored check of
January 24 (the president had signed it), he was discharged
by Respondent for that action.
Respondent contends that when this check was dishon-
ored, Coelho should have returned it to Cline for
coendorsement, in accordance with an arrangement Re-
spondent had adopted to have these checks cashed, instead
of going to court and filing a complaint. But this ignores
the fact that it was Cline, himself, who suggested that
Coelho reprocess the check, not that it be returned to him
for endorsement. When Coelho later went to see Cline
about the check, Cline was not available to take care of
Coelho's problem. Further, when an employer issues a
paycheck, it assumes a responsibility that that check be
honored upon deposit. The burden cannot be shifted to the
payee, without the payee's consent, to take steps, that may
be inconvenient, embarrassing, or undesirable to the payee,
to have the check made good. Indeed, the State has
provided the very remedy which Coelho employed to
protect the interest of the community in the free negotiabil-
ity of such instruments.
The General Counsel contends that Coelho's action in
filing a complaint against Respondent's president was part
of the course of conduct of the employees, and an
extension of their efforts and that of the Union which they
chose to represent them, to secure correction of a
fundamental condition of their employment, and thus
constituted protected concerted activity for the purpose of
mutual aid and protection of the employees' working
conditions. In support of this position, General Counsel
relies principally on the Board's decision in Afro-Urban
Transportation, Inc., 220 NLRB 1371 (1975) (in which I
served as the Administrative Law Judge). In that case the
discharged employee (Dusenberry) had previously dis-
cussed with a fellow employee the problem of dishonored
paychecks and the need to secure union representation. To
cover one such dishonored paycheck, Dusenberry's em-
ployer had given him a second check drawn on another
bank. When Dusenberry, came for his next pay, at his
request he was paid by cash, but was told I week's pay was
being withheld until Dusenberry returned the dishonored
check (which he had not previously been told to return).
Dusenberry responded, by stating that he would go to "the
union . . . the government agencies that funded the
company, ... the Department of Labor, and I considered
it a criminal action ... I should go to the police about it."
Thereupon Dusenberry was discharged. I agreed that such
employee effort to seek the aid of governmental agencies to
protect or improve working conditions of the employees
generally is a protected activity, but held that Dusenberry's
further statement that he would go to the police and to the
government agencies funding the employer indicated that
Dusenberry was activated by personal animosity and
personal interest only and thus was not engaged in
concerted activity. The Board reversed, finding not only
that resort to governmental agencies to protect working
conditions generally constituted activity protected by the
Act, but that Dusenberry's "previous attempts to join the
Union, his conversations with ... the only other employee
s Neither the Board nor I made a finding that Afro-Urban had union
animus. Respondent implies an inference to this effect.
similarly situated, in which both the Union and [the
employer's] pay practices were discussed, and the feeling
on both their parts that a need existed 'for a union to
protect them in such situations,' " constituted sufficient
concerted activity to afford Dusenberry statutory protec-
tion in the situation. The Board further held that the facts
did not support a finding that Dusenberry was engaged in
a personal venture showing malice or bad faith.
Respondent here, while conceding that in some instances
individual action may be protected as activity on behalf of
employee working conditions generally, asserts that in this
instance the actions of Coehlo were only in his own
individual interest and constituted an impermissible attack
upon Respondent's president and thus were not protected
by the Act. Respondent in its brief distinguishes Afro-
Urban Transportation as follows: "[T]here is no evidence of
union animus on the part of Respondent. Coelho did not
threaten to go to the Union. In fact, the Respondent had
no way at all of connecting the filing of the complaint to
the Union. While the Board in Afro-Urban held that
Dusenberry's outburst was provoked by the employer's
threat to withhold one week's pay, there was no such
provocation of Coelho in the instant case. Coelho did not
go to the Union; he did not go to the Massachusetts or
United States Department of Labor. Instead, he filed a
criminal complaint against his Employer, without even
notifying the latter of his intent." 6
After due consideration of the arguments and precedents
cited by Respondent, I have concluded that the legal
situation in this case is not fairly distinguishable from that
in Afro-Urban Transportation and that the Board's decision
in that case is binding on me here. In this matter it is
clearly shown that the constant dishonoring of the
employees' paychecks was a matter of common concern,
not merely of concern to Coelho. The employees had
previously, and apparently continually, complained to
Respondent about this; the employees had gone to the
Union, and had gone to the Board to compel Respondent
to recognize and bargain with the Union; and the Union
had presented the employees' complaint on this score at the
bargaining table. Coelho's action in seeking the advice of a
police detective concerning the problems he and the other
employees were experiencing was a reasonable extension of
the prior efforts of the employees to ameliorate this
situation. (Though I find Coelho's actions in this situation
reasonable in the circumstances, I do not mean to indicate
that in other circumstances an employee's concerted
activity must be reasonable to be protected. See N.LR.B. v.
Washington Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9, 16
(1962).) I further find that Coelho's action, following the
advice of the detective, in filing a complaint against
Respondent's president (who had been signing the employ-
ees' checks) constituted a resort to the public procedure
provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for such
purpose and was an action which reasonably might be
expected to aid all of the employees in their continuing
problem. Further, in the total circumstances of this case,
Respondent was clearly charged with notice that Coelho's
activity was part and parcel of the employees' common
109
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concern with Respondent's proclivity for paying them with
checks it had reason to believe would not be honored.
Upon the foregoing, and upon the record as a whole, it is
found that Respondent, by discharging George Coelho
because of his concerted activity protected by the Act,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Inasmuch as the Order
recommended hereinafter would not be affected, I find it
unnecessary to pass upon General Counsel's further
contention that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act by discharging Coelho.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging George Coelho, Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act
and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, it
will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Respondent has shut down its New Bedford facility. It is
clear that action does not remove the necessity of a
remedial order. See N.LR.B. v. Electric Steam Radiator
Corporation, a Subsidiary of Landers, Frary and Clark, 321
F.2d 733, 738 (1963) ("Irrespective of the ability of the
respondent to comply with the order, a decree of enforce-
ment is a vindication of the public policy of the statute");
see also Southport Petroleum Company v. N.L.R.B., 315
U.S. 100, 107 (1942) ("it still is possible that the Board's
order may yet be the basis-and the indispensable basis-
of liability on the part of [Respondent's officers agents,
successors, and assigns], regardless of any present incapac-
ity of [Respondent] to perform, or liability on its part for
failure to perform, its duty of reinstatement.").
As previously noted, General Counsel requests that
Allied Ambulance, Incorporated, be held jointly responsi-
ble with Respondent for remedying any unfair labor
practices found herein and that Respondent and Allied
Ambulance be ordered to make Coelho whole for wages
lost by reason of his discharge and to offer him reinstate-
ment to "a position at its Brockton location which is
identical or substantially similar to that held formerly at
the New Bedford location or in the alternative, place
Coelho on a preferential hiring list from which he would be
offered jobs as the Brockton location or at New Bedford or
any other location which [they] may open." There is
substantial reason to believe, on the record in this case,
that Allied Ambulance was a joint employer with Respon-
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
dent of Coelho at the times material, or was otherwise a
party in interest with Respondent sufficient to hold it
responsible for remedying the unfair labor practices found
herein. The order recommended hereinafter will be
sufficiently broad to impose such an obligation, if, in fact,
Allied Ambulance occupied such a position. This may be
determined in a compliance hearing, if necessary, at which
Allied Ambulance will have an opportunity to show that it
should not be held responsible to carry out the Order
recommended.
Having found that Respondent has discriminated against
employee George Coelho by discharging him on February
24, 1976, because he engaged in concerted activity for the
mutual aid or protection of employees, in violation of
Section 8(aX)() of the Act, it will be recommended that
Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to
his former job or, if such job no longer exists, to an
identical, or substantially equivalent, position at any
location at which Respondent, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, or assigns, may operate, or which may be operated by
anyone which was a joint employer with Respondent, or a
party in interest in the Respondent's New Bedford
operation at the time of Coelho's discharge, without
prejudice to Coelho's seniority or other rights and privileg-
es, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him by
payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he
would have earned as wages from the date of the
discrimination to the date of reinstatement, less his net
earnings during such period, in accordance with the
formula prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), together with interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum to be added to such backpay, such
interest to be computed in accordance with the formula
prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I issue the following recommended:
ORDER 7
Respondent herein, Ambulance Services of New Bed-
ford, Inc., New Bedford, Massachusetts, its officers, agents,
successors, assigns, and any joint employer or party in
interest with Respondent as defined above in the remedy
section, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or refusing reemployment to employees,
or otherwise discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure of
employment, or any terms or conditions of employment,
because they have engaged in concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act.
102.46 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
110
AMBULANCE SERVICES OF NEW BEDFORD
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer George Coelho immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to an
identical or a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions set forth above in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Make George Coelho whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
him, in the manner and in accordance with the methods
referred to above in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and to
effectuate the Order provided herein.
In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
(d) Post at its establishment at Brockton, Massachusetts,
if applicable, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix. " s8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed
by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it
alleges a violation of the Act not herein found, be, and the
same is, dismissed.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
111