Allied Metal Hose Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 14, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 1135 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC. 1135
Allied Metal Hose Company , Inc. and District No. 15,
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 29-CA-3498
August 14, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On September 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Nancy M. Sherman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
We agree with the Administrative Law.Judge that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) ands (1) of the
Act by admittedly refusing to bargain with the
Union which had been certified by the Board as the
exclusive bargaining representative of an appropriate
unit of Respondent's employees following a consent
election conducted under the direction of the Re-
gional Director for Region 29. The Administrative
Law Judge properly rejected Respondent's conten-
tion that the election underlying the Union's certifi-
cation must be set aside because of the Union's al-
leged improper offers to waive initiation fees. She
found, instead, that any offers of waiver attributable
to the Union were not objectionable under the stan-
dards set forth in Savair.2 In addition, she found that
certain statements made by employees Ramirez,
Leon Hourruitiner , and Baerga to their fellow work-
ers to the effect that those who signed a union au-
thorization card now and/or voted for the Union
would not have to pay an initiation fee, were not
objectionable under the Savair standards because (1)
they were made before the petition was filed and (2)
none of the employees making such statements was
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings.
2 N.L.R.B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
shown to have been acting as the Union's agent. Ad-
ditionally, the Administrative Law Judge found that
the rumors circulated by certain employees at
Respondent's plant about the subject of initiation
fees did not amount to the kind of third-party con-
duct that would warrant setting aside the election.
1. As to the single statement that was attributable
to the Union, we agree with the Administrative Law
Judge that employee Monaco's remark to employee
Brito, in the presence of Union Agent Fisher that, "if
we join the union . . . we don't have to pay any
initiation fee" did not transgress the specific man-
dates of Savair. In our view, Monaco's statement did
not in any way imply that the waiver of initiation
fees was limited to those employees who joined the
Union before the election nor was it conditioned
upon the employees' voting for the Union. As the
so-called waiver here is open-ended, the instant case
is easily distinguishable from those Board decisions
in which a union's waiver offers were found to have
created an ambiguity as to when an employee would
have to join the union in order to avoid paying initia-
tion fees?
2. With respect to prepetition offers to waive initi-
ation fees, the Board has recently modified its long-
standing Ideal Electric rule 4 to hold that an improper
offer to waive initiation fees, whether made before or
after the petition is filed, constitutes grounds for set-
ting aside an election 5 Accordingly, the credited pre-
petition statements of Ramirez and the other named
employees are relevant and have been considered.
Nevertheless, we agree with the Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that neither Ramirez nor any of
the other employees making statements regarding
waiver of initiation fees was shown to have been act-
ing as a union agent and that, therefore, their state-
ments cannot be attributed to the Union. For this
reason, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the
credited statements of these employees, if uttered by
a union agent, would have violated the ground rules
set forth in Savair.
3. We also agree with the Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that the conduct of Respondent's
employees during the preelection period did not ren-
der a free and rational employee choice impossible.
In so doing, we recognize that, under certain circum-
stances, an election may be invalidated because the
conduct of third parties, such as the employees them-
selves, has interfered with the statutory right of em-
ployees to participate in a free and uninhibited elec-
3 Inland Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc., 211 NLRB 724 (1974); see also The
Coleman Company Inc., 212 NLRB 927 (1974).
4 The Ideal Electric and Manufacturing Company, 134 NLRB 1275 (1961).
3 Gibson's Discount Center, a Division of Scrivner-Boogaart, Inc., 214
NLRB No. 22 (1974). This decision issued after the Administrative Law
Judge herein had issued her Decision.
219 NLRB No. 181
1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion .6 However, we do not read Savair to require
either the Board or the parties to police the preelec-
tion conduct of third parties with the same vigilance
and rigor that they are required to exercise in polic-
ing their own conduct . Under the circumstances of
this case, we are satisfied that the statements circulat-
ed by various employees about the Union's waiver of
initiation fees did not rise to the level of impropriety
that the Board has previously relied on in setting
aside elections because of third-party conduct. In
this respect , we fully agree with the Administrative
Law Judge that such rumors and misinformation as
might have existed did not create an atmosphere of
fear, coercion , and confusion among Respondent's
employees which could reasonably have interfered
with the employees ' free choice . Nor do we find con-
vincing reasons to hold the Union culpable and/or
responsible for such rumors or misinformation espe-
cially where , as here , the circulating statements in-
correctly reflected the Union 's initiation fee policy
and the employees made no attempts to ascertain the
truthfulness of such rumors. Accordingly, we adopt
the Administrative Law Judge 's conclusion that the
conduct of third parties (i.e., the employees them-
selves) does not provide grounds for invalidating the
election.
ORDER
on August 1, 1973, and a complaint issued on August 14,
1973, presents the question of whether Respondent's ad-
mitted refusal to honor the Charging Party's June 29, 1973,
certification violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act), notwith-
standing Respondent's contention that the election under-
lying the certification was invalidated by alleged
preelection statements regarding the Union's initiation
fees.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses ,2 and after due consideration of the brief filed by
Respondent , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE NATURE OF RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE CHARGING
PARTY'S STATUS AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent is a New York corporation which manufac-
tures metal hoses and related products at two places of
business in Long Island City, New York. During the year
preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representative
period , Respondent shipped products valued in excess of
$50,000 to States other than New York. I find that, as Re-
spondent concedes , it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act, and that exercise of jurisdiction over
its operations will effectuate the policies of the Act.
District No. 15, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Charging Party,
herein called the Union), is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent , Allied Metal Hose Com-
pany, Inc., Long Island City, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended Order.
6See P. D. Gwaltney, Jr. and Company, Inc, 74 NLRB 371 (1947);
N.L.R.B. v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., and Ben Barnet Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d
1086 (C.A. 2, 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1038 (1970); A . Werman & Sons,
Inc., 106 NLRB 1215 (1953); Cross Baking Company, Inc., 191 NLRB 27
(1971), enforcement denied on other grounds 453 F .2d 1346 (C.A. I, 1971).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NANCY M. SHERMAN , Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding, heard by me at Brooklyn, New York , on June
20, 27 , and 28 and July 30, 1974,1 pursuant to a charge filed
1 On June 17, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff conducted a
pretrial conference which the Charging Party, through error, failed to at-
tend. On June 20, Bernard Williams , the Charging Party's representative.
asked me for an adjournment on the ground , in substance , that the arrange-
I1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Pursuant to an agreement for consent election executed
on February 14, 1973, by Respondent and the Union, the
ments made at the pretrial conference had caught him by surprise and left
him unprepared to proceed . I adjourned the hearing until June 27. On that
date , Respondent's counsel , who cannot speak Spanish , requested leave to
use a tape recorder during the hearing in order to supplement his notes and
assist in preparing further examination of Spanish -speaking witnesses who
testified through an interpreter . Over Williams' objection, I granted
Respondent's request , with the understanding that the device would be put
out of the witnesses sight , that the hearing would not be interrupted be-
cause of any difficulties Respondent might have with the tape recorder, that
off-the-record discussions would not be taped , and that the tape would not
be used to draw into question the accuracy of either the official transcript or
the official translation . Milgo Industrial, Inc., 203 NLRB 1196 (1973). Be-
cause of my action in permitting use of the tape recorder , Williams an-
nounced that he would not participate in the proceedings , and physically
left the hearing room . Although Williams physically returned to the hearing
room a few minutes later and remained for a considerable period on that
day, he did not participate therein, or attend the hearing on any day thereaf-
ter. Further , although one or both of two of the Charging Party's business
agents (Sidney Fisher and William Oram ) were physically present in the
hearing room during much of the subsequent hearing , neither of them filed
an appearance on the Charging Party's behalf. The other parties and I have
sent Williams several letters advising him about when the hearing was to be
continued and other matters.
2 Because of the circumstances described supra, fn. 1, the Union called no
witnesses . For the purpose of creating a full record, counsel for the General
Counsel cross-examined many of Respondent 's witnesses (some of whom
had given pretrial affidavits to a Board agent) and called four witnesses of
his own.
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC.
Regional Director for Region 29 conducted an election on
March 7, 1973, in an admittedly appropriate unit of
Respondent's employees described infra, Conclusions of
Law 3. The tally showed that 15 ballots favored the Union,
9 were opposed , and 2 were challenged . Thereafter, Re-
spondent timely filed objections and supplemental objec-
tions to conduct affecting the results of the election. Re-
spondent alleged , inter alia, "Union representatives told
employees that if they voted for the Union they would not
have to buy a Union book, and if they didn't vote for the
Union they would have to pay an initiation fee."
On June 29, 1973, following an administrative investiga-
tion , the Regional Director overruled Respondent's objec-
tions and certified the Union. On July 18, 1973,
Respondent 's request for review of the Regional Director's
action was denied by the Board on procedural grounds
(infra, fn. 3).
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that since
about July 16, 1973, Respondent has failed and refused to
grant the Union's request for recognition as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the certified
unit . On August 29, 1973, counsel for the General Counsel
filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Respon-
dent filed an opposition dated September 24, 1974.
On December 17, 1973, the Supreme Court decided N.L.
R.B. v. Savair Manufacturing Company, 414 U.S. 270, 1973.
On January 11, 1974, Respondent filed a motion to remand
for reconsideration, relying on, inter a/ia, the Supreme
Court's Savair decision . On February 19, 1974, Respondent
filed a supplemental motion to remand for reconsideration,
attaching, inter a/ia, a copy of an employee affidavit, with
the affiant 's name deleted , stating, "That before the elec-
tion, when I was handed the union card, Rafael Ramirez,
Oscar Hourruitiner and Gabby Leon told me that the
union men had said if I signed the card I would not have to
pay for the book." On April 17, 1974, the Board issued an
Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment and Di-
recting Hearing . The Order stated , inter alia:
The Board . . . is of the opinion that , in light of the
Supreme Court's [SavairJ decision . the issue
raised by the Respondent with respect thereto can best
be resolved by hearing. Accordingly,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing be held before
an Administrative Law Judge . . . for the purpose of
taking evidence to resolve said issue ... .
Before calling the first witness, Respondent's counsel
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, in sub-
stance, that the Board 's action in remanding the case for a
hearing established that the Board believed that the Re-
gional Director should have held such a hearing before
certifying the Union; that, therefore , the complaint was
premature; and that the "hearing directed by the Board on
remand should be had in this Region in the nature of a
hearing on objections where an agent of the Regional Di-
rector will hear the matter as a Hearing Officer." I hereby
adhere to my hearing denial of this motion?
1137
B. The Evidence Regarding The Alleged Objectionable
Conduct
1. Introduction
The nonemployee organizers who conducted the Union
campaign at Respondent 's plant were Union Business Rep-
resentatives Fisher and Oram . Each of them had for sever-
al years been a professional union organizer, a job for
which a good memory for names and faces is a valuable if
not essential asset . For this reason , and on the basis of their
demeanor, I believe that they had a better recollection of
material matters , and engaged in more conversations with
Respondent's employees , than Fisher and Oram were will-
ing to admit, and hereafter describe certain respects in
which I disbelieve their testimony about the extent of such
activity . However , my evaluation of their testimony is tem-
pered by the evidence that Respondent operates a compar-
atively small plant to which Fisher and Oram paid a limit-
ed number of visits , that neither of them (so far as the
record shows) ever entered the plant itself, that practically
all Respondent's employees are Spanish-speaking whereas
Fisher speaks no Spanish and Oram very little , that the
events herein occurred up to 18 months before they testi-
fied, that their principal contacts with the employees
ceased about 15 months before they testified, and that they
have a number of organized shops to service , as well as the
duty to conduct other organizing campaigns.
Fisher and Oram first came to Respondent's plant in
mid-January 1973. A week after the March 7, 1973, elec-
tion, a number of employees met at a nearby bar with
Fisher, Oram , and an interpreter . It appears that all those
present had signed union authorization cards prior to the
election.4 All the witnesses who testified about this meeting
agreed that Fisher there discussed the subject of initiation
fees , but no two employee witnesses gave materially the
same testimony about what he said . While I have reserva-
tions about Fisher's and Oram 's respect for the truth, their
demeanor in testifying about this meeting lead me to credit
them as to this issue . Accordingly, I find that on this occa-
sion Fisher said that all those who presently were in the
plant would come in at an initiation fee which was the
equivalent of 1 month 's dues , and that any employees who
came into the plant after the negotiation of a contract
would be subject to the regular initiation fee.5 Fisher credi-
3 N.L.R.B. v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 496 F.2d 35, 38 (C.A. 8. 1974);
International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers [Liberty
Coach] v. N.L.R.B. , 418 F.2d 1191, 1196, fn. 14 (C.A.D.C., 1969). 1 note
that, before the charge herein was filed, Respondent 's request for review of
the Regional Director's action was denied by the Board on the basis of the
finality afforded his action by certain provisions in the consent election
agreement and by the Board's Rules and Regulations applicable to such
agreements citing, inter alia, Buffalo Arms, Inc v. N.L.R.B., 224 F.2d 105,
109-110 (C.A. 2). As previously noted, the Supreme Court's opinion, which
resolved an apparent circuit conflict noted in Respondent's petition for re-
view, issued after the filing of the complaint herein.
4 However, employee Jose Rodriguez , who apparently opposed the
Union , was invited to attend by his friends from work . He did not go.
s Employee John Montgomery , the only employee witness whose native
language was English testified that Fisher said that the dues would be $8.50
a month ; that "if we all went in as a group , there would be no initiation
fee"; and that employees who failed to join within 30 days "After the union
Continued
1138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bly testified that the Union's bylaws permit reducing the
regular initiation fee for organizational purposes , that the
Union's regular initiation fee is $50, and that its monthly
dues are $8 .50. Oram credibly testified that the authoriza-
tion card circulated by the Union does not constitute an
application for membership, that the Union uses a differ-
ent form for such applications , and that "Up until the pres-
ent time none of the employees of Allied Metal Hose are
members of our organization ." However, there is no sub-
stantial evidence that the Union ever described this distinc-
tion to Respondent's employees , or that they knew about
this difference from any other source .6
2. Alleged conduct by or in the presence of Union
Business Representative Fisher
a. Credited testimony for Respondent
Former employee Brito credibly testified without contra-
diction that, prior to the election, he came by a group near
the plant consisting of Union Business Agent Fisher and
employees Monaco and Garcia; and that, as Brito came
within 2 or 3 feet of Fisher, Monaco turned to Brito and
said in English that "the union has many benefits and if we
join the union , we will get the union pension and we don't
have to pay any initiation fee." Fisher said nothing.8 Em-
ployees Jose Rodriguez credibly testified that in mid-Feb-
ruary he heard a group of employees , including Monaco,
"saying that whoever didn't vote for the union would have
to pay for the book," worth about $60 or $70." The record
was certified and was in the shop" would have to pay $65 to join.
Montgomery's pre-hearing affidavit failed to refer to the 30-day grace peri-
od, but merely said, "Fisher told us that since we were coming in as a group,
there would be no initiation fees ." Employee Gabriel Leon testified that
Fisher said that , I month after "the Union entered," initiation fees had to be
paid. Former employee Angel Bnto testified that Fisher said , "We have to
join the Union because those persons who join the Union won't have to pay
any . . . initiation fee but the person who doesn 't join the Union will have
to pay the $60.00 fee. The person who doesn 't want to pay the $60 .00 initia-
tion fee , will have to get out from the factory "; and that Fisher did not say
when the employees would have to join . Former employee Carlos Baerga
testified that Fisher said, "those who join together will not have to pay for
initiation, for the book," and that an employee who did not join "has to pay
the book, which is $60 .00, or get out." However , Baerga stated in his pre-
hearing affidavit , "Fisher said that because we were all coming in as a
group, there would be no initiation fee for us though an employee who is
employed by the company later and who joined the Union later would have
to pay the initiation fee of $50.00." Employee Sergio Robert testified on
direct examination that, on this occasion , initiation fees were not discussed
at all. On cross-examination , he testified that initiation fees were in fact
discussed, "but we never talk about if you didn 't join now you have to pay."
6 Former employee Baerga testified that after the election , he told em-
ployees Fuste and "Mr . Rodriguez," among others , "see, now it cost you
money to get in or you have to join , you know ." Neither Fuste nor employee
Jose Rodriguez (infra, fn.9), both called as witnesses by Respondent, was
asked about this alleged conversation . In view of this absence of corrobora-
tion, the inconsistency between these alleged remarks and both of Baerga's
versions of Fisher's remarks (supra , fn. 5), and Baerga's demeanor, I do not
credit his testimony in this respect.
7 I am satisfied that this incident occurred prior to the March 7 election.
Brito initially testified that it occurred in February , then testified that it
occurred a couple of days after the election, and then that it occurred a few
days after another alleged incident , involving Fisher , which occurred in late
January or early February.
s Monaco and Garcia did not testify. Garcia retired at an undisclosed
time prior to the hearing. Fisher was not asked about this conversation.
fails to show whether this conversation occurred before or
after Monaco's exchange with Brito.
b. Discredited testimony for Respondent
On direct examination , former employee Baerga testified
for Respondent that in late January 1973 Union Repre-
sentative Fisher told a group of employees , including
"Rudy Rodriguez," that the initiation fee was $60, but if
the employees all joined together , they would not have to
pay initiation fees .9 Baerga's direct testimony about this
conversation is exceedingly confused about who said what,
and at one point he acknowledged, "I got it all mixed up."
However , he did testify at this point that he told Fisher
that he did not need a card because he had already ob-
tained one from Ramirez, signed it, and mailed it. He fur-
ther testified that Employee Ramirez had told him that if
Baerga signed it "now," he would not have to pay the initi-
ation fee, "which will be $60, something like that." Howev-
er, Baerga's prehearing affidavit states, in part, "I think
Fisher gave me a card . Whoever it was, he said fill this out
if you want , and if enough employees sign up , maybe we'll
have an election . . . at no time did any Union representa-
tive make any statements of any kind . . . about a Union
book or its cost." Moreover, Baerga testified on cross-ex-
amination that he did not recall whether Fisher said any-
thing to him about an initiation fee when giving him the
card . In addition, Baerga's prehearing affidavit states that
the March 14 gathering at the bar "was the first time to my
knowledge that any Union representative had said to the
employees that the $50 initiation fee was waived." On the
basis of Baerga's admitted confusion about this incident,
the conflicts between his hearing testimony and his pre-
hearing affidavit, and the witnesses ' demeanor, I discredit
Baerga's testimony about Fisher's remarks on this occa-
sion, and to this extent credit Fisher's testimony that prior
to the election, he did not discuss initiation fees with any
employee of Respondent.
Baerga further testified on direct examination that in
late January or early February Fisher told a group of em-
ployees, including Leon, Montgomery, and Robert, about
getting better benefits and more money , that the initiation
fee was "something like" $60, and if "we all have to join
together , we won't have to pay no initiation fee . . . . And
those who don't join will have to pay." Inferentially as to
this same gathering,10 employee Leon testified on direct
examination as a witness called by counsel for the General
Counsel that he did not hear Fisher say anything about
initiation fees. On cross-examination , when asked what
Fisher had said to the employees, Leon initially testified,
"Well, I think the people have to pay around $60 or 55, I
don't remember how much, if they don't join the union,"
and then conceded that he could not remember exactly
what Fisher said about initiation fees, but stated that Leon
knew for a fact that Fisher discussed initiation fees. Leon
Employee Jose Rodriguez testified for Respondent , but was not asked
about this conversation . The record fails to show whether "Rudy" and Jose
are the same individual.
ie Leon and Baerga gave consistent testimony regarding the date of this
gathering, and testified that it was attended by them , Fisher , and employees
Robert and Montgomery.
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC. 1139
conceded that on this occasion Baerga told him in Spanish
"That initiations had to be paid. People who didn't enter
the union had to pay initiation." In view of the portions of
Baerga's prehearing affidavit previously referred to, the
vacillations in Leon's testimony about what Fisher said,
the evidence (infra, fn. 25) that Baerga was following a
practice of conscious misrepresentation about the initiation
fee matter , Leon's limited knowledge of English (the lan-
guage used by Fisher), and the witnesses ' demeanor, I do
not believe Baerga's testimony about Fisher's remarks, and
conclude that Leon was confusing them with Baerga's.
Rather, and notwithstanding my reservations about
Fisher's veracity and certain conflicts between
Montgomery's 11 and Robert's 12 other testimony and their
prehearing affidavits, I credit Montgomery' s and Robert's
testimony that Fisher did not discuss initiation fees in their
presence, 13 and to this extent credit Fisher's testimony that
prior to the election he did not discuss initiation fees with
any employee of Respondent.
the General Counsel called Leon as a witness, but did not
ask him about contacts with Oram on the morning of the
election.14
While I have reservations about Oram's veracity general-
ly, I credit him over Fuste with respect to this incident. I
particularly rely on Respondent's failure to obtain testimo-
ny directly corroborative of Fuste about this specific inci-
dent from its witness Baerga, the only individual who, on
Fuste's version , would have knowledge of all the relevant
facts concerning the alleged message . Furthermore , Robert
credibly denied gathering with Oram that morning;15 and
Montgomery credibly testified that he did not join the
group, but merely said a few words to Oram.16 Further-
more, it seems to me unlikely that even in the context sug-
gested by Fuste's testimony, Oram would have overstated
the real $50 initiation fee by $10."
4. Alleged conduct by employees outside Fisher's and
Oram's presence
3. Conduct alleged to have been apparently authorized
by Union Business Representative Oram
Employee Ramon Fuste , a witness called by Respon-
dent, testified that after he entered the plant on the morn-
ing of the election , several employees-including, inter alia,
Robert, Leon, Montgomery , and Baerga-were standing
just outside the half-open plant door about 15 feet from
Fuste , having a conference in English with Union Business
Agent Oram . Fuste , who cannot speak Englis# and testi-
fied through an interpreter , went on to testify that Oram,
who speaks only a "little bit" of Spanish , "made a sign" to
Baerga and "point[ed] towards" Fuste , that "When the
conversation was ending" Baerga called him , that the two
approached each other , and that Baerga said in Spanish
that Oram had just told him that if Fuste did not vote for
the Union he would not have to pay $60 and if he did vote
for the Union he would not have to pay anything. No other
witness corroborated Fuste 's version of this incident.
Oram testified that prior to the election he had no con-
versation with any of Respondent 's employees about initia-
tion fees , and there is no direct evidence otherwise. Oram
further testified , without corroboration from any other wit-
ness, that the discussion at the plant door involved the
selection of a union observer . Oram testified that he could
not remember the names of the employees who initially
gathered with him at the door ; that one or more of them
went into the plant and came out with the message that
Leon would be the Union 's observer ; and that Leon there-
upon came to the door to introduce himself . Counsel for
11 Namely, whether a union representative was present outside the plant
within the week preceding the election , and whether the employees dis-
cussed benefits and initiation fees among themselves prior to the election.
See also supra, fn. 5, infra, In. 16.
12 Namely , whether employee Ramirez discussed initiation fees prior to
the election . Moreover, Robert testified that both Oram and Fisher were
present during the election , whereas the union representatives' work records
and other credible testimony establishes that only Oram was present. See
also supra, In. 5; infra, Sec. 11, B , 4, C, (2) (b).
13 English is Montgomery 's native tongue , and Robert (unlike Leon ) testi-
fied entirely in English.
a. Alleged conduct by the employees who claimed that they
first got in touch with the Union (Ramirez, Hourruitiner,
and Reyez)
Union Representative Fisher credibly testified that it
was a telephone call from an anonymous employee which
first alerted the Union to the employees' possible interest
in organization . Oram credibly testified that none of the
employees "ever acknowledged the fact of who called."
14 The tally of ballots was signed by Oram as the Union's "authorized
observer." However , this tally does not impeach Oram 's testimony , in view
of his own ineligibility under Board practice to act as observer while the
balloting was in progress . See National Labor Relations Board Field Manu-
al, Secs. 11310 and 11340.9.
15 Indeed, Robert did not even see Oram at the door. I infer that Robert,
as well as Fuste and others, entered the plant before Oram came to the door,
which was not shown to be in view of the locker room or Robert's work
station. -
16 At the heanng , Montgomery initially testified that he had no conversa-
tion with Oram on this occasion. After being shown his affidavit stating that
he did in fact say it few words to Oram , Montgomery testified that his
affidavit (executed a month after the election) was truthful, but that he had
no present recollection that this conversation had occurred. Because of his
demeanor and the fact that the incident had occurred abou( 15 months
before he testified, I do not think that the differences between his initial
testimony and his affidavit reflect on his truthfulness generally , or in this
specific connection . Similarly, I ascribe to mere failure of recollection
Montgomery's testimony that he could not "recall" Montgomery's having
literature in his hand , notwithstanding Oram's credible testimony that he
was distributing leaflets that morning.
11 In the absence of direct testimony from Respondent's witness Baerga
(or any other witness ) that on this occasion Oram made remarks about
initiation fees, I believe Oram's evasiveness about Baerga 's presence on this
occasion is insufficient to warrant an inference that Oram they mentioned
this subject . However , Oram 's testimony as a whole does show that he was
more aware than he was willing to concede of Baerga 's election activity. On
cross-examination , Oram testified that he knew Carlos Baerga by sight
"now that I've seen him today on the witness stand. I didn 't know his name
before." When asked whether Baerga was present with him outside the plant
with a group of employees prior to the election, Oram replied , "'I don't
believe so . . . there was a couple [of employees ] there . I don't remember
Mr. Baerga being there ." However, Oram stated in his preheating affidavit,
about 5 weeks after the election and more than a year prior to the hearing,
that "Carlos" was one of the employees outside the plant on the day of the
election . After Respondent 's counsel drew Oram 's attention to this affidavit,
Oram testified , "I don't recall right now , being so long ago , that if.he-was
there or not. It's possible that he was .... The only time I knew that man's
last name was today."
1140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employee Leon credibly testified that employees Rafael
Ramirez, Oscar Hourruitiner , and Rafael Reyez told him
that they first got in touch with the Union . Ramirez was
discharged in January 1973 , and all of the conduct attribut-
ed to him, Hourruitiner , and Reyez occurred before the
Union filed its petition on January 31, 1973. Ramirez' rela-
tionship to the Union is discussed infra, section II, C.
Employee Robert credibly testified that in January 1973
Ramirez told several other employees that the employees
would not have to pay an initiation fee because they would
be joining as a group.
Employee Leon , whose native language is Spanish, cred-
ibly testified that , in January 1973, when giving Leon cards
to distribute , Ramirez said in Spanish "to give the cards to
the boys and then if they fill out the cards, then they don't
have to pay the initiation ." 19 Employee Corretjer credibly
testified that , in mid-January 1973, Ramirez told him that
if he "signed the card for the union , [he] wouldn't have to
pay $60 for the book . . . . That some agent of the union
had told this to" Ramirez . Corretjer signed a card 2 or 3
days later and returned it to Ramirez . Former employee
Brito credibly testified that in mid-January Ramirez gave
him a card and said that he had "talked with the union and
the union said that if [Brito ] sign the card, [he] could get so
many benefits and [he] don 't have to pay any initiation
fee." Brito signed a card that same evening and returned it
to Ramirez on the following day. Employee Jose Rodri-
guez credibly testified that in mid-January 1973 Ramirez
"came over to me and spoke to me about the card , saying
that a union delegate had given it to him and he told me to
sign it as soon as possible and in that way I would save
myself the initiation fee to enter the union." Ramirez said
the initiation fee was about $50 or $60. Three or four days
later, Rodriguez signed the card , according to him "in
seeing that they were insisting that I sign the card and I
was the only employee that was left without signing the
card . I wasn't going to stand out for that reason and I
didn't want to see myself obligated to pay the initiation
fee." Rodriguez also credibly testified that prior to the elec-
tion he "spoke personally with," inter alia, Ramirez and
Reyez, and "all the employees who would get together in
the morning before going into work," about the Union,
including "about the fact that upon not voting , one would
have to pay for the book ," but he did not specify what any
individual employee said during these conversations. In
mid-January 1973 , Ramirez gave a blank authorization
card to employee Baerga and said , "Well, if you sign now,
you will not have to pay initiation fee . . . I was informed
it costs you $60.00 for initiation fee if you don't sign the
card now ." Baerga took the card home , signed it, and
mailed it. However , he did not regard Ramirez as a Union
representative.19
13 Leon initially testified , in response to questions directly put to him in
English , that Ramirez said to tell "the employees that if they did not sign a
card they would have to pay" dues when the whole thing is over. The
version set forth in the text was tendered in response to counsel 's questions
translated into Spanish . I find the second version to be more accurate be-
cause Leon can understand Spanish more easily than English and because
of the probabilities of the situation.
19 The above findings as to Baerga represent a reconciliation of his testi-
mony and his prehearing affidavit, which states that before the election no
"Union representative" talked about initiation fees.
Employee Fuste credibly testified that on January 19,
employee Hourruitiner told him , "if you don 't sign [the
union card] , you'll have to pay the initiation and if you sign
it, you don't have to pay anything." It appears that Fuste
never signed a card.
b. Alleged conduct by employee who became the Union's
election observer (Leon)
Employee Leon credibly testified that prior to the elec-
tion , on dates which he did not specify , he told four or five
employees that if they joined the Union or signed cards for
the Union they would not have to pay initiation fees 20
Employee Fuste credibly testified that about January 8 or
9, when he was out sick , Leon came to his home, tendered
him a union authorization card , and said , "If you sign it,
you don 't have to pay the initiation and if you don't sign it,
you will have to pay it . . . Ramirez gave [the card] to me;
the union man gave it to him so that he should have it
arrive to you." 21 Still according to Fuste 's credible testimo-
ny, he did not sign a card, but relayed a report of Leon's
statements to three employees (identified only by their first
names), who told him that "the same thing had been done
to them," without identifying the people who had given
them the cards.
I conclude from credited portions of the testimony of
employees Corretjer and Robert that Leon was present,
and did not demur, during the previously described inci-
dent when employee Ramirez said in January 1973 that the
employees would not have to pay an initiation fee because
they would be joining as a group.22 Employee Jose Rodri-
guez credibly testified that in mid-February, after signing
an authorization card given him by Ramirez, "I spoke with
Ramon Fuste , Gabriel Leon about that we had to sign the
card or if, on the contrary, we didn't sign, we would have
to pay the initiation fee." Rodriguez ' testimony does not
show what Leon said.
About 3 hours before the polls opened on the morning of
the election, Leon was named as the Union 's election ob-
server by agreement between Oram, Leon himself, and
other employees . Employee Fuste credibly testified that
later that morning, about 9:30 a .m., Leon told him, "Don't
forget that the person who votes for the union doesn't have
to pay for the book that is worth $60. Whoever doesn't
vote-whoever votes for the union doesn't have to pay for
the book that is worth $60. Whoever doesn't vote for the
union will have to pay for the book that is worth $60."
There is no evidence that Fuste then knew that Leon would
be a union observer . Ths polls opened about 2 hours lat-
er.23
20 He further credibly testified that he was given blank authorization
cards by employee Ramirez , who told him to tell the employees that if they
filled out the cards they would not have to pay initiation fees . The signifi-
cance vet non of this testimony is discussed infra, sec. 11, C.
21 The significance vet non of the reference to Ramirez is discussed infra,
sec. 11, C.
22 My finding as to the substance of these remarks and that it was Rami-
rez who made them is based on the testimony of Robert , whose memory
impressed me as more exact than Corretjer's. My finding as to the date is
based on Ramirez's January 1973 discharge . My finding that Leon was
present is based on Corretjer's undenied testimony The significance vet non
of the fact that it was Ramirez who made these remarks is discussed infra,
sec. 11, C.
23 After the election , the employees selected Leon to act as their steward.
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC. 1141
c. Alleged conduct by other employees
(1) Credited testimony for Respondent
Employee Fuste credibly testified that on January 27,
1973, employee Baerga 24 told him to sign a union card
because "If you don't sign the card, you have to pay the
initiation and if you sign it , you don't have to pay any-
thing." Fuste further credibly testified that in mid or late
February Baerga told him, "vote for the union so you don't
have to pay for a book that costs $60. On the contrary,
you're going to have to pay the $60." 25 As previously not-
ed, employee Jose Rodriguez credibly testified that in mid-
February 1973 Fuste, Baerga, and Monaco "were having a
discussion with, speaking, saying that whoever didn't vote
for the union would have to pay [$60 or $70] for the book."
Rodriguez further credibly testified that 5 or 6 days before
the election, Baerga "told me that to vote for the union,
that if I didn't vote I would have to pay for the book, that
a delegate of the union had told him that." Employee Leon
credibly testified that a "few times" prior to the election,
once in February and the others on undated occasions,
Baerga told him that initiations had to be paid, that people
who didn't enter the Union had to pay initiation of $55 or
$60.26 Baerga credibly testified that "as often as [he] could
see them," he told employees Fuste, Cardo, Rodriguez, and
"a few others that they should join the union and they
could get the benefits . If they don't they have to pay."
Employee Jose Rodriguez credibly testified that, about
the beginning of March, he had a conversation with em-
ployee Manuel Jorajuria "About the coercion that they
had done against us if we refused to vote for the union, we
would have to pay for the book."
Former employee Brito testified that in February "ev-
erybody was talking about the union, all discussions were
about the union . . . before we start to work, in coffee
break, at lunchtime, then another coffee break, and all the
time in the factory. . . . [The employees] were talking
about the union, the union benefits , about that if we join
the union that we don't have to pay any initiation fee. The
person who doesn't join the union would have to pay the
24 Fuste identified this employee as "Carlos Vargas," but testified that
Fuste had always addressed him merely as "Carlos." Counsel stipulated that
Baerga was the only "Carlos" on the payroll. Moreover, as indicated infra,
Baerga partially corroborated Fuste.
25 Fuste , who was called by Respondent , also testified that he reported
this conversation to employee Robert , who said, "If [Baerga] told you that,
it's because the union delegate told him to tell it to you," and that "it was
true that if [Fuste ] voted for the union , [he] wouldn 't have to pay the
$60." Robert , who was called by counsel for the General Counsel , testified
that he told Fuste that he, Robert , was going to ask Baerga about the mat-
ter; that Robert asked Baerga , "Where you find out this matter about we
had to pay an initiation fee if you no join the union?"; and that Baerga
"says this only for he wants to say so , he never heard about from any
member of the union . . . Nobody told him from the union that . . . He say
nobody from the union member tell me that , all I do is because I want to do
it because I would like to scare the guys, that 's all." Baerga, who was called
by Respondent , was not asked about the conversation described by Robert.
On the basis of the witnesses' demeanor, I credit Robert. However , there is
no evidence that he told Fuste about this conversation with Baerga.
26 Baerga 's February remarks purported to be, but were not, a translation
of remarks by Fisher . See supra, sec. II, B, 2, b.
$60 for the book." On the basis of this testimony and the
previously summarized, credited testimony about employ-
ee discussion of initiation fees, I conclude that during a
period which extended beyond the January 31 filing of the
petition and lasted until the election, a number of the em-
ployees frequently discussed initiation fees between them-
selves ; that much of this discussion was to the effect that
employees who signed union cards and/or voted for the
Union would not have to pay initiation fees of $60 or $70
whereas others would; and that some of it was to the effect
that initiation fees would have to be paid by employees
who did not join the Union, but not by employees who did
join.
(2) Discredited testimony for Respondent
(a) Regarding Montgomery's alleged statements
Former employee Brito further testified that during a
lunch break employee Montgomery told employee Joraju-
ria, and others whom Brito did not identify, that "if you
join the union, you don't have to pay an initiation fee, but
if you don't join the union you have to pay the $60.00 fee."
Brito vacillated in his testimony about whether this alleged
conversation occurred before or after the election. Employ-
ee Rafael Rivera testified that during a February 1973
lunchbreak, Montgomery said-in the presence of, inter
alia, employees Jorajuria, Leon, Robert, Brito, and Fuste-
that "if we join the union that we don't have to pay for the
book, the only one who have to pay is that doesn't join the
union." Rivera's prehearing affidavit states, "I never heard
anything about the Union book or its cost." Montgomery
(called by counsel for the General Counsel) testified that
prior to the election he had no discussions with any of the
employees about initiation fees , and described a conversa-
tion when Jorajuria said he was not interested in a union
because "you have to be a socialist." Robert ( a witness
called by counsel for the General Counsel) testified that
with exceptions immaterial here, prior to the election he
did not hear any discussion among employees about initia-
tion fees . Counsel for the General Counsel called Leon as a
witness , but did not ask him about Montgomery 's alleged
remarks??
I conclude that Montgomery did not make the remarks
which Brito and Rivera attributed to him. In the first place,
Montgomery is a fairly intelligent man who speaks English
as a native language, and I think it inherently unlikely that
he made such remarks, which are senseless if taken liter-
ally. Moreover, Rivera's testimony in this respect is square-
ly contradicted by his prehearing affidavit; whereas the
prehearing affidavits of Montgomery and Robert, although
in other respects inconsistent with their testimony (supra,
fns. 11 and 12), are not inconsistent as to this matter. Addi-
tionally, Brito vacillated as to the date of Montgomery's
alleged remarks. Further, I found Montgomery's and
Robert's demeanor more impressive than Rivera's and
Brito's.
27 Nor did Respondent ask its witness Fuste about the matter . However.
Fuste is a Spanish-speaking employee who testified entirely through an in-
terpreter; and, because Montgomery does not speak or understand Spanish,
any such conversation would necessarily have been carried on in English.
1142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Regarding Robert's alleged statements
Former employee Brito testified on direct examination
that in early February he saw employees Robert and Hour-
ruitiner standing outside the plant with Fisher. Still on di-
rect examination , Brito went on to say that later that same
day, Robert "told me that the union say, if we join the
union, we don't have to pay any initiation fee but those
who doesn't join the union, will have to pay the $60.00
book." On cross-examination, Brito testified that this con-
versation with Robert occurred a couple of days before the
election, which was held on March 7. Brito then went on to
testify that Robert asked him whether he had signed a
union card, that Brito replied he had, and that Robert then
said "that we have to join the union because if we join the
union now, we don't have to pay any initiation fee but if
we don't join the union now, we will have to pay the $60.00
initiation fee." On further cross-examination, Brito testi-
fied that before the election Robert said that "I [Brito]
have to vote for the union" because of its many benefits.
When asked whether there were other reasons , Brito re-
plied, "There were other reasons that-he told me that the
union agent told him that if we-that if we vote for the
union , we don't have to pay any initiation fee." When
asked whether Robert had said "if we vote for the union"
or "if we join the union," Brito initially said, "16 we join, I
think";28 then, in response to suggestions from me and
counsel for the General Counsel, replied "both;" then vol-
unteered, "I think it's almost the same word, vote or join";
then said he considered them the same ; and then said that
Robert used the word vote at one time and join at another.
In response to a leading question on redirect examination,
Brito testified that the Fisher-Robert-Hourruitiner conver-
sation occurred in late January or early February. Hourrui-
tiner did not testify. Fisher testified that prior to the elec-
tion he never discussed initiation fees with any employees,
and Robert that prior to the election he never discussed
initiation fees with any union representatives. Robert, who
was called as a witness by counsel for the General Counsel,
denied talking to Brito about the Union before the elec-
tion . Robert testified on direct examination that prior to
the election, he never talked to any other employees (with
exceptions immaterial here) about initiation fees, had no
discussions with employee Ramirez about the subject, and
did not hear Ramirez speaking to other employees about
the subject. On cross-examination , Robert admitted stating
in his pretrial affidavit that prior to the election Ramirez
told him that the employees would not have to pay initia-
tion fees because they would be joining as a group; and
initially admitted and then denied discussing the Union's
advantages with Brito before the election.
Particularly because Brito was Robert's helper, I believe
that Robert did in fact discuss the Union with him prior to
the election. However, I conclude that Robert did not
make the foregoing statements attributed to him by Brito.
a The transcript appears to ascribe this remark to me . As is clear from the
context , the remark was in fact made by Bnto . The transcript is hereby
corrected accordingly.
Robert impressed me as too intelligent to have either ac-
cepted from others or conveyed to Brito the senseless state-
ment, initially testified to by Brito, that employees who
joined the Union would not have to pay initiation fees but
those who did not join, would have to pay.29 Not until his
cross-examination did Brito improve the coherence of his
version of Robert's remarks by adding the word "now" at
two critical points; and during his subsequent testimony he
never again adverted to the "nows" or their equivalent.
Further, I find inherently unlikely Brito's testimony that
immediately after being told that Brito had already signed
a card, Robert advanced to him arguments directed at in-
ducing such action, particularly at inducing such action
"now." Brito's subsequent assertions that Robert simulta-
neously or on other occasions used such arguments to urge
a union vote impressed me as afterthoughts. Moreover,
Brito initially dated the conversation as having occurred in
early February, then as just 2 days before the March 7
election , and then as late January (that is, on a date when
such conduct was likely too remote to warrant invalidating
the election) 30 or early February. Furthermore, the se-
quence of events described in Brito's testimony suggests
that Robert obtained his figure of a $60 initiation fee from
or in the presence of Fisher; yet it is undenied that the fee
was in fact $50, and it seems highly improbable either that
Fisher would have led Robert to believe it was $60, or that
Robert would have forgotten the correct amount during
the short intervening period. For these reasons, and after
considering the witnesses' demeanor, I do not believe
Brito's testimony in this respect, and to this extent credit
Robert's testimony about his preelection conversations
with Brito.
(c) Regarding Rivera's alleged conversations
Employee Rivera testified that prior to the election, he
had conversations with employees Fuste and Pardoa to the
effect that employees who did not join the Union would
have to pay "$60 for the book." Pardoa did not testify.
Fuste testified for Respondent, but did not corroborate
Rivera's testimony. Rivera's prehearing affidavit states that
prior to the election he "never heard anything about the
union book or its cost." In view of this affidavit, the fact
that Rivera's testimony stands uncorroborated, and his de-
meanor, I do not credit his testimony in this respect.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
In N.L.R.B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270
(1973), the Supreme Court held that the Board should set
aside a union-won election preceded by union offers to
waive initiation fees for those who signed union "recogni-
29 While Robert's limited ability to understand English might account for
his getting such an initial impression of an English statement regarding
initiation fees , I believe him intelligent enough to realize thereafter that he
must have misunderstood the English words, because the speaker would not
likely have intended to say anything so foolish. Because I infer that any
Robert-Brito conversation about initiation fees would have been carried on
in Spanish , both employees' native language , I do not believe that Brito's
testimony in this respect flowed from either an inaccurate choice of words
by Robert or a misunderstanding on Brito's part of what Robert told him.
30 See infra, fns. 36 and 46.
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC. 1143
tion slips" before the election. The Court found " legiti-
mate" the Union's "interest in waiving the initiation fee,
when the Union has not yet been chosen as a bargaining
representative, because 'employees otherwise sympathetic
to the Union might well have been reluctant to pay out
money before the Union had done anything for them.
Waiver of the [initiation fees] would remove this artificial
obstacle to their endorsement of the Union."' However,
the Court stated that "this interest can be preserved as well
by waiver of initiation fees available not only to those who
have signed up with the Union before an election but also
to those who join after the election. The limitation imposed
by the Union in this case-to those joining before the elec-
tion-is necessary only because it serves the additional
purpose of affecting the union organizational campaign
and the election." The Board has read Savair as rendering
proper a preelection offer to waive initiation fees where the
offer extended to all eligible voters and was not limited to
those employees who signed up with the Union before the
election.3
As found supra, in February 1973, employee Monaco
remarked to employee Brito, in English and in Union Rep-
resentative Fisher's hearing, that "if we join the Union .. .
we don't have to pay any initiation fee." I find that this
statement was made under circumstances where Fisher
would be expected to disavow it if it were not true, and
therefore, that it bound the Union 32 However, the state-
ment was literally true with respect to all eligible voters as
well as all other employees hired before a contract was
signed, accurately described a valid union policy, and nei-
ther literally nor by implication asserted that eligible voters
would indeed have to pay initiation fees unless they joined
by a particular date. Accordingly, and although ambigui-
ties in the Union 's waiver offer about whether it extends to
postelection signatories are to be resolved against the
Union,33 I conclude that this statement did not affect the
validity of the election.34
As found supra, prior to the election employees Ramirez,
Hourruitiner, Leon, and Baerga made various statements
to their fellow employees about initiation fees . Many of
these statements would constitute objectionable conduct if
made by a union agent after the filing of the petition 33 I
31 See , e.g., Endless Mold, Inc., 210 NLRB 159 (1974); Lawrence Security,
Inc., 210 NLRB 1048 (1974); Wabash Transformer Corp., 210 NLRB 462
(1974); Con-Pac, Inc., 210 NLRB 466 (1974).
32 N.L.R.B. v. Urban Telephone Co., 499 F.2d 239 (C.A. 7, 1974); Bonnaz
Embroideries Tucking and Pleating and Allied Crafts Union, Local 66, Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (V. & D. Machine Embroidery Co.),
134 NLRB 879, 880 (1961); Local 5881, United Mine Workers (Grundy Min-
ing Co.), 130 NLRB 1181, 1182, enfd . 296 F .2d 734 (C.A. 6, 1961).
3Inland Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc., 211 NLRB 724, (1974); cf. Ban-
cro7t Mfg. Company, Inc., 210 NLRB 1007 (1974).
Because the initiation -fee waiver offer in fact extended to all eligible
voters, I regard as immaterial to the election's validity the statement 's fail-
ure to point out that initiation fees would have to be paid by employees who
could not vote in the election-namely , those who were hired after a con-
tract was signed . Cf. Coleman Co., Inc., 212 NLRB 927 ( 1974), where the
Union's statement that initiation fees would be waived for "all present em-
ployees who make application for charter membership ," without specifying
when such application would have to be made or what "charter member-
ship" was, was susceptible of the construction that eligible employee voters
would benefit by making a union commitment before the election, to avoid
paying the initiation fee.
find that, standing alone, they did not invalidate the elec-
tion for the following reasons: (1) all of Ramirez' and
Hourruitiner's statements were made before the election
petition was filed;36 (2) all but one of Leon's statements
either were shown to have been made before the petition
was filed, or were not shown to have been made af-
terward;37 (3) some of Baerga's conduct occurred before
the filing of the petition'38 or was not shown to have oc-
curred afterward (see supra, fn. 37),39 and (4) none of these
employees was shown to have been a union agent.
Although making no claim that Leon's appointment as a
union observer on the morning of the election rendered his
statements about initiation fees attributable to the Union,40
Respondent does contend that employee Ramirez' state-
ments on this subject are attributable to the Union. Rami-
rez did not testify, and there is no direct evidence that any
union representative made any remarks to him about initi-
ation fees4t Fisher and Oram testified that they gave no
more than one extra union card to any employee except
one, who was given 5 to 10 cards because he asked for
them. Both Fisher and Oram- testified that they could not
remember the name of this last employee, but that they
were fairly sure it was not Ramirez. However, I am satis-
fied that this employee was in fact Ramirez, in view of
Leon's credible testimony that Ramirez gave him several
blank cards to distribute and the credible testimony of sev-
eral other employees-that Ramirez gave them blank cards
to sign. Moreover, I am persuaded that in testifying that
this employee was not Ramirez, Fisher and Oram were
testifying untruthfully rather than merely mistakenly. Be-
cause Ramirez' January 1973 discharge led the Union to
file an unfair labor practice charge processed by Fisher,
because of Fisher's and Oram's somewhat evasive testimo-
ny about the matter, and because of their demeanor when
giving such testimony, I do not believe that they could not
recall him as an individual. Further, I infer from their un-
truthful replies in this respect that they were attempting to
conceal that they or one of them did in fact make state-
35 More specifically, Ramirez ' statements to Leon, Corretjer, Brito, Rodri-
guez, and Baerga to the effect that if they signed union cards they would not
have to pay an initiation fee; Hourruitiner's and Baerga 's similar statements
to Fuste ; Leon's similar statements to Fuste and four or five others ; Leon's
statement to Fuste that employees who voted for the Union would not have
to pay a $60 initiation fee, but those who did not vote for the Union would
have to pay the fee; Baerga's similar statements to Jose Rodriguez, and
Baerga 's statements to Leon that people who did not enter the Union had to
pay initiation of $55 or $60.
However, the election would not be set aside because of statements, like
those made by Ramirez, that the employees would not have to pay an
initiation fee because they would be joining as--a group. See supra, fn. 31.
36 See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 138 NLRB 453 (1962); Gate of Spain
Restaurant Corp., 192 NLRB 1091 (1971).
37 The burden rested on Respondent to show that such statements were
made during the critical period . Garden City Fan and Blower Company, 196
NLRB 777, 777-778 (1972). -
38 More specifically , one of his statements to Fuste.
19 More specifically , all but one of his statements to Leon , and certain
statements made to Fuste , Cardo, Rodriguez, and "a few others" "as often
as he could see them."
40 See Bridgeport Castings Co., 109 NLRB 749, 751-752 (1954).
41 Respondent discharged Ramirez 17 months prior to the hearing, and
there is no evidence that after the dismissal of the charge based on his
termination he had any further connection with or interest in the Union.
Accordingly, I reject Respondent's contention that his failure to testify calls
for an adverse inference against the Union or counsel for the General Coun-
sel.
1144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meats to Ramirez about initiation fees; and to this extent,
I discredit their testimony that prior to the election they
never discussed initiation fees with any employees 42
However, I do not think that Respondent has thereby
sustained its burden of showing that Ramirez ' statements
to employees about initiation fees are attributable to the
Union. Fisher's credible testimony that the Union's bylaws
permit the Union to reduce the regular initiation fee for
organizational purposes , and the credited testimony re-
garding his statements to the employees shortly after the
election, establish that the Union was not in fact following
an improper initiation-fee practice. Moreover, Ramirez'
statements to the employees about the matter were mutual-
ly inconsistent , and, indeed, some of them accurately re-
flected the policy which the Union followed in fact. Fur-
thermore, Ramirez' statements that the Union's initiation
fees were $60 or $70 inaccurately described the Union's
real $50 fee , and I think it inherently improbable that any
misrepresentation that the Union may have made to Rami-
rez about initiation fees would have included this particu-
lar misstatement . Because of such inconsistencies and inac-
curacies , because Ramirez' assertions to some employees
about the source of his initiation fee statements are hearsay
as to the identity of the source, and because of his fre-
quently vague descriptions of his alleged source ,43 I find
such assertions nonprobative with respect to the existence
or contents of communications between Ramirez and
union agents . Accordingly, I decline to find that Ramirez'
inaccurate statements that the Union followed an invalid
waiver policy echoed statements made to him by a union
representative , or were prompted by a union
42 However , in thus discrediting their testimony in this respect , I do not
rely on their diaries and Fisher 's weekly work reports , all of which were
received into evidence after they testified . Fisher's work reports and diary
corroborate his testimony about how often he came to the plant . Fishee s
and Oram's diaries do indicate that Oram may have paid a March 2 visit
alone and about which they did not testify . However , both union represen-
tatives were testifying entirely from memory about events which had oc-
curred at least 14 months earlier ; Fisher credibly testified that he had mis-
laid his 1973 diary , which he did not locate until after he testified; and
Oram credibly testified that his diary was then in his tax accountant's custo-
dy. Moreover, I see no reason why either of them should have deliberately
concealed a visit on March 2, after most of the allegedly objectionable
statements had already been made.
Nor do I regard Fisher 's testimony that he never conducted or scheduled
any preelection meetings among Respondent's employees as impeached by
his work report for the week ending January 19 . This entry states, "Visited
and handled shops at Rheingold Brewery, Schaefer Brewery, Berge Ind.,
Breakstone Foods and Filtron Corp . Attended meeting reorganizing Hand-
ing leaflets at Allied Metal Hose reorganizing this shop . Renegotiating con-
tract at Central Molding Corp." (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent 's brief
characterizes the "meeting" in the emphasized portion as an "organizational
meeting," and asserts that it "clearly pertains to Allied Metal Hose, since, as
may be gathered from reviewing Fisher's Weekly Activity Reports for Janu-
ary, February , and March," whose sole reference to Schaefer appears on the
January 19 report, "the other corporations listed were organized IAM
shops." (This work report was offered into evidence after the last testimo-
nial hearing day, and no explanation from Fisher of this entry was ever
tendered .) However , this entry is at least equally consistent with the hypoth-
esis that Fisher then attended a meeting of professional organizers (from
District 15 itself, its affiliates , or other labor organizations) to discuss orga-
nizational techniques . Moreover , not a single employee of Respondent testi-
fied that he had ever attended or even been invited to any preelection orga-
nizational meeting.
43 "Some agent of the union"; "the Union"; "a union delegate" (source of
card only); "I was informed."
representative's suggestion that Ramirez use an initiation
fee argument in attempting to secure employee signatures.
Rather , and notwithstanding Leon 's credible testimony
that Ramirez frequently talked to Fisher outside the
plant,44 I find that Respondent has failed to show that Ra-
mirez' statements in this respect stemmed from any source
other than private motives known only to him. Moreover, I
credit Fisher's testimony , which is not directly contra-
dicted, that he never selected any particular group of em-
ployees to act as organizers , and never instructed anyone
in the plant to act on the Union 's behalf . Additionally, I
credit Oram's testimony, which is likewise not directly con-
tradicted , that when giving out blank cards to employees
he never told them to assist him in organizing Respondent.
Accordingly, the record fails to show that in asking for a
number of blank union cards and subsequently urging
others to sign and distribute them , Ramirez was acting in
any capacity other than as a pure volunteer who sought to
further the interests of himself and his fellow employees, as
he saw them, by soliciting authorization cards through
techniques thought of and developed by himself alone.
Further, there is no direct evidence that Oram or Fisher
knew about Ramirez' improper representations regarding
initiation fees; and I do not infer such knowledge absent
evidence that these English-speaking union representatives
were ever in the plant where the employees were discussing
them (in. Spanish or otherwise ) or were present during the
Hispanic Ramirez' solicitation elsewhere . For the fore-
going reasons, I reject Respondent 's contention that Rami-
rez' statements about initiation fees were attributable to
the Union, and, therefore , its similar statements made by
other employees on the basis of Ramirez' representations
to them.4
Respondent's presentation of testimony regarding pre-
petition statements , and regarding statements made by per-
sons whose conduct was not even arguably attributable to
the Union, led me to expect a contention by Respondent
that even if no initiation-fee statements were attributable
to the Union , the election should be set aside because an
election atomsphere of fear, coercion, and confusion was
allegedly created by rank -and-file employees' postpetition
statements in light of prepetition statements connected
with initiation fees .46 While Respondent's posthearing brief
w To this extent , I discredit Fisher's testimony that no particular individ-
uals talked to him at the plant . Further , as a matter of inference, I find that
the progress of the organizing campaign was a frequent subject of Fisher's
discussions with Ramirez.
However, Leon did not tender probative testimony that Ramirez "fre-
quently reported to Fisher concerning the current status of the Union's
organizational activities inside the plant ," that Ramirez "acted as a conduit
of information during the Union 's organizing drive and frequently relayed
information from the employees to the Union and, in return , from the
Union to the employees ," or that he "periodically relayed information con-
cerning pro and antiunion sentiment in the plant which he had obtained
from Leon to Fisher, and also dutifully conveyed Fisher 's instructions back
to Leon." Leon testified that he did not overhear any conversations between
Ramirez and Fisher.
43 See Bufkor-Pelzner Division, Inc., 197 NLRB 950, 950, 954 (1972), enfd.
84 LRRM 2432 (C.A. 9, 1973); Bridgeport Castings, supra, 109 NLRB at
751-752 (1954); J. J Newberry Co., 100 NLRB 84, 86 (1952).
46 In evaluating election objections , the Board will consider prepetition
conduct insofar as it lends meaning and dimension to related postpetition
conduct . Stevenson Equipment Co., 174 NLRB 865, 866 , In. 1 (1969 ). See also
Consolidated Rendering Company, d/b/a Burlington Rendering Co., 161
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC. 1145
does not in terms so contend, I believe the issue is suffi-
ciently presented by the record to warrant exploration.
As to objections based on preelection rumors among the
employees, the Second Circuit has stated (N.L.R.B. v.
Staub Cleaners, Inc. and Ben Barnet Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d
1086, 1088, (1969) cert. denied 397 U.S. 1038):
The Board has been reluctant in the past to give the
same weight to anonymous or third party attempts to
influence the outcome of certification elections that it
gives to improper efforts by the parties themselves.
[Citing cases.] Even where the conduct condemned is
the product of rank-and-file Union members, the
Board has been hesitant to set aside an election in the
absence of a showing that they acted at the command
or urging of Union officials. See Orleans Mfg. Co., 120
NLRB 630 (1958):
While the Board will consider conduct not attrib-
utable to any of the parties in determining whether
an election should be set aside, the Board accords
less weight to such conduct than to conduct of the
parties.
See also E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 105
NLRB 710 (1953). The rationale for such a distinction
is soundly based. Generally, prejudicial remarks com-
ing from anonymous or non-authoritative sources are
apt to be more lightly regarded by employees than
those backed up by the employer or the union. Allega-
tions by one who controls the conditions of employ-
ment, or who seeks to participate in that control are
more likely to carry weight. Moreover, where one of
the parties is directly at fault, the most effective deter-
rent to future misconduct is to deny that party what it
sought to gain improperly. But, when unknown third
parties are responsible for the improper comments,
they have little concern with the expense and annoy-
ance incurred by repeating the election, and the
NLRB order in such a case carries with it no deterrent
effect.
Moreover, "any other rule would invite third parties or
one of the protagonists who doubted the election outcome
to anonymously create incidents and then attempt to use
them to set aside the election." N.L.R.B. v. Monroe Auto
Equipment Co., Hartwell Division, 470 F.2d 1329, 1332 (C.
A. 5, 1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 928 (1973). See also Price
Brothers Company, 211 NLRB 822 (1974).
Nonetheless, the Board will set aside an election on the
basis of third-party conduct which created a "general at-
mosphere of fear and confusion which precluded the hold-
ing of a free election." James Lees and Sons Company, 130
NLRB 290, 291 (1961). In determining whether preelec-
tion rumors reached this level, the Board considers, so far
as appears relevant here, (1) the seriousness of the suppos-
edly threatened harm, (2) the likelihood that the employees
will attribute the rumored threats to one of the parties, (3)
that party's power to carry them out, (4) the believability of
the rumors, (5) whether the allegedly objectionable rumors
were counteracted by other rumors, (6) the proportion of
the employees exposed to the allegedly objectionable ru-
mors, and (7) the frequency with which they were repeat-
ed.47 Moreover, (8) Savair, supra, indicates that the size of
the plurality is likewise to be taken into account."
Factors 6 through 8 are sufficiently established by this
record. During the critical period, at least 6 49 of the ap-
proximately 25 persons eligible to vote in an election whose
results might have been reversed by a change in 2 votes
were exposed, sometimes repeatedly, to allegedly objec-
tionable statements by fellow employees regarding initia-
tion fees.
The evidence regarding factors 2 through 5 contains cer-
tain deficiencies, although perhaps not fatal ones. Thus, it
was rumored that initiation fees would be required not
only from those who did not sign union cards (whom the
Union could obviously identify) but also from those who
failed to vote for the Union (whose identity would be con-
cealed by the secrecy of the ballot) 50 Further, it cannot be
assumed that none of the employees recognized as garbled,
because senseless , the rumor that those who joined the
Union would not have to pay initiation fees, but those who
did not join would have to pay them: Moreover, the inac-
curate postpetition rumors about the Union's initiation
fees may well have been at least partly counteracted by
Monaco's essentially accurate postpetition statements (im-
pliedly approved by Fisher) that employees who joined the
Union would not have to pay initiation fees, by Ramirez'
accurate prepetition statements to some employees that the
employees would not have to pay any initiation fees be-
cause they would be joining as a group, and by the fact
that the inaccurate rumors sometimes contradicted each
other.51 In addition, most of the postpetition-as well as
the prepetition-rumors did not purport to come from any-
one who had any particular connection with the Union or
any special knowledge about the initiation fee policy of
which the employees were hearing several different ver-
sions.
However, it is principally the content of the instant ru-
mors which leads me to conclude that they were insuffi-
cient to create an "atmosphere of fear, coercion, and con-
fusion ." Virtually all the elections set aside under this
rubric on the basis of third-party conduct have heretofore
involved violence or threats of violence, threats of job loss
on a mass scale, or highly inflammatory rumors on subjects
(e.g., racial matters irrelevant to the election issues. 2 While
I do not suggest that no other kinds of third-party conduct
could call for setting an election aside,53 the facts of these
prior decisions do indicate the type of third-party conduct
regarded as "of such nature as to preclude the exercise by
07 See, e.g., the cases cited infra, fns. 50, 51, and 52.
48 Cf. Central Photocolor Co., Inc., 195 NLRB 839 (1972).
49 Namely, Fuste , Leon , Baerga , Rodriguez , Jorajuria , and Brito.
30 Cf. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 186 NLRB 540 (1970); Price Brothers,
supra, 211 NLRB 822 (1974).
31 Cf. General Housing Industries, Inc., 197 NLRB 24 (1974).
NLRB I, 16-17 (1966), enfd. 386 F.2d 699 (C.A. 2, 1967). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. 52 See, e.g., Al Long, Inc., 173 NLRB 447 (1968); Universal Manufacturing
Dee's of New Jersey, Inc., 395 F.2d 112, 115-116 (C.A. 3, 1968); N.L.R.B. v. Corporation of Mississippi, 156 NLRB 1459 (1966).
Blades Manufacturing Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1003 (C.A. 8, 1965). s See, e.g, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 120 NLRB 765,
766-767 (1958).
1146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the unit employees of a free choice in the election" (Reed
Seismic Co., 182 NLRB 158 (1970), enfd . in relevant
part 440 F.2d 598 (C.A. 5, 1971) ). I conclude that the
third-party pressures exerted herein did not render a free
and rational choice impossible . These pressures consisted
of (1) endorsements which may have been regarded by the
endorsers (although erroneously) as having been "bought"
from them by the Union for $50 to $70, but which nonethe-
less may have been accepted by their fellows as unbought
views worthy of respect ; (2) some employees' possible
sense of moral obligation to vote for the Union after sign-
ing a Union card in the belief (although erroenous) that the
Union had "bought" their signatures for $50 to $70; some
employees' possible belief that the choice expressed in their
individual ballots, although secret, would nonetheless
cause them to lose or gain $50 to $70 if the Union was
voted in; and (4) some employees' possible fear (based
upon the erroneous belief that the Union was trying to
"buy" endorsements and votes for $50 to $70) that if they
did not sign they would face a "wrathful union regime
should the union win." See Savair, supra. I do not think the
cumulation of these possible pressures resulting from erro-
neous employee rumors rises to the level of the third-party
conduct which prior cases have regarded as invalidating a
Board election where the parties themselves have engaged
in no improper conduct.
Moreover, Savair 's holding that a union has a "legiti-
mate interest" in waiving initiation fees from employees
for whom the union had not yet done anything, and that
such a waiver would remove an "artificial obstacle to [such
employees'] endorsement of the union," points toward cau-
tion in setting aside a Board election on the basis of rumors
like those presented here . The instant record establishes
that this Union's proper initiation-fee policy designed to
protect this legitimate interest was so susceptible of em-
ployee misinterpretation that a number of individual em-
ployees gave different versions (mostly wrong) at different
times . Indeed, the 4 employees who related what Fisher
said at the postelection meeting at the bar gave four differ-
ent versions of what was said about initiation fees, and two
of them gave still different accounts in their preheating
affidavits (supra, fn. 5). The fact that such misapprehen-
sions developed among employees whose intelligence im-
pressed me as average or better u lends weight to the con-
clusion that Board readiness to set union-won elections
aside because of unfounded rumors alleging an initiation-
fee policy condemned by Savair would seriously jeopardize
union organizational interests whose legitimacy Savair ex-
plicitly sought to preserve . If employee misunderstandings
on this subject are sufficient to void a union election victo-
ry, the ease with which they develop-an ease vividly illus-
trated by the record herein-would deter wholly proper
waivers by suggesting that a union offers any such waivers
at its peril, even where (as is true here, so far as the record
shows) employee misunderstandings of that policy were
H Such misapprehensions cannot be ascribed mostly to the language
problem, which in any event is fairly common in certain areas and indus-
tries . The victims included Montgomery, who spoke only English (supra, fn.
5), as well as bilingual employees and employees who spoke little or no
English.
never drawn to its attention before the election was held.
In this connection , I attach significance to the absence of
evidence that any employee asked either the Union or Re-
spondent to clarify the initiation-fee matter , even though a
number of individual employees not only heard but ten-
dered mutually inconsistent versions . It seems to me likely
that if the employees had been seriously concerned about
the matter, at least some of them would have tried to get
the matter straightened out.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees employed
by Respondent at its premises located at 37-46 9th Street
and 37-29 9th Street, Long Island City,,New York, exclu-
sive of all office clerical employees , sales employees, pro-
fessional employees , guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act.
4. Since June 29, 1973, the above-named labor organiza-
tion has been and is now the certified and exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit
for the purposes of collective-bargaining within the mean-
ing of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about July 16, 1973, and at all times
thereafter, to bargain collectively with the above-named
labor organization as the exclusive representative of all the
employees of Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practic-
es within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that
Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom and,
upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate
unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such an
understanding in a signed agreement . I shall also recom-
mend that Respondent be required to post appropriate no-
tices . Because Spanish is the native language of most of
Respondent's employees, and some speak no English, such
notices shall be in Spanish as well as English.
In order to insure that the employees in the appropriate
unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargain-
ing agent for the period provided by law, the initial period
of certification is to be construed as beginning on the date
Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with the
Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the
appropriate unit. See Mar Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136
NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a Lamar Ho-
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC.
tel, 140 NLRB 226 (1962), enfd . 328 F .2d 600 (C.A. 5,
1964), cert . denied 379 U.S. 817; Burnett Construction Co.,
149 NLRB 1419 , 1421, enfd . 350 F .2d 57 (C.A. 10, 1965).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and upon the entire record , and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended
Order:
ORDER55
Respondent Allied Metal Hose Company, Inc., its offi-
cers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with District No. 15, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by Respondent at its premises located at 37-46
9th Street and 37-29 9th Street, Long Island City,
New York, exclusive of all office clerical employees,
sales employees , professional employees , guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any manner interfering with the above -named la-
bor organization 's efforts to bargain collectively with Re-
spondent.
2. Take the following action which is necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor
organization as the exclusive representative in the aforesaid
appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay , wages , hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an
understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Long Island City, New York, facilities
copies , in English and Spanish , of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 56Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being
duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be post-
ed by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall
1147
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29 in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.
55 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102
.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
56 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of The
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concern-
ing rates of pay, wages, hours , and other terms and
conditions of employment with District No . 15, Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with District
15's efforts to bargain collectively with us.
WE WILL , upon request , bargain with District 15 as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the
unit described below , with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, and, if an understanding is reached, em-
body such understanding in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All our production and maintenance employees
at our premises located at 37-46 9th Street and
37-29 9th Street, Long Island City, New York, ex-
clusive of all office clerical employees , sales employ-
ees, professional employees , guards, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
ALLIED METAL HOSE COMPANY, INC.