Alaska Barite Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 27, 1972

197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

ALASKA BARITE COMPANY 1023
Alaska Barite Company and Local 302, International
Union of Operating Engineers . Case 19-CA-5325
June 27, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
Respondent, however, has denied the commission of
unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to this matter
was held at Sitka, Alaska, on October 28, 1971, before me.
The General Counsel and Respondent were represented by
counsel. Each party was afforded a full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. Since the
bearing's close, a brief has been received from Respon-
dent's counsel; this brief has been duly considered.
On March 31, 1972, Trial Examiner Maurice M.
Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders
that the Respondent, Alaska Barite Company, Castle
Island No. 2, near Petersburg, Alaska, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAURICE M. MILLER, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge
filed June 23, 1971, and duly served, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board has caused a
complaint and notice of hearing to be issued and served on
Alaska Barite Company, designated as Respondent in this
decision. (The complaint, when drafted, designated Re-
spondent as -Dawson & Co., Inc., d/b/a Alaska Barite
Company. When the present hearing convened, Respon-
dent's counsel reported that Dawson & Co., Inc., had,
presumably, been a predecessor operator with respect to
certain facilities currently maintained and worked by
Respondent company. Pursuant to stipulation, the com-
plaint was, thereupon, amended; the references to Dawson
& Co., Inc., were stricken therefrom.) The complaint issued
August 5, 1971; therein, Respondent was charged with
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended. 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519. In Respon-
dent's duly filed answer, certain factual statements in
General Counsel's complaint have been conceded;
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire testimonial record, documentary evidence
received, and my observation of the witnesses, I make
the following findings of fact:
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent raises no significant question, herein, with
respect to General Counsel's jurisdictional claim. On the
complaint's relevant factual declarations, certain conces-
sions set forth in Respondent's answer, and testimony
proffered without contradiction, I find that Respondent
functions as a limited partnership licensed to do business
in Alaska; that, throughout the period with which this case
is concerned, Respondent was engaged at Castle Island
No. 2, near Petersburg, Alaska, in the mining, processing,
and sale of crude barite ore; and that, during the last
calendar year, Respondent's gross sales exceeded $500,000,
with more than $50,000 of such sales made to customers
located outside Alaska. I find, further, that Respondent
was, throughout the period with which this case is
concerned, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2)
of the Act engaged in commerce and business activities
which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act, as amended. Further, with due regard
for currently applicable jurisdictional standards, I find
assertion of the Board's jurisdiction in this case warranted
and necessary to effectuate statutory objectives.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 302, International Union of Operating Engineers,
designated as Complainant Union within this decision, is,
and at all material times herein has been, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act,
as amended, which admits certain of Respondent's
employees to membership.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issue
General Counsel's complaint herein alleges that, on or
about June 22, 1971, Complainant Union's representative
sought personal contact with Respondent's Castle Island
workers, on the island proper, for the purpose of soliciting
their membership in Complainant Union and their votes in
connection with a representation election which was to be
conducted shortly thereafter. General Counsel charges
that, on and since that date, Respondent has, throughout
the period with which this case is concerned, denied
197 NLRB No. 170
1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Complainant Union's representative reasonable access to
company workers housed on Castle Island, for the
purposes noted. Respondent's course of conduct, General
Counsel contends, should be considered interference with,
restraint and coercion, directed to Respondent's employ-
ees, with respect to their exercise of statutorily guaranteed
rights.
B. Facts
1. Background
Since some time in calendar year 1969, Respondent
herein, functioning as the successor of several previous
companies, has maintained and operated a facility for
mining and processing barite (barium sulphate) dredged
from some underwater deposits located near Castle Island
No. 2; this small island stands within the Duncan Canal, a
large fjord or sea inlet of Kupreanof Island, one of the
major Southeastern Alaska islands. Petersburg, Alaska, the
nearest sizable community, with a current population of
slightly more than 2,000 persons, is located on a smaller
island nearby.
Travel between Castle Island and Petersburg is possible
only by sea and air; the flight time by chartered seaplane
approximates 10-15 minutes when direct flights are
possible, but sometimes 20 minutes, while trips by motor
launch usually require something more than 45 minutes.
Most seaplanes locally available for charter, so the record
shows, seat four or five persons; charter rates for seaplanes,
within Petersburg's vicinity, approximate $60 per hour of
round trip flying time, plus standby time charges under
certain circumstances. No testimony regarding the availa-
bility, carrying capacity, or charter fee schedules of locally
based motor launches can be found in the present record.
During the period with which this case is concerned,
however, no regularly scheduled transportation service
between Castle Island No. 2 and Petersburg was provided;
charter fees for seaplane flights approximated $36 per
flight, with a lesser cost per person when more than one
passenger was carried. Communications with Petersburg
were solely maintained through a ship-to-shore radio
facility, which Respondent owned and operated, linked
with a comparable Petersburg sending and receiving
facility maintained by a local seaplane charter service.
On Castle Island No. 2, within a designated tract of land
which Respondent holds partially under lease and partially
pursuant to patent deed, several buildings have been
constructed; these include buildings which contain sleep-
ing quarters for Respondent's present crew complement,
together with a recreation room, separate mess hall, living
quarters for Respondent's resident manager, and various
buildings utilized in connection with the firm's barite
mining and processing operations. Respondent's workers,
during their regular five-day workweek, live on the island.
Though some married workers may have homes in
Petersburg, they normally return only for 3-night, 2-day
weekends, weather permitting. Those without fixed Peters-
burg residences, likewise, normally repair to that communi-
ty during their weekend free time only. So far as the record
shows, the sole means of land access provided for persons
approaching or leaving the island consists of a "floating"
dock, constructed of planks laid flat over a number of
sizable logs, linked together for a distance of some 250 feet
from the island's high water mark. Such a floating dock is
rendered necessary because of significant tidal variations
which affect the water level surrounding the island
differences sometimes measuring 20 feet. With high tides,
the entire 250-foot length of Respondent's dock will be
found afloat; when the tide is low, however, no more than
"the last couple of logs" will normally be water borne.
2. Previous visits by Complainant Union's
representative
Complainant Union's business representative, Ferrall W.
Campbell, maintains his residence and principal office in
Juneau, Alaska, where the Union likewise maintains a
dispatch hall. Campbell, so the record shows, has func-
tioned for 19 years as Complainant Union's sole field
representative within Southeastern Alaska; periodically, he
visits job sites , polices contracts, and services Union
members scattered throughout the area between Annette
Island and Ketchikan, to the south, and Yakutat Bay, to
the northwest. The distance between these widely separat-
ed localities approximates 465 airline miles . Southeastern
Alaska has no significant highway system. Surface trans-
portation between some of the larger communities can be
procured through a state operated ferry system; the ferries,
however, maintain limited schedules. Within this territory,
Complainant Union' s business representative customarily
travels between population centers by scheduled airline
whenever and wherever such service can be procured;
when required to visit smaller, relatively isolated communi-
ties or jobsites, however, he customarily charters locally
based plane services.
For some time, specifically during calendar years 1969
and 1970, Respondent contracted out barite mining
operations, successively, with two Southeastern Alaska
contractors; Respondent's Castle Island crew, then, merely
"processed" by crushing whatever crude ore was provided,
preparatory to shipment. Both contractors, Campbell's
credible, uncontradicted testimony shows, were then privy
to construction labor contracts with Complainant Union
herein. While they were conducting mining and dredging
operations for Respondent on Castle Island, pursuant to
contract, Complainant Union's field representative visited
their jobsite several times . Campbell's testimony regarding
these periodic visits, which stands herein without contra-
diction, warrants a present determination that a surrogate
for Respondent's resident manager , Robert Carnes, the
firm's surveyor , was cognizant with respect to them, during
1970 particularly, but proffered no protest and imposed no
restriction with respect to their timing or frequency. While
a witness , Carnes declared himself "sure" that Plant
Manager Dolph had, likewise, been aware with respect to
Campbell's visits.
3. Complainant Union's representation petition
Sometime during February 1971, Campbell learned, his
testimony shows, that Respondent was no longer engaging
a contractor to mine or dredge for barite; that Respondent
during the 1970-1971 winter season had, itself, hired
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY 1025
several of the workers previously engaged for such work by
the most recently departed contractor; and that Respon-
dent was currently "mining" with its own crew comple-
ment . On Sunday, February 28, while visiting Petersburg
on union business, Campbell fortuitously discovered most
of Respondent's Castle Island workers in town; Complain-
ant Union's representative secured signed designation
cards from some unspecified number. Campbell testified,
without contradiction, that, dunng the latter part of
calendar year 1970, he had had some prior telephone
contacts with one or more of Respondent's Castle Island
workers while they were in Petersburg; dunng these
conversations, the progress of Respondent's Castle Island
work, generally, had been discussed. Shortly thereafter, on
March 8, the field representative filed a representation
petition in Complainant Union's behalf, Case
19-RC-5750, seeking its certification as the collective-
bargaining representative for Respondent's Castle Island
crew. The petition contained a declaration, inter alia, that
recognition had been requested on March 1 previously;
this request, so the record shows, had been made by letter.
On March 17, Respondent's counsel, James J. Loeffler
replied; Campbell's request for immediate recognition and
bargaining without a secret ballot election was denied. The
Union representative was told, however, that, following
counsel's receipt of some pertinent facts, arrangements for
a consent election, without the necessity for a hearing,
might be possible.
The present record, with regard to this petition's
subsequent procedural history, contains few details. On
April 28, the Board's Regional Director issued a notice of
representation hearing with respect to Complainant Un-
ion's petition; the hearing date was set for May II at
Ketchikan, Alaska. On the latter date, however, Respon-
dent's counsel signed a consent election agreement.
Thereafter, on May 26, Complainant Union's representa-
tive signed. On June 3, the Board's Regional Director
approved this agreement. On the same date, Respondent
was requested to provide a list of eligible voters with their
addresses by June 11 or prior thereto. A notice of election
was prepared; the election was set for Friday, June 25,
between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m.
With a June 7 letter, Respondent's counsel dispatched
two copies of the requested "Excelsior" list to the Board's
Regional Director; therein, 10 eligible employee-voters
were listed. With respect to their addresses, various
Petersburg, Alaska, post office boxes were shown. Five of
Respondent's Castle Island workers were listed as sharing
P.O. Box 149; this group included Guadalupe Dolph, the
wife of Respondent's Castle Island mining manager. The
present record reflects a belief held by Complainant
Union's representative, which Respondent's counsel and
management representative have never challenged, that the
designated post office box was held in Respondent' s name.
One copy of this list was, subsequently, forwarded to
Complainant Union's representative; the record, however,
does not show the precise date when it was received.
4. Complainant Union's representative contacts
Respondent's workers
During the morning of Monday, June 22, Campbell
reached Petersburg; he promptly chartered a plane and
proceeded to Castle Island, for the purpose of visiting with
Respondent's workers during their lunch hour. Wallace
Dolph, Respondent's mining manager, so Campbell
testified , was affable regarding his visit; he met the Union
representative's plane and invited him to share the workers'
lunch. (Campbell, while a witness, declared credibly and
without contradiction that, though he had not seen Dolph
for some time, they had previously met. According to
Campbell, Dolph had never during his prior visits directed
him to leave the island. Complainant Union's representa-
tive introduced himself to three workers, listed on
Respondent's newly tendered roster, whom he had not
known previously. During a general lunch period conversa-
tion with Mining Manager Dolph and Respondent's
surveyor, Robert Carnes, present the firm's workers were
told that Campbell planned to return "after work that
night" and each night thereafter, until the scheduled
election day:
... so if they had any question about Local 302 and
[the] benefits of a union shop, I would be able to tell
them about it ... .
Campbell, so his corroborated testimony shows, merely
assumed that he would be welcome; he did not, I find,
present Dolph with any "demand" for permission to
return, but said merely that he "would like" to spend a
"couple of hours" per night there, for the next 3 nights.
When the lunch hour ended, Dolph accompanied
Campbell on his charter plane's return flight. According to
Dolph, Campbell was told that he (Dolph) was going to
call Respondent's counsel ; Campbell could not recall any
such declaration. Respondent's manager , however, did
request Complainant Union's representative to be sure to
contact him in town before returning to Respondent's
camp that night.
Campbell, so he testified, could not locate Dolph in
Petersburg dunng that day. When he proceeded to the
headquarters of his charter plane service, however, he
found Respondent's manager there. Regarding their
conversation and subsequent developments, Complainant
Union's representative testified, credibly and without
significant contradiction, substantially as follows:
He told me at this time , "on the [advice] of our
headquarters-counsel , we are not letting you go back to
the island," I was quite surprised because up to this
particular time Mr. Dolph had been real neighborly,
agreeable as employers go. He was, to my observation,
quite visibly shook up by my visit out there and he was
as nervous as a cat going back on the plane. When I
was advised I couldn't go back to the island I didn't
know what to do. We stalled around there in the
airlines [office ] for a while, Finally I told Mr. Dolph,
"You have refused me going back and having access to
the island. I promised those guys I would be out
tonight. I'm going anyhow. If you tell me I can't go
ashore, I'm not going to fight you, but I've got to make
an appearance out there."
Campbell declared, initially, that he would stand on the
plane's floats (pontoons) and wave. When their plane
reached Castle Island , however, Dolph declared, respond-
ing to a request , that Campbell could stand on Respon-
1026 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent 's floating dock ; he stated , further , that he would tell
Respondent 's workers Campbell was "down there" so that
should any wish to speak with him they could visit him
there. Dolph testified that he made this commitment before
he and Campbell left Petersburg ; my consideration of the
complete record , coupled with my observation of both
witnesses , has persuaded me that Campbell 's recollection is
more reliable. Campbell, therefore , stood on Respondent's
dock, sheltered by his plane 's wing, while signaling
Respondent 's bunk house , directly to the right of the dock
and some 100 yards up the bank . Respondent 's mining
manager, credible testimony shows, did deliver his prom-
ised message . Three of Respondent 's 10 workers , who were
already Union members, came down to speak with
Complainant Union's representative . According to Camp-
bell's unchallenged testimony , the weather was bad; it was
"raining and blowing" throughout the period of his visit.
The men spoke with him, I find , no more than 5 or 10
minutes; the testimony of Respondent's surveyor that
Campbell remained standing on the unprotected dock
between 45 minutes and 1 1/2 hours is rejected . Respon-
dent 's three new workers, however, did not come down.
Campbell 's testimony warrants a determination , which I
make, that throughout his stay Dolph was sporadically
visible on the bank moving in and out of Respondent's
bunk house.
Complainant Union's representative left some copies of
Complainant Union 's construction contract , which he
requested his three contacts to distribute among their
fellow workers . They said they would . They were told,
further , that since he had been denied access he planned to
return each night to see whether Respondent's attitude had
changed
The testimony of Respondent's surveyor, which I credit
in this connection , warrants a determination that Camp-
bell's three contacts did distribute his proffered Union
material to some members and that the forthcoming vote
was discussed.
During the evening of Wednesday , June 23, Campbell
did return . The weather was still bad. With respect to this
second visit , Campbell 's direct testimony , which I credit,
reads as follows: .
I taxied up in the plane with just me and the pilot ... .
I taxied up to the finger float and didn ' t make any
effort to go ashore. I wasn't going to fight them. I got
out on the float and some of the guys came to the door
to see who was there and in a few minutes one of our
members came down. I said , "Where's the other guys?"
He said , "The other guys are in the bunk house." I
asked if he had talked to any of the fellows and he said
he didn ' t think they would come out in bad weather. I
asked him to get the other guys to come down and talk.
He went back and got two other members to come
down . . . . I told the guys [the three members who
had come down the previous night] I was stumped .. .
I said , "Without talking to the guys I can't tell what
kind of a reception I'm going to have . .. .
Campbell could not recall whether he gave his worker
contacts any union literature on this occasion ; the record
will not warrant a factual determination that he did. While
giving his direct testimony , Complainant Union 's business
representative purportedly recalled that Dolph had been
visible on the bank while he (Campbell) was there.
Subsequently , however , he could not recall whether Dolph
had shown himself but declared that he was sure
Respondent 's manager had been there . During cross-
examination , Respondent 's surveyor recalled that during a
coffeebreak conversation which he and Dolph had the
latter had declared that Campbell would be coming out
Wednesday and Thursday but would remain on Respon-
dent's dock . I so find . While a witness herein, Dolph
conceded his knowledge with regard to Campbell 's second
visit; with due regard for the record , I conclude and find
that Dolph was, indeed , aware of Campbell 's presence on
Respondent 's floating dock.
5. Subsequent developments
On Thursday , June 24 , Campbell telephoned Complain-
ant Union 's Seattle counsel ; he reported the situation with
which he had been confronted , and requested that unfair
labor practice charges be promptly filed . Later that day,
Complainant Union 's business representative was able to
communicate , likewise , with the Board's field examiner,
then temporarily working in Anchorage. He reported that
the present unfair labor practice charge had been filed.
Field Examiner Perman suggested , then, that Campbell
meet him in Petersburg when his plane arrived from
Anchorage ; his plane was scheduled to reach Petersburg
on Friday, June 25 , shortly before noon.
Campbell , despite his previously declared intention to
visit Castle Island nightly, did not fly there Thursday night,
though the weather had turned fair . While a witness, he
testified that since he had flown out twice and been denied
,access, he did not propose to make another trip with
nothing new to communicate . In the meantime , however,
Respondent 's counsel, who had received Dolph 's Tuesday
afternoon telephone call in Houston, Texas, while prepar-
ing to leave for Respondent 's Castle Island facility, had
reached the operation somewhat earlier that day. Regard-
ing developments which followed his arrival , Manager
Dolph testified as follows:
I think when Mr. Loeffler came to the island, we
discussed Ferrall 's coming to the Island, and I told him
he would be back on Thursday . At that time we
decided if he came back to clean out the bunk [house]
and let the employees go. Mr . Campbell didn't show
up, so another discussion , we set up a time to have
lunch with him at a time after dinner where he could
meet with the employees and that 's how it was
arranged.
Loeffler, while a witness herein , confirmed this testimony.
General Counsel 's representative protested his proffered
confirmation, contending that it was completely self-
serving. The objection was overruled ; however, my
conclusion regarding its probative weight will be noted,
subsequently , within this decision.
6. The election
During the early morning hours of Friday, June 25,
Respondent 's management , pursuant to Loeffler's sugges-
tion , dispatched a radio telephone message , through the
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY 1027
firm's Petersburg charter airline contact, directed to
Complainant Union's representative. With respect thereto,
Counsel Loeffler's testimony,- which Dolph and Carnes
corroborated generally, and which I credit, reads as
follows:
... we [Respondent's counsel and resident manager]
determined we were going to ask an employee to call
Mr. Campbell as soon as the radio was operating in the
morning and, on behalf of the company, to invite Mr.
Campbell to the island at the noon-hour lunch break,
which was non-working time, to talk to the employees
about the union or anything else he wanted to talk
about, and that we would not be present . . . [This
telephone call] was made by Mr. Carnes [Respondent's
surveyor] at our request . . . Friday morning at 8 a.m.,
right after the radio became operative in the morning
... The instructions to Mr. Carnes were that Mr.
Carnes was to tell the operator to take down the
message and to relay it to Mr. Campbell at the hotel
and to await Mr. Campbell's reply. The message was
that Alaska Barite requests, the company was inviting
him out to the island to meet with the employees over
lunch in the mess hall and to talk to them about the
election or the union and that the company manage-
ment and supervisors would not be present . . . Yes,
Mr. Carnes gave the message to the operator. She
acknowledged receipt of the message and told us to
hold on while she contacted Mr. Ferral Campbell at the
hotel . . . When she came back on, she said that Mr.
Campbell had declined the invitation because he had to
meet a plane that day. [Emphasis supplied.]
Complainant Union's representative, who acknowledged
receiving an invitation to come to Castle Island for lunch,
conceded that he had chosen to remain in Petersburg
because he had made arrangements to meet the Board's
field examiner so they could discuss the scheduled election.
When the latter arrived, he reported that he had received
instructions from the Board's Regional Director to conduct
the scheduled election but to impound whatever ballots
were cast. The two men thereupon left for Castle Island.
There, during the afternoon, the election was conducted as
scheduled. All 10 eligible voters (with Surveyor Carnes
included) cast ballots. Pending this case's disposition,
however, these ballots have not yet been counted.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. General principles
The legal principles which control this case's disposition
derive from well-established decisional doctrine. The
Supreme Court has, already, delineated the fundamental
test within this field whereby the right of nonemployee
union representatives to enter some employer's private
property, for the purpose of discussing unionization with
his workers, may be determined. N.L.R B. v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105. Therein, the Court did conclude,
preliminarily, that with respect to preserving their property
rights concerned employers may ordinarily bar nonem-
ployees from distributing union literature and soliciting
union membership on their property. Concurrently, howev-
er, the Court likewise noted that organizational rights are
protected by law. Thus:
This is not a problem of always open or always closed
doors for union organization on company property.
Organizational rights are granted to workers by the
same authority, the National Government, that pre-
serves property rights. Accommodations between the
two must be obtained with as little destruction of one
as is consistent with the maintenance of the other. The
employer may not affirmatively interfere with organi-
zation; the union may not always insist that the
employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility
of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts
by nonemployees to communicate with them through
the usual channels the right to exclude from property
has been required to yield to the extent needed to
permit communication of information on the right to
organize.
This Board, therefore, must within each case presented for
decision balance the Union's necessity for "direct access"
to concerned employees against the employer's "right to
control" over his own property and any detriment which
might result from the admission to that property of union
organizers. N.L.R.B. v. S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d
26, 29 (C.A. 2). When striking such a balance, further, this
Board may properly conclude that, whenever the location
of a particular facility, within which living quarters for
workers have been provided, places such workers beyond
the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with
them, concerned employers must permit union representa-
tives to approach employees on their property. N. L. R. B. V.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, see pp. 112-113. -
Consistent with these principles, this Board has, with
judicial concurrence, laid down a rule that, absent
legitimate business considerations, employers who house
employees within their premises may not deny union
representatives direct personal access to such premises for
the purpose of discussing unionism with the workers
concerned, unless other adequate channels of communication
with such workers are demonstrably available.
We are, therefore, confronted herein with a narrow
question: Whether, with due regard for those facts which
have been developed within the present record, Complain-
ant Union's representative was really granted "adequate
opportunity" to communicate with Respondent's Castle
Island workers, despite management's refusal to grant him
full rights of access with respect to Respondent's land
based facility, during a crucial period preceding the
scheduled representation vote. For various reasons, which
I propose to discuss hereinafter, I find and conclude that,
with due regard for the total situation herein presented, the
limited access rights which Respondent's management
granted Complainant Union's representative did not afford
him a reasonable opportunity to communicate with
Respondent's workers, within the Babcock & Wilcox rule.
2. Respondent's contentions
In his brief, Respondent's counsel contends that four
factual conditions must be satisfied before any so-called
"legal right to access" can rightly be claimed. First, counsel
suggests:
1028 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There must be a remote physical situs, where the
employees spend almost all of their time, and thereby
the employees become inaccessible to the union.
He then declares, however, that General Counsel has
"totally failed to meet his burden" with respect to this
requirement. Presumably, Respondent's counsel refers to
record testimony that his' client's Castle Island facility is
located within 10-20 minutes flying time from Petersburg;
that some of the firm's workers, possibly five in number,
maintain residence there; that these workers, plus those
who do not maintain such residence, spend "many of their
weekends" there; that the firm's workers are likewise free
to visit Petersburg on week nights; that one worker owns a
plane which he berths, during the work week, at Respon-
dent's facility; and that charter plane service can be
procured for travel into town, following work, during the
week and on weekends. This testimony, in my view, cannot
be considered sufficient, however, to foreclose a determi-
nation that Respondent's Castle Island facility constitutes
a remote physical situs. Compare N.LR.B. v. Stowe
Spinning Company, 336 U.S. 226, 230; N. L K B. v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corporation, 167 F.2d 147, 148 (C.A. 6),
enfg. 70 NLRB 178; N.L.R.B. v. S. & H. Grossinger's, Inc.,
372 F.2d 26, 29 (C.A. 2), enfg. 156 NLRB 233; Sioux City
and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 193 NLRB No. 55,
TXD; Tamiment, Inc., 180 NLRB 1074, 1075; Kutsher's
Hotel & Country Club, Inc., 175 NLRB 1114, 1115. For
Respondent's 10 Castle Island workers, travel into town,
though feasible, clearly requires something more than a
negligible expenditure of time and money; the likelihood
that with respect to any given date the Complainant
Union's representative would find a significant number of
Respondent's workers accessible without personally visit-
ing their Castle Island camp merits characterization as
minimal.
Secondly, Respondent contends, inter alia, that Com-
plainant Union's representative could not, properly,
demand "legal rights of access" with respect to Respon-
dent's property, since General Counsel's presentation will
not, counsel claims, support a so-called condition prece-
dent determination that he had, actually, made "reasonable
efforts to communicate with [Respondent's] workers
through alternative means and arrangements" which could
have been followed. Compare N.L.R.B. v. Tamiment, Inc.,
451 F.2d 794, (C.A. 3), enforcement demed for 180 NLRB
1074, (Petition for Rehearing filed December 1971), in this
connection.
Specifically, Respondent cites Campbell's several con-
cessions: (1) That he made no effort to meet personally
with Respondent's Castle Island workers, jointly or
severally, while they were visiting Petersburg between
February 28 and June 22 despite several telephone calls
which he received while in Juneau, Alaska, his official
headquarters, from "one or two" workers suggesting that
Complainant Union's presumptive majority support, previ-
ously demonstrated, might prove to have been eroded; (2)
that he likewise made no effort, during the period noted, to
communicate with Respondent's workers through letter
correspondence, through the firm's ship-to-shore radio
communications link; or through newspaper advertise-
ments; (3) that he did not, preliminarily, solicit a
confirmation , from •;ither the firm 's resident manager or
company counsel regardm; his presumed right of access
with respect to Respondent's Castle Island facility during
the period i.1 question; (4) that he made no effort to
determine, before abandoning his planned Thursday
evening, July 24, visit, whether Respondent's management
would 1 ersist in denying his claimed access rights or
whether the firm's resident manager and counsel were then
prepared to abandon their previously declared position;
and (5) that he failed to proffer a favorable reply when
these management representatives tendered a specific
invitation, suggesting that he would be permitted to confer
with Respondent's Castle Island workers shortly before
their scheduled representation vote.
Despite these testimonial concessions , chargeable to
Complainant Union's representative, Respondent's conten-
tion that they necessarily foreclose any present determina-
tion supportive of claimed access rights cannot be
considered persuasive; that contention reflects too narrow
a construction of the Supreme Court's determinative
Babcock & Wilcox decision. Substantially, the firm's
counsel seeks a Board determination , consistent with the
Third Circuit's Tamiment decision previously noted, that
,.only after the union has made a showing that it used
reasonable efforts to utilize other available channels of
communication" may rights of access with respect to
Respondent's premises be considered warranted. Counsel's
suggestion, should this Board be persuaded to concur,
would require unions, when they mount organizational
campaigns, both to explore and to exhaust nearly every
possible alternative method for contacting employees
before direct access could be considered permitted, even
though the workers concerned may be either constructively
or literally insulated from the most effective method of
communication , personal contact with the union's organiz-
ers, and even though the possible alternative methods
would be patently ineffective. Such a result would serve no
practical need, and would in my view place an unreasona-
ble impediment on statutorily guaranteed rights.
The Supreme Court has, of course, drawn a distinction,
in its Babcock & Wilcox decision, between the respective
rights of workers and nonemployees, defined by the
statute, to conduct organizational activity on some
concerned employer's premises. While confirming such
rights for employees, the Court held, generally, that
employers may validly post their property against some
nonemployee's distribution of union literature whenever
the situation presented renders it likely that reasonable
efforts by the union, through other available channels of
communications, will enable it to reach concerned workers
with its message. Within the factual context which Babcock
& Wilcox presented, several examples of "other available
channels of communications" were mentioned . 351 U.S.
105, 107, fn. 1, 111, 113. The Court did note, however, one
particular situation wherein these so-called other channels
would not really be available to reach employees. Citing
N. L. R. B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Co., 167 F.2d 147, 148,
151, 152 (C.A. 6), which involved employees living and
working within an isolated lumber camp, plus its own prior
statements within Republic Aviation Corporation v.
N. L R. B., 324 U.S. 793, 798-799, the Court declared that
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY 1029
its general rule permitting employers to deny access would
not apply whenever "the location of a plant and the living
quarters of the employees' place the latter "beyond the
reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate" with
them; such employees were characterized as geographically
"isolated from normal contacts" such as "on streets or at
home, for by] telephone, letters or advertised meetings"
and their "inaccessability" was described as sufficient to
render "ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemploy-
ees to communicate with them through the usual chan-
nels." 351 U.S. at 111, 112, 113. These comments clearly
demonstrate that, for the Supreme Court particularly, the
overriding consideration, when questions of nonemployee
access rights are presented, should be the "availability of
other channels" which would permit effective communica-
tion with the employees; further, at least within the factual
context presented by those cases which the Court's
decision cites, some evidentiary showing that concerned
employees are physically "isolated from normal contacts"
with union organizers will be considered dispositive, within
the Court's view, with respect to determining the realistic
availability of such other channels.
Several courts have recognized that the only really
effective way for union organizers to communicate with
employees is by personal contact. The Supreme Court, in
its Babcock & Wilcox decision, presumably concurs, since
it notes that when workers, like those in the Lake Superior
case, both live and work on their employer's premises,
there simply is no opportunity for the union to make a
personal contact with employees separated from its
representatives, as they are, by physical barriers which the
employer alone controls. In such cases, therefore, the
employees' physical inaccessabihty itself:
... makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
nonemployees to communicate with them . , . [and
therefore] the right to exclude from property [must]
yield to the extent needed to permit communication of
information on the right to organize ... .
In S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 156 NLRB 233, 247-265, enfd.
372 F.2d 26, 29-30 (C.A. 2), this Board, with Court
approval, applied these principles and found that access
was required in a case involving a resort hotel, when the
record showed that some 60 percent of the concerned
employer's workers resided on the hotel property and only
rarely left the premises for brief periods. The court,
sustaining the Board's conclusion, noted specifically that
the majority of the workers lived on their employer's
premises and could not be reached by any means
practically available to union organizers.
With matters in this posture, counsel's suggestion that
this Board should now impose a further requirement, that
Complainant Union must actually seek out and exhaust
every alternative method of communication before it can
claim entitlement to access, cannot be considered well
founded in law or policy. The language which the Supreme
Court used in its Babcock & Wilcox decision, together with
the result reached, indicates that the physical isolation of
the concerned workers from personal contact with the
union's organizer will constitute the determinative factor.
Moreover, the Court's decision clearly shows that it would
ascertain the presence or absence of this factor, within the
particular situation with which it may be confronted, solely
through a consideration of the objective facts of geograph-
ic placement, without regard to the union's success or lack
of success in actually communicating with employees.
Respondent's counsel, therefore, cannot herein persuasive-
ly contend that the Supreme Court's reference to "reasona-
ble attempts" by the union therein to reach employees
should be taken to mean that Complainant Union herein
must show that it really "attempted" some alternative
means to reach Respondent's Castle Island workers, when,
from an objective standpoint, they were for all practical
purposes physically unreachable. Rather, this Board's basic
consideration must be whether, with due regard for the
physical circumstances, Complainant Union has really had
opportunities for effective personal contact, not whether it
has or has not made use of some opportunities for
communication which may have been available.
To recapitulate: Nothing within the Supreme Court's
Babcock & Wilcox decision suggests that unions must be
required to prove available alternatives inadequate, where
the "location of a plant and the living quarters of the
employees" themselves show that such workers are
"beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts" to
communicate with them. To require a labor organization's
representative, nonetheless, to seek contact with the
concerned workers in some other manner would be to
dictate little more than a futile gesture, which would serve
no constructive purpose but would, rather, require the
expenditure of considerable time , effort, and resources,
merely to confirm what should be clear from the objective
facts-that such other methods of communication provide
"no substitute for face to face contact" within a relaxed
atmosphere, and must therefore be considered ineffective.
This construction, regarding the legal doctrine which
must be considered determinative herein, has, compara-
tively recently, received specific Board sanction. Mono-
gram Models, Inc., 192 NLRB No. 99. Therein, this Board
stated:
... we do not believe that the critical issue in this
case hinges on the question whether the Union, did, in
fact, make a "reasonable effort" to reach these
employees. Whether or not such an effort was made, it
is the opportunity to make such an effort because of
"the location of the plant and the living quarters of the
employees" which is determinative of the Union's right
to approach the employer's employees on his property
Previously, the Board had, without qualification, con-
firmed statements within a Trial Examiner's decision
carrying comparable thrust. S. & H. Grossinger's Inc.,
supra, 259. Further, no court decision, save the Third
Circuit's, previously noted, has rejected the Board's
construction; to the contrary, the Second Circuit's enforce-
ment of this Board's order, specifically with respect to
Grossinger's, necessarily reflects its implied concurrence
with respect to the Board's position. Though a subsequent
Second Circuit decision, N.L.R.B. v. Kutsher's Hotel and
Country Club, Inc., 427 F.2d 200, did rely in part on a
finding that the Union there made "scant . . . efforts" to
organize the employees, that finding was coupled with
another determination that the physical location of the
1030 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees was not such as to represent a barrier to
communication. The Court, therefore, was realistically
determining that, unlike Grossinger's workers, Kutsher's
employees were not really physically "isolated from normal
contact" and that an opportunity for personal contact was
present which the Union should have used more extensive-
ly. The Court thereby necessarily reaffirmed its prior
Grossinger's determination, that "opportunity for access to
the employees" must be considered the decisive factor,
with respect to cases like the present one. With matters in
this posture, Respondent's contention, that Campbell must
be shown to have utilized various alternative methods for
communicating with concerned workers, herein, before his
claim for access rights could be considered meritorious,
must be rejected as contrary to law.
Thirdly, Respondent contends there must be some
showing that various "alternate, available means of contact
and/or communication" with Respondent's workers were
clearly inadequate. Previously within this decision, howev-
er, we have noted the Supreme Court's recognition that
"personal contacts on streets or at home, [or by] tele-
phones, letters or advertised meetings" would be clearly
inadequate with respect to workers isolated from normal
contacts. However, should a determination be considered
warranted, arguendo, that some showing calculated to
reveal the inadequacy of various alternative methods of
communication must be made herein, before Complainant
Union's claimed access right can be considered validated,
such a showing has, within my view, been made. Cf.
N.LR.B. v. United Aircraft Corporation, 324 F.2d 128, 130,
(C.A. 2), quoted in N.L.R.B. v. S. & H. Grossinger's Inc.,
supra. Therein, the Second Circuit noted that:
The predictable alternatives [to personal contacts] bear
without exception the flaws of greater expense and
effort, and a lower degree of effectiveness.
For example: Mailed material, generally, would have
carried minimal impact: further, Complainant Union's
representative could never have been certain that whatever
material he may have mailed would prove to have been
realistically directed toward its recipient's real or primary
concerns. Communication via the firm's ship-to-shore
radio clearly could not compare with personal solicitation,
particularly insofar as workers not personally familiar with
Campbell were concerned: further, such communications
could not have been maintained freely, since the possible
presence of management representatives, gathered before
the radio with a group of Castle Island workers, could not
have been foreclosed. Communication through newspaper
advertisements would necessarily have been limited by
virtue of space and cost considerations: further, the
likelihood that any given advertisement within a particular
newspaper would reach Respondent's workers could not be
guaranteed. See also Bok, "The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act," 78 Harvard Law Review, 38, 95-96;
Broomfield, "Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Con-
certed Trespassory Union Activity," 83 Harvard Law
Review 552, 553, 573-574. With matters in this posture,
counsel's third so-called "condition precedent" has, within
my view, been satisfied.
Fourthly, Respondent's counsel contends that there must
be shown some request for ;`reasonable contact and/or
communication" with employees, which request has been
denied. Suggesting once more that General Counsel's
representative has "totally failed to meet his burden" with
respect to this claimed condition precedent, counsel
contends alternatively that:
... even though the Union had absolutely no right
to access to private property, it is abundantly clear that
the Union representative was not denied access and, in
fact, was afforded far more access than either he
secondarily demanded or subsequently utilized.
Within this case's context, of course, some request to visit
Respondent's Castle Island facility, followed by that
request's denial, must be shown. Without such a record
showing, no question determinable by reference to the
statute would be presented. The present record, however,
will fully warrant a determination that Campbell did
proffer the necessary request which Respondent's resident
manager, following advice from his counsel, thereafter
denied.
Within his brief, Respondent's counsel has called
Campbell's June 22 statements and conduct "brash,
arrogant and commandeering" while declaring further that
the Union representative's declaration of purpose to visit
Castle Island three times before the scheduled representa-
tion vote constituted his "last-minute, arrogant and
unreasonable" demand. With due regard for the record
considered in totality, however, I find such strong language
hyperbolical. Clearly, Complainant Union's representative,
recalling the toleration with which Respondent's manage-
ment representatives had received him during prior visits,
felt himself free to presume that his planned visitations
would be similarly viewed, with no prior arrangement
necessary. His mildly stated declaration of purpose,
therefore, constituted his request, I so find. Respondent's
counsel currently claims that Campbell was demanding
"complete access to the Company's entire island facilities
two (2) hours each night for the last three (3) nights" before
the scheduled representation vote. Previously, however, I
have found that Complainant Union's representative did
not specify the number of hours he proposed to stay
nightly. The record, further, warrants a determination that
he merely proposed to discuss unionization with Respon-
dent's workers in their bunkhouse or recreation room.
Conceding that Respondent's management had denied
Campbell's first access request , counsel nevertheless
contends that Mining Manager Dolph subsequently
granted Campbell's so-called "second demand for access"
giving him more access than his so-called "counter-
proposal or second request" sought. This contention,
however, misconstrues the record. Complainant Union's
representative did not, really, voluntarily declare some
alternative desire to stand on Respondent's floating dock
for a time each night before the election to talk with the 10
eligible voters; he declared his purpose merely to be to
stand on his charter plane's pontoon and wave, so that
Respondent's workers would know he had tried. Respon-
dent's resident manager, I have found, was thereupon
responsible for relaxing his previously declared total access
ban; Dolph volunteered the suggestion that Campbell
could stand on Respondent's dock and further volunteered
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY
to tell Respondent 's workers that Complainant Union's
representative was there . With due regard for the context
within which Dolph's seeming concession was made,
however, I find it less than sufficient to provide that
"reasonable access" which the relevant decisions com-
mand . Compare N.L.R.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber
Company, supra, at 151-152 particularly, in this connection.
Conversations conducted on movable floating platforms,
while their participants stand exposed to wind and rain,
can hardly be considered conversations maintained within
the relaxed atmosphere which the relevant case law
optimally requires.
Further, however, counsel cites Respondent's Friday
morning communication , whereby Campbell was invited to
join Respondent 's Castle Island workers for lunch, there to
discuss unionization with them, some three hours before
their scheduled representation vote, without management
representatives present . This suggestion, within my view,
reflected nothing more than Respondent's tardy recogni-
tion that its previously declared position might be
considered unreasonably restrictive . Campbell's situation,
with due regard for his prior comnutment to meet
preliminarily with the Regional Office's field examiner,
then shortly due in Petersburg, necessarily rendered
Respondent 's invitation futile . Further, Respondent's
suggestion herein that such a last-minute visit, during
which Complainant Union' s representative would neces-
sarily have nothing more than a rather limited opportunity
to discuss the benefits of unionism , would constitute
reasonable access must be rejected. Within their total
context, Respondent's proffers, I find, were "too little and
too late" to satisfy statutory requirements.
Respondent suggests that, had Campbell flown to Castle
Island Thursday evening pursuant to his previously
declared plan , he would have found the firm's management
prepared to grant him timely "access" with respect to bunk
house and recreation room facilities . However, this
suggestion in my view reflects nothing more than post hoc
rationalization . Counsel Loeffler's testimony, that the
firm 's decision to grant Campbell land based visitation
rights Thursday evening had been reached earlier that day,
following his Castle Island arrival, has been credited. Since
Dolph, pursuant to his suggestion , had, however, been
responsible for the firm's prior decision to ban Complain-
ant Union 's representative, responsibility to communicate
Respondent 's change of policy with respect thereto was
necessarily theirs. And assuming, arguendo, that Loeffler
and Dolph had reached their reconsidered decision
sometime before the postdinner hour when Campbell's
previously projected visit could reasonably have been
expected , I find no rational explanation proffered within
the present record for their failure to communicate that
decision , beforehand, to Complainant Union's representa-
tive . (The particular "assumption" seems fully warranted.
Dolph could not recall whether Respondent 's counsel had
reached Castle Island Wednesday or Thursday; Loeffler's
testimony , however, will support a conclusion that he
reached Respondent 's facility during Thursday's daylight
hours.) With due regard for the circumstances herein
present , therefore , Complainant Union' s representative,
twice frustrated previously, cannot , in my view , be faulted
1031
for his decision not to make a flying trip which , so far as he
knew , would merely constitute a costly futile gesture.
Finally, Respondent contends that Campbell's June 22
request to visit Castle Island several successive times was
properly deemed "unreasonable and unneeded " with due
regard for the circumstances . In this connection , counsel
cites : ( 1) the Union representative 's conceded failure to
seek direct, personal contact with Respondent 's workers
between February 28 and the week within which their
representation vote was scheduled ; (2) his conceded failure
to request access rights before his final Petersburg visit; (3)
his conceded failure to seek prior communication with
those workers , designated on Respondent 's previously
provided Excelsior list, whom he considered strangers; and
(4) his decision not to discuss unionization during his June
22 lunch hour visit , with Manager Dolph present . Substan-
tially, Respondent's counsel , when he thus recapitulates
Campbell 's several purported failures , presumes to censure
Complainant Union 's representative for laches ; the con-
sensual decision which Loeffler and Dolph first reached, to
foreclose completely further face-to-face contacts between
Respondent's Castle Island workers and Complainant
Union 's representative should be considered justified,
counsel suggests , merely because Campbell 's last-minute
request did not deserve consideration . (Within his brief,
counsel has characterized Campbell's proffered reasons for
his failure to seek more communication with Respondent's
workers , between February 28 and June 22 specifically, as
feeble rationalizations . With due regard, however, for
Campbell 's situation as Complainant Union 's sole South-
eastern Alaska representative , plus his presumptive exper-
tise with regard to conducting organizational campaigns,
his proffered justifications cannot be thus cavalierly
dismissed.) Previously , the Union representative 's testimo-
nial concessions have been found lacking in persuasive
relevance , when proffered in support of Respondent's
contention that Campbell 's several conceded failures
should be considered sufficient to defeat his "legal right to
access" claim . Within my view, they likewise carry no
persuasive thrust when proffered in support of Respon-
dent 's further contention that Campbell 's June 22 request
merited rejection as both unreasonable and unnecessary.
This Board need not, with due regard for relevant case law,
balance, herein , Complainant Union's necessity for direct
personal access to Respondent's concerned workers against
particular "errors of ommission" described as sufficient to
constitute laches. Rather, Complainant Union 's claim of
necessity must be balanced against Respondent 's "right to
control" over its property and any "detriment" which
might result from the admission of union organizers.
N. L. R. B. v. S. & H. Grossinger 's Inc., supra. Save for a
brief, ipse dixit, claim that Campbell's projected visit would
have "disrupted" Respondent 's Castle Island operations,
however , the firm has proffered no proof whatsoever that
such visits would have been detrimental.
3. Conclusions
With matters in this posture , I find merit in General
Counsel's contention that Respondent herein , since June
22, 1971 particularly , has denied Complainant Union's
representative reasonable access to its workers housed on
1032 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Castle Island, for the purpose of soliciting their member-
ship in Complainant Union and their votes in connection
with a scheduled representation election. And Respon-
dent's course of conduct, I find, interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees, with respect to their exercise of
rights statutorily guaranteed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Respondent's course of conduct set forth in Section III
above - since it occurred in connection with Respondent's
business operations set forth in Section I above - had and
continues to have, a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several
states; absent correction, such conduct would tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce,
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Since I have found that Respondent engaged, and
continues to engage, in certain unfair labor practices which
affect commerce, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative
action, including the posting of appropriate notices,
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In light of these findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in this case, I make the following conclusipns of
law:
1. Respondent, Alaska Barite Company, is an employer
engaged in commerce, and business operations which
affect commerce, within the,meaning of Section 2(2) and
(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended.
2. Local 302, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act, as amended, which admits certain
employees of Respondent to membership.
3. By denying Complainant Union's field representa-
tive access to Castle Island proper, for the purpose of
soliciting employees during their free time on behalf of that
labor organization, and for the purpose of otherwise
communicating with such employees concerning organiza-
tional matters, Respondent has interfered with, restrained
and coerced employees with respect to their exercise of
rights which Section 7 of the statute guarantees. Thereby,
Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of
Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
Respondent, Alaska Barite Company, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Continuing or giving effect to policies or company
rules pursuant to which Union representatives have been
denied access to company workers on company premises
or within employee facilities on Castle Island proper, for
the purpose of soliciting them during their free time on
behalf of any labor organization, or for the purpose of
consulting, conferring, advising, assisting, or otherwise
communicating with them during their free time, in regard
to their statutorily guaranteed right of self-organization;
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prohibit Respondent from making and
enforcing reasonable regulations with respect to the timing
and frequency of visits by such nonemployee Union
representatives.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees with respect to their
exercise of rights which Section 7 of the statute guarantees.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended:
(a) If requested by Local 302, International Union of
Operating Engineers, grant Union representatives access
rights to company premises and employee facilities
thereon, for the purpose of distributing Union literature,
soliciting Union membership, or for the purpose of
consulting, conferring, advising, assisting, or otherwise
communicating with employees on Castle Island proper,
during their free time, subject only to reasonable regula-
tions concerned with the timing and frequency of such
visits;
(b) Post, at its facility on Castle Island No. 2 near
Petersburg, Alaska, copies of the attached notice marked
Appendix.2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 19, shall be posted immedi-
ately upon their receipt, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative. Once posted, they shall
remain posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that such notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(c) File with the Regional Director for Region 19, as the
Board' s agent , within 20 days from the date of service of
this Trial Examiner's decision, a written statement setting
forth the manner and form in which it has complied with
these recommendations.3
i In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
3 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY 1033
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing , during which all parties were given
an opportunity to present evidence and argument, it
has been determined that we violated the law by
committing certain unfair labor practices . In order to
remedy such conduct , we are being required to post this
notice . We intend to comply with this requirement, and
to abide by the following commitments.
WE WILL, subject to reasonable rules and regula-
tions , permit Union organizers not employed by us to
visit our premises and employee facilities on Castle
Island No. 2, for the purpose of soliciting our
employees , during their free time , on behalf of a union,
or for the purpose of consulting, conferring , advising,
assisting , or otherwise communicating with our em-
ployees, during their free time , in regard to their
statutorily guaranteed rights to seek self-organization,
to form , join , or assist a labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their choice, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or
to refrain from becoming or remaining , members of
Local 302, International Union of Operating Engineers,
or any other labor organization.
ALASKA BARITE COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Republic Building, 10th
Floor, 1511 Third Avenue , Seattle, Washington 98101.
Telephone 206-442-5692.