Section 893.18 - Transition; persons under disability(1) This section does not apply to a cause of action which accrues on or after July 1, 1980 or to s. 893.41 , 893.59 , 893.62 , 893.73 to 893.76 , 893.77(3) , 893.86 or 893.91 or subch. VIII.(2) Except as provided in sub. (2m), and except in actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture, actions against a sheriff or other officer for an escape, or actions for the recovery or possession of real property, if a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter was at the time the cause of action accrued under any of the following disabilities, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action: (a) The person is under the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers.(b) The person is insane.(c) The person is imprisoned on a criminal charge or in execution under sentence of a criminal court for a term less than life.(2m) The period within which an action must be brought cannot be extended under sub. (2) more than 5 years by any disability, except infancy, nor can that period be so extended, in any case, longer than one year after the disability ceases.(3) A disability does not exist, for the purpose of this section, unless it existed when the cause of action accrued.(4) When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the time the cause of action accrues the period of limitation does not attach until they all are removed.1971 c. 213 s. 5; 1977 c. 390; 1979 c. 323; 1981 c. 314; 1999 a. 85. Because the parents' claim arising from injury to their minor child was filed along with the child's claim within the time period for the child's claim, the parents' claim was not barred by s. 893.54. Korth v. American Family Insurance Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983). An estate's survival claim under s. 895.01 is not tolled by sub. (2) if the only beneficiaries of the estate are minors. Lord v. Hubbell, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d Wis. 2d 150, 563 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1031. A parent's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the same act as the child's injury benefits from the child's tolling period. Jendrzjek v. Tschopp-Durch-Camastral, (1991).