Wis. Stat. § 990.04
The repeal of a statute hereafter shall not remit, defeat or impair any civil or criminal liability for offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred or rights of action accrued under such statute before the repeal thereof, whether or not in course of prosecution or action at the time of such repeal; but all such offenses, penalties, forfeitures and rights of action created by or founded on such statute, liability wherefore shall have been incurred before the time of such repeal thereof, shall be preserved and remain in force notwithstanding such repeal, unless specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by the repealing statute. And criminal prosecutions and actions at law or in equity founded upon such repealed statute, whether instituted before or after the repeal thereof, shall not be defeated or impaired by such repeal but shall, notwithstanding such repeal, proceed to judgment in the same manner and to the like purpose and effect as if the repealed statute continued in full force to the time of final judgment thereon, unless the offenses, penalties, forfeitures or rights of action on which such prosecutions or actions shall be founded shall be specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by such repealing statute.
Wis. Stat. § 990.04
This section also applies to statutes that are amended after the commission of an alleged criminal act although before trial. Truesdale v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 481, 210 N.W.2d 726 (1973). Absent legislative intent to the contrary, repeal of a statute governing appeals of tax assessments did not affect a taxpayer whose right to appeal under the statute accrued prior to its repeal. Jackson County Iron Co. v. Musolf, 134 Wis. 2d 95, 396 N.W.2d 323 (1986). This section provides that although the state need not have commenced a prosecution at the time of the repeal, it is necessary that by the time of the repeal, the offender has committed the offense and thereby become subject to the penalty for the offense. A defendant has not committed an offense unless all the elements of that crime have been met. Thus, he or she incurs no penalties until that time. State v. Thums, 2006 WI App 173, 295 Wis. 2d 664, 721 N.W.2d 729, 05-2682. Citing Waddell v. Mamat, 271 Wis. 176 (1955), the court held that this section applies to a fully accrued right, not to a merely inchoate right that could ripen into a right preserved by the statute only upon the happening of a further event. Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Company, Inc., 2006 WI App 219, 296 Wis. 2d 666, 724 N.W. 2d 259, 05-2837. Reversed on other grounds. (See footnote 35.) 2007 WI 88, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1, 05-2837. A law is retroactive if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. A statute does not operate retroactively simply because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets expectations based on prior law. The mere expectation of a future benefit or contingent interest does not create a vested right. In this case, because the appellant did not have a vested right to the interest rate that applied in s. 807.01(4) before that statute was amended, this section was not implicated. Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 64, 370 Wis. 2d 500, 881 N.W.2d 702, 15-0179.