Woodley v. Mass. Mutual, No. 08 Civ. 0949, 2008 WL 2191767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008). Here, the complaint neither mentions CAFA jurisdiction nor avers the existence of 100 class members. The complaint thus fails to plead facts meeting the jurisdictional prerequisite of Case 1:08-cv-07508-SAS-DCF Document 18 Filed 11/05/08 Page 16 of 20 13 § 1332(d)(5).8 Because ADCB has not allege[d] . . . the facts essential to show jurisdiction, McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189, the complaint fails to state a basis for CAFA jurisdiction and, having failed to plead any other basis of subject matter jurisdiction, should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). B. Plaintiff Has No Basis to Assert CAFA Jurisdiction Not only is the complaint facially defective as to CAFA jurisdiction, but there is also no evidence that would support an allegation that the Capital Notes were acquired by the required 100 persons. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary.

at Plaintiffs’ allegations as to citizenship are insufficiently detailed to support a finding of diversity jurisdiction. This is a slender reed, at best.11 Courts have consistently interpreted §1332(a) as not requiring anything more than a plain statement of a party’s citizenship and domicile. According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]he statute does not say anything about specifying from which foreign state an alien hails, and so on its face it does not appear to demand more than an allegation that someone is “a foreign citizen or subject.” Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1998). 11 Defendant Proskauer Rose’s consternation as to Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations is all the more surprising given that their jurisdictional allegations as to Blix Street Records in the Central District of California consisted only of the following sentence: “This Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because this is a civil action between citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” See Exhibit 1 at ¶5. Proskauer relied on this single jurisdictional sentence throughout litigation for several years, including trial. Case 3:15-cv-02423-N Document 25 Filed 12/04/15 Page 18 of 23 PageID 245 15 As the Third Circuit appropriately summarized, “For diversity purposes, an alien is an alien is an alien.” Dresser Indus. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.1997). Additional details are irrelevant to the analysis.

As indicated above, all of the members of the proposed class, as well as Regional Finance Corporation of Texas, are citizens of Texas. Regional Finance Corporation of Texas is the primary defendant as it is the entity which holds the debt and conducts all debt collection activities in the state of Texas.10 As a result, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(4)(B). See Hollinger, 654 F.3d at 574; Watson v. City of Allen, Tex., 821 F.3d 634, 640-43 (5th Cir. 2016) (CAFA jurisdiction in federal court precluded when 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(4)(B)’s mandatory abstention requirements are satisfied). III. CONCLUSION 12.

B. Class Actions Filed In The Last Three Years The “local controversy” exception applies only if “during the 3-year period preceding the filing of the subject class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.” 28 U.S. Code § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii). “[T]he ‘no other class action’ factor must not be read too narrowly.

16 Given that Defendants bear the burden of proving that all the prerequisites for CAFA jurisdiction have been satisfied, but have not offered any evidence as to the size of the proposed Class – despite their ready ability to do so, see Govidan Declaration ¶ 1 – Plaintiff also reserves the right to seek leave to take limited jurisdictional discovery on this issue as well. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) & (d)(5). Case 1:07-cv-07783-AKH Document 6 Filed 09/28/2007 Page 27 of 28 23 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, this case should be remanded to New York State Supreme Court and Plaintiff should be awarded its costs and attorneys’ fees resulting from Defendants’ improper removal of this action.

By their plain terms, both the local controversy and home state exceptions apply here if more than two-thirds of the class members are citizens of Illinois. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). And Plaintiff does not rely on conjecture; documents revealed in the course of jurisdictional discovery reveal that over 98% percent of all putative class members reside in Illinois.

¶¶ 3, 17. 29 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C). Case 1:10-cv-11047-WGY Document 17 Filed 08/20/10 Page 14 of 25 10 In Genton v. Vestin Realty Mortgage II, Inc., 2007 WL 951838, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

¶¶ 3, 17. 29 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C). Case 1:10-cv-11046-WGY Document 17 Filed 08/20/10 Page 14 of 25 10 In Genton v. Vestin Realty Mortgage II, Inc., 2007 WL 951838, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

Furthermore, Mr. Murray’s acts or omissions in requiring members of the73 plaintiff class to perform work off the clock are at the heart of the Plaintiffs’ claims. Because this case represents a local controversy in which greater than two-thirds of the plaintiff class and a defendant from whom significant relief is sought are Arkansas citizens, and because all of the injuries incurred by the plaintiff class occurred within Arkansas, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) requires the Court to decline jurisdiction and remand this case to the state court where it originated. III. CONCLUSION This court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state wage claims and Plaintiffs’ complaint should be remanded to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.

¶¶ 79, 97, that these affiliates could have provided would be conduct by a non-fiduciary—conduct that by definition falls outside the narrowly construed exception. B. The Exceptions for Putative Classes Consisting Largely of In-State Residents Do Not Apply Plaintiff contends that this Court should remand because the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) or § 1332(d)(4) may “potentially apply here.” Pl.