Yes, you read that correctly.Our readers are usually pretty familiar with the nuances of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and (d) and the legislative history of CAFA, and are probably wondering, “How did the court reach this conclusion?” Let’s take a look.The plaintiffs initially filed a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 against DirecTV in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting CAFA as the basis of federal jurisdiction.

First, Evans found (with no analysis) that CAFA does not change the traditional rule that the party seeking to remove a case bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, at the threshold, citing as authority Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (See CAFA Law Blog’s summary of Brill posted November 2, 2005) and Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006)(See CAFA Law Blog’s summary of Abrego posted May 26, 2006).Second, Evans held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the “local controversy” exception to CAFA jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1332(d)(4), once the removing defendant establishes the existence of minimal diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1332(d)(2) at the threshold.As we explain in our article “CAFA’s New ‘Minimal Diversity’ Standard For Interstate Class Actions Creates A Presumption That Jurisdiction Exists, With The Burden of Proof Assigned To The Party Opposing Jurisdiction,” we believe that Brill and Abrego are incorrectly decided, and that correctly interpreted, CAFA’s text, purposes, and legislative history create a presumption in favor of finding that minimal diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2) exists at the threshold, with the burden of proof on the party opposing jurisdiction.

In Cappuccitti, another opinion written by Judge Tjoflat, the court held that jurisdiction under CAFA can be established only if the plaintiff’s claim in a purported class action puts in controversy at least $75,000. Thus, to the court in Cappuccitti, even if the aggregate amount in controversy in a class action exceeds $5 million, federal courts can exercise jurisdiction under CAFA only if one of the plaintiffs’ claims, standing alone, put in controversy at least $75,000: We hold that in a CAFA action originally filed in federal court, at least one of the plaintiffs must allege an amount in controversy that satisfies the current congressional requirement for diversity jurisdiction provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). . . . If we held that § 1332(a)’s $ 75,000 requirement for an individual defendant did not apply to § 1332(d)(2) cases, we would be expanding federal court jurisdiction beyond Congress’s authorization. We would essentially transform federal courts hearing originally-filed CAFA cases into small claims courts, where plaintiffs could bring five-dollar claims by alleging gargantuan class sizes to meet the $ 5,000,000 aggregate amount requirement.

According to some critics, CAFA would further exacerbate this problem by increasing not only the number of cases on the federal docket, but also, the complexity of such cases and the requisite money and attention associated with each case.1. CAFA’s New “Minimal Diversity” Jurisdictional Standard CAFA’s jurisdictional centerpiece is its new “minimal diversity” standard for interstate class actions. CAFA amends the diversity jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332) by adding provisions which give federal courts original jurisdiction in class actions that involve at least $5 million in dispute, where any one class member is diverse from any one defendant. Further, class members’ claims can, for the first time, be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the $5 million amount in controversy requirement.

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action in Oklahoma state court, alleging that several companies were responsible for environmental pollution stemming from the generation and disposal of coal-combustion waste (“CCW”) and fluid waste from oil and gas drilling (“produced fluid waste” or “PFW”). Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma pursuant to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for remand, claiming that their case fell within the “local controversy” and “home state” and "interest of justice" exceptions articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which require the court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs alleged that James Dohr, as NRT Missouri LLC’s (“NRT”) designated broker, was responsible for supervising NRT’s brokers and salespeople and adopting a written policy covering various matters, including the subject matter of the lawsuit.The defendants removed the action to the District Court, asserting traditional diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and CAFA jurisdiction under § 1332(d). The defendants asserted that complete diversity of citizenship existed for purposes of § 1332(a), because NRT Missouri was a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey and James Dohr was fraudulently joined so his citizenship should not be taken into account.

Minimal diversity requires only that one member of a class be a citizen of a state different from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (providing that “a mass action shall be deemed removable under [§§ 1332(d)(2) through (d)(10)]”).[5].

And in practice, it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters – provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.The Supreme Court first performed a textual analysis on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) and found that the place at issue is a leading place within a state rather than the state itself. Second, the Supreme Court opted for the comparatively simpler nerve-center test to promote administrative ease and increased predictability.

The district court ruled that YTB’s transactions with residents of states other than Illinois did not occur predominantly in Illinois and so were outside the Act. Then the district court dismissed the claims of persons who lived in Illinois, concluding that the suit was an “intra-state controversy” that belonged in state court under an exception to CAFA jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(4). Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment.

In this action, a District Court in Utah found that in absence of claim for monetary damages in a suit to compel arbitration, the requisite jurisdictional amount will be satisfied unless it is legally certain that the stakes of the arbitration are less than the jurisdictional minimum. George and Jill Guzzardo, together with twenty-six other named plaintiffs (the “Guzzardo Plaintiffs”), filed a class-action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d), seeking a class-wide determination that Amway’s arbitration agreement, non-competition, non-solicitation, and trade secret rules are unenforceable. They also sought injunctive relief precluding Amway from proceeding in arbitration upon claims against the Guzzardo Plaintiffs and the plaintiff class.After consolidation of the similar actions, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Amway moved to dismiss the Guzzardo Plaintiffs’ complaint, asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the absence in the pleading, as originally filed, of an express assertion of an amount in controversy in excess of $5 million, as required under CAFA.