Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-107
Oklahoma Code Comment
(1) Timber, minerals, structures, etc. are treated as realty, unless they are to be severed by the seller. Until severed, however, the agreement is effective only as a contract to sell, and not as a present transfer of property. If the timber, etc. is to be severed by the buyer, the transaction is not a contract to sell goods, but to sell realty, and therefore is not governed by the Code. This is a departure from the Uniform Sales Act, under which timber, minerals, etc. were considered as chattels if they were to be severed by either party before the sale or under the contract of sale. There are no Oklahoma decisions.
(2) Growing crops. The previous Oklahoma decisions have made a distinction between "fructus industriales" and "fructus naturales." "Fructus industriales," or "industrial crops" are annual crops, which were considered as personally, and subject to a sale as chattels even before severed "Fructus naturales" or perennial crops were considered a part of the realty until severed. Cockrum v. Johnston, 74 Okl. 325, 194 P. 210 (1921). The Commercial Code abolishes this distinction, and places the emphasis upon whether they are capable of being severed without material harm to the realty. Undoubtedly, under this test, both types of crops shall be treated as "goods" subject to the Commercial Code.
Fixtures. This section also deals with fixtures, but the term is avoided because of diverse definitions. "Fixtures" are defined in 60 O.S. § 7 as "A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines or shrubs, or imbedded in it, as in the case of walls, or permanently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings, or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts or screws." 60 O.S. § 334. dealing with removal of fixtures in general and of trade fixtures by a tenant. As to the latter it uses the test "if without injury to the premises."
The previous Oklahoma decisions have held that the intent of the parties, the nature of the equipment, the structure and mode of installation and purpose for which the installation has been made must all be considered in determining whether or not equipment is a "fixture." Gray v. Prudential Ins. Co., 182 Okl. 342, 77 P.2d 563 (1938). Although the Commercial Code test of "capable of severance without material harm" appears to be much simpler, it is doubtful whether it will substantially change Oklahoma law, for many of the circumstances mentioned in the Gray case must be considered in determining whether or not there is "material harm."
(3) Oklahoma has had no previous specific similar statutory provision.