agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person to be a minor under the age of eighteen years; and
is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree.
HRS § 707-756
Trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's proffered reason for requesting the withdrawal of defendant's second guilty plea on the ground that defendant had not been aware of a potentially meritorious defense that the State was unable to prove that defendant had traveled to the agreed upon meeting place as required under subsection (1)(c), where transcripts of the internet chat room conversations defendant had with minor provided compelling evidence that the meeting place was the Burger King, not a particular area within the Burger King.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3. Where it was not necessary for defendant to actually commit one of the felony offenses defined in § 846E-1 in order to violate the prohibition against the electronic enticement of a child under subsection (1) but only necessary under subsection (1)(b)(iii) that defendant act with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony offense defined in § 846E-1, the State was not required to specify in the indictment which § 846E-1 felony offense defendant intended to promote or facilitate.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3. Where State presented evidence to the grand jury that the person communicating with defendant represented to defendant that the person was a 14-year old girl, the State was not required to prove under subsection (1)(a)(iii) that defendant engaged in communication with an actual child, and the record showed that the agreed upon meeting place was the Burger King and not a specific table within the Burger King, evidence before the grand jury that defendant arrived at the Burger King and was arrested was sufficient to establish probable cause regarding the meeting place element.120 Haw. 480 (App.),210 P.3d 3.