Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-5
Unless an extension is granted, every judgment and decree of any court of the State shall be presumed to be paid and discharged at the expiration of ten years after the judgment or decree was rendered. No action shall be commenced after the expiration of ten years from the date a judgment or decree was rendered or extended. No extension of a judgment or decree shall be granted unless the extension is sought within ten years of the date the original judgment or decree was rendered. A court shall not extend any judgment or decree beyond twenty years from the date of the original judgment or decree. No extension shall be granted without notice and the filing of a non-hearing motion or a hearing motion to extend the life of the judgment or decree.
HRS § 657-5
District court erred in extending the judgment pursuant to a request that was not made within ten years after the original judgment was rendered. 536 F.3d 980. Statute does not run during period decree not enforceable due to interest of a life tenant not subject to plaintiff's claim. 20 H. 225. Applied to action seeking enforcement of promissory note where note was enforceable only as part of final divorce decree.73 Haw. 566,836 P.2d 1081. Garnishment order conclusively presumed to be paid and discharged upon expiration of underlying judgment.82 Haw. 197,921 P.2d 117. General scheme of § 653-11 and this section is to terminate a judgment when judgment is actually paid or presumed to be paid as a matter of law.82 Haw. 197,921 P.2d 117. Under this section, judgment, together with all rights and remedies appurtenant to it, are conclusively presumed paid and discharged after ten years unless timely renewed.82 Haw. 197,921 P.2d 117. This section controls over HRCP rule 5(a); thus, notice of a proposed extension of a judgment pursuant to this section must be provided to the judgment debtor prior to the granting of the extension, even if the debtor is in default and is not required under rule 5(a) to be served with pleadings; although failure to provide notice under § 657-7 was error, error was harmless where debtor never appeared to defend debtor's self, had an opportunity to be heard at a HRCP rule 60(b) hearing, and offered no defense on the merits to the original judgment or extension, and thus failed to demonstrate any prejudice.120 H. 1, 200 P.3d 370. Based on the plain language of this section, and construed in pari materia within the framework of the entire statutory scheme governing limitations of actions, "original judgment" of this section refers to the judgment that creates the rights and responsibilities that the party is seeking to extend. 121 H. 59, 214 P.3d 598. Trial court properly extended the second amended judgment to October 17, 2019, which was less than twenty years from the date of the "original judgment" date of October 18, 1999; however, trial court erred by extending the fourth amended judgment, filed on September 6, 2001, to September 5, 2021, where the "original judgment" date for purposes of extending the fourth amended judgment was the third amended judgment date of June 26, 2000, and the court was precluded from extending the fourth amended judgment beyond June 25, 2020.121 Haw. 59,214 P.3d 598. Where an unextended judgment is "amended in a material and substantial respect", so that it creates the rights that are being extended, the time within which a motion to extend the judgment may be brought "begins to run from the date of the amendment", because that judgment created those rights; where, on the other hand, the unextended judgment merely makes non-substantive or non-material amendments to a prior judgment, it does not create an enforceable right and it is not appropriate that the amended judgment extend the time allowed to revive the enforceable judgment.121 Haw. 59,214 P.3d 598. Where multiple judgments create the same rights that the party is seeking to extend, the "original judgment" is (1) the unamended judgment where the amended judgment makes non-material amendments to a prior judgment, but (2) the amended judgment where it amended the prior judgment "in a material and substantial respect".121 Haw. 59,214 P.3d 598. Where the second amended judgment dated October 18, 1999 materially and substantially changed the first-in-time judgment and amended judgment, the second amended judgment was the "original judgment" on the false imprisonment and battery claims against defendant; as petitioner's motion to extend the second amended judgment on May 8, 2007 was filed within ten years of the date of the original judgment, the trial court properly ordered that the second amended judgment be extended.121 Haw. 59,214 P.3d 598. Where the third amended judgment dated June 26, 2000 was amended by the fourth amended judgment on September 6, 2001, but the fourth amended judgment was a non-substantive change, the "original judgment" for purposes of extending the fourth amended judgment was the third amended judgment date; as petitioners sought to extend the fourth amended judgment on May 8, 2007 within ten years of June 26, 2000, the trial court was permitted to extend the fourth amended judgment.121 Haw. 59,214 P.3d 598. Limitations period begins to run on each child support payment as it becomes due; decree creditor may avoid effect of statute of limitations on part of decree debt for which statute has not run by obtaining new decree on unbarred debt. 6 H. App. 201, 716 P.2d 496. License revocation order is more like administrative order than judgment subject to ten-year limitations period. 9 H. App. 169,828 P.2d 1287. The notice requirement contained in this section does not apply to defaulted parties who have not appeared; thus, defendant, as a judgment debtor in default, was not entitled to notice of extension proceedings instituted pursuant to this section. 118 H. 132 (App.), 185 P.3d 880. Cited:9 H. 514, 517.