Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-62

Current with legislation from 2024 effective through June 4, 2024.
Section 53a-62 - Threatening in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony
(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when:
(1) By physical threat, such person intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury,
(2)
(A) such person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person, or
(B) such person threatens to commit such crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or
(3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection and the person threatened is in a building or on the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "religiously-affiliated community center" has the same meaning as provided in section 53a-61aa.
(c) Threatening in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class D felony.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-62

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 8, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 16; P.A. 16-67, S. 7; P.A. 17-111, S. 4.)

Amended by P.A. 17-0111, S. 4 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2017 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2017.
Amended by P.A. 16-0067, S. 7 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2016 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2016.

Cited. 175 Conn. 204; 182 Conn. 585; part of ruling in 182 Conn. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 Conn. 1; 193 C. 602; 195 Conn. 636; 201 C. 115; 202 Conn. 343; 205 C. 262; 207 C. 565; 208 C. 689; 209 Conn. 34; Id., 52; 222 Conn. 331; 224 C. 494; 227 C. 829; 241 C. 413; 242 Conn. 648. Cited. 2 Conn.App. 617; 3 Conn.App. 289; 8 CA 190; Id., 496; 9 Conn.App. 161; 14 CA 6; Id., 526; 25 CA 149; Id., 334; 26 CA 481; judgment reversed, see 224 Conn. 494; 28 Conn.App. 581; judgment reversed, see 226 Conn. 601; Id., 708; 31 Conn.App. 497; 33 Conn.App. 103; 40 Conn.App. 805; 41 Conn.App. 47. Words of defendant's threat to young victim, along with surrounding circumstances of the threat, were such that it was reasonable for jury to infer that defendant had placed the victim in fear of "imminent" serious physical injury. 75 CA 103. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. 83 CA 489. Cited. 37 Conn.Supp. 664; 42 Conn.Supp. 574; 43 Conn.Supp. 46. Subsec. (a): Cited. 169 C. 566; 197 C. 485; 201 C. 462. Judgment of Appellate Court in 28 Conn.App. 581 reversed. 226 Conn. 601. Cited. 227 Conn. 153; 228 Conn. 147; 232 C. 707; 233 Conn. 403. Subdiv. (3): Statements made that "more of what happened to your son is going to happen to you" and "I'm going to be there to watch it happen", when spoken to one whose son had suffered serious physical injuries, did not constitute a true threat due to subsequent apology and lack of other animosity between the parties; to ensure that only serious expressions of an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence are punished, as the first amendment requires, state must do more than demonstrate that a statement could be interpreted as a threat. 313 C. 434. Imminence is only one factor for a court to consider in determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat under section, and not a requirement. 327 C. 1. Subsec. is divisible, with offenses requiring proof of an intentional mental state under Subdivs. (1) and (2) and recklessness under Subdiv. (3); threatening offense committed with reckless disregard under Subdiv. (3) does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude under Second Circuit case law and for purposes of immigration consequences. 328 C. 198. Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647. Cited. 11 Conn.App. 80; 13 Conn.App. 386; Id., 438; 18 CA 643; 30 Conn.App. 95; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 147; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 Conn. 707; 35 CA 262; 37 Conn.App. 276; Id., 733; 38 CA 306; Id., 777; 39 CA 617; 40 Conn.App. 515; 41 Conn.App. 584; Id., 701. Subdiv. (2) was not unconstitutionally vague on its face; statute's application to defendant's conduct was proper and did not interfere with his duty to protect his child and statute was not vague as applied to facts of case; there is no indication that legislature did not intend to create separate crimes prohibited by Secs. 53a-181(a)(3) and Subdiv. (2). 81 CA 248. Convictions for threatening in second degree in violation of Subdivs. (1) and (2) did not violate right against double jeopardy because each conviction arose from a different violation. 154 CA 45.

See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.