(a) A person is guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person (1) (A) threatens to commit any crime involving the use of a hazardous substance with the intent to terrorize another person, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, evacuation or inconvenience; (2) (A) threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (B) threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such evacuation or inconvenience; (3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section 53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm; or (4) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with the intent to cause an evacuation of a building or the grounds of a (A) house of religious worship, (B) religiously-affiliated community center, (C) public or nonpublic preschool, school or institution of higher education, or (D) day care center, as defined in section 19a-87g, during operational, preschool, school or instructional hours or when a building or the grounds of such house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center are being used for the provision of religious or community services, or house of worship, community center, preschool, school, institution or day care center-sponsored activities. No person shall be found guilty of threatening in the first degree under subdivision (3) of this subsection and threatening in the second degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.(b) For the purposes of this section, "hazardous substance" means any physical, chemical, biological or radiological substance or matter which, because of its quantity, concentration or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics, may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health and "religiously-affiliated community center" means real property used for the provision of recreational, social or educational services that is owned or leased by a nonprofit organization that holds such property out as being affiliated with an organized religion.(c) Threatening in the first degree is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section is a class C felony.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61aa
( Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 7, 9; P.A. 02-97, S. 15; P.A. 03-22, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 10; P.A. 16-67, S. 6; P.A. 17-111, S. 3.)
Amended by P.A. 17-0111, S. 3 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2017 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2017.Amended by P.A. 16-0067, S. 6 of the Connecticut Acts of the 2016 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2016.Amended by P.A. 12-0114, S. 10 of the the 2012 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2012. Subsec. (a)(3): Neither the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor the state constitution require that the state prove that defendant had the specific intent to terrorize the target of a threat, only that defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the target of the threat would be terrorized, before defendant can be punished for threatening speech directed at a private individual. 330 C. 149. Subsec. (a)(3): Section is not unconstitutional under the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the state constitution as applied to threatening speech directed at public officials. Id. Subsec. (a)(3): Defendant may be punished for threatening speech directed at a third party if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk both that defendant's speech would be interpreted as a serious threat and that the threat would be communicated to the target of the threat. Id.
See Sec. 52-557t re defense to civil action. See Sec. 54-130g re pardon.