Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-59
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A. 99-240, S. 13.)
Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was "serious" was question of fact for the jury. 175 Conn. 204. Cited. 191 C. 142; 193 C. 333; 196 C. 18; 200 Conn. 607; 203 C. 484; 207 C. 233; 209 Conn. 34; 211 Conn. 441; 215 C. 739; 219 C. 363; 221 Conn. 402; 227 Conn. 301; 239 C. 467; 240 Conn. 743; 242 Conn. 125; Id., 389. Cited. 3 CA 607; 5 Conn.App. 590; 8 Conn.App. 545; 11 CA 621; Id., 699; 13 Conn.App. 139; 14 CA 244; Id., 309; 17 Conn.App. 200; 19 Conn.App. 654; 20 CA 437; Id., 521; 21 CA 557; 25 Conn.App. 171; 34 CA 103; 35 Conn.App. 107; Id., 609; Id., 762; 36 Conn.App. 336; 37 Conn.App. 180; 38 Conn.App. 20; Id., 777; 39 Conn.App. 333; Id., 645; 42 CA 624; 43 Conn.App. 549; 44 CA 6; 46 CA 691. Assault statute provides for intent to be transferred and does not require that defendant be aware of the presence of unintended victim. 84 CA 263. In challenge of evidence as being insufficient to prove element that appellant was "aided by two or more other persons actually present", where appellant and another defendant assaulted the driver of a jeep while a third defendant assaulted the passenger of a jeep and a fourth defendant kept lookout, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the lookout aided in the assault by following the jeep, blocking the jeep from exiting an alleyway and acting as a lookout, and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that appellant and other two defendants had aided each other by attacking from both sides of the jeep so that neither victim could assist the other or run for help. 111 CA 184. Re accessory liability under section, defendant only needs to have the intent to cause serious physical injury, not the intent to do so with a dangerous instrument; jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant intended to aid another to inflict serious physical injury on victim and that principal used a dangerous instrument. 136 CA 568; judgment reversed on eyewitness identification, see 314 C. 131. Convictions for assault in the first degree in violation of this section and risk of injury to a child in violation of Sec. 53-21, revised to 1997, are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 145 CA 374. Cited. 39 Conn.Supp. 347. Subsec. (a): Cited. 169 C. 428; 172 C. 94; Id., 275; 173 Conn. 254. Evidence victim suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the "serious physical injury" required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174 Conn. 16; Id., 604; 176 C. 138; 178 Conn. 116; Id., 448; 180 Conn. 481; Id., 557; 182 Conn. 449; Id., 501; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 Conn. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 Conn. 1; 183 Conn. 29; 184 Conn. 400; 185 Conn. 63; Id., 372; 186 Conn. 1; Id., 17; Id., 654; 187 Conn. 681; 189 C. 61; Id., 303; 190 Conn. 219; 191 C. 12; 193 C. 48; Id., 474; Id., 632; 194 C. 89; Id., 119; Id., 408; 195 Conn. 475; Id., 651; 196 Conn. 395; 197 Conn. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 Conn. 155; Id., 322; 200 C. 642; 202 Conn. 259; Id., 463. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 204 Conn. 207; Id., 523; 205 Conn. 370; Id., 673; 208 Conn. 38; 209 Conn. 322; 210 C. 619; 211 Conn. 1; 212 Conn. 50; 213 Conn. 97; 214 Conn. 122; Id., 344; Id., 717; 216 C. 188; Id., 492; Id., 585; Id., 647; 217 Conn. 243; 218 Conn. 747; 219 Conn. 16; Id., 363; 220 Conn. 385; Id., 408; Id., 915; 222 Conn. 117; Id., 444; Id., 718; 225 Conn. 450; Id., 524; 227 Conn. 301; Id., 518; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 Conn. 147; Id., 234; Id., 335; 229 Conn. 125; Id., 178; 230 C. 608; 231 Conn. 235; 233 Conn. 502; 235 C. 473; Id., 746; Id., 748; 237 Conn. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances, defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of Appellate Court in 39 Conn.App. 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 239 C. 481; 240 Conn. 395; 241 C. 665; Id., 802; 242 Conn. 143; Id., 485; Id., 723; Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Cited. 247 Conn. 662. Defendant was not without fair warning and his due process rights were not denied by court's holding construing a common law duty to act under section; evidence that child abuse victim had sustained obvious injuries was sufficient to support defendant's conviction based on his failure to act; re double jeopardy claim, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that his conviction with regard to different injuries arose out of the same act; this section and Sec. 53-21 do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser included offenses and are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. 260 C. 93. Defendant who was not perpetrator of physical assaults on child and who was neither a parent nor a legal guardian could not be criminally liable for assault in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (3); accordingly, defendant's conviction of two counts of that crime were reversed and case remanded for resentencing on remaining charge of risk of injury to a child. 274 C. 727. Sec. 53a-61(a)(2) is lesser included offense of Subdiv. (3), and court's refusal to grant related jury instruction constituted harmful error. 289 C. 742. Subdiv. (1): A fist or other body part is not a dangerous instrument. 307 Conn. 115. Convictions under Subdivs. (1) and (3) are not legally inconsistent because a person may intend to seriously injure a person within the meaning of Subdiv. (1) while simultaneously recklessly creating a risk of that person's death within the meaning of Subdiv. (3). 316 C. 651. Cited. 1 Conn.App. 609; 3 Conn.App. 166; 5 Conn.App. 40; 6 CA 124; Id., 469; Id., 476; 7 CA 309; 8 Conn.App. 119; Id., 176; 9 CA 79; Id., 169; judgment reversed, see 205 Conn. 370; Id., 330; 10 CA 103; Id., 176; Id., 302; Id., 462; Id., 643; 11 Conn.App. 499; 12 CA 217; Id., 655; 13 Conn.App. 12; Id., 120; Id., 237; Id., 687; Id., 824; 14 Conn.App. 1; Id., 140; Id., 493; Id., 511; 15 Conn.App. 34; Id., 416; Id., 531; Id., 704; 16 Conn.App. 184; Id., 206; Id., 346; Id., 390; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 477; 19 CA 174; Id., 618; 20 Conn.App. 27; 21 Conn.App. 688; 22 Conn.App. 199; Id., 340; Id., 610; 23 Conn.App. 28; Id., 315; Id., 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 152; Id., 264; Id., 316; Id., 556; Id., 563; Id., 624; 25 CA 243; Id., 275; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 619; 26 Conn.App. 52; Id., 114; Id., 145; Id., 331; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 641; 27 Conn.App. 73; Id., 322; Id., 654; 28 Conn.App. 34; Id., 290; Id., 402; Id., 548; Id., 825; Id., 833; judgment reversed, see 227 Conn. 518; 29 Conn.App. 59; Id., 262; Id., 704; Id., 744; 30 CA 9; Id., 26; Id., 68; Id., 232; Id., 359; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 Conn. 335; Id., 606; 31 Conn.App. 58; 32 CA 553; 33 CA 60; Id., 122; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 Conn. 502; 34 Conn.App. 223; Id., 261; Id., 610; Id., 691; Id., 807; 35 Conn.App. 51; Id., 138; Id., 279; Id., 699; Id., 740; 36 Conn.App. 41; Id., 473; Id., 483; Id., 506; Id., 576; Id., 695; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 21; Id., 464; Id., 749; 39 Conn.App. 18; judgment reversed, see 237 Conn. 748; Id., 563; 40 CA 60; Id., 387; Id., 483; Id., 515; Id., 624; 41 Conn.App. 515; Id., 565; Id., 831; 42 Conn.App. 307; Id., 371; 43 CA 205; Id., 488; Id., 578; 44 CA 26; Id., 231; Id., 476; Id., 499; 45 Conn.App. 270; Id., 591; 46 Conn.App. 684; Id., 734. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581. To secure conviction for assault in the first degree under Subdiv. (1), state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, did, in fact, cause serious physical injury to that person and caused that injury by means of a dangerous instrument. 70 CA 232. There was sufficient evidence from which jury reasonably could have found victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement and that defendant intended to cause such serious and permanent disfigurement where defendant butted victim's face with his head, bit her face, struck her on the head with a hairdryer, kicked her and attempted to choke her, resulting in scars to victim's face. 74 Conn.App. 633. Defendant's actions in shaking infant with such violence as to cause injuries consistent with "shaken baby syndrome" was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe and evinced extreme indifference to human life. Id., 736. Subdiv. (2): Fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 Conn.App. 646. Subdiv. (1): Evidence that defendant arrived at crime scene and fired several shots at bedroom where he believed wife was staying was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant committed attempt to commit assault in the first degree which requires proof of intentional conduct constituting a substantial step toward intentionally causing victim serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. 99 CA 203. Subdiv. (5): Court's instructions to jury improperly included additional element of intent to use firearm but did not prejudice defendant because inclusion of the additional element was to the state's, and not to defendant's, detriment. 107 Conn.App. 517. The jury reasonably could have concluded that scars constituted serious physical injury because they negatively affected the appearance of skin on face and abdomen. 118 Conn.App. 831. Mandatory nonsuspendable 5 year minimum term of imprisonment for violation of Subdiv. (1) does not violate constitutional due process or equal protection rights. 130 CA 632. Scarring does not have to be on a victim's face, it can be on far less observable parts of the body to support a finding of serious disfigurement; victim suffered serious disfigurement when scar was permanent, easily seen two and one-half years after the injury, and was located on the lower part of arm. 172 CA 668.